Mr. Speaker, I refer you to certain remarks made by me in this House on Thursday, 6 May 1982, during the Committee Stage of the Nursing Amendment Bill. These remarks are at present the subject in part of a Select Committee of this House. I did not intend that my remarks and subsequent action in removing myself from the jurisdiction of the Chair by leaving the Chamber, to reflect upon the Chair. To the extent that they could have been taken as such, I offer my apologies to the Chair and to this House.

Mr. Speaker, I have now had an opportunity of obtaining a Hansard copy of the speech made on Friday, 14 May, by the hon. member for Sandton during the Second Reading debate on the Internal Security Bill. I find that in that copy the following interjection appears in my name—

In case this has given offence to the hon. member for Sandton I withdraw those words.

Order! Before asking the Secretary to read the first Order of the Day, I wish to remind hon. members that when the House goes into Committee and Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair, members have to remain seated until the Chairman has taken his seat at the Table and the Committee has in fact commenced its business.

The same rules apply when the Committee has to report progress and until Mr. Speaker is back in the Chair and has received the report.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in the name of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 3, in line 34, after “ownership” to insert “by violent means”;
2. (2) on page 5, in line 29, to omit “any number of” and to substitute “more than twenty”.

The first amendment relates to the definition of “communism”. The definition of “communism” in this Bill is a vast improvement on the existing definition. However, we believe the proposed definition is not entirely correct and that is why I move an amendment in this regard. The proposed definition reads as follows—

1. (a) which is based on, has developed from or is related to the tenets of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin or Mao Tse-Tung, or of any other recognized theorist in connection with or exponent of those tenets, and which aims at the establishment of any form of socialism or collective ownership.

We are fully aware that socialism and collective ownership are in fact part of the communist doctrine, but communists are not the only people who advocate socialism or collective ownership of the means of production. For example, in this country we have Escom, Iscor and our S.A. Transport Services, to mention just a few forms of State ownership of means of production, and one would hardly call this communism. Many religious bodies advocate collective ownership. Blacks in South Africa have a communal system of land tenure. Co-operative societies are also a form of collective ownership. In many other countries of the world one has different degrees of socialism. In the United Kingdom for example rail services, coal mining industry, the shipbuilding industry and many other industries have been nationalized, but nobody would describe that society as communistic.

The point I want to make is that State or collective ownership as such does not constitute communism. However, what is important and what differentiates communism from these other examples I have mentioned, is the actual method of acquiring control of the means of production. Communism seeks to achieve this by violent and subversive means and also by non-constitutional means. They aim at a rapid precipitous change in society, and it is this aspect which sets them apart from the other examples I have mentioned. That is why we seek to have this amendment included in the definition of “communism” because it then defines communism far more clearly than the present definition in the Bill. I hope the hon. the Minister will be able to concede to this. With regard to the rest of the definition, e.g. the form of government which is intended to be instituted, we have no problems whatsoever.

Our second amendment on clause 1 is on page 5, in line 29, to omit “any number of’ and to substitute “more than twenty”. This section of the clause defines what a gathering is for the purposes of this Bill with particular reference to certain clauses, namely clauses 20(c)(ii), 46(1)(b), 46(3)(b) and 48(1)(b). In order to look at why we wish to change the definition of “gathering” it is necessary that I have a very brief look at the clauses themselves in order to explain why we want to effect a change. I have no intention of debating the clauses or to say whether we approve of the clauses or not. The clauses themselves will be discussed later on in the Committee Stage.

Clause 20, is the clause with which we have the most difficulty, and in summary it reads as follows—

1. (a) who the Minister is satisfied engages in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State … or
2. (b) whose name appears on the consolidated list, or who has been convicted of an offence.

The Minister can prohibit this person from attending “any particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind.” As I said earlier on, we are not arguing the merits of the clause now. That will come later, but what we are seeking to do now is to improve somewhat the position of the person who ends up in this situation. It must be realized that the person who ends up in this situation can end up being banned while he has not appeared in any court of law. It can be purely by virtue of what the Minister has deemed. As the clause now stands this particular person could find it extremely difficult to conduct a normal business, because a gathering can be one or two people. This person could even find it difficult to attend a social occasion with friends of his, because the terms of this Bill, as it now stands, exclude this. Such a person could even find it difficult to attend a Christmas party with relatives or with his family. What we are trying to do is to try to improve his position in this particular aspect. This is the reason for moving the amendment that a gathering does not include groups of less than 20 people. It will at least enable someone in a position like this to lead some semblance of a normal life.

If one looks very briefly at clause 46(1)(b) and 3(b) one sees that they relate to the powers of a magistrate or the Minister to prohibit a particular gathering which they deem to be against the interests of the security of the State. Again, there is no normal process of law and it is entirely left to what the magistrate or the Minister may deem.

The other clause to which this definition relates is clause 48(1)(b), which relates to the dispersal of a particular gathering and the methods by which the dispersal may be brought about. Here, again, we seek to reduce the size of the gathering to less than 20 people. We do not believe that a gathering of 20 people or less would ever constitute a threat to the security of the State. There are in fact other means at the disposal of the police, magistrates or the Minister to control this type of gathering should they consider it to be necessary.

Mr. Chairman, we do not intend to react to all the amendments that will be moved, but in this case I do wish to do so. With regard to the first amendment, relating to the definition of “communism”, I wish to state that the NRP will not be supporting that amendment. In fact, the words proposed to be inserted would in our view totally emasculate the definition of “communism”. I can understand why the hon. member for Houghton giggles to herself. It is because the policy of that party is that the Communist Party should be allowed to operate legally in South Africa.

Provided it does so without violence.

Provided it does so without violence. Inserting the word “violence” is therefore consistent with the policy of that party. It is consistent with their contention that the Communist Party should be able to operate legally in South Africa. We do not believe that this should be allowed, and that is why we do not support the amendment. [Interjections.] Hon. members of the PFP believe that the Communist Party should be allowed to operate provided they do not resort to violence, and therefore they want the definition changed to suit their policy. We do not agree with that; that is the difference. So let me just place on record that this party does not believe that the Communist Party should operate legally in South Africa, nor do we believe that the definition should be changed in order to make it permissive to advocate communism. The wording in this regard is quite clear, and it states—

1. (a) which is based on, has developed from or is related to the tenets of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin or Mao Tse-Tung, or of any other recognized theorist in connection with or exponent of those tenets, and …

The operative word is “and”—

Therefore the whole argument of the hon. member was utter nonsense. Advocating collective ownership, co-operate farming or anything like that would not be affected by that provision unless it were done in terms of the tenets of those people. [Interjections.] This is merely camouflage, and therefore we do not intend to support the amendment.

In regard to the other amendment that deals with gatherings, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister two questions. Firstly, what is the position of a family? Should the family not be specifically included here, because a person who is affected under this Bill, for instance if he is placed under house arrest, will be living with his family, and that would technically be a gathering. The second aspect which I think should be clarified is that of attending a bona fide church service in a church of which a person under house arrest is a member. I think this provision should be limited to the church of which he himself is a member, and not any church or any occasion. Before saying anything more on that, I should, however, like to hear the hon. the Minister’s reaction.

We will also not support the amendment to omit the words “any number of” and to substitute the words “more than twenty”. Nineteen people can sometimes make much more noise than 30 or 40 persons, as witness the reaction of the PFP just now when I was dealing with their policy in regard to communism.

Mr. Chairman, we on this side of the House also cannot support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South. In the first place, the addition of the words “by violent means” is unnecessary, and in the second place, it definitely weakens the definition of communism, as defined in clause 1, to which the hon. member for Durban Point also referred. In my opinion it is an unnecessary addition. One can argue that a plea for socialism as such is not necessarily a plea for communism. It is also true that in a certain sense one can make a plea for communal possession based on the Bible, but I believe that the context is very clear in the definition. What is involved here is a plea for socialism based on Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, and underlying the thinking of these exponents is the dialectical materialism that change, and socialism as part of that change, must come about as a result of a conflict between groups or communities. In other words, when one makes a plea for socialism by quoting these exponents, it is obvious that this socialism must come into existence through violence. That is why we feel that the addition of the words “by violent means” is unnecessary. On the other hand, it can also weaken the definition. As a matter of fact a new term has arisen in communistic terminology, namely the so-called “peaceful road to socialism”. The purpose behind this is specifically to justify the functioning of communistic parties in countries where they are allowed. This entire approach has already caused upheavals in international communistic circles. For example, the Communistic Party in England split over this very point. My argument, however, is that if one were to insert “by violent means” here, it would mean that for socialism a plea could indeed be made in a peaceful manner. These remarks on the amendment submitted by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South will suffice.

Allow me, however, to say a few words about the definition as such. I feel it would be difficult to improve on this definition. I think this specific definition incorporates all the aims of present-day communism, specifically as regards South Africa, too, and I feel that it is an improvement on the previous definition in two respects. The previous definition linked a plea for change by promoting riots directly to communism. However, this definition departs from this model. In the previous definition, the mere arousing of hostility between White and non-White was linked to communism. This definition also departs from this. There are advantages to this, because it means that individuals or groups will not necessarily be branded as communists in South Africa. However, this is not the whole story. It is in fact possible to advocate social, economic or political change by promoting rioting while at the same time being guilty of promoting communistic aims. As a matter of fact one of the immediate goals of the Central Committee of the Communistic Party in South Africa is to encourage such conflict situations, inter alia, between Whites and Blacks, the object being that the eventual conflict will lead to a communist take-over. That is why I feel clause l(xiii)(b) of the definition amply provides for this specific possibility.

I am particularly grateful—and this is the last remark I want to make in this connection—that this definition also adds the name of Mao Tse-Tung to the list of ideologists mentioned here, because this has specific significance for the South African situation. It was after Mao Tse-Tung that all communistic revolutions in the Third World passed through two phases, an initial so-called liberation struggle, which had nothing to do with socialism or communism, and after that a socialist-communist struggle which, in practice, generally means that the communists climb on the backs of the freedom fighters and use the so-called liberation struggle in order ultimately to realize communist goals. In our specific situation this means that the South African Communist Party is climbing on the back of the ANC and using their liberation struggle to bring about an eventual communistic take-over. For this reason I do not think that in South Africa one can still talk of a bona fide struggle for freedom in which the ANC is involved. This specific phenomenon is also obviated by clause 1(xiii)(c) of the definition.

For this reason I feel it is a good definition. It is acceptable to this side of the House, and we therefore reject the amendment by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South.

Mr. Chairman, I have a small point in respect of definition (vi). There appears to be an omission of some consequence. Maybe the omission is deliberate, although I hardly imagine so, or maybe I have misunderstood it, but there does not appear to be any reference here to an audio-cassette nor yet to a video-cassette, which are very efficient means of communication. If there is a reason for these being left out, I would appreciate knowing what it is.

Mr. Chairman, as regards the first amendment of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South, viz. the one concerning the definition of “communism”, I think that he has been conclusively answered by the hon. member for Durban Point and the hon. member for Randfontein.

As regards the second amendment, my answer to the hon. member for Durban Point is that the direct family of the person concerned is excluded in the original notice that is served upon him. Concerning the hon. member’s second question, I can tell him that such a person can attend bona fide church services on a regular basis after obtaining permission from the magistrate of his district. He only has to apply once for permission to regularly attend church services at whatever church he may choose. So there is no problem whatsoever in connection with such a person attending church services at a church of his own choice.

As regards the question of the hon. member for Umbilo, I am sorry I do not have an answer for him at this moment, but I shall inform him of the answer during the course of the Committee Stage.

Amendments put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, we will be opposing this clause. I want to refer immediately to a comment made by the hon. member for Umbilo during the Second Reading debate on this Bill, when, in his charge against us, he suggested that we were excluding, wherever possible, any reference to communism, simply because we happen to be opposing certain clauses in this Bill just as we opposed the Second Reading.

I want to make two quotations which I think will be of interest to the hon. member for Umbilo and his party as well as to the House. Although I have done this on numerous occasions, I should like once again to quote a statement from the official policy of the PFP which reads as follows—

And further—

I think that statement will indicate to the hon. member for Umbilo and to the House that in actual fact our opposition goes further than simply in respect of a party operating under the name of the Communist Party. For example, it is quite possible for any party or organization to seek and carry out the tenets and the objectives and the aims of the Communist Party while not subscribing to the name or title. [Interjections.] We believe in the objective test of the courts and it is here that we differ from the hon. member for Durban North. We believe in the courts. We believe that that is the place where this sort of thing should be judged and that it should not be judged by a political opponent.

In this connection I wish to refer to the Hansard of 1950 when the Suppression of Communism Bill was first introduced in this House. I wish to quote the amendment moved to the Second Reading of that Bill by the Leader of the then Opposition Party, the United Party, Mr. Strauss. His party’s amendment to the Second Reading of that Bill reads as follows (Hansard, col. 8933)—

In those days the United Party was the official Opposition, the precursor of the NRP. When it suits it to do so, the NRP claims the United Party as its father and, when inconvenient, states: We are a new party with new policies and new principles. I want to ask the hon. members of the NRP whether they are prepared to take the strong stand that the then official Opposition took and that today’s official Opposition is taking against laws of this kind. They do not. All they do, is sit on the fence. [Interjections.]

I want to say that we have the strongest objection to this particular clause. Referring again to the Suppression of Communism Bill in 1950, we find that in column 8946 of Hansard Mr. Strauss had the following to say—

The changes in this respect have been so minimal that I believe that these charges still stand. Mr. Strauss also said this—

In concluding his speech, the member who seconded the amendment of Mr. Strauss, Col. Jordan, had this to say (Hansard, col. 8957)—

Is this not reminiscent of the words used by this official Opposition?

As far as we are concerned we cannot support this clause as it gives the Minister an opportunity to take action against certain organizations and certain publications, despite the fact that there have been some improvements. There can be no doubt that they are there. We must look at clause 4 in conjunction with clauses 7 and 10 where there are certain safeguards. There is an opportunity to be heard, and that is a very real improvement, although the right to be heard is not absolute which is unfortunate. Nevertheless, our opposition still stands. Once again the courts are sidetracked. They are left out, and instead there will be a committee appointed by the Minister, the details of which are set out in clauses 7 and 10. We still have the Minister’s right to declare an organization as being unlawful.

It is interesting to note that in 1976 when we discussed a similar Bill, a then member of the United Party quoted from Hansard, Vol. 42, col. 1509. His quotation appears on col. 6471, Hansard, Vol. 62—

These are the Minister’s words—

He referred to students—

This is not what I am disputing or supporting at the moment. The quotation then reads—

I submit that the Government in opposing certain organizations, in opposing certain individuals, uses quite deliberately, because they know the scare and the fear that this arouses in the hearts and minds of our people, the word “communist” or “communism”. It is this wide net, it is this wide approach, this broad approach to which we object again and again and we continue that objection today.

A hint was given by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg South and indeed by the hon. member for Randfontein and I therefore submit that if one looks carefully at chapter 2 of Acts in the New Testament, one will find that under the approach of the Government the early church could well have been banned as an organization. [Interjections.] This is quite true, because there the church decided to have all things in common, to sell their property and to put all their money together in order to live as a community. This is one of the aims of communism, but they do not succeed very well in achieving that. Even in Russia they fail again and again and again. The very word itself, however, is inherent. The Government again and again destroys its own case by overstating it.

I want to pursue a question which I put to the hon. the Minister in the course of his Second Reading reply. I asked him whether he would be prepared to support this legislation …

That was a very good question.

… if there was a change of Government in South Africa.

Of course.

Yes, he replied that he would if there was a change of Government and one of the parties in this House became the Government, because, inter alia, the problem of security would still stand and one would need such laws on the Statute Book. I want to put something to the hon. the Minister in all seriousness because I think one must look very carefully at what has taken place in Southern Africa. I put it to him …

You are insinuating now.

No, I am not insinuating at all. I am urguing. Mr. Robert Mugabe is being criticized now for retaining legislation which he inherited from Mr. Ian Smith and he very conveniently, I think, holds onto this legislation in order to continue governing his country. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I must say that the arguments of the hon. member for Pinelands were completely unconvincing. I think the fact of the matter is that the hon. member and the PFP are not prepared to adopt a standpoint on the S.A. Communist Party and the South African ANC and other similar organizations. [Interjections.] I think it is a flagrant allegation or conclusion that the first Christian Church could be equated with a form of communism.

It was one of their objectives.

The hon. member is a theologian and he ought to know that that argument of his holds no water at all.

That is not what he said.

I think we as Christians should object to the allegation made by the hon. member for Pinelands, since he is trying to equate two things which are not at all in accordance with the premise of the Christian Church. The hon. member and his party are objecting to the clause simply because they are not prepared to adopt a standpoint on certain organizations, and now they are advancing this semblance of a general image which is supposedly created by this clause.

The clause refers to two specific matters: Firstly, organizations which are aimed at jeopardizing the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order, secondly, organizations that want to promote communism and the like in South Africa. These are the two specific matters and it should be easy to adopt a standpoint on them and to decide in favour of this clause.

It is interesting to note what the Rabie Commission had to say in this regard. In paragraph 11.3.3.9 on page 174 of the report, it stated—

According to the Rabie Commission, there was therefore not much criticism concerning the implementation of this clause in the evidence before it. Furthermore, the Commission stated that there is legislation in respect of this matter in various countries in the Western World. The Commission then dealt with this aspect and mentioned that there were three criteria which could be applied in assessing it. The approach adopted in some countries was that people involved in such organizations should be made punishable. Another approach is to take note of the aims of the organizations concerned in order to determine whether an organization is unlawful or not. A third approach is to declare a specific organization unlawful by means of legislation, and that statutory authority be provided for this. The Commission also stated that the latter method was the appropriate and most desirable method in South Africa. By the way, this method is comparable to the one followed in the United Kingdom. Thus the Irish Republican Army is an unlawful organization in the United Kingdom in terms of this approach. In other words, it is nothing new to declare a particular organization unlawful in terms of a statutory provision.

Other variations of this approach occur in many other countries. Apart from the cases mentioned by the Rabie Commission, similar legislation exists in Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Republic of Ireland and in Israel. I therefore wish to assert that, firstly, we have a measure which is essential in the South African context. Considerable improvements are being brought about by this measure— the hon. member for Pinelands conceded this—not only as far as the system of advisory committees is concerned, in terms of which a judicial officer shall be the chairman, but also as far as the amendment in respect of the review procedure introduced into the clause on the basis of the Rabie Commission report, is concerned. I think the hon. member would agree with me that as far as the review procedure is concerned, there is in fact, an improvement. Apart from the advisory committee’s investigation into these matters, the amended review procedure provides that the organization involved may, by means of a petition addressed to the Minister, take its case to the Chief Justice for review.

That is discretionary.

I therefore think that a considerable improvement is being brought about by this new procedure.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pinelands felt it incumbent upon himself to take me up on a statement I made in the Second Reading. Rather unfortunately, I think his argument was somewhat out of context of the situation that developed at the time, in 1950 I shall come to that subject in a moment. The hon. member indicated that the PFP policy clearly will not support any organization that adheres to violence or revolution for its means of change.

That is our policy.

This I accept. This is what the hon. member for Pinelands has said. However, the question I should like to ask is: Will the PFP accept passive resistance, the encouragement of general strikes or the dissemination of seditious literature by an organization to achieve their aims? These are points that I feel must be made clear and answered because whilst they are not violence and they are not revolutionary in the accepted sense that I believe the PFP policy document would have, they are none the less very unpleasant and dangerous if one is subjected to them.

If I may come to the statement made by the hon. member in relation to Mr. Strauss, this is where I think he gave only part of the story. In 1950, Mr. Strauss doubtless did make that statement, and unfortunately I do not have the document with the statement that the hon. member alleged he made. It must be remembered however, that the United Party at that time, although it most strenuously opposed the legislation, made it very, very clear that it was opposed to communism and, furthermore, an alternative Bill was in fact proposed that would make communism a crime of high treason. Communists could then be imprisoned after an appropriate trial through the courts.

That is the point— through the courts.

Precisely. All the way through we have agreed that in so far as this Bill is concerned, the part that disturbs us is that there is far too much authority on the part of the executive and not sufficient on the part of the courts. We have made that point.

Then you must surely oppose this clause, not so?

However, in so far as this clause is concerned, we regard the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North as being primarily for the protection of communism. I am sorry, but that is the way we look upon it. As far as we are concerned, under no circumstances can we support this.

I had no intention of speaking on this clause, but the hon. member brought me into the argument. However, I do feel quite clearly that the policy of not supporting violence and revolution is inadequate to restrain the activities of parties such as the Communist Party because it can still resort to a number of other very disrupting tactics.

Mr. Chairman, I should now like to continue my comments. If the hon. member for Johannesburg West looks at clause 4(1)(b)(iii), he will see that it refers to “any organization”, and this is the point I was trying to make earlier. In order to try and combat communism, we now refer to “any organization” that promotes any objective of communism. Anybody who has made a serious study of the theory—and, very largely, it is theory—in terms of collectivism, for example …

Why are you rejecting the whole clause then?

Because we believe that if one is going to take action against any organization, one should do this through the normal procedure of the courts. This is why I cannot understand why the hon. members of the NRP cannot oppose this particular clause. They say that they want to limit the power of the executive, that they want to use the courts.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the hon. member this question: He referred to the debate on the original Bill on communism, but can he tell me whether there was provision in that Bill for a review system under a judge, and whether reference was made there to the Judge President of South Africa? Were there two processes associated with the judiciary in the original measure?

The answer to that is “no”. The then Minister of Justice suggested a committee, and I think the hon. member has probably read about that. But the official Opposition of the day then did not argue for a judicial commission. They said that the courts were there and that we should use the courts. That is all we are saying now, and in doing so we are much more consistent with the standpoint taken at that time than the hon. member for Durban Point and his party are now. [Interjections.]

However, I was trying to point out to the hon. the Minister that the powers under this clause, as under so many other clauses, are going so wide that we are in danger of putting—indeed have already put—measures on the Statute Book that could be used by governments in the future. Without adding a single law to the Statute Book, they can assume total totalitarian and dictatorial powers. This is the legacy that this hon. Minister is bequeathing here, and I ask him very pointedly that, if there should be this change and these laws are on the Statute Book, what is to prevent future governments from declaring the Broederbond, for example, an unlawful organization because they do not agree with that organization’s particular philosophy?

You are putting ideas into my head.

Furthermore, quite seriously, Sir, a member of a particular organization, or indeed, the hon. the Minister himself, could under a new Government or regime be detained without trial so that not even his wife would know where he was as he would be languishing somewhere in solitary confinement or in a solitary cell.

That has nothing to do with this clause.

It has everything to do with it. I am talking about the full impact of widening powers.

You must not now address us on the whole Bill.

Very well, I will confine myself to the clause and say, as strongly as I possibly can, that clause 4, despite the improvements that have been introduced because of the recommendations of the Rabie Commission—and one is at least grateful for that—still neglects the normal process of law, the normal courts of the land, therefore we cannot and will not support it.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pinelands is trying to suggest that the actions of the hon. the Minister will in view of this clause, be arbitrary in all respects. However, I wish to suggest, with all due respect, that this is not the case at all. The clause states very clearly that the hon. the Minister must be convinced of a certain case before taking steps. [Interjections.] Secondly, one could ask oneself what the process is according to which he arrives at a certain conclusion is reached. Firstly, he has to receive information of some kind. Then clause 6 paves the way for him to appoint an authorized officer to investigate the evidence and information thoroughly, and after he has made a thorough investigation of that information, he is still required to request the advisory committee to institute a formal investigation. Judicial officers serve on that committee. Then a recommendation is made, and only then does the hon. the Minister take a decision. If that is arbitrary, I wish to respectfully suggest that those hon. members do not see the matter as I see it.

Yes, that is correct.

I wonder what those people think we are doing. It seems to me they think we are dealing with the proverbial Sunday school picnic, but this is not what we are dealing with at all. Take, for example, the kind of organization which the hon. the Minister must consider before he takes action. Clause 4(1)(a) states very clearly that it is an organization which—

or an organization which propagates communism or which tries to do various things considered to be communistic. I should like to refer to the Shackleton Report once again. Those hon. members are complaining that the net is being cast too wide. As soon as one is dealing with an illegal organization—whether it is a communist organization or not—one has problems. The Shackleton Report refers on page 54 to—

This report in fact, goes much further. I therefore wish to suggest with all due respect that nowhere in the Western world—in any case, not as far as I am aware—has a review system been created which contains so many safety devices as the system envisaged by this particular piece of legislation. Furthermore, I respectfully wish to suggest that if we were to examine what the Commission has to say in this regard, we would see that since the Internal Security Act was passed in 1950, only 21 organizations have been declared unlawful organizations in terms of the provisions of that Act.

Only 21!

Of those 21 organizations, all except three were declared un-lawful in 1977. Eleven organizations were declared to be unlawful in terms of the provisions of the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, and the last case in this regard was in 1964. I therefore wish to suggest that until now, these provisions have been used very sparingly, with a great deal of control on the part of the hon. the Minister and the other judicial officers, and I think we can trust the hon. the Minister and the judicial officers appointed in terms of this legislation completely. Those hon. members are moving a motion of no confidence and are casting aspersions on the reputations of those people, senior legal people who are appointed to serve on specific boards of review and advisory committees, by saying that those people are in any case mere rubber-stamps of the Minister.

I am pleased to support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pinelands made a remark here which, in my opinion, cannot be left unanswered. He said that in terms of clause 4, this Government should consequently have banned the early Christian Church.

Could.

However, nothing is further from the truth than this statement of the hon. member for Pinelands. The hon. member is trying to draw a correlation between communism as we know it today, and that early Christian Church. In point of fact, as he himself knows, there is not a single common denominator. I think the statement he made was really extremely irresponsible. The socialism, or collective ownership, if one wishes to call it that, of the early Christian Church, was not the end result of a violent action aimed at setting up a despotic, atheistic government. Surely there is no comparison between this form of collective ownership and the form as we know it today under the communist system. As a final remark, I wish to add that the hon. member for Pinelands is aware that the whole idea of collective ownership as manifested in the early Christian congregation, was based on charity. I think this is an extremely irresponsible statement which has been blazoned abroad from this House.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. member for Randfontein for his contribution to this particular point. I take the mere fact that he made that statement severely amiss of the hon. member for Pinelands.

You did not do too badly with the Christian Institute.

I can see no sound reason for the hon. member trying to draw an analogy which is no analogy at all, and for referring to the New Testament in such an unctuous way in this regard.

Ask Beyers Naudé how he feels about it.

The next thing to happen will probably be that the hon. member will tell us that Christ was a zealot and that because he was a zealot he was a terrorist. After all, this has cropped up in certain conversations before. Under these circumstances, we are expected to accept that the Lord was a terrorist. Is this the kind of the discourse the hon. member wishes to continue in this House?

That is totally unworthy of you.

Then I wish to make a serious request to the hon. member not to drag in references to the Bible in order to draw an analogy with communism.

I did not do that at all.

I do not think it is fitting here, and I ask the hon. member to stop using that kind of argument with regard to this legislation.

The hon. member asked me yesterday and again today whether I as an individual or as Minister would be satisfied with this legislation if there should be a change of government in South Africa. I wish to tell the hon. member categorically that this legislation is being placed before this House by the Government because the Government is convinced that it is in the interests of South Africa that such legislation should exist, taking our circumstances into account. This legislation is not being placed on the Statute Book to protect a section of the population of South Africa and/or certain political organizations or members of certain organizations in South Africa. This legislation is being placed on the Statute Book by the Government in the interests of South Africa and all its people. If, under any future Government—I am talking about a legal and responsible Government now—similar circumstances should prevail in the country as do today, I would submit to the provisions of this legislation with confidence, because I am convinced that it is necessary in the interests of all the people in South Africa.

I hope you remember that.

I hope that this is an adequate reply for the hon. member. He must not try and put trick questions to me or try to make me believe nonsense.

No, but just bear that in mind for the future.

The Government and this side of the House are introducing this legislation in the conviction that it is in the best interests of South Africa. This is my reply to the hon. member as far as this aspect is concerned.

I also want to tell the hon. member briefly that since his amendment rejects the principle of the clause, for this is basically what it amounts to, he must tell us whether we should therefore accept that he and his party are totally opposed to the principle contained in clause 4.

The answer is “yes”.

We must therefore accept that, according to them, organizations which act against the interests of South Africa, should not be restricted.

But you have got the courts. There are various ways of going about it.

The hon. the Chief Whip of the PFP says “yes”.

We are against banning.

The message which the PFP are therefore conveying to South Africa is that under a PFP regime no restraints would be imposed on these organizations which are defined as organizations working against the interests of South Africa. [Interjections.] Do I understand them correctly?

There are ways of doing it. [Interjections.]

This is therefore their standpoint. [Interjections.] I think we could keep the discussion of this subject fairly brief this afternoon. The standpoint of the Government as well as that of the PFP has been quite clear for many years. The standpoint of the NP, as supported by the NRP and the CP, is that it is in the interests of South Africa and its people that organizations which satisfy the requirements stated in this statutory provision, will be put under restraint as soon as possible to prevent them from proceeding with their evil work and evil intentions. That is our standpoint.

Therefore I do not wish to set out the principle of this legislation in detail once again. The standpoint of the hon. members of the PFP is just as clear. They say no.

That is right!

On this basis I therefore reject the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pinelands.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, this clause is the first of several clauses dealing with the Press and with publications and periodicals as a whole. As the first speaker on this side of the Committee I should like to deal with a few matters of principle relating to the clause as well as to the details.

I think it is important that the hon. the Minister should be aware that it is our contention that literature and publications that incite violence, or literature and publications that clearly promote the overthrow of the Government of the day by other than democratic means, or literature which has as its object the aim of inflaming racial tensions, must not be allowed free rein in the country. I say this because if free rein was given to such literature as was mentioned by the hon. member for Umbilo earlier, literature preaching sedition and violence and the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means, obviously anarchy would certainly be on the cards and could ensue. On the other hand, however, in imposing any curbs or penalties in respect of publications and newspapers I believe that certain basic principles should apply. For example, any decision to be taken involving the rights of people or publications should, we believe, not be exercised by politicians at all no matter what their rank may be. Political people whether they be in opposition or in government, and particularly in government, are already in the arena of ideological conflict and they should not be called upon to have the power to squash the publications of their opponents except through the ballot-box. No politician can be objective in his judgment of those who oppose him. As his very real rights are here affected, it is our belief that a maximum level of objectivity is called for. Herein lies the major flaw, in fact the fatal flaw in this clause, for it is the Minister, whoever the Minister may be, who makes the decisions.

Hon. members may say, yes, but how do you propose to deal with the ANC or the South African Communist Party and their publications and the seditious type of publications that are from time to time sent into the country? Hon. members may say that those are the sort of organizations and those are the sort of publications at which this clause is aimed. That may be so, but who—I put this question to the hon. the Minister— in his right mind could possibly call Mr. Percy Qoboza, a world-respected editor, a communist? Who could call him that?

Who called him a communist?

Well, he was placed inside under our security legislation.

But nobody called him a communist, and he was not placed inside because he was regarded a communist.

Well, he was placed inside.

Why do you ask such a question?

The hon. the Minister is giving me some answers. He was placed into a prison because the hon. the Minister believed that he was becoming a danger to the security of the State.

That is something else.

Yes, but the point is that publications can be banned for any of a number of reasons, and what I am saying is that the Minister’s decision relating to people and publications is necessarily and will always be a subjective one and not an objective one. Yet Mr. Qoboza, who is a highly respected moderate leader in his community, languished in prison for several months with no charge ever being brought against him.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister another question. Who today, in 1982 who calls himself a patriot, still believes that Mr. Jimmy Kruger was correct when he brought the whole Western World down upon us by closing down the newspaper World in October 1977? [Interjections.] The problem does not lie in the fact that this Bill and this clause will be applied against the sworn enemies of democracy. That is not the problem, the sworn enemies being the Communist Party, the ANC or perhaps even the PAC, but rather that this clause and the Bill can be used and has, in the case of its predecessor, in fact been used against those who are not revolutionary, those who are not communists and those who are not promoting terrorism.

The second problem is that powers of this nature in our circumstance should in fact vest in the hands of the courts, particularly in the hands of the Supreme Court whose judges enjoy tenure independent of the State and are not drawn from the bureaucracy.

In the case of every single publication?

I believe that decisions taken in terms of clause 5 of the Bill should be exercised, if they have to be exercised at all, by the courts and not by the Minister.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member—he was at the Publications Control Board yesterday—whether every single one of the publications he saw there must be subjected to a court of law before they can be banned?

I do believe that that would be correct. I do believe that if publications are to be banned or to be taken off the news-stands, such decisions should be made by independent bodies and not by people attached to the State. I think that viewpoint was put in 1974 when the Publications Act was first enacted in this Parliament. I think all members of the United Party, the old Progressive Party and other members in opposition argued that point of view. We are dealing with periodicals and other publications as defined. [Interjections.]

Order!

Saying that they should go before the courts does not even remotely imply that the sort of publicity material that was for instance seen the other day, should be allowed in this country. What I am saying is that I do not believe it should be in the hands of the Minister to make the decision.

In regard to the power of life and death over newspapers, the Minister and his staff, I believe, should have no greater status than that of a complainant. This clause unfortunately in essence provides that the implementation of the legislation will be by politicians and by bureaucracy.

We have specific objection to some of the words in the clause. The very first words of the clause, namely “if the Minister is satisfied” leave enormous scope for the Minister and an incredibly small amount of room for appeal or review. In fact, the only grounds in terms of the usage of that phrase for appeal or review is related to an irregularity which the Minister might commit in the process of deciding what he should do, thereby exceeding his powers, or mala fides. Provided he follows the procedure as set out his subjective decision in terms of “if the Minister is satisfied” cannot be attacked.

The two main objections therefore relate not really to the technicality of words but more to two main principles, namely that it should be the court and not the Minister who exercises decisions and, secondly, that that decision should not be related to the subjective satisfaction of the Minister. We will therefore oppose this clause. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, we have the same situation here as applied in respect of clause 4. As the hon. the Minister quite rightly indicated, the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton means that the PFP do, in fact, object to this clause in principle. The hon. member said so himself. This means that we are conducting the same debate we were conducting during the Second Reading and that is why it would surely make no sense to react to all the arguments of the hon. member now. It would serve very little purpose.

Yet I do wish to single out a few points. The hon. member for Sandton has a problem with the introductory words of the clause, viz. “If the Minister is satisfied that any periodical or other publication. A clear regulation and procedure is being laid down concerning the way in which this point may be reached. As the hon. member for Roodepoort pointed out earlier, it is not a case of the hon. the Minister suddenly deciding one day to take action against a certain publication.

Except if I see a Prog at that time of the morning!

Yes, that is quite possible. After all, this concerns the fact that a specific advisory committee would institute an investigation if the Minister should suspect that there is reason to prohibit a publication. In that case, this procedure is followed. Who serves on that advisory committee? It was pointed out earlier that it would not necessarily be bureaucrats. At least two of the three have to be judicial officers, or persons with a legal background. Having instituted their investigation, they would then advise the Minister, and even if the Minister decided to prohibit the publication, the editor or publisher still has the opportunity of having recourse to the review procedure as defined in clause 11. The argument of the hon. member for Sandton on this point therefore does not hold water. In terms of the existing measures, it would perhaps have applied to a certain extent, even though it would not apply directly. What is interesting about this aspect, is that the Rabie Commission mentioned that the provision in clause 5 was derived mainly from two previous Acts, viz. the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Internal Security Act. In the case of the provision contained in the Internal Security Act since 1950, i.e. over a period of 32 years, only eight publications have been prohibited. However, the Commission stated that it had evidence before it which indicated that this provision did not belong here. The Commission considered the position on the strength of the evidence before it, as any judicial commission, and also a good one, as this one was, had the right to do. They concluded that under the circumstances, in South Africa, it is necessary that this provision be retained in the Internal Security Bill. With regard to what the hon. member for Sandton said and with regard to what was said repeatedly during the Second Reading, we are looking at this matter from two different angles. I do not think the hon. member wishes to understand what we are trying to tell him. Nor is it of any use arguing about it any further, since what is involved here is the principle of the matter.

I should like to express my strongest approval of this clause, as well as of the improvements which are being made here. I also approve of the amendment to the formulation, as indicated by the Commission, of that section dealing with the marrying of relations between the various population groups. The Commission suggested a better formulation than the existing one, saying: Let us rather talk about publications aimed at promoting hostile feelings between the various population groups, in the realization that hostile feelings can cut both ways and that they do not necessarily have a racial connotation. We should also point out this specific improvement proposed by the Rabie Commission as well. I am pleased to support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, once again the greatest concern of the hon. member for Sandton is that the Minister should not have so many powers. I wish to ask the hon. member whether he believes that it is essential to have administrative law in a country like South Africa, and I assume that as a lawyer, he would say “yes”. I also wish to ask the hon. member whether he agrees with me that the implementation of administrative law often gives one scope for coming to a decision more rapidly than when one follows the normal legal channels. This is correct. I think the hon. member would concede that it is precisely because of this that it is necessary to make use of rapid and effective procedures in security matters. That is why we are dealing with an example of administrative law in this case. However, what are the guarantees the hon. member is seeking? The hon. member is seeking the guarantees that the Minister cannot act arbitrarily, thereby abusing his powers. It is precisely because of this that these safety devices are being made an integral part of the ensuing clauses of this Bill, viz. the advice which has to be given and review procedures which may be followed right up to the Chief Justice of the country. There is also the alternative that the party may go to court. The party has the choice.

That is mala fides, is it not?

No, the choice is that a party may go to court or it may follow a review procedure. In other words, safety devices are being made an integral part of the implementation of administrative law by the Minister and/or officials who may be involved in it. Because this is so, I am not prepared at this stage to argue the principle in general with the hon. member again. I think he would agree with me that this is really not necessary. The fundamental standpoints of both sides of the House are very clear. It is therefore not necessary that we argue that aspect in detail again.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with the hon. the Minister that it would probably be futile to debate in the Committee Stage, at length the principles on which we disagree. But the hon. the Minister made one comment which interested me and I should like him to advise us on this because it will help us in our attitude. He said that an aggrieved party could use either the review procedure or could go to a court, in terms of a later provision of the Bill. Let us assume the party does not use the review procedure. Can the hon. the Minister tell me precisely what rights the party has in approaching a court? Is it the right of appeal on the merits, in which case all the evidence is assessed, or is it only the limited right of review and, if that is the case, in what circumstances can the courts be approached in terms of this legislation?

Mr. Chairman, I understand it is an ordinary administrative review by the court.

Review?

Yes, an ordinary administrative review by the court. That is what it basically boils down to.

Not on merit.

Mr. Chairman, as the hon. the Minister therefore understands the legislation—and I think I agree with his understanding of it—there is no inherent right of appeal on the merits?

Not as such.

What then is the good of it?

Helen, nobody is talking to you.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, on the face of it this clause represents an improvement on the existing situation. The clause has certain definite functions. If the hon. the Minister has reason to suspect that certain action should be taken against an organization or a publication he is entitled to appoint a person to conduct a form of investigation, a person whose task it would then be to report to the hon. the Minister. I assume that that report would then, in due course, form part of the documentation sent by the hon. the Minister to the advisory committee, part of the documentation utilized by the hon. the Minister in making a decision relating to that organization or publication. In terms of this clause the hon. the Minister is therefore at least in a position to have before him, in a formalized fashion, information which he would probably not otherwise have been able to acquire.

There are, however, regretfully several serious flaws in the provision itself, and I should like to mention some of them.

First of all I think that we would be far happier if the clause was not stated in the permissive form, but rather in the peremptory form. As it stands, the clause states—

… he may in writing under his hand …

I think that “he shall” would be a far better way of stating this in order to ensure that some form of investigation was indeed undertaken before he made any decision, because surely whether the organization or the proprietor of the publication are co-operative or not—evidence that is gathered by his investigating officer would be of use in the later procedures when the matter is placed before the advisory committee which I shall discuss in a few moments.

The second flaw I note is that the hon. the Minister says he may designate “any person”. I think that we on this side of the House would far prefer that the Minister should state what roughly his intention is as regards the type of person who is to be appointed. Basic rights are involved and this person, as one sees elsewhere in the clause, is going to exercise some very important functions. He is going to question people, he is going to study documents, and upon his decision and recommendations will depend the very welfare and livelihood of people working on publications and newspapers and also the very aims and objects of the organization which may be investigated. I believe that the person the hon. the Minister appoints should be someone with a minimum legal training and who would understand the nuances of the law rather than “any person” as is presently provided for.

We are unhappy that the clause gives this investigating officer the power to enter premises without a warrant or to seize documentation or copies without warning. We believe that, when there is a formal investigation to be undertaken, the proper warning should be given to the proprietor of a publication or newspaper before the investigating officer goes about his job. We also believe that the people concerned, when they are interrogated or questioned by the investigating officer, should have had time to prepare and should have had time, perhaps, to seek legal advice concerning the answers they give relating to the matters under investigation.

If we look at subsection (3)(f), we see that it gives the investigating officer the power to “question either alone or in the presence of any other person”, etc. Then a little later on one sees that he has the power to call people before him and also to question such people alone if he so wishes. This is left to the discretion of the investigating officer. While subsection (5) affords a small amount of protection in that the person being questioned “shall be entitled to all the privileges to which a person giving evidence before a provincial division of the Supreme Court of South Africa is entitled”, this is of very little consequence if the investigating officer has no knowledge of the law in the first instance and, secondly, if the person being questioned does not have access to legal advice and himself has no knowledge of the rules of evidence, of what should or should not be allowed to be put to him and of what answers he may be able not to give. I think there should not be a provision in a law to the effect that a person can be questioned and his answers can be used against him, his publication or his organization without him having any legal representation.

Where do you find it in the Bill that he is not entitled to legal representation?

It says here that he may be questioned either alone or in the presence of any other person and that the person being investigated can be called upon to speak to the investigating officer alone.

Where is his attorney excluded?

If the clause provides that he may be questioned alone, as I read it that means specifically that no other person can be present.

But he may consult his attorney.

What I am saying is that, when questions are put to a person and his answers may decide the fate of his publication or organization, I believe he should have sitting with him while he is being questioned his attorney, legal representation, counsel or some person who will be able to advise him with regard to the answers he gives. That is the only point I am making. I think that that constitutes a flaw in the investigating procedures. If the person conducting the investigation and putting the questions is unqualified in law and legal representation is excluded by the application of the provision that he may see a person alone, I want to say that it is very likely that a one-sided report could be presented to the Minister so that, while no bona fides are in question, the report may be incompetent. It may then be a report which severely and wrongly prejudices the person or organization under discussion. Therefore, while we accept that the investigating procedure as set out here, is an improvement, we still believe that the clause is such that we cannot support it in its present form.

Mr. Chairman, what I cannot understand about the hon. member for Sandton is that his criticism of clause 6 is not at all fundamental. It is relatively superficial. I do not know why he did not, in the first place, make an attempt to eliminate the shortcomings he saw in the clause in a meaningful way by means of positive amendments. Instead, he wants the entire clause to be rejected. As far as I am concerned, this is not at all a meaningful approach on the part of the hon. member for Sandton.

As I have already indicated in the Second Reading debate, the authorized officer is the only one directly appointed by the hon. the Minister to investigate the matter. The appointment of every other board or individual in terms of the legislation under discussion is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice. I do not believe for a moment that in this instance the hon. the Minister of Law and Order would appoint someone who knew nothing about the law, about legal procedures or about the specific provisions of clause 6(5), which stipulates that any person being questioned under certain circumstances, is entitled to all the privileges to which anyone is entitled who is giving evidence before a provincial division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. I therefore do not understand the approach of the hon. members of the PFP at all.

If the powers of this authorized officer were really too extensive, why, then, did hon. members of the PFP not make a positive suggestion to the effect that certain things be done to limit a specific power? They do not try to make positive suggestions to improve the situation, but only seek to behave destructively by demanding that this clause be rejected in its entirety.

For interest’s sake, I want to say a few words in connection with the freedom of the Press and the authorized officer in question. In this regard the legislation goes much further than our forefathers did. I find it interesting to note that section 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Free State provided that the freedom of the Press was guaranteed provided it remained within the provisions of the Act. The provision goes no further. That is the end of the matter.

In the Constitution of the Transvaal—the one drawn up in 1858—it was stated that freedom of the Press was allowed provided the printer and the publisher remained responsible for what was printed and that they would also be held responsible for defamation, insults and attacks on peoples’ characters. These are therefore far wider powers than those we are discussing here today. The legislation under discussion incorporates far more security measures. I therefore support it in its entirety.

Mr. Chairman, during second reading I made some issue of this particular clause as an example. I made the point then that in this particular clause the hon. the Minister had the right to appoint an authorized officer to investigate organizations and periodicals. I mentioned further that once appointed this authorized officer had enormous power.

Amongst these powers he has, if necessary, force of entry rights, day or night. He can order people to appear before him. He can demand documents. He can demand facilities. In other words, the authorized officer has massive powers, and unfortunately experience has shown that when a person has massive powers those powers have an unfortunate habit of corrupting that person in the sense that he will have a tendency, if not under proper control, to abuse those powers. I can go no further than to quote, shall I say, two extremes of where this power has been abused. I refer here to Russia with its KGB and, on the other hand, the United States of America with its CIA. In both instances there are innumerable examples of the abuse of power where proper control has not been exercised. In as far as the United States is concerned, they have made some dramatic changes in respect of the operation of the CIA and have in fact now ensured that while not seriously diminishing the powers of the CIA, the CIA is subject to investigation itself and in certain instances has to have condonation of its actions. This was also what I suggested during the Second Reading debate. I said that we freely accept that there are certain circumstances in which, or occasions when it is vitally necessary in the interests of security to enter certain places and to exercise all of the powers called for in terms of these provisions. I have no quarrel with that. The NRP is simply of the opinion that without curbs this unfettered power can in fact be dangerous. That is why I suggested to the hon. the Minister during the Second Reading debate that he give some consideration to the possibility of the issue of some sort of warrant if circumstances so permit and that in other instances where there may not be sufficient time for the issue of such a warrant or where circumstances do not allow of it and where the normal procedures are not followed there should be some sort of system of condonation.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have made it very clear that I am doing my utmost to try to assist the hon. the Minister to have satisfactory legislation which will do what he wants it to do. At the same time, however, I believe that the fears of the public should be allayed in instances where they can reasonably be so allayed.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter remains that clause 6 provides for a preliminary investigation if the Minister so decides. It is not obligatory. The clause provides, inter alia, that the Minister—

The Minister has therefore to authorize such person in writing. It is not simply a question of an official barging in somewhere and abusing his powers. There are these safeguards in the very first provisions of this clause in regard to the concern the hon. member expressed in respect of the possible abuse of powers. The hon. member for Sandton said that such an investigation should be obligatory—the Minister shall in every case order such an investigation. However, the fact of the matter is that before the Minister can act, he must have the advice of the advisory committee. Therefore, if we make this obligatory on the Minister, it means that we shall be forcing a duplication upon him in every instance. That is what will happen in practice. In some cases it may not be necessary for the Minister to have such an investigation. He may have sufficient information at his disposal to go to the advisory committee and to follow the procedure as laid down. That is why I cannot accept the proposal of the hon. member because it will boil down to a duplication in many cases.

The hon. member asked me who this “any person” may be or usually is. He also suggested that this person should be somebody with some legal training and experience and so forth. I am informed that such an appointee in the past has usually been an experienced police officer. He was required to do the investigation for the Minister concerned.

The hon. member was also concerned about the fact that the person who is being questioned will not have the protection of legal advice …

While being questioned.

Yes, while being questioned. Of course clause 6(3) provides—

1. (f) question either alone or in the presence of any other person, as he deems desirable …

There is no prohibition on the person’s attorney being present. Should the designated officer wish to ask questions of a particular person alone, there again there is nothing to prohibit that particular person obtaining legal advice before such questioning or discussion takes place.

No.

I am just assuring the hon. member that as I read the Bill and according to the advice that I have received there is nothing to prohibit such a person having legal advice beforehand or having legal advice during such questioning and being protected in all respects. I do not say, however, that his legal adviser can or may be present at all times. What I say is that at all times such a person is entitled to legal advice should there be a need for it. I cannot take this issue any further because, as I say, it is clear from the Bill that there is absolutely no prohibition in this respect.

Mr. Chairman may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he agrees though that such a person does not have an inalienable right to have a legal representative with him at all times while being questioned?

But there is no such inalienable right which a person can have. There is no such thing. Why must that be provided for in the Bill? What is being provided for in the Bill is that such a person can obtain legal advice should he wish to do so. There is nothing to prohibit his doing that. That is what we want. We want a facility for such a person to be able to obtain legal advice, and the Bill does not prohibit it.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to argue this one point a little further. To obtain legal advice before a hearing takes place, a person would—let us assume he is being given notice of an investigation or is being summonsed by the hon. the Minister’s investigating officer—go to his lawyer to ascertain in the first place what his rights are. He does not know what questions are going to be put to him and he does not know what evidence is being held against him at that stage. He does not necessarily know why he is being investigated. I say “necessarily”, because he may know. He does not, however, necessarily know this. He goes to his legal adviser and, as the hon. the Minister has pointed out, he is quite entitled to do that. He asks his legal adviser what his rights are. His legal adviser then looks up the Internal Security Act and comes to section 6(5) which provides—

His legal representative then gives that person this advice. He may even, if he is a good attorney and remembers his law, try to explain to him some of the rules of evidence which apply and the sort of questions he might answer or might not answer. This man then has to go to face the investigating officer. The investigating officer may have a pile of books 15 inches high on his desk. There may also be files of documents and complaints which have been made against that particular publication or its staff running over a period of months or years. He may then be confronted with a myriad questions. The man may not necessarily be legally trained.

And you want him to have his lawyer with him from the beginning to the end of this period?

The hon. member for Langlaagte is correct. I want to tell the hon. member that if he ever had the misfortune—I hope he does not—to be accused of or charged with anything, as could happen to any citizen, he would not move without taking with him his legal representative to ensure that he did not prejudice his own rights. That he would do. It is his right and I honestly believe that he should have that right.

People who are under investigation should have that same right. When they are under investigation, when the answers that they give may in fact affect their organizations, their livelihoods, their publications and their very beliefs in life, when decisions and recommendations are made in respect of what they say to the investigating officer, they should have with them people who are able to advise them as to the legality of questions, as to whether they have to answer a particular question and whether they may or may not answer such questions. I think that is what we are looking for.

Mr. Chairman, I want to reassure the hon. member that I do not intend to agree to our inserting in the Act that a person’s legal representative may be present at all times. What concerns us is that a fair investigation must take place in the interests of all concerned. I have already given the hon. Member the assurance that as I read this clause, there is no prohibition on any person taking legal advice and there is no prohibition regarding the stage or manner in which legal advice may be taken. On certain occasions the accused’s attorney may be present and on other occasions he may not be present, but the accused will always have the opportunity to telephone his attorney for advice. All these are possibilities in terms of the legislation.

I also want to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that clause 6(5) expressly provides the following—

There is also an obligation on the questioner, the person undertaking the investigation, to undertake the questioning in terms of the provisions of this subsection. I have already told the hon. member that the person who will be appointed to undertake the investigation will obviously be an experienced person with the necessary legal training and experience. It is the duty of that person to ensure that the provisions of the legislation are complied with. There are therefore so many safety valves built into the relevant clause that I cannot make further concessions. I am convinced that the protection the hon. member seeks is already to be found in the relevant clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry the hon. the Minister does not see any great merit in our views on the question of having some sort of control over this situation. Our primary problem is in respect of the possibilities of, perhaps, forcible entry, of necessity, and the fact that generally a State department that does indulge in that type of activity is not going to be held in very high esteem by the general public and the Press. It is going to involve quite a considerable amount of adverse publicity because the public or media may well not even be objective in their approach to this matter. We feel if there was judicial backing for this it might well make life a little easier in the ultimate for the people concerned. Nonetheless, so far as we are concerned, although we believe that perhaps in due course the hon. the Minister may well wish he had something like this as a, should we say, back door escape from bad publicity, we do not feel that our view is sufficient to justify our being able to vote against the clause. Although we are a little unhappy about this aspect, we will not be opposing or assisting in voting against the clause.

Mr. Chairman, is the hon. member saying or insinuating that if a member of the Police Force is used that he is then part and parcel of a State department, that he will therefore not be held in high esteem by the public and that this may cause bad publicity? Is that what the hon. member is saying or insinuating? I should like some clarity on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry if I gave him that impression. I believe the Police Force are held in very high esteem. However, as far as forcible entry at any time and under any circumstances is concerned there are unfortunately people who will invariably look to the evil side of it rather than the necessitous side of it. This is why I suggest that if one had a judicial backing to this the question would not arise.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. member for Umbilo for his support of this clause.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, this clause is—and the hon. the Minister will be pleased to hear me say it—a distinct improvement on the existing situation. In terms of this clause an advisory committee is appointed whose report must be considered by the Minister before he can take action against organizations or publications. We agree with the tenor of the clause. However, we have one quite important problem and three lesser problems which we should like to discuss with the hon. the Minister.

In this connection I should like to move the amendments which stand in my name on the Order Paper and which will have to be renumbered as follows—

1. (1) On page 15, in line 22, to omit all the words after “judge” up to and including “division” in line 24;
2. (3) on page 15, in line 66, to omit all the words after “(a)” up to and including “that” in line 68 and to substitute “The chairman of an”;
3. (4) on page 17, in line 7, to omit “exceed a period of twenty-one” and to substitute:
   be less than a period of thirty
4. (5) on page 17, in line 19, to omit “exceed a period of twenty-one” and to substitute:
   be less than a period of thirty

In addition I should like to move the following amendment which, for the hon. the Minister’s information, was only drafted today. It does not appear on the Order Paper.

I only received it a few minutes ago.

I apologize to the hon. the Minister. I should however also like to move the following amendment—

1. (2) On page 15, in lines 34 and 35, to omit paragraph (b) and to substitute:
2. (b) a nominee of the Association of Law Societies of Southern Africa and a nominee of the General Council of the Bar of South Africa.

I move this extra amendment and I think the hon. the Minister will get the sense of it very quickly. I do not think that it is an amendment which requires any deep study. I am sure he will understand its meaning.

The first amendment is moved in line with our philosophy of trying to distance the decision-making process in matters of this nature from the State. We believe that people who are in the process of advising the Minister on issues of this nature should in fact be divorced completely from the State. They should be people who are not employed by the State. In other words, we go along with people being on the advisory committee such as for example experts and people of high standing who are judges, advocates, attorneys and academics. Although my first amendment deals with the deletion of the possibility of a magistrate being appointed, this does not at all mean that it is a reflection on the magistrate or on the lower courts. What it means is that we feel that the advisory committee should not be linked to the State at all. From that flows the amendment which has just been handed to the hon. the Minister which seeks to include on the advisory committee a member of the General Bar Council and a member of the Law Societies of Southern Africa. We believe that the State is already heavily involved in this legislation and that the hon. the Minister should seek advice outside of this area.

The third amendment relates to the right to be heard. Clause 7(5)(a) relates to the procedure to be adopted by the advisory committee and it reads as follows—

It then goes on to provide for certain machinery whereby in respect of certain notices given to the people who are being investigated they can make representations. This is a permissive clause. We believe that in effect it should be peremptory clause. We believe that the advisory committee should not have a discretion but that it should have to advise the people under investigation of such investigation and to place such organization, publication, publishers or whatever in a position of being heard or of making representations to that advisory committee. It is the old argument which we have heard many times in this House relating to audi alteram partem. I accept that it is the hon. the Minister’s intention that those under investigation would generally be asked to appear or to make representations. I accept that, but what I am saying is that it should always apply and not lie in anyone’s discretion whether a person or an organization is in fact given the right to advance argument on his or its behalf. I assume there would be quite restricted circumstances. Here is a situation where an investigation can be undertaken and the subject of the investigation could in theory be unaware of the fact that that publication or publisher, for instance, is being investigated at all. If there is no investigation by an investigation officer in terms of clause 6, i.e. the previous clause, and if the organization or publication is not given notice or asked to make any representation in terms of clause 7, then such organization or a publication could in fact be unaware of a Minister’s intentions before it is either banned or, in the case of a newspaper, closed down. They could in fact have this happen to them without being given the opportunity of presenting a case. Advice could be sent to the Minister without the organization or the publisher of the publication having had the opportunity of making representations or putting in a memorandum.

It is quite interesting if one looks back on some of the history in this regard. I have here a cutting from The Cape Times of 27 October 1977 relating to this matter. I should just like to read to hon. members what it states. It states—

The point that I am trying to make is that the right to be heard should not be permissive. The right to be heard or to make representations should in fact be peremptory. It should be a right which cannot be taken away from an organization, a person, a publication or a publisher. I do not believe the hon. the Minister should be allowed to take any action at all until such time as, in particular, a publisher has had the right to make representations.

The last two amendments relate to lesser matters. They relate to time periods within which certain representations can be made.

Before we take this clause any further, I should like to hear some answers from the hon. the Minister to the points that have already been made.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad that the official Opposition at least considers this clause somewhat of an improvement. I endorse this view because in my opinion this is a dramatic improvement of the entire procedure.

The first amendment moved by the hon. member for Sandton will have the effect of removing from the list someone who is a magistrate or a chief magistrate, and in fact this can only be interpreted as a reflection on the status of persons occupying the position of magistrate.

No, that is not so.

Some of the cases that magistrates hear involve security legislation, and there is therefore no reason why they must be excluded in this case. In my opinion it would be a reflection on their impartiality.

The amendment just moved by the hon. member for Sandton involves the two persons referred to in clause 7(2)(b). He contends that these people must be specified as coming from two organizations, but I consider this a restriction on the freedom that must exist here. There are also many other disciplines besides law, many other organizations besides those two, which can make a particularly valuable contribution in such an investigation. Here I have in mind for example, people specifically qualified in strategic studies, people who have made a study of the political situation in South Africa, and people who have a special knowledge of publications, etc. As far as I am concerned I cannot support the amendment, but am in favour of the Bill remaining in its present form.

As far as the amendment in connection with clause 7(5)(a) is concerned, in my opinion it is quite clear that there may be cases where it is not in the public interest to make the reasons known. If this clause were to be amended to provide that the reasons must be made known, this could in some cases lead to serious embarrassment for the security of the State. There is always the possibility, if a committee initially judges that it is not in the public interest, that later, after consultation, it could decide that it is in fact in the public interest, and that it may even be possible to give reasons. However, if the Bill were to be amended as contemplated in the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton, these reasons would have to be given even if it were not in the public interest to do so. For this reason I regard this amendment, too, as unacceptable.

As far as the other two amendments are concerned I believe that the maximum period of 21 days for which provision is made, is aimed at bringing the case to a speedy conclusion, so that subversive elements do not have the opportunity to prolong it ad infinitum.

Mr. Chairman, this clause probably represents the greatest single thing to come out of the Rabie Commission’s report. As such it has been generally welcomed by everybody throughout the country. It does represent a tremendous step forward and we on these benches would once again like to indicate our support for the concept. I think the remarks made by the Association of Law Societies express our views very well. In paragraph 2.6 they refer to the kernel of our objection to one part of the clause where they say—

This is particularly true in cases where an absolute discretion is given to State officials in the exercize of such drastic powers. It is our contention that the concept of the advisory Committee is correct but that its component parts or membership could be improved. The amendment of the hon. member for Sandton on clause 7(1) will therefore be having our support. This also applies to his second amendment. Those are the two main amendments affecting the composition of the advisory Committee. We feel very strongly that the hon. the Minister should have an opportunity of presenting the public with a advisory Committee of such stature that it comes as close as possible to replacing the judiciary, which has in fact had to take place as a result of the State having to adopt extraordinary powers in its role of protecting that liberty in which the judiciary can function. Every effort should therefore be made to make this judicial tribunal—as we see it— a body with the greatest possible status. We shall therefore be supporting the first and second amendments of the hon. member for Sandton.

We do not, however, see any reason for supporting the hon. member’s other amendment, because there must obviously be circumstances under which this improved advisory Committee, which we are suggesting should be of such a high standard, will make correct decisions about whether or not a certain matter would be in the public interest. We therefore see no reason to support that amendment. We have no quarrel with the hon. member’s amendments relating to lines 7 and 19 on page 17. They do, in fact, allow for a slightly longer period in which the exercising of the authority can take place and in which the evidence can be produced in order to substantiate any defence that a person might wish to put forward. So the kernel of the whole question of renewal and improvement emanating from the Rabie Commission’s report is contained in the proposal for the advisory Committee which, as I say, has been welcomed by all sectors of society, by the public in general and more specifically by both sides of this House. We feel that we should not miss any opportunity of making this a body of the highest possible standing. It should have the best possible image in the eyes of the public, and here I am referring to the country as a whole. I believe that if we manage to do that, the advisory committee would be in an unassailable position. Accordingly we shall be supporting those amendments, as I indicated earlier in my speech.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the message that the hon. member on that side of the House wants to get across is that there should be an advisory board of the necessary stature, with experts appointed to that board. The Bill provides for the Chairman to be a lawyer, i.e. a judge of the Supreme Court, as at present, or a person who has held office as a magistrate, etc. In other words, the chairman is to be a person with advanced legal training. Then the Bill provides for two other persons, one of whom shall be a person holding a degree or diploma in law, i.e. he will also be legally qualified. Therefore at least two of the three must have these qualifications. The third person can be of any particular discipline. I cannot bind myself to them being only from the legal discipline, either from the Bar or the Side-bar. I think that that is unfair. As the hon. member for Helderkruin has correctly pointed out, there were other disciplines which could also be accommodated in this particular body from time to time. Therefore I am sorry, but I cannot accept that particular amendment of the hon. member for Sandton.

I am not prepared to curb the discretion of this particular advisory committee because there may be circumstances which necessitate this committee having a discretion. There are, however, safeguards built into the Bill in regard to the exercise of this discretion. Clause 11 provides that any person, against whom action has been taken without notification, may petition the Minister. The Minister is then obliged eventually to submit that petition to the Chief Justice. There are therefore safety measures built into this particular clause and/or other clauses in respect of the particular worry the hon. member for Sandton has.

I think that my remarks in general cover the arguments advanced by the hon. member for King William’s Town as well.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has just said that he would not accept the amendment handed to him earlier today relating to clause 7(2)(b). Is that correct?

Is that the question of the two nominees from the …

From the Association of Law Societies. Would the hon. the Minister then be prepared to accept an amendment which specified the appointment of two other persons, basically provided they are not in the employ of the State?

No, I cannot accept that.

The hon. the Minister gave as a reason the fact that they need not necessarily all be lawyers or advocates. I shall go along with the hon. the Minister on that and I am sure that we all will. They may be academics. They may be experts in a particular field. Let me explain to the hon. the Minister that our rationale is that we are trying to divorce the advisory committee as far as possible from any links with the State. We should like the Minister to have the advice of a committee which is absolutely independent of the Government. That is really the basis of what I am trying to put to the hon. the Minister. So, if the hon. the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment he put for the reasons he gave, would he be prepared to accept an amendment to alter the paragraph to read “to other persons, who shall not be employees of the State”? That would then cover our problem and it certainly would not hurt the argument the hon. the Minister advanced a few moments ago.

Mr. Chairman, such a proposal may cover the hon. member’s problem, but it does not cover mine. The fact of the matter is that the Bill provides that two other persons may be appointed. That means that both of them may come from the private sector. On the other hand, one or both of them may come from the public sector. I cannot agree that the Minister should be bound in the way the hon. member proposes. The Minister must be in a position to appoint the particular person who in the particular circumstances may be the fit and proper person to appoint. I cannot take this issue any further. I think it would be a bit unfair to bind the Minister as the hon. member proposes.

Amendments (1), (2) and (3) negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendments (4) and (5) negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments appearing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 19, in line 17, to omit “no” and to substitute “A”;
2. (2) on page 19, in line 19, to omit “but” and to substitute “and”;
3. (3) on page 19, in line 29, after “committee” to insert and his legal representative”;
4. (4) on page 19, in lines 42 and 43, to omit subsection (11);
5. (5) on page 19, in lines 44 to 60, to omit subsection (12).

The first amendment relates to clause 8(7) and is basically aimed at enabling witnesses who appear before an advisory committee to have legal representation. That point has been argued by the hon. member for Sandton, and I do not intend to repeat why, before appearing b efore an advisory committee, a witness should be entitled to have a legal representative with him. Although in clause 8(5) it is provided that the normal rules of evidence appertaining to the Supreme Court should apply, if one looks at clause 8(2) it is quite clear that the procedure which is to be followed by the advisory committee is in fact in the discretion of the committee itself. In other words, the committee can decide which procedures it would follow when conducting its affairs. Obviously one takes into account that there will be legally qualified people on the advisory committee. Nevertheless, it does make it much more confusing and much more difficult for a witness to appear before an advisory committee not knowing what procedure is to be followed, not knowing whether or not there are guidelines which the advisory committee has to follow. In those circumstances, even more so than in cases in which there are fixed guidelines, a legal representative should be present to provide guidance and assistance. I should like to refer hon. members to the Rabie Commission’s report—page 191—in order to see what motivation and what line of reasoning they adopted in order to arrive at this sort of measure. In essence it appears that the Rabie Commission relies on three factors in its decision to exclude legal representation in the case of witnesses appearing before advisory committees. Firstly, the Rabie Commission finds that in the past legal representatives have been found to co-operate with those who are security risks. Secondly, they find that information which is of a sensitive nature and which affects the security of the State should not be disclosed to legal representatives or to witnesses. Thirdly, they state briefly that they doubt that the legal profession itself would be prepared to support a suggestion that legal representatives who are nominated, if some are excluded, should not have the right to appear.

Those are the only reasons that are put forward. There is no suggestion in the report, as far as I could find, that there were negotiations or discussions with the various legal bodies, either the Bar Council or the Society of Attorneys. There is no suggestion in the report that consideration was given to working to a system in terms of which, for example, a panel of legal representatives would be available to assist these people; a panel which, in the eyes of the hon. the Minister, would be acceptable, and which would also be acceptable to the various Law Societies and Bar Councils. That does not seem to have happened.

The hon. member for Sandton has motivated the reason for legal representatives to be present and in this regard I want to refer to my third amendment which amends subsection (8). This amendment speaks for itself and is to the effect that the legal representative should be present.

My fourth amendment refers to subsection (11) which reads as follows—

Here again, the powers of the court to regulate the procedure and activities of the advisory committee are excluded altogether. In this regard I want again to refer to clause 8(2) which enables an advisory committee to work out its own procedure. It becomes even more necessary to have judicial control where there are no fixed procedures which can be checked. In my view there can be no justification for excluding the court which, under certain circumstances such as these, would play the role of checking whether or not proper procedures were followed when the deliberations took place.

The same applies to subsection (12). Severe penalties are set out in this subsection. The advisory committee is dealt with as though it were, for example, a commission appointed in accordance with the relevant Act, a body which normally has these protective measures in order to enable it to function properly. If the advisory committee is not subject to the scrutiny of the courts when it should not be entitled to the protection set out in subsection (12). The advisory committee has, as it were, a very thick protective armour without there being any counter-balance as far as the court is concerned. The question of judicial checks and controls was dealt with during the Second Reading debate. We have stated our view very clearly in this regard and I do not intend to repeat it.

Mr. Speaker, as regards the first amendments the hon. member for Durban Central has just moved, I examined the reasons furnished by the Rabie Commission for this clause. The only criticism the hon. member levelled at it was that the opinion of the legal profession was not called for. The hon. member did not substantively refute the recommendations of the Rabie Commission. I would say that there is therefore no reason why those recommendations of the Rabie Commission should be rejected.

As regards the fourth amendment moved by the hon. member, namely, the deletion of subsection (11), which provides that no court of law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce on the functions or recommendations of a committee, I want to say that the provisions in this subsection are in line with the entire principle we discussed during the Second Reading debate, namely that the person or entity that must accept responsibility for this, is the executive and not the courts. This subsection is therefore in line with the principle which has already been accepted.

As regards the deletion of subsection (12) I do not think that the hon. member made a case for the deletion of that subsection. The advisory committee is a committee of inquiry and as such it must be put in a position, and the instruments must be at its disposal, to institute a thorough inquiry. If this amendment were accepted, this entire clause would be deprived of its force and effect. We have in fact accepted that this clause is one of the improvements in the security legislation and if one deletes this subsection, thereby depriving this advisory committee of its power to institute an inquiry, it would detract from that improvement that is being effected here. It gives me pleasure to support the clause.

Mr. Chairman, we in the NRP shall support the first four amendments, but we do not see our way clear to supporting the fifth. I do not want to make a long speech in this regard, because we have heard the arguments for and against. As far as we are concerned the provisions which the first four amendments seek to introduce are desirable and will reflect well on the procedure in respect of witnesses. Accordingly we shall support them, but not the fifth amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to place the standpoint of the Rabie Commission in regard to this matter on record. In this connection I refer to page 191 of the report where the commission makes the following statement—

†I do not think it is necessary for me to take the particular point any further in respect of this amendment. I also stand by the advice of the commission itself.

*Anyway, what the third amendment amounts to is that the jurisdiction of the courts should be restored to them. I am sorry, but this amendment cannot be accepted either. The proposal incorporated in the legislation is nothing new which is being brought before the House now; it is a provision which has already been fully incorporated into the existing legislation. In this connection I refer to section 10sex (11). So this is nothing new. Here, too, the Rabie Commission once again advises that it is essential and of the utmost importance that finality be reached as far as preventive security action is concerned, and since the activities of the advisory committee are of a mere fact-finding or advisory nature, intervenient action by the courts will in any case be inappropriate at this early stage. I agree with the commission in this respect.

I refer, in the final instance, to the hon. member’s amendment that subsection 12 be deleted. If that should happen, the committee would simply be paralysed.

† I cannot see how we can delete subsection 12 and still expect this committee to be able to do its work. In the circumstances I am sorry, but I cannot agree to the deletion of subsection (12). If the hon. members want me to go into further detail, I can do so, but I really do not think it is necessary. The subsection cannot be deleted if one wants the committee to function successfully. I therefore cannot accept the amendment.

Amendments (1) to (4) negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (5) negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 10:

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to speak on this clause at any length at all. I merely wish to state the attitude of my party. Once the procedures mentioned in the earlier clauses have been followed, this is the clause which gives the Minister the right to implement a ban on the publication of any newspaper of periodical. It also allows the Minister to declare any organization unlawful. As we stated earlier, we believe that this function, if it exists at all, should exist only after a proper court action, and therefore we cannot support this clause as it stands.

Mr. Chairman, we have a problem in regard to the period and so I want to move the following amendment—

We have a problem with regard to the short period in respect of publication in the Gazette of the actions of the Minister. It is quite obvious that within 14 days some people might not in fact have received the Gazette and in many cases they will not be able to make representations. This is purely an administrative issue and without going to extremes and making the period too long, we feel that three weeks is at least a reasonable period.

Mr. Chairman, 14 days is the usual time limit allowed in so many instances in law and I am of the opinion that 14 days is a fair period. I am therefore not prepared to accept the amendment.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 11:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Clause 11 sets out the procedures to be adopted for the final review of the decisions of the Minister relating to the declaring unlawful of certain organizations and relating further to closing down or preventing the dissemination of periodicals, newspapers and other publications. While we welcome the fact that a review procedure has been set up—and we particularly welcome the fact that the review procedures have been set up at a very high level, as high as the Chief Justice of the country—we note with some dismay that there is to be no review of the decision of the Minister on the merits of the case which gave rise to the Minister’s action. While the Chief Justice may well, after considering all the documentation laid before him, disagree strongly with the Minister’s decision to take the executive action which has in fact been taken, as long as the Chief Justice comes to the conclusion that the Minister did not act in bad faith and that in fact he followed the prescribed procedure, he has no power to upset the decision of the hon. the Minister. An inherent weakness in this very limited form of review is that the Chief Justice has no power to hear any new evidence at all or to hear any argument on the evidence. The petitioner in particular, the person who asks for this review, has no power to give evidence and certainly— and I think this is one of the most important defects—except for the very formalistic reasons he can expect to be given for the action taken, has absolutely no right to know what evidence has been adduced against him, his organization or his publication. He therefore has no method of bringing into question the evidence which was before the Minister and which gave rise to the Minister’s decision; in other words, that evidence has never really been tested by cross-examination or argument of that sort. While we support this clause—I want the hon. the Minister to have no doubt about that—and a review of this sort is obviously a relief, we feel that it is nevertheless not nearly strong enough. In terms of subsection (4) the Chief Justice—

1. (a) exceeded the powers conferred upon him by this Act;…

do certain things. Let us be quite straight with each other and say that it is very seldom, almost remote, that the hon. the Minister would exceed the powers given to him—he has very wide powers.

Especially if you have a competent Minister.

Yes, especially if you have a very competent Minister.

We may well have one day.

The problem is that there are those who question the competence of Ministers. Very often the people who question the competence of Ministers are those who are the aggrieved parties who may have an opinion diametrically opposed to that of the Minister. The first point is that the Chief Justice must be satisfied that the Minister has exceeded his powers or that he has acted in bad faith. All that the Minister has to show is that he was satisfied, after following the various procedures, that a certain set of circumstances had occurred or was prevalent. I believe it is almost impossible, in the circumstances of this legislation, for a Chief Justice to come to the conclusion that the Minister exceeded his powers or acted in bad faith or even based his decision on considerations other than those contemplated in section 4(1) or 5(1), whichever may be applicable. In normal circumstances the right of review is a very limited right, but in these circumstances it is a right which is of absolutely nebulous value to the person seeking the review because of the limitation placed on the power of the Chief Justice. The gravamen of the amendment is therefore to delete those grounds upon which the Chief Justice may make a decision. It is in order to enable the Chief Justice to bring his mind to bear on all the issues and the circumstances, obviously limited by the normal rules of review. If this amendment is accepted, it does not mean that the Chief Justice could conduct a complete and full appeal on the merits. It is a review procedure, but at least it gives him the normal and complete powers of review which are not as limited as here. Therefore subsection (4) would read—

The central section of subsection (4) is therefore deleted. We believe that that would be an improvement and we hope that the hon. the Minister will accept the amendment. If the hon. the Minister does not accept the amendment we shall still support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the matter which I wish to raise is in the same field as that raised by the hon. member for Sandton, but I plan to do it in a different way. I accordingly wish to move the following amendment—

;or

1. (d) based his decision on a factual report referred to in section 7(3) and which did not conclusively support the recommendations contained therein.

The reason I do it this way is to have a positive indication of what the Chief Justice may consider; in other words, the factual report and the recommendation.

Together with the hon. member for King William’s Town, the hon. member for Sandton and others I want to say that this new procedure for review and reference to the Chief Justice is what has changed a great deal of our thinking towards this sort of authority which is assumed in this Bill. This comes close to what this party has always stood for. The hon. the Minister himself will be able to confirm that as far back as the original Schlebusch Commission, the investigation into certain organizations, our representatives on that commission in a minority report called for a system of judicial review by a judicial tribunal. This not only has a judicial body for reviewing but also provides that if rejected, it should go to the chief justice. This removes most of the evil and provides a safeguard against abuse of the powers which are being taken. This applies throughout this measure. However, the present provision in this clause which limits the Chief Justice, in turn weakens the value of the improvement. We believe that the Chief Justice should have the power, if he finds that the recommendation which has been made and the decision taken by the Minister is not in keeping with the factual report, to set aside the notice of the Minister. After all, what this proposes is simply that the Chief Justice shall take account of the inquiry, the factual report and the recommendation, whereas the hon. member for Sandton’s amendment I think leaves it too wide. It leaves it so wide that he could take into account any matters which pertain and which really are not part of the investigation. This amendment, however, pins it down to the issue which has to be decided. I should like to see one further step, not necessarily in relation to clause 11, but in regard to the review procedure provided for in clauses 28 and 29. I have in mind a final safeguard that will add just one more stamp of legitimacy and acceptability to this measure. I am not moving it as an amendment now as I do not think it is necessary at this stage, but it is a principle that will apply to further clauses. Where the Minister rejects the finding of an advisory committee, and it then goes to the Chief Justice who does not set aside the finding and the Minister continues with his action, I believe that the Minister should then have to report this fact to Parliament— i.e. that he should table a report in Parliament within 14 days or within 14 days after Parliament meets if it is in recess. The Minister should also table a record of those cases where he has gone against the judicial advice he had received from a review board or against the confirmation of that advice by the Chief Justice, and in that case Parliament would then be the final arbiter. I am not suggesting that the Minister’s power must be taken away, but I am asking that he should be made accountable, and that Parliament should know of the instances in which he has ignored the advice given to him. I should like to get reaction on this suggestion, because we will deal with it more firmly in later clauses. At this stage I wish only to suggest an expansion of the powers of the Chief Justice so that he can look at the factual report as well as at the recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we on this side of the House cannot agree with the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sandton and the hon. member for Durban Point. The hon. member emphasized three cardinal points here, namely (i) the “limited form of review”, (ii) the problem in connection with cross-examination in respect of this clause, and (iii) “the almost impossibility”, as he called it, of the Chief Justice arriving at a decision with reference to a Minister’s decision. I feel that the official Opposition and the hon. member for Durban Point should not see this clause as an entity on its own, but that they should consider this legislation, and specifically this clause, by starting from clause 7. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I just want to anticipate a clause in order to sketch the background, and perhaps then the hon. members will be able to see this clause in its true perspective.

Before the Minister exercises his authority to declare an organization unlawful, for example, or to ban a publication, in terms of the provisions of clause 7 of the Bill he must first consider a factual report and recommendation regarding the organization or publication in question made to him by an advisory committee appointed by the State President on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice to inquire into all matters relating to such organization or publication. This provision puts clause 10 into perspective to a greater extent.

When the Minister by notice in the Gazette declares an organization unlawful or bans a publication, he may, in terms of clause 10(3) (a) and (b), be requested to give reasons for his actions, and he must give as many of the reasons which induced him to issue the notice in question as can, in his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to the public interest.

In clause 11, provision is made for review of the Minister’s action by the Chief Justice. Here I cannot agree with the hon. member for Sandton that this would be difficult for the Chief Justice, because the Chief Justice or such other judge of the appellate division of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice may designate, is appointed to review the hon. the Minister’s action. Of course, it is also important in this regard to note that there is no infringement of the rights of an interested party to institute proceedings in a competent court to have a notice by which an organization is declared unlawful or a publication banned, declared invalid, provided such proceedings are proceedings as prescribed in clause 12. I think that when we get to the discussion of clause 12, the hon. member for Sandton will be able to see this clause we are now debating in better perspective.

I feel the hon. member for Durban Point would do well to consider two specific matters, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I want to digress for a moment. I refer to the case of the State vs. Moroe, or perhaps more specifically, Rex vs. Mososa (1931, CPD). In that case, Judge President Mr. Justice Gardiner said that it was more difficult for a fat man than a thin man to commit the offence of housebreaking. [Interjections.] Actually he was stating a hypothetical case. He said if there was an opening only large enough for a thin thief to get through, and a fat thief enlarged the opening so that he could get through, the fat thief was not committing the offence of housebreaking. [Interjections.]

I do not think we can endorse these amendments. It gives me pleasure to support the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, in response to what the hon. member for Overvaal said—I am referring here to the sensible part of his discussion—let me just point out to the Minister that he should not be misled by the statements of the hon. member for Overvaal and just summarily reject the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Durban Point, because here we come to one of the most cardinal questions being asked about internal security, and that is whether the Chief Justice does, in fact, have the power to overrule the decisions of the hon. the Minister, in this particular respect, only in regard to organizations and publications. In the discussions of the Second Reading, we made it very clear that one of the major reasons why we opposed the Bill at Second Reading was because we felt that the executive action did not have a sufficient judicial breaking or controlling effect, and the inclusion of the amendment, moved by the hon. member for Durban Point, to a very large extent rectifies that position. Here we are not speaking about whether the hon. the Minister exceeded his powers, or acted in bad faith, or in terms of clause ll(4)(c) “based his decision on conditions other than those contemplated in section 4(1) or section 5(1), whichever may be applicable”. We are talking here about the competence of the hon. the Minister’s judgment, in other words the merits of the case, whether it should be set aside or not. The hon. the Minister would be the first to recognize that there is a very real possibility that his judgment, despite the advice that he is given—because obviously he can disagree with the advice of the review board—could be in error. So, in order to produce a mechanism that is as failsafe as one can humanly make it, it is advisable to allow the judge, the Chief Justice, to have the power to overrule the hon. the Minister’s decision when it comes to deciding the merits of the case. This is very important indeed, and I therefore want to appeal to the hon. the Minister and to that side of the House not to summarily reject the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point. It is a very important question with very serious consequences, and I can therefore only appeal to the hon. the Minister.

Mr. Chairman, the crux of the matter remains the fact that the highest authority in the case of matters affecting the security of the State is the executive. That remains the crux of the matter. It also lies at the root of the argument we are conducting, namely to what extent the Chief Justice should be involved in the matter, if at all, and whether the State is prepared to concede that the judicial authority should have the final say in these matters or not.

Just in connection with the factual report.

Yes, but that is the principle that is at issue here. We cannot just concentrate on the question of whether the Chief Justice should consider the merits of the factual report and then just leave the matter at that. It all relates to the principle of who is the highest authority with regard to security matters. In this connection I refer hon. members once again to the Rabie Report, in which it is repeatedly indicated that with regard to matters of State security, the executive is the highest authority.

† That is the particular reason why I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point. My reason is based on this standpoint. If one accepts the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point, it means that the Chief Justice is empowered to substitute his own finding for that of the advisory committee on factual issues. That is what the hon. member is asking me to accept. For the reasons I have advanced, I am not prepared to accept that amendment.

That is, however, not the end of the story. The hon. member for Sandton also moved an amendment in this respect. He also wants something more than just a normal review. I have given one reason why I am not prepared to accept that. Another is that, as the hon. member for Overvaal has explained, the Minister concerned is in the first instance guided by a factual report which he may ask for. In the second instance he is advised by an advisory committee which has a lawyer as its chairman. Furthermore, one of the other members must be a lawyer by training and the third member will of necessity also be a highly trained individual in a specific field. The Minister is therefore advised by this advisory committee consisting of specialists on the facts of the case. Then it is for the Minister to come to a final decision based on this advice and all the facts which he has in his possession. It is only from that point onwards that the Minister must submit the particular issues to the Chief Justice for his consideration on review. Therefore, again, I feel that there are sufficient safeguards built into the system to cover the particular concern members have expressed in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, I accept that the executive carries the final responsibility, but we are going so far as to allow the Chief Justice to review the actions of the Minister in one respect. If the Minister makes a mistake, acts beyond his powers or does not act in conformity with the considerations which he is bound to take into account, his power can be interfered with. All I am asking is that the facts should also be taken into account so that the facts on which he acts can be reviewed. This will act as a safeguard against a mistake or abuse. It will act as a double safeguard. It will not necessarily only be a safeguard against abuse of power, but also against a mistake where an action is not justified by the facts in the evidence. I really ask the hon. the Minister to think again about this before we get to the later clauses, because there this issue is going to become far more vital. Here it is perhaps not so crucial because one is dealing with a different procedure, but later on, when we deal with persons detained in terms of clauses 28 and 29, this becomes a far more important factor. We will later move that the same procedure must apply in respect of clause 29. I really think the hon. the Minister is missing the point of the value this can have for making this procedure acceptable to public opinion, to those who believe in the rule of law and to world opinion which criticizes us for our so-called totalitarian methods of detention. One knocks it all on the head by providing that the top man, the Chief Justice, can review and prevent any abuse of this power. The value to the country, the value internationally, the value in combating attacks on us without taking away the hon. the Minister’s power, I believe, is what is very important. Should the hon. the Minister be adamant, however, I want to come back to my previous suggestion that he should report to Parliament when he acts against a recommendation, so that Parliament can call him to account in his executive capacity.

The hon. the Minister has failed to deal with that, and I ask him to deal with that as well.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban Point will remember that in the good old days of the Schlebusch Commission … [Interjections.]

You mean the bad old days of the Schlebusch Commission! [Interjections.]

In the good old days of the Schlebusch Commission, when politics was not as involved as it is today, when Parliament basically consisted of the Natte and the Sappe, who governed the country, and that was that, we did not have so much trouble from people with left-wing tendencies. [Interjections.] In those days the Government was adamant about it that the executive would be the highest authority as far as State security was concerned. The United Party in those days was just as adamant about it that the judiciary should be the highest authority in some respects. Today we still differ with the official Opposition, and I am still not prepared to agree with that particular point of view. Therefore the hon. member for Durban Point should just accept that the Government is not prepared to subscribe to that point of view. That is why I am not prepared to accept this amendment or any other similar amendments in connection with clause 20, once we come to it. As far as the hon. member’s alternative suggestion is concerned, however, I want him to give me some time to consider the matter. When clause 29 is discussed later this evening we can come back to the matter. That does not mean that I will agree to it, but it is nevertheless a suggestion which I should like to consider.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. the Minister for his reply. I should, however, want to point out to him that in terms of subsection (4) the hon. the Minister has already said that the executive is the highest authority. I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the fact, however, that the principle has already been accepted by him in terms of this clause. The Chief Justice may therefore set aside steps taken by the hon. the Minister in respect of subsection (4)(a), (b) and (c). We are merely asking for the inclusion of a paragraph (d), which will bring in the merits and the facts of the case. The hon. the Minister has already accepted the other three paragraphs of subsection (4), in terms of which he admits that he cannot be the highest authority in the land. The Chief Justice may set aside the hon. the Minister’s decision. I do not believe therefore that that argument applies. The hon. the Minister has already accepted it. We are now offering the hon. the Minister the opportunity to bring in a paragraph (d), indicated by the hon. member for Durban Point, as an additional factor, which will include both the facts and the merits of the case. The hon. the Minister has already accepted that the Chief Justice may set aside his decisions. I am therefore afraid that that is not a foundation for the argument put forward by him, and we once again appeal to the hon. the Minister to reconsider his decision.

Open up your heart and let the sun shine in, Louis!

Amendment moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 12:

Mr. Chairman, I move the two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 25, in line 12, to omit “fourteen” and to substitute “thirty”
2. (2) on page 25, in lines 23 to 30, to omit subsection (2).

The first amendment relates to a time limit within which an aggrieved party may approach the court. In my first amendment I ask that the time limit be extended from 14 days to 30 days. In order to prepare documentation for review 14 days can in certain circumstances be a too short a period. I do not believe anybody will be prejudiced in any way should this period be extended to 30 days. It will merely ensure that there will at least be a reasonable time within which a party may lodge documentation to bring the matter under review. I therefore ask the hon. the Minister to accept that first amendment.

I feel a sense of futility in having moved the second amendment because it relates to negating a provision in terms of which the intervention of a court is allowed. Subsection (2) reads—

1. (a) pronounce upon the validity of any notice issued under section 4(2)(a).

Clause 4(2)(a) relates to the power of the Minister simply to issue a notice stating that an organization that existed many years ago has been perpetuated in a new type of organization which is now declared to be the same as such old organization. Clause 12(2) provides further—

1. (b) make an order whereby, pending the outcome of any proceedings referred to in subsection (1), the operation of any notice issued by the Minister in terms of section 4(1) or 5(1) is suspended or in any manner postponed.

This means that pending any review proceeding or any other court action a court cannot make an order temporarily suspending an order made by the Minister in declaring an organization unlawful or in declaring a publication unlawful and banning that publication.

Perhaps in the circumstances of what the hon. the Minister has been saying throughout in regard to the various provisions of this Bill, I feel that this is a somewhat futile amendment to move in that I sense that it will not be accepted. At the same time, however, we feel that the courts should not be by-passed and that executive action should not hold final sway. It is for these reasons that I move the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I have an open mind in regard to the question of the 30 days. In fact, this party moved an amendment on a previous clause to make it 21 days where the Government Gazette was involved because, thanks to the hon. the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, it sometimes takes a week for the Government Gazette to arrive. Therefore, as I say, we go along with the first amendment.

However, we do not go along with the second amendment entirely, namely to omit subsection (2). We would like to see a court still able to pronounce although we accept the fact that one could not have a court suspending an order pending the outcome of proceedings. In many cases that would frustrate and negate the intention. Therefore, without wanting to argue the matter at length, I wish to move the following amendment—

This will mean that the prohibition will apply only to the suspension of an order pending proceedings but will permit the court to pronounce on the validity of a notice. I think this matter has been argued fully and I do not wish to belabour it any further. I want therefore to commend this alternative amendment to the hon. the Minister which does half of what the hon. member for Sandton is seeking to do.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sandton was quite correct when he said that his second amendment was rather futile. I say this, Sir, because it is not acceptable for several reasons.

*When one examines section 3(2) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, one finds in it the same time limit which one finds in this clause. In the 1950 Act, too, only 14 days are allowed. This is the first reason why we should not deviate from this.

The hon. member for Sandton did not consider the provisions of clause 11(2) of the Bill either. He moved amendments to that clause, too, but in that case he was quite satisfied with the period of 14 days within which the petition had to be lodged. In this clause, however, he is not satisfied with the period of 14 days within which certain steps must be taken in terms of the clause.

The main reason why we cannot agree to extending the period to 30 days, as the hon. member wants us to do, is that speed is of the essence. The Rabie Commission makes this very clear. The Rabie Commission says in its report that it considers it to be of the utmost importance that finality should be reached as quickly as possible with regard to the action to be taken. Now the hon. member says that 14 days is not enough time for an effected person to prepare his documentation. In my opinion, that is not a valid argument.

Furthermore, the Rabie Commission points out that when it comes to the prohibition of publications or the declaration of organizations to be unlawful organizations, a liquidator is appointed who has to exercise control over the assets and goods of the organization which is declared unlawful. If one allowed a period of 30 days, a practical problem would arise for the liquidator of such an organization. What is he to do with the assets and goods of this organization during a period of 30 days? That is why the Rabie Commission says in its report that the matter should be finalized as quickly as possible.

There is yet another aspect. Clause 11 deals with the review of the steps taken in respect of organizations or publications. The review procedure prescribed by clause 11 is an alternative to the procedure contained in clause 12. It is undesirable and would be bad law if the periods which the interested parties are allowed in terms of the two clauses were to differ. For that reason, too, the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton is not acceptable.

As far as the hon. member’s second amendment is concerned, the hon. member himself conceded that he did not believe that it would be acceptable to us. I think he was quite correct in that respect. We are dealing here with an organization in a new guise. A specific organization is declared unlawful under a particular name, but then simply reappears under a different name. Actually it still consists of the same group of people and it is still the same organization. However, it has re-emerged under a different name. In terms of clause 12(2), when such an organization in a new guise has been declared by the Minister to be the same as an organization which has already been declared unlawful, it is absolutely essential, and it actually goes without saying, that under those circumstances, the interested parties should not have any recourse to the courts. In actual fact, one is simply dealing here with the younger brother of the big brother who has faded into the background. In terms of clause 12(2)(b), when proceedings are instituted in terms of clause 12(1), no one can request that the operation of the notice be suspended or postponed. In this respect, I strongly endorse what was said by the hon. member for Durban Point. In this connection I agree with him.

For these reasons, the amendments of both the hon. member for Sandton and the hon. member for Durban Point are not acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. member for Durban North for a very effective reply. I do not wish to repeat everything.

†  May I just say to the hon. member, in respect of his particular amendment to this clause, that paragraph 2(a) is really just a re-enactment of section l(3)(d) of Act 34 of 1960.

This is the chance to improve it.

In my view it cannot be discarded, because, as the hon. member for Ermelo has explained, it would then be possible for an unlawful organization, by means of continually changing its name and instituting court proceedings against being declared unlawful after such a change of name, indefinitely to frustrate the taking of steps against it. It is as simple as that.

As far as the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sandton are concerned, the report of the Rabie Commission is very clear and in this regard I refer you to paragraph 11.4.9.21. The period of 14 days is the usual period allowed for in respect of all the different procedures of this kind. It is discussed in the report and it is accepted as a fair and reasonable period. Because of the time factor, I do not want to go into all the details that the report already enumerates.

*With regard to clause 12 as a whole, it is a verbatim re-enactment of the corresponding section in Act 34 of 1960. The substance of the clause is that no court shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon a finding of the Minister that a particular organization is in fact an organization which has already been declared unlawful under a different name. The practical need for this measure, which was approved by this House in 1960 and which has never given rise to any unreasonable action, is obvious. An organization cannot be allowed to frustrate essential steps against it indefinitely merely by changing its name and by instituting proceedings as a result of this.

The directive contained in clause (2)(b) is new. It is intended to ensure certainty in law concerning the status of a particular organization or publication at a given moment, as recommended by the Rabie Commission.

For these reasons I cannot take the matter any further, and under the circumstances I cannot accept the amendments moved by the hon. members.

Amendments moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 13:

Mr. Chairman, I move the first two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper as follows—

1. (1) On page 25, in line 49, to omit “, be in possession of”;
2. (2) on page 25, in line 64, and on page 27, in line 1, to omit “or objects similar to the objects of such organization”.

I do not intend moving the third amendment. We consider that the wording of clause 13(1)(a)(ii) is far too wide. The fact that nobody may “be in possession of or display anything whatsoever indicating that he is or was at any time before or after the commencement of this Act an office-bearer, officer or member of or in any way associated with the unlawful organization” seems to us to be going very far indeed. People have things in their possession which they do not even know about. It may also well be that a person who was a former officer-bearer of an unlawful organization is subjected to raids by the Security Police and, quite accidentally, discovered in his house there may be some badge or other insignia of office which could get him into serious trouble. When I say “serious trouble” I mean serious trouble. This subsection must be looked at together with the penalty clause. The penalties are laid down in clause 56(1), under which anybody who in any way infringes the provisions of clause 13(1)(a) becomes liable. That penalty is imprisonment, without the option of a fine, of up to ten years. We believe that is an absurd provision to have to punish somebody for “being in possession of” which simply means that one may have something lying around in a drawer, for example, a pamphlet or something of that nature, and, as I say, having been subjected to raids by the Security Police, is hauled in because nothing else can be found against such a person. We have had examples in the not too distant past where exactly that sort of person has been penalized for having, say, a banned book in his possession. In this case it would be a pamphlet belonging to a banned organization. That is the reason for my first amendment.

The second amendment relates to the advocating of objects similar to the objects of a banned organization. That goes very wide as well because there are many objects which are perfectly innocent but which are exactly the same as the objects of some not so innocent organization, such as, shall we say, equal pay for equal work or higher wages or better conditions of work. All these could easily be the declared objects of a banned organization and they could equally be the objects of a perfectly lawful organization such as a trade union which is pressing for better conditions for its workers.

I move only these two amendments. I am not going to move the third amendment because I can see that it could create very considerable difficulties. It relates to the taking possession of the assets of an organization which is declared unlawful by a liquidator. I must, however, say something in this connection although I am not moving the amendment. I notice that the hon. the Minister’s predecessor, that is the Minister of Justice, is having considerable trouble getting rid of the assets of all those organizations which were declared unlawful in 1977. According to a reply which I received in answer to a question which I put two years ago, the assets of the organizations declared illegal in 1977, excluding the Christian Institute the amount in respect of which is not declared, amounted to the very considerable sum of just on R196 000. That is a lot of money. Apparently the Minister or the liquidator must have been shopping around to find some scientific cultural organization—I think this was laid down—which could receive this amount of money but nobody would touch it with a barge-pole. It is tainted money and, apparently, the liquidator could not find an organization that was prepared to accept this rather magnificent gift of R196 000. So now, of course, the money is just being kicked back into the State Revenue Fund, according to clause 14(3). Too bad, is it not, that no one will touch this tainted money? Maybe if the Government had shown a little generosity just prior to banning the organization and had asked the office-bearers, having warned them that this was going to take place, which welfare organization they would recommend, the money could have been decently disposed of. [Interjections.] It could have been used to the advantage of the Animal Welfare Fund or anything that they preferred. Any registered welfare organization should have been able to receive this money and had it had the blessing of the organization whose money had been confiscated I am sure it would have been accepted. Not under the present circumstances, however. So it is simply being swiped by the State. I want to point out that not one of these organizations has indeed been given a chance to defend itself in a court of law, other than the old plea of mala fides.

What has that got to do with this clause?

It has a lot to do with the clause.

You are just thinking aloud. You have not moved your amendment.

No, but I am nevertheless talking to the subsection in regard to which I have an amendment, and I am perfectly entitled to do that. That subsection remains in clause 13, and I am entitled to talk to it. However, I have made my point…

And you got away with it too.

I did not get away with anything. It is the hon. the Minister who has got away with all that money. It is now going into the State Revenue Fund. The hon. the Minister swiped it from the organizations. He could not find anybody to take it over, and this was handled in a very uncharitable way indeed. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Houghton has just referred to the money “swiped” by the Minister.

Yes, swiped.

I want to suggest that if a specific influence had not been exercised by certain sectors and certain organizations had not been intimidated, this problem would never have arisen. In my opinion that money is in any case of more use in the Treasury than if it had been possible to use to the benefit of those organizations. I feel there can be no doubt about that.

I believe the hon. member for Houghton conceded that her third amendment was unacceptable, because she realized that there were practical problems in this connection. In my opinion this side of the House feels no remorse about the matter of money taken from such organizations to be given to another organization or which might even end up in the Treasury.

As regards the question of ownership or specific property belonging to an unlawful organization, I agree wholeheartedly with the provisions of this clause. The penalty clause is severe but, as I have already said, in Ireland and Britain in similar cases a fine of £1 000 is imposed. Our penal provision is therefore not exorbitant. As far as the question of ownership is concerned it is clear that it is not totally prohibited, but that the same onus applies which applies to the possession of explosives, housebreaking implements or anything of that nature. If any person therefore came into possession of such items innocently, he may in fact be found not guilty if he is able to advance a reasonable explanation for such possession.

In my opinion the hon. member for Houghton used a very poor example of the objections of an organization to try to indicate what the background to her argument was, because I could not understand it. If an organization’s objections and the way in which it functions indicate that it could be a banned organization, it must expect to be prosecuted. I therefore support this clause without reservation.

Mr. Chairman, I rise only to say that we shall not support these amendments. The first two amendments that have been moved were designed solely to make it more difficult to deal with people who are members of subversive or unlawful organizations. I cannot see how one can be in possession of something and say there is not, in fact, any association involved. [Interjections.] If someone has a membership card in his bottom drawer, he should get rid of it if he knows that the particular organization is illegal. [Interjections.] I do not know what they are scared of. Surely if one searches certain premises and finds something in somebody’s bottom drawer, e.g. a membership card of the Communist Party, the ANC or some other body, one could simply say that because one was not carrying it on one’s person one was, in fact, not a member. If one must to go those extremes to protect these people, all I can say is that I am sorry, but we do not want to go along with it. The same applies to “objects similar to the objects of an unlawful organization.” There have been so many bodies that have changed their names but have, in fact continued to propagate views very similar to the views propagated by the body previously declared unlawful. I see hon. members of the PFP smiling over there. I wonder what they are afraid they might be accused of propagating, if the objects are similar to the objects of an unlawful organization …

We are not smiling at you; we are, in fact, laughing at you.

I would be out of order if I were to say what I was thinking, so I will not say what I was thinking. [Interjections.] I will simply explore the possible arguments for wanting to make it more difficult to catch communists and subversives. I leave it to hon. members to imagine why a political party would want to make it more difficult to get a conviction against a communist…

Conviction?

… or a revolutionary.

Get a conviction?

Well, to bring them to heel.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I just wonder whether you should allow a member to …

Order! The hon. member must take a point of order.

That is precisely what I am trying to do. I wonder, Sir, whether you should allow an hon. member to make the sort of insinuation or innuendo by posing a question in the way in which the hon. member has just posed it now. [Interjections.] His question was: I wonder why the PFP wants to make it more difficult to catch or prosecute or convict a communist. [Interjections.] I do not believe that is parliamentary.

Order! I listened very carefully to the hon. member for Durban Point and I did not interpret it in that way. I therefore cannot uphold the point of order. The hon. member for Durban Point may proceed.

I gather that the third amendment has not been moved, so I shall not argue the point, but if it were moved, we would not support it either. I just want to put that on record.

We accept the clause as it stands.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to reply briefly to what the hon. member for Houghton said. In the first place I want to deal with her amendment in connection with the matter of possession. The matter of possession is not as innocent as the hon. member tried to imply. I concede that there may be times when a person may innocently be found with something in his possession, but there are quite enough ways in which such a person can prove his innocence, which ought not to be to his disadvantage. What is important however, is that we cannot do without this provision in connection with possession in this clause, because the mere possession of an object can also be used in a passive but calculating and subtle manner to propagate the activities of certain unlawful organizations. As a matter of fact it has repeatedly been found that possession is the forerunner of a more conspicuous carrying or displaying of the object. I do not want to go into too much detail here but from our point of view possession is important. It is therefore essential that provision be made for possession in this clause.

As far as the second amendment of the hon. member is concerned, I want to repeat that a person can pretend to act quite innocently and with the best of intentions. I do not question the hon. member’s motivation for her amendment. However, we have also experienced the problem in practice that a person has tried to promote the aims of an organization subtly and when we wanted to arrest him, he tried to hide behind that subtleness. That is why the State and the legal draftsmen have learnt through experience over the years that the correct approach is to make the fullest possible provision for a matter. That is why the words were inserted which the hon. member wants deleted, namely “or objects similar to the objects of such organization”. From our point of view it is essential to have even this in the clause to make provision for the eventualities I described. That is why it is difficult for me to accept the amendment and I am asking that the clause be accepted unchanged.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 15:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 29, in line 40, to omit “forty” and to substitute “ten”;
2. (2) on page 31, in line 5, to omit paragraph (c).

Clause 15 provides for the registration of newspapers. I do not think there can be any real objection to the fact of the registration of newspapers. The fact that newspapers have to be registered and have to be recorded as being newspapers, with the legal connotations that flow from that, has been part of our law for a long time. We do, however, object to the fact that the registration fee has been increased from R20 000—or perhaps is is from R10 000—to R40 000. This is a very large sum of money.

It could of course be argued that over the years inflation has taken its toll and that the value of money has diminished. That argument is not without substance, but if one takes into account that the sum of R40 000 even in today’s times is a really large sum of money, I believe one will find that it is excessive. This is a deposit paid to the State and, if this publication falls foul of the Minister in terms of clause 5(1), be it only one edition of that publication, and it is consequently banned and taken off the streets, this deposit of R40 000 can in fact be forfeited.

I also see the registration sum of R40 000 as a tremendous hindrance to new businesses and persons who may wish to start up a newspaper in different parts of the country. Not every newspaper has the circulation of Rapport, the Sunday Times, The Star or Die Transvaler—I should exclude Die Transvaler because that hardly has a circulation—or one of the other major newspapers.

Watch Beeld too.

Many of these newspapers are small newspapers circulating in small towns and country districts. The institution of a deposit of R40 000 before such a newspaper might be registered is in my opinion a great hindrance to the freedom of expression or the free flow of information.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h00.

Evening Sitting

Mr. Chairman, does the hon. the Minister wish to ask me a question?

Yes. Will the hon. member for Sandton be so kind as to cut it short, please? [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, you will remember a story I told very long ago in this House, of which the hon. the Minister reminds me again now. It is a story relating to cutting things short. [Interjections.] I hope that the hon. the Minister, who hails from that enormous city of Potchefstroom, where he received his incredibly erudite legal training will understand the point I am trying to make.

I shall do my best. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I was saying in relation to clause 15 that some of the difficulties we have with this clause, are, firstly, the very large sum of money which is required before a newspaper can be registered. I am trying to make this point, which, I believe, is an important point, namely that this will be a retarding influence on the establishment of new newspapers, on the dissemination of information and on the dissemination of news. I am sure it will not affect the very large newspapers, but it is certainly going to be a damper on the starting of new newspapers and publications.

The other objection we have to this clause relates to the terms or the reasons for which the registration of a newspaper might lapse. It is in this connection that a second amendment has been moved. I believe that at least two of the provisions of clause 15(5) are indeed unreasonable. The first provision states that the registration of a newspaper will lapse if the newspaper is at any time not printed and published during a period exceeding one month.

That was also the provision in the predecessing legislation.

That is not part of your amendment, is it?

No, it is not. I do, however, wish to speak to this matter. We believe this is an unreasonable provision. We live in a time of labour difficulties and of changes in the patterns of labour organizations. We have had strikes on newspapers, strikes which could occur again, and we know that this particular provision was used only two years ago to close down a certain newspaper.

We feel this is an unreasonable period of time. We believe that a newspaper’s registration should not lapse purely when it is strikebound or ceases to be published for so short a period.

The second point is that if the newspaper changes hands—and I think that is the substance of the amendment which I moved— the registration of that newspaper should not automatically lapse. I believe that many newspapers which are controlled by companies—some of which are private companies— do from time to time change hands. If the shares in a public company are involved and relate to take-overs or mergers or aspects of that nature, we believe the registration of the newspaper should not automatically lapse. Hence the motivation for my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sandton is concerned about the large sums of money involved in the deposit, which in terms of this clause is being increased from R20 000 to R40 000. In the Rabie Commission report it is indicated that the sum of R20 000 was fixed for the first time in 1971. Since then the value of money has of course dropped considerably, and this is one of the reasons for the increase, as indicated by the Rabie Commission in its report. However, that is not all. I think one must consider the particular responsibility resting on the Press, particularly in these times. One must also consider the pattern some of these publications have followed in the past. The hon. member for Johannesburg West pointed out that since 1950 only eight publications have been banned, but if one analyses them, essentially only two were banned, for every time the relevant newspapers were published in another form and in another guise. As a result one must not merely look at one side of the entire matter.

I feel, as far as the newspaper business is concerned, that we should, in the light of this clause, take clear cognizance of the world-wide development in the Press service and of specific responsibilities resting on the Press in this regard. As a Government and a State we are unequivocally anti-communist. In a recent publication, International Freedom under Attack, compiled by a certain Dante D. Pascel, various writers expressed their concern regarding the work of and the hold which Communism in its various manifestations is gaining over the international news media. This includes international broadcasts, the ordinary mass media, the role of the Third World in this connection and the politics of Press censorship. The writers in this book also show that the Russians have been trying since 1976, by means of the acceptance of specific proposals by Unesco, to place all mass media under the control of Unesco. The aim of these steps is quite obvious when one reads this book.

In the book on page 150 and further, specific reference is also made to the establishment of a Marxist Centre in Prague under the control of the International Organization of Journalists. This organization is a highly effective part of the Marxist information machine, and is the largest organization in the journalistic world at this stage and controls 150 000 journalists in 109 countries. The organization also provides a great deal of school education and training for journalists from, inter alia, the Third World.

With this as a background I feel that this amount as a deposit and the control over the Press in general is essential.

The question of a change in name, which was the final point raised by the hon. member for Sandton, is in my opinion untenable. In consequence of the various publications which have already appeared and the changes in name which have taken place from time to time, I believe that this is a good solution to the problem in this regard.

As far as the question of publication within one month is concerned, the position is made quite clear in subsection (5), where it is provided that—

The decision therefore rests with the Minister in co-operation with the Minister of Internal Affairs, and if a legitimate or sound reason can be indicated as to why these specific publications could not appear for over a month, I do not believe that these Ministers, in the responsible positions they occupy, would act unreasonably. For this reason I have no problem in supporting the entire clause.

Mr. Chairman, the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sandton are not acceptable to me. As far as the first amendment is concerned, I want to point out that we decided as long ago as 1962 that the registration fee would be R20 000. According to the Reserve Bank the R20 000 of 1962 is now worth R78 000, but we are only asking for R40 000. This is a very fair amount, and the hon. member may as well accept it.

As far as the second amendment is concerned, I should like to point out that experience has taught us that it is of very little use from a security point of view to exercise control over the registration of a newspaper while a newspaper can, after registration, merely undergo a change of ownership and once again fall into the hands of undesirable persons. Consequently the second amendment is not acceptable to me either.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 16:

Mr. Chairman, we on these benches are going to oppose this clause. The clause relates to the composition of a consolidated list and in our view this amounts to a continuing and additional penalty on the people concerned. The clause relates to a list which shall be compiled, in the first place, of the names of members of organizations which have been banned or restricted and which appear on the liquidator’s list, and secondly, it relates also to people who have been convicted in terms of clauses 54, 55 and 56(1) of the Bill of offences relating to terrorism or sedition and to people furthering or deemed to be furthering the objects of communism. It refers also to people who have been restricted from certain places—this could also include of course house arrests—and it also refers to people who have been detained at any time in terms of the preventive detention provisions. The clause also deals with those who have been listed since the initial legislation was passed in 1950. In these circumstances the names of the people are recorded after they have had the opportunity of objecting and the Director shall then in terms of the provisions publish a notice in the Gazette of the names on the list.

As I say, the clause provides that a person whose name does appear on the list will have the opportunity of objecting, but in effect this really amounts to rubbing salt into the wound. What we are doing is to set up, by compiling a list of this kind, some sort of doomsday list which must carry with it some sort of stigma for the person concerned.

It carries with it a considerable stigma.

Yes, that is correct. In terms of the provision, the Minister may remove the name of a person after good cause shown for the removal of his name. It does not say the Minister “shall”; it says the Minister “may”; in other words, the name of a person who at any stage has fallen foul of the law in terms of any of these provisions, will remain on the consolidated list. Even if he shows good cause he is still subject to the good naturedness or the sense of justice of the Minister at the time. It is a permissive thing; it is not a compulsory thing. The Minister “may”, if good cause is shown, remove his name from the list. It is obviously therefore intended as an on-going punitive measure, even after a person has received punishment and has been restricted and subjected to all these provisions. We believe it then hangs like a sword of Damocles over any individual who at some stage in his life may have fallen foul of these very far-reaching laws in that his name remains on the list. It can be used by the authorities as a sword of Damocles over the person concerned and we believe this is totally unnecessary. We believe that it is a provision which recurs time and time again throughout the Bill because there is frequent reference to the consolidated list. We believe it is totally bad in principle. We also believe it is a doubling of the penalty and a continuing punitive provision, and for those reasons we are going to oppose the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the …

The clause?

No, I want to support the hon. member for Berea. I am not supporting this clause.

That was a nice try, Vlokkie.

I am not supporting this clause; I am against the clause for the reasons already set out by the hon. member for Berea. I want to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 31, in lines 26 to 29, to omit paragraph (c);
2. (2) on page 33, in line 8, to omit “(b) or (c)”.

Clause 16(1)(c) refers to persons in respect of whom a prohibition imposed under clause 19(1)(a) or (2) is in force or who are or have been detained in terms of the provisions of clause 28. Interestingly enough all three categories of people are people who have been by ministerial edict declared guilty and either restricted and banned or have been placed in preventive detention. Those are the three categories of people affected by this clause. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we do not believe that anyone can be punished in this way without the decision of the ordinary courts of law and we do not believe that it should be left to ministerial edict to do this. The result of this, as the hon. member for Berea has mentioned, can be very serious indeed. This consolidated list is like the list in the Gilbert and Sullivan opera, the Mikado, where someone sings “I’ve got a little list, I’ve got a little list.” However, it is much more sinister than the little list kept in the Mikado because if one is on this consolidated list all sorts of consequences may follow one throughout one’s lifetime. It may mean that such a person may never get a passport if he applies for one. It may mean that one cannot become a member of a provincial council. In fact, one is specifically and expressly forbidden in clauses 33 and 34 from standing for or becoming or remaining a member of the provincial council or of this House. Therefore, as a result of ministerial edict one will probably be punished for the rest of one’s life. It will only be by the grace of the Security Police rather than the Minister that one may finally, if one is lucky, have one’s name removed from that list. Ministers are very careful about what they do when someone is on a consolidated list. I know this from years of experience of trying to get passports for people who were once banned or who might have been in preventive detention or who in some way or another got themselves onto the list of the Security Branch, let alone the consolidated list. It is almost impossible—I would not say entirely impossible because there have been cases where people have succeeded but at least very difficult indeed to free these people from the on-going punitive effects of being placed on the consolidated list.

My amendment to omit “(b) or (c)” in fine 8 on page 33 simply means in effect— this is a very innocuous amendment and the hon. the Minister may even consider it—that clause 16(3)(c) will then read as follows—

The clause as it stands refers to (b) or (c) but I want to omit this to make it include (a), (b) and (c); in other words, I want everyone who has in any way been included on a consolidated list to be notified by the Director that he has been put on the list. I think that is a very reasonable amendment and the hon. the Minister should have no difficulty in accepting it.

Mr. Chairman, having just listened to the argument of the hon. member for Berea in favour of this clause being rejected in its entirety and having also listened to the argument of the hon. member for Houghton, I was again struck by how one-sided and dangerous the hon. members of that party are with regard to security matters. The people whose names appear on this list are not angels. These were people who were looking for trouble, who committed an offence or who intend to commit an offence. [Interjections.] Listen to those hon. members carrying on because they do not understand what is involved here. I repeat: The people whose names appear on this list are not angels. What does this clause deal with? A record, or as it is referred to here, a consolidated list of people who have been guilty or intend to be guilty of offences jeopardizing the security of the State, shall be kept in an orderly way. Nothing more and nothing less is involved. It is a direct result of the Rabie Commission’s recommendation that the lists referred to in section 8 and compiled in terms of section 4(10) or section 7(2), should be revised. I am referring here to paragraph 11.3.2.22 of the Rabie report. Sir, here we have yet another example of the unpatriotic and decadent attitude of the hon. members of that party with regard to the security of the country.

Mr. Chairman, on a point or order: Is the hon. member allowed to refer to “unpatriotic and decadent” principles on this side of the House?

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word decadent.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it. Because of the attitude the hon. members have adopted in connection with this legislation, they stand branded in the eyes of all peace-loving South Africans as people who can never be entrusted with the responsibility of governing this country. Although they could make a contribution with regard to the security of the State here, they are not even prepared to do that.

It gives me pleasure to support this clause in its entirety. We do not see our way clear to accepting any of the amendments moved by the hon. member for Berea or the hon. member for Houghton.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think the hon. member for Berea expects me to discuss with him the principle involved here. That is clear as far as both sides of the House are concerned.

It would be exciting if you did.

As far as the hon. member for Houghton is concerned I cannot accept her amendments for two important reasons. In the first place the hon. member asked that the names of restricted persons and also persons detained in terms of clause 28, should not appear on the list. But these may be people whose activities were of such a nature that drastic steps had to be taken against them.

Then you should charge them in the courts.

That is why it is necessary that their activities, statements, speeches and remarks should be monitored by placing their names on the consolidated list. For this reason I cannot accede to this request.

As far as the second amendment is concerned we would have a practical problem if I were to accede to the hon. member’s request. The persons mentioned in clause 16(1)(a) are frequently people, officials or members of unlawful organizations whose addresses we cannot readily ascertain. Frequently the available documents are out of date. In addition, there may be a large number of people and it is not physically possible to take that task on our shoulders so that the Director of Security Legislation can notify everyone in person at their addresses. That is why this list must also be published in the Government Gazette. The important reason why I cannot agree with the hon. member is because it creates a practical problem which in my opinion is not worth placing on the shoulders of the Director of Security Legislation.

And if it says “where possible”?

Mr. Chairman, I have given my reply.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, clause 18 is another clause that we on this side of the House cannot support. It relates to restrictions in regard to certain persons and their membership of certain organizations and public bodies. In fact, it gives the hon. the Minister, once again, extremely wide powers in regard to various persons.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, Sir, the hon. member may ask a question when I have finished with my speech. This clause gives the hon. the Minister extremely wide powers. It reads—

1. (a) who the Minister is satisfied engages in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order …

That is the one category. Then there is also the person—

1. (b) whose name appears on the consolidated list …

which we were discussing in connection with the previous clause. The hon. the Minister may require such people to do any number of things. He may require a person, in these circumstances, to resign from any organization. He may require him to refrain from becoming an office-bearer. He may even require him—and this is a very startling provision—to “refrain from becoming a member of any public body specified in the notice or from holding any public office so specified …”. So this gives the hon. the Minister the widest possible power. The hon. the Minister, in his own discretion, can interfere in the life of a person, can interfere in the contacts such a person has in the community, the contacts such a person has with any organization. The hon. the Minister, in his discretion, can simply, by way of notice, require such a person to resign from office or not to stand for any public office. It is the most wide-ranging of powers that are being given to this hon. Minister. We can see no reason whatsoever for this power to be given to any Minister of State. We believe that it is open to considerable abuse. For any reason whatsoever the Minister—perhaps not this hon. Minister but perhaps another hon. Minister—may simply victimize a person and say he is to be restricted and is not to be allowed to take part in public life, to serve on the local town council, to serve on the local health committee or whatever the case may be. We believe that this provision goes far beyond any bounds of reasonableness and we shall therefore oppose this clause.

Mr. Chairman,

I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (b) who has been convicted of an offence specified in Schedule 2,

It specifically relates to clause 18(1)(b), its effect being that the restrictions would only apply to those individuals who have been convicted of an offence specified in schedule of the Bill. The first portion of the provision that it seeks to delete are those words which relate to the consolidated list. Clause 16 has already been dealt with, and in clause 16(1)(c) one notices for example that persons who have been restricted in terms of section 19 have to be on this list as well. That has been dealt with. One wants to prevent that those individuals who have been restricted in terms of clause 19 and who have not been convicted of any particular offence are liable to further punishment by being placed on the consolidated list as is provided for in clause 18. It is quite clear that, if one has been restricted in terms of clause 19, it does not necessarily mean that one will automatically be entered in the consolidated list, because the clause provides that the Minister may by written notice place one on that list. Nevertheless, that power is still in the hands of the Minister and one wants to prevent the situation arising where the decision whether or not a person who has been restricted will appear on the list will be based on the discretionary power of the Minister.

The remaining portions of paragraph (b) which one ought to delete and which I am moving to delete relate to the far-reaching powers the Minister has, in deciding whether or not a person should appear on the consolidated list. The amendment concerns that person—

That is so wide and gives the Minister such a wide discretion that, again, one ought to temper that discretion.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether he could possibly tell the Committee why the hon. member for Yeoville was not here yesterday when the vote on the Second Reading was taken?

Order!

Why was the Minister of Defence not here?

If the hon. member had taken the trouble of reading a newspaper, he would have seen that the hon. member for Yeoville addressed the German-South African Chamber of Commerce at a luncheon in Johannesburg.

Do you know what he said there? [Interjections.]

Order!

The powers which the Minister has in terms of paragraph (b) entitle him to restrict someone if in the view of the Minister that person is likely to engage the activities endangering the security of the State. That is the vaguest test which can be applied.

Order! Hon. members are conversing much too loudly in this House. If hon. members cannot lower their voices, they should rather go and talk in the lobby. The hon. member for Durban Central is making a serious point and hon. members should listen to him. The hon. member may proceed.

Thank you, Sir. I was trying to indicate how wide the Minister’s powers are in terms of this paragraph, because he is entitled to place a restriction on an individual if in his view that person is likely to engage in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State. So there are two aspects: The first is the likelihood of him doing so and the second is the endangering of the security of the State. Both of those tests are so vague and leave the Minister with such wide powers that they cannot be incorporated in a Bill which is supposed to deal with the security of the State and in which there are no adequate safeguards.

Then there is an amendment printed on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Pinetown. I believe that the hon. the Minister intends dealing with that aspect. Perhaps he could indicate to us on what basis that aspect will be dealt with in the future.

Mr. Chairman, just before the hon. member for Krugersdorp addresses the Committee, allow me to explain to the hon.member for Durban Central that, without moving an amendment, I intend to assist the hon. member in agreeing to allow the information which is being requested to be given, but not by way of an amendment to the Bill. I shall, however, do it by way of an inclusion in the notice that has to be served on a person in terms of this particular clause, and also the following clauses to which this provision may apply.

Clauses 19, 20 and 28?

Yes, up to clause 28.

Mr. Chairman, we shall not reach agreement tonight as far as this clause is concerned, purely because we and the PFP hold completely different views. However, I believe that hon. members—and specifically the hon. member for Berea—are not being reasonable in their approach when they allege that the hon. the Minister’s powers are too wide. The hon. member for Durban Central has advanced the same argument. However, I am convinced that this particular clause cannot be seen in isolation. It should be read with other clauses in this legislation, including clause 25, in terms of which the Minister has to furnish reasons, clause 38, which refers to the board of review, clause 41, which lays down the position of the Chief Justice with regard to the provision of this clause, as well as clause 72, which provides that the Minister has to report to Parliament.

Purely because we also believe that the Minister and the State should accept the responsibility of the executive for the steps to be taken in terms of this legislation, I support the clause, and I believe that the arguments advanced by the hon. member for Berea and the hon. member for Durban Central are not valid.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Berea will again agree with me that it is not necessary for us to debate the principle involved here. We all know what the motivations are of hon. members on both sides of the House. With reference to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Central, I should like to explain to him that what he is actually asking for is an aggravation of the situation. We are trying to ease the situation. The hon. member should read the clause properly. It reads as follows—

1. (b) whose name appears on the consolidated list, or who has been convicted of an offence specified in schedule 2, and who the Minister has reason to suspect engages or is likely to engage in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order or propagates or promotes or is likely to propagate or promote such activities …

The point that the hon. member is missing are the words “and who the Minister has reason to suspect”.

Does the hon. member accept my argument? If he does, I suggest we leave the matter there.

I will not pursue the matter any further, because the hon. member indicates that he agrees with me, Mr. Chairman. The hon. member agrees that the point that I am making is a relevant point. For that particular reason I do not believe there is any reason why he should insist on his amendment going forward.

Order! Does the hon. member for Durban Central wish to withdraw his amendment in view of what the hon. the Minister has said?

Mr. Chairman, with the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment. We shall, however, still oppose the clause.

Amendment, with leave, withdrawn.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated on the Order Paper, we should like to have this clause negatived.

Clause 19 relates to the restriction or banning provisions in the Bill. This aspect has been dealt with at some length during the Second Reading debate. Government speakers have continuously relied on the point that sufficient control, sufficient checks and balances exist in order to justify banning provisions of this nature. There have been views to the effect that the provisions of clauses 38 and 41, which provide for review and further referral to the Chief Justice, are sufficient to warrant and to justify the provisions contained in clause 19. I do not want to go into the aspects with which I have already dealt during the Second Reading debate.

I merely want to deal with one aspect which I believe is relevant to us in South Africa. This one aspect differentiates our position from the position in those countries which are referred to in the Rabie report. On page 183, in paragraph 11.4.2.9, the Rabie Commission says the following—

*Furthermore, the Rabie Commission then refers to the view taken in the report of the Royal Commission on Security of Canada and then refers to the position in Canada and other Western countries. I think it is important to realize that in the case of Canada, the powers which are granted to the executive are of course subject to the opinion of the electorate on what the executive does. In other words, in Canada the whole population has a say in the executive. The executive is elected by them, and this is in itself a check and a balance, because if the executive should abuse the powers entrusted to it, the electorate would see to it that another executive is elected at the next election.

The same position applies in South Africa.

The position in our country is not the same. In our country the majority of the people affected by this legislation are not in a position to change the executive.

† That is the reasons why we have to be super-supersensitive with our security legislation. The majority of the people who are affected have no right and no power to change the executive. Therefore, throughout the Rabie Commission’s report, any comparisons to Canada, Australia or Britain are not of the weight which one would normally have given it, because in those countries all the people have the right to change the executive by ordinary vote. We have to be even more careful with our checks and balances than in those countries, and for these reasons we ought not to have the banning provisions where there are no better checks, with limited rights to the Chief Justice and the review committee and not being subject to scrutiny by the courts.

Mr. Chairman, this is really priceless. Yesterday or the day before the hon. member for Durban Central asked me to furnish examples of Western countries where this kind of situation applies. I then gave him a series of examples.

No, you referred to Malawi, Ghana and Uganda.

I also referred the hon. member to the situation in the Netherlands, where even the mayor has these powers, but the hon. member did not like that example very much. Apparently the hon. member has now decided that it is not good enough that similar provisions apply in Western and other countries, and he is now trying to advance other reasons. Now he comes forward with this argument that the majority of the South African population do not choose the executive. That is the basic difference between this side of the House and the official Opposition. The official Opposition sees the total population of South African citizens who ought to be enfranchised, who ought to vote for this Parliament and thereby vote for the executive as well.

They are all affected.

That is not true.

The hon. member for Durban Central knows that this is one of the basic differences between his party and this party. We shall not be able to agree in this regard. To us this is a fundamental issue on which we shall not give way.

Under the circumstances I am merely placing on record that for obvious reasons, both political and otherwise, I cannot accept this amendment by the hon. member for Durban Central.

Mr. Chairman, there are two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper. I am grateful that the hon. the Minister has indicated that they are really not necessary, in view of the fact that he is prepared to include this in the notice. However, on a point of clarification, I would just like to know whether when the hon. the Minister says that, it means that he is going to amend the regulations. Obviously I accept the hon. the Minister’s word that he will do this, but he will agree with me that it is much more important for us to know that it will be a Minister who is going to do it, rather than Minister Le Grange. If he can give us some indication in this respect, I might not move the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member does not even have to accept my word or that of any other Minister because what I am saying is that I intend including this in the written notice which must be served on the person concerned. If that is not done, the hon. member can take me to task in the next session of Parliament. Meanwhile I am giving this assurance here, i.e. that it will be included in the written document, and he can check whether it has been done or not. I even have a draft of the wording here which I can send to him to give him an indication of what I intend doing.

Mr. Chairman, let me just emphasize that I accept the hon. the Minister’s word without hesitation. The only point that I am making is that, whether he is aware of it or not…

You want a written safeguard.

That is correct. We must have it in writing. [Interjections.] Therefore I will not move the amendments printed in my name.

Mr. Chairman, we on this side of the House do not go along with the attitudes of the official Opposition in voting against this clause and almost every other clause. This is the operative clause in dealing with subversion, etc. However, I wish to move as an amendment—

specified person or class of persons.

As the clause is now worded, the hon. the Minister can forbid a person “from communicating with any person or receiving any visitors”. This means that the hon. the Minister could literally put such a person into total isolation. He can forbid him to communicate with any person at all. He may not even talk to his wife or to his family. As it is worded now, it can be a total prohibition, leading to a total isolation of a person from any contact and any communication with any other person. I move this amendment so as to make it clear that the hon. the Minister must specify in the notice either the person or persons or the class of persons with whom he may not communicate. I will not argue about it further. I think it is straightforward. I ask the hon. the Minister to consider this.

I only want to say further that we on this side of the House also welcome the hon. the Minister’s undertaking that notice will given. We intended supporting the amendment of the official Opposition and we have another amendment on the same subject on a later clause.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment moved by the hon. member is acceptable to me, but may I suggest that the amendment reads as follows—

or category of persons specified in the notice

I accept that. Therefore, with the leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, I now move as an amendment—

or category of persons specified in the notice

There are more males than females.

Mr. Chairman, I am not prepared to allow the continual chirp, chirp, chirping and the insinuations that come from the hon. member for Houghton to go unchallenged. I am getting a little tired of it. This continual squeaking—I do not know what one can call it—and the continual making of insinuations and accusations against this party must be answered. I want to say to the hon. member for Houghton and to that party that we made it absolutely clear that we are opposed to communism and everything that goes with it, to the ANC and to revolutionary actions. We are not prepared to be cat’s paws to any effort to make it easier for subversion to take place … [Interjections.] … to make it easier for people to escape identification or to evade prosecution. Therefore we support the necessary actions and powers …

Banning!

Order! The hon. member for Houghton must contain herself.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that in this particular clause the banning of a person is covered by a review, by a body headed by a judge or a judiciary trained person who is required to investigate the situation and give advice to the Minister. It is further covered by review by the Chief Justice of South Africa. That goes a long way towards judicial review and it satisfies us. Clause 19 is one of the clauses that falls four-square within the review procedure. That party has so little confidence in judges, legally trained people and in the Chief Justice that it will continue to oppose every single proposal without exception. They are opposing this clause and they will oppose clauses 21, 22 and 23; indeed, they will oppose every clause that has any teeth in dealing with communism. I do not know whether their attitude has anything to do with visas for getting to Moscow but we are not prepared to be part of that game. As long as there is a judicial check and balance, we are prepared to concede that special powers are required to deal with special situations, and that is why we will support this clause. We are of course, moving amendments that we feel will make the whole Bill more acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I see the old, old story unfold itself in this House with the hon. member for Durban Point. [Interjections.] The hon. member voted in favour of measure after measure that introduced these Draconian laws in South Africa. He is on record in Hansard as having voted for every single one of those laws and the result is that he is now trapped by his own past because on the one hand he wants to vote for this Internal Security Bill that we are debating in this House. Every natural instinct that that hon. member has—because he has communism on the brain—persuades him to vote for this Bill but, unfortunately he has put it abroad in Natal and elsewhere that his party stands for the rule of law and, therefore, he has to have a facade of opposing measures that introduce restricting, banning, detention without trial, all the measures contained in this Bill. [Interjections.] He accuses us, however, of opposing those clauses, and of course we are opposing them. Those are all the key clauses in this Bill that make it so obnoxious. The hon. member is, however, supporting the clauses while he voted against the Second Reading. He hopes to run back to Natal and confuse the electorate once more. [Interjections.]

Then you never listened to the debate.

He never learns a lesson! Look at the wretched little crew that was once the great official Opposition in this country, the United Party! Because it took equivocal lines on all these major issues to do with the rule of law in South Africa, it has been reduced to a fragment of its original self.

Order! The hon. member must please come back to the clause. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban Point was not very much on the clause either. [Interjections.]

The hon. member said he was going to vote for this clause, and he accused us, who are obviously going to oppose it, of doing so because we want to draw the teeth out of any clause that makes it easier to combat communism. He also said that we have no faith in the judges and pointed out that there is a review board procedure. [Interjections.]

Order!

There is a private fight going on between the hon. member for Umhlanga and the hon. member for Turffontein, Sir.

It is with your soulmate over there.

If the hon. member has so much faith in the procedure of review and the Chief Justice, why did he move an amendment when we were discussing a previous clause which made it necessary for the Chief Justice to examine the factual situation?

Because I wanted to improve it.

Well, we want to improve the total situation in South Africa, and the way in which to do that is to vote against a clause like this.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, this is the clause that lays down restrictions in respect of certain persons relating to attendance at gatherings. If the Minister is satisfied—not if the courts are satisfied and not by any objective judgement, but if Ministerial opinion is satisfied—that any person is engaging in activities likely to endanger the State, he may prohibit that person, as also any person whose name appears on the consolidated list, “from attending any gathering, or any particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind”. That sounds reasonably innocuous. It just means the Minister thinks certain people should not attend gatherings. However, if one looks at what a gathering means in terms of the definitions clause and if one looks ahead to the penalties that may be imposed if anybody in fact breaks the ban put on him by the Minister on attending gatherings, then this becomes a very serious provision indeed. What definition of “gathering” is given in the definitions clause? The clause states the following—

1. (a) sections 20(ii)… any gathering, concourse or procession of any number of persons;
2. (b) any other provision of this Act, a gathering, concourse or procession of any number of persons having a common purpose, whether such purpose is lawful or unlawful.

So, one cannot attend a lawful gathering of more than two people.

More than one person!

Yes, more than one person. The hon. the Minister tells me that two people constitute a gathering. That means that if one meets for a common purpose with any other person while one is forbidden to do so by the hon. the Minister, one commits an offence. Having been caught committing such an offence, one then has to pay the penalty, and that penalty can be imprisonment of up to three years, in terms of clause 56(1)(p)(i) of this Bill. That is a very serious provision indeed, and I wonder how the hon. the Minister can possibly justify this when he knows that there are dozens of people who are on his list, people who are forbidden to attend gatherings, people who are literally condemned to lead a twilight existence, completely removed from the normal company of fellow human beings, removed from participating in any normal gathering, be it lawful or unlawful.

This is not the sort of provision that one finds in any democratic country and I challenge the hon. the Minister to produce yet another one of his—I must tell him this— highly inaccurate examples that he has produced so far. The Israeli example has been abandoned. The Northern Ireland example has also been abandoned. On Friday I am going to check up on the Netherlands example because I will be most surprised if a democratic country like the Netherlands has any such provision—for example, banning— which the hon. the Minister says they have. I want to know whether the hon. the Minister can produce an example of any democratic country which has this sort of provision …

No, we cannot go over all that again. I gave you all the examples yesterday, but you will never accept them.

No, the hon. Minister keeps telling us …

I can give you hundreds more but you will never accept them.

The hon. the Minister keeps on telling us that there is nothing unusual in the provisions which are to be passed here.

Because you do not like it. That is why I do it.

I do not like it. [Interjections.] I have made it very clear why we on these benches do not like that. I want to know whether hon. members of the NP who are so obsessed with communism do not realize that these measures are exactly the type of measures that one finds in communist Russia.

That is quite right!

There one does find detention and banning and banishment to Siberia, labour camps, etc. It is there that one finds these measures. We who oppose measures like this are in effect opposing communist measures. It is hon. members on the Government side who are so obsessed with the necessity of fighting communism and who are supporting the very measures which one finds in communist Russia. [Interjections.] We are going to oppose this measure as we have opposed every other measure in this Bill that introduces communist measures.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot understand why the hon. member for Houghton does not refer to the full contents of the particular clause. She wants to lead hon. members and everybody else to believe that it is only the innocent people …

The guilty should be in gaol!

… only the innocent people who are the victims of the provisions of this Bill. What does this particular clause provide for? The hon. member for Houghton compels me to spend some very valuable time now quoting this particular clause or aspects thereof in their proper context. What does this clause say? I quote—

Not the innocent ones—

1. (a) who the Minister is satisfied engages in activities which endanger or which are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order or propagates or promotes or is likely to propagate or promote such activities;
2. (b) whose name appears on the consolidated list or who has been convicted of an offence specified in Schedule 2 or under section 59 or 60 or of any offence for which he has been sentenced under section 58, and who the Minister has reason to suspect engages or is likely to engage in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order or propagates or promotes or is likely to propagate or promote such activities; or
3. (c) who the Minister is satisfied is causing, encouraging or fomenting or will cause, encourage or foment feelings of hostility between different population groups or parts of population groups of the Republic in any area.

Are these now the little innocent angels to whom the hon. members so often refer?

But it is your judgment.

Not at all.

If they were not innocent, they would have been behind bars. [Interjections.]

Order!

There is an entire difference in approach to this clause. This is so for obvious reasons as is well known. I therefore do not intend proceeding any further.

Mr. Chairman, in the first instance I want to say that for the reasons I have advanced under clause 19, I shall obviously not move the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper. I again thank the hon. the Minister.

Just to follow on what the hon. member for Houghton said in terms of gatherings, I want to point out that there is a great deal of misunderstanding about this term, and I want to read a few of the definitions of “gatherings” which we have from actual cases—

This was not a great, big rally; not a great, big disturbance, but it is one type of gathering one is prevented to take part in—

That too is a gathering—

Now you are being absurd.

A braaivleis where nobody eats or talks?

Sir, this is not my idea. In this case it was merely a braaivleis. [Interjections.]

’There one can eat, drink and converse. Now listen to this one—

Scandalous!

This affects a lot of people; not communists, but people whom that hon. Minister has decided have to be banned—

This was decided in a 1972 case—

This was decided in 1974.

Who was that “priester”? Was it you?

I am not a priest; does the hon. the Minister not even know it?

This is what the public should know. The hon. members on the other side should know this too, because they are responsible for it.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, we want to see this clause negatived. It is a clause which in effect will bring the greatest possible inconvenience on the people on whom the hon. the Minister serves a written notice requiring them to report regularly at police stations. A lot of people have over the years complained bitterly to me about the extreme inconvenience to which they are subjected by having to report regularly at a police station. If they happen to forget on any particular occasion to report at the police station, they are charged for breaking the banning order and are once again subjected to severe penalties. For these reasons and because we do not believe that any of these laws really belong in a country which purports to be a democratic country and not a country behind the Iron Curtain, we are going to oppose this clause.

Mr. Chairman, if I understand the hon. member correctly, she is saying that because she opposes the legislation as a whole, she also opposes this clause. The practice at issue in this clause is a well-established practice and I think that there are very good reasons for it. The hon. member speaks about inconvenience that this may cause, but the clause provides for exceptions that can be made. I suggest that we are dealing here with a matter of necessity. It is impossible for the executive to ascertain over and over again whether or not a person has disappeared. We are dealing here with a procedure which has been tried and tested in practice and which is essential. We cannot, therefore, accept the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to confirm what the hon. member for Nelspruit has just said. It is indeed an established practice. I want to set the mind of the hon. member for Houghton at rest—to the extent that that is possible—and assure her that this clause will be used sparingly. Nevertheless it is still a necessity. We need it, and therefore we are unfortunately unable to endorse her standpoint.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 22:

Mr. Chairman, in this clause reference is made to the restrictions on persons—

1. (a) whose names appear on the consolidated list;
2. (b) who, at any time before or after any organization has been declared to be an unlawful organization by or under this Act, were or are office-bearers, officers or members of that organization; or
3. (c) in respect of whom any prohibition under this Act by way of notices addressed and delivered or tendered to them is in force …

This gives the hon. the Minister quite wide-ranging and arbitrary powers once again, and we will therefore be opposing this clause. The courts are once again by-passed, and I find it interesting that there now appears to be a steadily increasing change of attitude on the part of the NRP. For example, people who are restricted or banned are, it appears from what the hon. member for Durban Point said, automatically assumed to be communists.

When did he say that?

That is what he said earlier. I find it interesting that the hon. the Minister tries now to defend the hon. member for Durban Point as it usually is the other way around. But I suppose the closer they come the more they share. Nevertheless, I want to make the point that to be declared a communist in South Africa, or in most Western countries, is a very serious charge, and I think the hon. the Minister will agree with that. To even suggest a person is a member of the Communist Party is serious because this is a banned organization, an organization which all of us in this House oppose, and it is therefore a very serious indictment indeed. I think one of the worst features of the arbitrary powers that the Minister has is that if action is taken by the executive against anyone—anyone at all, a student for example—the public automatically identifies that person as someone who is a communist or is guilty of subversion, sabotage or treason. Such a person can be restricted without any trial, thus never appearing before a court of law. It is the hon. the Minister who makes that decision. He will of course tell us that he does not make it on his own, but in the end he must take that responsibility, and the hon. the Minister has not tried to duck that responsibility in any way. As a result of that and because their names appear on the consolidated list, this means that they are prevented from becoming office-bearers, officers or members of any organization which is specified in such notice. This means, in effect—and I think the House should appreciate this—that it is not possible for a young man or woman who may still be studying, to become a member of even a debating society, except with permission.

Don’t be ridiculous.

No, that is absolutely true. They cannot become a member and an office-bearer of a tennis club or a basket-ball club.

That is right.

This has happened. The hon. member for Verwoerdburg does not understand. These people are not angels. They are terrible and they are about to kill us all, bomb us and all the rest, but a lot of these people are already covered very widely by this net. I am not suggesting for a moment, and the hon. the Minister knows it, that every one of them is an angel and that there are not people who are trying to subvert the country. I accept that. What I am saying is that the arbitrary powers given in terms of this clause to the hon. the Minister are very far-reaching and very wide indeed. Once again the courts are being by-passed. For that reason we shall oppose this clause as strenuously as we know how because we believe that once again this is a shift, a movement, a decline, a movement away from the rule of law. Therefore we shall definitely oppose this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pinelands has in fact confirmed and explained his party’s objection to the principle of this clause. I should just like to say in a few words that our standpoint is of course clear, and we are therefore in opposition to one another as far as the principle is concerned. This is understood and I say this merely to place it on record. I also just wish to make clear that reference is made in the clause to certain organizations in general, and we know, too, that when we read everything in context, there are certain organizations that concern themselves with certain things that concern the security of the State. If anyone wants to belong to innocent associations or clubs such as those which the hon. member gave examples of, then in terms of this Bill it is possible for such a person to belong to that kind of association or club unhindered, under given circumstances. I do not wish to debate this matter further with the hon. member. The hon. member knows that in terms of the provisions of the legislation these people can be afforded room to monoeuvre. Therefore I do not wish to argue with him further. Time is so limited. It is just that the examples given by the hon. member cannot be allowed to stand unqualified. I just wish to qualify them again, together with the reassuring factor.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the problems of time and so on, but we are dealing with human lives here, people who are deeply affected by this legislation. I think it is well-known that I personally am affected as well. It does seem very strange to me that just two clauses back we were discussing the definition of a gathering. In joining a committee, in participating in a very ordinary committee, for example, that of a tennis club, one is breaking that order because one is participating with more than two or three people for a common cause, for example, to plan a tennis tournament. The hon. the Minister may be well motivated but he is actually wrong. That is why I say the hon. the Minister’s powers are too wide and too arbitrary. The hon. the Minister may come back to me and say that in certain instances if one is talking about specific people they could apply for permission to do this or that, but in terms of the notice served on them it is quite clear that they are not allowed to do this. Have we now reached the stage …

Yes, we have.

… where one has now to ask permission to join a tennis club, to become part of that membership and committee?

It is dangerous subversion.

That is the point. It sounds ludicrous and stupid but it is actually true.

He does not believe it.

If only we could get that point across to the hon. the Minister instead of having to listen to him constantly harping upon this as though everyone is about to attack and to destroy. There are people who are labouring under this and have been doing so for many years. That is the only point I am making and that is why we feel so strongly about it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to place on record once again that the hon. member should at any rate not try to solve a personal matter, and surely I cannot advise the hon. member to go and see a lawyer. Surely this is not the purpose of the discussion in the Committee Stage. However, I do want to point out to the hon. member once again that he should emphasize the right phrase, and I shall just quote it to him again.

† Clause 22(1) reads—

1. (iii) in any manner taking part in any activity, of any particular organization or any organization of a nature class or kind specified in such notice …

If a tennis club is not specified in the notice the person can join such tennis club. If a debating society is not specified in the notice, he can join such society.

But he cannot attend a gathering.

I am merely pointing out that the emphasis falls on the words “specified in such notice”, and that we should try to see these things in perspective and also argue and debate them in perspective.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 23:

This clause deals with restrictions relating to the publication or dissemination of speeches etc. emanating from individuals who may not even be in the Republic any more and who may be living abroad but who were at one stage resident in the Republic. This seems to be one further extension of the net that is designed to encompass and keep out any information, even from people living overseas, in regard to views which, according to this clause, defend activities that are calculated to endanger the security of the State. This is once again a wide clause in which the Minister is given the power to use his discretion in dealing with such cases according to the severity of the case. Clause 56(1)(p), which is referred to in this clause, relates to any speech, utterance, writing or statement, recording, reproduction etc. made by individuals who may no longer be in South Africa. It is impossible to prevent or to deal with all possible opposition to the South African situation and if the hon. the Minister by this Bill intends to include even overseas countries, then it is an excess that should not be attempted in a Bill on internal security. The hon. the Minister will in effect be trying to control, in addition to the normal censorship provisions that exist, the utterances, speeches etc. made by people who long ago may have written about or dealt with particular subjects. He may in retrospect prohibit the reproduction of these speeches and impose these arbitrary decisions and restrictions in terms of this Bill. I cannot accept, again in the view of the hon. the Minister, if he is satisfied that that is the position, that these restrictions should be able to be imposed upon speeches and information of that nature. Again no adequate security and no adequate checks and balances are provided for, and for that reason a clause like this should not be accepted.

Mr. Chairman, the reasons the hon. member for Durban Central has just advanced are not at all convincing. The hon. member is using the hackneyed terminology of this debate when he says that the hon. the Minister has unrestricted, unbridled discretionary powers and certainly will not succeed in stilling the demands and incitement of people who even operate outside South Africa. However, his argument takes no account of the reality of South Africa, and that is that there are people leaving our country—moving across the borders of our country—specifically in order to launch an orchestrated propaganda campaign against this country and perform work of incitement which could be dangerous to the State. When one reads this together with clause 56(1)(p), one sees that this is a well-known provision that is essential to us in this country.

Mr. Chairman, I still maintain that the provisions of this clause are very necessary.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 26:

Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the hon. the Minister could give us any idea of how many people do take advantage of the fact that they can obtain financial assistance at the hon. the Minister’s discretion? Has he any idea how many people there are and what the amount is that is involved?

Mr. Chairman, I do not have any idea off-hand, but I shall try to find out what the position is and let the hon. member know on Friday morning.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 28:

Mr. Chairman, in a Bill of this kind it is difficult to know which is the worst clause. If the next clause, clause 29, is possibly the worst clause, then clause 28 is certainly the second-worst clause.

Right.

This is a horrifying provision to have in any legislation in any democratic country. The provision starts with the chilling words—

1. (a) if in his opinion there is reason to apprehend that a particular person will commit an offence referred to in section 54(1), (2) or (3)…

It then goes on to give the widest possible scope to the hon. the Minister to deprive people indefinitely of their freedom or to place them in detention, with very few rights indeed. It is this provision, which has been in operation in other legislation in South Africa, which has caused untold harm and agony to the people concerned and which has brought South Africa into so much disrepute outside our borders.

And which has kept the country secure to a large extent.

Ah, there are other ways in which the country can be kept secure. The clause states—

Even if one looks at the definitions in clause 54(1), (2) and (3), one sees that they are very wide definitions. For example, clause 54(1) states—

1. (b) achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change in the Republic.

Further on it states that any person who—

1. (i) commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts to do so …

may be guilty. So even in terms of clauses 54(1), (2) and (3) it is couched in the widest possible terms. In terms of clause 28 this is simply a matter which depends upon the opinion of the Minister as in effect it says that he may act if in his opinion there is reason to suspect, etc.

Let me say, incidentally, that the clause contains a very quaint word which I think, with respect, is not the correct word. In subsection (1)(a) one reads—

In the Afrikaans text the relevant words are “om te vrees”. I would think that for the sake of good English the word “suspect” would be better than “apprehend” in this sense. I think that the word “apprehend” rather relates to the physical apprehension of a person.

In any event, if one interprets that, it says in effect that if the Minister has a suspicion that any person may commit any one of these offences, he can take the Draconian steps provided for here. He can commit a person to prison. Notice is then served upon that person with reasons. Then, if the Minister does not actually serve that notice on the person concerned, the Bill provides that any police officer who has received information that a notice has been issued can detain a person for seven days for the purpose of handing him that notice. Otherwise this information can be transmitted by way of a telegram. Then it also includes the awful provision that—

relating to the detention of the person concerned. In addition, nobody shall have access to such a person with the exception that at some stage the said person may have the assistance of a legal adviser to consider his response to a notice.

So, what we are doing in a provision of this kind is to give the Minister, on the grounds of a suspicion, the right to deprive a person of his freedom indefinitely, to give the Minister the right to detain a person indefinitely and to give him the widest possible scope. The person concerned is given 14 days’ notice to make representations in writing to the Minister relating to his detention and release. These provisions are totally unacceptable and totally objectionable as any possible system of law. We on these benches can in no way support this clause and we shall vote against it.

Mr. Chairman, I merely rise to indicate that I do not intend moving the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper on this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendments—

1. (1) On page 43, in line 15, after “prison” to insert:
   • and shall by such notice specify the said person’s rights under this Act and the conditions under which he shall be held, which information shall be conveyed to the said person by the said member of the Prisons Service
2. (2) on page 43, in line 59, after “Director” to insert:
   • , a judge of the Supreme Court, a chairman of a board of review

Let me indicate what the purpose is of these amendments. Firstly, when a person is sent to a prison by notice, there is no indication of the status which that detainee should enjoy, nor is there any indication of what his rights are or of what restrictions will be placed on him. The purpose of my amendment is to make it clear that, when he is placed in a prison, his status will be clear, defined and known both to the authorities and to the person himself. If one has this, there will at least be clarity about what he is entitled to, how he is to be treated, what privileges he is to be allowed, etc. At the same time that will be conveyed to him. So he will know what his own rights are, including his rights to appeal or to make an application to a board of review in terms of clause 41 of this Bill. That right to appeal, and the procedures that are prescribed there, are again the only reason why it is possible to accept a clause of this nature. Without them this clause would be totally unacceptable. It would in fact be totally repugnant. The fact, however, that there is a mechanism for judicial review and that the matter can go to the Chief Justice will make the end result more acceptable to us. I hope that when we discuss clause 41 we will be able to approve it on the strength of that provision. Only that will make it in any way acceptable to us.

The second amendment—the insertion of “the judge of the Supreme Court, a chairman of the Board of Review”—is to enable a review board, when it is considering any matter, to have access to the detainee in question. The board is entitled to take evidence. It is entitled to call witnesses, and therefore it must have access to that detainee. Otherwise one frustrates the operation of the review board itself. Unless they are able to have access to the detainee, and also to take evidence, the boards cannot do their work. That is why I have moved the two amendments, which, I believe, will indeed clarify the position and will also improve the situation which exists in terms of clause 28.

Mr. Chairman, before I move the amendments which are printed in my name on the Order Paper I want to get clarity from the hon. member for Durban Point, who has just moved two amendments, on whether I am correct in saying that if these two amendments of his are accepted, he and his party will vote in favour of this clause.

I have said that the review procedure—the judicial review—is the only thing which can make this clause possible of consideration.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. member for Durban Point for his explanation.

It is as clear as mud!

These amendments do not change that.

As far as we in these benches are concerned, Mr. Chairman, we will support the two amendments moved by the hon. member for Durban Point.

The first one is exactly the same as the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Central.

Yes. And the hon. member for Durban Point will support our amendment.

That is correct.

Mr. Chairman, I now move the two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 43, in lines 57 and 58, to omit subsection (7);
2. (2) on page 43, in lines 59 to 61, and on page 45, in lines 1 to 14, to omit subsection (8) and to substitute:
3. (8) Any person being detained in terms of the provisions of this section shall be so detained in accordance with the provisions of the Prisons Act, 1959, which relates to unconvicted prisoners awaiting trial for an alleged offence.

Clause 28(7), which I had moved should be deleted, reads as follows—

Of course, subsection (2) refers to the detention of people without trial.

We support you in that too.

Good!

I am very grateful to the hon. member for Durban Point for his support again. This is a remarkable clause. It flies in the face of anything any civilized Western country stands for. The words “no court of law shall have any jurisdiction” means that a person who is apprehended, who is arrested, who is detained, in the middle of the night, at his home or at his place of work or wherever he might be, is taken because the hon. the Minister says he must be taken, and locked up, is confined without access to anyone or without any recourse to any court of law …

You nearly move me to tears!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Mossel Bay says I nearly move him to tears. I believe it is quite a disgusting thing for him to say.

And he is a lawyer too!

I hope that neither he nor members of this party or members of his family will ever have to experience that, but I warn him that he will not always be in power. The signs are clear for anybody to read that the time is coming when he will not be.

You stick to the Bill.

I hope he will remember the words that he has said. There is something I want to tell the hon. member, the hon. the Minister and indeed anyone on that side. I do not know if any of them watched television on Sunday night and listened to the hon. the Prime Minister speaking at Springbok. If not, I want to remind them of one thing he said. Incidentally, the portion that I saw was excellent. I commend the hon. the Prime Minister for his courage. What did he say? There was one sole person interjecting, I gathered, because he did not like what the hon. the Prime Minister was saying. The hon. the Prime Minister paused and then said—

Is this clause against the Coloureds? [Interjections.]

Let me develop my argument. The hon. members should not be so ashamed of what their Prime Minister said.

I think he did very well.

What is your argument?

Do not distort what he said.

No, I am not distorting it. [Interjections.] I wish the hon. members would not be so excitable. I know it was a good Prog speech and that the hon. members there are worried. They should not be worried. The hon. the Prime Minister then continued—

I now want to tell the hon. member for Mossel Bay …

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

That is exactly what I am trying to do, Sir, but I am constantly being interrupted. When I talk in terms of …

What do you want to tell me?

Just give me a chance; I am coming to it.

Give him a chance.

If that hon. member is not prepared to say that he is prepared to take the place of someone who is detained without any recourse to a court of law, no matter under what conditions then he really should support us. Then he should say, yes, it is terribly important that everybody who is apprehended in this way has an opportunity to come before a court of law so that he can have an appeal to the courts. The hon. member should know this better than anybody else because he is a lawyer.

This then concerns the first amendment that I have moved, and it seems to me that anybody with any kind of sense at all of fair play, of justice, must support this amendment.

I now come to the second amendment I have moved. Perhaps I should repeat it for the purpose of my argument. It reads—

1. (8) Any person being detained in terms of the provisions of this section shall be so detained in accordance with the provisions of the Prisons Act, 1959, which relate to unconvicted prisoners awaiting trial for an alleged offence.

Why do I ask for that? For the reason that if one is apprehended by the Security Police on instruction of the Minister and one is detained in terms of what I am asking for—i.e. in terms of the Prisons Act, 1959—it means, as the hon. member for Mossel Bay again will know very well, that as a prisoner awaiting trial, one at least can have access to a lawyer. I think this is normal right in a civilized country. One then can at least have access to one’s family which I think is a right.

But the hon. member for Houghton complains about the treatment of persons awaiting trial.

That has nothing to do with the case. Does the hon. member agree with what I am saying here?

It is still better than this.

It is no use ducking the issue.

I do not agree.

Of course that hon. member does not agree. He wants people to be incarcerated. That “verligte” hon. member for Krugersdorp …

That is nonsense.

… is prepared to say, “yes, detain them; bury them in some gaol; do not worry about their parents and their family; do not worry about lawyers; do not worry about anything at all.”. [Interjections.] Well, that is what this clause is asking for, and that is what happens in life. Where has the hon. member been living?

I have been living in South Africa.

Living in South Africa and agreeing with this. Therefore, the hon. member and every hon. member there must not pretend that they can be sympathetic, sorry and sad when people die in gaol, because they agree with that.

I say we move this amendment and I hope the hon. the Minister will see the sense of this, not only for the sake of the people concerned, which is our first criterion, but also for the sake of South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, through the hon. member for Berea the official Opposition has intimated that after clause 29, this clause is the one they feel strongest about and wish to oppose most strongly.

We feel the second-strongest about this clause.

Yes, the second-strongest. The hon. member for Berea used strong language when referring to this clause. He says it is a “horrifying” clause, and his argument was neatly followed by the hon. member for Pinelands with a violent emotional outburst. He said that anyone who supported the clause was a heartless person, a person in whose heart there was no feeling or reasonableness. In doing so the hon. member used an example which cannot in any way be applied to this clause. He referred to a speech made by the hon. the Prime Minister and tried to draw a parallel between those people who lack certain constitutional rights and those who are in preventive detention in terms of the clause. However, these are not comparable circumstances, Sir.

The hon. member contends that anyone who supports this clause has no sense of fairness or reasonableness. When the hon. member makes this attack on me, then that is in order. He can do so, and I shall deal with it in the appropriate way in the political arena. However, I think that he is unreasonable also to make that attack on people who have a finely developed sense of justice. I refer here to the commissioners of the Rabie Commission who submitted this specific recommendation to the Government. The hon. member says that I have no sense of justice, but he is also clearly intimating that the commissioners of the Rabie Commission— people with a long record in legal affairs— have no sense of justice either. I suggest that the hon. member should read carefully pages 168 and 169 et seq. of the Rabie Report. If he does so, he will see that this specific clause is indeed necessary. A case is made there for the need for this clause. However, one cannot read this clause in isolation, because there are other mechanisms in other clauses of the Bill preventing powers from being exercised in an uncontrolled fashion.

There are certain control mechanisms. Throughout the debate we have been differing as to the force of that mechanism, and we are unable to come to an agreement. However, to intimate that the people who endorse this provision are a heartless and soulless group of people is not correct. Nor does it become the spirit of the debate.

The hon. member ought to use the same strong language in regard to the proven facts surrounding this clause, and in respect of those people who have already been on the other end, the receiving end, of the clause. If he were to read the appropriate sections of the Rabie report he would find that there are heartless and soulless people on the other side as well.

As far as subsection (8) is concerned, the hon. member used a number of adjectives. I do not wish to apply any of them to him, but would prefer to discuss the merits of the clause with him.

There is no merit in the clause.

The hon. member used a number of adjectives to advance arguments that lacked merit. In the amendment to subsection (8) moved by the hon. member, he wants to make the case that people detained in this way should also be subject to the Prisons Act, viz. that this Act should also apply to unsentenced prisoners. If the hon. member understands the spirit and tenor of the clause as well as the motivation in the Rabie report, viz. that one must detain these people in a specific way, then he would not move this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, while the hon. member for Pinelands was speaking, I remarked by way of interjection that the hon. member was almost moving me to tears. I did not say that owing to a lack of compassion with the genuine suffering of people. The hon. member for Pinelands was trying to dramatize the effects of this particular clause. [Interjections.] He was, however, not succeeding in dramatizing it; he was acting pure melodrama. It was in reaction to that that I made the remark that he was nearly moving me to tears, by way of sarcastic comment.

I was completely serious in saying what I did say.

The hon. member then saw fit to remark that as a lawyer I should know better. Allow me, Sir, to state categorically that it is because I am a lawyer that I do know better. [Interjections.] People who are not well versed in law, such as some politicians—and I include among them hon. members opposite—meddle with legal principles and in doing so create a completely distorted picture. That is what I object to. When I deal with legal matters, I deal with them in a proper legal way. I never play politics with law; I also do not try to create the impression that I am practising law when I am in fact practising politics, as the hon. member for Pinelands did.

*There are specific limits to the law, and there are specific limits to politics. One should not piously adopt the standpoint that one is practising law, when one is in fact trying to score political points. The courts are there to administer justice based on the facts submitted to them, and in terms of legislation or common law the courts then give their verdict. This is legal practice.

What is contained in this specific clause is a measure making preventive action possible, precisely in order to prevent action reaching the stage at which it will become punishable by the courts in terms of some statutory provision or other. What the argument of the hon. member for Pinelands amounts to is that if a person should see someone breaking into a building with the object of committing an offence there, he should first allow the housebreaker to carry on, should allow him to finish committing his offence—whether it be assault, robbery or murder or whatever it may be—before he calls the police, who will charge the housebreaker and take him to court. [Interjections.] In other words, no preventive action must be taken to prevent an offence. This is what the present measure makes provision for. That is why it is absolutely meaningless to try to involve the courts in this. After all, the actions of the persons concerned have not yet reached the stage at which they can be taken to court on the strength of facts by means of which an existing offence can be proved. That a prospective offender’s action will reach that stage is in fact being prevented in terms of this measure, and this is being done in the interests of the safety of those who are threatened by his actions. That is the essence of the matter. To play judge in a situation such as this is simply to try to score political points, while the hon. member knows as well as anybody what the real object of this measure is.

Since the hon. member referred to me personally and said that he hoped that I would never find myself in a position where this measure would be applicable to me, I want to assure him that if I were ever guilty of this kind of action which the measure seeks to counteract, I accept that the measure should be made applicable to me as well.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether he has ever had any contact with the families or people who have been detained in terms of a provision of this kind?

I do not count these people among my friends. That is my reply to the hon. member’s question.

That is a terrible thing to say.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Mossel Bay tells this House that there is a complete difference between matters which pertain to the law, i.e. legal matters, and politics.

No, in the first instance, I never used the word “complete”. Do not put words in my mouth.

All right. I accept that the hon. member did not use the word “complete”, but he did say that there are certain matters which have to do with law and that there are certain matters which have to do with politics and that I am playing at politics and he is playing at law. To put it politely, I think the hon. member is being a little absurd. We are legislators and we also belong to different political parties. We have different political approaches. What we are arguing about is the very essence of the matter and that is that it is a Minister who belongs to a particular party, who subscribes to a particular policy, who has the supreme power. That is the essence of the matter.

That is not what I objected to.

He does not object to that!

Of course he does not object to that! That is why his whole argument falls flat. Although he is not present at the moment, the hon. member for Krugersdorp must have been writhing in his seat and even the hon. the Minister must have been embarrassed to listen to the hon. member saying that we are like people who watch a man climbing through a window in order to steal, but who say that we must first talk to the police and must first get the man to the court before we apprehend him. Has the hon. member never heard that breaking and entering is a crime? Does he not know that if a man does that, one can arrest him and that he then appears before the court?

Of course!

That is right. Why then use such a stupid illustration? That is exactly the point we are making. That man, that burglar, that common rapist, the murderer or the thief appears before a court of law, but not the man who is detained. No, he must be incarcerated and he cannot even have the benefit of a court of law. He is detained merely on suspicion by a politician. We are pleading that we become committed to the rule of law but this clause deliberately states that a person who is detained cannot appeal to a court of law. That is why I said to the hon. member that as a lawyer he surely cannot agree with that.

This is a form of preventive action.

Preventive action “se voet”!

Just sit down and I shall answer you.

Well, I hope that answer will be a little better than the answer we received from the hon. member for Mossel Bay.

Mr. Chairman, I want to explain one particular point before this message which the hon. member for Pinelands has now been propagating is again sent into the world unqualified.

Oh, come on!

That hon. member must keep quiet. I am not talking to him, I am talking to the hon. member for Pinelands.

You are talking to our party.

Subsection (7) of this clause must be read with subsection (2). Subsection (7) applies to the provisions of the regulations made by the Minister of Justice. That is all. This clause must also be read with clause 42 which provides that within 14 days such a detainee may apply to court to have his case reviewed and/or he may prefer review proceedings by the review board which entitles him to a review of the facts on which this order was based. It is therefore not an unqualified detention of a person with no recourse whatsoever. In terms of clause 42 such a person can apply to court, and he can exercise his alternative right and apply to be heard by the review board which will go into the facts of the matter. It does not mean therefore that a person is being detained without having any rights whatsoever as far as a court of law is concerned, and I should like to make this point very clear before we adjourn this evening.

It is not on the facts; it is on your opinion.

I will address the Committee further on this particular issue on Friday morning and give more facts about this. I wish to make it perfectly clear, however, that it is not an unqualified refusal or prohibition as far as these rights are concerned.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.