Mr. Speaker, I move—

1. (1) the desirability, or otherwise, of statutory control over rents;
2. (2) measures to afford tenants continued protection against exploitation, victimization and arbitrary ejectment;
3. (3) measures to curb related malpractices with reference to the Sectional Titles Act, 1971, the Share Blocks Control Act, 1980, and the Alienation of Land Act, 1981; and
4. (4) related matters,

the Committee to have power to take evidence and call for papers.

Agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, when the debate was adjourned on Wednesday night, I was replying to the amendment of the hon. member for Pinelands. It is the first amendment in particular to which I have already replied, so I want to proceed by replying to the hon. member’s second amendment. I should like to point out to the hon. member that if his amendment were accepted, it would frustrate the entire object of the detention, because free access to persons who are being detained in terms of this provision would merely enable them to continue their activities from prison. This has been our experience time and again. If this proposal of the hon. member were accepted, therefore, our object would be frustrated. Therefore I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment.

† This brings me to the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point. He also drafted two amendments to this clause. I cannot accept his first amendment because, as I have already indicated, the information the hon. member asked for will be included in the particular notice. I am, however, prepared to accept his second amendment if the hon. member would be prepared to accept, for his amendment, the insertion of the words “of South Africa” after the word “Court”. His amendment would then read as follows—

That I would be prepared to accept, but the first one I cannot accept.

With regard to the general remarks made by the hon. member for Berea, I want to place on record that although the hon. member may find this particular clause abhorrent—he displayed his attitude to the principle involved in no uncertain terms—ours is not the only country where one has this kind of legislation. [Interjections.] There are a number of countries in the world …

Behind the Iron Curtain.

… where there is legislation similar to this on the Statute Book. [Interjections.] I know there will not be any agreement on this, but there is the example of Bophuthatswana, the Central African Republic, Eire …

Good comparisons.

I am just putting this on record so that people can have the information, so that people who even try to look at our situation objectively can also use this information when they are discussing this particular matter. That is why I am giving this information. There is also Ghana, and I can give hon. members the particulars of the various Acts, if they want them. There is also Hong Kong and specifically also India which is so quick to criticize South Africa. I can also mention Israel, Malawi, Malaysia, The Netherlands … [Interjections.] … Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and even the USA, though during an emergency of course.

Are you going to declare an emergency?

In some cases it is merely in times of an emergency and in others it is not. I am just mentioning the names of the particular countries concerning which we were able to ascertain what the position was in respect of this kind of legislation.

We are in good company, I must say.

Because the attitude of this side of the House is quite clear as regards the principle involved, I do not wish to take the matter any further.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the hon. the Minister for indicating that he accepts the second amendment. With leave of the Committee, I therefore withdraw the amendment I moved.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw, with leave, withdrawn.

In lieu of that amendment, I now move as an amendment—

1. (2) On page 43, in line 59, after “Director” to insert:
   , a judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa, a chairman of a board of review

I have merely substituted the wording as read by the hon. the Minister. All it amounts to, is the addition of the words “of South Africa”.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived.

Amendment (1) moved by Dr. A. L. Boraine negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Dr. A. L. Boraine negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, I move as an amendment—

I should like to inform hon. members at this stage that I have decided to investigate, in consultation with the Commissioner of Police and the Director of Security Legislation, the existing Force orders and instructions to the Force concerning the conditions under which persons are detained and interrogated, and I shall announce broad guidelines in this connection at a later stage.

Mr. Chairman, we are, of course, very pleased to hear of the amendment which the hon. the Minister has moved and we shall support it. However, this does not in any way alter our opposition to clause 29, which is the core clause of this whole piece of legislation. To all extents and purposes it is, with some minor amendments, exactly the same as section 6 of the Terrorism Act, 1967. That section had some fundamental flaws in it. Firstly, there was indefinite detention, and, despite the amendment that the hon. the Minister now has to receive a report every three months as to why a particular person is still being detained, there is still no limitation in law as to the length of time that he can be held. And he is still to be held—and here again we enter the realms of semantics—in isolation, alone, in solitary without the necessary what I would call academic descriptions of those terms, either in terms of the prison regulations or anything else. The fact of the matter is that there is no access to this man and he is kept alone. In many cases people were arrested, detained and interrogated once and then left alone for months on end with no access to them by anybody at all. Even the toughest measures that are applied in other countries allow the detainee access to his lawyer. For example, in Northern Ireland, after 48 hours a man must see his lawyer if he so desires. The hon. the Minister keeps on mentioning other countries, and he gave us a fine list this morning, I must say. He mentioned Ghana, Hong Kong and India. The one country he forgot to mention, one which I think would have really been most applicable to this legislation is the USSR. I have no doubt that powers of detention without trial, the power to ban people, to arrest them and to hold them without trial are rife in the Soviet Union. The hon. the Minister noticeably did not mention that country. The hon. the Minister keeps on quoting Israel and I want to tell him that the Israeli law that he quoted was in operation before 1979. That law no longer applies. It was materially altered by the Emergency Provisions Act of 1978 which was ratified in 1979. Therefore, what we have done is to adopt laws that were operative in Israel before they were amended. Those laws were amended because there was a very strong feeling in Israel that although Israel was in a state of almost permanent emergency—in other words, warfare—since 1948, she must not give up the normal civil rights which her constitution ensures. Therefore the hon. the Minister must stop quoting Israel.

The other fatal flaw in this clause is that nowhere is any real code of conduct laid down for interrogation. The hon. the Minister said that this was difficult to do. I do not know why this should be difficult to do. At the moment there are police instructions, although these are very limited indeed. The Bennett Committee which sat in England on the Northern Ireland situation suggested about 11 major methods of monitoring and making certain that interrogations did not take place during long intervals and that no degrading methods were used, and they also made various other suggestions which would greatly improve the situation for detainees who have no right of legal access and who are denied all access to the courts of law and no referral to the Chief Justice. The one additional safeguard which is being introduced for persons in preventive detention in terms of clause 28, for persons who are banned or restricted, or even for organizations and publications which are prohibited, is either a board of review, or an advisory committee and then referral to the Chief Justice. This last step is denied those people who need it most, i.e., the detainees who are held under section 29. There is no referral as far as they are concerned. There is also no access to the courts. That is specifically denied. I must say to the hon. the Minister that we on these benches do not attach great importance to the fact that in the other cases there is access to the courts, for the simple reason that it can only be on the basis of a plea of mala fides, and everybody, whether legally trained or not, knows that is almost impossible to prove. So, access to the courts where it is dependent on proving that the Minister did not put his mind to it when he made the decision, is virtually impossible, and we are not very impressed with the access to the courts that is allowed in those cases.

Sir, as far as we are concerned this is the most objectionable clause in the whole Internal Security Bill. We are most depressed that the Rabie Commission, from whose report this legislation emanates almost directly, made no recommendations regarding the removal of the very worst features of a law which has got South Africa into trouble throughout the world because of the number of people who have died in detention, either under this form of solitary confinement or under the previous form, the 90-day detention period—which is now suspended—and because it makes absolutely no provision for any code of conduct whatsoever. We cannot understand that the commission, which was to report on the fairness of our legislation, did not afford any protection whatsoever to the people who are now denied an almost sacred right of the individual, the right to have some protection against the might of the State by virtue of habeas corpus. That is gone. If I steal a bicycle, I am still, of course, protected by habeas corpus and I have to be brought before court within 48 hours. However, if the Minister is of the opinion that I am a security risk—and it is only his opinion, backed up by reports given to him by the Security Police, reports to which I have no access and which I therefore cannot deny, and charges which I know nothing of—completely untested by any objective opinion and I am denied the right of habeas corpus, which is so valuable a right.

There are one or two little changes being introduced—apart from the one the hon. the Minister has just moved—and those we will discuss in further detail when my colleagues move the amendments which stand on the Order Paper. Very briefly these changes are the system of having a board of review but with no referral to the Chief Justice, and the fact that the Minister is now personally responsible for detainees. To that I do attach some importance. The hon. the Minister is now personally responsible because he has to sign an order every month for the further detention of a person held under clause 29.

Then there is, of course, the old inspectoral system and there is the visit—now in private—of the detainee by the magistrate and by the district surgeon. I understand the hon. the Minister is going to accept an amendment in that regard. Those are the changes, but they in no way give the protection which we believe is vitally necessary for people who are detained under this clause.

The hon. the Minister quoted Bophuthatswana as an example, but only today there was a report in a newspaper that the Appeal Court judgement in Bloemfontein held that the South African Terrorism Act is in conflict with the constitution of Bophuthatswana. In other words, because Bophuthatswana has a bill of rights the detention of anybody under the Terrorism Act in Bophuthatswana is in fact ultra vires.

That is their baby, not ours.

But the hon. the Minister quoted them. When it suits the hon. the Minister he uses Bophuthatswana as a country which has laws similar to ours but forgets to mention that in Bophuthatswana there is an overriding bill of rights which gives the individual the right of appeal to the courts.

That is their business.

Our own Appeal Court decision in Bloemfontein had only one dissentient, and guess who that was?

Mr. Justice Rabie.

Yes, well done! First prize to the Chief Whip for guessing correctly first time.

Are you sure?

Yes, I have had a telex in that regard. Judge Rabie gave the only dissenting opinion. The rest of the Bench evidently agreed with the judgement. The judgement was by Mr. Justice Miller with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Jameson, Mr. Justice Muller, Mr. Justice Diemont, Mr. Justice Viljoen and Acting Justices Galgut and Van Heerden. [Interjections.] So, Sir, the sentence has been set aside.

I have argued this clause fairly fully and the hon. the Minister will have gathered that despite the few amendments that are being effected and despite the improvements which the hon. the Minister himself has effected, we are obviously going to oppose this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Houghton is not even trying to give a reasoned reply to the provisions of the clause, although the clause and its effect is dealt with comprehensively in the Rabie report in paragraphs 10.1 to 10.85. In these paragraphs the commission dealt with the existing section 6, and what we are discussing here is essentially no more than a reformulation of that section. The commission also discussed the criticism levelled at that section. All the arguments she raised here were in fact arguments raised before and considered by the commission. However, the commission also heard evidence setting forth the reasons for the existence of the section. Every provision in the clause, as it is incorporated in the Bill, is in any case adequately explained in the Rabie report.

Let us in the first place consider the general point of departure. I am referring—this is discussed in paragraph 10.67 of the report— to what Lord Shackleton said, inter alia, in his report concerning the assertion that terrorists are also entitled to access to the courts and the objection to people being detained without trial. I am quoting from this report—

This is important—

If the police know of a person who has information on activities aimed at the security of the country and the police do not follow up that evidence, I would also be justified in saying, in the words of Lord Shackleton, that the police were being negligent.

We should consider what happens in other countries. We must remember that we are dealing with a new kind of crime here. Here we are dealing with an organized crime. It is not a matter of an individual committing a murder and then having to rely on his own resources, but a matter of a person committing crimes in collaboration with others. These are people committing calculated crimes which affect the entire community. These are people who receive training. We must not forget that these people receive training to enable them to commit these crimes. In Germany we find that legislation has been passed which even gives the State the right to confiscate the statement made by the accused to his attorney. This is something for which provision is not made in our legislation. As regards the right of the individual to have access to his legal representative, this is certainly a more drastic provision affecting that right than anything we have in South Africa.

However, that is not the end of the matter. I found that in the USA the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals said—

That is in fact the line of reasoning adapted by the hon. member for Houghton—

This applies in America, but here in South Africa the hon. member may seemingly allege this with impunity. This is what “a civil rights libertarian” is graciously allowed to do in South Africa. This, in the first place, is the background to this legislation.

If one were to look at police reports and evidence given before the commission, one would find that it was inter alia requested that it should only be for a short period. However, police evidence urges us to bear in mind that we are dealing with trained criminals and that it has taken up to three weeks before a person who has been arrested has revealed his name. When this kind of evidence is given before a commission one expects a sensible commission to take such evidence into account and to make its recommendations accordingly.

Evidence was also given that if access were to be given to a detainee, it would in fact be possible to abuse such access to achieve the objects for which the specific person is being detained in the first place. Under such circumstances it would therefore be irresponsible to grant access to a detainee.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that we are dealing here with a new kind of crime. This is crime which has started to crop up during the past two or three decades, and it is clear that it is well-organized and committed by specially trained people. They infiltrate this country after the crimes have been planned outside the borders of this country, as appeared from evidence given before the commission. It is also a new phenomenon in our modern society for a neighbouring State to allow its territory to be used for terrorist activities against one of its neighbours. These are in fact new phenomena for which the authorities responsible for a country’s security must find new solutions. Judging by our security legislation this is exactly what happened in South Africa. Earlier legislation passed subsequently proved to be inadequate and amendments had to be made to cope with a changing situation.

The legislation before us today is consequently based on experience gained over the past few years and was recommended by a distinguished legal commission—a very distinguished legal commission if one considers the persons who served on it. Particular attention was given to any malpractices which might exist within the parameters of the legislation and various methods were suggested to combat this. Inspectors, medical practitioners and magistrates, inter alia, may visit detainees; the Minister may apply to the board of review, and finally there is review by the Chief Justice. This legislation is also aimed at ensuring the security of that hon. member and, as a matter of fact, the security of every one of us, and we can only be grateful that we have a Police Force which is doing everything in its power to protect the security of the country. I therefore support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member who has just spoken was incorrect where he said that this clause fell under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Chief Justice. That is one of our objections to it, and in the appropriate clause we shall seek to include this clause, clause 29, with the other clauses falling under the procedure for review and ultimately reference to the Chief Justice for his final determination. In regard to the Chief Justice we shall reintroduce the amendment that was earlier rejected by the hon. the Minister. We wish to debate it further. This clause, therefore—with the limitation of review to a review board only, and also without the reference to the Chief Justice—contains elements which make it less acceptable or more unacceptable than the other clauses in terms of which powers are granted. There are, however, improvements which, we believe, can still be brought about. There are amendments in my name on the Order Paper which, for procedural reasons, I shall not be moving as printed on the Order Paper because there is an additional amendment introduced. I therefore move the following four amendments—

1. (1) On page 45, in line 50, after “directions” to insert:
   • , which shall include the prohibition of violence or threat of violence, torture, including psychological torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment,
2. (2) on page 49, in line 19, after “fortnight” to insert “in alternate weeks”;
3. (3) on page 49, in line 20, after “magistrate” to insert:
   • in order to hear and assess complaints by that person
4. (4) on page 49, in line 21, after “surgeon” to add:
   • in order to observe and report any signs of ill-health or injury and to report on the condition and welfare of such person

These amendments seek to achieve the following. I heard the hon. the Minister’s announcement that he would introduce a code or regulation which would determine the handling of detainees. In order, however, to make it absolutely clear that it is the intention of the legislature that that code should exclude the sort of behaviour that I have listed in my amendments—violence, threat of violence, torture, etc.—I believe it should also be included in the legislation. By accepting this amendment it would then be clearly stated that the directions given for the handling of detainees would prohibit the offences which I have listed in my amendments.

If there is going to be a code, I am satisfied that that will be an improvement and is something we shall be welcoming. I do believe, however, it should be seen—the world should see, our critics should see—that it is also the intention of the legislature, and that the code in terms of which detainees would be handled will indeed include these prohibitions, and naturally also many others. These are the essential ones, however, and I believe it could be done without inhibiting the powers of the police. It is common cause, and also accepted by the hon. the Minister, that this is not the intention, and that this will not be allowed. Therefore let us say so. Let me emphasize that it will not take away any power, that it will not limit any power, but that it will simply include in the legislation what is the proclaimed intention and attitude of the Government to bring about.

My second amendment would mean that a detainee would be visited one week by a magistrate and the following week by a district surgeon, instead of possibly receiving two visits on the same day, and then going for two weeks without a visit. This would ensure that a detainee was in fact visited every week; one week by a magistrate and the next week by a district surgeon. It would also reduce the period of time in which any malpractice might have been committed with the evidence of such malpractice having disappeared before the next visit. The proposal is therefore that the detainee should receive a visit every week.

The other two amendments are simply to make it clear what the purpose of the visit is. Quite clearly, the magistrate is not going to visit a detainee in order to say good morning , indicate what a fine day it is and generally just pay a social call. The visit is for a purpose, and we believe that that purpose should be specified as being the hearing and assessing of complaints made by the detainee.

Why should there be any complaints?

If there were no complaints, everything would be in order. [Interjections.] The point is that that should be for the protection of the detainee.

There could just as well be some compliments flying about.

Fine! Then the magistrate would hear and assess them. [Interjections.] I would be quite happy to put it in the legislation. I would be quite happy to have “to hear compliments” as well as “to hear complaints” inserted. The same applies to the district surgeon whose purpose is “to observe and report any signs of ill-health and injury”. So it would be quite clear what the purpose of the visit is. I am not alone in my view, because it is also the view that was put to the hon. the Minister by the bar council. Surely he cannot question their bona fides? Theirs is not a political approach. It is a question of clarity, of having absolute clarity about the intention, because clause 29 is the one clause about which there is the greatest and most consistent doubt being sown. It is in terms of this provisions that most of the problems occur, from which most of the incidents that harm South Africa arise. It is therefore in this clause, in particular, that the greatest measure of protection and clarity must be inserted, and the purpose of all four of these amendments is to make it absolutely clear that whilst there is a need—and there can be a need; we accept that—to hold people for the sake of interrogation, in meeting that need the various points I have made would indicate the attitude of the Government, the spirit in which the Government approaches this matter. The rejection of these amendments, however, would imply— and this is the important part—that it is not the Government’s intention to prohibit violence and so on, that it is not the Government’s intention that the magistrate should hear complaints and that it is not the intention that the district surgeon …

Now you are really talking nonsense.

No, I am not. [Interjections.] If there is any objection to these amendments, it must be because the Government does not want those aspects included in the law, and that is my point. Let us make it clear beyond any doubt in the law

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether any policeman has the right to treat a prisoner in a way that would be prohibited by the hon. member’s amendment?

No, I want to put it in so that it is clear to the world, clear to all our critics, that this is not tolerated in South Africa. The hon. Minister himself has just said that he is going to draw up a code or regulations that would specify this …

Do not put words in my mouth.

Well, that is what I understood the hon. the Minister to say. I understood him to say that he intended to draw up regulations dealing with the handling of detainees. Did he not say that?

[Inaudible.]

Therefore those regulations will specify how detainees must be handled. It is therefore the hon. the Minister’s own intention to detail how detainees will be handled, and all I am asking is that he puts this into the law so that the world can see that it is not the intention of the Government to permit this sort of thing.

Mr. Chairman, may I just say that Judge Rabie’s was only one of four dissenting opinions in the Marwane case on Bophuthatswana. He was not the only dissenting judge, but he was one of them.

That does not matter. What matters is the way in which you referred to Judge Rabie.

That is too bad. He will hang me one day, no doubt.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 45, in line 52, to omit all the words after “until—” up to and including “first” in line 7 on page 47 and to substitute:
   1. (i) in the case where the attorney-general declines to prosecute, his decision in this regard is made known; or
   2. (ii) in the case where the attorney-general decides to institute a prosecution against the said person, the relevant indictment is served upon the said person; or
   3. (iii) the said person’s release is ordered under subsection (5),
      whichever takes place first: Provided that no person shall be detained under this subsection for a period exceeding seven days.
2. (2) on page 47, in fine 9, to omit all the words after “shall” up to and including “and” in line 13 and to substitute:
   after an arrest in terms of that subsection forthwith notify the Commissioner thereof, and the Commissioner shall after having been so notified forthwith advise the Minister of the name of the person so arrested, and the Minister and the next of kin of the person arrested of
3. (3) on page 47, after line 38, to insert:
   (e) The provisions of section 41 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the review proceedings.
4. (4) on page 47, in fine 41, to omit “thirty” and to substitute “seven”;
5. (5) on page 49, after line 21, to add:
   (10) Access to any person detained in terms of the provisions of this section shall be granted not less than once a fortnight to a parent or other close relative of such person.

I shall try to justify these amendments in the course of my speech. I want to say at the outset that I feel there is some merit in the standpoint of the hon. member for Durban Point that the rejection of some of his amendments is by implication an admission that the Government is not anxious to create the impression that it wants to move away from some of the problems created by this clause.

The hon. member for Houghton indicated our basic opposition to these provisions. As she indicated, this clause is in fact the most objectionable and unacceptable clause in this entire Bill, bad as the others are. There are no other provisions in this Bill or in the existing legislation which bring the security legislation so much in issue as the provisions of this clause. I want to tell the hon. Minister that the application of these measures is to a great extent counterproductive because the impression it leaves brings the entire system of the security legislation in issue.

As if only our country has it!

That is not the point. The hon. Minister knows what the implications were of the events which took place in South Africa in terms of this measure. However, there is no evidence that this happened in other countries.

What about the recent case in Holland? There is not a …[Interjections.]

If the hon. the Minister wants to argue the correctness of this statement he may do so, but he knows and every one of us here knows that there is nothing which brought this security legislation so much in issue both here and abroad as this measure. He knows this. It gives me no pleasure to say so. However, this is the reason—I am mentioning this because it is part of the background against which I am arguing—why I want to join the hon. member for Houghton in expressing my disappointment that the Rabie Commission showed so little understanding for the opposition which has developed in South Africa to these powers in the Bill. As I understand the report the Rabie Commission did not show any understanding either for the wide-ranging repercussions which the application of these provisions have had both here and abroad to the prejudice of our country.

On page 153 et seq of its report the Rabie Commission suggested a number of improvements to the existing procedure, as stated here. These improvements are summarized on pages 154 and 155. In brief they amount to the following: In the first place, that further detentions are authorized in writing by the Minister; in the second place, that six months after the arrest the case must be brought before a board of review; that the detainee must be given an opportunity to address written representations on the matter of his further detention to the board of review; that the Inspector of Detainees must report; that if the circumstances allow, the reference must be given; that the detainee must be visited at least every 14 days; and that the Commissioner of Police must have the discretion to allow other persons to visit the detainee. These are some of the improvements and they are welcome. But those improvements do not affect the essence of our objection to this clause. As a matter of fact there are two other recommendations by the commission which make matters worse. The one is the deletion of the 14 day provision contained in section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act in favour of the more onerous provision in terms of the Terrorism Act. We know that what happened in practice is that a person was detained in terms of section 22 and before those 14 days expired it was decided to detain him in terms of section 6 of the Terrorism Act. In other words, section 22 afforded no protection in practice. However, as long as section 22 was on the Statute Book the possibility at least existed that after 14 days a person could only be detained after a judge of the Supreme Court had looked into the reasons for his further detention and had authorized it. The hon. members for Pinetown and Parktown will motivate the other amendments.

My amendments have four main aims. The aim of the first amendment is to restrict the period of detention. In other words, what I am saying is that the detention of a person is ended in the circumstances I mentioned, depending on what happens first. I must say I am not very happy with the amendment for the sober fact is that the Attorney-General—in this connection I am referring to the first two parts of the first amendment—also owing to pressure of work on staff, could take a long time before he decides whether or not to prosecute a person. During that period the person continues to be detained. Under the circumstances, however, it seems to me that instead of leaving it exclusively to the discretion of the Commissioner of Police, as is contemplated by this Bill, it should at least be provided that when one of these three occurrences which I mentioned in my amendment take place, the person should immediately be released.

The second aim of my amendments, particularly amendment (2) and amendment (4), is to place an obligation on the persons involved in this detention, in this case the Commissioner and of course the Minister, to consult the close relatives of the detainee in this connection. In amendment (4) I suggest that the word “seven” be substituted for the word “thirty”. In my opinion seven days is long enough. The effect of this will be that the Minister must be notified not after 30 days but after seven days and that the person’s further detention must then be authorized by the Minister. This seems to me a reasonable amendment and I can only say that I feel it ought to be acceptable to the hon. the Minister.

Amendment (3) deals with the review procedure. It is totally incomprehensible to us why further review by the Chief Justice is excluded in respect of persons who will be detained in terms of this clause.

Did you not read the report?

I read the report, but the reasons given were totally unconvincing. What appears in the report is certainly not sufficient reason and justification, because one of the basic problems is that there is no indication that the Rabie Commission consulted any of the detainees or had them give evidence before it, with the possible exception of one. I cannot see any reason why detainees in terms of this section do not also have the right to the further review for which clause 41 makes provision.

Amendment (5) is aimed at ensuring that access to a detainee can be obtained by his close relatives. It is just as important as any of the other amendments. If necessary I shall elaborate further on these amendments I have moved.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 49, in line 19, after “Detainees” to insert:
   • on admission be examined by a district surgeon and shall thereafter
2. (2) on page 49, in line 21, after “visited” to insert “in private”;
3. (3) on page 49, in line 21, after “surgeon” to add:
   • or, at the request of such detainee or a member of his family, by a medical practitioner appointed by the Medical Association of South Africa

I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the fact that the amendments I have moved in respect of subsection (9)(b) deal with the medical care of detainees. I think that the medical care of detainees is a very important aspect. If one looks into the past and sees what has happened, one realizes that this is of vital importance not only to the detainees and their relatives, but also to district surgeons, the medical doctors of South Africa and to South Africa. Therefore I should like to tell the hon. the Minister that we are not only talking about medical care; we are actually talking about life and death. Therefore I should like in all seriousness to ask the hon. the Minister whether he is satisfied that the provision of medical care of detainees is adequate. The hon. the Minister can answer me now or later.

I shall answer you.

I should also like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he believes that the detainees should not have the right to have the same medical attention once they have been detained as the medical attention they had before they were detained.

These are the three questions I should like to ask the hon. the Minister.

What medical care have the detainees received in the past? I am very pleased the hon. the Minister of Health and Welfare is here because, during the discussion of his Vote on 19 April 1982 (Hansard, col. 4841) he gave us the kind of routine in respect of the medical care of detainees, and I should like to quote what he said then—

At the bottom of the same column the hon. the Minister is recorded as having said—

That has been the extent of the medical care for detainees in the past. This Bill now determines that the detainees must be seen at least once a fortnight by a district surgeon. Therefore the only improvement in this legislation is that a detainee must be seen once a fortnight. I think the hon. the Minister will agree with me—and I do not say this to make a political point—that there is great discontent about the medical care given to detainees. There is also a lot of suspicion about it. I cannot quote all the reports, but want to quote a report from this morning’s Cape Times under the heading “ ‘Disturbing omission’ by Rabie Commission” which states—

That was the view expressed by the Association of Law Societies.

This was the view expressed by the president of the Association of Law Societies. The report states further—

It is not us on this side of the House who are saying this, but the Association of Law Societies.

And you love to repeat that particular sentence.

In the same newspaper there is also a report of what was said by Dr. D. McKenzie, a very highly respected medical teacher and Dean of the Medical School at the University of Cape Town. He is also a member of the Medical Association. In the past I think he was on occasion also a member of the Medical Council. I quote from The Cape Times of today—

I also have another article in which it is stated that the Medical Association of South Africa has appointed another ad hoc committee to go into this matter. I am not trying to argue with the hon. the Minister. The hon. the Minister might tell me that he believes the provision of medical care to detainees is sufficient, and I respect his opinion. But he must accept from me that there are many people—not just people trying to make trouble—many people in high positions who do not feel the same as the hon. the Minister or that side of the House about this matter. I think the hon. the Minister of Health will agree with what I am saying. I have therefore moved amendments which I believe can bring about a great difference and permit the hon. the Minister when he says that he is satisfied with the medical care of detainees, to prove it. For that reason, and for that reason alone, have I moved these amendments.

My first amendment proposes that on admission a detainee should be seen by a district surgeon. The aim of my second amendment is for the detainee to be seen in private. It is amazing that the magistrate is allowed to see him in private but not the doctor. Does the hon. the Minister not trust his doctors to see these detainees in private? To my mind that is quite an amazing omission. My third amendment is on page 49, in fine 21, after “surgeon” to add “or, at the request of such detainee or a member of his family, by a medical practitioner appointed by the Medical Association of South Africa.” I cannot see any reason why the hon. the Minister cannot accept all three these amendments. According to the hon. the Minister of Health, detainees are already on admission immediately seen by a district surgeon, and we merely want to write it into the law.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister another question: Does he believe that interrogation and detention can lead to medical conditions and that these conditions can occur rapidly? All medical evidence proves that it can happen. I am not just talking about long periods of interrogation of sensory deprivation or of torture, but just the mere fact that they are detained can lead to medical conditions. Does the hon. the Minister agree with that? If he agrees, does he believe a period of once a fortnight, something as vague as that, is sufficient to diagnose, prevent and treat these conditions? The Bill as it stands now does not do the good name of medicine credit and cannot help prevent diseases. I therefore appeal to the hon. the Minister to consider and accept my amendment.

My third amendment asks for a private medical practitioner appointed by the Medical Association of South Africa to be allowed to visit a detainee. I do not want to denigrate district surgeons. I personally believe that under the circumstances the majority of them are doing a good job. But they have to work under a horrible law, and that is why they cannot do their work properly. If the hon. the Minister allows medical practitioners appointed by the impartial Medical Association of South Africa—to act as a check and balance—to visit detainees, then there is no cause for suspicion when a patient dies in detention as he has been cared for also by a private medical practitioner. Nobody can then start spreading stories. I am trying to protect the hon. the Minister and his district surgeons with this suggestion, and I am very serious. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Mossel Bay is laughing again because he does not seem to care or mind if detainees die. [Interjections.] The hon. member did the same thing on Wednesday night.

I am laughing at you man, I am not laughing at the seriousness of the matter.

I have great doubt whether the hon. member worries about these things. I have to ask the hon. the Minister what he has against these amendments. If the hon. the Minister does not accept the amendments I shall say that he has something to hide.

That is a scandalous remark.

I say this because medical doctors have a strict code. They are people who will always have the security of the State in mind and therefore they will not abuse that privilege and that trust. It is for these reasons that I must repeat that I cannot see why the hon. the Minister will not be able to accept these amendments because I feel that they will be of great benefit to district surgeons and to the Department of Prisons in respect of this legislation. These amendments will also protect the good name of South African doctors not only among the public of South Africa but also among the public overseas.

Mr. Chairman, in the course of my speech I shall come back to the remarks by the hon. member for Parktown. I just want to say that this is one of the most important clauses in this Bill. This is undoubtedly the case, and that is probably why the official Opposition singled it out as the one clause they wished to object to most strenuously. We have no objection to constructive criticism and arguments we could take into account in improving this clause. Now, however, I wish to ask those hon. members why they are opposing this clause in these terms. I say that this sort of conduct is objectionable. We on this side of the House have gained the impression that the arguments of the hon. members on that side of the House have been used up and have stopped with the hon. member for Houghton, and she has been fighting this legislation since 1964. [Interjections.] That is where their arguments were used up. They have not come forward with any new arguments, they merely used the same ones; the only difference is that she did it better than they. They then merely drew up a list of dirty words which they came and poured out in this House about this specific clause. [Interjections.] Surely that is true. Those hon. members would do well to go and read their speeches.

The hon. member Prof. Olivier said that the legislation, and this clause in particular, were objectionable because they only applied in South Africa, and it was only in South Africa where people have died in detention. When the hon. the Minister interrupted him in that regard, the hon. member said that what the hon. the Minister had said in connection with the Netherlands was untrue too. [Interjections.] Give me a chance, please. I want to point out to the hon. member that on 5 February this year, the following report appeared—

[Interjections.] Now the hon. member comes along and tries to make out that this only happens in South Africa. We have repeatedly said that we are sorry when this happens. All we ask of those hon. members is that they be fair to South Africa. They must not go and shout it from the rooftops that it only happens in South Africa.

I say that this clause is essential and indispensable for the maintenance of law and order in South Africa. It is now being alleged that the Minister can simply catch anyone, and that he then disappears and no one hears from him again. Surely that is rubbish. At what stage is a person taken into custody and detained in terms of this legislation? It is only when there is a suspicion that that person is engaged in subversive activities and terrorism.

That is not so.

Of course it is so. [Interjections.] Now that hon. member is shaking his head so hard that I can hear it from this side of the House. After all, there has to be a suspicion in terms of clause 29 that such a person has engaged in terrorist activities and subversion.

Nonsense!

No, that is not true.

Surely no one will detain a person in the absence of such evidence. [Interjections.] Those hon. members do not know what is going on. They have not read the clause. First go and read clause 29.

You will soon see what a mistake you have made.

Mr. Chairman, the Rabie Commission that investigated this matter had no doubt whatsoever as to the absolute necessity for clause 29—the old section 6 that we used to have. I can do no better than to quote to this Committee what the Rabie Commission has to say about this matter. In paragraph 10.77 on page 153 of the report they state the following—

Then the commission goes on in paragraph 10.78—

The hon. members of the Opposition want to take this weapon—according to evidence, the only weapon—out of the hands of our police. That is what they want to do. What is the reply of those hon. members to this? What do they want? What does the hon. member for Parktown want? [Interjections.] Do the hon. members want us to take this weapon—according to evidence, the only weapon—out of the hands of our Security Police?

It is not the only weapon.

The hon. member for Berea must not come and tell us that it is not the only weapon. Does he perhaps know of another one?

Read the clause.

Sir, I am now referring to the evidence submitted by the police to the Rabie Commission, and they are the people who are concerned with these matters; it is not the hon. members of the Opposition who are responsible for State security and have to maintain law and order in South Africa. Nevertheless, they maintain that we have to abolish this clause. No, my goodness, surely we are not children!

The principle of detention for questioning is not an alien measure in countries where there are such security problems.

In Ireland they are able to cope without it.

I can prove by quotations that the British used this kind of legislation in Northern Ireland. They detained or interned 4 500 people. I have evidence to show that those people could not be released because then they would immediately be reincorporated and taken up into the system by which subversion and terrorist activities were committed.

That is rubbish!

I am telling you that when those countries were in the situation that their State security has been endangered, they have included such measures in their State Books. For example there is Israel—but the hon. member for Houghton now says that Israel repealed that in 1979. That may be so, but at this stage Israel is achieving peace with most of its enemies. That is precisely the point. However, we must bear in mind that this appeared in Israel’s Statute Book between 1945 and 1979.

The point we want to make is that South Africa is experiencing difficult circumstances. There are terrorists who are making matters more difficult for us as far as State security is concerned. If that were to cease, we should not leave this measure on the Statute Book for longer than is essential. Surely the hon. the Minister said that clearly in his Second Reading speech as well, but that you omit to mention.

I should also like to deal with the amendments proposed by the hon. member Prof. Olivier. He wants the detention to be for seven days only. Surely there is evidence in this regard, too, before the Rabie Commission. In our circumstances this is not practicable, and the Rabie Commission investigated this in depth as well. For example, a terrorist is caught on the border. The hon. member for Port Elizabeth North also referred to this. It is well known that there are cases where it has taken 21 days before such a person has even told the police who he is.

The situation here in South Africa is different to that in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland the British police, for example, searched 75 000 houses in order to get hold of these people and obtain data about them which could be processed in a computer. When they catch a man, they know within hours after they have taken his fingerprints who he is. We cannot do that here. We catch him on the border, for example, and bring him here, but then he does not want to tell us who he is. It takes us 21 days before we can ascertain who he is. However, that hon. member wants us to release him after seven days. Surely they would laugh at us if we were to accede to the request of the hon. member. What does the measure mean if hon. members want us to apply it in such a way in South Africa? Therefore I say that seven days is far too short; this measure simply cannot be implemented in this way.

The hon. member also says that we must inform the next of kin without delay. However, he does not tell us who the next of kin are. That man is caught by us on the border and he simply will not tell us who he is. Who are his next of kin?

You would not even tell the hon. member for Pinelands about his son.

That is something completely different. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Groote Schuur should rather not drag the personal affairs of the hon. member for Pinelands in here. We shall speak to the hon. member for Pinelands personally when we come to that point. The hon. member for Groote Schuur need not be so aggressive about it. The point is, how are we to implement it in practice? The hon. member wants it written into the legislation that we must inform the next of kin without delay, but in the mean time the detainee does not want to give us his name. How, then, are we to know who his next of kin are? Surely, then, we cannot support that amendment of the hon. member.

Apart from the Rabie Commission, which went into this matter in great depth, we read the following in the authoritative Bennett report—

Therefore this was not even the case in Northern Ireland.

But that has been changed since.

I know it has been changed, but when that country was in a serious state of emergency as far as security matters are concerned, they recognized that it was not essential that the next of kin of a detainee be notified of his detention. I am trying to explain to the hon. member that we are in a similar situation, but she nevertheless argues that we must change the legislation. In fact, she does not want this clause in the Statute Book.

Mr. Justice Bennett goes on to say—

[Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, listening to the hon. member for Verwoerdburg disturbs me even more than these clauses do. The hon. member says—he repeated it and expressed himself forcefully— that before one is detained in terms of clause 29, one must either have committed, or the police must believe that one has committed or is about to commit, an offence, in other words, that one must be a suspect. That is what he thinks the clause provides, and he argues very forcibly along that line. Let me just read to him some of the things this clause provides for—

Not even relating to himself. So any person who may be a witness, can be detained in terms of this clause. In fact, I want to tell that hon. member that that, in fact, is so much the case that even the hon. the Minister now answers questions in the House, he actually answers them in this form: He says section 6 “has no direct bearing on criminal charges.” The argument of the hon. the Minister is that this clause primarily deals with the interrogation of witnesses.

We do in any event not agree with the indefinite detention of a potential accused, but it is a very different matter to say that a potential witness should be detained indefinitely.

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) on page 47, in line 15, to omit “once a month furnish the Minister” and to substitute:
   • furnish the Minister forthwith and thereafter every seven days
2. (2) on page 47, in line 18, to omit “six months” and to substitute “one month”;
3. (3) on page 47, in line 57, after “release” to insert:
   • and in so doing may be assisted by his legal adviser
4. (4) on page 47, in lines 60 to 63, to omit subsection (6);
5. (5) on page 47, in fines 64 and 65, and on page 49, in lines 1 to 6, to omit subsection (7);
6. (6) on page 49, in fines 7 to 16, to omit subsection (8):
7. (7) on page 49, after line 21, to add:
   • (11) The interrogation of any person detained in terms of the provisions of this section shall be conducted in accordance with a code of conduct determined by the Commissioner with the concurrence of the Minister.

I wish to deal specifically with my amendment relating to subsection (6), which states—

According to that subsection, any court in the land, whether it is the Appellate Division or any other division of the Supreme Court, is excluded from any pronouncement in regard to the validity of any action taken in terms of this clause. I want to know why that provision has been specifically included. I want to know why the Supreme Court should not have any jurisdiction whatsoever. Do we not trust the judges? Do we not trust them at all? The question of whether we trust medical doctors or not has already been raised in the House today. It is also quite clear to us that the hon. the Minister does not trust lawyers. That is very clear. Why can judges, however, not have access to these detainees?

There have been nearly 4 dozen deaths in detention. Even if one ruled out the possibility of assault together—on the assumption that there have been no assaults whatsoever—and if one were to look at the fact then that nearly 4 dozen people detained in terms of this particular measure have died in detention, does a situation not arise then in which one inevitably has to express the conviction that the Supreme Court surely ought to have some access? Does that not, in the breasts of reasonable men, raise some sort of incentive urging them to ask themselves whether the Supreme Court ought not to have some access in the light of these situations? I want to ask the hon. the Minister how many deaths it does take for him to begin to concern himself with the question of whether our judges should have access. How many deaths does it take? Does it take 5 000? Does it take 10 000? How many? At what stage does the hon. the Minister say to himself: I think maybe the judges ought to have some kind of access or some kind of control over these matters?

One death should be enough!

Mr. Chairman, in the absence of an answer to that question I should like to put it to the hon. the Minister that if it does not occur to him that the courts ought to have any power, it does raise suspicion. It then raises the suspicion that the hon. the Minister does not want the judges to know what is going on in detention, that he actively does not want the judges to know, and that he will indeed not let reasonable, objective, legally trained men know what is happening in detention, because he specifically wants to hide the truth. That is the only conclusion one can come to. If anybody else can suggest another reason, Mr. Chairman, I shall be very happy to listen to that reason. I have sought the answer to this question for years. Now we are discussing the clause; let us have that answer today. Let us have the answer straight. Do not let us have any smearing. Let us have the accusation that we in the official Opposition do not want security legislation or that we are unpatriotic.

I have here with me the memorandum which the Bar Council submitted to the hon. the Minister. I do not think it is necessary for me to quote at length from this memorandum. It is all here for everybody to read. I do, however, want to draw the attention of hon. members to page 13 of this memorandum, where the Bar Council deals with this particular clause. I quote—

That is one of the Bar Council’s conclusions. They deal with this over many pages. They also say—

I should just like to interrupt my argument at this stage in order to refer to what the hon. member for Houghton said when she raised the case of the recent Bophuthatswana matter heard in the Appellate Division. I made some inquiries this morning and spoke to one of the advocates who appeared in that matter. The position was that all 11 judges agreed that there was a conflict between the Terrorism Act and the Bophuthatswana constitution. That was common cause among all 11 judges. They all agreed that the constitution of Bophuthatswana would overrule the Terrorism Act. The only issue was whether that applied only to future legislation in Bophuthatswana or whether it also applied to earlier legislation, such as the Terrorism Act. On that issue the four judges—Mr. Justice Rumpff, Mr. Justice Rabie, Mr. Justice Cilliers and Mr. Justice Joubert—ruled that it did not apply to previous or existing legislation. All 11 judges agreed though that the Terrorism Act should give way to the Bophuthatswana constitution, which exists there, of course, in the form of a bill of rights based on the European Convention of Human Rights.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the other amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, I have already argued to some extent the one to subsection (8), which substitutes section 335 of the Criminal Procedures Act. I argued that during Second Reading. [Time expired.]

The hon. member for Durban North … [Interjections.] I am sorry, the hon. member for Pinetown. In any case, the hon. member tried to be the hon. member for Durban North, but did not succeed. [Interjections.]

He did succeed.

The hon. member for Pinetown tried to take the hon. member for Verwoerdburg to task for misquoting the clause of the Bill. The hon. member for Pinetown proceeded to quote from the clause, but, honestly, I could not, looking at the clause, follow what it was the hon. member was quoting. The hon. member must have been quoting very selectively. If one looks at the marginal note on this clause, one sees the following—

If one then reads the actual words of the clause, one finds that it is stated categorically that a commissioned officer may order the arrest of a person “if he has reason to believe that any person …” That is where the hon. member stopped quoting. He said “any person” but did not describe the persons to whom this applied. The clause does, however, go on to state—

1. (a) has committed or intends or intended to commit an offence referred to in section 54(1), (2) or (4) …

What about clause 29(1)(b)?

In other words, the hon. member for Verwoerdburg was perfectly entitled to argue on the grounds that he did.

The wrong premise.

He was quite entitled to argue that this clause provides for the detention of people in respect of whom there is a distinct reason for believing that they have committed or are about to commit an offence.

And others.

Now deal with clause 29(1) (b).

If we read clause 29(1)(b) we find reference being made to people—

So Clause 29(1)(b) does not just relate to anybody. It relates to people who are potential witnesses for proving the commission of an offence. [Interjections.]

He is only a witness.

It is therefore ridiculous to argue, as the hon. member for Pinetown tried to do, that this clause is just aimed at the indiscriminate detention of people. [Interjections.]

But he is only a witness.

It is true, as the hon. member for Hillbrow has just said by way of an interjection, that “he is only a witness”.

† He is, however, a very material witness in a very serious case.

What about murder? Is that not serious?

He is a material witness in a very serious case.

What about murder?

It is therefore not just “any person” who is involved. The person who would be detained in terms of this provision would be a person who was either an accomplice or a person who was directly or indirectly associated with the commission of the offence. [Interjections.]

Not true.

Hon. members of the Opposition wish to argue …

Is the Minister in the Seychelles trial associated with it?

Hon. members of the Opposition, it seems, wish to argue that in particular cases people may be detained, in terms of this provision, who are not directly or indirectly associated with an offence. Let me produce the evidence so that we can judge it. One cannot just make a sweeping statement and say that this clause is aimed at such people. This clause is patently aimed at the person who is in fact directly or indirectly associated.

As a witness.

If within the ambit of the implementation of this clause some innocent people, or people who think they are innocent are also apprehended, let them then produce the evidence. One cannot just make a sweeping statement…

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, Sir. I have very little time on this point. My time has been restricted.

You have got all day.

We know that that hon. member has no respect for parliamentary procedure.

I am allowed to ask a question.

However, we on this side do have that.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member allowed to say that I have no respect for parliamentary procedure? [Interjections.]

Order! That is a matter of interpretation. The hon. member for Mossel Bay may proceed.

After the hon. member has wasted more of my time, I conclude by summing it up in the words of the following proverb: One should not throw out the baby with the bath-water. Because there may be, in terms of this provision…

What you really mean is that the end justifies the means.

No, I do not mean that at all. I do not think the hon. member understands what I am saying. What I am saying, is that because action might be taken against a person against whom action ought not to be taken in terms of the aims of this clause, the whole provision should not be thrown out of the window. This provision is a necessary one. The hon. member for Verwoerdburg argued correctly, on the grounds of the findings of the Rabie Commission, that it is a necessary provision. However, I should like to state categorically that it is the absolute height of naivety and irresponsibility to advance hypothetical arguments that the clause may involve people who are not directly or indirectly involved.

Mr. Chairman, I think we could probably continue for many hours to debate the principle involved here with one another. I am also sure that it is not the intention that we should debate the principle indefinitely during the Committee Stage. That is why I am rising at this stage to try and reply to the arguments which have been raised.

I should like to commence by referring hon. members to the standpoint of the Rabie Commission on this particular matter. One will find it in paragraph 14.5 on page 216 of the report under the heading “Aanhouding vir die doel van ondervraging”. There the Commission stated the following—

As far as I am concerned, this is a most adequate reply to the question which, inter alia, was put by the hon. member for Pinetown. The commission went on to say—

This is followed by a whole series of proposals put forward by the Commission, all of which have been included in the Bill. Although the hon. member for Houghton and other hon. members opposite are becoming hot under the collar about clause 29, I therefore have no intention of saying anything further about its principle. Hon. members on this side advanced very adequate arguments this morning, and during the Second Reading as well, as to why clause 29 is essential. Whether we like clause 29, is, of course, another matter. To my mind, however, it is a question of the necessity of that section. I therefore content myself with the sound arguments put forward that clause 29 is a necessity in our circumstances and that it has been found to be so by the Rabie Commission. To me it is quite adequate that the Rabie Commission has found it to be so. They were people of high standing and possessed of expert knowledge, who gave a great deal of attention to this matter. If hon. members were to read the other section of the report, they would see how much attention was given to clause 29.

As far as specific matters which hon. members raised are concerned, I just wish to make one or two general remarks. I wish to tell the hon. member for Parktown that we have absolutely nothing to hide, and I therefore reject the allegations he made. Once again that hon. member has done this in a calculated way so that their best friend in this matter, i.e. the Cape Times, can blazon this abroad once more. The hon. member for Pinetown, who is a well-known advocate and the hon. member for Parktown, who is a well-known surgeon, and who is indeed internationally renowned, not only suggested, but blatantly accused the Government of wanting to hide things, of not wanting the medical world to know certain things and of not wanting the judges to know certain things either. I reject that accusation with contempt. [Interjections.] It was done in a calculated way as part of this campaign they are conducting and that is why they are so grateful that they could get hold of this morning’s Cape Times since it contains three articles dealing with this aspect, most of which is such old news, however, that one does not even feel like reading it again. However, this is presented day after day for one reason only, and that is to convey this evil message to the world. [Interjections.] This is the only reason why hon. members want it. That is why I say to those hon. members that I reject with contempt the insinuation that these things are being done because the Government wishes to hide something.

Just answer the question.

I should now like to deal with amendments moved by hon. members.

No answer.

You are always talking nonsense and then you want other people to reply to it.

A Prime Minister must behave like a Prime Minister, not like a politician.

It is the report of a judge which you do not wish to accept.

I should like to tell the hon. member for Durban Point that any objections the Government may raise to certain amendments being moved, does not necessarily mean that we agree with the indictments which the hon. member may think they contain. We do not agree that there is a lack of supervision or a lack of medical treatment or that malpractices take place. That is why I wish to tell the hon. member that if I am not going to accept some of his amendments, he should not assume that we are therefore necessarily placing our stamp of approval on the things he is concerned about. One cannot argue in that way.

Let us discuss it on merit.

The hon. member Prof. Olivier moved that clause 29 be amended from line 53 onwards. However, the deficiency in his amendment is that the hon. member omits the police completely who are a factor involved here. The police are the people who have the information, inter alia, to advise the Attorney-General so that certain steps may subsequently be taken. Nevertheless, they are completely excluded from the clause. This is something which cannot work in practice, and for that reason the hon. member makes it impossible for me to accept his amendment since the advisory body to the Attorney-General is being excluded. For this reason, I am not prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment. His other argument in respect of the period of seven days has already been replied to adequately by the hon. member for Verwoerdburg and other hon. members.

Another amendment of the hon. member Prof. Olivier, one which also creates serious problems for me, is his second amendment. This amendment provides that the place where the person is being detained, should be made known. We are not prepared to do this for a number of reasons. One of these is security. The second is because of practical considerations and the third is humanitarian. These are three of the most important reasons why we are not prepared to make known the place where a person is being detained. With regard to the words which the hon. member proposes to have deleted and substituted by other words, I wish to point out that it is simply a technical alteration which I do not wish to dwell on. As the hon. member is aware, we do, in fact, notify the immediate family of a detainee as soon as possilbe, as circumstances allow, that a person is being detained. Sometimes this occurs immediately because a person is detained at and removed from his home. Or this occurs in the presence of other people who then convey the message. It very seldom happens that a person is found completely alone by the police and is then detained. Even when this does occur, his immediate family are notified as soon as possible. For these reasons, I regret that I cannot accept the hon. member’s second amendment either.

In his third amendment the hon. member requests that the review procedures should be applicable here. The Rabie Commission also discussed this, and now I simply with to single out the most important reasons why the review procedures cannot be implemented here. The reason is because this measure is one which deals with temporary circumstances in respect of a detainee. A person may be detained for one day, one month or six months. It is therefore a temporary situation. It is different from when we restrict a person for a fixed period and then periodically consider the restriction order by way of review. The principal reason is that we are dealing here with a purely temporary situation which lasts longer than six months only by way of an exception. A procedure has been prescribed whereby the case may be reviewed. My amendment this morning brings about a further improvement by stating that if there is an exceptional case, i.e. longer than six months, a detainee’s case is reviewed every three months after that. But this is an extremely exceptional case. There have been a few persons who were detained for longer than nine months, but this is the exception. These are the reasons why I cannot accept this amendment. The hon. member’s fourth amendment has already been replied to.

In his fifth amendment, the hon. member requests that access be granted to a parent or other close relative not less than once a fortnight. We are by no means prepared to grant this, for practical reasons which were discussed during the Second Reading and which are evident from the report. The object of detention for questioning is precisely to obtain information from people and not to have a stream of people visiting them all day so that the police are hardly able to do their work of obtaining information from the person. For obvious reasons I am therefore not prepared to accept the amendment.

† The hon. member for Parktown moved three amendments. I have already indicated to the hon. member that I am prepared to accept his second amendment, so I shall not elaborate on that. As far as his third amendment is concerned, I am not prepared to accept it. The hon. member’s third amendment proposes the addition of the words—

As I say, I am not prepared to accept this amendment.

Why not?

Because we do not want the private sector involved in this procedure.

You are going to regret that.

Let us be very clear on this. The private medical practitioner—I am just distinguishing between him and the district surgeon now—is not excluded in all events in terms of the Bill. Of course not. I have explained often that when necessary detainees have immediate medical treatment by the best practitioner available. The question whether detainees are entitled to medical care and whether they are entitled to the best medical care is not in dispute. They have it and they will have it. What is in dispute is that the hon. member is asking that a medical practitioner of the detainee’s choice…

No, that is not what I said.

Yes, that is what you said.

The hon. member is asking that a medical practitioner at the detainee’s request and/or at the request of a member of his family be allowed to see him.

A medical practitioner appointed by the Medical Association of South Africa.

Yes, I know. The medical practitioner’s name could be on a list provided by the Medical Association. The reason why I am not prepared to accept the amendment is because when a person is being detained for the purpose of obtaining information from him, we do not want that information to be published outside. There is a risk involved. A medical doctor is no angel.

Do you not trust the doctors?

Since when is a medical doctor an angel? [Interjections.] I say there is a risk attached to this. That is why I am not prepared to allow a private medical doctor under these circumstances, i.e. because of the risk involved as far as the publication of information is concerned. [Interjections.]

Does the hon. member not trust the doctors appointed by the State?

Because a district surgeon is appointed by the State, he cannot be trusted, but a rivate doctor can, in fact, be trusted. This is what the hon. member is saying.

What nonsense!

With all due respect, it is no use the hon. member getting hot under the collar. We are both professional people and we both have respect for our professions. I say in all seriousness, and this is not meant to disparage the medical profession or any particular doctor, that there is a risk involved. We have had experience of this kind of thing and we are therefore not prepared to take the risk that information which might be very sensitive, is divulged. I do not mean to disparage the profession or any particular medical practitioner.

The Medical Association of South Africa is therefore a risk!

The issue here is the risk factor. The hon. member may interpret it as he wishes, but I say with all the responsibility I have and with all due respect to the profession, that we are not prepared to take that risk. We are dealing with sensitive issues, issues dealing with the security of the country, and we have had experience of people in various professions who have divulged information under these circumstances. Even clergymen have done this. [Interjections.] Of course, I have enough evidence; that is why I am telling the hon. member these things.

The hon. member’s request in his third amendment, viz. that a detainee be examined by a district surgeon on admission, is not practicable.

But the hon. the Minister of Health said that this was being done.

Yes, but the amendment of the hon. member refers to an examination on admission.

But that is what the hon. the Minister of Health said.

Please give me a chance. It could be that a person is only admitted a few days after his detention, and therefore the hon. member’s amendment creates a practical problem. If we can think of a better proposal during the course of this debate, I am, however, prepared to consider it. But at this stage I can tell the hon. member that the amendment, as it is worded at present, causes a problem in practice. If he can propose something better at a later stage, we could consider it.

†Before I leave the hon. member for Parktown I want to say that I trust the hon. member is aware of the statement issued by Prof. De Klerk of the Medical Council after their interview with the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health and Welfare and the Commissioner of Police in which he expressed satisfaction in regard to the medical attention that is being given to detainees as well as in regard to the procedure that is being followed in that respect. Am I to understand that the hon. member is not aware of that statement? Is it just because it is in favour of the Government that the hon. member is not aware of it? [Interjections.]

This was a statement that was published in all the newspapers. It was also published in The Cape Times. Am I to understand the hon. member did not read it? [Interjections.] Must I accept the fact that that hon. member did not read that statement by the chairman of his own council?

I have a letter to prove what was said; so the hon. the Minister had better be careful in regard to what he is saying. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I am astonished to learn that the hon. member did not read the statement issued by the chairman of the Medical Council. Can you believe that! Must I provide the hon. member with a copy of that statement?

I shall read to you in a moment what was said.

I shall gladly provide the hon. member with a copy of that statement.

The hon. member for Pinetown asked me to reply specifically as to why the courts are being excluded from the procedure as laid down in clause 29. I do not intend to quote that portion of the report which runs from paragraph 10.57 onwards although I have already quoted certain paragraphs from the report to the hon. member in this regard. There is no specific passage in the report dealing with the particular question put to me by the hon. member and I do not intend to advance a conclusive answer to his particular question. The fact of the matter is that we are dealing here with a procedure to elicit information from people and if any such person knows that within a certain length of time he will be entitled to approach a court of law in any respect, then one must accept the fact that that particular person will refuse to say anything at all. The hon. member for Verwoerdburg has already referred to the fact that certain of these people are not even prepared to provide their own names and addresses within the first two or three weeks of their detention because of their resistance to being questioned. Hon. members of this Committee have already been told that we have to deal here with highly trained and intelligent people and it is not an easy task. However, I do not intend to take this matter any further except to confirm once again the views expressed by the Rabie Commission.

The first amendment of the hon. member for Pinetown provides that the Minister must be informed every seven days instead of every month. That would be an impossible task. If we only had a few people on our hands, it could be done. However, if we have a number of people on our hands it is administratively quite impossible and for that reason I am unable to accept the hon. member’s first amendment.

As far as his second amendment is concerned, namely, to substitute a period of one month for the six-month period as far as the question of review is concerned, this is also quite impracticable and I am not prepared to accept it.

As far as his third amendment is concerned, I have stated very clearly over the past few days why I am not prepared to accept the fact that such a person be assisted by his legal adviser. Therefore this amendment too is unacceptable. In short, I am not prepared to accept any amendment of the hon. member.

As far as his seventh amendment is concerned, I think that the short indication which I gave at the beginning of discussions this morning goes some way in assisting the hon. member in what he has in mind.

Are they going to be secret or public?

No, it will not be secret; it will be published. My final decision in such a matter will be made public, of course; that is the whole purpose of it. The world must know where they stand with us.

In the Gazette?

At this stage I cannot say whether it will be published in the Gazette, but it will be made public so that the public and hon. members can know.

I am prepared to accept that one amendment of the hon. member for Parktown, but unfortunately I cannot accept the other amendments.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister suggested that I did not read the report which the Medical Association submitted after its meeting with the hon. the Minister of Health and Pensions. I want to tell the hon. the Minister that I did read that report. I took note of that report. In fact, I also read what the hon. the Minister of Health and Welfare said about this matter. I want to quote again Hansard, 1982, col. 4841, where the hon. the Minister said—

Unlike to what the hon. the Minister suggested, I think I try to do my job to the best of my ability. I therefore endeavoured to find out exactly what was said. Since the hon. the Minister has accused me of not reading these things, I should like to read to him whether they did, in fact, do their job correctly. I should also like to read to him what was said—

He did not say that they were doing their job correctly, but that he was of the opinion that the responsible personnel were doing their best within the confines of present legislation.

I should like the Committee to judge if this is exactly the same as that what the hon. the Minister has said. The hon. the Minister should therefore not accuse me of things about which he knows nothing.

I read a report in The Cape Times about that.

It was never said that they were doing their job correctly; what was said was—

There I should like to leave the matter.

There was a statement by Prof. De Klerk; why did you not read that?

I should like to continue, and I think it will take me only another two minutes. I want the hon. the Minister to listen very carefully to this—

I am quoting the Medical Association—

I want to leave the thought with the hon. the Minister that the Medical Association will keep on pressing for proper medical care so that these people will have an opportunity of seeing private practitioners. By way of interjection I told the hon. the Minister that he would regret not accepting this amendment. I want to repeat that he is going to regret it, and I stand by that.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has not yet referred to the four amendments I moved.

Mr. Chairman, I now intend to deal with those amendments. The hon. member moved the three amendments he had on the Order Paper, and handed in a fourth amendment today. I wish to refer, firstly, to the amendment in which the hon. member requests after “fortnight” to insert the words “in alternate weeks”, in other words that the magistrate and the district surgeon should either consult with one another, or that their visits should be arranged in this way. That raises practical difficulties, because it means that the magistrate and the district surgeon must always consult with one another, or contact each other to arrange their visits. These are also busy people, and unfortunately this amendment can for practical reasons not be accepted. [Interjections.]

As far as the first amendment on the Order Paper is concerned, I have explained to the hon. member that I am not prepared to include this in the Bill as such. These are matters that will be considered by myself, by the Commissioner of Police and by the Director of Security Legislation during the next few weeks and months, when I will formulate clear guidelines for publication that will explain the code or procedure.

To which of those prohibitions do you object?

That is not at issue now. What we are discussing now is whether this amendment should be included in the Bill or not. I am not prepared to include it in the Bill, but the factors mentioned in the amendment are factors that of course will be considered by me in the administration of this particular portfolio.

In regard to the third amendment, I want to ask the hon. member why he only refers to complaints. There can just as well be compliments.

Add inter alia.

Surely it is not a practical suggestion, Sir. The magistrate visits the detainee precisely in order take cognizance of his welfare and his circumstances in all respects. Why should only the complaints be singled out now? I do not believe that any good reason can be suggested for that. The legislation provides that the magistrate must visit the man to establish what his circumstances are in all respects.

That is not provided in the legislation.

Surely we cannot make provision for everything in the legislation. It would be ridiculous. Nothing of this nature is included anywhere in legislation. I am sorry, but I am not going to dwell on this any further.

†The hon. member’s fourth amendment seeks to insert the following—in order to observe and report any signs of ill-health or injury and to report on the condition and welfare of such person.

Why does the district surgeon visit a detainee? Certainly not to play chess with him! He visits him to satisfy himself as to the health and welfare of the detainee.

I am sorry, but I am not prepared to accept any of these amendments for the reasons that I have advanced.

Mr. Chairman, that attitude of the hon. the Minister is absolutely incredible. He comes to the House with an absolutely closed mind, and every attempt to improve the legislation, every attempt to assist in preventing its exploitation and its use to harm South Africa, is treated with contempt. It is ridiculed, or it is classified as unnecessary. Everyone of the proposals that I have made here was also suggested, inter alia, by the Bar Council.

[Inaudible.]

Do you disagree with the Bar Council? Everybody is wrong except Louis le Grange!

The point is that the hon. the Minister does not disagree with one of these things. He says that he is going to provide for their prohibition. I repeat that what I wish him to insert in the Bill is that the regulations for handling detainees shall include the prohibition of violence, threats of violence, torture, including psychological torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment. I should like to hear from the hon. the Minister whether he too believes that those forms of treatment should be prohibit

Business suspended at 12h45 and resumed at 14hl5.

Afternoon Sitting

Mr. Chairman, before business was suspended, I was criticizing the hon. the Minister’s attitude to our amendment. I want to say that the approach of the Government, its arrogance, its total insensitivity to feelings…[Interjections.]

But now you are talking absolute nonsense! [Interjections.]

Yes, its insensitivity and its total lack of finesse in handling delicate matters is the reason why this country has become in many people’s eyes the polecat of the world. [Interjections.] It is because of that kind of insensitivity and arrogance displayed by the hon. the Minister that South Africa has become the polecat of the world. We try to assist. We try to strengthen South Africa’s defences. We try to include things in a measure, things with which the hon. the Minister agrees, which he says are right, which he says are what is going to happen, which he says is the intention of the Government, but he does not want it in the legislation. That is why people criticize us and attack us.

If that is the attitude of the hon. the Minister, he has only himself to blame if he is criticized. We will vote against this clause. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make an appeal to the hon. the Minister. He indicated that he would not accept the second amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point. In his reply he said this presented practical difficulties because it meant that the magistrate and the district surgeon would have to talk to each other about the matter. Surely, as it is at the moment, it presents no more difficulty than already exists, because at the moment the magistrate and district surgeon have to visit a detainee on a fortnightly basis. They are merely to continue visiting him on a fortnightly basis—should the hon. member for Durban Point’s amendment be accepted— but on alternate weeks, so that one week a detainee will be visited by a district surgeon and the following week by a magistrate. I cannot see what practical difficulty could arise from this.

I should appeal to the hon. the Minister to reconsider this matter. It is little enough but it surely ensures continuity of visits on a weekly basis by either a magistrate or a district surgeon. I must say that I cannot understand the hon. the Minister’s reasoning.

Mr. Chairman, the case put by the hon. member for Umhlanga is a matter which can be arranged and investigated administratively. Consequently there is no reason why it should be stipulated in the legislation. In practice this is probably what will happen.

In practice it could of course also happen that, over a period of 14 days, a detainee has to be visited in any case by a magistrate as well as by a district surgeon and the Inspector of Detainees. Consequently it may even happen that the detainee in question will be visited every four or five days by one of these three people. This is the position.

With regard to the hon. member for Durban Point’s argument I should just like to point out that it is not necessary at all for him to get so excited now. The fact of the matter is that all the things which the hon. member for Durban Point asked for in his amendment are things which are already not permissible.

But let us then say so!

They are already things that are not permissible at all. Consequently there is no need at all to stipulate this specifically in the legislation. For that reason I am therefore not prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendments (1) and (2) moved by Prof. N. J. J. Olivier negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendments (1) and (2) moved by Mr. S. A. Pitman negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by the Minister of Law and Order agreed to.

Amendments (3) and (4) moved by Prof. N. J. J. Olivier negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendments (3) to (6) moved by Mr. S. A. Pitman negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (1) moved by Dr. M. S. Barnard negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (3) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (2) moved by Dr. M. S. Barnard agreed to.

Amendment (3) moved by Dr. M. S. Barnard negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (4) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (5) moved by Prof. N. J. J. Olivier negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment (7) moved by Mr. S. A. Pitman negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, as we go along, it gets worse and worse.

Surely that does not form part of your motivation.

I am actually fascinated that the hon. member for Verwoerdburg takes the attitude he does. This clause does not even have the merit that it can be used to detain the accused. It does not even have the merit that it can be used to detain the person who is to be interrogated. It is simply and plainly a clause to detain witnesses. If one believes, like the hon. members opposite do, that detention is a thing to be used against accused people, against witnesses and against all sorts of categories of people, I can understand one taking that attitude. However, to me it is absolutely shocking that our system of law in this country has reached the stage where one can detain witnesses until the trial is over. The hon. members opposite know very well that these trials can take two to two and a half years. These people can be detained and no court of law has any jurisdiction, even over witnesses. In terms of clause 31(4)—

who is the person who will have detained him. Then, in terms of clause 31(7)—

or to do this or to do that—no court has any right at all. I hardly know what to say if this is what our law has come to. I can even understand that the hon. members opposite take the attitude that this is as our law should be. However, in that case I really do not know how to argue with them because we on this side just do not believe in the same principles as the hon. members opposite. In terms of this clause no objective need has to exist for the Attorney-General to exercise his power and there don’t have to be any objective facts for him to exercise his power. It simply states that if “in his opinion” it is in the interest of the administration of justice. That is one of the grounds on which he can invoke this clause and just detain a witness until the trial is over. As I say, it may be two years; it may be ten months or it may be one and a half years. It is a thoroughly bad situation, and I can see no justification for it. When we were discussing clause 29, I asked the hon. the Minister on what grounds he could justify no interference by a court of law, on what grounds he could justify the fact that no court of law could have access to a detainee. His answer then was that if a person was being interrogated, it would be a bad thing to allow the court access because then he might resist, for example, by not giving his name or any other information. But what about this clause? How does one justify no access by a court of law in terms of this clause? This clause is not intended for interrogation. This clause is intended for a person who is likely to give evidence to the court, somebody who has already made a statement. How does one justify the fact that no court of law has any jurisdiction or any right? I think this is a thoroughly bad clause and completely in line with the kind of provision we have in this iniquitous Bill. We shall vote against it.

Mr. Chairman, hon. members of the official Opposition must make up their minds. When we came to deal with clause 28 they said that that was the worst clause of the Bill. Then when we came to clause 29, they said that that was the worst clause of the Bill. Now, however, the hon. member for Pinetown says that it is getting worse as we go along. Obviously that is patently contradictory. It just illustrates the attitude of hon. members opposite.

It is like your speeches. They are getting worse all the time.

Those hon. members do not want any clauses in the Bill which will enable the police and the hon. the Minister effectively to curb terrorism in this country.

That is rubbish.

Sir, I have the same opinion of the hon. member.

*Clause 31 contains basically the same provision that already exists in section 12(b) of the Internal Security Act, 1950. The principle of the detention of witnesses by order of the Attorney-General is no new principle in our criminal law. As a matter of fact, it has existed in the Criminal Procedure Act since 1955. This clause makes provision for witnesses to be detained when their evidence is needed with regard to specific offences, namely rioting, treason, terrorism, the harbouring of terrorists and the like. No general authority is therefore being given to the Attorney-General here to detain witnesses as he sees fit. It is only applicable with regard to specific offences. In addition these witnesses are not being detained by order of the hon. the Minister either. We have listened ad nauseum to arguments by the hon. members of the Opposition that the hon. the Minister cannot be entrusted with these powers, that the police cannot be entrusted with them and that the courts should be the arbiter when it comes to exercising these powers. Here we now have a provision which empowers the Attorney-General, who is an officer of the court… The hon. member is laughing, but surely he knows that this is the case.

He is not the court.

I did not say he was the court. I said he was an officer of the court. Now this authority is being given to the Attorney-General, who is an officer of the court. However, hon. members opposite are not satisfied with this either. What it amounts to is that whether it is the Chief Justice, the hon. the Minister, the Attorney-General or the Commissioner of Police, the PFP is not prepared to entrust anyone with these powers because they are opposed to the exercising of these powers. Nothing unmasks them more clearly than this attitude they have now adopted in respect of the powers of the Attorney-General. [Interjections.]

The motivation for this provision is also very clear. If the hon. members refer to the Rabie report they will see that this provision exists in the first place to prevent witnesses being tampered with. The second object of the provision is to prevent intimidation. The third object is to prevent flight; the fourth, is to ensure the safety of the witnesses, and the fifth is to promote the interests of the administration of justice in general. The fact of the matter is that the police—this is also in accordance with the findings of the Rabie Commission—rely on the questioning of terrorists or suspected terrorists to obtain information on terrorist activities, infiltrators, the concealment of weapons, etc. Because of threats the information the police must rely on to combat these activities is difficult to obtain from potential witnesses. We dare not be naive with regard to these activities. It is the stated aim of, inter alia, the ANC to take action against informants, and these are not mere threats. If hon. members refer to the Rabie report they will find innumerable examples where threats were converted into action and people were murdered or assaulted as a result of evidence they gave to combat terrorism. That is why it is necessary for witnesses to be detained for their own safety. I shall quote one paragraph from the decision of Mr. Justice Hefer in the case State vs. Seketi and Others 1980 (1). On page 174 of the South African law reports the learned judge said—

This is what the learned judge said in that case. But hon. members say we should close our eyes to these facts and should be naïve about these matters. No, Sir, this measure is as necessary as any other measure in the Bill to protect witnesses who are prepared to give evidence to combat terrorism. Under the circumstances the behaviour of the official Opposition with regard to this measure is not only irresponsible but also the height of cynicism. They make a tremendous fuss about human rights, particularly when it comes to witnesses and others involved in this land of anti-terrorist action. But they care nothing about the security of those people, as appears from the standpoint they have now adopted with regard to this measure.

And what if a witness does not want to be protected?

I respectfully suggest that hon. members of the official Opposition’s opposition to this clause is nothing but political opportunism portunism and the height of irresponsibility and cynicism.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to place on record the attitude of the NRP in respect of this particular clause. I want to say right at the outset that we shall, of course, vote against it and I should like to tell the hon. member for Mossel Bay particularly why we shall be doing so and why we think that there is a considerable lack of logic in the arguments advanced by that hon. member here this afternoon.

In the first place, let me say very clearly that I think most hon. members here recognize the need for pre-emptive action to be taken in respect of witnesses who are material to a case and that it may well be necessary, as in the case of people who are suspected of the activities themselves, in other words, the accused who are alleged to have committed the criminal act, to detain witnesses. We believe that the Attorney-General may have that power. However, in all cases the gravamen of our argument is, in the case of both the accused and witnesses, that a court of law or judicial tribunal cannot test the validity of a decision by that individual. That is the gravamen of our argument. It is not whether it is an individual such as the Attorney-General, who is a member of the courts in South Africa, but the fact that his opinion may not be tested against the due process of law. That is where the hon. member makes a mistake. [Interjections.] In that case one may just as well take every magistrate’s decision in South Africa today and say that it should never go to appeal. Look at the appeal cases in the history of our South African courts. How many judgments have not been reversed or set aside or ameliorated? We do not blame those people for their errors. It is a very human and real possibility that even a learned person on his own and without due judicial process can make a mistake in his decision.

In the second place, we are dealing here with both active and passive witnesses. A passive witness is a person who happens to be in a particular place at a particular time and who has information regarding a particular conspiracy but who is himself not in fact part of that conspiracy at all. Such an individual can also be taken into custody and held as a material witness. As the hon. Member for Pinetown correctly pointed out, some of these cases can continue for two or three years and such a witness may be incarcerated for that period.

Then we have the active witness, the man who in fact conspired with others to perpetrate a particular crime. I think that this is what was referred to by the hon. member for Mossel Bay—that some of these people are themselves involved in a conspiracy. If such people were to be let out, they could be interfered with or even killed or they may flee the country. However, it is certainly an easy thing for the judicial authorities to determine who is an active and who is a passive witness in such a case. If in fact the individual is an active witness, in other words, he conspired with other people to commit a particular act, then surely he is as culpable as the individual against whom he is going to testify.

May I ask a question? Will the hon. member for Durban North concede that the innocent witness will be equally in jeopardy if he is not detained? Will the hon. member not concede that he will be as much in jeopardy as the witness who is a guilty party?

Mr. Chairman, that is very possible, but once the circumstances have been explained to the witness it should be his decision, unless the Attorney-General has other cause for deciding not to allow such a person to go out into the outside world. [Interjections.] That is the difference. He should be a participant in the decision as to the extent to which he is going to be in jeopardy. That is the point of conflict in this regard. We are relying on a single individual to make this kind of decision which has mammoth consequences for the person concerned.

I want to say in conclusion that subsection (7) of this clause provides—

These are as wide and sweeping powers as the Minister has in respect of other provisions in this Bill. Our argument therefore remains the same and we believe that it is just as valid in this case. This action may be necessary and an individual may be given these powers but in all circumstances it must be subject to the proper procedures of law and to review by a judicial institution.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Mossel Bay has referred to the Criminal Procedure Act and to the fact that in terms of the 1955 Act the Attorney-General has powers to arrest witnesses and to have them detained. There was, in fact, no adequate review procedures provided for in the Act. One of the reasons why the Botha Commission, which sat subsequently to look at the Criminal Procedure Act, was requested to go into that aspect, was that the legal profession and the public as a whole queried this lacuna in the Criminal Procedure Act.

The Botha Commission specifically went into the question as to whether or not judicial control ought to be provided over the Attorney-General where he has power to detain witnesses. In its report the commission in fact recommended that judicial scrutiny should be provided for where the Attorney-General has this power. This recommendation was then followed and approved by the Government and it was introduced into the new 1977 Criminal Procedure Act.

But that was not in respect of security legislation.

I shall deal with that; that is so. In section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Act the procedure is set out in terms of which the Attorney-General has to act when he detains witnesses who have to give evidence in relation to such crimes as murder, kidnapping, robbery and housebreaking. It provides that the information on which the Attorney-General acts has to be placed before a judge in order to enable him to establish whether the grounds are justified and whether the Attorney-General acted within the spirit of the Act.

The hon. member got very excited and accused this side of the House of having no confidence in the decisions of the Attorney-General, he being an officer of the court. We are not alone in the view that an Attorney-General or any officer of the court should not have the sole say in matters like this. In fact, the Botha Commission comes to the very same conclusion. That, however, is not a sign of no confidence in that officer’s ability to judge a situation, but purely a human safeguard as the hon. member for Durban North pointed out. The Botha Commission takes the same attitude that one cannot let the Attorney-General on his own make that decision without judicial review. On page 157 of its report the Rabie Commission refers to the Botha Commission and to the reasons which persuaded that commission to recommend judicial review.

You accept the report of the Botha Commission, but not the report of the Rabie Commission.

We are now dealing with the Rabie Commission and they refer to the Botha Commission. I should like to quote…

Where did the hon. member for Mossel Bay buy his doctorate?

Order! The hon. member for Parktown must withdraw that remark.

Sir, I withdraw it.

You are “laag en gemeen” (base and despicable).

Order! The hon. member for Mossel Bay must withdraw the words “laag en gemeen”.

I withdraw them, Sir.

Sir, in paragraph 10.105 of the Rabie report, the following is said with reference to the Botha Commission—

That is exactly what we are trying to achieve by means of the proposed amendment, namely to prevent arbitrary encroachments on a person’s liberty.

I agree with the hon. member for Mossel Bay that this proposal is intended for normal times, and this was dealt with in the report of the Botha Commission.

†However, in the Rabie Commission’s report the only motivation for not providing for judicial review or check is because they maintain that normal circumstances are not prevailing today and therefore the reasoning as contained in the report of the Botha Commission does not apply. In my view the Rabie Commission follows some strange reasoning in paragraph 10.110 on page 158, namely—

*Therefore the commission comes to the conclusion here that collecting all these details and submitting them to a judge would involve too much work for the Attorney-General. This in itself is not in our opinion a valid argument.

†We cannot accept that as a valid reason, although I admit that the commission does not state this as its only reason. It does, however, rely on this argument in coming to the conclusion that there need be no judicial review. The hon. member for Durban North and the hon. member for Pinetown have already dealt with the question of judicial review and therefore I do not intend to take it any further at this stage.

The amendments appearing in my name on the Order Paper also relate to clause 31(3). One of the aims of my amendments is to reduce the period during which a witness can be detained in terms of this clause, namely to reduce the period from six months to 60 days under paragraph (b). That amendment speaks for itself, Sir. Clause 31 is a drastic clause, as indicated by the hon. member for Pinetown. Even 60 days in is a punitive measure, but that would at least be a reduction of the period provided in the clause.

The hon. member for Pinelands has already stated that detainees ought to be dealt with in terms of the prison regulations. He argued his amendments under clause 28 and I do not intend to repeat the submissions he made. However, there was the criticism from the Government side that we were now trying to introduce the prison regulations to appertain to these detainees, whereas we apparently criticized the conditions under which those prisoners were kept. Obviously, the criticism that we raised in regard to prisoners who are awaiting trial relates to overcrowding, lack of facilities, etc. That was the subject of our criticism.

Mr. Chairman, I now move all the amendments that appear in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 51, in line 18, to omit “six months” and to substitute “sixty days”;
2. (2) on page 51, in line 21, to omit “six months” and to substitute “sixty days”;
3. (3) on page 51, in lines 22 to 27, to omit subsection (4) and to substitute:
4. (4) Any person being detained in terms of the provisions of this section shall be so detained in accordance with the provisions of the Prisons Act, 1959, which relate to unconvicted prisoners awaiting trial for an alleged offence.
5. (4) on page 51, in lines 37 to 41, to omit subsection (7).

Mr. Chairman, I move as an amendment—

This is an identical amendment to the one I moved in respect of clause 29. I do this simply to be consequential. It serves the same purpose as the amendment I moved in respect of clause 29. The case has already been argued by the hon. member for Umhlanga.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

There is no need for me to develop the argument any further. It has already been referred to in the past. We believe it will be far better to omit the word “fortnight” and to substitute “week”. This means that there will be a weekly visit.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The hon. the Minister has indicated that he will accept this amendment. This will mean that the district surgeon will see detainees in private. I believe this will bring about a great improvement, and I thank the hon. the Minister for accepting this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the principles involved here, I just want to refer hon. members briefly to two short paragraphs in the report of the Rabie Commission. In the first place I refer to paragraph 10.100 on page 157 of the report. It reads as follows—

I refer the hon. member for Pinelands to the paragraph I have just quoted from the report. I also refer him to paragraph 10.114 on page 158 of the Rabie Commission report, which reads as follows—

† Why does the hon. member for Pinelands not read the report? It is not necessary for him to reply to my question. He should read it properly and then conduct his argument on the basis of the Rabie Commission’s point of view itself.

*I do not want to pursue this matter of principle any further, Mr. Chairman. It was set out quite clearly by the commission itself. The background to this is therefore clear, and I therefore leave the matter at that.

As far as the proposed amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point is concerned, I just want to point out that it is identical to the amendment he moved in connection with clause 29. We have already settled the matter, and I believe that the hon. member and I came to an understanding on this matter during the discussion of clause 29.

†I cannot accept the first two amendments moved by the hon. member for Durban Central. These cases are intricate cases. They involve a lot of work, and the commission has decided on the best advice from the attorneys-general on a period of six months, as is stipulated in the Bill, instead of a shorter period. I am not prepared to argue with the commission. They have decided on a period of six months on the basis of all the evidence and advice before them. As far as the hon. member for Durban Central’s third amendment is concerned, I also explained earlier that it was not in the best interests of justice that these people should enjoy exactly the same privileges as ordinary witnesses.

*The fact of the matter is that it is important that these people—as the hon. member for Mossel Bay has already indicated— should also to a great extent be protected against intimidation, threats and other influences which may be exerted over them.

The hon. member’s fourth amendment refers to the proposed deletion of the relevant subclause. This, too, we have already debated. I refer the hon. member specifically to paragraph 10.110 of the Rabie report. I should also like to reaffirm that the main reason why the commission, inter alia, adopted this standpoint is in fact set out in 10.113 of the report. The reason is that it would lead to long-drawn-out proceedings, which would delay the specific hearing, to the detriment of everyone involved. I am therefore sorry to say that I cannot, for these reasons, accept these amendments of the hon. member.

The arguments of the hon. member for Pinelands have already been raised. We both know why it is impractical to shorten the period from 14 days to one week.

I have indicated to the hon. member for Parktown that his amendment is acceptable.

Amendments (1) to (3) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Dr. A. L. Boraine negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Dr. M. S. Barnard agreed to.

Amendment (4) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause, as amended, put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 51, in line 52, to omit, “55 or 56” and to substitute “or 55”;
2. (2) on page 53, in line 13, to omit, “55 or 56” and to substitute “or 55”.

Basically, what this clause amounts to is that under the specific circumstances set out in the Bill, a person who is a member of the House of Assembly or of a provincial council may be deprived of his membership. At the same time, certain people may be prohibited in terms of the clause from making themselves available for election to the House of Assembly or a provincial council. We are particularly concerned about the problems caused by clause 56 in this connection because in many respects clause 56 is very widely framed. I refer for example, to clause 56(1)(c) and (h). I am aware that there are provisos in clause 56(2) regarding the circumstances under which a person may be found guilty in terms of paragraphs (c) and (h). Even the concessions or safeguards in terms of subsection (2) are not sufficient to neutralize what I feel are the extreme generalities of paragraphs (c) and (h). The same really applies to paragraph (d), too, which is very widely framed. As far as paragraphs (k) and (1) are concerned, I want to remind the hon. the Minister that the hon. member for Houghton moved that clause 19(1) and (2)(ii) to which these paragraphs refer, should be deleted. The same applies to paragraph (n) which reads—

We discussed this when we discussed clause 20. This involves the fact that the Minister can prohibit a person from attending a gathering of whatever nature. As far as paragraph (p) is concerned, I am aware that the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of clause 56 tone down to a certain extent the effect of paragraph (p). Here, too, I feel that the field covered by paragraph (p) is far too wide and too general. The same applies to paragraphs (r), (s) and (u). It is unnecessary for me to motivate every paragraph here in detail, and say why we feel that the provisions of these paragraphs are too widely framed for this type of offence. We also feel that it is not justified to mete out such extremely severe punishment for offences of this nature, by even providing that someone may lose his membership of the House of Assembly or a provincial council or can be prohibited from standing as a candidate for the House of Assembly or a provincial council. In other words, our basic problem is the particularly general nature of the offences mentioned in clause 56, in the light of our objections in the course of this debate regarding some of the offences mentioned in clause 56.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to suggest that there is no reason at all for the concern of the hon. member. On the other hand, it is also true that clause 56 makes provision for very serious offences. When drafting this legislation it was not possible in practice to delete some of the provisions of clause 56 in connection with this specific matter. The safety valve the hon. member is seeking lies in the fact that steps which can be taken against a member of the House of Assembly, are initiated by the House of Assembly itself. The House of Assembly can therefore recommend that in spite of his being found guilty, no steps should be taken against the particular member. In other words, the House of Assembly can itself decide whether the offence was serious enough for steps to be taken against the hon. member. In view of this I feel that provision is made here for the necessary discretion. The hon. member can therefore rest assured that there is a safety valve built into the system so that in practice it can be applied effectively.

As far as subsection (2) is concerned it seems to me as if there is a choice, in other words either the Minister or the House of Assembly can give approval. In other words, in this specific case the Minister himself has a discretion he can exercise.

Yes, that is quite clear. In terms of subsection (2) it can either be the written approval of the Minister or the permission of the House of Assembly which is obtained. As far as I am concerned I consider that the necessary safety valve is built in here.

Mr. Chairman, in the Second Reading I quoted this particular clause as one of those to which one could take reasonable exception because there is a rather unfortunate principle involved in it. I do not intend talking about the principle because that has already been accepted, but I still believe that one particular aspect of the clause is dangerous. In fact, in Zimbabwe they have found that legislation enacted in the time of the Smith régime has been used against them subsequently. The situation here, which I have referred to in the Second Reading, relates to a person who was, before the passing of this Act, a member of the Communist Party. I firmly believe that to have this sort of legislation could be dangerous. We believe that the Communist Party is a pernicious, dangerous cult and one has no quarrel with that as a concept. We believe that, and as a consequence we have banned the Communist Party. The law prohibiting people belonging to the Communist Party has been on the Statute Book for a long time. It is a crime to belong to the Communist Party. I accept that and have no quarrel with it at all. However, to have legislation which says that for things done at any time before an Act was put on the Statute Book a person shall be considered a criminal—let us call it that— is a bad principle, because what happens if, at some stage in the future, there were to be a dramatic change in Government? I cannot see that in the immediate future, but what would be the position if there were to be a dramatic change in Government and they were to say that any person who had been a member of the NP should not be permitted to serve as a member of Parliament? I have no love for the communists—I make this point very clear—but this is a dangerous principle. We on these benches have discussed this issue, and whilst we fully support the motivation of perhaps keeping communists out of public office, we do not like this particular clause because it is a dangerous clause and can be used at some time in the future in a way which one does not intend it to be used.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that this particular provision has been part of this legislation since it was first introduced in 1950. [Interjections.] I am not arguing whether it is good or bad. This provision was in the original Act, and this is merely a re-enactment. We have not had any particularly bad results from this to substantiate the worry that the hon. member has. [Interjections.]

Amendment (1) negatived and amendment (2) dropped (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 34:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This clause again refers to clause 56 of the Bill, and I do not want to repeat my general argument in this connection. However, there are two or three additional considerations which apply in connection with this clause. The first is that here we have the situation— more than is the case with the previous clause—that people who have already been found guilty and have already been punished can be placed in the position where they may not be able to earn a living. Their right to work or pursue a profession is therefore being assailed here. It seems to me a most unhealthy principle that a person who has already been punished can be prohibited from pursuing the professions mentioned in clause 34. This principle is wrong, because once someone has been punished he should not be punished again for the same offence. [Interjections.]

There is also a second aspect I want to mention. I am aware that the clause makes mention of persons whose names appear on the consolidated list and who have committed offences. However, if we look at clause 16, in which provision is made for the consolidated list, and we consider the circumstances under which a person’s name can be placed on that list, we must remind the hon. the Minister that as far as clause 16(1)(c) is concerned, an amendment was moved by the hon. member for Houghton from which it is quite clear that we object to the names of persons who are guilty of offences in terms of clause 19(1)(a) or (2) appearing on that consolidated list under all circumstances and thus being further punished because they may not practise as advocates, attorneys, notaries or conveyancers.

I have a third problem. I can understand that the hon. the Minister, or the Government, may feel that for some reason one would not want to allow a person guilty of these offences to practise as an attorney or advocate. In theory one can perhaps concede that there is something in this, because that person is then in a position to call witnesses and so forth. However, I fail to understand why such a person, and I should like the hon. the Minister to tell me what the reason for this is, should be prohibited from acting as a notary and particularly as a conveyancer, because in all honesty, this does not seem to me to make sense. I therefore call upon the hon. the Minister to consider our objections as formulated in our amendment.

In consequence of the previous clause the hon. the Minister said that he conceded that clause 56 made provision for certain offences of a serious nature, but that there were also other offences which were actually so minor that the punishment for which provision was made in clauses 33 and 34 need not be imposed for them.

For the sake of justice and fairness—i.e. if the hon. the Minister’s statement is correct in respect of clause 34 as well—it seems to me essential that we differentiate between offences of a more serious nature and others which are less serious and ought not, therefore to carry the implications we see in clauses 33 and 34.

Mr. Chairman according to the Rabie report the Minister of Justice is supposed to be a very wise man. [Interjections.] I think we must recognize that the Minister of Justice, as a wise man, will exercise the discretion he may exercise in terms of this clause very wisely. I think we can confidently leave this matter in the hands of this wise father. I say this in lighter vein.

The fact of the matter is that the clause makes provision for a discretion the Minister may exercise. As far as the less serious offences in terms of clause 56 are concerned, there is the necessary discretion which can be exercised. Although I myself have not yet had anything to do with this and will not have to take the decisions in this regard in future either, I find it logical that there may be many circumstances under which one would be able to decide in favour of such a person. The legislation makes provision for the descretion and there is therefore no prohibition. The prohibitions referred to are nevertheless serious offences. However, this really does not mean that a person who has been punished, will continue to be punished for the rest of his life.

As far as the second amendment of the hon. member is concerned I want to point out that one cannot be a conveyancer and/or a notary unless one has been admitted as an attorney of the Supreme Court. If the hon. member therefore feels that although a person is not allowed to practise as an attorney, he should be allowed to practise as a conveyancer or notary, this is a matter he should take up with the hon. the Minister of Justice, and prior to that with the relevant law societies.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 35:

Mr. Chairman, this clause refers to the establishment of boards of review, and at this stage I wish to move the following amendments—

1. (1) On page 53, in line 66, and on page 55, in lines 1 and 2, to omit “or a person who has held office as a magistrate of the rank of chief magistrate or as a magistrate of a regional division”;
2. (2) on page 55, in lines 12 and 13, to omit paragraph (b) and to substitute:
3. (b) one shall be a nominee of the Association of Law Societies of Southern Africa and one shall be a nominee of the general Council of the Bar of South Africa.

The purpose of these amendments ought to be clear. The review board has certain important functions to perform and the provision for this board and the question of reviews is one of the improvements in this legislation. The hon. the Minister has repeatedly criticized hon. members on this side for not being constructive in relation to this measure. It is true that we are not happy about the process of review but at least this is an improvement. I am trying by my amendments to improve it still further in relation to the composition of the review board because I think it is important that the review board should be of the highest repute and should be seen to be independent of the State in its composition. I think that this is very important indeed. I may also say that I think it is very important that if these review boards are going to function properly and are going to enjoy the confidence in any sense of the public, the names of the members of the board should be published as soon as possible. I would also hope that in the composition of these boards the hon. the Minister will not be dictated to by the need to appoint White people to the board but that if there are people of other races who may qualify, they will also receive consideration to be appointed as members of the board.

Clause 35(1)(a) provides that of the three members who will form a board of review—

In other words, a person who has a legal background. I feel that what I have just quoted, especially the words “or any other person, except a person in the service of the State” tends to support the amendment that I have moved asking for the exclusion of retired magistrates as far as eligibility to be members of a review board is concerned. I say that whatever their qualifications, the fact of the matter is that magistrates are seen by the public as being people who have come up from State employment. Most of them have become magistrates because they started as public prosecutors in the first place.

What about a judge? Is a judge not a State employee?

No. A judge comes from the Bar and in that sense he is not a State employee. He certainly is employed as a judge but he has a far more independent image than a magistrate has in the nature of things because, as I say, a person first qualifies as a public prosecutor and then he becomes magistrate. A judge comes from the Bar, from the advocates, from the legal profession and he has a far more independent image in the eyes of the general public than a magistrate has. I think the hon. the Minister must accept that. I am not saying this in criticism of magistrates. [Interjections.] No, Sir. I believe it is far better that if we are going to have this review board and its credibility is going to be seen as being of the highest, we should have on it the people who are seen to be most independent. That is why I ask in the first place that retired magistrates be excluded. I also ask, as far as the other members of the board are concerned, that the hon. the Minister should accept what the legal profession itself has asked for. It has asked that a member of the Association of Law Societies should be one of the members, and a nominee of the General Bar Council of South Africa should be another member. I believe that in these circumstances the credibility and the independence of the review boards will be much higher than they are in terms of the existing provisions of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, we already argued this matter yesterday when we discussed the advisory committee, and I do not want to repeat all those arguments again. While discussing that particular clause, I pointed out that we had here either a judge, an ex-judge or very senior ex-magistrate. In other words, it is not proposed that it must be a serving judge or a serving magistrate as such.

As far as subsection (b) is concerned, it gives the Minister the power to exercise his discretion in the appointment of those two persons. It can either be somebody from the legal profession or from any other discipline, as may be necessary under the circumstances, and it may also be a White, Black or Coloured person. There is no restriction in regard to the particular race group, nor to the particular discipline, and I prefer to have it this way, as it gives the Minister the power to exercise the necessary discretion in this particular matter.

We shall have to rely on his wisdom once again.

Yes, the hon. member is quite right.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 38:

Mr. Chairman, I move the second amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I shall not move the first amendment because it is apparently necessary in view of subsection 2(c). In regard to the second amendment, I do not intend to argue this at length, except just to say that our attitude is that provision should be made that people who are allowed by the Board of review to give oral evidence before it, should be able to have legal representation. Our attitude is that people should have legal representation when their rights might be adversely affected, particularly their right to freedom, and I just cite the case of Regina vs. Slabbert (1956, TPD). This, of course, is only in the case when the Board of review allows someone to give evidence, because it is in their discretion as to whether they allow people to give evidence, but where they do, we ask that they should be allowed legal representation. I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that we are not putting it any higher, than that. We are not here even asking for a right to cross-examination because that is not provided in the clause. We merely ask that these people should be allowed legal representation, and I just want to point out that in the case of Regina vs. Slabbert, Mr. Justice Rumpff made the point that legal representation should be given, where possible. A further point is that clause 38 does not, of course, deal with a terrorist or a criminal, but a person who is innocent.

Mr. Chairman, in conformity with the practice we have followed all along, I move the following amendment—

What the amendment seeks to achieve is to bring clause 29 into the ambit of the review procedure so that that too will be included in the same procedure, namely a judicial review. We will ultimately move an amendment to seek to change clause 41 in order to bring the Chief Justice into the review procedure.

I need not pursue the matter any further. We have made it very clear and we have been consistent throughout. Where there is a judicial review we will support the measure. Where that does not exist we will oppose it. That is why we opposed clause 29 and clause 31. This is, however, a further attempt to bring clause 29(1) into the full ambit of review.

Mr. Chairman, in respect of the second amendment moved by the hon. member for Pinetown, the report of the Rabie Commission states very clearly why it is not in favour of a person being represented at the hearing. Among other things, the commission believes, it will lengthen the proceedings. All the arguments in respect of the matter are advanced in the report, and I do not want to repeat them all here again.

It is also true that such a person is entitled to legal assistance in the preparation of his request to the review board. That means that he has legal assistance up to that stage. We have already gone over all the other arguments too during the discussion of one of the previous clauses.

The hon. member for Durban Point has moved an amendment in which he seeks to bring clause 29 within the ambit of the review board. That is, of course, if I understand the hon. member correctly.

Well, there is a review, but I want it to be on the same basis as in the other clauses.

Here again, the matter has already been discussed during the debate on clause 29. I have already stated why this cannot be done. I do not want to repeat all those arguments again. Under the circumstances I am not prepared to accept this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, clause 29 does provide for review. The hon. the Minister, however, has not explained why he wants a different procedure from that followed in the other clauses. That is the issue.

Mr. Chairman, I have already explained why there is a difference. I have done so during the discussion of clause 29. I moved an amendment myself to clause 29 in order to provide for a further review every three months, if necessary. If we should detain a particular person for a period exceeding six months—that is in terms of clause 29—his case must be reviewed every three months. That has been provided for in the amendment I moved personally. As I have also explained, in clause 29 we are dealing with a more temporary situation.

Does that mean a review after six months, and every three months afterwards?

Yes, but that is the exception. I do not, however, want to repeat all the arguments again. It has been made very clear during the discussion of clause 29. In the circumstances I cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point.

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. S. A. Pitman negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 41:

Mr. Chairman, I move the first amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I shall not be moving the second amendment at this stage because it has been reworded so that it can be moved to clause 72, where it more properly belongs. I shall therefore not be moving it at this stage.

The purpose of the amendment I have moved is to ensure that in the case of a review by the Chief Justice, in terms of clause 41(2), he will examine the matter before him in terms of exceeding powers or acting in bad faith, or base his decision on the statutory considerations and, in addition, take into account the content of the factual report and its recommendation to see whether the recommendation accords with what is contained in the factual report. In other words, it is a limited review of fact, not an open review without limitation. It is merely a review of the factual report in relation to the recommendation.

I want to make it very clear, in dealing with this matter, that throughout we have adopted exactly the same attitude to the various clauses, and that is that where there is a judicial review and the matter goes to the Chief Justice, we support the clause. In substantiation of that attitude, I want to remind the hon. the Minister of a commission on which he served and of which he was actually chairman at one stage. I am referring to the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Organizations. There the hon. the Minister himself accepted that Parliament should consider this question of judicial review, but (par. 20.4.1., page 516)—

The commission, however, felt that this was beyond its terms of reference. The deputy chairman of the commission was Mr. L. le Grange, and I am referring to 7 December 1973. He signed the statement (paragraph 20.4.1, page 516) that—

and thought it was a matter that should be considered by Parliament, but that the commission could not act on it.

Then there was also a minority report, and this is also something I want to get on record. In the minority report, signed by the three members of the then United Party, there was the following recommendation (page 516, paragraph 20.5.7.10)—

Then it deals with what the tribunal should do and states further—

I place this on record to show that consistently, since the original Schlebusch Commission on which the hon. the Minister himself served, our attitude has been that there should be a judicial tribunal and that its composition should be exactly the same as or very similar to what is now incorporated as the board of review, except that in the case of the chairman we felt and still feel he should be a judge. That principle is now incorporated, but it is not incorporated throughout and the Minister is not bound by the findings of the board of review. Therefore we feel that, if the hon. the Minister will accept the amendment proposed to enable the Chief Justice to examine the factual report and recommendations, that will meet our objections and universal objections to what are regarded as arbitrary executive powers. It will also round off the rights of the board of review, because that board only has the right to make recommendations. The other will round this off and I believe it would strike a tremendous blow for the recognition that South Africa in fact respects, and within the circumstances of this country tries to get as close as possible to, the normal rule of law.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 59, in line 2, to omit “as soon as possible” and to substitute “within fourteen days”;
2. (2) on page 59, in line 17, to omit all the words after “may” up to and including “question,” in line 24.

Once the board of review has recommended measures which are not as strict as the ones the Minister adopted initially, in terms of this clause the Minister is obliged to refer the matter to the Chief Justice. According to the present wording he is obliged to do so “as soon as possible”. The suggested amendment provides for a time period to be fixed to that, namely 14 days. That is suggested in order to provide certainty. At the moment the wording “as soon as possible” is such that the period cannot be defined and that no certainty emanates from it as far as the detainees and everybody else are concerned. It needs to be limited in order to enable all the parties concerned to know where they stand as regards the time period. Once the Minister has issued the order, he should, one assumes, be in possession of the necessary information on the basis of which he took the decision. With all due respect, it should therefore not be necessary for him to wait much longer than 14 days to submit that information to the Chief Justice. The information would be at hand already and I submit that it can only provide clarity and speed up the review procedures provided for in this Bill if my amendment is accepted.

The second amendment relates to the grounds upon which the Chief Justice should be entitled to review the proceedings set in motion by the Minister. We are of the view, as we have stated before—the hon. member for Houghton made this clear during the Second Reading debate—that the limitations that are provided for are not justified and that the Chief Justice should not be subject to the limitations set out in the clause.

Mr. Chairman, as regards the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point, I want to state quite clearly that I accept the particular concern of the hon. member. I still recollect our decision in that particular commission 9 or 10 years ago. What we asked for there, if I remember correctly, was as the hon. member quoted, a judicial review of certain administrative proceedings. What we are discussing here today is also a judicial review by the Chief Justice of certain administrative procedures that are followed. It is not an appeal on the facts. It is a review on the law. May I in this respect refer the hon. member to page 179 of the commission’s report where one finds paragraph 11.4.1.5 which is a very relevant paragraph in regard to the arguments advanced by the hon. member. This particular paragraph states—

*That is why I say that there are well-meaning friends inside and outside this country who would very much like the judicial authority to obtain this power of intervention. That brings us back to the basic principle, and that is whether in South Africa we want a higher authority than the executive with regard to security matters. Do we want to give the judicial authority the higher authority? The standpoint of the Government is “no”. The standpoint of the Rabie Commission is “no”. The standpoint of all judicial authority is “no”. Under those circumstances, although I appreciate the hon. member’s standpoint, I am not prepared to accept that amendment, because it would have the direct result that as soon as the judge had to consider a factual report, he would be involved in the factual consideration of security matters. Then we would be accepting the principle that the judicial authority can exercise a higher authority than the executive with regard to security matters.

†For that particular reason I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment.

As far as the hon. member for Durban Central is concerned, his first amendment, to stipulate 14 days, seems acceptable to me. I think we can introduce that.

We are making progress.

However, as far as his second amendment is concerned, it concerns a question that we have debated on more than one occasion, and for reasons that I have already advanced during the debate I am not prepared to accept that amendment.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, before the hon. member for Durban Central moves his amendment, I want to tell him that it will unfortunately not be acceptable to me for reasons which I have already given in respect of other clauses. I trust therefore that the position is very clear to him.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has tried in advance to discourage me from moving my amendment. Nevertheless, I wish to move the amendment to this clause standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

My reason for moving this amendment is a practical one. The hon. the Minister will probably know from experience that very often when people have been detained and they require the assistance of a legal representative, it is difficult in the first instance to obtain the services of such legal representative or sometimes to obtain the funds to brief one and, secondly, to prepare the relevant documents within a period of 14 days. In the normal course of events, if a detainee has contact with a legal representative, if he has a permanent legal representative with whom he normally deals and he has the money needed for this purpose, there should be no problem. However, in the case of an individual who is detained and who has not gone through such procedure before and who initially does not have the necessary funds to appoint a legal representative, it would in my view require more than 14 days to enable him to obtain the services of such legal representative. It is for that reason that I am proposing that a period of 30 days will be reasonable, particularly if a detainee is perhaps, shall we say, from a rural area, an area where his family is not easily contactable, when funds have to be raised for this purpose and so forth. As I say, I move this amendment for practical considerations only and I trust that the hon. the Minister will appreciate the problems I have enumerated.

Mr. Chairman, all those reasons have already been considered by our courts and on occasions which I have already mentioned. However, the fact remains that this is a period which has stood the test of time. That is the first point. In the second place, this provision is also in line with the review procedure of 14 days, so I do not see my way clear to making a change here to extend the period beyond 14 days. We would then have to make the necessary change in the other case as well. This would mean that we would have to make quite a number of changes in this connection, which in my opinion is not practical at this stage. For those reasons 1 cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 43:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment to this clause standing in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This is actually the same amendment that was moved to a previous clause by the hon. member for Durban Point. In any event, if this amendment is accepted by the hon. the Minister, which I gather it will not be in view of the fact that he rejected the previous amendment by the hon. member for Durban Point, the effect will be to bring those persons detained in terms of clause 29 into the ambit of this clause as well. As the hon. the Minister has given us his explanation in this regard, I see no point in debating the matter any further. However, I shall be very pleased if he will explain to me what he and the department mean when they say that they cannot bring clause 29 detainees into the ambit of judicial referral because this is “operational”.

No, it is not operational.

Well, that is the term that was used and I should like to know what it means. I presume it does not mean in the bush?

Mr. Chairman, I move the first and second amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 61, in line 15, to omit “twelve” and to substitute “six”;
2. (2) on page 61, in line 16, to omit “six” and to substitute “three”;

These amendments relate to the review proceedings and they are self-explanatory. Instead of those proceedings taking place respectively at intervals of not less than twelve months and six months, they should take place at intervals of not less than six months and three months respectively. I think those two amendments are self-explanatory in that they call for more frequent reviews which I believe would be justifiable in the circumstances.

I then want to move the following amendment which does not appear on the Order Paper—

1. (3) On page 61, in line 42, to omit “as soon as possible” and to substitute “within fourteen days”.

The effect of this is as follows: Where the matter is in the hands of the Minister and he has had a recommendation from the board of review, the Minister is obliged to do certain things. If his decision involves stricter measures than those recommended by the board, the Minister is then obliged as soon as possible—that is how the clause reads at the moment—to submit a copy of the request and of the report of the review board to the Chief Justice, but in terms of my amendment he will be obliged to do so within 14 days.

I am confident that the hon. the Minister is going to accept this amendment because I think it is almost in line with the accepted amendment of the hon. member for Durban North on an earlier clause. I think it is reasonable in these circumstances to say that the Minister must do this within a period of14 days. I think we should stipulate the period rather than have the much looser term “as soon as possible”.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Berea has moved three amendments, and 1 am quite prepared to accept the third one, the result of which will be that a period of 14 days will be stipulated. I cannot, however, accept his first and second amendments. There again I refer the hon. member to the Rabie Report where this whole matter is discussed. I am saying this just to save time. In all those cases we have to do with long-term matters. I do not think that it is really necessary to elaborate on the report.

As far as the hon. member for Houghton is concerned, I think my own amendment to which the Committee has agreed…

It does help.

Yes, it helps a lot, and the hon. member seems to be quite happy…

Partially happy.

Well, from the expression on her face she seems to be quite happy and therefore I think I need not proceed with that argument.

I am not sure what the hon. member has asked me, but if she has asked me to explain why I refer to clause 29 detainees as “operational” …

That is the term we were told.

Well, I am sorry, but I have never used that term.

All right, we shall find out privately.

Amendment moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendments (1) and (2) moved by Mr. R. A. F. Swart negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting). Amendment (3) moved by Mr. R. A. F. Swart agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 45:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper as follows—

1. (1) On page 63, in lines 21 and 22, to omit “as frequently as possible” and to substitute “once a fortnight”;
2. (2) on page 63, in line 38, after “Minister” to insert “and to the Board of Review”.

In effect my first amendment says that an Inspector of Detainees shall once a fortnight visit a detainee, while the second amendment provides, in subsection (4), that the report from the Inspector of Detainees shall not only go to the Minister, but also go to the board of review. My first amendment seeks to omit the words “as frequently as possible” and to substitute “once a fortnight”. By having an inspection once a fortnight there is some time limit and the relatives of the detainee are reassured to some extent. We also submit the fortnightly visits are not too frequent because the hon. the Minister himself, not merely the inspector, has to apply his mind to every detainee every five days. We think, therefore, that for the inspector only to have to attend to a detainee once a fortnight is not asking to much, although that does not mean that he has to visit them wherever they are.

[Inaudible.]

I merely want to make the point that in a sense the inspector is the only control factor. In the second place, the board of review’s knowing this cannot in any way be regarded as a danger to security, because in any event they are in the know.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to the first amendment, there is merely a practical problem that we have. In the first place, the magistrate and the district surgeon have to visit a detainee once every 14 days, and that is quite in order, as it falls within their districts. They therefore have only limited distances to travel to visit these people. On the other hand, an inspector may, for example, have half the Cape Province, the whole of the Orange Free State or the whole of Natal to cover. It is therefore very difficult to provide that he “must” visit each detainee every 14 days, and it is only for that particular reason that the clause states “as frequently as possible”. The figures of the number of visits that I already supplied to the Committee show that these inspectors are definitely doing their job. There is no doubt about that. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Houghton is even very satisfied that they are going out of their way to do their job.

Who says so? Because I am not crying, you think I am satisfied.

Is the hon. member dissatisfied then?

Yes!

Then I withdraw that remark, Sir. It is, however, a pity that she is dissatisfied.

As far as the board of review is concerned, I foresee that the report of the inspector will be part of the documents to be handed to this board of review. It must be a complete packet that is put before the board of review, and this document must, of course, be part of this packet. I therefore foresee no problem whatsoever in this regard. It will be in the possession of the board of review.

Will you not accept that amendment?

But that is what will happen in practice. I have accepted quite a number of amendments so far.

I have never had an amendment accepted.

Well, the hon. member does not ask nicely enough.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 50:

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendments—

1. (1) On page 67, in lines 49 and 50, to omit “warrant officer” and to substitute “lieutenant-colonel”;
2. (2) on page 69, in fine 15, to omit “magistrate” and to substitute “judge”;
3. (3) on page 69, in lines 25 to 27, to omit paragraph (d);
4. (4) on page 69, in lines 32 to 34, to omit “as soon as possible after the arrest of any person in terms of the provisions of subsection (1), notify the Minister of his name and” and to substitute:
   • after the arrest of any person in terms of the provisions of subsection (1), forthwith notify the Minister of his name, and the Minister and the nextof kin of the person so arrested of
5. (5) on page 69, in line 38, to omit “magistrate” and to substitute “judge”.

This clause relates to a new provision. It provides for a new form of detention for a maximum period of 14 days. It appears that it can be used almost against everyone, and if one looks at the Rabie Commission report it also appears the possibility is foreseen that this new legislation might be used against children or minors in future. The clause provides that if a police officer of or above the rank of warrant officer is of the opinion, inter alia, that the actions of a particular person contribute towards a continuation of a state of public disturbance, disorder, riot, etc., that officer may, without warrant of arrest, detain such a person for a period of 48 hours. In the end that person can be detained for 14 days, subject to certain other provisions.

In terms of the first amendment I have moved, this authority should not be entrusted to an officer of as low a rank as a warrant officer. That is why I have moved that we should substitute for the words “warrant officer” the words “lieutenantcolonel”. It is after all a very wide power which is given to deprive a person of his freedom, albeit for 48 hours and then for 14 days.

There are many more warrant officers than lieutenant-colonels.

Anyway, if the hon. the Minister says he has not got so many lieutenants-colonel, I should suggest one must find a rank higher than that of warrant officer so that one can be sure—with all due respect to the lower ranks—that a policeman of senior authority is given the power to deprive a person of his individual freedom. If it is not a lieutenant-colonel, perhaps the hon. the Minister can suggest a captain or a major or a lieutenant, at any rate. I do think, however, we must stipulate that this authority should be given to somebody who is of known authority within the ranks of the Police Force.

My second amendment seeks to provide that when a person is detained the matter should be determined by a judge or a magistrate. If that is clear from the amendment I have moved, it also follows from that that my third amendment is consequential because it also deals with the question of the magistrate. As I have said, I propose that the authority should here be given to a judge and not to a magistrate.

My fourth amendment provides that when a person had been arrested instead of as at the present time, the commissioners, being obliged to notify the Minister of his name and of the place where he is being detained, he should, after the arrest of a person, certainly be obliged to notify the Minister of his name, and that the Minister and the next of kin of the person detained should be notified of the place of his detention. I believe this is extremely important. We know of instances in which people are gravely concerned. A member of their family is being detained, and they are not immediately told where he or she is detained. I think it should be obligatory on the authorities not only to advise the Minister, but also to convey to the next of kin information in connection with where such a person is being detained.

My fifth amendment also follows automatically on the previous four amendments.

Mr. Chairman, in this instance, too, there are once again various practical reasons which I should just like to identify for the hon. member for Berea. In the first instance, we are not dealing here with a single case of a person who—as in the case of clause 28, clause 29 and also in other cases—is being held by the police in a calculated manner because they have a certain suspicion, possess certain information, or whatever the case may be in terms of the legislation before us. We could, for example, be dealing here with a situation under riotous circumstances; riotous circumstances that could be prevalent over a large area. It could, for example, include the entire Cape Peninsula. It could even include the whole of Soweto. It could, therefore, include large urban areas or a variety of towns in a specific police division. Consequently it is not practical to involve specified officers, even of the rank of lieutenant or higher, in the legislation, for it stands to reason that the higher the rank, the fewer the officers holding that rank. The system operates like a pyramid throughout the departmental hierarchy. Because the rank of warrant officer is the senior rank of non-commissioned officers and because a warrant officer has to be a person who has had a certain number of years’ service, who had to sit for certain exams—most of the time also a person who already has quite a few years behind him— and because he is a responsible, respected, appreciated member of the Force who is also a responsible person, the fact that a warrant officer should be mentioned in the legislation involves no problem at all. Men of that rank are also more readily available and normally they would also be involved in such a situation and would therefore be able to take action. This is the reason why.

This brings me once again to the question of a magistrate instead of a judge. This is a purely practical matter. We do not have enough judges to deal with all the riot situations. There must be between 30 and 50 magistrates who could be available in the northern suburbs of the Cape Peninsula to apply the provisions of the Act. For those practical reasons I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment in this regard either.

In his fourth amendment, in the Afrikaans text—it does not appear in the English text—he is asking once again that the place where the person is being detained, too, should be made known to his family. I have already explained that this is not acceptable and I have given the reasons why. In those circumstances I cannot accept that amendment either.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether one could not have “wherever possible” inserted? There are times when one just does not know how to find the next-of-kin, but there are many times when one does know how to find them. So if one inserts “wherever possible”, one could inform the next-of-kin if one knows where they are.

The hon. member is missing the point. The amendment I have before me asks for the police to inform the next-of-kin, not only of the fact that the person is being detained but also of the place of his detention.

And why not?

No, I have explained that on more than one occasion during this debate. I have given the hon. member the reasons why it cannot be done, and I do not want to have to repeat every argument on each occasion. I gave the reasons very fully earlier today and yesterday.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 53:

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper …

I thought so.

Ah, you nearly caught me, but not quite!

I identified your mistake.

I just want to point out that we are going to object to this whole clause, because I cannot see why it is not left to the local authority to make the decision. In terms of the Constitution Act the meetings referred to—or processions—are those for the holding of which permission has already been given by the local authority, divisional council or whichever body happens to be in charge. I therefore do not know why the hon. the Minister does not have any confidence in the ability of the local authority to decide whether or not the procession is likely to cause any disturbance. I do not know why it should be taken out of their hands and placed in the hands of a magistrate. So although I am not going to move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, we are going to object to the clause.

You are not, however, moving your amendments, are you?

No.

So I do not have to reply.

Well, the hon. the Minister can just tell me why he thinks it is necessary to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I really cannot help it if what the hon. member is actually asking me to explain to the Committee is why she went completely off the rails. The fact of the matter is that this clause provides—

The hon. member is asking that the local authority should grant such permission, but the very first body that is referred to is the local authority. Now the hon. member is asking that the local authority …

I did not move the amendment. You did not listen to what I said.

What the hon. member’s amendment amounts to is that the local authority should consider the original decision of a local authority …

I did not move the amendment.

But the hon. member asked me to reply. Is she asking me to tell the Committee why she made a mistake?

It would have been better if you had not replied.

It would have been a mistake if I had moved it, but I did not move it.

Then I will not reply to it.

You can give me credit for not moving it. I realized that it was already in the hands of the local authority and that the magistrate can overrule the local authority.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 54:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 71, in lines 14 to 19, to omit paragraphs (b) and (c);
2. (2) on page 71, in line 55, to omit “educational,”;
3. (3) on page 73, in line 49, to omit “educational,”;
4. (4) on page 73, in lines 58 to 61, to omit paragraph (e).

To understand what we are trying to get at here, one must obviously take into account the fact that this particular clause deals with the offences and penalties. When one considers the extent of the penalties, I hope one begins to understand what we are trying to achieve by means of my amendments. For example, members of the Committee will note that at the end of clause 54(1), in lines 39 and 40, it is said that the people concerned—

That of course includes the death sentence. That is a very, very far-reaching penalty. In clause 54(1)(b) and (c) one sees, for example, the words “industrial, social or economic aim or change in the Republic” and “induce the Government of the Republic to do or to abstain from doing any act …”, etc. The hon. the Minister will obviously refer to the fact that clause 54(1)(i) refers to “commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts”, but it goes further and covers a very wide territory. To suggest that people who are involved in any way whatsoever will be guilty of treason and therefore stand the risk of being sentenced to death has to be highly undesirable and for that reason I ask for the omission of paragraphs (b) and (c).

Then I ask for the omission of the word “educational” on page 71 in line 55. Those people found guilty under subsection (2) will be found guilty of the offence of subversion and will be liable on conviction “to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years”, or if there was violence involved in any way either by the people concerned or as a result of their actions, they could be liable on conviction “to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 25 years”.

It is well known that there is still considerable dissatisfaction in for example, some of our schools regarding the systems of education as they exist today.

And in universities.

Yes, and in universities, for that matter. “Educational” will obviously cover young boys and girls in schools—probably Black schools, Coloured schools and Indian schools—as well as certain universities. We have made it very clear in the House and outside that we do not support school boycotts. We have made it clear that we very often understand some of the underlying causes and reasons and ask for them to be changed, but even when boycotts have taken place, some of us have been involved directly by calling for an end to the boycott and asking the Minister to meet with the teachers, the professors or even the youngsters concerned. For those young people possibly to be involved in a situation where they get caught up, in a situation which is not really of their own doing, and then to be guilty of the offence of subversion and liable to a very, very severe penalty, a penalty not exceeding 20 years or, in the case of subsection (2), 25 years, is for us not acceptable. Therefore we ask that the word “educational” be omitted both on page 71, line 55, and on page 73, line 49. If one looks at page 75 of the Bill one finds that if a person is found guilty of an offence, it will be regarded as sabotage, and that person will then be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years. I do not have to repeat my arguments there. I think that that penalty is excessive in the extreme. Therefore we ask for the word “educational” to be deleted.

My final amendment is on page 73, in lines 58 to 61, to omit paragraph (e). Obviously, in terms of industry or undertakings generally, it may well be a strike situation and we know that our own industrial situation is fluid at the present time. We know that a great number of strikes are taking place. Therefore to include paragraph (e) and then to find people guilty of sabotage and therefore also liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years, is not even in the interest of the State, let alone in the interests of the people concerned. For that reason I ask that paragraph (e) be omitted as well.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the first amendment I should like to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that terrorism is not necessarily aimed solely at the overthrow of the State or putting in fear or demoralizing the public. Overseas, and already in our country as well, we have had examples of the use of the strategem of inducing fear by violence in order to achieve a more immediate aim. The Silverton Bank siege is an example of the use of violence in order to move the Government to do something, something which is covered in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this clause. As far as paragraph (b) of clause 54 (1) is concerned I can also think of more than one example of how violence can be used to achieve some economic objective or bring about some social change. The law adviser notified me that if paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) were to be deleted, it would create a major loophole in regard to a proper definition of an offence in terms of the clause. In other words, this is also a matter of proper legal drafting.

I also wish to reply to the hon. member in regard to sentences. Amendments (2) and (3) of the hon. member concern an aspect which I, too, had considered. I cannot allow “educational” to be deleted from the Bill, specifically in view of what we have already seen can happen during situations of unrest at our schools and universities and as regards boycotts in one form or another. Unfortunately the fact is that people in the educational field may overstep the mark in order to achieve aims which are not purely educational. It is therefore essential that we should cover the educational sphere, too, by means of this Bill.

I also wish to point out to the hon. member that we do not have minimum sentences in this regard. There is no minimum sentence. In other words, if circumstances crop up which justify a caution or a light sentence, it is within the discretion of the courts to make provision for that. Moreover, if I am not mistaken, a prosecution is only instituted on the authority of the Attorney-General. In terms of the provisions of clause 64 a prosecution is only instituted on the authority of the Attorney-General.

With regard to the hon. member’s final amendment, his fourth amendment, it is true that there are many examples that could be quoted of how a specific machine or a part or section of a factory, or the entire factory, can be paralyzed by committing some form of sabotage. It is not intended to utilize this legislation in respect of strikes. We are dealing here with acts of sabotage. The purpose of strikes is chiefly to negotiate and impose rights for those who are on strike. There are other laws that make provision for that. We are not dealing here with strike situations as such. That is a matter for other departments and other legislation, namely labour legislation. We must understand one another in this regard. We are dealing here with legislation in which we are making provision for acts of sabotage which may be committed in or in the vicinity of factories. This is something entirely different to the normal strike situation where workers wish to negotiate and/or impose certain things in their own interests. In this regard I wish to refer the hon. member to paragraphs 9.2.3.2 and 9.2.3.3 of the Rabie report in which this standpoint is further elucidated.

Mr. Chairman, for the record I want to make the point that I am aware that these are maximum and not minimum penalties. In each case, as I have tried to indicate, the people concerned “shall” be guilty of the offence of terrorism and “shall” be guilty of the offence of subversion. These are very wide-ranging terms, and that is the point which I was trying to make. It does seem to me that they are far too severe in the instances I have indicated. However, I have made my point and the hon. the Minister has replied to it.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 56:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 77, in lines 9 to 12, to omit paragraph (c);
2. (2) on page 79, in lines 23 to 24, to omit “imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten” and to substitute:
   • a fine not exceeding five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five
3. (3) on page 79, in lines 26 to 27, to omit “imprisonment for a period not exceeding three” and to substitute:
   • a fine not exceeding three hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two
4. (4) on page 79, in fine 31, to omit “imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years” and to substitute:
   • a fine not exceeding two hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year
5. (5) on page 79, in fines 33 to 35, to omit “one thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year” and to substitute:
   • two hundred and fifty rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months

The amendments proposed relate to section 56(1)(c), which deals with the possession of publications disseminated by unlawful organizations. This subsection has far-reaching consequences in terms of this Bill because, e.g. a conviction under clause 33 could be a reason for preventing a provincial councillor or an hon. member of this House retaining his position. It is a far-reaching provision, one which could affect completely innocent individuals who for different reasons are in possession of these documents. The situation which the hon. the Minister obviously wants to prevent is clearly set out in subsection (l) (b), namely the publication or dissemination of such documents. The mere possession of such documents is an offence in terms of this Bill and is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of three years without the option of a fine. There are instances, e.g. of letter bombs, which one has become used to. Individuals who are for example in possession of documents that are distributed in city centres, say near railway stations, would automatically become liable to a prison sentence of three years without the option of a fine. I am sure that that cannot be the intention of the hon. the Minister, and that is the reason why I have moved this particular amendment.

The other amendments relate to a reduction of the sentences and seek to introduce the option of a fine. I maintain that the crimes involved here are not such that the option of a fine should be excluded, and that is what my amendments seek to rectify.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The implementation of these provisions of this clause has two effects. Firstly, it creates a category of persons who, by virtue of their having been served with a restriction order or by virtue of their names appearing on the consolidated list or by virtue of their having been convicted in terms of this legislation or of a previous offence, may not be quoted in respect of their speeches, writings and even utterances in any periodical or publication. The second effect is that it creates a new category of persons to which this order which may be made by the Minister can be applied. When we look at clause 23, we see that if the Minister is satisfied that any person has engaged—notice the past tense—in activities which endanger the State, or advocates, advises, defends or encourages or has advocated, advised, defended or encouraged activities such as the achievement of any of the objects of communism, the Minister may make an order making the provisions of clause 56(1) applicable to such person. That means that if the Minister makes such an order, although such person may not have been convicted of any offence or even charged with any offence and may not have been involved in any other difficulties arising out of this legislation, such person can, by such administrative order, be placed in the situation where anything that he may write in the future, or any utterance or speech he may make, may not be quoted, used or published in any way in South Africa. We believe that the very wide powers given to the Minister in this respect allows the Minister to silence critics, particularly those who the Minister thinks are more radical critics of the Government, literally by administrative means. We must also note that there is to be no appeal against the decision of the Minister in matters of this sort. The Minister needs merely be satisfied that the person concerned has furthered one of the aims of communism in order to make such an order. As we have seen over the past 10 years, this sort of provision has prevented the publication of a great deal of material which we believe would have been in the public interest if published. Persons who have been banned or restricted in the past may not even be quoted in history books. We may therefore well find the situation that in books relating to present day South Africa the utterances of persons who have fallen foul of the Government may not even be included. That would obviously make those books, incomplete. But, what is more important, by preventing the publication of any utterance by those categories of persons mentioned here, I think that the Government is on the way to creating a situation in which many South Africans will be unaware of the views of many people who, for better or worse, play a part in the history of this country.

It is interesting to note that this order of silence follows upon a person being restricted, banned or convicted in terms of this legislation and applies even after his death— to his grave and beyond. Until the time such an order is in the discretion of the Minister lifted a person may not be quoted, even though he may be long since dead.

We must also note that the penalties applicable to quoting such a person’s utterances are fairly severe. I think three years’ imprisonment is the maximum sentence. Let us look at the consequences for a particular person. Let us say the Minister finds the views of a journalist to be in contravention of the legislation on only one occasion. An order is then made in terms of clause 56(1) in respect of such journalist, and that journalist may then be deprived of his livelihood.

Sir, we cannot support this particular subsection. That is why I have moved my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the argument of the hon. member who has just sat down is in my view covered by the provisions of subsection (3) in general and by subsection (4) in particular. If the hon. member would also read the motivation set out in paragraph 13.3.1 and further on in the report, he would find that he is sufficiently answered. Because of the time factor I do not intend repeating all those arguments. I am satisfied that the hon. member’s concern is covered in terms of subsections (3) and (4).

As far as the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Central is concerned, the provisions of clause 56(1)(c) must be read in conjunction with subsection (2). As such I think such a person is justifiably covered in respect of his actions. The necessary safeguard in this respect is therefore also built into this clause.

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. D. J. Dalling negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendments (2) to (5) moved by Mr. P. H. P. Gastrow negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 57:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 81, in lines 26 and 27, to omit “two thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years” and to substitute:
   • five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months
2. (2) on page 81, in lines 29 and 30, to omit “three thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years” and to substitute:
   • one thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year
3. (3) on page 81, in lines 32 and 33, to omit “five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six” and to substitute: two hundred and fifty rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three
4. (4) on page 81, in lines 44 and 45, to omit “two thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years” and to substitute:
   • five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months
5. (5) on page 81, in lines 62 and 63, to omit “two hundred and fifty rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months” and to substitute:
   • one hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days
6. (6) on page 83, in lines 2 and 3, to omit “one thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year” and to substitute:
   • two hundred and fifty rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months

The amendments are aimed at reducing the sentences provided for here. We regard them as too heavy.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the amendments moved and all the other similar ones that are still to be moved, I should like to give an indication that I have given them very careful attention. This applies not only to the amendments before the Committee at present but also to all other similar subsequent amendments. In the light of all the circumstances I cannot accept any of the amendments aimed at a reduction of sentence or penalty. I wish to give an indication at this early stage that this is my reply with regard to what we have before us at present, and also with regard to a whole series of subsequent clauses. I have given very serious attention to this matter, but I regret that I cannot accommodate hon. members in this regard.

Amendments negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 58:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The hon. the Minister has already intimated that he is not prepared to consider a reduction in penalties. This is a pity because he knows that there is a considerable amount of legislation about which many people are dissatisfied. Moreover, this often has nothing to do with politics.

There are no minimum sentences. That is the important point.

I am aware that there are no minimum sentences, but the penalties are prescribed in clause 58 and 59 indicate in what a serious light offences ought to be regarded by the courts imposing the penalties.

That is correct, but…

Yes, but there are many kinds of protests than can be made. For example, a protest could be made against the laws relating to desecration of the Sabbath, because people regard this legislation as old-fashioned and, by way of protests, everyone might go and infringe those laws on a certain Sunday. As far as I am concerned, the penalties in this regard are quite excessive. In my opinion it would be more fruitful if the hon. the Minister were to accept the amendments on clauses 57, 58 and 59 and, if it were evident that they were being abused, he could come back to this House and point out to us that he had tried to be reasonable, but that people were abusing it. The penalties could then be increased.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is best to make provision that a court may exercise its discretion. If a court were to decide that this was not a serious matter, a light sentence could accordingly be imposed.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 59:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I regret that the hon. the Minister has already indicated that he is not prepared to accept the proposed amendment.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 62:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name in the Order Paper, as follows—

In the light of the hon. the Minister’s reaction to previous amendments of this nature, I do not intend motivating this amendment further.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to.

Clause 66:

Mr. Chairman, I merely rise to state that we shall be opposing this clause because it is a very far-reaching clause. We believe that it is too wide a definition of the interests of the security of the State. That is why we are going to oppose it.

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause 70:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The clause relates to a warning which the Minister may give before doing a number of things, for example declaring an organization to be unlawful, prohibiting the printing, publication or dissemination of any periodical, and various other prohibitions and restrictions. The clause states that the Minister may give a warning to the people concerned before taking action against them. This is an entirely permissive provision. I believe it should be mandatory that the Minister should give a warning before taking steps of this kind. That is why I have moved the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the Rabie Commission singled out this specific problem. We find it on page 193 of the commission’s report in paragraph 11.4.10.4, where it is stated as follows—

Accordingly the word “may” instead of “shall” was decided upon. It really will not be possible to do this in all cases. Therefore I want to let the discretion afforded here by the commission, suffice. I am therefore satisfied with the use of the word “may”.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 72:

Mr. Chairman, the amendment here is, of course, an attempt to include, in the reports which the hon. the Minister has to submit to Parliament, the persons against whom he has taken action in terms of clause 29 of this Bill. It is as simple as that. We do realize that clause 29 has a subsection which stipulates that no one shall have access to information. I sincerely hope, however, that the hon. the Minister is not including Parliament in that prohibition, because in the past, although section 6 of the current legislation contains a similar stipulation, it has been the custom of hon. Ministers to give information to Parliament when requested to do so. I therefore hope that the hon. the Minister will say that, not withstanding anything contained in clause 29, he will give information to Parliament.

I therefore move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, this clause provides for the tabling of reports to Parliament in three circumstances. When dealing with clause 41 I referred to the second amendment that was printed in my name on the Order Paper, an amendment which I did not move because it belonged more properly in clause 72. I want to move a further amendment, which will create a fourth category of items to be reported. Those are cases in which the hon. the Minister has rejected any recommendation made to him by an advisory committee or a board of review, and after it has been finalized by the Chief Justice. In terms of the clause, as it stands, the Minister must report the fact that he has exercised his power in terms of the various sections. I do, of course, support the amendment of the hon. member for Houghton to include clause 29 in this—he only has to report the action he has taken in terms of the various sections, the fact that any gathering has been prohibited or that a police officer has dealt with people attending a gathering. It does not indicate whether or not the Minister has been advised or how he has been advised. I therefore move as my first amendment—

1. (1) On page 95, in line 5, after “disperse” to insert:

; or

1. (d) the Minister has rejected any recommendation made to him by an advisory committee or board of review and after the Chief Justice has reviewed the matter where applicable,

In other words, where the Chief Justice is not involved, he does not come into the picture. This is the only way I can see in which the hon. the Minister can advise Parliament that he has acted against the recommendation of a committee or board. He indicated at an earlier stage, that he did not rule out the possibility of his doing this, so I am now giving him the opportunity to do so. He has indicated that he will not accept judicial control over his actions because he says that the executive is the body that must take responsibility. If that argument is accepted—and the fact that we do not accept it is why we have voted for a Chief Justice to deal with the facts—it is the executive that must be held responsible to Parliament. If one is to accept the hon. the Minister’s bona fides, it must be pointed out that it is his duty to report to Parliament, which then becomes the final arbiter, because that is the body which must control executive action.

I now move as my second amendment—

1. (2) On page 95, in line 11, after “session” to add:
   and in respect of paragraph (d) shall include a summary of the factual report and the reason for his rejection thereof

This amendment makes it possible for Parliament to consider whether the hon. the Minister was correct or incorrect in rejecting a recommendation of an advisory committee. I know he will not accept this, because he will say that he cannot disclose all information. That is why I specifically use the term “a summary” because a summary will not necessarily have to disclose sensitive information. It would, however, give Parliament an indication of why the hon. the Minister acted contrary to a recommendation of a committee or review board.

My first amendment is therefore aimed at placing the hon. the Minister in a position of being responsible to Parliament, and the second to enable Parliament to make a fair and informed judgment of the cases he reports.

Mr. Chairman, in all seriousness I have a problem with both hon. members’ motions. This is purely an issue of sensitive security information and its handling and publication.

In the first instance, let us briefly examine the standpoint of the hon. member for Houghton. She asks that details in connection with clause 29 detainees be provided to Parliament as well. However, at that stage we may still be engaged in extremely sensitive operations, follow-up actions or investigations. Therefore it is really in no-one’s interests that the matter be reported to Parliament or to anyone else. The fact of the matter is that I cannot simply dash off a few sentences and say that that is my report to Parliament. Names would, after all, have to be provided. Surely certain details would have to be provided concerning the person in question. At that stage we might not want the person to be identified under any circumstances, but due to a legal provision, we should be obliged to furnish information to Parliament identifying the person. We need not even make provision for it to be regarded as a confidential report of Parliament. The fact of the matter is that the moment we do that, a whole series of persons will have that information at their disposal, all people who have to do with Parliament. Therefore, as regards the motion of the hon. member for Houghton, it is really an impractical situation involving too many risks. Unfortunately, therefore, I am unable to consider it.

To a large extent this problem links up with what was advanced by the hon. member for Durban Point. I want to assure him …

The second amendment, not the first.

I am considering the entire presentation by the hon. member.

I moved my two amendments separately for that specific reason.

I have the two amendments of the hon. member before me. Could he just indicate to me in regard to which of the two I must reply to him.

To each separately. The first concerns the report, and the second concerns the content based on the principle of reporting.

The hon. member asks that the Minister should report to Parliament in regard to each case in which he does not accept the ruling of the board of review and in which the case is referred to the Chief Justice. I can see no reason why the Minister should report to Parliament in this regard. The legislation provides that the Minister must approach the Chief Justice if he does not accept the ruling of the board of review, in the sense that in that case there is a heavier burden on the person involved than there was before the ruling. Only then does the Minister have to approach the Chief Justice. Why, then, should there be a report to Parliament in this regard? The specific question on which the Chief Justice must satisfy himself, on the grounds as provided in the Bill, is whether the Minister has complied with the legal provisions or not. What this amounts to, therefore, is that the Minister should only inform Parliament in regard to each dispute between himself and the board of review and should also indicate that the matter has been referred to the Chief Justice. Of what use might that be to Parliament? Surely it could be of no use whatsoever to Parliament. In any event, the Minister must report on all the various matters as provided in the Bill. I honestly cannot see the practical advantage of issuing this further report. If the hon. member wants to add something else, I shall listen with pleasure.

Mr. Chairman, I am not letting the Minister get away with this. [Interjections.] Let us at least argue on the facts and not on a “wriggle around the corner.” The Minister does not want to tell Parliament about it when he rejects the recommendation of an advisory board or the board of review. That is the point. He says he will not be responsible to a judicial process—not be subjected to the judgment of fact by a court or the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may only review because this concerns an executive decision. Now the hon. the Minister is asking: Because it goes before the Chief Justice, why should it come to Parliament? However, he will not let the facts go to the Chief Justice.

He is playing ping-pong.

Yes, he is playing ping-pong here. He now takes the full responsibility and we want him to report to Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question. He must not start a fight about this so late in the afternoon. He must just assist me to give him a proper answer. Will the hon. member be so kind as to tell me what kind of information he thinks should be furnished to Parliament?

Certainly. In regard to my first amendment, the information will be the fact that he has rejected a recommendation of an advisory committee of the board of review—that is all. He will simply report the fact.

My second amendment states “shall include a summary of the factual report and the reasons for his rejection thereof”. Let us argue that one separately. Let us first consider the principle that he should report his differences to Parliament when he differs from a board of review.

And what is the second one?

As regards the second one, we can argue about whether he is able to give Parliament the facts. I have said that he could give a summary, an indication, of why he rejected it. We can argue about and debate that one, but he cannot debate against his responsibility to Parliament to tell us when he differs unless he wants to hide the fact that he has disagreed with review boards, etc. Unless he wants to hide that fact, he cannot object to my first amendment. Let us then argue on the second amendment, namely whether it is practical for him to give a summary of the circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, I can assure the hon. member that as far as possible it is not my intention to hide anything from Parliament or anybody else, even in public. As far as the hon. member’s first point is concerned, it seems to me that I can accept that. However, as far as his second point is concerned, I still have my basic problem and I therefore cannot accept it.

That is something. Thank you.

Amendment moved by Mrs. H. Suzman negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Amendment (1) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw agreed to.

Amendment (2) moved by Mr. W. V. Raw negatived (Official Opposition and New Republic Party dissenting).

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 74:

Mr. Chairman, I move the following amendment—

I handed this amendment to the hon. the Minister earlier this afternoon. It is quite obvious that the intention of this amendment which I must admit I only thought of today, is to try to make this legislation of a temporary nature. We have precedents for this in this House and certainly there are precedents for this in the countries to which hon. members have been referring as examples of other countries which have this sort of legislation. In the United Kingdom there is the Emergency Temporary Provisions Act of 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Act of 1976 which were introduced to cope with conditions in Northern Ireland. Both make it quite clear that those provisions are temporary. Indeed, the Emergency Temporary Provisions Act requires re-enactment by Parliament every six months; otherwise the Act simply falls away. The Israeli Act is also of a temporary nature and has to be re-acted. Its title obviously describes it as such, viz. the Israeli Emergency Powers, Detentions and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1978-’79. In South Africa we do have a precedent as well. I can remind hon. members that in 1963, when the General Law Amendment Act was introduced, the section that allowed for 90-day detention—and that was the first detention-without-trial law that we had in South Africa—was a temporary provision in that it had to be re-enacted in exactly the same way as I am suggesting this whole security legislation should be re-enacted every year. The hon. member for Verwoerdburg, the hon. member for Mossel Bay and indeed the hon. the Minister himself, have all stressed throughout the debate during the Second Reading and the Committee Stage—more particularly when we were debating the very stringent measures of clauses 28 and 29—that they do not like this sort of legislation and that they wish we had no need for this sort of legislation. The hon. member for Mossel Bay is nodding his head and therefore I am reflecting his views correctly. I think the hon. member for Verwoerdburg would also agree that both of them would prefer not to have legislation such as this on the Statute Book, because it puts us beyond the pale compared with countries that adhere to the recognized processes of the rule of law. Therefore none of us, I think, really wants anything like this for the Republic of South Africa.

Neither do we like to have terrorism.

No, we also do not want terrorism. The hon. member keeps using that sort of ridiculous argument. It is like my saying I am not in favour of capital punishment—which in fact I am not—and therefore I must be in favour of murder. It is exactly the same silly argument. [Interjections.]

One does not prevent murder by having capital punishment.

I have moved this amendment and I hope very much that the hon. the Minister will see his way clear to accepting it. All it means is that, if conditions change and the country no longer has to fear terrorism, sabotage, subversion etc., Parliament will not re-enact this security legislation and it will simply fall away. I think that that is a very reasonable suggestion to make.

Mr. Chairman, the standpoint of the Government in regard to this specific point has already been stated very clearly. In my Second Reading speech in particular I adopted a very clear standpoint at the request of the NPU. In the course of a long interview of several hours with a deputation from the NPU they made an earnest request to me to state the Government’s standpoint on this matter very clearly. I had my Second Reading speech supplemented, inter alia, to make provision for that request on the part of the NPU. I must say I was a little disappointed to see that that serious matter which I stated very clearly on behalf of the Government, as I was asked to do by, inter alia, the NPU, was emphasized by very few, if any, of the newspapers of the NPU, nor was it publicized as a very positive standpoint, viz. that this is legislation which one should like to regard as of a temporary nature, and that if circumstances were to prevail in which the legislation was no longer necessary, this kind of legislation would no longer be implemented and could be repealed. Hon. members on this side of the House also stressed this standpoint, and I do not think there can be any doubt about the bona fides of the Government and/or members of the Government in regard to this matter.

To conclude the discussion of this point, and also for the sake of a comprehensive Hansard report, I wish to quote a brief extract from the Rabie report, viz. from paragraph 8.24.10 on page 96—

I hope the hon. member for Houghton was listening to this.

Yes, I have listened.

I shall therefore let this argument suffice in confirmation of the standpoint of the Government and this side of the House and the very clear standpoint of the Rabie Commission, to conclude the discussion of this problem. For those reasons I am not prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment.

I also want to take the opportunity to thank all hon. members of this House for their contributions in disposing of this difficult task. It was a tremendous task to assimilate all the amendments, but I am grateful that hon. members took so much trouble—particularly hon. members on this side of the House, but also all the hon.members of the other parties—in assisting once again to set a fine example of how a Bill can be improved in the parliamentary system by intensive parliamentary debate.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Speaker, I move—

It is the aim of the Government to ensure that the remuneration and conditions of service of judges are in keeping with the responsible post they occupy.

In clause 1, statutory authorization is granted for the payment of an allowance to a judge who has been seconded for service as a judge of the High Court of a State which formerly formed part of the Republic, while he holds the office of Chief Justice of such a State in a permanent capacity. The provision is being made retrospective to the date of the independence of Transkei.

†To ensure that the conditions and circumstances pertaining to the office of judges remain worthy of their status, it has been decided to introduce, with effect from 1 April 1982, a scheme whereby State-owned motor vehicles will be made available to judges for official and private use.

*As hon. members are aware, the salaries of employees in the public sector were increased with effect from 1 April 1982. Accordingly, I now request that the salaries of judges be adjusted with effect from that date on the basis set out in the Bill, and further adjusted so as to be in line with certain standpoints raised in the Hoexter report. All judges are still, of course, in receipt of an annual non-taxable allowance of R3 000.

Mr. Speaker, at 17h30 on a Friday afternoon we find ourselves in the position in which judges sometimes find themselves when, on a Friday afternoon at the end of a circuit court session, counsel uses long, tortuous arguments. They will therefore understand it if we limit ourselves now. I merely wish to put forward our support for the Bill. We welcome it for two reasons: In the first place judges will now have an income which recognizes their status equate and appropriate income, and in the second place that the increased remuneration which is provided for in the Bill will ensure that the best qualified advocates from the Bar take up those positions. We therefore support the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, we in these benches welcome the Bill and we support it accordingly.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

Bill not committed.

Bill read a Third Time.