Order! Before the Secretary reads the first Order of the Day, I wish to make a statement. I have had the opportunity of examining the official report of the speech made by the hon. member for Langlaagte last Friday on the Second Reading of the Internal Security Bill.

The hon. member put three questions in connection with the hon. member for Houghton—

1. (a) Whether she had been a member of the so-called “Port Elizabeth Movement” in 1947, which organized mass meetings at the Johannesburg City Hall at which communism was propagated;
2. (b) what the difference was between her and Mr. Nelson Mandela—referring to the election of a Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, in which they were both candidates; and
3. (c) whether she had ever dissociated herself from the bomb incident on the Johannesburg station in 1964.

After thorough consideration of the entire matter, I came to the conclusion that these questions by implication reflected upon the hon. member for Houghton. I discussed the matter with the hon. member for Langlaagte and he declared himself prepared to make a statement in the House.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw any accusation which could be contained by implication in the aforesaid questions.

Mr. Speaker, in my speech last night I used the words “political terrorists”. I withdraw those words.

Mr. Speaker, in the light of the withdrawals made this afternoon by the hon. member for Langlaagte and the hon. member Mr. Schutte concerning comments they had made relating to the hon. member for Houghton in particular, and to the PFP in general, I should like to withdraw the comparisons that I made last night between the hon. the Minister of Law and Order and Nelson Mandela. I should also like to withdraw my references in relation to the hon. the Minister relating to political terrorists. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: Unfortunately I have not been able to give you a warning of this because prior to seeing you I had consulted with the Deputy Secretary and with the hon. member for Durban Point. The hon. member for Durban Point at first agreed to make a withdrawal, but has since withdrawn that agreement. Therefore I should like to take a point of order: If one looks at the Hansard that has just come to my attention over the lunch hour, it appears that during the debate last night the hon. member for Umbilo made the following comment (Hansard, 17 May)—

Mr. Speaker, you made a ruling on that and I was allowed to continue with my speech.

Appearing in my Hansard, however, under the name of Mr. W. V. Raw, are the following words (Hansard, 17 May)—

As I have said, I taxed the hon. member for Durban Point with these matters and he agreed that he had in fact made that comment, and also agreed to withdraw it. As he has now withdrawn his agreement to withdraw it, I ask you, Sir, to instruct him to do so. [Interjections.]

Mr. Speaker, the statement made by the hon. member for Sandton is not quite correct. I said I would check my Hansard. I also said that I had used those words. I have checked my Hansard since but it does not appear there and I have not yet received an extract of the hon. member’s Hansard. If you consider such an interjection to be an innuendo, Sir, let me say that I did not intend it as such and am prepared to withdraw it. I have not seen it, however. Therefore I am not able to withdraw something I have not seen.

Order! Will the hon. member be willing to withdraw that remark once he has seen it in Hansard?

If it appears there and an innuendo is attached to it, I will certainly be prepared to withdraw it. It was not intended that way, but I was unable to take a decision without having seen it myself.

Order! Then the matter can be taken further tomorrow. In the meantime I shall reserve my ruling.

Mr. Speaker, just before the House adjourned last night, I was referring to the statement of the hon. member for Pinetown that his party supports the idea of security legislation, but on two conditions. The first is that it should be associated with the idea of temporariness. Last night I also dealt with the question that the threat to the security of the State, as far as the present indications are concerned, is not of a temporary nature and that there is therefore no justification for associating the idea of temporariness with the availability of these measures at this early stage.

However, there is also a second argument. This is that, in any case, the PFP do not accept the idea that the responsibility for the maintenance of security measures when the State is being threatened, should be in the hands of the executive. Therefore they are in reality opposing this legislation in principle. That that is the case has also been stated by various speakers on that side of the House. If this were to be done it would mean that for the next few years, whenever this power is reviewed, we would have to conduct a debate each time on the merits, on the principle of this legislation. I see very little sense in this.

The second condition which the hon. member for Pinetown put forward, is that there should be judicial supervision which would also be able to find on the merits of the decision and therefore, by implication, on the merits of the threat as well. If this condition were to be accepted as justified, it would mean once again the rejection of the premise that the executive is responsible for the security of the State and should itself take all reasonable steps which it deemed to be in the interests of the protection of the security of the State.

Now it is not quite clear what the Opposition’s standpoint on this matter really is, since varying statements have been made. However, they are being camouflaged. I came across a paper delivered by the hon. member for Yeoville who, by the way, has not yet taken part in this debate. This paper was reported in S.A. Forum, volume I— Nos. 8 and 9 in 1980, under the caption “Inside South Africa”, and it dealt with “External security and internal stability in South Africa”. Mr. Schwarz has this to say in his introduction—

I believe that this is a clear concession that there are two facets, and that there should be security activities aimed at maintaining security. By implication, the paper also concedes that the greater the acceptance of the dispensation by everyone, the less the security activities will be necessary. However, the greater the non-acceptance of the dispensation, the greater the extent to which security activities will be necessary to ensure internal stability.

However, the hon. member for Houghton holds a different premise, and this has become apparent in this House over the decades. As long ago as 1963 (Hansard, columns 4671 and 4672) she expressed her opinion of the so-called 90-day provision and she says that this legislation would drive people to desperate acts of recklessness and that she would never support the idea of security legislation. In 1965 she again said that if there was in fact such a low-intensity threat, or if the alleged threat did in fact exist, a state of emergency should be declared. In 1967 (Hansard, column 7041) this type of legislation was again under discussion and she asked: “Are we not safe yet? At which stage is this country going to consider itself safe?” In a Standing Committee debate (Hansard, 11 May 1979, column 512) the hon. member for Houghton said to the then Minister of Justice—

She explained what she had in mind, and concluded—

I also took part in that debate and I also made the same appeal to the hon. the Minister. However, the hon. the Minister rejected it. In the interim he has left our ranks and we have had other Ministers of Justice since then. However, the executive has decided in the meanwhile to appoint such a judicial commission to undertake the investigation, for which I, and I think all hon. members in this House, are very grateful.

In the debate to which I have just referred, the hon. member for Houghton also associated herself with the L. C. Steyn Memorial Lecture given by Advocate D. P. de Villiers at the Rand Afrikaans University and from which she has also quoted during the present debate. This time however, she did so very selectively. Yet there are a few statements made by Advocate De Villiers on that occasion which, in my opinion, warrant closer analysis in this House. We should also bear in mind that the hon. member for Houghton has described that paper as “an excellent paper”. With reference to the Kroon case, Advocate De Villiers quoted Mr. Justice Rose-Innes as stating—

Advocate De Villiers also referred to a verdict given by acting Judge of Appeal, Mr. Justice Jaap De Villiers, when he said that its temporary nature could be accepted—

Advocate De Villiers went on to say—

Further on in the paper he stated—

He analyzed the statement further and arrived at the following conclusion in paragraph 34 of the paper—

Further on he stated—

Now I should like to quote from the speech made by the hon. member for Houghton in the present debate—

Now I ask myself: Where is the logic of this argument? The hon. member referred to the brilliant paper of Advocate D. P. de Villiers in which, inter alia, he made the statement that we were living in a low-intensity state of emergency which hardly required to be declared. In fact, Advocate De Villiers maintained that it would be counterproductive if a state of emergency were to be declared. However, the hon. member for Houghton is now complaining because the Bill before this House is supposedly perpetuating this state of emergency.

Last night I referred to the idea of temporariness—something which we on this side of the House accept, in any case—and I said that when the need for this legislation ceased to exist, the legislation should also cease to exist. In his paper, Advocate De Villiers also referred to the fact that the then Minister of Justice, to his perpetual credit, as he put it, repealed the legislation in 1965 when the necessity for it ceased to exist in the opinion of the executive at that stage.

It was against this background that the Rabie Commission was appointed. Two judges have served on the Commission since 1980, inter alia, Mr. Justice McCreath, who was still a senior advocate at the time of the appointment of the Commission. What does the Rabie Commission say now? I do not wish to go into detail, but hon. members should remember that it was a judicial commission which had to arrive at a point of departure as to which principles should apply in respect of security legislation, in other words, in respect of the threat to the security of the State. The Commission states its standpoint as follows in paragraph 8.7.3.5—

In this regard, the Commission referred to the Zamora case, the Appeal Court Case of 1916, and quoted as follows from page 77 of the law report—

The Commission went on to say in paragraph 8.7.3.6 of its report—

This aspect is also dealt with in full by the Commission in paragraphs 11.3.1.23, 11.4.2.12, 13 and 14, 11.3.1.25 and 26, and they arrive at the same fundamental standpoint which we on this side of the House have held over the years, viz. that the executive is responsible and therefore should decide what the threat is and what steps should be taken. In spite of the fact that the hon. member for Houghton claims that she has read this report many times and that she has studied it thoroughly, she still continues to fall back on the rule of law, as other members on that side of the House have done. We all know the origin of the concept “rule of law” in Dicey’s classic statement, yet even so I think it is still necessary to point out how the rule of law is interpreted by a few other great minds in South African history. Firstly I want to refer to what Mr. Justice P. C. Hiemstra had to say in an article in the South African Law Journal, 1971 on page 47—

In other words, there are two components in this case as well. The rule of law is only possible if the authorities have that philosophy, but also if the community over which the authorities have to govern, is allowed to practice that philosophy by the subjects as a totality. Ellison Kahn, who is not a supporter of this party either, has the following to say on page 22 of the South African Law Journal, 1973—

He is speaking about an essential balance for the sake of the maintenance of the security of the State. This balance is also a relative concept. It is not simply a concept which has to find expression given concrete form at a given time, because the circumstances change. As circumstances change, a new balance has to be struck. Arthur Suzman has this to say on page 269 of the South African Law Journal, 1968—

As I have stated, and as the Rabie Commission has found, the question as to whether the State is, in fact, being threatened, is a question which must be answered by the executive and has nothing to do with the judiciary as such. This is not only the case in South Africa. In British law, where the rule of law originated, there are the cases of Hosenball and Agee, 1977, and I just wish to quote from the former case where Lord Denning had the following to say—

And further on—

The Home Secretary was the member of the executive who was responsible for that discretionary decision. He too had the final say. He arrived at the conclusion that the court did not have the right to interfere. What does the hon. member for Houghton say? I quote once again from her speech in which she said—

It is true that reform could be a contributing factor, but that it can remove the state of emergency, the “emergency conditions” to which the hon. member was referring, is an illusion. However, perhaps we should not deny her this standpoint from the point of view of her philosophy. She went on to state—

She is therefore saying that we can suddenly have peace and a Utopia in this country if we remove all legislation, including security legislation. Then there will no longer be a threat. Sir, what are these hon. members trying to do?

You know very well she did not say that.

But I have been reading from her Hansard.

You are talking rubbish.

Apparently that hon. member was not in this House when the hon. member for Houghton was speakxsing, or else he closed his ears so that he could not hear what she was saying.

I was here.

The hon. member for Houghton went on to say—

She says that it is a great disappointment because we have not returned to the maintenance of the rule of law. Now, there are other critics of the Government as well, and I am referring to Occasional Paper No. 3 of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits—this is the March edition—where this statement is made on page 36 of this seminar—

They therefore acknowledge that this argument which they see as a utilitarian argument, may well be an argument.

Read a little further.

This is precisely what I am talking about. Just a little further on the critics go on to say—

I ask once again: In the sentence just before the last one I read, they say that there is a utilitarian argument which they also understand, but then, on the other hand, they negate it by trying to apply it to the nth degree. These critics, like hon. members of the PFP, have also concentrated on many of the positive aspects contained in this piece of legislation. On page 59 they state—

Here the action taken against individuals is being referred to.

They, too, had a lot to say about the Bennett report which, as has been stated a number of times, was not the subject of the terms of reference of the Commission; in any case, not as interpreted by the Commission itself. Then only a classic, or perhaps a true case: in the terms used by the hon. member for Houghton, the critics state on page 80, the report—

This, then, is the whole philosophic point of departure which differs to such an extent that we and they cannot agree. This is the actual point I wish to convey to this House: These debates are futile since we are trying to reach an accord from two points of departure.

In conclusion: What is the official Opposition doing? They moved an amendment—

They are therefore saying that they would rather keep what we have than have what we can get. They are pleased that we are going into this in such detail, because if this amendment is accepted, we shall not be able to come up with a new approach during this session.

What is the NRP doing? Their attitude is—I am saying this on the basis of their amendment—that they are not going to support the Bill—I am referring now to the hon. member for Durban Point—since relations between the population groups in the country are not being improved by this legislation. Inter alia, this legislation is there precisely because relations are not perfect.

Bearing these premises in mind, it is impossible to conduct a meaningful debate, and since we are now almost at the end of this debate, I wish to make the statement that it is fortunate that we are nearing the end, since we have really wasted a great deal of time because we could not agree‘

Mr. Speaker, in terms of Standing Order No. 58, I indicate that the debate will be continued for a further period of one hour.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Randburg has been anything but convincing in his efforts to justify the passage of this Bill through this House. He did nothing to allay our fears in regard to the very considerable defects in this legislation and neither did he do anything to allay our fears that this is not merely a temporary measure but that it is to be a permanent part of the statutes of South Africa. When he introduced the Bill, the hon. the Minister did so in a sense apologetically in that he said that he wished he did not have to introduce this legislation and that he hoped that the time would come when the legislation would not be necessary. Nothing that the hon. member for Randburg has said has indicated to us that this Bill is going to be any less permanent than any other piece of legislation passed in this House. The hon. member for Randburg asserted that it was the executive authority that was responsible for the security of the State, that it was the responsibility of the executive to look after matters affecting the security of the State. He said that we questioned this responsibility. That is not so. It is the responsibility of the executive to look after the security of the State but what we say is that the executive can exercise that responsibility but that they need not exercise it without the scrutiny of the courts when it comes to the effects which this Bill can have on the rights of the individual in South Africa. The hon. member went on to talk about trying to achieve a necessary balance between the interests of the State and the interests of the individual. It is precisely because that necessary balance is not to be found in this legislation that we are opposing it.

In winding up this debate on behalf of the official Opposition, I want to say that it is necessary for us to look at the main principles of the Bill and at what we are seeking to re-enact here this afternoon. As we know, this Bill is in effect a re-enactment of previous security legislation. In our view it is a re-enactment of all the worst features of our security legislation with relatively minor improvements. In other words, it is an omnibus measure which represents a compendium of all the old horrors of our security laws. That is what it is because included in it are all the old horrors of indefinite detention without trial for interrogation as accused or witnesses, or arbitrary banning of individuals or preventive detention, of arbitrary bannings of organizations and publications, of absolute executive authority over persons to the exclusion of the courts and a total contempt for the basic rights of individuals. That is what this Bill in fact encompasses

What you are saying is not true.

Sir, the hon. member for Verwoerdburg challenges what I am saying. Is this not what the previous legislation was all about and is it not what this Bill is all about? [Interjections.] As legislation, we believe it to be thoroughly bad in itself, as were its components in the previous Acts to which we have referred, However, what makes this Bill worse, is that it must now be seen against the background of experience of the way in which these powers have been exercised in terms of the earlier Acts. In a sense, this is the difference between this debate and the debate which took place during the ’sixties and the ’seventies in regard to the precursors of this piece of legislation. No longer at this stage do critics of the severity and extremity of these powers need to rely on conjecture or supposition and suspicion that the powers given the State may be abused in the future as such critics were compelled to do when the original measures were first enacted. That is no longer necessary. We can now look at this re-enacting, composite Bill against the certain background of the abuse of power which we know has occurred over the past almost two decades and which still occurs in the implementation of this type of legislation. We can look back at the deaths in detention of people who have never been tried before a court of law. We can look back on the needless and inhuman detentions of people for long periods and sometimes their release without ever having been tried.

Most of them.

Most of them, as my hon. colleague says. We can look back on harsh and restrictive banning orders on people. There has been severe harm done to the health of detainees and their innocent families. There have been innumerable instances of unwarranted interference in the freedom of movement of people resulting very often in the destruction of their means of earning a livelihood and with a lack of compassion that is almost akin to sadism. This is all part of the background—if we look at the manner in which previous legislation of this kind has been implemented— against which we have to look at the re-enactment of the measures in the present Bill. The Bill is, of course, a product or consequence of the Rabie Commission’s report, but the principal weakness in the operation of the Rabie Commission and its report was that it seemed almost unconcerned with the way in which power had been used in the previous measures and the effect this had had on people. It did not apply itself to those issues. It did not apply its mind to the question of deaths in detention or to the numerous reports of severe ill-treatment of detainees, to the methods of interrogation or to the codes of conduct. All this the Rabie Commission did not apply its mind to. Hon. members protest that this was a judicial commission. It was indeed a judicial commission and it did its work, but the greatest disappointment did not lie in the task it addressed itself to, but in what it did not address itself to, because it left out very essential elements, particularly in the light of previous experience.

I said before, in the debate on the Rabie Commission report, that the commission was totally overawed by and obsessed with the total onslaught concept. In general terms it took the view that in the prevailing circumstances the end justified the means. This was the basis of the Commission’s report and it is the basis of this legislation. So it therefore came down firmly on the side of the belief that unbridled executive authority was justified, rather than allowing the courts any real authority in determining the guilt of people suspected of undermining the security of the State or of allowing individuals the real protection of the courts. This is, of course, reflected overwhelmingly in this Bill, as it has been reflected overwhelmingly in the speeches of Government members during this debate. I think, for example, of the speech of the hon. member for Pretoria Central and the hon. member for Roodeplaat, both of whom are lawyers who tried to argue the merits of the legislation. They acknowledged that wide powers over the rights of individuals were being given to the executive in terms of this legislation. They also acknowledged that this was contrary to what they would normally have found to be desirable, but they pleaded that in the existing circumstances in South Africa all this was justifiable. They then concluded that in the end we only needed to place our faith in the good sense of the executive and the Minister. One of them—I think it was the hon. member for Pretoria Central—likened the hon. the Minister to a wise and responsible “huisvader”. This is an extraordinary argument and conclusion. I have nothing personal against the hon. the Minister.

You had better not!

Well, there you are! [Interjections.] He can be a very pleasant individual from time to time. I have no doubt that he may be a very reasonable and benign individual filled with the milk of human kindness. [Interjections.] Perhaps he does have those characteristics, but if Government members think that people would willingly abdicate their right of freedom, their right to be presumed innocent until they are found guilty by a court of law, entrusting those basic and individual human rights to a benign “huisvader”, all I can say is that I think they are very wrong indeed. The facts are, from our experience—not only of this hon. Minister, but perhaps even more of some of his predecessors who have been responsible for the administration of our security laws—that there is no confidence that basic freedoms are safe in the hands of the executive. [Interjections.] Security legislation in South Africa—and the House must recognize this—is not respected by the general public. It is feared, because people already know of the abuses that have taken place at the hands of the executive.

There has been a good deal of talk about the improvements in the Bill, and there are indeed certain improvements in the Bill. This is something we have indeed conceded, but the improvements contained in the Bill must, unfortunately also be seen against the background of past experience, and while some of these improvements will ameliorate the conditions of the people deprived of their freedom without trial, the overriding authority of the executive still remains, and against the background of the experience in the operation of existing legislation, even these improvements will do little to allay public fear and anxiety about arbitrary arrest and detention.

I should like to look at some of the more important improvements in this legislation.

Firstly, there are the changes relating to persons detained for purposes of interrogation, viz. the old section 6 of the Terrorism Act and clause 29 of the Bill. At present a person may be held indefinitely in police custody for interrogation and his only safeguards are, firstly, that he shall be visited by a magistrate once a fortnight if circumstances permit and, secondly, that he may make written representations for his release to the Minister of Justice and the Minister shall receive monthly reports on the reasons for holding a detainee from the Commissioner. In addition, we know that in practice he is visited periodically by the special inspectors for detainees. The new legislation changes this to some extent. It says that a person detained under clause 29 will be visited by a magistrate not less than once a fortnight. He will also be visited by a district surgeon not less than once a fortnight. The position of the inspectors is given legal recognition in the Bill and the Commissioner of Police is allowed the discretion to allow other persons to visit a detainee. Then it says that the detainee may not be detained for more than 30 days unless the Minister authorizes a further extension. Then it says that, if the detainee has not been released after six months, the Commissioner must submit reasons to a board of review why he should not be released and this board, after receiving representations from the detainee, shall report its findings to the Minister. Then, however, it is up to the Minister, so we get back to the executive authority. In other words, the changes relating to a person detained under clause 29 of the Bill are basically internal and administrative and in the end it is left entirely up to the Minister or the executive authority to decide on the fate of the detainee concerned.

Another improvement in the Bill relates to the review proceedings in connection with people detained or restricted under clauses other than clause 25, i.e. persons in preventive detention and restricted persons. Here the current position in terms of the Internal Security Act provides for a review committee to investigate the Minister’s action in regard to the detainee within two months of his arrest and thereafter at six-monthly intervals. The recommendations are not binding on the Minister and no court of law has jurisdiction to pronounce upon the functions or recommendations of the committee. This Bill changes that in certain ways. It says that the decision to place a person in preventive detention is taken by the Minister on the basis of information furnished to him by the Directorate of Internal Security. The Minister then issues an order and the person concerned has 14 days to make representations to the Minister. The Minister then places that information before a review board. The board then has a hearing in camera and the detainee does not have legal representation at that hearing. The board then reports to the Minister and the Minister then decides in his own discretion. Only if the Minister’s final decision contains stricter measures than those recommended by the board is the matter referred to the Chief Justice, who may then set aside the Minister’s decision only if he is convinced that the Minister exceeded his authority, acted in bad faith or based his decision on considerations not relating to the safety of the State.

So basically, again, it is the Minister or the executive who has the real say and this in our view is not in any way adequate as a means of providing any real protection of the rights of detainees in terms of this legislation. It always comes back to the arbitrary decision of a single man, namely the Minister in charge of the department at a particular time. We are not impressed. We see these measures as improvements, but we do not believe that they in any way assist the situation in regard to our objection to the basic principle of the person being deprived of the right of access to a court of law to prove whether he is innocent or guilty.

There are other improvements in the Bill which have been referred to. I shall again refer to them briefly. The recognition of the res iudicata principle is obviously an improvement. The restoration of some discretion to the courts in respect of abolishing the minimum sentence is clearly an improvement. The abolition of the provision of the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act, which places the onus of proof on the accused to rebut certain presumptions of guilt with proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the substitution of rebuttal with proof on the balance of probability, is also clearly an improvement. These are the main improvements contained in this legislation. They are minimal, however, in relation to the package deal of the assaults on individual rights and the rule of law, which this Bill represents.

Allegations made by most Government side speakers that we on this side of the House are opposed to any move to protect the security of the State, is, of course, absolute nonsense. The hon. member for Turffontein, if I remember correctly, said that we were committed to opposing law and order in South Africa.

That appears to be the case.

But that is what you are doing. [Interjections.]

Mr. Speaker, that is of course absolute nonsense. [Interjections.] That is absolute nonsense, and hon. members on the Government side know it is nonsense. Of course there is a need to preserve the security of the State. Of course there is a need to ensure that law and order is maintained in our society. I want to ask hon. members on the Government side again, however, why we show such little faith in the ability of our courts of law to pronounce upon these matters. Why do we deliberately go out of our way to remove from the courts the authority to pronounce on these matters? Why must it be necessary to give unbridled authority to the executive to be the sole arbiter on these matters, to the exclusion of the courts, and also to the exclusion of almost every known and acceptable principle of our law.

We have said it before, and we say it again here today, that if people are suspected of crimes against society, of sabotage, of treason, of subversion of law and order, for heaven’s sake bring them before a court of law, and if they are found guilty, punish them accordingly. That is the crux of the whole matter. If people are suspected of any of these crimes, bring them before a court of law. If they are convicted they should be punished accordingly.

In the process of preserving the security of the State there must be respect for the inalienable right of the individual in any free society to be deemed innocent until he is proved guilty, and to have a fair trial before he is deprived of his freedom. Even in its detail, however, this Bill consistently denies these principles, as did the recommendations of the Rabie Commission. It could have been better. The commission could have come along with far more reasonable suggestions, which would have brought about the sort of balance for which the hon. member for Randburg pleaded here this afternoon, between the interests of the State and the interests of the individual.

To take, for example, the provision of section 6 of the Terrorism Act, and of clause 29 of the Bill, there are a number of steps that could have been taken—even in terms of the hon. the Minister’s own thinking—to protect the rights of those concerned and to curb the unbridled authority of the executive. There could, for example, have been a limitation of the period of detention. What possible justification can there be when a person is detained for interrogation for an indefinite period? In most other countries this period of detention is fixed. In Ireland, I think, the period is seven days. That is enough to enable the police …

Have you not read the report?

What I am saying, is that I can see no justification for no time limit whatsoever. I can see no justification for a situation in which a person can be detained for the purpose of interrogation for an indefinite period. I believe that could have been one of the steps that would make this a little more reasonable had it been recommended by the commission. I can also see no justification why, once again, judicial control should be specifically excluded. Clause 29(6) of this Bill repeats the provision in the Terrorism Act. It is an extraordinary provision to be contained in any legislation, when it says—

No court of law will have any such authority whatsoever. Hon. members do not seem to mind that at all. They do not seem to find that at all strange. Surely, in any democratic society that is a most extraordinary provision to have in any legislation.

This fact, perhaps more than any other— the fact that the courts are specifically excluded—I believe, undermines public confidence in the operation of our security legislation. Ministerial supervision may be one thing, but it can never be a substitute for control by an independent judiciary.

Even as to the detail of this obnoxious clause, why should some concern not be shown for the detainee by allowing him access to visits by his family, by allowing him access to an approved and independent medical doctor?

You know very well why not.

Why should the detainee not be allowed access to his legal adviser? In reply to the hon. the Minister, I do not know why not. [Interjections.] I believe that it is a total imbalance that the detainee should be kept in a position of total isolation from people. The hon. the Minister looks surprised. I wonder if he has sat—and I hope he has—as I sat in the lounge of my home between Christmas and the New Year when two distraught parents came to me, and they were not political people but Transvalere who had come down because they were concerned about their daughter who had been detained in Durban some six or eight weeks prior to her parents’ visit to me, under the existing legislation. Her parents came to me and said: “We are concerned about our daughter’s health; we should like to see her, but are now allowed to. Will you tell us what our legal rights are?” I had to look them in the face and say: “You have no legal rights whatsoever.” [Interjections.] That is an extraordinary thing to have to say to any parent! I wonder how the hon. the Minister and hon. members would feel if they found themselves in that sort of situation. One could not tell these people that they could go to court, or that they can get an order to see their daughter, or that they can get an interdict, because one knew that there was a total blanket in regard to these matters and that there was no way that parents could have any access to their children who are detained.

[Inaudible.]

That is the situation, but the hon. the Minister says that I should know why no access to detainees is allowed. I do not know why it is not allowed, I think it is inhuman and sadistic, and I think it is a disgusting provision in any proper legislation. [Interjections.] One could ask why it is not possible in a Bill of this nature to impose some restriction on the activities of the interrogations under this clause, e.g. by prescribing some supervision of their activities and by setting out a code of conduct relating to the methods that they can employ.

In reply to an appeal by the hon. member for Houghton, the hon. the Minister said in a previous debate that he was not prepared to have any sort of independent inquiry into what happens to people when they are being detained. Allegations can therefore be made, and there have been widespread allegations over a very long period. If the hon. the Minister was really concerned, he would have an independent inquiry into methods of interrogation, into complaints of people who had been in detention, an inquiry that would encompass the production of a proper code of conduct in circumstances of this kind. However, the hon. the Minister shows no concern in that regard whatsoever.

Any or all of these things that I have mentioned—visits by other medical doctors visits by attorneys and families, the authority of the court being recognized, any of these things—would bring some balance to the situation of a detainee, as opposed to the present situation where the detainee is totally at the mercy of the police interrogators and without any meaningful rights whatsoever.

The obsession with the omnipotence of the executive authority in relation to security matters has clearly made it impossible for the Government to make any meaningful improvements to this legislation that might have made it more palatable. Why, for example, could it not have allowed the review board that is provided for in the Bill, to have the final say as to the action of the authorities in matters of preventive and other restrictions? After all, the legislation provides that the review board has to be presided over by a judge or a retired judge, a person with legal experience; so why not allow that review board to have the final say in regard to matters of this kind? But, no, the hon. the Minister is, as I have said, obsessed with the fact that this authority has to remain with the executive. Even in terms of the provisions of clause 29 the hon. the Minister is obliged to refer a recommendation which he makes and which is stricter than that recommended by the review board to the Chief Justice. Why must the Chief Justice be restricted as to the areas in respect of which he can pronounce upon the hon. the Minister’s action? The Chief Justice of all people, Sir, the highest legal authority in the country! He has got to have it prescribed that only if the Minister acts in bad faith—in these circumstances that is a very narrow area indeed— can he upset the Minister’s decision. Why on earth could it not be possible to allow this chief judicial functionary in South Africa to have that right to make a final decision? So, throughout the Bill, whether it is in respect of the broad principles or in respect of detail, everything is subservient to the executive authority. We cannot subscribe to this and we find the main principle totally repugnant and in conflict with every basic principle of the rule of law. That is why we have moved the amendment standing in the name of the hon. member for Houghton.

Before I conclude, I must comment on the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point. I believe that amendment is a masterpiece of confusion, ambiguity and equivocation if ever there was one.

That is only your opinion.

It is everybody else’s opinion too.

Rather than confront the principles of the Bill on their merits, the amendment moved by the NRP suggests that the main weakness of this Bill is the damaging propaganda that can be made against it. That is what it suggests. It suggests further that merely an early judicial review or a prohibition of unacceptable methods of interrogation, and—the third leg is remarkable—limiting the possibility of false allegations against the security services by permitting detainees’ own doctors to visit them, would make this Bill acceptable to the NRP. We cannot go along with that, because they are not concerned with the detainees; they are concerned with false allegations.

We are concerned with both.

That is not the case in terms of this remarkable amendment moved by the NRP. It is a jumble of words and is ambiguous, conflicting and equivocal in every sense. We cannot support that amendment and we will not support it. We will, in terms of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Houghton, vote against the Second Reading of this Bill because we believe it should be read this day six months. It is bad legislation and it therefore cannot have our support.

Mr. Speaker, in the course of my reply to the debate I shall reply to virtually all the matters which were raised by the hon. member who has just resumed his seat, and I shall also refer during the course of my reply to the speech which the hon. member for Randburg made this afternoon in such a competent way. Consequently the hon. member for Berea will pardon me if I do not dwell specifically on his speech now because at this stage I should like to reply to the debate as such.

We have come to the end of a long Second Reading debate, and hon. members will agree with me that—apart from a few exceptions—it was a very good debate and was in certain respects of an excellent standard. I should like to thank the hon. members involved very sincerely for that, and particularly the hon. members on the Government side of the House who went to so much trouble in planning the contents of their speeches. I thank them for their positive support and contributions.

I also thank the Conservative Party for its support for the Bill. In this connection I want to refer to the speech made by their chief spokesman, the hon. member for Koedoespoort. He has tendered his apology for his absence this afternoon. He made a well-prepared speech in which he displayed a firm grasp of the essence of the Bill.

It was interesting to witness, in this debate, yet another clash between the PFP and the NRP. It has been quite a number of years since we last experienced such a clash in this domain. Our experience in earlier years was that the old United Party always wanted to be against the Government and never wanted to give the Government too much support, because they were afraid that if they did so, they might lose out in the process. The long and the short of it was that they faded away completely, and that happened because of one main reason, i.e. because during all those years, particularly when it came to matters of this kind, they tried to sit on two stools. The amendment moved by the hon. the leader of the NRP is so typical of this. How does their amendment read? It reads as follows—

1. (1) adequate safeguards, by means of early judicial review, against executive action against persons;
2. (2) statutory prohibition of unacceptable methods of interrogation; and
3. (3) limiting the possibility of false allegations against the security services by permitting detainees’ own doctors to accompany State medical officers when visiting them.

Why does the hon. the leader of the NRP not take a clear stand on this legislation? Why does he not state that the fundamental standpoint which he adopts is, inter alia, that there is a lack of judicial supervision? We are then dealing with a central issue. Why not also have judicial supervision over the executive? In the second place, why does the hon. the leader of the NRP not say that he is opposed to the legislation because they object to unacceptable methods of interrogation? In the third place, based on his own amendment, why does he not say that he is opposed to the legislation because the Government does not want to allow detainees to be visited by their own doctors? Surely we would then know where we stand with one another.

This is only one of the features which emerged from this debate.

Finally, and in general, it was interesting to note that not a single member really attacked the substance of the Rabie report and the motivation contained therein for this legislation. Hon. members attacked the Rabie report in general and alleged that the Rabie Commission had not gone deeply enough into the interrogation of prisoners and detainees. There was criticism of that aspect, but not a single member of the Opposition examined the Rabie report and took issue with the commission on the merits of the case. Not a single member of the Opposition examined the Rabie report and took issue with the commission on its motivation for the legislation for this House.

But we debated the Rabie report on an earlier occasion.

If I may dwell on the official Opposition for a moment, there are a few matters I should like to single out. In the first place the PFP in this debate again did what it has been doing ever since it came into existence, which is that it constantly opposes all forms of security legislation. It makes no difference what it is, the PFP is opposed to it. The best example of this occurred the other afternoon when we were dealing with the Intimidation Bill in this House. We were peacefully discussing the legislation with one another when I rose and told the official Opposition that it seemed to me that I could accept that they were not opposed to the principle of the Bill, but only to certain definitions on which they wanted greater clarity. All the hon. members participating in the debate, including the Chief Whip, nodded their heads and intimated that that was indeed the position, but only 10 minutes later the official Opposition voted against the principle of the Bill. It is such an obsession with them to oppose any form of security legislation introduced by this Government in this House that they even voted against the Intimidation Bill, and I am certain they did so to the embarrassment of some of the members on the opposite side of this House. I am now looking one of them straight in the eye and I know that it was to his embarrassment, too, because he has more sense than that.

A second matter I should like to single out is that this debate indicated to us once again that as far as this kind of matter is concerned the official Opposition never expresses a single word of thanks to the S.A. Police. In this 12-hour debate not a single word of thanks was conveyed to the S.A. Police for the exceptional services they are rendering to safeguard South Africa internally and otherwise, particularly in regard to the matters this legislation deals with.

That is not true. [Interjections.]

I wish to refer to a third matter. Not a single member of the official Opposition has ever, in this kind of debate—and I doubt whether I misunderstood them—made a direct attack on terrorists, on communists, on the ANC or the PAC and their fellow-travellers. With great difficulty the hon. member for Umbilo extracted a kind of answer from one of the hon. members here yesterday in connection with his attitude to the ANC. Not once has any of those hon. members risen and even tried to state a convincing case in this connection.

What do you mean by that?

Never, in any of these debates on security legislation, has the hon. official Opposition ever emphasized the comprehensive onslaught on the RSA. The sole emphasis is always on the problems experienced by some of the persons concerned. It is only those problems which are always emphasized.

I wish to identify a further matter in this connection. The good results which are achieved through the application of the security legislation are never emphasized by the official Opposition. On the contrary, the image that is constantly being presented is that things are going badly for us because we have security legislation. That is the image which is constantly being presented. We have now experienced the same position in this debate. One speaker after another made the point that things were going badly for us in the security sphere because we had this legislation. There are hon. members in this House who, from years of experience or as a result of personal knowledge which they have, can speak with authority on the exceptional benefits which we have for a long period now enjoyed in South Africa because, inter alia, we have security legislation. However, not one of those hon. members opposite will rise to their feet and emphasize this point.

There is another matter which I also found disappointing, and which also occurred in this debate. In discussing this kind of legislation, and particularly during such a debate as this, when we discuss the legislation in general, those hon. members do not allow an opportunity to pass of constantly presenting trusted officials, experienced officials who have already rendered many years of excellent service to this country, people such as magistrates, inspectors of detainees, of whom some are former attorneys-general, district surgeons, police and others as unreliable, just as soon as they have to deal with security legislation. These senior people can be trusted with the most important matters of the State, they can be trusted with the most important interests of the State, but as soon as they become involved in security legislation, they are unreliable. That was the image which was conveyed by one speaker after the other—they are unreliable. This is the cunning and disparaging image which they always convey.

The official Opposition is part of a general disparaging process in which use is made of every possible means.

That is untrue.

Use is constantly being made of terms and concepts that have been wrenched out of context, and in addition wild and false allegations are constantly being made, particularly for overseas consumption. I maintain that the official Opposition is part of that pattern. One of the best examples of their partners in this pattern is the Detainees’ Parents Support Committee, and others. [Interjections.] I have been waiting for weeks now for three professional men, Dr. Colman, Dr. Koornhof and Mr. Floyd to support their irresponsible and shameful accusations. They are also part of the overall pattern. They said they could substantiate their allegations with evidence in respect of what has happened during the past six months. I am still waiting for that, and I think it is high time it was said that I now have a growing conviction that one cannot believe them. I have a growing conviction that one cannot believe people of that kind, who are respected people in society, on the ground of the wild allegations they make and because they cannot subsequently substantiate them. [Interjections.] I maintain that the official Opposition is guilty in the sense that they are part of that pattern, as this debate has once again demonstrated.

I come now to the last general point I wish to raise in regard to the official Opposition. This legislation, which deals with such an extremely important matter, which goes so directly to the heart of our country’s problems and is in the interests of our country because we must have security legislation, the official Opposition finds “repulsive”. They find it “walglik”—that is how the Afrikaans dictionary translates that word.

Because of your record.

Yes, the hon. member is on record.

*The official Opposition finds this legislation repulsive, and that is their reaction when the security of their country is at stake: They find action taken by the Government repulsive.

† The hon. member for Houghton emphasized a few facts to which I want to refer in particular. The hon. member asked amongst others why no detainees gave evidence to the Rabie Commission. If the hon. member would refer to the terms of reference of the commission, she would find one reason why not.

In fairness they could not give evidence through fear.

I do not want to dwell on that now.

† Another reason can be explained by putting a question to the hon. member: Why did she or any other hon. member not advise the many detainees they know to offer themselves as witnesses to the commission notwithstanding the commission’s terms of reference? Not one of them did that. Why did they not do it? I can also advance another reason why some detainees were not prepared to give evidence to the Rabie Commission even had they been asked by either the commission or any of these hon. members. That is because they know very well that the moment their names or their evidence is made public, their lives would not be worth one cent in so far as the ANC is concerned. I can give sufficient proof in connection with the ANC, directly and in general, about people who gave evidence in court and/or people who gave information to the Police about the ANC and other subversive activities in South Africa.

The hon. member also referred to certain laws and said that these laws had done absolutely nothing to decrease the incidence of violence in South Africa. I wonder what South Africa would have looked like or what the position in South Africa would have been today had we not had these laws. It would have been a very, very serious situation.

That is just guess work.

The hon. member also said that weighty evidence of the devastating effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees was available. She then referred to A. S. Mathews and Prof. Vorster of the Rand Afrikaans University. Their findings are the weighty evidence. I shall come back to the weighty evidence of the hon. member, but first I want to comment on something else.

The hon. member made an interesting remark when she said that inspectors paid 1 635 visits between February 1981 and December 1981 to detainees. According to the hon. member they received “interestingly enough only 28 complaints”. Instead of being thankful for the fact that there were only 28 complaints, she said “interestingly enough only 28 complaints”.

*Nothing is good enough; absolutely nothing is good enough. Here we have a fine record, which she herself quoted, but there is nothing on earth that is good enough.

† Let me come to the weighty evidence in respect of solitary confinement. I want to refer to an article by Prof. Chari Vorster, a psychologist at the Rand Afrikaans University, and published in the Cape Times of 12 February 1981. This is now the big authority quoted morning, noon and night by Opposition speakers.

*One need only look at the provision in connection with solitary confinement, and how hon. members consider this to be manna from heaven. But this manna from heaven is full of weevils, and I shall demonstrate this.

† Prof. Vorster is quoted as saying the following in this report—

I quote further—

The professor goes on to say—

In answer to the question he then says—

*I am quoting these passages because I wish to show this House what detention is. I want to indicate what detention alone, in a cell, means as well as what solitary detention is. I want to place this fully on record this afternoon. The professor went on to say—

Then he referred to American prisoners of war in Vietnam, and said—

The article continued—

He asked the question, but did not even take the trouble to make a telephone call and ask any member of the security police or the commending officer of any police station whether the people who were being detained did at least get a chance to take exercise.

That person would have been able to tell him that they are afforded an opportunity to do so twice a day. This, however, is the authority who has been quoted in this House ever since the beginning of the year. The professor then continued—

In other words, he must have some company at least, it makes no difference whether it is even his interrogator. However, I shall indicate how much company those people who come to pay us a visit have [Interjections.] The professor went on to state—

This is what the authoritative professor has to say. He says there is no risk attached to allowing their family to visit them. [Interjections.] How many times have we not listened to these authorities before in this House? Then the article concluded in the following way—

That is the hon. member’s authority.

No, only one of my authorities.

But what is the position?

[Inaudible.]

I have asked hon. members so many times in this House please to draw a distinction, in their public statements, between detention and solitary confinement—and I have addressed my request as a result of the connotation which is attached to the latter. [Interjections.] Time and time again I have said that we must explain clearly to people what we are talking about, viz. when a person is punished by solitary detention. However, the hon. members do not want to listen. After all, it does not suit them to contribute anything towards the creation of a positive image.

What is solitary confinement? Solitary confinement in an isolation cell is imposed in terms of the sentence of a court; further, as often and for as long as it is urgently and absolutely necessary to secure or restrain any prisoner who has displayed or is threatening violence or who has been recaptured after escape or who is contemplating escape; further, when it is requested in the interests of the administration of justice by the police authorities; and, fourthly, in cases where the medical officer prescribes it on medical grounds. Except in those cases where a court has sentenced a prisoner to solitary confinement in an isolation cell with or without dietary punishment, a prisoner may in addition or in the alternative be placed in irons or subjected to some other approved means of mechanical restraint. This is solitary confinement that I am referring to now to proceed: Solitary confinement is not imposed if the medical officer or psychologist certifies that it would be detrimental to the physical or mental health of the prisoner. Solitary confinement, with or without dietary punishment, takes place strictly in accordance with the sentence of the court, and after the sentence has been served, the prisoner is immediately discharged from it. In all other cases solitary confinement and/or restraint can only be applied for as long as is absolutely necessary. In addition, there are certain periods which may not be exceeded.

Then, on the other hand, there is separate detention. There are never complaints about that, although there is a whole series of people who are detained separately. Provision is made for that in terms of legal provisions or Government regulations. I have before me more than a page full of examples to which I can refer the hon. members. It is just that I do not want to concern myself with this this afternoon. I want to use my time to draw a distinction between separate detention and the term “solitary confinement” which is used by all ill-disposed persons.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he will not concede that the element in all of this is that of being solitary, alone, deprived of the company of other human beings?

I find it amazing that after 29 years in this House the hon. member has not yet learnt when one should be quiet and when one should speak. She asks me this question, and I am on the point of telling her that these people are not imprisoned in that kind of seclusion.

Of course they are.

Very well, then I shall give the hon. member the authority. The legal provision relating to this form of detention is contained in the Prisons Act. It relates to trials by magistrates and/or on occasion, trial by an officer as well. Section 51(2) reads—

1. (a) to undergo imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months; or
2. (b) to be kept in solitary confinement in an isolation cell with or without light labour for a period not exceeding 42 days, 28 days of which may be ordered to be passed on reduced diet: Provided that no continuous period passed on reduced diet shall exceed 14 days, and that at least 14 days shall elapse between one period passed on reduced diet and another such period.

So much for the article in question.

What is the practical situation about which the hon. member is so concerned? The hon. member thinks that the practical situation is as depicted in a shocking cartoon which appeared in the Cape Times a few weeks ago. It was an absolutely shocking picture of the torturing of the people who are detained, and it appeared on the editorial page of the Cape Times. This, it seems to me, is the image the hon. member for Houghton has of the detention of people in solitary confinement. The Afrikaans term for solitary confinement is “alleenopsluiting”.

[Inaudible.]

Order!

There are no special single cells for solitary confinement. The cell used today for the solitary confinement of a prisoner could be used tomorrow by another prisoner who asks specially to be imprisoned alone. To tell the truth, there are several prisoners—at any rate, this is my experience—who regard it as an honour if their own cell can be allocated to them. I am now referring to the prisoners in general. There are several prisoners who ask to be locked up alone for a variety of reasons. For example, those who would like to study, etc.

I have already explained how an officer or magistrate could sentence such a person to solitary confinement in terms of the Act. However, what happens? The prisoner is certified as medically fit to be kept in solitary confinement. He is then transferred from the communal cell where he may have been, to a single cell. This cell complies with all the requirements in respect of light and other hygienic conditions. During the period for which he has been sentenced to solitary confinement, he is afforded an opportunity for physical exercise for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon every day outside his cell; usually together with other prisoners who are also in solitary confinement. This, then, is the solitary confinement of the hon. member for Houghton.

In practice, prisoners kept in solitary confinement are all kept in the same block of single cells. It therefore happens that prisoners in this category also have communication with one another. They speak to one another from their cells. Everyone who has been inside a prison will know what it looks like in the separation corridors of a prison.

Prisoners in solitary confinement are also visited daily by the head of the prison, who hears all complaints and requests. The prisoner also has contact with the members of the prison service who work in the section in question. Medical treatment is available at all times and if at any stage during the period of solitary confinement of 30 days a medical practitioner certifies that a prisoner was not fit to be detained further in solitary confinement, he is immediately removed. Therefore the mistaken impression that solitary confinement implies that during this period a prisoner has no communication with anyone and is simply left to his lot, is not correct.

What, then, is the situation in regard to people detained by the police? This is the so-called “solitary confinement” of which there is no question as regards the detention of any person in terms of this security legislation. I wish to make an earnest appeal to hon. members today to disseminate this specific message, because the dissemination of contrary is only to the detriment of South Africa. A detainee in terms of the security legislation, apart from these relatively similar facilities, also has other provisions that apply to him. For example, he is visited by a magistrate. He is visited by an inspector. He is visited by a district surgeon. He is visited daily by the police. He is in daily contact with members of the S.A. Police Force. If he develops the slightest complaint, he is immediately taken to a hospital, a doctor’s private consulting rooms or a dentist. If he requires psychological treatment and the district surgeon agrees, he is immediately taken to a psychiatrist or someone else who can provide him with the necessary assistance.

It sounds like a five-star hotel!

Therefore there is no question of imprisonment of the nature of which the great authority of the hon. member for Houghton, Prof. Vorster, speaks. No question of that, when he says—

I hope that hon. members opposite will not again try to present a picture in public on the basis of such faulty authority by continually using the term “solitary confinement”, knowing that they do so against their better judgment and that by doing so they are projecting a false image.

I do not think I should dwell further on the hon. member for Houghton.

† The hon. member for King William’s Town made a speech on a subject on which he was very ill informed, to say the least of it. The hon. member for King William’s Town emphasized the question of torture of detainees. He also asked several questions in connection with it. He said that that was what we have to discuss; let us say it to one another, he said, and let us debate it in the House. I want to ask the hon. member what personal evidence he has of any torture of detainees by the police. None at all. What effort did he make to testify before the Rabie Commission? None at all. Of that I am sure. The hon. member asked why some of these detainees chose death instead of detention and asked me to give a lengthy explanation of the methods used in interrogation. Mr. Speaker, during the discussion of my Vote I tried to save time by not quoting in detail from several court cases that I had in my possession. However, I think it is in the interest of the House that I place some of these cases on record today, because what is the actual position? Only those cases where the police have been criticized have been given wide publicity, and I have never denied that because over a period of 20 years many things can happen under such sensitive conditions as we have to operate under. After all, we are all human beings. So I have never denied it and I have never said that it will never happen again in future, although I try to ensure that it will not happen again. However, as I have already said, we are all human beings. As I say, only those few cases where the police are criticized are published and are always referred to.

*For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I trust you will grant me a few minutes, because I think that these court cases should be placed on record so that if hon. members want to consider matters objectively, they can also see the other side of the matter. In a recent criminal case, The State vs. M. S. Loate and S. K. Seatlholo, various allegations were made by the defence to the effect that the accused and witnesses had been assaulted by members of the Security Branch in an effort to make them submit false evidence. In his judgment the magistrate found that in all cases these allegations by the defence were unfounded. This is a well-known case and was heard at Vanderbijlpark during the past few months.

Secondly, in the case of The State vs. D. Gumbi, the accused alleged that he had signed a confession under duress due to the violent actions of members of the Security Branch. After an investigation in a trial within the trial, the magistrate rejected these allegations and accepted the confession as evidence.

Thirdly, during the trial of a trained terrorist, The State vs. W. K. Mwlana, the accused alleged that he had been cruelly assaulted and that members of the police had made efforts to drown him in the Vaal River. These allegations were not accepted by the judge.

Fourthly, the accused, Duckey Sedikwe, alleged in the course of his trial that he had been assaulted during a certain period while he was in detention. The member who had allegedly committed the assault had, however, been on vacation during the period in question. In this instance, too, the court rejected the allegations.

In the fifth place, I refer to the Supreme Court case in Pretoria, Case No. CC154/81, before Mr. Justice Theron. It was a case of high treason, that of The State vs. Anthony Bobby Tsotsobe, Johannes Shabangi and David Moise.

In this trial the advocate for the defence, in attacking the confessions, contended in regard to each accused that the accused had been assaulted in the course of their detention. With regard to Accused A. B. Tsotsobe, the defence tried to prove a system, namely that various detainees, even those who had not been involved in this matter, had been assaulted in the same way and method. Mr. Justice Theron accepted the evidence submitted by the State and admitted as evidence the confessions in respect of all three of the accused.

In the case of The State vs. Izac Simu and Others in Pietermaritzburg, Zimu submitted evidence alleging that during his detention he had been abused and assaulted. The court had evidence proving that the allegation was unfounded and ridiculous. The court ignored the allegations.

In the seventh instance I refer to the case of The State vs. Harry Gwala and Others, which was also heard in Pietermaritzburg and concerned conspiracy and recruitment. All ten of the accused alleged in evidence that they had been assaulted in detention. The court heard evidence and ruled that the allegations were unfounded.

I now refer to an eighth case, the case of The State vs. J. Mange and Others. It was a terrorism case in Pietermaritzburg. The accused, John Sekete, alleged that he had been assaulted in detention. The advocates for the defence withdrew, and after that for the rest of the trial proceedings, the allegation of assault did not receive the attention of the court.

There is another case I want to refer to. On 13 January 1978 an urgent application for an interdict preventing the S.A. Police from assaulting or mishandling a detainee, Boy Makanna, came before Mr. Justice Schoch of the Cape Supreme Court. On 18 January the applicant’s advocate withdrew the application. By that time tremendous damage had probably already been done through the Press. The presiding judge said in his finding that he had studied statements and that he had found that there was no justification for the application. He also directed that the cost of the application be borne by the applicant.

I also wish to refer to a further case. A similar application was made on 13 January 1978 on behalf of Cornelius Kata. The case was so unsuccessful that the applicant withdrew his application and offered to pay the respondent’s costs.

Let me refer to one final case, the case of The State vs J. Nyathi in Krugersdorp. The charge against the accused was escape from legal custody. The accused escaped from the offices of the Security Police by jumping out of an open window on the fourth floor. He then alleged that he had been coerced into doing so. How many times have we not heard that? And what was the finding of the court? The court rejected these allegations and found him guilty of escaping.

I could mention a whole series of such cases to hon. members.

† Mr. Speaker, I have decided to place these cases on record this afternoon. I am sure the hon. member for King William’s Town will use these cases in the preparation of his speeches before he addresses people in future. [Interjections.]

The hon. member has also said that all the evidence we have about the system of inspection of detainees has not brought about any form of security as far as detainees are concerned. How can the hon. member say that? What is the hon. member’s authority for saying that it has not brought any form of security for the detainees? This system was introduced by my predecessor after the Biko case, and the hon. member is aware of the history since the Biko case. If it was not for the Aggett case, we would have had a very good record since the Biko case, among other things because of the system of inspection of detainees by the inspectors. Why then does the hon. member say these things? Surely the hon. member is … However, let me rather hold my tongue. Did the hon. member not listen to the hon. member for Houghton when she quoted the figures which I have just quoted, namely that there were 1 638 visits in one year and only 28 complaints? I am sure not all those complaints were in respect of assaults; some might have been in respect of food, some in respect of medicine and some in respect of clothing. [Interjections.]

The hon. member also asked me to provide in future for a code of interrogation. All I can say is that it is extremely difficult—as has been shown in the UK—to formulate a specific code for interrogation and/or to apply any such particular code in practice. However, I do not wish to discuss this now.

The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North, who apologized that he would not be present, made three allegations which I cannot describe as other than scandalous. Why did the hon. member say these things? He said in Elsies River the people saw their own people being shot dead in the streets by the police. He said this with no qualification whatsoever.

*He puts it as if we simply went out and shot and killed 32 people in Elsies River that evening. Why did the hon. member not add that more than 50 businesses were burned down? Why does he not say that damage amounting to R2 million to R3 million had been caused? Why does he not mention how many people had been injured by stone-throwing and how many people had been stabbed to death? Why does the hon. member not mention how much damage was done to vehicles in the street? Why did he not also mention the outstanding record of the S.A. Police, in co-operation with the community concerned, during the riot periods, and the fact that there was a minimum of violence and injuries? Did we really have to go and stand with our hands behind our backs that evening while everything was burning and being smashed and people were being killed? However, the hon. member does not tell that to the House or to the outside world. Therefore I say that this was absolute willfulness on his part.

† The hon. member referred to two political murders in South Africa. When has any political murder been committed in South Africa? The hon. member for Berea cannot mention one. He is a very senior lawyer and he cannot mention one. Not one of the lawyers on the other side of the House can quote me one particular political murder in South Africa not even our friend the judge. Why then did the hon. member refer to the Smit and Turner murders as political murders with any insinuation attached? Why did the hon. member refer in such an unqualified manner to the Soweto riots where hundreds of people, according to him, were shot and killed by the police in the streets of Soweto? This was just such an unqualified statement. Has the hon. member not read the Cillié Commission report in respect of the S.A. Police? If so, why does he make these allegations? I say it is absolutely scandalous.

The hon. member for Durban North referred to detention without trial which eventually ends up with solitary confinement. Before I go any further I want to point out that that particular hon. member yesterday tried to outdo the Progs at their own game and failed miserably. The rest of his team are “goeie ou Sappe van die vroeë dae”, including the hon. member for Umbilo. Henceforth that hon. member will be known as the Prog of the NRP.

Ron, that is a great compliment!

The hon. member for Durban North was also worried about the fact that in terms of this legislation Parliament cannot exercize control over the Minister. He said that that is the de facto position. The hon. member also referred to the Minister’s accountability to Parliament by convention only. He said that it was impossible for hon. members to monitor the activities of the Minister. That was one of his main concerns as far as the Bill is concerned. Then he made the following allegation and again I do not know why if it was not meant for outside publication. He said that the Minister had powers of life and death over detainees. What powers of death have I got over detainees in terms of this Bill or any other Bill? The hon. member for Durban North is a senior member of this House but that is the kind of statement he makes. I want to ask the hon. member to show me during the Committee Stage or at the Third Reading where his authority is in this Bill that the Minister has powers of fife and death over detainees.

I was referring to the effects of your decisions.

Why then did you not qualify it?

Look at my Hansard and you will see it.

I am asking the hon. member whether he is implying that the Minister of Law and Order has the power even to kill people in detention?

Circumstances can kill them, such as solitary confinement.

The hon. member can explain that later. He also asked specifically whether the rest of the Cabinet accept joint responsibility with the Minister of Law and Order for the provisions contained in this Bill. He also posed the same question to the hon. the Prime Minister. Let me say emphatically that the hon. the Prime Minister as head of the Government and the whole Cabinet accept responsibility for the provisions contained in this Bill. I shall enumerate the hon. members the reasons why that is the position.

Does that include the consequences of it?

In the first instance, this Bill was approved by the Cabinet to be presented to this House, in the second instance, it is being presented to the House of Assembly which is a public place, where its provisions are being debated in public so that the whole of South Africa will know what it provides for. What is the position in practice? Legally it provides for magistrates, district surgeons, inspectors of detainees, police officers and/or other senior officials to visit detainees and to keep a record of such visits under certain circumstances. In the second instance, it is only a senior police officer with the rank of lieutenant-Colonel or higher who under certain circumstances is entitled to detain a person in terms of this Bill. I am referring here particularly to clause 29 which has been the main concern of hon. members opposite. Thirdly, there are the conditions laid down by the Commissioner of Police which apply to people in detention. These are departmental conditions laid down by the Commissioner of Police which are public knowledge, a copy of which is given to every detainee the moment he is detained in a police cell. Fourthly, the Bill provides for the Commissioner to be informed as soon as possible after the detention of a particular person. The Commissioner must immediately inform the Minister concerned and, after a period of 30 days, the Commissioner of Police must convince the Minister in writing of the necessity to prolong the detention of that particular person and then the Minister accepts responsibility for that detainee. If the Minister accepts that advice and if he confirms it, then he is responsible. After six months, of course, there is the board of review which applies to the case of a particular detainee. What is more, the Commissioner of Police has monthly to provide the Minister concerned with his reasons as to why that detainee should still be kept in detention. If that is not sufficient public knowledge and if those are not adequate safeguards that are built into the system to save the Cabinet embarrassment, then I do not know what would be. The Minister of Law and Order does nothing in secret to the embarrassment of the Cabinet. The Minister of Law and Order is responsible to the Cabinet and he is also responsible to this House as the highest authority in the country. There is no higher authority in the country than this House notwithstanding the fact that hon. members have been asking seriously and earnestly for judicial authority to be placed over the executive authority. The Minister is responsible to this House and I do not think that the hon. member can ask for more than that.

I want to refer hon. members to the authority in the report of the Rabie Commission on the question of executive actions being subject to judicial subject to judicial control. I want to refer hon. members to page 183 of the report at paragraphs 11.4.2.9 and 10, both of which I should like to quote. They read as follows—

In the commission’s opinion it would create an untenable situation, and this is an authoritative commission. The commission goes on to say—

This is what was said in Canada. The quotation concludes—

I do not think we need better authority than that, but why did the hon. member not read the report? Why did the hon. member not quote that to the House? Why does he expect me to look it up for him and to quote it to the House?

The hon. member also asked for a Select Committee of the House to be privy to security information, including all secret information which may apply to the different sets of circumstances envisaged by the Bill. I am sorry, but for obvious reasons I cannot accede to that request. Because of the time factor I do not think the hon. member expects me to give him a complete answer on this issue; it is so clear. [Interjections.] The answer to this request therefore is: No, it cannot be done for obvious reasons.

The hon. member for Durban Central also referred to detainees disappearing from the face of the earth. Why does he use this slogan? In whose interest is it? Is it in the interest of the hon. member and his party? Surely, it cannot be. It cannot be in the interest of the House and it cannot be in the interest of South Africa. Why do people say from time to time that detainees are disappearing from the face of the earth? What does the hon. member mean by that? [Interjections.] He does not respond. I want to ask him what proof he can produce of detainees who disappear from the face of the earth in terms of what he says.

The Bill makes it possible; that is the point.

Furthermore the hon. member said that no other Western country has such provisions when he referred to the banning of people.

What does he know?

That is a good question.

† He also said that this was a dangerous grey area which could be used against the Government’s political opponents. He said that there should be adequate checks and balances. He then said the only authority we had for this was a reference in the report to King Solomon. [Interjections.]

*Then King Solomon was the only one who thought of these things. After all, the hon. member did not read the report. The hon. member referred in the first instance to page 171, and on that page the commission states—

I mention this in case any hon. member wishes to read it this evening.

However, I want to refer to page 178 and focus attention on paragraph 11.4.1.4. Here we have a reference to the position in inter alia Israel. I, too, can quote authorities from various other countries. Just to indicate how it is implemented in practice, I quote this paragraph—

I take it that Israel is one of the Western countries which the hon. member and I can both refer to. I read further—

That is an example of a Western country where this takes place.

I think I must give the hon. member some more authority for this. I think it is right that I should make it available to this House. Now hon. members have it at their disposal, if they would be good as to refrain from presenting this one-sided picture. I am merely referring the hon. member to certain countries, without going into all the details. However, I have the details here if the hon. member wants to look at them at a later stage. [Interjections.] The details which I am supplying to the House have been ascertained to the best of our ability by way of diplomatic channels, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, our embassies and well-disposed officials and other people in other countries. If one or two provisions have been changed or repealed in the meantime, then this authority is subject to that. I could refer hon. members to Bophuthatswana, in the first instance, but I accept that hon. members will take no notice of that because that is supposedly based on the advice those people have received from South Africa.

In the second instance I should like to refer to Ghana, and I quote one provision—

I have already referred to Israel. Of particular importance in that regard are sections 108 and 109. I have already referred to section 111, but I should now also like to refer to sections 108 and 109. However, I shall begin by quoting section 110—

May I ask for the date of that?

Subsection (2) reads as follows—

This also corresponds to a great extent with our provisions relating to the restriction of people.

What date is that?

No, wait a moment, I have already qualified my authority. I am referring here to Lebanon. I can also refer hon. members to Malawi, the paragon of Africa, the peace-loving country in Africa that is our good friend. [Interjections.] Section 6 (1) reads as follows—

In other words, if the hon. member for Pinelands were to set foot in Malawi it would not even be a Minister that would decide on his weal and woe.

And that is democracy?

An administrative official could decide there and then, when he alighted from the aircraft, whether it was in their country’s interests to have him there. [Interjections.] And I can guarantee that he would not send him back on the next flight. [Interjections.]

And that is democracy, eh? That is what you want for South Africa?

I can refer the hon. member for Durban Central to Malaysia. I can also refer him to the Netherlands. [Interjections.] He was asking for authorities as far as Western countries are concerned. Let me therefore give him the example of the Netherlands.

*I refer to the Act of 23 July 1952. I do not understand the abbreviation, but it seems to me that reference is being made to section 361. It might also just be an identifying number, but in any event I quote section 13(1) of the Wet op die Regulering van Buitengewone Bevoegdheden van Burgerlijke Gezag, as amended in 1971—

Even the mayor! I quote further—

There are undoubtedly a few people whose “vertoefen in de open lucht” have had to be restricted in our legislation as well. [Interjections.] I quote further—

The mayor can do all that. Just think how fortunate all the former mayors in this House would have been if they had had such a provision! Then we might have had less trouble in South Africa.

† The hon. member asked for further authority. Let me refer the hon. members to Zimbabwe, and here I am referring specifically to the legal provisions enacted during the term of office of the Rhodesian Government and which today still apply in Zimbabwe. The Law and Order Maintenance Act, section 39(2), states the following—

That applies in Zimbabwe today if my authority is correct—

I can go on in that way. There is the case of Uganda.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether, should there be a change of Government in South Africa and should he no longer be in the Government, he would be prepared to live under the same laws which he now supports?

When there is a change of Government in South Africa, irrespective of which Government it is if it is formed by one of the parties in the House, that Government will have the same problems this Government has. They will have exactly the same problems as far as the security of the State is concerned that this Government has. The only difference is that there will then be a much livelier Opposition than we have today.

In the last instance let me refer hon. members to the position in Uganda where “the President may in normal conditions where there is no emergency, order the restriction or detention of any person who has conducted himself or is about to conduct himself so as to be dangerous”. I do not think I need give the hon. member for Durban Central any more authorities on that particular issue.

I also want to refer the hon. member for Durban Central to a very important article which appeared in the Juridical Review, 1972, on page 12. In that article entitled “Law and Order in terms of Emergency” Lord McDermot said the following about internment in Northern Ireland—

The author proceeds—

This is important. I continue—

Then the author gives an example I do not want to quote because I am pressed for time. He continues—

I think this particular article should be read by each and every hon. member of the Opposition. This is not a quotation by a South African politician, but by Lord McDermot.

The hon. member for Durban Point concentrated on one particular central theme during his address. That was his concern about the adverse propaganda South Africa was receiving abroad. In his amendment he also referred particularly to that specific aspect. I have already quoted it. I am therefore not going to elaborate any further on that matter. The question arises, however, who is responsible for this adverse propaganda. Let us blame the Government in the first instance. Let us also blame this legislation. Are these the only reasons? You see, Sir, the hon. member for Durban Point and other hon. members of the NRP always seem to blame the legal position in South Africa alone for the adverse propaganda that this country is receiving abroad, as if that is the only reason for it. Mr. Speaker, have you known that a minimum amount of publicity is given abroad, even in a country such as the United Kingdom, to matters pertaining to security legislation? Those people have, of course, a particular loyalty to their country, something which is lacking among many people in South Africa. In South Africa we also seem to have a blatant campaign against every piece of security legislation. In other countries security legislation receives a minimum publicity while a maximum amount of loyalty is shown to the country itself. On the other hand, in South Africa we have a maximum publicity and a maximum campaign, with a minimum loyalty.

The second reason I should like to emphasize here today is the phenomenon of pronouncements by opponents of our security legislation in South Africa. I can give many examples of such pronouncements, but I should like to refer, for instance, to a particular professor at a well-known South African university, who said in public and also during lectures to his students that in South Africa, in terms of our security legislation, a person could be detained merely for suffering from ingrown toe-nails—as simple as that. If he did not like the colour of a person’s hair, any policeman could arrest any individual in any street in South Africa, this particular professor added. It is because of pronouncements such as these, and many others too, that South Africa suffers.

Allow me, Sir, to refer to yet another example of this sort of pronouncement.

*Prof. D. H. Van Wyk, a professor in Law at Unisa and a person who has often been quoted in this House has the following to say, according to Die Burger of 12 March 1982—

And then the following important words—

Is one honestly to believe that the security police and I provide people with poison to enable them to take their own lives?

It is scandalous!

That is what the learned professor says. That is what a professor in law at Unisa says.

[Inaudible.]

No, the hon. member is talking about propaganda. I share his concern. I am merely providing him with examples in order to illustrate what I mean. The professor goes on to make further statements. What is more, he is a professor in law at Unisa. He goes on to say—

This is a professor in law that is projecting this false image. He goes on to say, with regard to visits by the inspector of detainees—

† That is why I say that I share the hon. member’s concern. All I have done is to criticize the hon. member’s approach and that of his party. I will therefore not be coming back to that issue. I do, however, share the hon. member’s concern about this particular matter, and I have also explained why I am not in a position to accept the hon. member’s amendment. I do, however, thank the hon. member for the interest he shows in this very important matter, although it does not really have a direct bearing on the crux of the Bill that we are discussing here today. I have just touched upon this issue in stating my motivation for not accepting the hon. member’s amendment.

The hon. member for Pinetown apologized for his absence this afternoon. His main argument was in respect of the exclusion of the courts. It is, however, a fact that it is only under clause 29 that a person cannot apply to court. In all other cases a person can apply to court. I should like briefly to refer the hon. member to paragraphs 10.78 and 10.79 on page 153 of the report.

*Here the commission has the following to say—

Clause 29 is an essential measure, Sir. I also quote the following paragraph—

† Sir, this is the authority the hon. member asked for as far as clause 29 is concerned.

I do not wish to delay the House any longer, but should like to refer, as another authority, to an article by Prof. Francois Venter of the University of Potchefstroom.

*The article appeared in one of our newspapers under the title of “Dit is binnelandse veiligheid”, and it is very illuminating. In this article Prof. Venter also refers to the need for the system for which provision is made in clause 29.

To conclude my remarks about speeches by hon. members, on the other side of the House, I just want to refer briefly to the hon. member for Umbilo. As is his custom in this House, he adopted a balanced standpoint. The only difference in this regard is that yesterday he cast his sober approach to the winds and tackled the official Opposition as only an experienced old United Party supporter from Natal can, and it was quite a pleasant experience for us on this side of the House. [Interjections.]

The hon. member Prof. Olivier referred in fairly general terms to certain matters which we can discuss in greater detail during the Committee Stage. I shall give more attention to the hon. member’s standpoint at that stage.

As far as the hon. member for Sandton is concerned, I have not reacted today to the speech he made last night, and for good reasons. I did not know that he would be prepared to withdraw today what he said last night. I also want to draw attention to the attitude with which he said it. It was a calculated attack, and accordingly I was at first unwilling to reply to him. However, since the hon. member withdrew his allegations today, and because he did so in a proper spirit, I shall reply during the Committee Stage to arguments he advanced.

I have already expressed my appreciation of the outstanding speeches made by hon. members on this side of the House and I appreciate in particular the preparation they involved.

I now wish to appeal to all hon. members in this House, particularly hon. members opposite and the media, to present security matters in the correct perspective and to use the correct terms. I have identified a number of matters for hon. members today and have requested that these matters be quoted in the right context. For example, I wish to refer to the accusation that is constantly being made, i.e. that people are being detained without trial, that people are detained in solitary confinement. But surely we know that they are being detained for questioning. We know, too, that detainees are only detained on the basis of decisions by senior people, and that they first have to comply with certain provisions of the Act relating to the information on the basis of which they are entitled to take certain steps against citizens of the State. I therefore want to ask that when we refer to solitary detention, we do so in the correct perspective. It is in no one’s interests to carry on as we are doing now. I appeal to everyone not to keep undermining and breaking down the trust we have in our officials and judicial officers when we refer to our magistrates, inspectors, district surgeons and police officers who are involved in these matters in a supervisory capacity. Just as I appeal to the hon. member for Kling William’s Town, I want to appeal to all hon. members, in referring to the so-called mistreatment of people, not to emphasize the few cases on record—28 out of more than 1 600, of which not all concerned assault—but that we should also emphasize the other side of the matter and quote the series of cases where false accusations were made, accusations which could not be substantiated. I want to ask that we identify everyone who makes these wild, far-fetched statements, whenever it may be, as liars, and persistently say: “We cannot believe you.” Everyone who opens his mouth to make these far-fetched statements must be told flatly by every right-thinking and responsible inhabitant of South Africa that “We cannot believe you; you are a liar.” Moreover we must go on the offensive and not remain on the defensive. I therefore sincerely ask that we do these things. This will not be in the interests of the NP or the Government but in the interests of the Republic of South Africa.

Question put: That the words “the Bill be” stand part of the Question,

Upon which the House divided.

As fewer than fifteen members (viz. Messrs. R. B. Miller, B. W. B. Page, W. V. Raw, P. R. C. Rogers, A. G. Thompson and D. W. Watterson) appeared on one side,

Question declared affirmed and amendment moved by Mr. W. V. Raw dropped.

Question then put: That the word “now” stand part of the Question,

Upon which the House divided:

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Mr. Speaker, we have now reached the Third Reading stage of this Bill. No amendments at all were accepted by the hon. the Minister during the Committee Stage of the Bill and therefore our opposition to this measure remains unchanged in any way. As I mentioned in the Second Reading debate, this is the third in a trilogy of Bills in this category which have the effect of limiting the right of assembly, and we on this side of the House object to that.

The first piece of legislation in this regard was passed in 1970. That legislation affected the right of the public to assemble in procession. They can no longer do so without the permission of a magistrate and it is my contention that since that time no permission has ever been given by a magistrate for any form of political procession. If the hon. the Minister has different information in this regard I am sure he will give it to us.

The second piece of legislation dealt with the prohibition of gatherings and demonstrations around the precincts of Parliament and that Bill was passed in 1973. That Bill further limited the right of assembly and what is more it defined a demonstration or gathering as meaning one or more persons. Since that time, of course, we have had no demonstrations around Parliament, or if we have had them they have been broken up and the persons involved have been charged under the particular section of that legislation. Now we come to the third Bill of this trilogy, and from now on any demonstration arising out of a gathering of one or more persons in a court-house, or within 500 meters of a courthouse, is to be an offence unless a permit has been obtained from a magistrate for such a gathering or demonstration to take place.

Obviously no such permit is ever going to be given, and we believe that a large number of innocent people are going to be dragged into gaol as a result of this measure. People who are caught up in demonstrations willy-nilly are gong to find it very difficult indeed to prove that they were innocent bystanders, and what is more we believe that the powers that exist at present for a magistrate or a judge to clear the court, should there be any behaviour that is in any way disruptive of court proceedings, are perfectly sufficient. We furthermore believe that this is, as I mentioned originally, yet another incursion, on the part of the Government, into one of the fundamental and elementary rights in any democratic country, and that is the right of peaceful protest or the right to demonstrate or assemble.

For those reasons we shall be opposing the Third Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, as the hon. member for Randburg rightly pointed out, those hon. members—particularly the hon. member for Houghton—and us are, ideologically speaking, diametrically opposed to one another. As far as these principles are concerned, we are arguing at cross purposes. I honestly think she is wasting our time and we are wasting her time. I do not think we shall ever arrive at any logical accord. With all due respect, I want to suggest that the right of protest is recognized on a reasonable basis. The State does not act unreasonably when it comes to implementing what has to be done. Individual, harmless placard-bearers are, for example, not arrested. Protests still take place today, in spite of the legislation in connection with the Parliament building which was passed in 1973, and to which the hon. member for Houghton referred. In spite of that legislation demonstrations still take place. For example protest meetings are still being held on Greenmarket Square, on the Parade, in Joubert Park in Johannesburg, etc. There is no problem when it comes to legitimate protest. It is when such behaviour is not harmless that action has to be taken. When the protest is organized and has to lead to the disturbance of the court proceedings, it is definitely not harmless. Nor is it only in this country that action is taken against such actions. In such a case the action usually takes place on an organized basis, whether or not it is near a court building. It is usually arranged by specific organizations. In this regard I should like to refer to the Shackleton Report. If one looks at page 54 of this report, it is quite clear that very firm action is taken against actions of this kind, particularly when they occur on an organized basis. Originally the fine for this offence was £400 or six months’ imprisonment or both. Recently it was increased to £1 000 in cases where it could in any way be proved that such protest was in connection with a banned organization. With all due respect I want to suggest that any onus of proof resting on the person arrested for such an offence should be based on a balance of probability. I do not think the specific person can be expected to prove that he was not in any way involved in the demonstration if onus of proof is in any way more strictly applied. The argument of the hon. member for Houghton, which I have already cast in her teeth, is that no magistrate would agree to such a protest. As far as I am concerned this is a nonsensical argument by the hon. member and shows an absolute lack of confidence in our judicial system and the officials performing these functions. I am fully confident that those people are capable of performing their judicial task fairly and will also consider such an application fairly. I do not believe that the Opposition can go any further.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Houghton again demonstrated to us that in principle she is opposed to any legislation which is concerned with restricting or dealing with terrorism. [Interjections.] I was shocked at the statements made by the hon. member in this House. When the hon. the Minister was speaking and reference was made to her intended tour of Russia, she said—

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: Can the hon. member explain the relevance to this Third Reading of the arguments of the hon. member for Houghton in another debate?

As a matter of fact, I have some doubt too, but I shall allow the hon. member for Langlaagte to proceed a little further.

Sir, I merely want to point out what could happen in our country if a Bill such as this one were not passed. On the last Monday of February 1965 there were in court people who had bombs.

*How often in 1965 did bombs explode in court?

But that already is an offence.

Wait a moment. This is something one should prevent. I want to quote the following extract—

Only one person will enter carrying a bomb.

Perhaps that is true. There had already been such cases. I consequently cannot understand why this legislation is only being introduced now. It should have been on the Statute Book long ago. The effect of this Bill can only be to stabilize law and order in our courts. No witness must ever be under the impression that anyone can attack him or in any other way by a threat to him while he is in the court building. Any person who looks at the witness or gesticulates to him may be a danger to him. The hon. member for Houghton says that in such a case the judge may suspend the court proceedings. Terrorists are therefore able if they make a noise inside the court or outside it, to bring legal proceedings in this country to a standstill day after day or even cause them to collapse. One could imagine what kind of effect this would have in our country.

But even now they cannot do it.

I really do not know what the hon. member for Langlaagte is talking about.

At the time of the Abram Fischer hearing there was a certain Trawella. It is said of him that he also appeared in court at one stage. He said that he was a communist and also a South African. He said that he first came into contact with non-Whites at university. It is also said of him—

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: The hon. member has been talking about bombs, but we are dealing with a Bill to prevent demonstrations by people in or near courts. Surely, this Bill has nothing to do with communism, bombs, etc. Will you please give a ruling in this regard?

As I see it, the hon. member is pointing out what could happen should demonstrations be allowed in the vicinity of our court buildings. I shall allow the hon. member to proceed.

If we in South Africa have the situation that the effect of a gathering of people is that the life of a person who is being tried is endangered, or that someone giving evidence feels threatened, there has to be legislation in this regard. If there is any kind of threat from any source to the maintenance of law and order, even in our courts, there has to be legislation in this connection. That is why we support this Bill. The hon. member for Houghton referred to the fact that the hon. the Minister had indicated that we knew that our magistrates and other people would be reasonable. We realize that they will be reasonable. Can the hon. member tell us that any magistrate or any judge in this country has not acted fairly towards any person who was being tried? To make such statements here is really not worthy of an hon. member of this House. Nor do I think that it does the security situation in South Africa any good.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Langlaagte for his support for this Bill. I also want to thank the hon. member for Roodepoort for his contribution. The hon. member for Houghton added nothing new to the Second Reading debate we have already had and I do not think it is necessary for me to repeat all those arguments.

No, don’t.

Nor do I think it is necessary for me to motivate the standpoint of the Government in regard to this legislation again.

Question put,

Upon which the House divided:

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Mr. Speaker, I will not detain the House very long. I think our attitude to this Bill was stated very clearly during the Second Reading debate and also during the Committee Stage. We indicated at the Second Reading that we had problems because we believed that the Bill in its present form would introduce uncertainty into our law, although we conceded that if the intention of the hon. the Minister was simply to take steps against people intimidating individuals either in court cases or other matters then, clearly, we had sympathy with that because no responsible Opposition or responsible member of this House would be in favour of that sort of intimidation taking place. We also indicated, however, that we felt that the provisions of the Bill were framed far too widely and could include other instances. During the Committee Stage the hon. the Minister attempted to clarify the issue by saying that this was not in fact the intention; that a much narrower intention was envisaged than the wording of the Bill would indicate. We moved an amendment in an attempt once again to narrow the terms of the Bill, to make it more clear, to indicate that in fact it was intended on a very narrow basis to act against people employing methods of intimidation in an effort to persuade other people to change their viewpoints. The hon. the Minister did not see his way clear to accept that amendment and we voted against the main clause during the Committee Stage. We are now at the Third Reading faced with the position where we still believe that the Bill in its present form is couched in terms which are far too wide. We believe that they should have been narrowed and therefore we cannot support the Third Reading.

Mr. Speaker, hon. members were all agreed that unlawful intimidation is undesirable and endorsed this principle. However, there are fears in regard to the practical application of the legislation, but I do not think it should cause any problems. The crime which is being created requires intent, i.e. an intention on the part of the accused. In addition the act must be without lawful reason. The term “without lawful reason” has been interpreted by our courts in various decisions as “unlawfully or without legitimate reason”.

† This should allay all fears of the hon. member for Berea that lawful acts may fall within the ambit of this Bill. It was clearly argued by the hon. member for East London City that a proviso, as envisaged by the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Berea, would only amount to a repetition of the words “without lawful reason”, as it appears in the first line of clause 1. The term “without lawful reason” is all-embracing, and it is our contention that the fears expressed by the hon. member for Berea are unfounded, because no lawful act will fall within the ambit of this legislation.

*It therefore follows that intimidation by means of assault or injury to property, or a threat to this effect will always take place without lawful reason. An act can only go unpunished if there is a lawful reason for it, and such a reason can easily be given. Therefore I cannot share the fears of the official Opposition, and should like to support the Third Reading of this Bill

Mr. Speaker, I am merely rising on behalf of this side of the House to pledge our support for the Third Reading of this Bill. Tested by all the norms of necessity, efficiency and fairness, we believe that the measures of this legislation are not only in the interests of the security of the State, but also in the interests of the individual.

I thank the hon. member Mr. Theunissen for his and his party’s support for the legislation, and I also thank the hon. member for Nelspruit for his support. I should like to give hon. members the assurance that if there is one Bill in regard to which I am convinced that the right thing is being done, it is this one because, in spite of what I said earlier today, there are a few hon. members of the PFP who do nevertheless agree with the principle of the Bill. A few hon. members of the PFP also agreed with my explanation during the Committee Stage in regard to the legal aspects, although they voted against it every time. I am therefore convinced that a few hon. members of the PFP—although they are going to vote against the Third Reading—are satisfied with the principle of the Bill and that their doubts regarding “without lawful reason” and “damage” have been allayed.

Question put,

Upon which the House divided:

Mr. Speaker, I move—

This Bill is the product of the Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation, also known as the Rabie Commission, and is intended to replace the Official Secrets Act, 1956. As hon. members know, the Official Secrets Act is a measure which repealed the British Official Secrets Act of 1911, which had been in force in this country, but which at the same time re-enacted in a South Africanized form the same provisions, as supplemented by the Official Secrets Act of 1920, which had not been in force in this country.

Apart from certain adjustments and subsequent amendments, the Official Secrets Act is still for the most part in line with the British legislation. However, it is not for this reason that we want to replace the Act. Like the Rabie Commission, we are in no doubt as to the need for such provisions. However, we also agree with the Rabie Commission that the Official Secrets Act should not be retained in its present form, and we accept the recommendations of the Rabie Commission in this connection as well.

The Bill does not contain any fundamental departures from the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. In fact, some of the provisions have been taken over from the Act word for word. However, there are some new provisions, as well as adjustments and amendments, which are fully motivated in the Rabie Report, but which I nevertheless want to explain briefly.

Clause 1 contains a number of definitions, and an innovation in this connection to which I should like to draw attention in the fact that the definition of “agent” includes an agent of a “hostile organization”, which is also defined. These definitions have a bearing on clause 3 in particular, which relates to espionage.

† Regarding the necessity for these provisions, the attention of hon. members is directed to the evidence contained in the Rabie Report. In paragraph 6.97 of the report reference is made to the new strategy of a certain terrorist movement to infiltrate our security forces with the view to subvert these forces and to obtain information that may be of use to that organization and undoubtedly also its masters behind the Iron Curtain. We furthermore have the undisputed evidence in the very recent case against Christie in which he was convicted, namely that he had agreed to obtain information on nuclear power and energy matters in the Republic for the purposes of this terrorist movement. In view of these facts hon. members will agree with me that the provisions I have referred to have become necessary.

In regard to clause 1, Mr. Speaker, I also wish to refer to the provisions of clause l(2)(d). The Official Secrets Act of 1956 does not contain similar provisions. The reason for this omission is that since provision regarding an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence had been made in other legislation, the relevant provisions of the British Official Secrets Act of 1911 and 1920 were not included in the Official Secrets Act of 1956, i.e., the South African Act. Unfortunately sight was lost of the fact that by not including the relevant provisions of the said enactments in the 1956 Act, the provisions for certain presumptions, for in camera hearings and for the stipulation that a prosecution may not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General would no longer apply with regard to a prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence under the Act. This defect is now being rectified by clause l(2)(d).

Clause 2 is a re-enactment of the provisions of section 2(a) of the 1956 Act, the object of which is the protection of works of defence and I take it that hon. members will agree that such protection is necessary.

Clause 3 redefines the crime of espionage and replaces section 2(b) and (c) of the Official Secrets Act, 1956. I have already explained why it is necessary to extend the provisions to cover espionage operations by or on behalf of hostile organizations, but I would like to elaborate on the provisions as far as they cover information relating to the prevention or combating of terrorism, and in this regard I also refer to similar provisions contained in clause 4.

*Considerable criticism has already been levelled at these provisions through the news media, especially in so far as they may prohibit the disclosure of particulars of persons who are being detained for purposes of interrogation concerning terrorist activities. It is clear from paragraphs 8.7.1.41 and 8.7.1.55 of the Rabie Report that it is the intention of the Rabie Commission that clause 4 should make such disclosure punishable under certain circumstances. The reason for this is given in paragraphs 8.7.1.51, 52 and 53 of the Rabie Report, and you will allow me, Mr. Speaker, to quote the following from those paragraphs—

However, this is not an innovation. When we look at the provisions of section 3(2)(a) of the Official Secrets Act, and the definition of “police matter” in section 3(2)(b), there is no reason why the disclosure of the detention of a particular person for a purpose which is prejudicial to the security of the Republic should not also be an offence in terms of that section. No such prosecution has yet been instituted in terms of section 3, and the reason is obvious. As the Rabie Commission also points out, no-one can be convicted of such an offence if the information that was published was already known to many people, or if the facts that were published did not prejudice the State in any way. Accordingly, it is not the intention to make this provision applicable to information which is generally known. The clauses concerned render unnecessary provisions such as those which were contained in the Second Police Amendment Bill, 1980, and which would have directly prohibited the publication of information concerning detentions.

As the Rabie Commission mentions in paragraph 8.7.1.42 of its report, there is no doubt about the fact that the disclosure of information which hinders the police in the action they take to prevent or combat terrorism is prejudicial to the interests of the State. Hon. members will agree with me that the disclosure of such information regarding terrorism, whether direct or indirect, would only be to the great advantage of terrorists. Surely we cannot allow this if we have the security of the Republic and all its inhabitants at heart. I just want to point out that the provisions concerned render the provision made in section 27C of the Police Act, 1958, superfluous, and consequently that section is being repealed by clause 15.

Clause 4 is merely a consolidation of the existing section 3(1) and (2) of the Official Secrets Act. As hon. members will notice, however, the definition of “police matter” is not being re-enacted, since it has been rendered superfluous by the provisions concerning information relating to the prevention or combating of terrorism. A distinction is also being drawn by clause 4(1)(b)(iv) between official information the disclosure of which would prejudice the security or interests of the State and information the disclosure of which would not result in such prejudice. In this respect, therefore, the prohibition contained in section 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is being relaxed, since that section covers all official information—whether or not it merits protection.

Another innovation is clause 4(1)(b)(v), which provides for the case where an outsider has obtained an official document by finding it or ferreting it out while he is not entitled to be in possession of it and has disclosed the information contained in the document while it was protected. This is a shortcoming in the Official Secrets Act which is now being rectified. Since clause 3 only provides for cases where information is obtained for the purpose of disclosing it to a foreign State or a hostile organization, it is necessary to provide for those cases where persons are already in possession of such information, whether legitimately or not, and then discloses it to a foreign State or a hostile organization for a purpose which is prejudicial to the security or the interests of the Republic. There is no reason why such persons should not be subject to the same penalties as those applicable to the real spy. Clause 4 provides for this.

The rest of the clauses are mainly re-enactments of the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. The presumptions in sections 7, 7A and 8 of the Act, which are being re-enacted in clauses 8, 9 and 10 respectively, have been adjusted in the light of the new provisions introduced by clauses 3 and 4 in particular.

Then I just wish to refer to clause 14, which, like section 1 of the Official Secrets Act, confers upon the State President the power to declare any place to be a “prohibited place” for the purposes of the Act, but which now also gives the State President the power to declare organizations outside the Republic to be “hostile organizations” for the purposes of the Act. The reason for this is that organizations may be established abroad which, like the ANC, may make onslaughts on the Republic. Because the organization is operated from abroad, it cannot be declared unlawful. The only way in which espionage by or for such organizations can be covered is by declaring those organizations to be “hostile organizations” for the purposes of the Act, as recommended by the Rabie Commission.

As far as the short title is concerned, I should like to explain briefly why the name “Official Secrets Act” has been discarded. The Rabie Commission points out in paragraph 12.7 of its report that in spite of the name and long title of the Act, the expression official secret” does not occur anywhere in the existing Act. Because of the varied nature of information which may be confidential or deserving of protection for some reason or other, it would not be possible either to formulate a suitable definition which would cover all possible cases satisfactorily. The name proposed in clause 16 is more indicative of the purpose of the proposed legislation, namely the protection of information.

Finally, I just want to announce that in response to representations made by the Press Union, I have decided to move during the Committee Stage that the words “or may be” in paragraph (bb) of clause 4(1) be deleted.

Mr. Speaker, I shall not be able to react at this stage, during the discussion of the Second Reading, to the proposed amendment that the hon. the Minister has just announced. I think we should look at that in the Committee Stage, but before dealing with this Bill specifically, I think it is necessary to mention three basic standpoints that are accepted by the PFP and against the background of which our attitude towards the Bill should be measured.

The first standpoint is that in any country—and not just in South Africa—in these modern times of international hostility, with sophisticated and governmentally-funded espionage being very much part of the armoury of virtually every State, a form of official secrets legislation is, in fact, an essential protection measure. I think that the hon. the Minister and the Government must understand that when we state our attitude, we do so in the knowledge that we accept that in South Africa, as in any country, there must be a form of official secrets legislation protecting the secrets and strategic interests of the country. If the strategic and military resources of our country enjoyed no protection at all, I believe that we would very soon fall prey to the predatory forces lined up against us and so, I believe, would any country. Therefore there can be no objection, in principle, to legislation being maintained to ensure that the strategic interests of our country are properly guarded.

The second point that I should like to raise is that a Bill designed to protect the interests that I have mentioned does not become acceptable merely because of its stated intention. It is, in fact, the specifics within the Bill that must determine our attitude at Second Reading and our attitude towards the legislation as a whole.

This brings me to a third point. Previously unacceptable provisions in the Officials Secrets Act, which this Bill is replacing, do not become acceptable in this Bill merely because, in restating them, no new principle is involved.

Right.

I think the hon. the Minister must understand that aspect in the attitude we are going to put to him, because I believe that a bad principle in the original Bill remains a bad principle when it is re-enacted.

Hear, hear!

There is, however, a further point to consider. If this Bill that is before us today were not accepted by this House, the country would not automatically be shorn of protection against its enemies. The present Official Secrets Act of 1956 would remain in full force and effect. So it is against that background that we would like to bring a critical and yet objective eye to bear upon the Bill.

Our first criticism is that some of the provisions are so widely drawn as to promote vagueness, perhaps even to prevent the disclosure of information which is not sensitive at all and which it could well be in the public interest to have disclosed.

Who decides that?

That hon. member must please just allow me to develop my argument before he interjects, for he will then see precisely what it is I am trying to explain. Allow me to try to illustrate the point by example. Perhaps that will help the hon. member for Hercules who is interjecting. Clause 2 of the Bill relates to the offence of approaching any area declared to be a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the security “or interests” of the Republic. To charge a person for approaching a strategic installation for a purpose prejudicial to the security of the State is one thing—we would support such a charge—but to include in the wording of the Bill the vague phrase “or interests” brings a completely different connotation to bear and one which is exceedingly vague. One must remember that a “prohibited place” need not necessarily in terms of the definition of such place be a military establishment at all. It may not even relate to a military establishment. In clause 14 of the Bill the State President is granted the unfettered power to declare any area whatsoever to be a prohibited place.

Secondly in this connection, the provisions of clause 10(1) should not be overlooked, for in that clause a presumption on favour of the State, of prejudicial purpose itself, is created which places an additional burden on an accused person. All this is in relation to clause 2. Finally, in relation to that clause, the penalty upon conviction is exceedingly heavy: A maximum of 20 years in prison without any discretion being afforded to the courts to impose an alternative sentence.

Is there a minimum?

No, there is not a minimum. I used the word “maximum”. Let me just explain to the hon. member Mr. Schutte for his edification that, when legislation placed on the Statute Book makes provision for a maximum sentence of, say, 20 or 30 years, that gives the courts a clear indication of the weight of seriousness which through the legislation is placed upon an offence of the sort at issue.

It is a guideline.

In the proper case. [Interjections.]

The point I am trying to make is that, in the case of an offence which the legislature, we in the House, consider to be a very serious offence, that offence should be clearly defined and should not be vague, especially where the sentences prescribed for such an offence are in fact very long sentences, and more especially where there are presumptions which are difficult to overturn and which are created in the same legislation relating to that offence. So, I believe that in legislation of this sort in the circumstances I have mentioned words should in fact be honed and used as precision instruments and not as a blanket bludgeon.

The same criticism can be levelled at the provisions of clause 3 of the Bill. While I am absolutely certain that it is the hon. the Minister’s intention that the offence created in terms of clause 3 should relate only to the disclosure of sensitive or secret material, the wording of this clause in fact goes far wider and includes the disclosure of material which could affect “the other interests of the Republic”, as it is stated in the Bill. If we wish to bring into being an Act which protects military, diplomatic or security interests of the Republic, let us do so, but not by creating the possibility of prosecutions for offences which are in fact not defined. A dragnet clause such as clause 3 goes far further than curbing pure espionage.

We have another problem with clause 3 of the Bill. That is that the only element of intent—and this is perhaps a somewhat legalistic argument—required to be proved, is that of disclosure. The evil intent to damage the security interests of South Africa is not required for the commission of this offence. Here again there are certain presumptions which are created in favour of the State; this time by the provisions of clauses 8 and 9.

If I could, however, come now to the clause which causes me the greatest concern of all, I should like to refer to clause 4. It is not because it effectively protects vital information that it causes me such concern. That is not my problem. I am also not concerned about the fact that it is useful in guarding the secrets of South Africa and the strategic interests of our country. That is not the complaint that I have. In attempting to do this, however, this clause acts as a total catch all type clause, protecting virtually every and any kind of official information, whether important or trivial, whether sensitive or insensitive. Whatever the hon. the Minister may say about his intentions, the provisions contained in this clause can easily be used to prevent the disclosure of information to which, I believe, the public should be entitled.

So you want to decide that?

No, definitely not. In order to illustrate this point, however, I should like to read to the hon. member what is stipulated in clause 4.

But we can read, too!

Just hold it! I am going to give you a special treat today. I should like to read clause 4 in a drastically abbreviated form, in which I have redrafted the clause and left out all the words except those which serve to prove the point that I am trying to make here. Every single word that I read out now does appear in the clause as printed though. I read, as follows—

If hon. members should like to look at the Bill they can see how it differs from the exact wording of the clause. I quote again—

1. (b) Any document, model, article or information—
   1. (i) which he knows or reasonably should know … relates to a security matter or the prevention or combating of terrorism …
   2. (iv) which he has obtained … and the secrecy of which document, model, article or information he knows or reasonably should know to be required by the security or the other interests of the Republic …

and who—

1. (aa) discloses such … document … article or information to any person …
2. (bb) publishes such … document, … article or information in any manner or for any purpose which is or may be prejudicial to the security or interests of the Republic …

I should like to ask the hon. the Minister a very straight question. I think he has in fact given the answer in his Second Reading speech. Therefore I shall not put the question as strongly as I was going to do it. Can this clause, in the eyes of the hon. the Minister, be utilized to prevent newspapers from reporting on detentions in terms of security legislation? I think the hon. the Minister has given us an answer. The answer is yes. This is a question which is posed, and allegations of this nature have also been made by academics; many academics who have commented on this Bill …

The information concerned is of course qualified information.

Yes, but it is in the hands of the hon. the Minister. He has to decide whether a charge is to be brought for this or not. If such information then comes into the hands of a newspaper or publication, in the light of a ministerial warning under the Protection of Information Bill, no newspaper will publish such information, whether it be sensitive information or not.

You should deal with the Rabie Commission’s reasoning in this respect.

All right. Let me, however, argue this a bit further. There is authority for this, as the hon. the Minister has pointed out, in the Rabie Commission’s report. The hon. the Minister, however, did not quote that particular paragraph. Paragraph 8.7.1.55 contains that authority. Paragraph 8.7.1.55 reads as follows—

What about paragraph 8.7.1.54?

I have read that paragraph. I am not going to read the whole thing. The hon. member can read paragraph 8.7.1.54, and I will read 8.7.1.55—

“… met ’n doel”. There is the requirement of intent.

Right. We have all read the relevant sections in the Rabie Commission relating to this matter, and in terms of the example quoted by the hon. the Minister in his Second Reading speech, I honestly believe that he himself believes that this type of provision will be used to prevent the publication of the arrest or detention of a person in a war situation, perhaps in regard to a skirmish on the border or where an act of sabotage is being planned. I believe that the intention is to prevent the publication of such an arrest in order not to make public information that will enable other people to escape the attention of the law. The hon. the Minister has mentioned that. If, however, that is the intention, I believe that it is not beyond the capabilities of the drafters of legislation to ensure that the intention of the hon. the Minister is carried through. How ever, the hon. the Minister has had a catchall clause drafted that can be used in any circumstance at all. We and many other South Africans do not feel happy about this because the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act—the Acts that are in existence at the moment—have on many occasions been used to detain people who are not terrorists, and the hon. the Minister will not deny this. That, Sir, is where the problem lies. There are a number of journalists, trade unionists and academics who can testify to the fact that they have been detained and that they never were and never will be terrorists. Some people have been detained merely to cool off, and the hon. the Minister has indicated this across the floor of the House. [Interjections.] The hon. the Minister will remember that when I asked him why a certain young man had been detained, he replied that he had been detained in order to let him cool off. [Interjections.] I want to make the point that the hon. the Minister as well as the other hon. Minister who is in charge of these matters has detained people who are not necessarily purist terrorists. The hon. the Minister bona fide believed them to be a threat to the security of the State in one form or another. Mr. Percy Qoboza, for example, is not a terrorist and neither is he a communist, but he was detained for several months. Who can deny that? He was detained for reasons that the Ministers may well have thought were correct but he was detained all the same. If in those circumstances this clause can be used to prevent publication of the fact that persons have been detained—I refer to those people who are not the sort of terrorists to whom the hon. the Minister referred in his speech—it can also be used to prevent the publication of the detention of students, of editors or anyone else.

May I ask the hon. member a question? Is the hon. member aware of the fact that in terms of the existing section 10(1)(a)bis the names of detainees have to be disclosed to Parliament within a certain period, or is the hon. member deliberately confusing the issue?

I am aware of that but, firstly, it does not apply to all detainees and, secondly, Parliament does not sit all year round. The way in which Parliament operates at the present time is that it is in fact only sitting four and a half months per year, so that for virtually six or seven months in the year Parliament is not in session and therefore does not have notice of these detentions. There is therefore not full and total protection. I am aware of the protection mentioned by the hon. the Minister but I do not consider it to be a full and proper protection. This clause can be used—I am not saying it will—to prevent the publication of the names of students, editors, trade unionists or other people who are radically opposed to the Government but who are not terrorists and perhaps not even communists or members of the ANC or PAC. Not only will the State then have the power to detain without trial, but it will also have the power to keep those detentions secret, certain categories of detainees for a longer and others for a shorter time. I believe that that power cannot be accepted by an Opposition party and I believe that that power is untenable in a democratic country.

I should like to quote two legal authorities on the wording of clause 4. Prof. Mathews, in a book which several people have been quoting in this House, wrote of two serious defects. I want to quote from page 93 of his book.

I did not quote from that thin book which you have in your hand—it was a far bulkier work.

Yes, it is the same book. Several hon. members on the NP side of the House have quoted from it. I quote from page 93—

1. (a) The defect of uncertainty. How is one to determine whether any of the interests of the State require secrecy? No criteria are provided.
2. (b) Interests of the State is a broad concept and almost any kind of information will touch some interest of the State. This means that the prohibition has an astonishing breadth.

That is what Prof. Mathews says.

Yet they say he must be in favour of the Bill.

Prof. Mathews is not the only academic who has voiced an opinion on this. Prof. Van der Vyver of the University of the Witwatersrand believed that it would be impossible for a person to know what the law required of him to conceal. I quote him—

As I said earlier, uncertainty in a law is bad enough, but when this uncertainty is coupled with presumptions in favour of the State, particularly those contained in clause 10, and when the penalties upon conviction are as heavy as those prescribed, then the chances of injustices being perpetrated are very high indeed. The vaguely stated codes on what may or may not be published are horrendous and, I believe, should be opposed.

There are two other matters I should like to mention briefly at this stage. We are not happy with the very broad powers given to the courts to hold trials in camera. Certainly in cases involving intelligence or tactical defence matters the courts should have the power to hold trials in camera. For many reasons they should have this power relating to the nature of the evidence itself and perhaps even to the witnesses who give evidence. However, to grant the power to close the courts when “the other interests of the Republic’’ come into focus, is an open licence to a closed form of justice, and we cannot go along with it.

Finally, the power given to the State President, without any criteria being set and without any checks or balances being built in, to declare any association outside the Republic to be a hostile organization, is one which will cause a great deal of difficulty. Certainly South Africa is confronted by more than a conventional enemy. We live in a time of so-called Governments-in-exile, of organizations fighting the battles of groups and of front institutions acting as pedlars of arms and, therefore, adaptations to laws to meet these modern threats are not out of place. But once again, regrettably, the cure which is devised is far broader and more all-embracing than that which is required to meet the problem.

All the matters that I have mentioned will be debated at greater length in the Committee Stage, but I think that it is correct that at this moment we should move an amendment prior to this Bill being debated any further. I accordingly move the following reasoned amendment—

1. (1) its provisions are so widely drawn as to prevent the disclosure of information which it could be in the public interest to disclose;
2. (2) the intention required to establish the offence of illegally obtaining and/or disclosing certain information relates only to the intent to obtain and/or disclose, while prejudicial intent need not be proved;
3. (3) certain provisions of the Bill are so vaguely phrased as to be incapable of unambiguous interpretation;
4. (4) the State President is granted unfettered power to declare any foreign organization to be hostile; and
5. (5) the penalties are excessive.”.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that the attitude of the official Opposition, as now stated by the hon. member for Sandton, was absolutely predictable because the hon. members of the official Opposition invariably try to project a respectable image, while at the same time emasculating the measure before the House. That is exactly what the hon. member for Sandton has tried to do in this particular case.

Be careful: we shall start on you next!

The hon. member intimated that he and his party accepted the necessity of having legislation to protect certain information. He also referred to the fact that the security situation in which South Africa finds itself has become very complex and sophisticated. At the end of his speech he reiterated the fact that an adaptation of the law to meet the exigencies of the situation would not be out of place.

*Having said all this, and having tried in this way to project a respectable image of his party by indicating that they are also in favour of measures such as the one which is before us at the moment, the hon. member expressed a whole series of misgivings which are quite unfounded. These are all misgivings which are based on erroneous interpretations given to the provisions of the measure by the hon. member. Then the hon. member expects us not to proceed with this measure, which is actually essential, according to his own submission, because of these erroneous interpretations which he gives to its provisions.