Mr. Speaker, as regards the business of the House next week, I want to make the following brief statement. Tomorrow, Thursday, 1 September, this House will divide on the remaining clauses of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill. On Friday, 2 September, the Second Reading Stage of the Referendum’s Bill will be disposed of. I just want to point out that it has been agreed among the parties that the division on the latter Bill will take place before the House adjourns on Friday.

On Monday, 5 September, the Committee Stage of the Referendum’s Bill comes up for discussion and on Tuesday, 6 September, the House will dispose of the Third Reading of the Bill and then proceed to dispose of business as printed on the Order Paper.

On Wednesday, 7 September, the Third Reading of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill will come up for discussion. This will continue until Thursday, 8 September. On Friday, 9 September, the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning will deliver his reply to the Third Reading debate of the Constitution Bill, after which the House will once again proceed to dispose of business as printed on the Order Paper.

Mr. Chairman, before business was suspended yesterday evening, I was saying that clause 31 was specifically the clause confirming the self-determination of the relevant groups in the new dispensation. At that stage the hon. leader of the CP conceded that I was right in saying that he, like all of us, had in the past spelled out the fact that we have not only stood for the self-determination of the Whites in South Africa, but have also wished the other groups in South Africa to have as much of it as we claim for ourselves. At that stage the hon. member for Waterberg was, of course, saying it in a different context, because then it was a matter of one geographic area, but in the meantime the hon. member has, of course, changed his opinion.

To the same extent the hon. member Prof. Olivier, the ex-disciple of apartheid who now finds himself in die PFP, has also professed as much. Let me refer to his Apartheid—a Slogan or a Solution? I think the hon. member would do well to go and read what he himself has written, because then it would be clear to him what I am referring to.

This merely attests once more to the solidarity of those two parties when it comes to this matter, something which also comes to the fore when a vote is taken in this Committee.

Order! The hon. member must deal with clause 31.

Clause 31 specifically points out to us what the mechanisms are to ensure that no action can be taken by any one of the Houses that would detrimentally affect another House when it comes to dealing with legislation on own affairs.

In conclusion let me say that it would be interesting to see how the CP is going to vote on this clause and whether, at this stage, it still advocates the self-determination of not only the Whites, but also the other relevant groups included in this dispensation.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Johannesburg West made a tremendous fuss about the fact that in the Select Committee we voted for this clause, but in the process he did not try to come to grips with the arguments I raised in this connection. Instead he tried to score a cheap political point.

I want to point out to the hon. member that it is also strange that the SABC did not broadcast my hon. friend for Rissik’s reply to this. In his reply he told of how hon. members opposite had changed their standpoint in regard to various clauses.

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to repeat that argument of the hon. member for Rissik.

I am not going to do so, Mr. Chairman. I just want to point out to the Committee how frequently the Government has had a change of heart in regard to the views it adopted in the Select Committee. Now it is suddenly a sin for Opposition parties such as the NRP or the CP to adopt a different standpoint, when the NP has adopted different standpoints on several occasions. I just want to mention a few instances.

May I put a question to you?

No, I have only a short time at my disposal.

It must also be remembered that six Ministers and eight NP members were members of the Select Committee. It is alleged that we are teaming up with the PFP, but let us just look at a few facts. On motions before clause 1 the NP …

Order! I am sorry, but the hon. member cannot discuss that matter now. We are discussing the particulars of clause 31.

Mr. Chairman, I am just reacting to the point made by the hon. member for Johannesburg West yesterday evening.

Order! I concede that the hon. member can react to that, but he cannot advance arguments that are not within the purview of clause 31.

I must point out that the hon. member for Johannesburg West has tried to make a debating point of the fact that in regard to this clause we are adopting another standpoint to that which we adopted in the Select Committee. I want to point out to him that in regard to the question of whether we should call the head of State the President or the State President, the hon. member voted with the PFP against the CP.

Order! The hon. member is very ingeniously circumventing my ruling. The hon. member for Johannesburg West advanced this argument in connection with clause 31 and the hon. member for Brakpan may only address me on that.

Then I just want to tell the hon. member that he should go and have a look, for a moment, at the minutes of the Select Committee to see how frequently the NP voted with the PFP against the CP.

I would also be glad if the hon. member for Johannesburg West would just react, if he can, to the merits of the standpoint I adopted in regard to clause 31, i.e. that this clause means the end of the right to self-determination. A people’s right to self-determination will now depend on the arbitrary power of a State President who acts in consultation with a mixed Cabinet. If he and the hon. member for Kroonstad say that is the right to self-determination, they do not know what they are talking about.

Mr. Chairman, the State President must endorse any amendment of a Bill by a House before it is valid in law. The State President therefore determines whether an amendment to a law will be passed or not. If he does not want to pass the Bill, the work of a House is fruitless, because a decision unanimously adopted by a House does not mean anything without the State President’s endorsement. If the State President, as prescribed in clause 18, does not consult the two chairmen of the other Houses and yet endorses the legislative amendment of a House, the Bill would be passed. It would, however, be invalid until the State President’s endorsement has been obtained.

Clause 31 allegedly deals with Bills involving the own affairs of a specific population group disposed of in its own specific House. This statement is untrue. That House can adopt any decision, but without the State President’s endorsement it would not become law. That amendment adopted by that House cannot come into operation. The White House will consist of 178 members. If the 176 Whites pass a legislative amendment, but the State President does not endorse it, what they have been doing is merely sitting there like a lot of fools, because this means they cannot amend a law on their own, and for that reason there is no such thing as own affairs. It is completely impossible for a Chamber to deal with own affairs without the endorsement of the State President. In another context it also means that their discussions are restricted by the provisions of this clause. They can discuss something as much as they want to, but if the State President does not want to give his signature, they must withdraw it. In other words, it must go back to that House. There will be 176 hon. members there who are to be paid. It is also clear that even freedom of discussion will not be allowed full expression since it will, in fact, be restricted by the requirement in the clause that the State President must first endorse the measure before it becomes law.

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member?

No, Mr. Chairman. If a law cannot be passed by a House, it is not an own affair. How is it then possible that 176 Whites sitting here will not know whether it is an own affair or not? Only the State President will decide whether it is an own affair.

Order! I am sorry, but the hon. member has already advanced that argument. The hon. member must now come forward with a new argument.

Mr. Chairman, I must just elaborate on that by saying that I accept that the whole lot of hon. Ministers and other hon. members sitting here will say that the Whites can decide the matter. But then the State President comes along and says: “No, I will not sign the amendment. You did not even know what an own affair of the Whites was. I shall decide for you whether it is an own affair or not.” If he does not sign, the affair becomes a general affair, because if it is not an own affair, it can only be a general affair.

There are efforts to make out a case for the fact that there are indeed own affairs. I have proved the contrary to be true.

Order! I am now asking the hon. member for the last time to come to light with new and relevant arguments. The issue here is not own affairs. The issue is the Bills on own affairs of a population group, and I am not going to allow the hon. member to conduct any further discussion on own affairs.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask for your guidance in this connection? In order to discuss the State President’s endorsement of a legal amendment, to the legislation of which House must I say that he attaches the endorsement? Is it an own House or an own affair? How must I explain that the White House has no legal power.

Order! the hon. member must simply abide by my ruling and discuss clause 31. Then we shall have no difficulty.

Mr. Chairman, I am trying to abide by your ruling, but if I cannot refer to the endorsement attaching to own affairs, it makes it impossible for me to conduct a discussion and deal with my argument.

Order!

How else must I debate the matter?

Order! I have no objection to the hon. member referring to an own affair, but the hon. member is discussing own affairs, and that I cannot permit.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to make it clear to you that hon. members allege that the CP is saying that the State President, in acting in this case, will be putting the Coloureds and Indians in an apartheid cage.

Order! The hon. member please resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I want to address you on this.

Order! The hon. member must resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I am asking whether I can address you?

Order! The hon. member must resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to resume my seat. I prefer to leave.

Then the hon. member must withdraw from the Chamber for the remainder of the day’s sitting for disregarding the authority of the Chair.

Yes, I shall do so.

Whereupon the hon. member withdrew.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the hon. member for Langlaagte owes the House an apology.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to react to what the hon. member Prof. Olivier said about this clause yesterday evening. The hon. member dealt with the entrenchment of apartheid, with apartheid supposedly being endorsed by this clause.

I contend that this is not quite accurate. This clause is a prolongation of the mandate the NP obtained in the 1981 election. You will remember, Sir, that in 1981 the NP went to the electorate with a manifesto in which we very expressly spelled out for the voters the way in which we intended to amend the constitution. As a result this clause makes provision for the political rights of the Coloureds and the Indians, and at the same time we are very clearly spelling out how those rights will be exercised in their own respective houses. We are also making provision for each of the three groups to retain its right to self-determination in regard to matters that are individual to each group. Wherever democracy has failed, throughout the annals of history, this has been caused by the policy of that hon. member, i.e. the “one man, one vote” policy.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is what the hon. member is saying within the purview of this clause?

Order! I am listening to what the hon. member is saying and I shall call him to order if necessary.

This clause offers a solution to this problem. It forces the President, in agreement with the Ministers’ Councils, to ensure the participation of the respective population groups in legislation on own affairs. Where matter involving the Indian community are, for example, exclusively applicable to them, they are free to go and consult the President. The President will then discuss it with the respective chairmen, and subsequently that matter comes before the relevant House in the form of legislation. That is self-determination for the Indian group, for the White group and for the Coloured group, as the case may be. The hon. member for Brakpan refuses to see this. Instead he goes from platform to platform alleging that the NP is busy depriving the Whites of their right to self-determination.

Nor is the clause creating extraordinary powers, as the hon. member Prof. Olivier alleges. On the contrary, this clause is giving substance to the NP’s promise to the people, i.e. that we want to link up the position of State President and Prime Minister, thus devising better ways for the administration of our country than that afforded by a system of one man, one vote. The clause entrenches the rights of the respective population groups. Contrast with this those democracies in Africa that have been brought down because the authorities ignored minority groups. It led to chaos.

It is interesting how the PFP has, since we began with this debate, tried to test their policy throughout the country. They went to the Bushveld, to the Lowveld, to the Winterveld and to the Suurveld …

Order! the hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, the fact that they have been rejected indicates that the provisions in this clause are specifically what the people have accepted. Therefore those hon. members must also pay heed to what is contained in this clause. It does, after all, form part of the new constitution.

The Official Opposition is now, for the first time, advocating a constitutional policy which they concede will, the fact, result in Black majority rule.

Order! I extend a friendly request to the hon. member please to confine himself to the content of clause 31. If he does not heed my request, I shall have to order him to resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I accept your ruling.

Well, sit down then! [Interjections.]

Order!

From experience we realize that if we did not carry out the relevant clause to the letter, we would not adequately be able to deal with the own affairs of each separate population group. That is also why the clause is formulated in its present terms. Last but not least, I should like to add that I am glad to be able to tell the hon. the Minister that the mandate from the voters of Boksburg is in complete accord with the provisions of the clause under discussion. Therefore we are also grateful for the fact that the hon. the Minister has worded the clause as he has done, and that we shall be implementing it as such.

Mr. Chairman, clause 31 relates to the own affairs of a population group. In terms of the clause the own affairs of the population group concerned are dealt with by the specific House concerned. This means that the agendas of the respective Houses would be made up of own affairs. It means that the business on the Order paper of each separate House would reflect the own affairs of the relevant House. The question now is what is going to appear on the Order Paper of the respective Houses. The matters that will appear on the Order Paper of the respective Houses will relate to the self-determination of the respective population groups.

Our standpoint is that this clause is completely meaningless. It is meaningless because no such thing as own affairs exists. Consequently no business can appear on the Order Paper of each individual House. That is why we are saying that this clause is part of the NP’s political trickery in connection with self-determination; self-determination that is being dealt a death-blow by this legislation, with this Bill as the funeral notice. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I really believe hon. members of the CP are engaged in misrepresentations here. We only have to note the statement that the hon. member for Jeppe has just made. Surely that was an unequivocal attempt by the CP to broadcast a message to the world which cannot but give rise to all kinds of rumours and groundless fears outside this House.

My message is a message of truth. [Interjections.]

With regard to the relevant clause, we have again witnessed a typical example of such CP tactics. Yesterday evening this was clearly illustrated. This afternoon the hon. member for Brakpan reacted to this very vehemently, apparently because he got hurt.

It was because the SABC had treated us so unfairly. [Interjections.]

Yes, the SABC only broadcasts NP propaganda.

His Master’s Voice. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I cannot accept any responsibility for what the SABC broadcasts. [Interjections.]

Order! A debate on the SABC does not in any way fall in within the purview of clausa 31.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Brakpan provoked me. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the argument is actually about what the hon. member for Jeppe said in regard to the clause under discussion, and of course about what the hon. member for Brakpan said about this clause yesterday evening. This confirms what I said at the very beginning of my speech.

[Inaudible.]

the hon. member for Rissik’s argument is, of course, also relevant here. My contention was that the relevant legislation gave rise to the establishment of the CP. I know that I may not argue that point now. I do, however, think it is an interesting point to react to at Third Reading.

All these statements by hon. members of the CP can, I believe, bring one to only one conclusion, and that is that in the near future the CP is going to experience serious problems in its efforts to sell its stories to the general electorate. [Interjections.] That is, of course, because the members of the CP went and told the world, by way of their gossiping, what they thought would be contained in the Bill. Now, however, the Bill itself is giving the lie to their gossip. That is why the CP is going to encounter set-backs in the future.

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I am now confining myself to clause 31. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Brakpan alleges that I cannot use the argument that he is not allowed to have to change of heart about the respective clause in the period between the Select Committee and this Committee. Then he quotes the example of a standpoint we are supposed to have adopted about the title given to the position of State President, about which we are supposed to have said in this Committee …

In 5 to 10 other places too.

Order! I have only allowed the hon. member for Brakpan to mention it, not to discuss it, and I am not going to allow the hon. member for Johannesburg West to discuss it either.

I shall not take it any further, Sir.

I want to come back to the argument on clause 31. I want to say that the hon. member for Brakpan is wrong in his statement that because we did so there, they may also do so here. The question that is involved is what, according to their argument, the content of clause 31 is. This goes hand in hand with what the hon. members for Brakpan and Rissik said yesterday evening about the value they attach to clause 31, read in conjunction with clause 16. Then there is only one conclusion one can draw, and that is that for them clause 31 is one of the fundamental clauses in the Constitution Bill. The question that now arises is: If that is something one regards so seriously, how is it possible to adopt one standpoint about it in the Select Committee and another standpoint here?

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member?

No, Sir, because the hon. member did not want to answer my question on this point either. It is, therefore, a matter of the value the hon. member for Brakpan attaches to this clause.

What about Ministers that can sit in this House?

The hon. member says that he regards this, in conjunction with clause 16, as one of the most important clauses. One day he says this and the next day he says that.

It is clear to me that the hon. members for Brakpan and Rissik have, in some way or other, been pressured into changing their standpoints. Perhaps they have realized that the standpoint they adopted in the Select Committee would not fit in with the story they wanted to tell the outside world. That is why they did the about-face. They did so that they could continue with their gossip concerning clause 31. Because it suited them from that point of view, they have now reversed their standpoint.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry if I am interrupting the CP war, but I think it is necessary for me just to put the viewpoint of the NRP on record. One can argue, justifiably, that the power accorded here for the President to certify a matter as being within the purview of an own affair, or not, can be criticized. However, if one is to have own affairs, i.e. control by a group over its own affairs, there must be a mechanism for administering it. As we are in favour of groups controlling and dealing with their own intimate affairs, we have looked at this mechanism and, with all its possible shortfalls and imperfection, we see it as necessary to prevent continuous conflict in that one House can pass amendments in conflict with the principle of a general measure. We shall therefore support this clause as it stands as part of the machinery for groups to control their own affairs.

Mr. Chairman, it is very interesting that the official Opposition and the CP find themselves able to join together in rejecting this clause. I immediately concede that their reasons for rejecting it differ.

As widely separated as heaven and earth.

I do not think we should use the word “heaven” here. I think we should choose another term, because that does not fit in here. It does prove one thing, however, and that is that if one goes far enough to the left, one lands up with the CP, whilst if one moves far enough to the right, one lands up with the PFP.

You people are nowhere.

Then one gets that interesting, unholy wedlock between opposing factions. That also explains how it is possible for the CP to enter into a relationship with the HNP. If one moves a little further, one also gets the AWB into the bargain. [Interjections.] By their conduct here, hon. members of the two Opposition parties I have just been speaking about contribute to the confusion surrounding the question that has to be answered on 2 November. That is very interesting indeed. I think that at some stage or other we shall nevertheless have to ask the real “Dr. No” to stand up.

That fits in beautifully with clause 31!

It does indeed fit in with clause 31. [Interjections.]

Order! I just want to point out to hon. members that hon. members on both sides of the House participated in a reasonable amount of political discussion on this clause. The hon. the Minister is merely reacting to those arguments. The hon. the Minister may therefore proceed.

Tell us about Harry Oppenheimer and others.

The hon. member for Brakpan can put his question at Third Reading. Then it will be in order. I could put many questions to him, but I would rather spare him the ordeal, because he already has enough troubles as it is.

I now come to the hon. member Prof. Olivier. He made a very important statement about his party’s standpoint in saying that this clause is the ultimate in the entrenchment of apartheid. The hon. member for Brakpan—and other hon. members in his party have followed in his footsteps—says the clause makes a farce of own affairs or self-determination in regard to own affairs. This is a typical example of how the subjective standpoint of hon. members in the official Opposition and in the CP influences their analysis of the Bill. Because the hon. member Prof. Olivier argues on the basis of a specific standpoint, he sees in the Bill the ultimate entrenchment of separate development. And he was a professor! The other professors advising the CP see, in the same wording of the self-same clause, the destruction of self-determination. My only argument is that the clause does not lend itself to that conclusion.

“You want it, we have it.”

No one has ever credited the hon. member for Kuruman with having a quick grasp of things. He need not prove it all over again. The fact of the matter is that the clause cannot be open to both conclusions. I can understand, however, why such a set of circumstances could arise. The hon. member’s standpoints are not grounded in or motivated by what is contained in the clause, but rather in the fact that they must seek self-justification for the opposition to the Bill. In the debate they must find self-justification for the fact that they are advising people to vote against the Bill and the clause. That explains the spectacle we have been witnessing today in regard to the formulation of the views of the official Opposition and the CP. I am going to prove it.

The hon. member for Brakpan will concede that own affairs are not defined in this specific clause. This clause prescribes how the legislative process in regard to own affairs will take place. It does not, however, describe the content. So to argue that this clause turns own affairs into a farce is obviously a false and malicious conclusion. The sole intention is to lend an appearance of authenticity to the statement of the hon. member for Jeppe that this is a piece of NP political deception. The hon. member for Brakpan will concede as much. The first reason why I say that his statement is in no way borne out by the clause is because the description of own affairs is not dealt with in clause 31 and, secondly, because own affairs are dealt with in clause 14. So to test his statement about whether own affairs have been turned into a farce, we must not look at this clause, but rather at clause 14.

I now want to tell the hon. member what he is actually saying when he says own affairs are being turned into a farce. What is the test to determine whether matters are the own affairs of a specific population group? I am now arguing about the hon. member’s statement yesterday evening. [Interjections.]

We have finished debating clause 14.

Yes, that is quite correct. It is interesting to hear the hon. member for Barberton say that, because he has apparently understood this. Those in his party who spoke on clause 31, however, apparently did not understand it. They did not understand it, and I want to suggest that if there is someone who needs advice in regard to the interpretation of the clauses, the hon. member for Barberton need only lean forward and whisper into the ear of the man sitting in front of him. There is, however, one problem, and I want to concede as much. I think the hon. member for Barberton is better qualified to speak about the clauses in this Bill than the professional CP adviser. He makes a much better job of it and I do, in any event, want to compliment him in this specific connection. [Interjections.] What is a farce? Matters that intimately concern one are a farce! [Interjections.]

Is the hon. the Minister discussing clause 16 now?

No, I am discussing clause 14 now.

Clause 14 is subject to the provisions of clause 16.

I am coming to clause 16. The hon. member for Jeppe comes along and says matters affecting the culture of people, are a farce. He says that matters affecting the customs and traditions of people are a farce. Clause 31 provides the procedures and mechanisms for having legislation on these matters passed in the various Houses, but the hon. member for Jeppe says this is a farce. I hope the hon. member is prepared to say in public what he has said here. I hope he is prepared to go and say what he regards to be the destruction of self-determination. The hon. member must stand up and tell the people. [Interjections.]

It is in Hansard. [Interjections.]

He must not come along with misrepresentations. He must tell the truth.

Sir, I have now finished arguing with the hon. member and will therefore not contravene your ruling in this specific connection.

Clause 16 has to do with answering the question about what own affairs are. If those hon. members vote against this clause, they are basically voting for something else, i.e. general affairs. [Interjections.] There is no other conclusion one can draw. A certificate is necessary for Bills involving own affairs, and if those hon. members vote against this clause, they are voting against self-determination. Then they will be voting for the fact that there must be only general affairs. They will therefore be voting solely for co-responsibility, and not for self-determination, because that is the connotation of the hon. member for Jeppe’s arguments and he cannot get away from that.

In the Select Committee we told each other that we would not adopt a rigid standpoint so that people would not be reproached for putting forward different arguments in this Committee. Here there is something else involved. The hon. member is now arguing that the clause, as worded at present, will destroy self-determination. [Interjections.] The hon. member is indicating that this is so. Then surely that was also the case in the Select Committee, not so? It could not have become destructive from that point in time to this. That is the only point I want to make. It could not have become destructive from that point in time to this. That is the point the hon. member for Johannesburg West wanted to make on the basis of the content of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister to give us his argument about the change in the Government’s decision about the representation of Ministers in the House of Assembly and in the various other Houses? Why has he changed his mind on that score?

The answer to that is a very simple one, and I shall gladly furnish the hon. member with that answer. The Government’s standpoint was firstly that it did not accept the recommendation of the President’s Council to the effect that Ministers should not be brought in from outside Parliament. The Government’s standpoint was specifically that they should be drawn from parliamentary ranks. The Government, however, did concede that there should be the possibility of bringing people in from outside from time to time.

But how seriously did you discuss the point?

I did discuss it seriously, but the hon. member must now give me an opportunity to reply to his question. He could do me the courtesy of listening to me. Does the hon. member not want to listen to me?

I gladly listen to you.

As has been the case throughout, to each clause the hon. members attach a malicious interpretation, that is also what they have done to this specific one. Unswervingly in accord with the principle that we have an executive authority that is bound to Parliament, I accepted that this could be allowed to apply overall. That is the reply to the hon. member’s question, and I think it is a reasonable reply.

Let us now weigh up my answer to the hon. member’s question about the relevant clause and the hon. member’s standpoint on this clause. Here it is no longer a matter of the principle. The hon. member adopted the standpoint that this clause represents a mechanism for dealing with the legislative processes involved in own affairs. Surely that is the principle embodied here. The hon. member identified himself with the procedure embodied here. Now the hon. member is not proposing a procedure that accords with the principle and is, in his judgement, a better method of achieving the goal. The hon. member is not projecting the clause on the basis of the procedural provisions embodied in it; he is rejecting it on the ground of the principles. Surely the hon. member cannot get away with that.

I should simply like to deal, at one and the same time, with the contradictions, the two divergent statements of the hon. member Prof. Olivier on behalf of his party and the hon. member for Brakpan on behalf of his party, because both their standpoints are equally devoid of merit. First I come to the hon. member for Jeppe. He states that what appears on the Order Papers in the various Houses will be matters affecting the own affairs of these specific groups. That is not, however, quite correct; it is only half the truth. In terms of clause 15, matters which are not own affairs are surely general affairs. General affairs are surely also included on the Order Papers of the respective Houses. This is plainly in accordance with the standpoint the hon. member for Brakpan himself advocated, i.e. firstly the existence of own affairs and, secondly, the legislative authority of an institution that would pass legislation involving own affairs. The hon. member accepted that, did he not?

Without any other controlling instrument.

That is not true. In two respects the hon. member is not correct. Firstly the House of Assembly was to have decided on it in terms of the 1979 legislation. That was therefore another body. The statement in connection with another body is therefore not true.

The White House of Assembly.

But what about the Coloureds. Surely we are now talking about the own affairs of all the population groups. It is also untrue in one other respect, i.e. because the Council of Cabinets was also to have decided about what were own affairs for the other two population groups. So there is a second controlling instrument. It is no use the hon. member shaking his head. I am not going to repeat the whole history now …

There would be no use in doing so, because we shall not convince each other.

The hon. member must not ask me to convince him. He must just look straight in front of him and diagonally to the right. I did not adopt any standpoint about the 1979 legislation in Hansard, and the hon. member knows it. He must therefore not start an argument with me. If he wants to start an argument, he must do so with other people.

The hon. member for Brakpan also accepted the fact that in the State as such, when it comes to the own affairs of the three population groups about which we are arguing here, there would also be certain matters of joint interest. Is that not so? The clause also has to do with general affairs. Surely the hon. member accepted the fact that there would be co-responsibility in regard to general affairs. If the hon. members says that legislation making provision for own affairs and decisions about such own affairs, and making provision for general affairs and the acceptance of co-responsibility for such general affairs, was the clause of his no longer sitting on this side of the House, let me say that it is untrue. If the hon. member argues, as he did yesterday, that the reason why they are no longer sitting on this side of the House relates to the specific method defined in clause 31 for dealing with Bills, let me say that that is not true either, because the fact of the matter is that this legislation was drawn up in this particular form after those hon. members had left the NP. So in the course of a few minutes the hon. member for Brakpan therefore made four factually incorrect statements. He is not so ignorant as not to realize the implications of what he said.

I now want to reply to what the hon. member Prof. Olivier said. I am not going to apologize in the least for the fact that the self-determination of the various population groups in regard to matters affecting their lives is a fundamental or cardinal point of departure of this Government. I do not apologize to the hon. member for repeating that this is the only method whereby individual rights can be upheld in this country if we want to do so within the group context. In contrast to that, it was his argument that the intention was to discriminate against people, and my reply to that is that if we were to obtain a “yes” vote in the referendum, this would be the first time in the country’s history that other groups would obtain the right to participate at parliamentary level, and the hon. member knows it. When I speak of self-determination in regard to own affairs, and the mechanisms to ensure that decision-making can take place, I am not speaking in the absolutistic sense in which the hon. member for Brakpan speaks about that aspect. I am speaking of it in the same terms in which he previously spoke about it, i.e. that there are identifiable areas between what are own affairs, in regard to which there can be self-determination, and what are general affairs in regard to which there has to be co-responsibility. Let me tell the hon. member for Brakpan once again that he should do himself a favour. He should get up and say that he no longer stands by that.

We disagree about what co-responsibility means.

No, we do not disagree. [Interjections.] We disagree about whether it exists at all.

That is nonsense.

All I have thus far been hearing from the hon. member for Waterberg have been meaningless noises, as usual. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Waterberg …

It is no use sneering.

I have not even started yet. About the discussions surrounding these clauses the hon. member for Waterberg …

He is like a red rag to a bull, eh?

No, he is not a red rag; he is just a rag, and not even a wet rag. The hon. member for Waterberg is provoking me. The hon. member is the leader of a party.

Who is provoking whom?

The hon. member for Waterberg is the leader of a party, and my request to him now is: If this clause is as fundamental as the hon. members of the CP say it is, why did he not speak about this too? He did not speak about this, nor about clause 14, dealing with own affairs. Nor did the hon. member speak about…

You do not give him a chance to speak.

Your leader did not speak either …

The hon. member for Waterberg should rather keep quiet, because each time he opens his mouth, he puts his foot in deeper. The hon. the Prime Minister is not in charge of this legislation. I am. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition—I want to give him credit for that—was prepared to put his standpoint, even though I do not agree with that standpoint.

The Prime Minister is going to participate during the Third Reading debate.

Yes. I also want to ask the hon. member Prof. Olivier whether he agrees with me that this Bill does—as defective and inadequate as he argues it is—give the Coloureds the right to take decisions about own affairs. Does he agree with that? In regard to own affairs the Coloureds are without a vote. We can reproach one another about the reason why this is so, but this does not detract from the fact that this is so. The hon. member also knows that as far as the Indian population is concerned, decision-making in regard to own affairs is defective and that this provision is an improvement on that situation.

Are you going to hold referendum’s to obtain their approval?

Whether they want to hold referendum’s, or apply some other kind of test, I shall be discussing with their leaders, not with the hon. member for Bryanston.

Order! In future hon. members must confine themselves to the particulars of clause 31. I realize that the hon. the Minister must react to questions that have been put, but I would be glad if he could confine himself as much as possible to the clause itself.

As you say, Sir, I am reacting to the statements made here. For example: Does the hon. member Prof. Olivier agree that the “unacceptable” policy of which he accuses this side of the House is, for the first time, giving other groups an opportunity to decide about their own affairs?

I shall be replying to that at Third Reading.

Good. Both the PFP and the CP further allege that the respective Houses would only be rubber stamps for the State President.

Now there will be three stamps.

Sir, if we could only get an additional stamp for the hon. member for Bryanston, then at least he would also have a name. Sir, this allegation by the two opposition parties is a misconception of the State President’s function in this connection. In clause 33 it is stated that the State President shall only decide whether a Bill does, in fact, deal with own affairs or whether it deals with general affairs. The State President does not, after all, personally have legislative powers that will make it necessary for the Houses to serve merely as rubber stamps.

Nor was that my contention.

Surely I am agreeing with the hon. member?

Sir, what I am saying is that it is totally unrealistic for the PFP and the CP, as they have indicated, to be voting against this clause. It is totally unrealistic not to have any mechanism to prevent one group, in the name of group autonomy, passing legislation in its House in connection with matters affecting other groups. In contrast with the hon. member for Brakpan’s argument, this clause is specifically intended to give each House the power to deal with its own affairs in terms of the mechanism prescribed here.

In conclusion, Sir: The State President has no power to express himself on the merits of legislation, as has been alleged here. As long as legislation falls within the jurisdiction of a House, that House will have the final say about the relevant matter.

Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that the hon. the Minister is very ungrateful, I am going to make another effort to be of assistance to the Government. [Interjections.] Consequently I move—

On this occasion I should like to refer to the problem that arises when matters are discussed separately by the three Houses. I also wish to point out that it is essential that there should indeed be an opportunity for the discussion of general affairs, affairs relating to the interests of all the population groups. An opportunity must be provided for those matters to be discussed jointly. My recommendation is that that opportunity should be created by way of joint sittings of all three Houses of Parliament, where general affairs may be discussed because they are of importance to all three of the groups.

If that opportunity does not exist, if general affairs cannot be discussed jointly, the idea of power-sharing, an idea which the Government has, after all, accepted, is frustrated. This also frustrates the principle and system of democracy. Moreover, it prevents the possibility of meaningful debating joint deliberation and decision-making. The hon. the Minister ought to agree with me when I say that for the democratic system to work effectively, it is essential for the elected representatives of the various political components of the society to be afforded the opportunity to convene in order to achieve certain objectives.

They ought to be able to meet to discuss national affairs, to put forward and consider competing standpoints, investigate and weigh facts, to exchange ideas with one another and, as a result of this process, to promote mutual understanding and co-operation. In this way there could be a striving for consensus, and decisions could be taken in connection with the specific national affairs being debated. This being the aim of democracy, it cannot be achieved in a situation in which the components debate them in watertight, separate compartments. I believe that the hon. the Minister will agree with me in this regard. This can only be achieved when the representatives are able to convene in one and the same assembly-hall and discuss these matters with one another.

I should like to put forward an example by way of illustration. The example I wish to use, is the following. The various White political groups meet in this House to conduct a debate on national affairs. In terms of the structure proposed in the Bill under discussion, however, it could happen that the NP meets in one place, while the CP holds its own separate meeting elsewhere, as will the NRP and the PFP. Legislation would then be submitted in the various political Chambers, and if consensus were not achieved in reaching agreement, if a deadlock were reached as far as those separate Chambers were concerned, it would be referred to another Chamber, a Chamber of non-elected members, in order to get a final answer as to which of those proposals are acceptable or not. Obviously this is laughable and counter-productive. It would promote division, conflict, confrontation and rebellion if that system were to be adopted.

That is a stupid and ridiculous comparison.

The hon. member says it is ridiculous. It is ridiculous. I wholeheartedly agree with that clever hon. member. It would be a ridiculous system, an absolutely laughable system. That is the very system that the Government is putting before South Africa by way of this constitution, namely that the various components meet separately and that there is no opportunity for them to meet to discuss these matters.

Why do you not pass a motion on that?

Let me give another example. It may be that there exist in South Africa among the Coloureds, the Indians and the Whites, groups with the same political philosophies. Say for example there are large groups that pursue democracy, that support the idea of free enter-prize, that are anti-communist and patriotic towards South Africa. Say all the Indian representatives, all the Coloured representatives and 49% of the PFP supporters in the White House feel this way. In terms of this system those people cannot combine to pursue that philosophy in South Africa as a philosophy of the South African nation.

In view of this, and in order to help the Government overcome this very weak and unfortunate aspect of their constitution, I propose that the clause printed in my name on the Order Paper be adopted by this House. It would be a great improvement. If the hon. the Minister is not prepared to accept this reasonable amendment of mine, it means only one thing and that is that the Government is not prepared to implement democracy in practice in South Africa and that it will only be satisfied with continued White supremacy. Therefore the rejection of this amendment means that the Government wants to implement continued White supremacy in this new system. In that case it is unacceptable to us.

Mr. Chairman, I just briefly want to state the standpoint of the CP in regard to the proposed new clause. It deals with joint sittings of the three Houses with regard to Bills of general importance. We are opposed in principle to joint sittings in a joint Parliament. I just want to say to the hon. member for Bryanston that he should not be so hasty. He should not push the NP too far. They are on the way there. In point of fact the joint committees in which the Bills in question will be discussed and fully debated, constitute in an embryonic form the future joint Parliament that will meet in a joint sitting. Therefore the hon. member for Bryanston is only a few years ahead of the NP. He must not become impatient. Nor must he be overhasty.

Sir, we are unable to vote for this clause.

Mr. Chairman, once again we have here an eloquent example of the co-operation on that side of the House. Both of those Opposition parties are opposed …

But I have just said that we are not going to vote for the proposed clause.

Oh, then I misunderstood the hon. member.

In any event, I want to deal with the hon. member for Bryanston. He advanced an argument here in which he in fact tried to compare apples to pears. In his customary clown-like fashion he tried to dismiss a very important matter by saying that he was effecting an amendment to the legislation by way of his amendment to insert a new clause. On analysing the basis of the new clause one finds that in fact it unmasks that party’s standpoint, because what they are asking for here are in fact joint sittings in which legislation is also to be voted on. This simply brings us back to the old trick of those hon. members, the trick of attempting, as a minority group in this House, to combine with the majority groups in the other Houses to cause their minority standpoint to prevail. In fact, that is the purpose of the hon. member’s standpoint. Nor is his idea a new one, because it has already been put forward in the Select Committee by the hon. member for Sea Point. It was put to this House later, too, by way of instruction. There are other such amendments to the same effect. The hon. member for Sea Point is moving the same amendment on the clause immediately following this one. Moreover, the same amendment is being moved in respect of clause 33. That is by no means an exhaustive list. Therefore, this is a constant refrain from that party to try to have joint sittings in which it will be possible to impose their will, by majority decision, on the majority standpoint of the House of Assembly.

The mechanism proposed by the hon. member is in fact, in contrast to what he said, a mechanism that will increase conflict dramatically. Apparently those hon. members are not concerned about the heightening of the conflict in this situation. It is also in total conflict with the handling of the whole approach to this constitutional reform in the sense that the hon. member proposes a one man, one vote situation, a majority vote. That is very clear from his interpretation of democracy. In contrast, it is the view of this side of the House that these problems must be dealt with on a group basis. By moving this new clause that party specifically wishes to deny a group the right to discuss, protect and deal with its own affairs.

Last night, with reference to those hon. members, the hon. member for Durban Point quite rightly said: “They want to deny any group the right to protect its own affairs.” That is what the new clause of the hon. member for Bryanston is really all about. The concept of joint sittings is only one of the methods of dealing with the situation. One could also think of other methods. One could allow the President to take those decisions or, as hon. members have themselves said previously, there could be a constitutional court to give rulings in this regard. However, this side of the House has decided that that will not be the desired solution, but that the mechanism whereby to deal with conflict must be based on a different method of arbitration.

Mr. Chairman, the philosophical principles on which this new dispensation is based are, on the one hand, that there will be joint responsibility among the three groups represented in Parliament, viz. the Whites, Coloureds and Indians, and on the other hand, that there will be so-called self-determination as regards own affairs, exercised by the three groups in the three separate Houses. Even if one were to accept that division—the standpoint adopted by my party is that we cannot accept the division—then that does not necessarily mean—I grant the hon. member for Uitenhage that—that as far as general affairs are concerned, the three Houses still need to function separately. Indeed, there can be separate Houses—and that, I take it, is the fundamental principle of the Government, if one accepts the principle—which then deal with own affairs, whereas the groups are able to deliberate jointly on general affairs. In this regard I wish to refer to the situation in Belgium. As far as I know, due to the cultural differences between the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking people in Belgium, these two groups meet separately when discussing the specific cultural interests of the two separate groups. As regards all the other affairs, however, the two groups meet jointly as the Belgian Parliament. Therefore we already know that in terms of the practical system as it functions there, it is possible to have a division between two groups on the basis of a justified division of interests—concerning cultural matters—but that on matters of common interest they meet jointly. Therefore that principle is not a new one and it is therefore being applied.

I listened attentively to the hon. member for Uitenhage when he was explaining why he rejected the idea of a joint meeting on general affairs, to use the terminology of the amendment. The only objection he mentioned, if I understood him correctly, was that this was a method whereby the official Opposition sought to use this motion to combine forces with the members of the other two Houses at such a joint meeting in order to obtain a majority in such a joint sitting. [Interjections.] That is what we understood him to say. [Interjections.]

Let us analyse this objection advanced by the hon. member. In the first place, I want to say that Bills concerning general affairs come from the Cabinet. The Cabinet initiates legislation on general affairs. Therefore I must take it that on the basis of the principle we are discussing here—that of collective Cabinet responsibility—those Ministers who come from the other Houses, and who are members of the Cabinet, would certainly have given their support to that legislation on general affairs when the Cabinet sent that legislation to the three Houses. Therefore the assumption does, after all, exist that those Ministers of the three Houses will indeed be capable of taking their parties, or the majority of their parties, with them in the discussion of that legislation. Therefore, how the hon. member for Uitenhage can assume that the basic point of departure that will arise from this is the possibility of the Opposition in this House—whoever that may be—teaming up with the members of the other two Houses leaves me dumbfounded, because it indicates to me that he does not understand how the system is going to work as far as general affairs are concerned.

What does the hon. member for Uitenhage imply by saying that? When he says these things I assume that ne is speaking about this opposition against the governing party; if so, he is assuming that the standpoint of this Opposition party will be so acceptable to the members of the other two Houses that they will necessarily agree with this Opposition. That means that he is moving a motion of no-confidence in those people; in other words, a motion of no-confidence in the policy of his party towards those people. I have already asked on what grounds he could assume, in terms of the provisions of the Bill, if that policy were acceptable to those people, that those people would necessarily agree with the opposition. [Interjections.]

What about the Standing Committees?

Yes, then we come to the Standing Committees, and in that regard there is already a problem because it has already been intimated that the opposition will be given representation in those Standing Committees. Therefore I say that if that hon. member makes that assumption, he is casting a reflection not on the opposition, but on his view of the probity and points of departure of the other people and of his party as well. I cannot understand that. I cannot understand how a thinking person who, with regard to these matters, comes and talks about consensus, about goodwill, about a new dispensation and reform, can make that assumption, viz. that it will necessarily mean that the members of those Houses will only combine with the Opposition. That is an argument I am honestly unable to understand. It is tantamount to a motion of no-confidence in the Government itself to advance that argument.

In conclusion I wish to advance an additional argument. We know that the new system is going to be time-consuming. It is going to be time-consuming for the simple reason that the three Houses have to sit separately on so-called own affairs. Why should we drag out and complicate parliamentary procedure to a still greater extent by having three Houses for general affairs as well? Every Bill concerning general affairs has to be submitted to each of the three Houses. Even if it goes to Standing Committees it must, in any event, come back to each of the three Houses for the Committee Stage and Third Reading or whatever. It will undoubtedly—and the hon. member for Uitenhage will concede this point if he can forget about his prejudice for a moment and think purely in terms of the practical functioning of the system—facilitate parliamentary procedure tremendously if Bills of general interest could be submitted to only one body; in other words, to the three Houses sitting jointly as Parliament.

I want to associate myself with the amendment of the hon. member for Bryanston.

Mr. Chairman, during the speech by the hon. member for Uitenhage we once again had confirmation of the standpoint we have adopted in recent times, and that is that the governing party does not listen when debate is being conducted. A standpoint is easily adopted. The hon. member for Brakpan stood up after the hon. member for Bryanston and stated his standpoint. The hon. member for Brakpan stated very dearly in the Committee …

He put it badly.

The hon. member for Smithfield is very worried, because he knows what is going on in his constituency. If it had been my constituency I should have been equally worried.

He is lying to the people there.

The hon. member and I can appear together on a platform there.

He lies to them there every time.

It is amazing. My hon. colleague stands up …

Why do you not object when I say that he lies to them there?

My hon. colleague stated very clearly in the Committee that we differed with the standpoint adopted by the hon. member for Bryanston; we were opposed to it. However the hon. member for Uitenhage stated that this was another example of how the PFP and the CP agreed about matters. The hon. member has not been here long, and I point out to him that if one wants to make a contribution here one should at least listen to what is said in the debate.

Oh please, do not advance such weak arguments.

What is interesting about the proposed new clause is that you, Sir, ruled that it was in order. The new clause moved by the hon. member for Bryanston is not, therefore, in conflict with the principle of the Bill. This is a very interesting point.

The hon. member for Uitenhage also did not argue that he was opposed to the principle underlying the proposed clause. I think that the hon. member will have to rise again and give us another reason as to why he is opposed to the proposed clause.

He did not have a written speech.

Yes, that is so.

The Constitution Bill as introduced by the Government contains many concealed aspects, because what the hon. member for Bryanston is proposing here is done at other places. The Select Committees that are being established are, in any event, mixed, integrated and underground. They are out of the public eye. The public does not know a great deal about this kind of thing. The one place where integration will occur is right at the bottom and the other place is right at the top, and here, too, it will not be easy for the public to see what is going on. Therefore, what the public is being led to believe is that the three Houses are separate; but what is not being said is that they are being integrated underground and that they are mixed, and that this is also the case right at the top. The hon. member for Bryanston must not be hasty. If the Government carries on along this road of integration, then eventually there will only be one House, and the three Houses will disappear. In the debate yesterday the hon. Minister said that he and I differed fundamentally with one another about this matter. He is right.

When did you find that out?

The hon. the Minister is now asking an interesting question. I want to tell him when I really found it out. It was in the caucus last year when the hon. the Minister advocated mixed government and power sharing. Then I really heard it for the first time, although I had known that certain people had such tendencies.

You knew that it was implicit in the provisions.

I want to conclude by saying that the hon. the Minister will have to spell out clearly to us at some stage, in this debate or in the future, what his actual view of the future is with regard to these three Houses of Parliament. I predict that the ultimate objective is that the walls between the three Houses will disappear and that eventually there will only be one Parliament with one House.

Mr. Chairman, I concede that that argument is irrelevant, but what is relevant is the confession of the hon. member for Rissik. It is of great importance that the hon. member for Rissik has, for the first time, said that when he was the chairman of my group I spoke about political power sharing.

No.

The hon. member has just said so.

I said in the caucus; not in the study group.

After all, the hon. member was a member of the caucus. He was chairman of my caucus group. Whether I said that or not is irrelevant now. What is relevant is that the hon. member did nothing about it. That is the pattern of action shown by that hon. member. He states that I made a statement in the caucus with which he did not agree.

Was he part of your group? Which group will the Chinese form part of?

I do not think the hon. member for Bryanston should interfere in this. I shall be dealing with his group in a moment. This is the first time the hon. member for Rissik has said that the Government adopted a standpoint in the caucus about the meaning of joint responsibility. It must obviously have happened before the hon. member left the NP.

On 24 February last year.

I did not discuss that subject on 24 February 1982.

No.

But the hon. member said that I spoke about that.

No.

Of course. The hon. member has just said that he found it out then for the first time. He cannot get away from this so easily. The hon. member said that he realized it for the first time then, with reference to what I had said in the caucus. I made a note of that and the hon. member can go and look in his Hansard if he likes. If he says that he made a mistake …

If I said that, I made a mistake.

Very well. I accept the hon. member’s assurance. However, the hon. member is not a person who makes mistakes about matters of that nature. We know him too well for that. He does not make mistakes about such matters. Consider what the hon. member has just done—and I take this amiss of him. He says that Select Committee are underground instruments. He adopts the standpoint that Select Committees are underground. Now I want to take him at his word. It is no longer a matter of the composition; it is a matter of the existence of Select Committees. He states that they are underground. I concede at once that the hon. member knows more about that type of activity than I do. That I readily concede. I really cannot claim to be an authority in that field. Therefore, when the hon. member sat in the Select Committee on the Constitution together with the PFP, the NRP and the NP, was he engaged in an underground activity, merely because that discussion is usually confidential?

Now that is some argument.

I really want to say to the hon. member for Kuruman that I do not expect to stoop to his level. I am unable to stoop so low. We are now dealing with the process of joint deliberation.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You ruled that no personal remarks would be permitted. The hon. the Minister has just said that he is unable to stoop so low as far as the hon. member for Kuruman is concerned. I think that that is a personal remark. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister may proceed.

The hon. member for Rissik participated per definition in what he now describes as underground activities. He sat in that Select Committee for a very long time. To describe an extension-piece of this Parliament in that way does not befit the hon. member. I want to make a second statement. I think that in fact the hon. member’s terminology implied something different, viz. that it is underground depending on who takes part in it. That is what the hon. member really wanted to say, or else he would not have taken part in its proceedings. The hon. member argues that you, Mr. Chairman, accepted the amendment as in order. As a result the hon. member argues by way of inference that it is not in conflict with the principle of the Bill. I am not discussing your ruling, but the inference drawn from it by the hon. member. That is that a motion moved by hon. members may not be in conflict with an accepted principle of the Bill, whereas it may in fact be in conflict with the principles of a specific party. I do not apologize for that. The principle in this regard and in regard to joint decision-making at the legislative level are clear as far as the NP is concerned. They are embodied in this party’s guide-lines. Moreover, they are being given effect to in that general affairs, in contrast to what the hon. member for Bryanston wants, must be discussed in the separate Houses. We accepted that as such. This is also embodied in clause 67 of this Bill which provides that no decisions will be taken at joint sittings. That, indeed, is the standpoint of the Government. For the hon. member to argue at length that that is really what we intend, on the basis of a ruling given by the chairman, is really untrue.

No, it is not in conflict with the principle of the Bill, after all.

That is untrue. Nor, however, is it in conflict with the principles of the Bill that people make false assumptions on the basis of the Bill and, having done so, base their arguments in this regard on a false premise.

I now come to the hon. member for Bryanston. I wish to put it to the hon. member here and now that I believe he can argue better than he did here on his own motion. Let us just consider how he advanced his argument. Where did he begin? He made the statement that the various population groups will discuss Bills on general affairs in separate institutions—viz. the separate Houses. By analogy, the hon. member went on to argue that it would be precisely the same thing if hon. members of the PFP, hon. members of the CP, hon. members of the NRP and hon. members of the NP were to deliberate separately on legislation. Surely that is, with all due respect, a ridiculous argument. [Interjections.] Surely it is an absurd argument. However, I can understand why the hon. member for Bryanston advances that argument. That view of his dates from the days when he represented a specific faction in his party.

That is correct.

No, Mr. Chairman, I think I am wrong. The hon. member argues in that way because he still represents a certain faction in his own party.

Yes, a faction which does not feel too happy.

Correct. It is a faction that does not feel very happy. They do not feel very happy about the leadership they are being given in regard to their standpoints on reform. That is why the hon. member for Bryanston is arguing in that way.

What is the NP’s standpoint in this regard? I say this honestly, and once again I do not apologize for it. Our standpoint is that if we want orderly Government in this country, we must accord recognition to the existence of separate groups. Then, too, we must make available to the various groups the necessary institutions within which those groups can deliberate and within which those groups may thrash out among themselves the divisions within those specific groups.

Your division is based on race.

I shall argue that with the hon. member later. However, that is not what is at issue now. I am prepared to debate this aspect with the hon. member for Bryanston. I shall also debate it with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition.

On television.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Parktown is quite television-mad. There is a video shop just around the corner; I urge the hon. member to pay a visit to it. [Interjections.]

I see enough comedy here.

Marius, one Barnard is already outside. [Interjections.]

All I can say to that, Mr. Chairman, is that I am not so sure whether another Barnard should not leave. [Interjections.]

The fundamental difference between the point of departure of the official Opposition and that of the Government is that the Government is not prepared to have joint decisions taken in one and the same legislative institution. The hon. member for Bryanston knows as well as I do that mutual political differences and diverse standpoints exist within the ranks of the groups in question. I want to give him an example. The hon. member has been sitting here for the last number of weeks listening to the debate and helping to determine its quality. It is a debate among Whites concerning relations politics in the country. Perhaps, if he were to fall silent and think about this, he would put this question to himself: If this deep division exists between us, and there is an equally deep, perhaps even deeper, division in Brown ranks and Asian ranks, and they were to be brought into the same legislative body, what chance would there be …

Then your Standing Committees and your President’s Council are going to be a mess, surely.

Sir, the mind of the hon. member for Bryanston closes when he opens his mouth.

If it is not going to work here, it will not work there either.

Just give me a chance. The hon. member should just listen for once. In those circumstances I say that there is no chance on earth of achieving order. I say that absolute chaos will develop in such an institution.

The hon. member is aware that his motion entails decision-making within a joint body for groups.

Healthy power-sharing.

No, Sir, a sickly one.

Are you saying that if the Coloureds, Indians and the Whites decide together, that is sickly?

When the hon. member comes round, yes. In a Select Committee it is specified that no binding undertaking is imposed upon anyone. The best example of this is the degree to which hon. members change their standpoints between the Select Committee and here. The fact is that the success of the President’s Council—and it has achieved major success, although it has not put forward results acceptable to the hon. members opposite …

You had to sack Worrall.

We did not sack him. I wish I had the power to sack certain other people. The fact is that the committees of the President’s Council, committees on which various political parties and groups were represented, succeeded in achieving consensus on fundamental matters.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member should just give me a chance. Does he want to make another speech? If so, I shall resume my seat.

If it worked there, why can it not work here?

I contend, then, that what happens in committees does not happen in the open House, in which the hon. member speaks to the gallery, in contrast to what he does when he is in a small group and the Press cannot hear what he says. That is my point. For that reason we differ fundamentally with the hon. member for Bryanston on this particular subject.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with the hon. the Minister that the hon. member for Bryanston did not make out a good case for his amendment, which is a pity because I wanted to support it because I believe it is the direction in which we have to move. But the hon. member for Bryanston, as usual, turned it into a racial debate, and that is not my motivation. My motivation is that what is known as concurrent majorities, i.e. majorities obtained separately in different bodies, is one of the most difficult things to achieve. Therefore, by separate decision-making in separate Chambers one reduces the possibility of consensus being achieved by the interplay of ideas. I do not deny the hon. the Minister’s argument that in an open forum there is a tendency to play to the gallery and that therefore one gets confrontation being emphasized rather than consensus. However, we as a party believe that the final decision-making on joint affairs should be taken in a single forum, either in a joint sitting—to which we have committed ourselves and which we supported throughout the Select Committee—or in a body comprising representatives of each of the Houses, such as the President’s Council or the Joint Standing Committees, where members will sit together around a table or in a Chamber trying to find consensus and agreement.

The principle is, to our minds, that when final agreement must be reached, after all the processes have been finalized—the reference to the Joint Standing Committees and the seeking of consensus—and when the final decision is taken on behalf of the three Houses, that that decision should be taken together. In principle therefore we will support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Bryanston. However, we do it because we believe it is good procedure and not because we believe that races must be merged and that group identity and group recognition must be removed from the decision-making process. We do not believe that is practical. We do not believe it is realistic. I am not going to argue that now, because we have argued it before. I believe we will come to this.

I saw the acceptance of the amendment in the Select Committee that joint sittings could be called or demanded by the three Houses as a step towards the achievement of ultimate joint decision making in one forum. I know the Government does not accept it and that it is not its policy, but it in fact makes it possible in the future. Therefore we will move again on that clause that resolutions may be taken, because we think this is where we have to end up. However, we are not making this a make or break thing because constitutional development is an evolutionary process. Whilst we set out and record our views as to where it should be leading we are prepared to support step by step progress towards that goal. We will therefore support the amendment by the hon. member for Bryanston, knowing it will not be accepted, but to indicate that we see this as the direction towards which we must move. When speaking on the next clause we will accept the procedures which are designed here for achieving consensus agreement.

Mr. Chairman, having listened to the hon. member for Durban Point, I just want to observe that the NRP has again begun to assume a certain importance in present-day politics. I think the conduct and standpoint of that party are very important in the politics of today.

I should like to single out two aspects of the hon. member’s speech. Firstly, he reproached the hon. member for Bryanston and said that he was turning the debate into a racial debate. I must say I cannot entirely agree with the hon. member. The second point he made—this is interesting—is that “races must not be merged”. Is that correct?

Yes.

It is interesting that the NRP should now more or less be advocating the old racial federation and that these three Chambers should be regarded, at least by the NRP, as three Chambers representing three population groups which do differ culturally from one another, but which do differ racially.

Only racially?

I am referring to what the hon. member for Durban Point said. I do not think my standpoint is relevant now. [Interjections.] The hon. member used the word “races”. He said that “races must not be merged”. The word “race” has only one meaning.

I just want to say something about the hon. the Minister too: When I used the term “underground”, I did not mean it in a bad sense. What I meant was that the functioning of the Select Committees would be underground, i.e. out of sight. My hon. colleague, the hon. member for Brakpan, always speaks of the engine-room. It is going to be hidden down below, where it will not be visible to the public. My standpoint, and in this respect the hon. the Minister and I will differ politically, is that for certain reasons, the governing party is not making it very clear to the public outside that one is dealing here with a parliamentary system in which there will be integrated discussion, at least in those places where it is not visible to all, and that there will be integration in the top structure as well. The Government is only pointing out the so-called own affairs and separate Houses to the public outside. That is what I meant by that.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by saying that I think the hon. member for Bryanston was quite correct in his argument concerning the principles of the Bill, for if there is integration in the engine-room down below, or in the top structure above, I cannot see, in the light of the principles of the Bill, why there should be any difference with regard to joint sittings, by the three Houses when the so-called general affairs are discussed.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Rissik will not get away with this.

No, I do not want to get away with it.

The hon. member will not get away with it. His assertion is not borne out by the facts. He says that the Government is only telling the public about own affairs in separate Houses and is not referring to the Joint Committees. I say that this is not true. That hon. member knows this as well as any other hon. member. I have said in this House, and I have consistently said in public, that apart from the formal changes to the constitutional dispensation of this country, there will also have to be a new style of government. I know the hon. member knows that I have said this.

You say it, but most of your colleagues do not. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, we have progressed to the point where the hon. member for Rissik concedes that the person who has a specific responsibility in respect of this subject does in fact say this. This represents progress, because he said at first that we were deceiving the people outside. Now he has conceded that I say this. So I am not the one who is deceiving the people; that hon. member is doing so in terms of the statement he has made. [Interjections.]

Order!

Secondly, I want to tell the hon. member that our standpoint in this particular connection is quite clear, therefore: If we have to change that statement, it will mean that tremendous emphasis will have to be placed on the discussion on the committees, where the various groups and parties will take part in the deliberations. Once again there is no ambiguity or deceit in this connection. We effected an amendment to the clause concerned on the Select Committee. It was done in the presence of that hon. member, and the minutes are available. What grounds does the hon. member have, then, for saying that we are hiding it now? Surely it is simply not true.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member of Rissik used interesting terminology. He said that discussion would take place on the standing committees. Whether it be underground or not, it will take place. That hon. member himself was in favour of mixed institutions, committees, where people of different races would be involved in a discussion of constitutional matters That hon. member voted for it. However his vote was not a confidential one; he did it under his signature.

Advisory.

The hon. member for Brakpan says it was advisory. Of course it was advisory, just as the standing committees are going to act in an advisory capacity vis-à-vis the respective Houses. A standing committee cannot bind any of the Houses, however.

It is an extension of Parliament.

Yes, but it functions in terms of certain rules. The hon. member for Brakpan says it is an extension of Parliament. Let us see what the position is. Did the hon. member take a decision on the Select Committee … [Interjections.] I am asking the hon. member for Brakpan a direct question and I want him at least to be reasonable enough to give me a direct answer.

The hon. the Minister is right.

Of course. Then the hon. member must not talk nonsense. [Interjections.]

It is an extension of Parliament.

Yes, but with limited powers of discussion.

Yes, but the President’s Council …

Order! With regard to interjections and the reaction to interjections I should like to point out that the proposed amendment has nothing to do with the President’s Council. It has nothing to do with standing committees either. It has to do with joint sittings.

Yes, of course, Sir, but the argument which the hon. member for Rissik is advancing is that this particular proposal is not acceptable because it contains different elements of the same principle. That was his argument. That is why I say that the conduct of those hon. members will not serve any purpose.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to react briefly to one of the most important points made by the hon. the Minister. At one stage I thought that the hon. the Minister was going to support me as regards this amendment, because he said that the Government’s experience was that joint sittings in which representatives of the various race groups were present, could be successful, that they could cooperate effectively with one another, that they could achieve joint objectives on the basis of the Government’s experience in connection with the President’s Council. I think that the Government inserted the proposal relating to the Standing Committees in this legislation on the basis of its confidence in the success of finding consensus among various groups in such a body, as its experience with the President’s Council had taught the government. The hon. the Minister now says that the only reason why this cannot succeed in the House of Assembly, the only reason why Coloured, Indian and White representatives … [Interjections.] … cannot succeed to the same extent in co-operating and reaching consensus as regards national affairs, is the presence of the people in the public gallery and the Press Gallery.

That is untrue.

That is what the hon. the Minister expressly said. He said that it could work, but that it could not work here because here we have to do with the Press and the public. Therefore the hon. the Minister says that the system is acceptable, and that he is personally aware of its success and, in addition, that he has confidence in its success and that he is confident that it will work in the Standing Committees, but that it cannot work here. [Interjections.] It can only work if it takes place behind closed doors. When the Press and the public are present, the whole process is hampered. Therefore the system and the principle are good, but they must not operate in the presence of the Press and the public. That is how I saw the standpoint of the hon. the Minister.

I just wish to suggest the following. I believe that if these are the only stumbling blocks …

But I did not say that.

… in the way of the process and the system then I think we can go ahead and accept my proposed amendment, and then we can see how it will work in practice. Then we could perhaps speak nicely to the Press and the public in order to have this matter successfully implemented in practice. I do not think that the hon. the Minister should be so frightened because the Press may report outside what takes place in here. Moreover he must display more confidence in the elected representatives of the various population groups by believing that if they have the opportunity … [Interjections.] … to debate with one another and associate with one another and eat together and drink a beer together and hold a braaivleis together, it would very probably be possible for us to find consensus and in this way solve many problems in South Africa and overcome many major obstacles for our country.

Mr. Chairman, clause 32 has to do with the settling of differences in Parliament in the case of disagreement among the proposed three Houses of Parliament.

Under the Westminster system political disagreements are usually settled by way of resolution within the House, in other words, by simple majority vote. The majority party decides the matter, and that is the end of the disagreement. In this clause we have an attempt on the part of the Government to introduce a new system of settling disagreements. It is ostensibly an attempt to move away from a simple majoritarian imposition of the will of the majority on the House. This is where we have to look at the entirely new role that is going to be given to the President’s Council.

Up till now the President’s Council has had mainly an advisory role. It deliberated on matters referred to it, it studied evidence etc. and then made recommendations, but then in an advisory capacity. Those recommendations could be considered and accepted by the Government or they could be ignored. There was for example the report of the present President’s Council on central government constitutional changes. It was an interesting report, but the recommendations were largely ignored by the Government, which came forward with its own constitutional proposals.

In this particular clause the President’s Council shifts away from an advisory function to a key decision-making function within the new constitution. In fact, the President’s Council becomes an intimate part of the apparatus of the executive President to impose his and the will of the dominant party in the White House on the rest of the country and on Parliament. Therefore one has to assess this shift within the context of resolving differences amongst Houses and whether this is going to be effective.

They very fact that we have this clause in the proposed new constitution is an indication of the awareness on the part of the Government that there are going to be significant differences between the various Houses and that some kind of deadlock-breaking mechanism has to be created. Normally, in a divided society where there are different segments, the very existence of inter-segmental or inter-communal conflict leads to the pressure for consensus on the one hand or to complete breakdown on the other hand. That is why one has this peculiar kind of conflict resolution going on in divided societies. I am saying that the existence of inter-communal or inter-segmental conflict is as it were the momentum leading towards consensus. It is the threat of breakdown which itself becomes the most important factor leading to the search for consensus in those societies.

But what is happening here? Here the issue of conflict itself, if I understand the logic and the philosophy underlying it correctly, is removed from the contending parties and is decided by another body, outside of Parliament itself. The issue on which there cannot be disagreement is not resolved within Parliament, but is referred to another body. The underlying philosophy is that this other body must be a more depoliticized body, a more non-partisan body, a body that can devote more mature and objective reflection to the issue at dispute and then make recommendations and refer it back to Parliament or to the President for it to become law. In terms of what I have read about this kind of idea about the function to be fulfilled by the President’s Council, in a sense one could argue that it has to fulfil the role of a constitutional court, being a more dispassionate body to deliberate on matters on which there is disagreement amongst the Houses. I am not saying it is exactly the same because obviously in a constitutional court one also has a Bill of Rights which happens to be the terms of reference within which that constitutional court can operate, to which it can refer and then give judgment and in that sense resolve differences. But is this so here? This is the big question we have to ask ourselves in looking at the role of the President’s Council. Obviously if one wants to assess whether or not it can perform this function, one cannot do so effectively without also looking at the composition. But as the composition of the President’s Council is not at issue in this particular clause I obviously cannot dwell on the nature of the composition, except to say that it is clear by reading the clause that determines the composition of the President’s Council, that it is obviously not a non-partisan body. In fact it is a partisan body that ostensibly has to fulfil a non-partisan function. This is one of the potential contradictions that is going to be built into the new President’s Council.

Let me try to illustrate it. The President’s Council will have to decide on any matter where there is no agreement between two Houses or where one House disagrees with two Houses. It is spelt out for us quite clearly in clause 32(1). It spells out for us when a matter is referred to the President’s Council and the President’s Council/has then to deliberate on the matter. The interesting thing is that the President himself is in an extraordinary powerful position as far as resolving these disputes is concerned. If one looks at clause 32(1)(d) one sees that there is no compulsion on the President to refer a matter on which there is dispute to the President’s Council. It states quite clearly that the President “may” refer a matter to the President’s Council. But not only that. He may not only refer it to the President’s Council, but in his wisdom he may withdraw it from the President’s Council once he has referred it to that council. Therefore, theoretically, a situation exists where a matter of dispute can be left unresolved almost indefinitely, depending on the whim of the President. There is no compulsion on him to refer the matter to the President’s Council. But let us assume that the President in his wisdom decides to refer a matter to the President’s Council. The President’s Council has a sectional composition. The way in which it is composed is simply an extension of party-political interests that are already reflected in the dominating parties of the three Houses. That is quite clear if one looks at the clause that determines the composition. The issue at dispute amongst the three Houses, the matter on which they cannot disagree, is then referred to a body that ostensibly has to have a non-partisan and objective approach, but in its composition already reflects the predominance of the dominant party in the White House. Therefore the matter of dispute carries over into the President’s Council. What we do have then, however, is that in that so-called non-partisan and expert body an opinion is going to be expressed, which, I would believe, will most likely reflect the opinion and the attitude of the dominant party in the White Chamber. It is, I submit, most unlikely that this will not be the case. Then that recommendation is referred back to the three Houses, and it has the air of some kind of non-partisan decision. In fact, however, it is simply the will of the dominant party in the White House that is being imposed in a roundabout way back on the three Houses of Parliament. In other words what is simply done here is to create a very devious process by way of which the will of the dominant party is in any case being imposed on Parliament. It is done in such a manner, however, that the impression is being created that it is not done by way of employing the old majoritarian resolution of the House of Parliament to decide disagreements between the Houses. This is what is happening here.

Furthermore it has the appearance of being less of an imposition of one party domination on the rest of society. In this sense, I believe, a very dangerous principle is being introduced. Again we simply have an extension of the contradiction which, as I have already mentioned, exists in clause 14 and also in clause 16; a contradiction in that the appearance is being created of consensus politics, of conflict-resolving politics, but under the guise of creating such an appearance the dominance of one party and the will of one party will still be entrenched in this new provision. In addition to that, however, we do not even have the simple situation in which the dominant party, by simple resolution of the House—by way of the straightforward tyranny of the majority, if I may use that technical phrase—imposes its will on the rest. Furthermore discretionary powers are being given to a President, an executive President, who can decide whether such resolution can be taken by the President’s Council. He can decide whether the President’s Council should have the time and the right to resolve the issue in connection with which he has decided to refer it to the President’s Council.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has tried to criticize quite harshly the role of the President’s Council as well as the role of the State President in his relationship to the President’s Council.

The first statement I want to make here is that there is a contradiction in the statements made by the hon. members of the PFP. They object to a dispute being referred to a body outside Parliament. On the other hand, however, they object to the fact that that body outside Parliament will only reflect the state of the parties within Parliament itself. This amounts to a certain dualism in their argument with regard to this matter.

When one examines the task and purpose of the President’s Council in this connection, or in fact the problem which arises here, it is clear that we are trying to get away as far as possible from majority rule; from domination by the majority party. This is proved by the fact that we are creating a whole series of mechanisms, of which clause 32 of this Bill forms an integral part, for dealing with every matter on which consensus may not easily be reached. This is a lengthy procedure. It is also a procedure which may vary from one day to another. One particular Bill may take a certain course, for example, while another Bill may take a completely different course. Everything depends on the circumstances at any given moment. This means, therefore, that the ball can be kicked back and forth, as it were, among the Cabinet and the respective councils, the separate Houses, the Select Committees, etc. It may also be referred to the President’s Council for advice, whereupon it may be referred back to the Cabinet, to be submitted to the Houses again, and so forth. The process could go on in this way. It amounts, therefore, to a whole lengthy procedure which can be followed. Therefore one can say that the Government is doing its level best to ensure that if there is any possibility at all of reaching consensus on a particular subject, that consensus will in fact be reached. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also made great play of the extraordinary powers which the President has in this connection. In fact, he said at one stage: “It can be left unresolved at the whim of the President.” So the President can decide according to whim whether or not he is going to refer any matter. If the fancy takes him, he may refer it to the President’s Council, or then again he may not. I do want to say that this account of what is going to happen here is not entirely fair. After all, it is in fact possible that a particular matter may be initiated by the Cabinet and the President, but that it may be so vehemently opposed and that for some unforeseen reason, it may give rise to such tremendous conflict among the three Houses, that the President may have to use his discretion and to refrain from following through with the matter. In fact, it is not very different from the present position. It has happened in this House that a Bill has been introduced, that objections have been raised to it and that the Cabinet, which in fact is simply playing the role which the President will play in future, has then decided to withdraw the Bill, with the result that it has simply disappeared from the Order Paper. This has happened, after all. It is not because of a whim of the Cabinet. It is because specific circumstances may arise which make it unwise to proceed with that particular measure. I submit that it is really a little unfair to argue, on the basis of the powers which the President has in this connection, that he will actually be able to act dictatorially. I think one should try to remove this facet of the President’s power from that argument.

Indeed, another point which I wish to make is connected with the fact that the President’s Council is outside Parliament, that it does not form part of Parliament. I actually find it gratifying to see the way in which the Opposition is resisting the idea that the President’s Council should have that power, for in my opinion, this points to an attitude which I should like us to have in this House, in the sense that when a dispute arises among the three Houses in future, we as members of Parliament are going to do our utmost to resolve that dispute so that the decision will not be taken out of our hands. I think that is important.

Tell that to the marines.

I just want to refer once again to the fitness of the President’s Council to take such a decision. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition compared it to a kind of constitutional court. He said that he put it between inverted commas. In view of the composition, the modus operandi and the other functions of the President’s Council, I think that if this function is to be performed by any body outside Parliament, the President’s Council is ideally suited for that purpose. The President’s Council will occupy itself from day to day with matters concerning the government of the country, with research and discussions of public affairs. Therefore that body will be acquainted with the problems and be aware of the circumstances in the country. Its nature will be political and it will be politically orientated. When it becomes necessary for the President’s Council to take a certain decision, it will then be equipped to do so. It will not be in the position of a court which occupies itself with legal affairs from day to day and only occasionally has to decide on a political matter. They will be politically informed, politically skilled and politically developed at all times.

I want to make one last point in this connection. It is often suggested—I am not saying that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has done so today—that the President’s Council is actually going to be the instrument which is going to be used in order to govern and that virtually every law relating to matters of common concern will end up by being referred to the President’s Council. I want to express the confidence in myself and in my hon. colleagues in this House, as well as in our colleagues who are still to be elected under the new dispensation, that through co-operation we shall indeed arrive at that consensus which will help to ensure that the President’s Council will have to be used as seldom as possible for this purpose.

Finally, I want to refer to some other systems which have developed in the world. I am referring here to the Westminster system in particular, in which two Houses developed which had parallel legislative powers, just as our three Houses have today, in the sense that every law also had to be passed by both Houses. This resulted in a great struggle between the Houses which lasted for many years, but that was at a time when the nature of government was quite different from what it is today. That paralysis resulting from conflict, which they could still afford, we cannot afford today. Therefore we must have a mechanism which will enable us, when all our attempts to achieve consensus on an urgent matter have failed to resolve the problem, to cut the knot. For that reason, I take pleasure in supporting the clause in its present wording.

Mr. Chairman, this clause gives the State President the power to refer any matter on which there is disagreement to the President’s Council for a final decision. I should like to state the standpoint of the CP in this connection. We shall not have time to discuss the composition of the President’s Council. It is unfortunate that we shall not have time to discuss that.

It is your fault. [Interjections.]

Who introduced the guillotine?

We did not introduce the guillotine, nor did we introduce the three subsequent guillotines.

You are the filibusters.

Unfortunately, we shall not have time to discuss the composition of the President’s Council. [Interjections.]

Order!

This is a matter on which we disagree with the governing party, because we say it is undesirable that an outside body consisting of members of the three population groups should have the final say in any dispute between the three Houses. Apart from the fact that the President’s Council consists of members of various population groups, it is also an indirectly elected body which is naturally not accountable to the voters.

I should like to refer the hon. the Minister to clause 32. The hon. the Minister alleges that the President’s Council does not form part of Parliament. I should like to read clause 32(4)—

So it does form part of Parliament. There is no doubt about that. If it has given the final decision, it is an Act of Parliament. Therefore the President’s Council forms part of the parliamentary institution. We cannot get away from the fact that this body, to which members of three population groups will belong, and which is not elected by the voters—as the hon. the Minister likes to say—will have the final say in these matters.

The hon. member for Helderkruin says that in the normal course of events, these matters will not come before the President’s Council. The whole purpose of the Bill is to eliminate conflict and to try to achieve consensus. However, I want to ask the hon. member whether he can imagine what kind of dispute it is which will eventually be submitted to the President’s Council. It will not be a dispute such as the one which we had the other day about a quota for universities, a dispute in which the hon. the Minister of National Education threw in the towel within three weeks. It will be a dispute which will go to the heart of politics in South Africa. It will deal with the question of group areas, the inclusion of Blacks in this new constellation, the abolition of the Immorality Act, the admission of Indians to the Free State, etc. It is going to deal with very cardinal and fundamental problems which exist in South Africa. If this type of dispute has to be resolved by a President’s Council which is composed in the way in which it will be composed, can hon. members imagine the conflict that will result?

That cannot be solved by a heartland policy. [Interjections.]

Exactly! The hon. member has identified the essence of the conflict. Conflict can only be eliminated by partition. It cannot be eliminated by these mixed bodies, which are actually a bluff. It can be eliminated by separate development, in case hon. members have forgotten that word. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Helderkruin went on to say, in reply to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, and criticizing him a little for his use of the word “whim”, that when a Bill is so controversial that it may be necessary for the State President, under those particular circumstances, rather to withdraw the Bill in order to avoid conflict, he must also take into consideration the fact that when two of the three Houses feel very strongly that the Bill should be passed, or when the majority parties in two of the three Houses want the Bill to be submitted to the State President, and he decides not to proceed with it, this will lead to enormous frustration on the part of those who want that Bill to be passed. Once again there will be conflict. I do not know exactly what the hon. member meant by his argument about “part of Parliament”. I have dealt with that.

He says that this President’s Council is aware of the problems which are continually being experienced in politics and that for this reason, it will be eminently qualified to give a final decision on matters which have given rise to conflict among the three Houses. Those persons may be well versed in politics; they may have a political background, but the real idea of the President’s Council was to bring together a group of experts to be a permanent commission of inquiry in respect of constitutional and other problems which could arise. However, they will not necessarily be better qualified than the House of Assembly, the three Houses themselves, to resolve a conflict which may arise. The mere reference of a matter to the President’s Council will be a conflict-stimulating exercise.

Under these circumstances, the Conservative Party cannot vote for the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss two aspects of the speech made by the hon. member for Helderkruin. He was wrong in saying that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition had said that the state of parties in Parliament would be reflected on the President’s Council. He said that the conflict in Parliament would be reflected there. However, this is not so. That President’s Council is composed in a much more clever and diabolical way. We suggested that it should in fact reflect the state of parties. We said it should be constituted on a proportional basis, but that was voted down. However, the President’s Council is composed in such a way that there will always be a built-in majority representing the biggest group in the White Parliament, and that biggest group in the White Parliament will then be able to dominate all kinds of groups and all kinds of parties that are represented on the President’s Council. So it does not reflect the differences. It only reflects the supremacy of the White party in this House of Assembly. [Interjections.]

The second argument of the hon. member for Helderkruin was almost breathtaking, especially coming from that hon. member, because he has a good understanding of Parliament. He told the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that they had such a regard for the status of Parliament that they would do everything in their power to ensure that matters were not referred to the President’s Council in future. [Interjections.] I just want to tell the hon. member that no one is going to have any confidence in members of Parliament who are going to yield and to make obeisance to the situation of the status of Parliament: who now want to give away the status of Parliament, but who say that they will defend it and fight for it afterwards. Once one has voted down the status of Parliament, one cannot be trusted to fight for the status of Parliament again in future. [Interjections.] Once one has surrendered, one will not take up the cudgels for that principle again at a later stage. That is what those hon. members are doing in connection with this legislation.

†That is in fact the prime objection of the Opposition to this clause. Our fundamental objection to this clause is that it detracts from the authority of this Parliament because the legislative authority of this Parliament is being removed. The power is now being given to another body to make laws and to resolve deadlocks over the head of this Parliament. In that sense this Parliament is not going to be the sovereign law-making body even in terms of this constitution. The final responsibility is going to be placed on the shoulders of the President’s Council. Hon. members may ask: Is it really so? But the clause provides, inter alia—

When the President’s Council makes its decision it shall be binding on all three Houses of Parliament even if two of the Houses have voted against such a Bill and even if the majority of the members of all three Houses have voted against such a Bill. Irrespective of such a fact, that decision will still be binding on this Parliament. As I have said, our prime objection is to the fact that this clause takes away from Parliament, as the body which represents the voters of South Africa, the right to decide on legislation for the people of South Africa, and places it in the hands of a body which is not Parliament.

I want, therefore, to move the following amendment, which constitutes an attempt to regulate this matter. It reads as follows—

1. 1. On page 22, in line 4, to omit all the words after “may” up to the end of the Clause and to substitute:
   refer any such bill back to Parliament with or without suggested amendments, with a request that it be reconsidered.
2. (2) Upon receipt of such request the Speaker shall refer such bill with such amendments to the appropriate standing committee on bills dealing with general affairs.
3. (3) The standing committee may by resolution after consideration of the bill refer the bill with or without amendments to a joint sitting of the three Houses for consideration and final decision: Provided that if the bill is not a money bill the said resolution is supported by not less than two-thirds of the members of the standing committee who voted on the resolution, or that the bill has been introduced in and approved by at least one House in two successive ordinary sessions of Parliament.
4. (4) A bill which is passed by a joint sitting of the three Houses in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be deemed to have been passed by Parliament.

This amendment does not go as far as did the amendment in the form of a new clause moved by the hon. member for Bryanston, because that proposed new clause sought to provide that all matters should be referred to a combined meeting of the Houses. That would obviously be our first choice. However, this amendment presupposes that one still has the three House situation and that the three Houses reach a point of disagreement. This amendment of mine seeks to bring back the authority for resolving deadlocks to Parliament, to restore it to this body and not to give it to an outside body. It seeks to ensure that we shall have the status of a legislative body and not merely have the rubber stamp of a President’s Council imposed upon us. That is the first intention of this amendment. I want to say that I am flabbergasted that in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa which has a long tradition of Parliamentary Government—in which I would have assumed that individual members in a sense of pride at being members of Parliament would feel that they wanted to hand on the concept of the importance of Parliament to future generations—hon. members should act as they do. They will simply say that they do not mind. They do not mind because they have handed over the authority to a body which is not Parliament and which is dominated basically by the nominees of the one party and nominees of the White State President of South Africa. What kind of members or Parliament are we? What kind of people are we that the legacy of 70 years of parliamentary government is handed over on the basis that somebody else can take over and make our decision for us?

I am flabbergasted and extremely distressed that my hon. colleagues even on the side of the Government should he down and just accept quite meekly this new situation that is going to arise in South Africa.

My first intention is to try to bring to Parliament the concept of resolving deadlocks. Once one has gone through the first process to come back to the Joint Committees or Standing Committees to try to resolve the issue, then one should under certain circumstances be able to send it back to a joint meeting of the three Houses. The first attempt we make in this amendment is to bring back the authority for resolving deadlocks to Parliament.

As the hon. the Minister in charge of the Bill will know, we would have preferred and still prefer to have an Upper House or a Senate or a House of Review which is an integral part of Parliament and which can assist in this deadlock-breaking machinery. We would prefer in fact that Parliament was not constituted in this way, but that there was another part of Parliament which would help in the form of a deadlock-breaking machinery. We moved this in the Select Committee, but it was voted down. We moved it by way of an instruction, but it was ruled out of order because it would involve additional expenditure. We would have preferred that nevertheless. We want to bring the machinery back to Parliament and our authority; not the authority of the President’s Council.

The second element of importance in this amendment is an attempt to achieve a process of consensus in government in South Africa. One thing is quite clear and that is that one cannot have a process of consensus developing when one has a simple majoritarian concept applying to both the legislature and the executive. When one party either through Parliament or its rules or the State President or the President’s Council can impose its will upon all other parties, all other Houses and all other groups, there is not an incentive for the State President or for the majority party to seek consensus.

The first object with this amendment is to try to get away from the idea of just simple majoritarianism in the direction of concurrent majorities. As has been pointed out by the hon. member for Durban North, it is not a new concept. It was a concept which operated in South Africa when we had a Senate. It is a concept which operates in every Western country where they have a bicameral system of government.

Our idea is that one should not be able to rule by one simple majority, but that differing majorities created in different ways have each to approve of a legislative process before one gets it through on to the Statute Book. It will be said by the Government who is accustomed to running roughshod over the people of South Africa that this is going to be difficult; the Government would like to have the majority. Yes, it is going to be difficult, but the concept should be that no one simple majority can dominate over all others. Therefore the majority of the three Houses separately is one majority and the majority of the members sitting together is a separate majority. When one has those majorities concurring, one would be forced to reach compromise, one would be forced to negotiate and one would be forced to look for consensus.

The second point is that this amendment gives to each individual House what is known as a suspensive veto. It says that one cannot reintroduce legislation which has been voted down by individual Houses in the same session of Parliament. In exactly the same way under the present constitution when we had a Senate except for money Bills one could not reintroduce legislation except in another session.

We think it is highly desirable that when Houses are in conflict with one another, one should not rush off to the President’s Council to force it through. We say in those circumstances it makes sense to say that that legislation cannot be reintroduced except in another session of Parliament when there has been time for reconsideration.

Therefore we believe that this amendment, although it is inadequate because it is dealing with an inadequate situation, is an attempt, a serious attempt to re-establish the authority of Parliament as the sovereign legislative body in South Africa and a serious attempt to see that in future in South Africa we do govern on the basis of consensus and we do not govern on the basis of NP majority rule.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of the arguments advanced by the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Sea Point, we have the situation that these two parties are literally standing side by side. They are not standing back to back, but side by side. The hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Sea Point are saying exactly the same thing. They say that they object to the fact that the legislative powers of Parliament are being surrendered to a non-elected body.

A non-parliamentary body.

It comes to the same thing. As far as this argument is concerned, therefore, the two parties are standing side by side.

The hon. member for Sea Point says that he would have preferred to have a Senate or an Upper House as well. Would he also prefer the members of that Senate or Upper House to be designated in the way in which the members of the Senate were designated up to 1980? If that is the argument of the hon. member for Sea Point, I just want to point out that the Senate was in no way a body which was directly elected by the electorate. The members of the Senate were designated in almost the same way as the way in which the members of the President’s Council will be designated in terms of this measure. The point I am making is that the Senate was not a directly elected body either. The Senate had more power under the old dispensation that the President’s Council is going to have in terms of this proposed constitution.

Did it have the power to take final decisions?

Order! The hon. member for Kuruman must give the hon. member an opportunity to make his speech.

Is it not a fact that the Senate was able to reject legislation passed by the House of Assembly, except for financial measures? Surely this was the power which the Senate had. The point I want to make is that the Senate was not a directly elected body. The same applies to the President’s Council.

may I ask you a question?

No. I should like to complete my argument. The arguments of the hon. members for Brakpan and Sea Point do not hold water, therefore. As far as I know, the hon. member for Brakpan never objected to the powers or the legislative authority which the Senate had. If he did not object to the way in which the Senate was composed, why does he have this objection to the President’s Council?

I should like to make a further point in passing in connection with what the hon. member for Brakpan said. He said that the confrontation which was going to arise among the three Houses would not be about trifling matters, but about fundamental ones. This is probably true and I do not dispute it, but what I should like to point out to the hon. member in this connection is that the President’s Council has also dealt with all the subjects to which the hon. member referred as being fundamental problems. The hon. member knows as well as I do that on the President’s Council as it is composed at the moment, there are representatives of all the groups which are going to be represented on the new President’s Council as well.

I just want to point out to the hon. member that he cannot discuss the President’s Council as such at this stage. I know the hon. member is reacting to arguments advanced by the Opposition, but I should be glad if he would confine himself to the clause.

In that case, Mr. Chairman, I shall leave the point at that. In order to bring the debate back to this clause, I just want to say that it will be possible to achieve consensus on the President’s council. We have already had proof of this. I honestly want to say that the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point—and I think he conceded this in part—is indeed not in agreement with his own philosophy. I do not think the wording of his amendment is in agreement with the philosophy of his party.

In what sense?

After all, the hon. member would have preferred a totally different structure. This system which the hon. member for Sea Point has proposed here could never be accommodated in the structure envisaged in this Bill. It is an institution which could never fit into the set-up envisaged in this Bill. Nor is it in line with the philosophy of the hon. member’s party. His own philosophy advocates a totally different structure, and the hon. member must concede that, after all. Therefore I do not think the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point can be acceptable if it has to be applied to the constitutional model which we have before us.

Coming to the clause itself and the question of what it is concerned with, I should like to react to what the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said earlier on. He said that we paid lip service to consensus, but then we turned consensus into a farce. The hon. member for Helderkruin has already pointed out that one must take into consideration the fact that there are, after all, going to be different levels at which these attempts will be made to achieve consensus. There is the Cabinet. Before one comes to the Cabinet, there is the State President himself, who is going to play a conciliatory role with regard to consensus among the three groups. He himself is going to be a person who is to a large extent going to play a conciliatory role. Moreover, no legislation will be initiated in the Cabinet before consensus has been reached on such legislation within the Cabinet. Then there are the joint committees. In the fourth place, we come to the President’s Council. The point is, therefore, that there are various mechanisms by means of which attempts can be made to achieve consensus. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition pointed out that a decision has to be taken somewhere. Before that point is reached, however, there are at least four other steps which are taken and which—I want to argue in terms of our experience up to now—may offer a solution even before one arrives at that final point of decision-making. Therefore I think that the structure which is being created in this clause for dealing with disagreements among the Houses within the model which is before us is the best possible one, and for that reason I gladly support the clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Johannesburg West has just made a speech which I think he should try to forget as quickly as possible. On the part of the CP, however, we should like to request him to repeat that speech of his as regularly as possible to the voters before the referendum. We would even be prepared to pay him to do so, because with a speech of that nature he will serve as an excellent organiser for us. While he was raising dust here, the hon. member for Johannesburg West said that the PFP and our party were supposedly standing side by side. I do not know what he meant by that. Nor do I know what he was trying to imply by that. He was merely raising dust. Of course it is true that we sometimes agree with the PFP. Occasionally, however, the NP also agrees with the PFP. So what is wrong with that? I do not think the hon. member scored a single point with that argument of his. [Interjections.]

What the hon. member for Johannesburg West will never be able to get away from, however, is the fact that he, who is a lawyer, and who also served on the Select Committee, made the allegation that the Senate, which has been abolished, had more powers than the future President’s Council had. Surely it is a fact as plain as the nose on one’s face that the Senate had no sovereign power beyond that of the House of Assembly.

As long as you do not go around kicking it, Koos. [Interjections.]

It was simply a completely erroneous statement. It was untrue, and we shall keep on reproaching him with it. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sea Point moved an amendment, and in his motivation he levelled criticism at the fact that the President’s Council will now be the arbiter of matters which should be dealt with by Parliament. That was a fine idea of his. We agree with it in part. However, when he says that the Coloureds and the Indians should form part of the structure within Parliament, and that they will therefore have sovereignty over the Whites, we differ with him. That is unacceptable to us.

Clause 32 of the Bill under discussion foresees uncertainty and conflict among the three Houses. When we read the clause we note that there is a reference in it to disagreement among the Houses, In terms of the clause a method is therefore being suggested for the regulation of conflict. The unavoidable inference is, therefore, that the Government foresees in advance that its constitution plan is going to fail. In this connection I should like to quote from representations which were before the Select Committee, and which came from representatives of Unisa. I quote from page 53 of the report—

This means that the Government realizes well in advance that its constitution plan is not going to work. That is why I maintain that what we are dealing with here is conflict. The Government should very much like to move away from conflict, and in the direction of consensus. That is a fine intention. Is this plan going to work, however? Is it going to help in the process of resolving conflict?

The President’s Council is now being designated as the final arbiter that has to decide a conflict. In the first place, the designation of the President’s Council as final arbiter is a drastic and unpardonable deviation from the NP’s principles of the past, and in particular from the 1977 proposals, in terms of which it was to have been exclusively an advisory body. The fact that a body outside Parliament is being brought in here to decide the weal and woe of Parliament, and to decide matters pertaining to its sovereignty—a body which has not been elected by the voters—means only one thing, and that is the destruction of a principle of democracy.

The Government finds itself in a serious dilemma. That dilemma came about because of the following reasons. Certain Coloured leaders and certain Indian leaders are committed. Those Coloureds and Indians who are probably going to have representation in the two other Chambers, are committed. They are basically committed to two premises. In the first place, they want to bring Blacks to this place as well, and in the second place, they want certain segregationary measures abolished. I think this is going to be the basis of the conflict which is going to arise in the future. [Interjections.] The conflict is going to arise when the members of the Coloured Chamber and the Indian Chamber come to this place and make their demands here; their demands that the Group Areas Act should be abolished, and their demands that the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and section 16 of the Immorality Act be abolished. In addition, they are perhaps going to refuse to do compulsory national service. The hon. the Minister has still not replied to our questions in this regard. He is running around with half truths and with full untruths, but he does not reply to our question. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, are you calling me to order?

No. The hon. member may proceed.

Koos, do you think your Coloured homeland is going to solve all those problems?

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Innesdal should rather confine himself to his pension problems. He has many problems in that respect. [Interjections.]

I want to tell the hon. the Minister that there are very serious questions to which we want answers. Let me put some of those questions: When the Coloureds and the Indians come to this place and make their demands, what does the hon. the Minister tell us will the standpoint of the Government be? The people are asking us this question, and we are repeating it. We want the answers to these questions. Is it going to make concessions? If the Coloureds ask for the Blacks to be admitted in a fourth Chamber, and if they ask for the Group Areas Act and other legislation to be abolished, what is the standpoint going, to be? We say it will not be abolished. We want to know what the answers to these questions are. If the Government is not going to make concessions …

If.

Yes, “if’. The hon. member’s interjection has caused me to think of a very interesting question. Is he therefore saying that the Government is going to make concessions? My standpoint is this: If the Government is not going to concede to the demands which those two Houses are going to make, what are the Coloureds and the Indians going to do then? You see, Sir, the Coloureds and the Indians are committed. They are committed to reform or, in our language, transformation, recreation. They are committed to coming here—this has been stated repeatedly—with the aim of bringing Blacks to this place as well and abolishing certain laws. That is what they are committed to. Those demands are going to be made.

The fact of the matter is that with those demands which are going to come, the new dispensation will simply not work. The demands of the three Houses which are going to exist are too divergent. The Whites insist on full self-determination. They insist on their own sovereign Parliament as we now have it. This is the demand of the Whites. On the other hand, the demands of the Coloureds and the Indians are in fact that that situation should be destroyed, that Blacks should be brought in and that segregatory measures should be abolished. The basic demand of the three groups in the new dispensation are going to be irreconcilable. There is no other conflict regulator. There is only one which can work in this case, namely separate development. After all, it works with the Blacks. Why is it being applied in that case? Why cannot it also work with Indians and Coloureds?

The future of this dispensation or, as the hon. member for Helderkruin said, of this constitutional goggomobile of the Government is conflict over the basically irreconcilable demands of Coloureds, Indians and Whites. This is its future, a future in which, I wish to say, Coloureds and Indians are going to become frustrated and from which they are going to withdraw. When we reach the stage where they withdraw, what then? Then South Africa’s political situation is invidious. [Interjections.] The hon. members can laugh if they like. The hon. members who are laughing, like the hon. member for Kempton Park, do not know what is stated in the Bill in any case. So they have to laugh. After this goggomobile has broken down, we shall have a situation far worse than the status quo. That is where this dispensation is heading. Then the Government has to go back to the drawing board. When this conflict occurs owing to the irreconcilable demands, the Government has to go back to the drawing board, back to the planning room.

Now I ask: Is all this worth while? Is it worth while since we are going to return to the status quo in any case? By introducing this Bill, the position of the Whites is being drastically weakened for the replanning phase which must lie ahead. In the second round the Whites are saddled with the serious problem that in terms of clause 99 which is going to come under the guillotine, the White House of Assembly alone, even though all 178 members voted unanimously, cannot amend the Constitution Act. They then find themselves in a terrible position, a poorer position than today. Then we have the situation that as a result of the conflict which is going to arise, as a result of the irreconcilable demands of the three groups, we shall have to go back to the drawing board and that the Whites will then be in a weakened position. That is why we say that this goggomobile should be scrapped. Let us look for a better plan. The name of that better plan is “separate development”. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Jeppe said a whole lot of things to which I should like to react. Let me begin with his last statement, namely that we can find ourselves in a situation where clause 99 comes under the guillotine and is passed and that this House, as constituted at present, will never again have the power to change things of its own accord. We must examine the underlying philosophy. The hon. member and his party have only one philosophy in mind, and that is that they are the boss. They decide and they are going to decide for everyone for all time.

Only for the Whites.

No, not for the Whites only. That party will also decide for the others. Sir, out of fear that you are perhaps going to rule me out of order if I discuss this matter too widely, I want to return to a few other ideas which do, in fact, fall within the framework of this clause.

The hon. member said that the mechanism contained in clause 32 could not work because the demands were basically irreconcilable. Is the hon. member implying that the present demands of the Coloureds and Asians, which according to him are heavy demands on the Whites, are in fact reconcilable with what that party is prepared to give? Is the hon. member truly trying to convince the House that the Coloureds and Asians of South Africa would far rather have a homeland each and enter a new dispensation with those hon. members as leaders?

The referendum deals with your proposal, not ours.

Of course it does.

What does Chief Buthelezi have to say about the policy of separate development and ultimate independence? [Interjections.]

Chief Buthelezi says many things. However, he also does many things and co-operates in an effort to achieve a consensus between his ideas and our ideas.

That is what we want to do.

While we are using Chief Buthelezi as an example here, let us apply what he said to the argument of the hon. member for Jeppe. The hon. member for Jeppe said the Blacks were going to come forward with a demand for a fourth Chamber. Surely hon. members know that Chief Buthelezi is the man who rejects the idea of a fourth Chamber most vehemently of all. He is the one who says that he does not allow his power-base to be split. What is the hon. member talking about then? If we call upon someone to testify, let us call upon him to testify for the standpoints of both sides.

The hon. member for Jeppe also asked us how far we would go before we would concede. We are not entering the future with a hard approach in which we wish to force our will upon everyone. We are entering the future for the very purpose of achieving a consensus. We are entering the future to find a dispensation which will be a better dispensation for everyone, which will offer everyone the possibility of hope and opportunity in future. Unfortunately the hon. member had very little to say about the clause itself. From now on I shall try to confine myself to the contents of this clause. [Interjections.]

The hon. member for Sea Point reacted to the speech made by the hon. member for Helderkruin and said that we were depriving Parliament of the final decision in terms of the mechanism which was being created here while it should really have remained with Parliament. The hon. member for Helderkruin touched lightly on this argument, and I should like to debate it further. There is no need for any matter ever to have to go to the President’s Council. The three Houses reach accommodations among themselves. I also wish to suggest that if one does not know how the arbiter is going to decide, one will lean over backwards to get a decision which will suit one. [Interjections.]

I want to build on two arguments as to why it is unlikely that the President’s Council will emerge as the so-called legislator, as has been argued here. Firstly, one does not know what decisions are going to be made. For that reason one will really lean over backwards to see whether one cannot achieve some form of consensus or other which is acceptable to one. This approach will be adopted in all three Houses. If an hon. member should argue that this would not be the approach, there is a second argument.

The argument is apparently that an inherent part of the composition of the President’s Council is that the power of the White majority party will triumph. If that should be correct, it would mean that the entire credibility of the new system would be utterly destroyed. No one can afford to have the President’s Council acting as a legislature, because then the consensus approach does not exist at all. In other words, the majority party in the House of Assembly will have to be accommodating by giving the other people as much as possible of what they want by complying with their reasonable demands and not simply continuing stubbornly to force what suits it upon the other Houses.

There you have it!

I hear the hon. member Mr. Theunissen saying “There you have it”.

You know that there will be demands.

But of course they are going to have demands. When the hon. member makes such a noise, however, he is merely reaffirming that he believes in a dictatorship. He believes in a dictatorship of the AWB, the CP, the HNP and whatever else can be thrown in with them. [Interjections.] If the hon. member would keep quiet for a moment, I can continue my argument. [Interjections.] The second part of the second argument is the following: If it were indeed to be the view that the majority party in the House of Assembly is going to enforce its will and that the President’s Council would come forward with a decision which would on every occasion simply be an extension of the feeling of the House of Assembly, the President or the majority party in the White Chamber, then the Coloureds and Indians will also be accommodating in this sense that they will scale down their demands so as to get something at least rather than to get nothing in the end. I wish to argue that this is not as those hon. members fear.

Finally, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition adopted the standpoint here that if the President were to withdraw legislation, which is after all within the competence of the executive to do, also in the system in which we now find ourselves, one could end up with a situation in which one postpones a decision indefinitely. One simply does not get an answer. This argument has been raised. Now I want to ask this question: If it is possible to postpone a decision indefinitely, surely it is better than when that decision were enforced and greater conflict created? This is also a very positive aspect of consensus-seeking. The longer one can wait and can afford to keep on talking for the sake of a consensus, the better. The hon. members of the official Opposition have a constitutional plan which they will submit to the national convention, a plan which in respect of the settlement of conflicts contains the provision that if a 10% to 15% veto were to be exercised, everything will be held back. Then the hon. members must not clamour about indefinite postponement. When we talk about indefinite postponement, then we must think of whether a decision will ever be taken according to their plan with a 10% veto against the decision of the 89% majority of such a Parliament.

I should very much like to support this measure as well. I think it is something positive which has been put down in writing here.

Order! I have now allowed hon. members to discuss this clause widely. I appreciate that the clause lends itself to that. However, I am making an appeal to hon. members please to confine themselves as far as possible now to the essential particulars of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with very great interest to the hon. member for Randburg. If he and people like him represented the majority party on the President’s Council we would perhaps have had a better South Africa. But unfortunately angels do not come here everyday of the week. The most important thing that the hon. member said was that if the President’s Council acted against the desires of the people, the whole credibility of the President’s Council would be at stake. This is not the first time it has happened, and I intend dealing with it just now.

Order! I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member, but he may not discuss the President’s Council at the moment.

I am just replying to the hon. member for Randburg on one aspect. He spoke about credibility and I just want to …

The hon. member may mention it but he must not discuss it.

No, Sir. I shall not discuss it. All I wanted to say was that at one stage this House did constitute a High Court of Parliament which really undermined the credibility of the NP.

I have a great deal of difficulty in understanding how this clause will function because, as far as I can see, it flies in the face of the sovereignty of Parliament. The clause provides, inter alia, that the President may refer a matter to the President’s Council for its decision. When one looks at the President’s Council, as was mentioned by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, one finds that it differs from the previous President’s Council in that it has a judicial as well as an advisory function. Up to now its function has been advisory. This means that when the President refers a matter to the President’s Council for its decision, it then has to decide on the merits of the case. The moment it has to decide on the merits of a case, it tests the validity of a decision of a House and, in doing so, interferes with the sovereignty of that House. This is in conflict with the provisions of clause 30 which this Committee has already passed. In clause 30 we decided that the President and the Parliament of the Republic constituted the sovereign legislative authority. What do we mean by “sovereign legislative authority”? The hon. member for Randburg quoted the Dicey principle and the supremacy of Parliament. However, there is an entirely new point of view in this regard and I should like to try to explain why a portion of these provisions is ultra vires. In this connection I want to prove this new view by quoting from Essays in Constitutional Law by Houston in which it is stated, inter alia—

Yet the courts now have jurisdiction to question the validity of an Act of this House on the grounds of its composition and on the grounds of procedure but have no jurisdiction on the area of power. This new jurisdiction is exercisable either before or after the assent of the President has been given. In other words, Sir, sovereignty is a legal concept.

Arising out of this, if the matter of a dispute between two Houses is handed over to the President’s Council for investigation, one actually finds that there is a judicial body investigating the validity of what each House in dispute has put forward. The moment it goes into the validity of what they have said, it is ultra vires this legislation because in terms of clause 34 no court of law will be permitted to question the validity of an Act of Parliament. How, therefore, can we have a President’s Council coming into existence and testing the validity of the actions of a House? I say this because clause 30 provides that the President and Parliament are the sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic while clause 37 provides that Parliament shall consist of three Houses, namely a House of Assembly, a House of Representatives and a House of Delegates. How can a body outside this Parliament investigate judicially any decision made by any one of the Houses? It cannot be done; it will be invalid. Therefore once this happens, the courts in terms of clause 34 cannot, if the Bill has been passed by this House, test the validity of something enacted by Parliament. Therefore I feel that the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point is quite correct. One has to have a body which consists of the three Houses themselves to make the decision. One cannot have an outside body which has a judicial function testing the validity of any of the three Houses because then one is taking sovereignty away from them.

In the case of the High Court of Parliament it was decided that Parliament cannot give a body something which Parliament itself has not the power to do. Therefore one cannot give to the President’s Council the same powers that this Parliament tried to give to the High Court of Parliament [Interjections.] Yes, here we are giving the President’s Council the power to act judicially. The Government does not want to give those powers to the courts, but if those powers were given to the President’s Council, then there would be no reason why one of the Houses could not take Parliament to court to adjudicate the question as to whether the sovereignty of that particular House was trampled on. That is the point. It will be declared invalid. I do not think the President’s Council can operate in the manner required in this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make two points in reply to the arguments which were raised. If one examines the argument that it is in fact the President’s Council that is going to have the real supremacy in this whole configuration, one must also consider that we could go a full five years without the President’s Council having to take a single decision. Consequently, under those circumstances, the President’s Council would not be able to do anything to enforce its opinion, its will, upon anyone. Under those circumstances I do not think that one can speak of the President’s Council as part of the legislature or as a powerful body or anything along those lines.

To this one could add a codicil. If one takes cognizance of the fact that the President’s Council cannot change an iota of what the Houses will submit to it, one realizes that it is merely able to make a choice between the various versions that have been submitted to it. In that respect one undoubtedly cannot speak of the President’s Council as a legislator. It is only able to take a decision, and that decision it can only take if Parliament enables it to take a decision which it itself was unable to take. In fact, it is within the power of Parliament to exclude the President’s Council from the picture completely.

As my second point I wish to argue to the other side a little by associating myself with an argument which the hon. member for Randburg advanced. If it were to happen that every second Bill introduced in Parliament eventually ended up before the President’s Council, it would mean that the system had in fact collapsed. If one bears in mind the cumbersome and thorough conciliation procedure which is built into clause 32—all the various variations which are possible—and one finds that those various procedures fail time and again to bring about a reconciliation and we are forced to approach the President’s Council every second day for a decision, then it would mean that the provisions in the system are so profound that it will not be possible to resolve them in any way at all. That would be evidence, not so much of the failure of the structures which are being created here, but of the irreconcilability of interests. I do not think we shall reach that point, but these procedures which are being created are, as far as one is able to conceive, just about the best imaginable under the circumstances of South Africa. They will afford us the opportunity, if it is in any way possible, to reach an agreement and to keep a democracy going in the country. This is what we shall be able to do with the help of this mechanism.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the hon. member for Helderkruin has raised the point that if virtually everything goes to the President’s Council for the resolution of conflict, it would really mean that the system has broken down. It is this aspect I want to deal with. I want to deal with the question of disagreement, which is the concept provided for in this clause, namely that of the resolution of conflict.

The problem of politics, as I see it, and the question of conflict resolution, is that in South Africa these two things have to do mainly with race. In other parts of the world, particularly the Western World, the problems are in the main of an economic nature. The issues there turn around whether it is capitalism or socialism, they turn on the creation of jobs, on the question of growth and inflation. Governments are removed or created by reason of the failure or success of their economic policies.

What is really going to happen as this new system of ours develops, is that two real sources of conflict are going to arise in respect of which the conflict resolution mechanism will have to be brought into play. The one is laws which relate to discrimination on the grounds of race, and the second is the allocation of the resources of the community, in other words finance. It is the allocation of resources which is the problem in countries in the Western World, and in time it is in respect of this aspect that we are going to have problems in South Africa.

Let us look at the two types of financial legislation that we have. Firstly, there is tax legislation and the source of conflict here is whether or not the impact of the tax legislation should be on a particular group or a particular section of the population. Let me give an example. One group may feel that it represents a section of the community which would be hardest hit by, let us say, indirect taxation, while another represents a section of the community which would not like direct taxation to reach too high a level. The possibility of conflict and differences of opinion therefore arise in respect of tax legislation, and this would have to be resolved.

The second type of measure is Appropriation Bills which we will have to pass. The problem is who should get the benefit of the revenue of the State and how that revenue should be allocated. The issue is going to be whether use is being made of a community’s resources in order to satisfy the interests of that particular group and in order to meet particular given and stated political ends of the persons who are sitting in the legislature that deals with it.

You can govern a country and leave a whole lot of laws intact without passing new laws every year, but you have to deal with financial legislation and appropriation laws every year. Unless you change the whole concept of appropriation laws, you will have to have a law each year which may well be a source of differences of opinion, because the question of the allocation of resources is going to arise in respect of the appropriation laws. Unless you pass a general law in terms of this constitution in which you lay down a formula which is permissible in terms of what is laid down in the financial section of the measure which I am not allowed to debate at this stage, and in addition have a formula which you have worked out by consensus in terms of which you accept the principle, firstly, that you are going to remove discrimination in regard to the appropriation of resources to certain social services and, secondly, evolve a formula by means of consensus in terms of which that is applied on an annual basis, you are actually going to find yourself in a conflict situation annually when you have to deal with the most important legislation, which is in fact your appropriation laws.

Firstly, what I ask is that we deal with the question of potential conflict before the legislation is introduced. That can be done by means of a budget committee which I believe should operate before financial legislation is introduced. Secondly, what will we do if your legislation is here and we have to resolve conflict after it has come here without recourse to the President’s Council? That is really the issue because my difficulty is—and, interestingly enough, I agree in this respect with the hon. member for Helderkruin—that what in fact is going to make or break this constitution is actually the number of references to the President’s Council, and where the potential for conflict exists is in the field of finance and the appropriation of funds. That is where the real crux of this whole matter lies. I suggest that the difficulty in respect of the structuring of a constitution based on race is that one’s conflicting economic interests tend to be associated with race whereas the real issue is economic appropriation, and the allocation of resources should be based on need and equity and not related to race. Race should not be equated with economic needs.

But you will not argue that it is possible to remove historically …

No, I am absolutely with you. That is one of the reasons why I say that we should actually achieve a consensus in respect of the removal of discrimination and then work out a formula for a period of time in order to deal with it. Otherwise we shall have this annual conflict. One thing is clear, and I have tried to stress this, and that is that one cannot expect any member of Parliament, whether he be in any one of the three Houses, to go back to his own constituents and say that he has voted for something which in fact discriminates against them. We shall have to try to avoid that at all costs; otherwise no constitution will work, whether it be this constitution or any other.

The other problem to which I have tried to draw attention before and to which I have not had an answer is that one cannot run a country with a multiplicity of budget debates as is contemplated in this particular piece of legislation. According to this legislation there will be six budget debates, thus six potentials for conflict and the problem is that of those six we might have to refer at least one to the President’s Council every year for decision. If we are going to have reasonable race relations we cannot afford to have the budget passed every year as a result of a President’s Council decision. I call the hon. member for Helderkruin as my witness. One cannot do it because then the evidence is there that the system has broken down and does not work. That is why I think we shall have to look at the whole concept of how we will resolve these conflicts in relation to finance because, whether we like it or not, in the end the whole issue is going to be how we remove discrimination and how we appropriate the money in order to bring about that removal of discrimination. Discrimination is not merely talking about votes, amenities and things of that sort. Discrimination is inherently a financial and economic matter. In the reality of world politics it is economics which really cause the conflict, a conflict which we have to try and solve. If we are going to solve the problem of economics and the competing demands for the resources of this country, we shall have to meet the challenge of communism and socialism and the challenge that is put by those who put violence before us and use that violence as the temptation in order to hold out a hope for people that they will get a greater share of the economic cake. That is why I believe that the conflict-resolution mechanism that has to be introduced in this measure should be looked at again, particularly from the point of view of finance and the appropriation of funds, because that is where the real risk lies for conflict in the constitutional structure that anybody may set up, whether it be this one or any other.

Mr. Chairman, what the hon. member for Yeoville stated here in regard to the problems in future is quite probably true. However, I also find it interesting that the hon. member is apparently satisfied with the mechanism here except for the limited number of cases which he also pointed out. I want to be a little wilful and say that it seems to me as if it will be possible, within the next few days or weeks, to start a kind of “democrats for Reagan” campaign in the form of a “PFP for the yes vote”.

Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by making a few general statements. Before I do so, however, I want to state immediately that I have great sympathy for the problem identification of the hon. member for Yeoville. My own standpoint is that if the fair expectations of people on the socio-economic level in a society are complied with, their demand for political participation will be less acute than it would otherwise be. I fully concede that point to the hon. member. I am in full agreement with him.

†I concede immediately, Mr. Chairman, that the conflict inherent in our society is to a great extent present obviously on account of the race factor, though not solely on account of the race factor. I say that because I believe that this society is not only divided in terms of race. I believe the hon. member will concede that point too. The society in this country is also divided along the lines of its many peoples.

And the economy.

I am coming to that point later. Furthermore, our society is also divided because there is a socio-economic stratification in this country …

Which is identified with race.

Which is co-incidental with race.

It is a result of the ideology of the NP. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, when one tries to argue on the level hon. members of the official Opposition try to establish, it is unfortunate that one has to react to interjections of the kind just made by the hon. member for Bryanston. I want to say something to the hon. member for Bryanston, Mr. Chairman. He is still reasonably young. He never saw, however, a place called Windermere, here in Cape Town. He also never saw Cato Manor, in Durban …

Or even Sophiatown.

… or Sophiatown, outside Johannesburg. Those were places which really existed, places where people were living in utter poverty and squalor …

Like Crossroads.

I shall come to the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens as well, Mr. Chairman. [Interjections.] That hon. member does not understand the concept which is involved when in a society basic inequalities exist which make equal competition completely impossible. In such circumstances, there cannot be a question of equal competition at ail, because that would be an abstract thought which would make the disparity greater and not smaller. The hon. member, I am sure, will agree with me on this point.

Yes.

Therefore I believe the hon. member for Yeoville should also address himself to his bench mate, the hon. member for Bryanston, so that he can be taught to abstain from making frivolous and stupid interjections when I try my best to conduct a serious discussion with the hon. member for Yeoville. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to take the matter even further. I have often said that reform in one sphere of human activity can destabilize a society unless that reform is synchronized to coincide with the other spheres or levels of human activity. Therefore, it is perfectly clear that any hope of success we will ever have in this country will not only depend on constitutional reform. It is also going to depend on the success we attain in the economic sphere, and on the success we achieve in the social sphere. They are all interrelated. This is no new thought that I am expressing now. It is a truth as old as human society itself. I do understand too that people will use the political mechanisms in order to accomplish a more equal distribution of the resources in the country. Unfortunately, some people would be prepared to destroy the resources in the country if they do not have a perception of the limitations on the means of countries. I believe the hon. member for Yeoville will concede that point as well.

Therefore I suggest that, irrespective of whether people do or do not agree that it is adequate, what we have in fact perceived in this country over the past years is a process of change, not in the derogatory sense of the word but in a good sense, a process of change at all levels which makes it easier to have constitutional reform. I have said that, if we are to succeed in this country, no matter who governs it, the acceptability of people in the eyes of others must also be increased. Therefore, what is in fact being done is that the whole concept of reform in society, socially, economically and constitutionally, is being integrated. Just incidentally, my department is responsible for that at the moment.

I would go further and say to the hon. member that I also agree that in future, quite apart from other conflict areas which are real, the financial one is going to be very important. Therefore I also agree that mechanisms must be created to resolve, on a formula basis if possible, the financial conflict areas before we come to the Houses or to Parliament. There are many levels at which that sort of negotiation can in fact take place. It could take place, and probably will, in the Cabinet—as is the case today—in which various groups are in fact involved. It will take place in the Ministers’ Councils where representatives of the groups will be involved. It is most definitely going to take place in a possible standing committee on finances.

Do you accept the concept of a budget committee?

I accept the concept of discussions in such a standing committee.

For the budget?

Well, on a continuous basis if I have the say. I do not want to anticipate the rules, because we have agreed with one another that the composition, functions and so on of Standing Committees will be determined in terms of the rules. If we cannot resolve that in terms of the rules, we shall have to do so in terms of an Act. I want to say to the hon. member now that I believe that it is incumbent upon us at the earliest possible moment at least to determine some formula that could be applied.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether he would accept the concept that, where one does have the different groups in the different Houses, if there are discriminatory social services, the formula has to be of such a nature that at the end of the road that discrimination will cease to exist?

My reply to the question is that it is Government policy that there must be an equal distribution of facilities. It cannot be attained overnight. That I think the hon. member will concede. I have indicated previously—I do not want to labour this point because those issues have not been resolved—that we will have to present to this House a financial Bill that will have to lay down standards of services to the communities and, secondly, a unit-expenditure element as part of that formula. I would not, in all fairness, be able to tell the hon. member at this state how that can be done, because that is the subject matter of investigation by the technical people in this particular regard. I would not want to prejudge any finding or recommendation they may want to make.

On the principle?

Yes, naturally I am talking about the principle.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h00.

Evening Sitting

Mr. Chairman, when business was suspended for the supper break, I was dealing with the hon. member for Yeoville.

I think the hon. member will grant me one point, namely that the progress which we make constitutionally is also determined by economic and financial factors. There are financial and economic limits to the progress we are able to make in the constitutional sphere. The hon. member will agree with that. He knows that if we were to adopt a policy of one man, one vote in the same institution in this country, the financial claims and demands would be so great that it would not be possible to meet them.

We do not stand for one man, one vote in a unitary system. [Interjections.]

That is interesting. I am so pleased the hon. member is helping me in my argument. If we were to involve all the people in the same institution, the conflict and rival claims to the economic and financial resources would be even greater, would they not? That is why the hon. member does not stand for one man, one vote. He is quite right.

In a unitary system.

Of course.

You do not stand for that either.

My proposals are contained in this Bill. I want to make the general statement that the economic resources of the country impose limits on the constitutional reforms we are able to effect. They impose limits on the extent of the services we are able to render. The hon. member has already conceded that point, and I agree with him. It is not possible to achieve that concept of civil rights which hon. members opposite advocate—not the hon. member for Yeoville, because he does not agree with it—in our society and system on the principle of the Western concept. It is just not possible. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also agrees with that.

I shall say something about that in a moment.

Should I not rather wait then? [Interjections.]

We have an interesting debate in progress now.

I just want to make certain that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is conducting the same debate I am conducting with the hon. member for Yeoville.

There is no problem.

Is there no problem? [Interjections.] Then I am so pleased that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is making such progress with the hon. member for Yeoville. If he can show the same progress with him as I am, we are going to get somewhere tonight.

I pay you the same compliment. You are making very good progress. [Interjections.]

It is astonishing.

Is it not phenomenal? It remains a fact that the products and taxation produced by the modern sector in South Africa are admittedly the largest in Africa, but per capita they are still very small compared with other Western countries. The hon. member knows that they achieved the system which forms the basis of his own party’s policy—I know he does not agree with it—at a stage when their per capita resources were far greater than our resources are today. I shall not pursue the matter any further. As regards the standpoint of the hon. member for Yeoville on the mechanisms which may be used by the various Houses to allocate the financial resources of the State to the various population groups, I want to assure him that there was very little of what he said which the constitution does not make possible. I want to tell him one thing, however, and that is that the motion of the hon. member for Sea Point makes it impossible because that hon. member’s motion does not seek mechanisms and systems for reconciling those possibilities for conflict. He is actually looking for a substitute for what he says is the decision-making power of the State President. He argued quite emotionally that hon. members in this House were prepared to crawl for the sake of a handing back of power from the President’s Council to Parliament. When I say this I am using his words. What his motion therefore amounts to is that a Committee of the House of Assembly has more powers than the House of Assembly itself has. That hon. member must not shake his head, because I am going to deal with it now. The purport of the hon. member’s second amendment was that that if a Select Committee—if I remember correctly—decided on a piece of legislation with a two-thirds majority, then it became law.

Not so. You are quite wrong. Read the amendment.

I have read the amendment and I will come back to you in a moment.

*The hon. member for Sea Point reads what he likes into his own amendments and if a person makes a critical analysis of what is contained in it, he reacts as he is now reacting.

Read the printed word.

I did read the printed words. We have had a great deal of difficulty with printed words during the past session.

No one differs with the elucidation by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition of the conflict in society. No one differs about the fact that it is going to be difficult to resolve it. On this clause the hon. member is now arguing that the essence lies therein that we, as much as possible, should remove the resolution of conflict from the party involved. He says that is basically what is stated here. He says that according to this clause we are going to have to use another body outside Parliament for this purpose.

That is how I understand what you are trying to do.

However, I do not understand the hon. member’s exposition of the matter. I am debating the hon. member’s interpretation and I want to make sure that he said that because I do not want us to make a mistake about what he said was stated here.

Yes.

He said that we should do this—this is how he understands the clause—by means of a depoliticized body or institution. Did I understand the hon. member correctly?

Yes.

The hon. member argues further that the proposals that the President’s Council may fulfil an arbitration function arises out of the argument that it is a non-partisan body. Is the hon. member still with me? He said that he was not allowed to talk about the composition then because it was not relevant, but he said that the composition itself—and he was making a general statement—was merely an extension of what was happening here.

Of the problem.

Yes, of the problem itself, of course. In other words, of the party-political standpoints which apply here. From that point I now wish to argue with the hon. member because he must in the first place, make apply this argument to the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. I now wish to put this question to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. Is the composition of a select committee political or non-political? Surely the hon. the Leader of the Opposition knows that if he uses the argument that we are getting a depoliticized institution to help to resolve the conflict, then he cannot support the hon. member for Sea Point. [Interjections.]

Of course. Yes.

The hon. Leader of the Opposition says he can, but then I want to ask, how? Does he want to tell me that the motion of the hon. member for Sea Point is that a select committee should to do this because as an institution it is less politicized than the President’s Council. He must argue that point with me. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is now reading the hon. member for Sea Point’s speech. [Interjections.]

I do not understand the point you want to make.

Of course the hon. the Leader of the Opposition will not be able to understand it. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition argues that our proposal is that we should get an institution which has been depoliticized. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition says the composition of the President’s Council has not been depoliticized. [Interjections.]

Correct.

Very well, then. Has the hon. member for Sea Point’s one been depoliticized? [Interjections.]

No.

Then the hon. the Leader of the Opposition must not say that that is the argument. In all due respect, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition cannot say that he supports the clause as it stands. [Interjections.]

I shall reply to that later.

Sir, the fact of the matter is that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition argued—and he confirmed it a moment ago when I spoke to him—that his objection to the president’s Council as an institution which should try to resolve conflict—the arbitration function—is that it cannot serve that purpose because it is an extension of the majority party in the House. He also said that that body had not been depoliticized and that was one of his arguments. He agreed with that. All I want to ask him now is, if the condition should be that the body that should fulfil that function has to be depoliticized, how the hon. leader can support the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point? [Interjections.]

I think the hon. the Minister misunderstood me. I shall repeat my argument.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition will concede that I asked him whether he had said this and that he indicated that he had. However, I should like to give him an opportunity to explain his argument further. The fact remains that the select committee was also politicized. Does the hon. the Leader of the Opposition agree with that?

Yes, of course.

Of course. Very well. Then it is not therefore possible to get a “non-partisan institution”. [Interjections.]

It is possible to use a body in the legal system … [Interjections.]

Like the court?

Yes, like the court.

Well, that is interesting. I want to argue this point now, because the hon. member for Sea Point argued strongly a moment ago that we should not confer the powers of Parliament upon an outside body. [Interjections.] If I were the hon. member for Sea Point I would keep quiet. He asked whether we were not ashamed of allocating our responsibilities to an outside body. [Interjections.] Actually, he stated it in emotional language. I think it is a good thing that the hon. members who sit next to one another should thrash out their respective standpoints with one another.

The hon. the Minister must not make up things. He must read my Hansard.

I am not discussing Hansard in connection with these specific matters. Surely we conducted a long debate on an outside body and the hon. member for Sea Point knows it.

The hon. the Minister is arguing on a false premise.

The Afrikaans translation is different. I am now dealing with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and arguing with the hon. member for Sea Point. The hon. member for Sea Point argued strongly that we should not give our parliamentary powers to an outside body. [Interjections.]

For decisions on laws.

For decisions on laws. However, that is all I said. The hon. member said in connection with decisions on laws. I now want to ask him whether a constitutional court is an outside body. [Interjections.]

Of course it is an outside body.

In other words, the hon. member wanted both things: A Bill of Rights and an outside body that is able to interpret.

Continue.

I have every intention of continuing. All I ask is this: Does it have the power to assess the merits of legislation?

In terms of the constitution, yes. [Interjections.] It cannot make a law.

The hon. member says it cannot make a law. Can it assess the validity of a law?

A court can always assess the validity of a law.

Now we do not understand one another at all. The hon. member says the court can always assess the validity of a law—in substance. That is not correct, however. When we began, the hon. member argued that we needed an instruction to empower the court to assess the validity, but now he is telling me that the court always has the right to do so.

In terms of the constitution.

Oh no, please. The fact of the matter is that the hon. member and his party were not satisfied with the fact that the court had the power, as is at present the case, of being able to assess procedures; in other words, is able to determine whether a law was brought into existence or not. He argued that it should go further so that the court should be able to test the validity.

The testing of a law is part of the constitution.

All I am asking the hon. member—I do not think we are so far removed from one another that we cannot both understand this—is whether he wants the substance, the merits of Bills to be tested by an outside body. After all, that was what he wanted. [Interjections.] The hon. the Leader of the Opposition says this is true; he did want that. [Interjections.] My goodness me, if only the hon. member for Sea Point could listen occasionally.

But you are putting questions to me.

Then let me talk to the hon. member for Sea Point instead. If his motion for a Bill of Rights had been accepted, as well as his motion for a constitutional court, then an outside body would surely have decided the validity of a law on its merits on the basis of the norms of the Bill of Rights. Surely this is a fact, and why should we quarrel with one another about this? All I want to say is that we have finished arguing with one another about this matter.

I come next to a statement made by the hon. member for Jeppe—he is not here at the moment. His standpoint was that there was total irreconcilability among Whites, Coloureds and Asians. If we argue about this, we need not discuss a constitution. If we proceed from the standpoint that the demands and claims of these three groups—I shall leave the other groups out of the argument because they are not relevant now—are so irreconcilable that they cannot be reconciled within the same State dispensation, we must terminate the constitution of the country. Then we must say that the reality of this country—this is now according to the perception of that hon. member—is such that reconciliation is not possible.

Partition.

And then partition is not possible either.

Why not?

I shall reply to that. Even the partition concept must at least be accepted by the other people.

We give them Lot’s share.

That is very interesting. The hon. member was a clergyman and an organist, too. He said we shall give them Lot’s share.

The best share. He chose.

This is very interesting. I want to put a question to the hon. member. I want to put the question to him because he has made an interesting remark. [Interjections.] Is the policy of the hon. member that the White people divided the country and that the Coloured people choose?

I did not say that.

The hon. member said that we should give them Lot’s share. If I remember correctly Abraham divided and Lot chose. The hon. member is a theologian. Can I now go and say that the hon. member for Koedoespoort, speaking on behalf of the CP, says that in terms of that principle one group should divide and the other choose?

I did not say that.

Lot’s share was determined according to a specific formula, viz. that the one divided and the other chose. The hon. member said it and he cannot get away from it. If the hon. member had not said it, let us consider the other side of the matter, viz. that he divides and chooses himself. Is that what the hon. member wants?

It has already been divided.

That is very interesting now. The hon. member said it has already been divided. Who divided it?

You people did. [Interjections.]

The Whites have the lot. [Interjections.]

Sir, we cannot hear the Minister very well.

The more I talk, the less the hon. member hears me in any case. I want to tell the hon. member for Brakpan that he should tell the hon. member for Koedoespoort that he should not say such ridiculous things here that people laugh at them.

It is less ridiculous than this multiracial constitution of yours.

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask you to ask the hon. member for Kuruman to address hon. members properly. Apparently it is not part of his background to be able to do so.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask you whether you have taken cognisance of the awful noise coming from that side of the House … [Interjections.] I just want to have it placed on record that hon. members opposite are making such a noise that they sound like a lot of cats in the dark.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that such a noise is frequently the result of provocation.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is improper of the hon. member for Brakpan to say that members on this side of the House are behaving themselves like cats in the dark. I suggest that he withdraws that.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to ascertain from you what provocation there was for the reaction which came from hon. members opposite.

Order! It is not necessary for me to react to that. However, I may just point out that the hon. member for Brakpan perhaps did not see it, but from here I could see the gesture which the hon. member for Koedoespoort made when he walked out. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a remark in this connection. You cannot do it, because you are in the Chair. I was under the impression that the hon. member for Koedoespoort was going to demand his Lot’s share outside after he had divided it himself.

He was indicating that he had to go and reply to a telephone call.

Order!

Hon. members must give the hon. the Minister an opportunity to make his speech.

I want to say at once that I did not get the impression that the hon. member for Koedoespoort went out to engage in feline activities outside the House.

I want to come back to the official Opposition now and make a few general statements. This specific clause is not the only clause which professes to deal with the solution of conflict. When I say this I am not saying that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that it was the only way. I just wish to make the point that it is not the only suggestion for mechanisms or institutions which can help to resolve the conflict between groups.

May I agree with you?

Yes, you may. The hon. member for Yeoville agreed with me completely. I also understood that the hon. member for Yeoville and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition had a conversation before they came in here. Apparently this is contagious. I am not saying this with any ulterior motives. The motions which we have agreed to so far include various mechanisms to see whether we can arrive at a consensus. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is quite right when he says that when we have inter-group conflict or tension, which exists in a society such as ours, there is a natural tendency to seek mechanisms for resolving it. Once again we agrees on that score. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also agrees with me that whether we want to or not and whether the division occurs on a basis of peoples or whether it occurs on a racial basis, there is of course natural endeavour on the part of groups to decide their own affairs. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition agrees with that as well. There is a second one and that is that every group—and the entire debate today demonstrates this—also wants to get as much of the decision-making over what affects the groups into its own hands. I wonder whether the hon. the Leader of the Opposition agrees with me on that score. Surely the entire history of countries with multinational or multigroup structures demonstrates this. For that reason the answer is frequently group domination. Let me now admit candidly tonight that it is a fact that the Whites have dominated the political scene in this country and still do so today. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition agrees with me on that score. It also remains a fact, whether the hon. the Leader of the Opposition agrees with it or not, that the Government has for a period of 35 years now been trying to escape from that situation.

In a strange way.

The hon. member may differ about how we wanted to do it, but he must concede that it has been the political endeavour for the past 35 years to escape from the domination of one people or group over another. This has found expression in the fact that independent countries have come into existence as a part of the process of getting way from domination by one group of another. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition can argue as much as he wishes and whatever the policy of his party may be in future …

With this Bill you have gone from the frying-pan into the fire.

The fact which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and his party cannot escape from is that those States do exist. They cannot get away from that. Just as they cannot get away from the fact that national legislative assemblies exist. Whatever they are going to do in the long run, these will have to be components or elements in any possible solution they must propose. Neither he nor his party can escape from that fact. In any event it is all part of the same objective, although we differ about the mechanism.

Therefore what is the situation now in terms of the present legislation? I want to put a question in this regard to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, and I would be delighted if he would reply to me. Does this legislation and the clause under discussion not present a further part of the philosophy which is aimed at getting away from domination?

Out of the frying-pan into the fire.

Oh, please. I am talking to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition now. [Interjections.]

Order!

Does this not represent part of that philosophy? In the second place does it not also represent—even though the hon. the Leader of the Opposition does not agree with it—a mechanism which must help to resolve the conflict among groups? How are we trying to do it now? All three groups are being involved in the executive authority. Does the hon. the Leader of the Opposition agree with that? All three groups are involved in the executive authority. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition indicates that he agrees with that. Surely this is not something which has applied up to now. In regard to areas of conflict—and this brings me to the hon. member for Yeoville—they are therefore already being consulted in the initial stages before we come to the legislative institutions. They are therefore being consulted by way of their participation in the executive authority, something which was never previously the case. Now I want to say this again, because it is important that this should be repeated. Possibly it does not comply with the hon. member’s perception or with their replies; nor with those of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, nor even those of the hon. leader of the CP. The fact remains, however, that this forms part of the process of the resolution of conflict.

Two further statements I want to make are the following. Apart from the formal interaction which takes place on the executive level, and which is an important component of the mechanism by means of which that conflict may be avoided or resolved, I believe that a very important informal interaction is going to exist; something for which provision is in fact being made in the legislation under discussion. One of the most important instruments in this respect are the Standing Select Committees, and what happens on those Select Committees.

In the Bill under discussion, therefore, there is a second formal component, apart from the executive authority. This is the acceptance of the concept of standing Inter-House Committees, on which all parties will be represented—and let me add at once, so that there need be no misunderstanding about this—that have a minimum of representation in the respective Houses. I also believe that it will be possible in this way to make a joint contribution to the attaining of consensus in regard to those aspects and those areas in regard to which the greatest conflict exists. In this specific connection the hon. member for Yeoville laid his finger on the problem. Nor is there anything in these proposals which prevents a standing financial committee for example, from attaining consensus in regard to the allocation of money in advance, except on the executive level.

The third statement I want to make in reply to the standpoint of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is that the executive authority will constantly be in a position to effect amendments to Bills if the originals provoke too much opposition. Surely it is a fact that the whole basis on which we are arguing is that Bills on general affairs should be introduced in consultation with the Cabinet—in fact, not only in consultation with the Cabinet but after the Cabinet has arrived at a consensus in regard to them. All of us accepted, although we differed as to the methods, that the people who should be included in the Cabinet and in the Minister’s Councils should have the majority vote of the parties in their own Houses. Surely these have consequences because there is a dual process, a two-way process, which is built in as a mechanism to try to reconcile conflict in the institutions.

It seems to me and in this connection I associate myself with the hon. member for Helderkruin—that, although other people make a mockery of this, all the mechanisms needed to bring the parties to a reconciliation are built into the system. I would think, just as the hon. member for Helderkruin does, that members of the various Houses will do everything in their power to attain consensus themselves rather than to have another body do it. This has nothing to do with the snide remark made by the hon. member for Sea Point that people were crawling to another body. It has everything to do with an effort to see whether he cannot find solutions in accordance with democratic principles. It is very interesting that the hon. member for Sea Point excluded financial measures from his amendment.

There is the time factor of one session or the next session. This is not being excluded from the procedure.

But surely the question of one session has a specific meaning. The hon. member himself is including a mechanism for the approval of a measure on financial matters. Surely that is a fact. The reason why he is making this exception is that he realizes that the country has to be governed and that the country’s services have to be provided. Surely this is a fact. Consequently the hon. member himself foresees in his amendment circumstances in which decisions have to be taken regardless of his motion. All I want to tell him is that the Government’s point of departure in accordance with its own guidelines as expressed in the Bill is that we accept that, in spite of all our efforts to cause people to participate in the process, there must always be effective government as well; and effective government includes the concept that there has to be decision-making. There is only one institution which can avoid the intervention of another body—this is the point which the hon. member for Helderkruin made—and that is the Houses themselves.

Provision has to be made—and it is being done in this clause—for the case where a House still does not approve of a Bill or clauses of the Bill, in spite of all the processes I have referred to. The hon. member for Sea Point’s own motion makes provision for the same thing in a specific set of circumstances in regard to financial measures. The question we have to answer is what provision is being made for this contingency. Once again it is purely in accordance with the problem the hon. member for Sea Point has in regard to financial measures. There were three possibilities we could consider. The one was that the State President took a final decision. In this connection I should like to have the attention of the hon. member for Brakpan.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No, I want to talk to the hon. member for Brakpan now. The hon. member for Brakpan, who placed his opposition to this clause on record, should just help me a little, for one of the alternatives is something which he supported. It is that the President together with one Parliament can resolve the conflict. Surely that is the case; the hon. member stood for that alternative. I am not referring now to the Council of Cabinets, in regard to which he wrote letters. All I am referring to now is the concept. [Interjections.] In terms of the rule of fairness—I am referring here to the hon. member Mr. Theunissen—the former hon. Prime Minister spelt out that that President could be a White, a Coloured or an Asian. No one wrote a letter to him about that.

Please give us another turn to speak too.

I am almost finished. There is still plenty of time to speak again.

The hon. member decided further that any one of the Houses could resolve a conflict. The hon. member voted on this matter himself. However, I do not know whether he still stands by that alternative.

There is also a second possibility. In the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point use is made of settlement—except in respect of finance bills, because I do not want to argue with the hon. member about that—by means of a two-thirds majority in on a joint Select Committee, is that not what the hon. member is proposing?

You have not understood me at all.

In that case the hon. member can explain it again later. If words have any meaning, however, that is what he said. Settlement by the House jointly is the third alternative which is unacceptable. We have already indicated this. At a joint sitting all the divisions among the various groups are brought together.

Not necessarily.

In other words, those divisions do not apply there.

It simply means that that will not necessarily be the case.

The hon. member for Sea Point has already had a turn to speak, and it seems to me the hon. member for Hillbrow has also prepared something to say.

You also said you were going to discuss clause 98 with me still.

Yes, but the hon. member is not making it possible. After legislation has gone through all the processes, after it has already been to the Select Committee and after everything possible has been done, a final conflict is declared. Now what is the sense in referring it back to that process again? Hon. members are now arguing that it is in the discretion of the President to decide to refer the matter. Of course he has a discretion. If resistance of the respective groups is such, however, that there is no sense in referring it without alienating the Houses completely, surely he would be foolish to refer it. Then one is beginning all over again. Let me say one final thing in this regard. The purpose of this clause is to find an institution in which politicians are represented and on which the majorities and minorities in the various Houses are represented and to which the President has to appoint people. No one has so far come forward with a suggestion offering a more practical solution than this one.

Mr. Chairman, by way of commencement I want to make only three remarks. The first is that we are only dealing with clause 32 now, and the Government has introduced a guillotine motion. I think it will be placed on record when we have disposed of this debate that the hon. the Minister, as an individual, spoke for longer than each of the Opposition parties. I am not saying this to be critical of the hon. the Minister. The very reason I am saying this is because the points the hon. the Minister touched on are so important, that we really ought to debate them, but we do not have the time to do so.

The second point I want to make—and the hon. the Minister would concede this—is that it is impossible to do justice to the points the hon. the Minister touched on in a 10-minute speech. Consequently, I am unable to give my attention to all of them. That would be impossible. The hon. the Minister spoke for almost an hour, and he raised some important issues.

50 minutes, anyway.

50 minutes. The hon. the Minister raised some important issues, and I do not take it amiss of him, since this is important legislation. All I want to say, is that the filibustering has not only come from the Opposition side.

I want to come back to some of the points the hon. the Minister made. I want to concede at the outset—and I have admitted this from the beginning—that the hon. the Minister has repeatedly stated that the problem of domination is the central problem in South African politics. I never said that the hon. the Minister had not said that. All I was trying to say at the commencement of my speech on clause 32, was that that clause did not assist us in getting away from the problem of domination. To tell the truth, I tried to indicate why we are still going to have a great deal more trouble with the problem of domination.

Allow me to touch on only a few of the other issues the hon. the Minister raised. There is the question of a constitutional court and a Bill of Human Rights. What I was trying to say, was that if we tried to establish a depoliticized institution outside of Parliament, it could be an institution of that nature, i.e. a constitutional court with a Bill of Human Rights built into the constitution. In other words, one specifically isolates certain aspects of the political debate, and says that decisions must be taken on those aspects. The hon. member for Yeoville also tried to point this out. When it comes to the question of racial discrimination, one should not allow interest groups to make decisions in that respect, since they do, after all, have conflicting expectations and circumstances in a multinational society. Therefore, if one wants a depoliticized institution, one should have a constitutional court in which finality can be given, constitutionally speaking, if matters of discrimination were to arise, for example, in the expenditure of revenue. That is the model. If we consider what is happening here, it is being claimed that we are creating a depoliticized institution, a President’s Council, which is claiming to try to deal with this problem. What is in fact happening, however, is that this President’s Council, in its composition and functions, is really only becoming an extension of the conflict which is being isolated from Parliament itself.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Leader of the Opposition a question?

Mr. Chairman, I really have very little time. If there is time at the end, I shall give the hon. the Minister a chance. That is all I was trying to say. I was not trying to score political points off anyone, or to advance arguments to be funny. I was just trying to say that we cannot get away from that dilemma.

However, that is not really what I wanted to discuss, although one could speak about that for hours. I want to come to a much more central issue the hon. the Minister touched on, an issue arising out of the speech of the hon. member for Yeoville. The hon. the Minister said that the economic capabilities of a country placed restrictions on constitutional development. One would agree with that without any reservations. The hon. the Minister then went on to say that if it did not get rid of discrimination, and economic discrimination in particular, constitutional development was really a futile undertaking, since it would only serve to exacerbate the problem. In other words, if constitutional development does not succeed in solving the conflict surrounding economic inequality, we would only be exacerbating that problem. That is what I understood the hon. the Minister to mean. The hon. the Minister then went on to deal specifically with the Coloureds, the Indians and the Whites. He said that if, in these circumstances, we were unable to give attention to this at a constitutional level, we could forget about the problem and then we would be saddled with it. If this is true of the Coloureds, the Indians and the Whites, it is infinitely more true in respect of the Blacks. I do not want to discuss the Blacks. All I want to say, is that the way in which the Government is going about solving this problem for the Coloureds, the Indians and the Whites, is going to create expectations in the Black people which are going to make demands on politics. In the next breath, the hon. the Minister says: I just want to say that we will never be able to deal with these demands by way of one man, one vote, since one man, one vote is going to create a dilemma. One man, one vote, is a political formula. One man, one vote does not define the demands. One man, one vote does not determine what the demands are that people are going to make. One man, one vote is a way of meeting those demands. [Interjections.] All I am trying to say, is that the realities of those demands still exist, and that the way in which the hon. the Minister and his Government are going about meeting those demands as regards three minority groups in this country, is exacerbating that problem in respect of the greater majority of people in south Africa. This is one of the central points of conflict I am trying to single out. I am unable to discuss this, since I know that the Chairman will call me to order, since this is a completely restricted debate. I am simply saying that if political institutions deny powerless minority groups the right to make economic demands, we are creating conditions for revolution. I am not the one saying this. There are countless historians throughout the world who would be able to spell out the conditions for violent revolution. If a minority government, which is in power, does not create political opportunities for other groups within that society to make their demands in a peaceful way in order to rectify their position of economic inequality, it is creating the conditions for revolution. I am not arguing with the hon. the Minister; I agree with him. However, what I do not agree with him about, is that this mechanism which is being given substance in clause 32, in fact, contradicts the wish the hon. the Minister expressed so eloquently earlier this evening. Consequently, we are not really resolving conflict by way of clause 32.

I now want to come back immediately to the argument of the hon. member for Helderkruin. The hon. member’s whole reaction and speech with regard to my argument was based on what he hopes will happen. I have no problem with that. I also hope that that will happen. However, I cannot be led by the hope of the hon. member for Helderkruin. I must look at what is contained in clause 32. Clause 32 also allows for the possibility of a development which is in direct conflict with the wishes and hopes of the hon. member for Helderkruin. Because those divergent possibilities exist, the Government wants to try to exploit them by saying that we and the CP have joined forces, which, of course, is nonsense. However, because those divergent possibilities exist, they create problems of conflict in this constitution. This is not going to be determined by the results of a referendum. Nor is it going to be determined by the political points we score off one another. [Interjections.] In the final instance, it is going to be determined by the groups which that side of the House now wants to involve in a new constitution. If those groups are unable to make their demands in such a way as to reduce conflict, if those groups are unable to make their economic demands in such a way that they will be satisfied, we are not going to succeed despite all the well-intentioned wishes of the hon. member for Helderkruin, and despite the propaganda campaigns the Government is launching, as well as those we and the CP are launching.

Finally, this brings me to an argument advanced by the hon. member for Randburg. I want to ask him politely not to oversimplify our approach. He asked that if that was my argument, what about the veto right? That veto right can only come into operation after there has been a convention and after an agreement has been reached. [Interjections.] That is the logic of the argument—after it has been decided what the constitution is to be, and after it has been decided that there should be a Bill of Human Rights and a constitutional court, and that there should be no discrimination in legislation. Those hon. members do not have to agree with me; I do not expect them to either; but at least they must accept my argument for what it is, and proceed to argue on that basis. One cannot misrepresent my argument and think that my objections to the constitution will have been answered. Surely that is a foolish argument. I know the hon. member for Randburg as someone who respects another’s standpoint even though he does not agree with it, but I do not think he showed that respect in this particular case.

To sum up, and to return to what the hon. the Minister said, I wish to point out that the hon. the Minister said that groups naturally aspired to be able to make their demands. Well, I have been arguing since clause 14 that the Government is not giving the Coloureds and the Indians the right to make their demands, and that the Government decides what their own affairs are in this legislation. The new State President is going to decide when those own affairs may be debated in legislation, and if those groups say: “What you are telling us, are not own affairs”, matters must simply proceed on the basis of the decision of the State President, and on the basis of a schedule. If that is self-determination—I must agree with the CP in this respect—it is a farce. What makes it a farce, is precisely this mechanism we are incorporating, since it is just as much of a farce as the CP is turning it into. They are turning this into a farce by saying that it is not a State President who must decide what the own affairs of other people are; the Whites must decide what are own affairs for all the other groups. We say that this is nonsense in both cases, since if people who identify themselves as groups, are unable to decide themselves, there is no such thing as own affairs, and therefore this whole system is based on the manipulation of one group to get another group into a position in which they will not have the say those hon. members claim they want to give them, in any case. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, apparently the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is having problems participating in this debate, and one could respectfully say that the argument he advanced covered such a wide field that it was nothing but provocation, and that the hon. the Minister would need at least 50 minutes to react to those arguments. [Interjections.] I want to point out to the hon. the Leader that the discussion of this clause has taken approximately 100 minutes. We have been dealing with a number of aspects during the past 10 minutes, and I do not think that you, Sir, would permit me to pursue the arguments of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition.

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the details of clause 32. [Interjections.]

Sir, I shall comply with your request with pleasure, but you cannot take it amiss of me in this case when I tell you that I am foregoing the privilege of reacting to some of the arguments of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition.

There is an important aspect we cannot get away from, and that is that by way of this clause we aim at overcoming a checkmate situation which may arise. What is important, is that this clause is also the mechanism with which to overcome the checkmate situation which, in fact, already exists. The official Opposition is arguing on the one hand that a mechanism must be found, but that the mechanism offered in this clause is defective. That is the argument of the hon. members of the CP, as well as the hon. members of the PFP. Logically speaking, I have no choice but to agree with the hon. the Minister that there is an untenable situation contained in the arguments of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, read in conjunction with the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. In fact, the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point, by way of the mechanism he proposes in it, once again brings the point of conflict to Parliament as a political football. In contrast, the CP suggests partition as a mechanism.

In contrast to those hon. members, we are of the opinion that the problems of South Africa cannot be solved or evaded by ignoring them. The mechanism being established by way of clause 32, with all its possibilities, the responsibilities that rest with the State President, and his power to refer matters to various institutions, offer such an opportunity. I think that in this way we shall visibly demonstrate the tolerance this clause affords the various groups.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Mr. Chairman, the Committee spent some time in dealing with the clause that deals with disagreement between the Houses and how that conflict is to be resolved. We now come to clause 33 which deals with assent to Bills. In terms of clause 33 we see that the President has to assent to the Bills. I think it must be unique in the history of any Western democracy that a State President has to assent to his own Bills. Normally they would be referred to some higher body and I think it is only under dictatorships where a person gives his assent to his own Bill. Nevertheless the clause provides for assent to be given when a Bill has been passed by Parliament. We have no objection to that. We also have no objection when a Bill has been passed in accordance with section 31, i.e. as far as own affairs are concerned. However, paragraph (b) of this clause refers to Bills which are deemed to have been passed in terms of section 32(4). I think it must be unique that in respect of any legislative body a Bill is deemed to have been passed. I do not know of any other legislative body in respect of which Bills are deemed to have been passed. I therefore move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 22, in lines 43 and 44, to omit paragraph (b).
2. 2. On page 22, in lines 51 to 56, to omit subsection (2).

The reason for my wanting to delete paragraph (b) is because it refers specifically to a Bill deemed to have been passed in terms of section 32(4). We know that the State President can refer Bills to the President’s Council in terms of this clause for advice. After that advice has been given the bill is then returned to the House for a period of 14 days and members can then decide upon it.

The State President can also refer Bills to the President’s Council for decision. When a Bill is referred for decision it is a final decision and it does not come back to the House. The matter is finalized by the President’s Council. As far as the President’s Council is concerned, once again I think it must be unique in the history of constitutional law anywhere in the Western world—and I do not know of its being done anywhere outside the Western world—where a Bill is referred to a body which in fact is a hybrid body, a body that is a carry-over, a pale shadow of the old President’s Council. The Bill is not referred to a body such as a Senate. That is of course what would happen under a normal constitution. However, we do not have a Senate in South Africa any more. We have no upper House at all to which such a Bill can be referred. There is also no house of review, and …

But you are arguing a clause which has already been agreed to.

That Bill is not referred to a body which constitutes in any way a part of Parliament because in terms of this legislation only the three Houses will constitute Parliament. That Bill will, however, be referred to the President’s Council, which is not even part of Parliament. The President’s Council is nothing but an artificially created body, the final aim of which is of course the preservation of the NP. It is evident of course that the Government look upon the President’s Council as their piêce de résistance, if I may refer to it in this manner, Mr. Chairman.

If the President’ Council had been elected on a proper basis—elected by the members of the three Houses in accordance with the principle of proportional representation, with a transferable vote in order to be representative of the three Houses—then perhaps our attitude towards the practice of referring Bills to the President’s Council in this way would have been somewhat different from what it is now. To refer Bills, however, to a body which is by no means representative of this sovereign Parliament…

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to discuss the merits and demerits of the President’s Council now.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, the clause stipulates that Bills will be referred to the President’s Council. All I am saying is …

Order! The hon. member is not allowed to discuss the President’s Council now. He should confine his remarks to the contents of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am only referring to the President’s Council in so far as it is relevant to what is contained in this clause. The clause stipulates that Bills must be referred to the President’s Council.

Order! The hon. member is discussing the President’s Council but the contents of this clause have no bearing at all on either the merits or the composition of the President’s Council, nor on the way in which it is elected.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely stating why we resent this particular stipulation. We are against it because the President’s Council is not the proper body to which, we believe, in any democratic constitutional system legislation passed by Parliament should be referred for ratification. I am sure this situation is unique; it does not exist anywhere else in the world. Nowhere else in the whole world is legislation referred to a body for ratification, a body that is not even part of Parliament. That body now has to take a final decision on such legislation referred to it.

Order! I believe the hon. member is indeed discussing the President’s Council now.

Mr. Chairman, I am only referring to the President’s Council in so far as it relates to this clause. [Interjections.] It states here … [Interjections.]

Order!

It is stated here in the clause that Bills will be referred to the President’s Council. That is what it says here, Mr. Chairman.

Order! The hon. member is going too deeply into the whole question of the President’s Council now. I want him to realize that that is not relevant to the discussion of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going into the whole question of the President’s Council as such. I merely want to point out that the President’s Council is in fact a hybrid body, that it cannot therefore take a valid decision, and that we object most strongly to the stipulation in this clause that a Bill will be referred to a body of that nature for final ratification before being presented to the State President for his assent.

Furthermore I should like to point out that we will indeed have to deal, in terms of this clause, with Bills that will have varying wordings. There will indeed be different versions of the same Bill.

Where do you read that?

In clause 32(4). The hon. the Minister should read his own Bill, Mr. Chairman.

But that has already been agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, clause 33(1) states as follows—

have been passed by Parliament…

Mr. Chairman, clause 32(4) tells us what will happen should there be more than one version of the same Bill.

But that has been dealt with.

Order! The hon. member for Hillbrow cannot discuss clause 32(4) again. He may refer to it in passing, but he cannot discuss it again.

Mr. Chairman, I merely want to … [Interjections.]

You are dealing with the wrong clause, Alfie. [Interjections.]

I am referring to clause 32(4) because it relates to clause 33. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, it is not clear to me who takes the final decision on this matter. What other obscure body can decide when a Bill should be deemed to have been passed by Parliament? [Interjections.]

That brings me to my second amendment, Mr. Chairman. That merely seeks to omit subsection (2) of clause 33. I am not going to repeat all the arguments already advanced when clause 31 was discussed. I merely want to reiterate that our chief objection in this regard is that the President has the power in terms of subsection (2) of this clause to issue a certificate referred to in clause 31(2).

Mr. Chairman, clause 33 simply deals with the assent of the President to Bills, but the clause further provides that when a Bill has been passed by Parliament, the State President must do certain things. We do not accept Parliament as it is constituted in clause 37. Furthermore, when a Bill is deemed to have been passed by Parliament in terms of clause 32(4), after there has been a dispute and the President’s Council has given a final decision on the matter, the President has to assent to the Bill. We do not think that the President’s Council should have the right to decide whether or not a law is an Act of Parliament. Thirdly, the State President will assent to a Bill if it has been passed in terms of clause 31. Clause 31 provides that the Bill which has been referred to a House, can only be passed by that House after a certificate has been received from the State President, and in those circumstances the State President acts in consultation with a mixed Cabinet. Consequently, the entire procedure being set out here is the result of a mixed Government, a mixed President’s Council and power-sharing. Therefore we are unable to accept this clause. Nor can we vote for the amendments of the hon. member for Hill-brow, since this will not get us anywhere. Consequently, we shall be voting against the clause, as well as against the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say at the outset that the amendments of the hon. member for Hillbrow are unacceptable. I also want him to reflect on the fact that he did not advance arguments on those particular amendments to the clause, but on clause 32. His entire argument concerned the fact that he does not accept that legislation be referred to the President’s Council for a decision. The hon. member would agree with me that that was the basis of his argument.

But that arises out of this.

It does not. The hon. member for Hillbrow is making the same mistake as the hon. member for Bezuidenhout did. The hon. member for Bezuidenhout came forward with the strangest argument. He said that the provision the hon. member for Hillbrow was opposed to, and which has already been accepted, is in fact creating a judicial body which is above Parliament. However, we have already accepted that Parliament is sovereign.

We have not yet accepted that. That comes at a later stage.

Sir, I just want to tell the hon. member that his whole argument was based on the fact that the amendments to the previous clause would be accepted. The hon. member would concede that. We have accepted that clashes will be referred to the President’s Council. A decision will then be taken concerning which of the particular Bills that have been approved, will be the valid Bill. It is then deemed to be an Act of Parliament. We have already accepted that clause. The hon. member cannot undo entirely the effects of that clause by way of these amendments. That, in effect, is what his amendments mean.

Mr. Chairman, with great respect, if the hon. the Minister’s argument were correct, you would have ruled the amendments out of order. The amendments are perfectly in order. The amendments are to omit paragraph (b) and subsection (2). It so happens that this refers to a decision taken in terms of the previous clause, but I did not make that reference; it is made in the Bill itself. Because the relevant clause is referred to in this clause, we must move that it be removed and we must motivate its removal. The motivation for its removal is based to a certain extent on the previous argument and also on the arguments advanced now. So, the hon. the Minister can reject the argument if he wants to, but he cannot say that it has nothing to do with the argument of, for example, the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. With great respect, Sir, that is a different story entirely.

Amendments 1 and 2 negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Mr. Chairman, I should like to speak on clause 34 and in doing so I would be most grateful if you would allow me to commence by quoting three short paragraphs which have been drawn from The Cape Times of 30 July 1983. The report emanates from Pietermaritzburg and it reads as follows—

I am quoting Mr. Justice Rabie on the inroads into the powers of the courts. The hon. Chief Justice was not referring to this constitution at all when he made this speech. However, no matter which way one looks at it, the message is actually the same, for when Judge Rabie speaks of significant inroads being made over the past few decades into the powers of the courts he surely includes the amendments introduced into the constitution in 1955 after Parliament had been rebuffed by the Supreme Court when the Nationalist majority attempted to divest the Coloured population of its franchise rights.

Is that your conclusion or did he say that?

That is my conclusion. From that time the question of the courts’ right to adjudicate upon the actions of the legislature was settled within very narrow limits. It is therefore not the argument of the PFP that this clause 34 radically reduces the rights of the courts as they presently exist in the present situation or under the present constitution, because this draft provision under debate with certain exceptions to a large extent merely confirms the existing situation.

Clause 34(2)(a), however, is deceptive. It is deceptive because it is couched in positive terms and the impression is created that the courts will now be granted new powers to check the legislature against abuse. Of course, when one takes the trouble to read the rest of the clause, one is very soon disabused of any such notion because in the end result no court has the right or even the ghost of a chance of pronouncing upon any legislative action except in such limited circumstances as to render that right almost meaningless.

Our argument is a different one, and it is this. While clause 34 constitutes no deep departure from what presently obtains, this cannot be said of the constitution itself. The Bill as a whole, incorporating a powerful executive President, a tricameral Parliament and a President’s Council with a deadlock breaking function, is certainly a major breakaway from the existing regime and the existing system. Last night there was argument in regard to where sovereignty lay and, while I do not intend to deal with that argument tonight or even to discuss it, there is one point that is quite clear and that is that sovereignty does not he in the constitution. It lies in the political leadership of the country and in their legislative and administrative organs.

What are you trying to say?

Did the hon. the Minister not understand that? [Interjections.] Well, then I shall go through it in simpler language.

What does the hon. member understand by that?

What I am trying to say is that sovereignty does not lie in the constitution; in other words, the constitution is not sovereign. Sovereignty lies in the political leadership of the country; in other words, it lies in the decisions of politicians executed through their legislative and administrative organs. That is exactly what I am trying to say. I say that it is our standpoint that it is the constitution that should belong to all the citizens of the country which in fact ought to be supreme, and not human beings. This is all the more so when we are entering a new phase of constitutional development that is fraught with uncertainty and potential conflict. A constitution has a far greater chance of acceptance and eventual success if its provisions and the legislative and administrative actions carried out in terms of that constitution are in the case of dispute, for instance, subject to impartial review by a body other than one that is politically oriented. A constitution and legislation flowing thereafter in terms of that constitution which are capable of manipulation by those politically involved in the decision-making process, retains within the system serious seeds of future frustration, disagreements, division and disaffection.

We say now is the time to look afresh at the whole question, particularly when we are discussing clause 34, of the involvement of the courts in the testing of the legality of laws passed by Parliament. In this instance, as the Bill contains scant reference to individual rights nor in fact to any substantive right relating to individuals or groups at all, the question of testing rights on the merits of any aspect is, quite frankly, hardly at issue. We are not then asking now that the courts be vested with legislative sovereignty. That is not our plea; far from it.

You are not asking that now?

We cannot ask that now, Sir, because there is no Bill of Rights. Taking the stage that this Bill has reached we also cannot ask that the courts be vested with legislative sovereignty; as I say, far from it. However, what we are asking is that the constitution be vested with sovereignty and that the courts standing apart as they do from the political battles be granted the jurisdiction to protect that sovereignty in the interests of all the groupings in South Africa.

I should like to revert for a moment to a speech made some months ago by Mr. Justice Diemont, an Appeal Judge, parts of which I quoted at a previous occasion. During the course of his address Mr. Justice Diemont described the events which occurred in the middle 1950s relating to the constitutional crisis which had then arisen. He completed his comments in this particular regard by saying—

This came from a judge of appeal, Mr. Justice Diemont. I should like to say that that is our view too. Accordingly I now move the amendment printed in the name of the hon. member for Durban Central on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 22, in lines 59 to 64, and on page 24, in lines 1 to 10, to omit subsections (2) and (3) and to substitute:
   1. (2) It shall be within the competence of a court of law to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of any Act of Parliament.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the amendment as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that you have ruled that the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton is inadmissible, I want to react to a number of things the hon. member said. Firstly, I think we should take the strongest exception to the fact that the hon. member involved the person of the Chief Justice in this debate in order to lend some sort of support to his arguments and those of his party. I think that is absolutely reprehensible, and I take it extremely amiss of the hon. member for doing so.

The hon. member quoted the passage he read from the speech made by the Chief Justice at the opening of the new Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg out of context, but he was trying to use it to lend some potency to his argument, in any case. The hon. member said that he conceded that the Chief Justice was not referring to the Constitution Bill.

But the principle is the same.

No, it has nothing to do with the principle.

The hon. member went on to say that the conclusion he had reached from the speech of the Chief Justice, were his own. He conceded that, but he nevertheless tried to use the speech of the Chief Justice to substantiate his arguments. I think we can only register our displeasure at this.

The hon. member advanced another argument and said that despite the fact that clause 34 reflected the position in respect of common law as far as the testing right of the courts is concerned, one should not look at the powers of the courts; one should look at which law one is dealing with here. Since when has the power of our courts to test the validity of a particular law depended on the kind of law one is dealing with? Surely that argument does not hold water.

All clause 34 is doing, is to formulate once again in our new constitution the powers our courts have always had, under the present constitution as well, in respect of common law. For that reason, we are strongly in favour of retaining clause 34, and we take pleasure in supporting it.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sand-ton made a few interesting statements in spite of the fact that the amendment he moved was out of order.

The hon. member began by saying that the wording of the clause was “bedrieglik” …

Deceptive.

Yes, that is “bedrieglik” in Afrikaans.

“Deceptive” is a little stronger.

The hon. member must accept that the Afrikaans translation of “deceptive” is “bedrieglik”. He said the wording was “bedrieglik” because it suggested that the courts were being given new powers. Whoever suggested that?

The hon. member for Ermelo.

The hon. member for Ermelo spoke after the hon. member for Sandton. How could he have said that before the hon. member for Sandton spoke? Honestly, the hon. member for Durban Central should not be so stupid.

†Nobody has suggested that it gives the court more power. It just reaffirms the situation as it obtains in terms of clause 59.

That is what I said.

No, the hon. member did not say that. The hon. member proceeded to make a very interesting statement. If I understood him correctly, he said that sovereignty did not he in the constitution, but in the political leadership.

And in the legislative and administrative organs.

The point is that sovereignty has never been written into a constitution. It is true that a constitution may confer sovereign powers on certain institutions, but is a new constitutional concept which is put forward by the hon. member for Sandton, namely that the constitution can be sovereign. There could be sovereign legislative powers in terms of a constitution. However, I leave the matter at that.

*The hon. member for Ermelo, and I want to associate myself with him, accused the hon. member for Sandton, in the first place, of bringing the Chief Justice into the debate and in the second place of quoting the Chief Justice out of context. For the sake of truth, for the sake of the office of Chief Justice and for the sake of this House’s relationship with the Bench, it is necessary for us to quote the Chief Justice correctly. What did the Chief Justice say? I have his speech here with me.

Did I quote him incorrectly?

No, but the hon. member quoted him out of context. The Chief Justice said—

But the hon. member uses extracts …

I used what was quoted in the Press.

I do not care where …

But you should care.

The hon. member uses what was published of the Chief Justice’s speech to support an argument…

He does not send me copies of his speeches.

He then went on to say—

This is the part which the hon. member quoted out of context or incompletely—

And this is the important word—

Since the hon. member quoted the Chief Justice so readily, why did he not also refer to his recommendations on the security situation and the security legislation necessary to ensure order in the country …

What an unfair comment.

No, it is not an unfair comment. I quote further—

We agree with that. But what did the hon. member also say? He said: “They cannot at this stage because of the acceptance of certain other clauses plead for a legislative function for the courts”. Those were the hon. member’s words.

I said a testing right on the merits.

No, the hon. member did not. He said “legislative power for the courts”.

Can you not just stick to the truth? It would be helpful.

Look at your Hansard.

Order!

I did not say legislative powers.

The hon. member must do me a favour. He must go and read his Hansard. Then we can debate this matter further.

I shall.

Please. It would be fair.

In the speech the hon. member for Sand-ton quoted, the Chief Justice identified certain powers that are seeking to destroy the existing dispensation in the country. The hon. member’s party is a status quo party. The hon. member said—and you must allow me to refer to this because it concerns the speech of the Chief Justice—that it was his standpoint that until such time as consensus was reached at a national convention, the White Parliament would dominate all people, Black, Coloured, Asian and White. I say this will unleash the powers of revolution and violence. On the other hand the hon. members of the CP will admit at once that in order to implement their policy, that of a homeland, will take decades, and until that takes place, the status quo will also apply. This means White domination of all people. This will unleash the same powers of revolution.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: This is a total abuse of the Committee Stage. The hon. the Minister is replying to matters which I did not even raise. I stuck closely to the question of the courts and you, Mr. Chairman, were a witness of that. The hon. the Minister is now talking about status quo parties and about Black domination. That has got nothing to do with this particular clause, and I therefore ask you to ask him to bring the debate back to this clause and to bring it back to the points that I raised.

Order! The hon. member for Sandton quoted, apparently, from a newspaper clipping of a report of a speech made by Mr. Justice Rabie. The hon. the Minister replied to that.

*I would nevertheless appreciate it if the hon. the Minister would now confine himself to the clause and to the arguments arising from it.

Mr. Chairman, the fact remains that Mr. Chief Justice Rabie pointed out that there were powers of revolution which had been unleashed in this country, and which had resulted in the normal powers of the court having to be encroached upon for the sake of peace. That is all I want to say about this. For that reason hon. members participating in the debate must in all fairness …

But then how did you get around to us?

Because you form part of the same pattern. [Interjections.] I therefore ask hon. members simply to state their facts correctly.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to deal with any of the arguments raised by the hon. the Minister. I do, however, have a few questions I should like to put to him. I want to know from the hon. the Minister whether he had any knowledge, prior to me stating it in my speech earlier this evening, of whether I was going to quote Mr. Justice Rabie.

The hon. the Minister does not reply. I shall therefore repeat my question. Did the hon. the Minister have any knowledge, prior to me stating it in my speech earlier this evening, that I was going to quote Mr. Justice Rabie?

I shall reply to that. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like the hon. the Minister to reply now across the floor of the House. He has put many questions to me in the past, all of which I have answered. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, then I should like to know why, by coincidence, did the hon. the Minister happen to have in his hand a full copy of the speech delivered by Mr. Justice Rabie. [Interjections.] I want to know that, Sir. Did Mr. Justice Rabie give that speech to the hon. the Minister for use in this debate? If so, why have we not been given a copy of that speech too? I want to know that. [Interjections.] I do not believe that is the case. I do want to know, however, how it happened that the hon. the Minister—not by coincidence, I believe—happened to have a copy of that speech in his hand.

I distributed copies of my speech to the Press this afternoon, thinking we would come … [Interjections.]

Order!

… thinking we would … [Interjections.]

Order!

This is most relevant, Mr. Chairman.

Order! The hon. member for Sandton may ask a question. He may not, however, demand any immediate reply from the hon. the Minister. Therefore the hon. member must proceed with his speech.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not demand an immediate reply then. I do not, however, believe everything is quite above board. In the normal course of events, as many parliamentarians often do, I distributed copies of my speech to the Press before 17h00 this afternoon. I want to know whether the hon. the Minister had a copy of my speech, which he used then to polish up his own speech. Why did he, by coincidence, have in his hand a speech which he, not by any stretch of imagination, could have found relevant to the debate on the clauses of this Bill? The hon. the Minister accused me of quoting the speech out of context. I have never seen that speech. I have only read a report of it; a very brief report, which contained certain statements. I did not mislead the House. I explained to the House that I had read a report of that particular speech. I added that Mr. Justice Rabie was not referring to this constitutional debate. I said, however, that I believed there was a principle contained therein, which was true. The principle I wanted the hon. the Minister to understand was the following one. I quote again from that newspaper report, as follows—

That is what Mr. Justice Rabie said. I said that no matter which way one looked at it, the principle remained the same. I then drew my own conclusion, which I readily admitted. I did not try to draw Mr. Justice Rabie into this debate. I merely said that he had stated a principle and that that principle was one which, I believed, could apply to these circumstances. That was my entire plea.

I was very surprised therefore that the hon. the Minister suddenly stood up with a copy of that speech in his hand, and glibly stated that he was now going to read the complete text. I had no objection to him doing that. All I want to know, however, is whether the hon. the Minister—and I shall come back to this again because I am a man of suspicious mind when it concerns the Government—knew in advance that I was going to raise the matter. If he had no advance knowledge of that, why then did he have a copy of that speech on his desk?

Mr. Chairman, all I should like to say on this matter is to state what, I believe, the hon. member for Sandton is really doing. I believe he is indeed casting a slur on the Press.

Nonsense! [Interjections.]

That is obviously the case. The hon. member is casting a slur on the Press. He says he gave copies of his speech to the Press before 17h00 today. Then his suspicious mind comes into play because he suspects that some member of the Press corps has given me a copy. [Interjections.] That is the only conclusion one can draw from what he said. What are the facts?

I am asking you.

The hon. member says he has a suspicious mind, and I agree with him. The fact is that, when the hon. member stood up and quoted Chief Justice Rabie from a newspaper cutting, the hon. the Minister of Justice, who happened to have a copy of that speech because it was delivered in public, brought me that copy.

It was sent to me.

Yes, it was sent to him while the hon. member was talking. I would therefore suggest to the hon. member that it is most inappropriate for him to cast aspersions on other people.

I accept your explanation.

It is not a question of whether the hon. member accepts my explanation; he has already cast aspersions on other people.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 2. On page 22, in line 60, after “shall” to insert:
   , subject to the provisions of section 18,
2. 3. On page 22, in lines 62 to 64, to omit “an Act of Parliament or any law purporting to be an Act of Parliament” and to substitute:
   any law which is expressed to be enacted by the State President and Parliament or by the State President and any House
3. 4. On page 24, in lines 4 to 6, to omit paragraph (c).
4. 5. On page 24, in lines 9 and 10, to omit “or a law purporting to be an Act of Parliament”.

As regards amendment No. 2, I should like to say that the objective in subsection (2)(c), as stated in this Bill, is to debar the courts from investigating the specific or general nature of an Act of Parliament. Because the formulation does not fulfil the true objectives, I have moved a motion that a new provision be inserted in subsection (2)(a) to give expression to that objective to debar the courts from investigating the specific or general nature of an Act of Parliament and from declaring a law invalid because it does not comply with the provisions of clauses 14 and 15.

As far as amendment No. 3 is concerned, I want to say that the words “an Act of Parliament or any law purporting to be an Act of Parliament” assumes two things, viz. firstly, an act which is valid, and, secondly, an act which is invalid. To give substance to the real meaning, it is proposed that the wording as contained in the amendment be inserted in subsection (2)(a), thereby saying that the court is being empowered to investigate a law which can be identified as an Act of Parliament, regardless of whether it is valid or invalid.

Please read the wording. I only have it in English, and there is a problem with that.

I shall read it to the hon. member with pleasure. The words I propose inserting in the Afrikaans text, are: “wet wat te kenne gee dat dit die bepaling van die Staatspresident en die Parlement of van die Staatspresident en ’n Huis is”. I hope the hon. member for Durban Point deems that to be correct.

Amendment No. 4 is merely a consequential amendment to amendment No. 2. I have moved that paragraph (c) be omitted.

As regards amendment No. 5, we come back to the argument I advanced with regard to amendment No. 3. It is aimed at omitting the words concerned, since it is unnecessary to insert them there again. It is unnecessary that they appear there.

Mr. Chairman, we have 30 minutes left for the Committee Stage of this Bill, and I note on today’s Order Paper that the hon. the Minister is going to move a considerable number of further amendments to the remaining clauses. I do not think we are going to have the opportunity to discuss them, however.

Allow me to refer briefly to the amendments the hon. member for Johannesburg West has moved. I agree that his second amendment is correct. In fact, when we discussed clause 18, we argued that clause 34 did not reflect the correct position, since clause 18 places a restriction on the provisions of clause 34. I gained the impression that the hon. member for Johannesburg West did not agree with our arguments at that stage.

I did not speak to that clause.

Then it was the hon. the Minister who did not agree with us. However, it would seem to me that since then there has been a glimmer of understanding that there is, in fact, a restriction …

The amendment had already been placed on the Order Paper before we debated clause 18.

Just give me a chance.

As far as the hon. member’s third amendment is concerned, I think that the new wording he has proposed is perhaps closer to the real situation as it will exist in the new dispensation. I do not think the hon. the Minister is listening to me at present, but I would appreciate it if the hon. member for Johannesburg West would do so. In terms of our existing constitution, Parliament consists of two components, viz. the State President and the House of Assembly. In terms of the proposed new dispensation, However, Parliament will not consist of the President and the three new Houses, but a new name is being used and Parliament consists only of the three Houses, without the President. I therefore think this motion of the hon. member for Johannesburg West is closer to the real situation. The true position in terms of the new constitutional proposals is that Parliament as such, as defined in the Constitution Bill—Parliament being the three Houses—is not capable of making a law on its own. They can only do so in co-operation with the State President. Consequently, I think the hon. member’s third amendment is closer to the real situation. The wording could perhaps be improved, but there really is no time for that.

I also agree with the hon. member that his fourth amendment is in line with his second amendment. As regards the hon. member’s fifth amendment, I do not think he has gone far enough. Clause 34(3) reads as follows—

He has moved a motion to the effect that the words which follow be omitted. I want to tell that hon. young member that even after the omission of those words, that amendment of his is by no means in line with his third amendment, for which law of which Parliament is he referring to after omitting those words? As I have already said, Parliament, as defined in the Constitution Bill, cannot make a law on its own. Even if the Committee is prepared to accept the hon. member’s amendment, subsection (3) would really be meaningless. I do not think there is time to consult the legal advisers. However, that is not my problem, but the hon. the Minister’s.

I wish to conclude. From the beginning, it has been our standpoint that any Act of Parliament, the highest legislative authority in South Africa, should be duly passed in terms of the provisions of its constitution. We have already advanced the argument that as a result of the provisions of clauses 16 and 18, our desire that a law should be duly passed in terms of the constitution, is not being met. I am saying this because clause 18, read in conjunction with clause 34, makes it impossible for any court of law in South Africa to make inquiries to determine whether the provisions of the constitution have been duly complied with. Although the second amendment of the hon. member for Johannesburg West is in line with clause 18, which has already been accepted, we have no choice but to record our objections once again. Consequently, the new clause, if it is amended as proposed by the hon. member, does not satisfy us in the least.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to waste time as we are getting towards the end of this debate. However, I must refer to amendment No. 3 of the hon. member for Johannesburg West where he uses the word “expressed” in a particular context in the English language. Frankly, this does not make sense. It is certainly not English as it is spoken and I would hate it if this Bill became law with such an idiocy as this word included. I know the meaning of the word in the context that one “expresses” an idea or an opinion. I also know it in the context that a lady who is carrying excessive milk, “expresses” milk but I have never heard it in this particular context. I do not want to waste time but I would like to suggest that even the original word “purporting” is infinitely better than “expressed” although I accept that it may not be the right word.

Therefore I move an amendment—

1. 6. On page 22, in line 63, to omit “purporting” and to substitute “deemed”

I think this would make more sense. It certainly is English. In the form that it is, it looks to me like one of those Japanese solecisms that one does not expect to find in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think it is necessary for me to react to what the hon. member for Umbilo said with regard to his amendment. It seems as though the argument I used earlier is still valid. There can still be uncertainty as to whether or not what is being investigated is an Act, in other words, whether it is valid or invalid. I do not know whether the wording he has moved will necessarily make the position clear with regard to what we want to achieve here.

I should like to get back to what the hon. member for Barberton said and I shall continue in the same humorous tone he adopted and refer to him as the hon. very old member for Barberton. He argued about amendment 5, particularly the deletion of the last part of clause 3. I do not think it is necessary to go further as he suggested because if we read what is stated in subsection (1) we find that it refers back to clause 33(1), because clause 34(1) provides—

All that subsection (3) is now providing is that no court shall be competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament. The situation therefore very clearly remains as defined in clause 34(1). I therefore do not think it is necessary go any further than that.

Mr. Chairman, that was really an ingenious argument of the hon. young member for Johannesburg West. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, I envy the hon. young member his youth, and that is the truth. If his latest argument is correct, why was it necessary to move his third amendment at all? Surely it was unnecessary.

But these are two different things.

They are not two different things. We are discussing Acts of Parliament. Irrespective of that, if we look at amendment (5) of the hon. member, we find that if his amendment were accepted as it stands, the new clause would read as follows—

With all due respect, that is not very good Afrikaans. I think a word is missing. [Interjections.] Well, we can disagree about that. I think there is a “nie” missing. I do not know whether our language is on the way out in the new dispensation. [Interjections.] Let us at least use our language properly.

Mr. Chairman, we should very much have liked to argue about this particular clause for longer. However, I know that the hon. the Minister is extremely eager for all his amendments to be put in the remaining 700 seconds of this debate if possible, and for that reason I shall not debate the matter any further.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to say the man spoke with spirit, because that would be against the rules; I shall therefore content myself with the remark: It was unexpected! [Interjections.]

†Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to enter into a debate in regard to what was said by the hon. member for Umbilo. However, I must tell the hon. member that I cannot accept his amendment. Neither do I wish to become involved in an argument in regard to the English language because I am not qualified to do so. However, I am assured by the legal advisers and by the translators that the terminology used in the amendment does in fact express the purport of the amendment.

It just isn’t English.

There is no other law that uses it.

It is a solecism.

Sir, the hon. member will understand my position in this regard. I do not wish to argue the point.

I should like to be shown any law that uses that phraseology.

As I say, Sir, I cannot argue that point because I am not qualified to do so.

I have just two remarks to make. The first is that I accept the amendments of the hon. member for Johannesburg West. I should also like to reply very quickly to the hon. member for Barberton because he referred somewhat cynically to the fact that I would want to move my amendments before the time ran out. [Interjections.]

*I wish the hon. member for Barberton would pay attention; I am talking to him.

What did you do when he was speaking?

He diverted my attention.

The hon. member made the somewhat snide remark that he hoped that I would now have the time—I think he said 700 seconds—to get all the amendments through. I also want to comment on the reaction of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. In the Committee Stage—this excludes the debates about the instruction—until tonight 394 speeches have been made to which a reply had to be given. I asked hon. members at the beginning of the debate whether they wanted answers to their questions and the reply was that they did want answers. The hon. member for Barberton is shaking his head. There is a second fact which is important—but unfortunately the Hansard staff could not give me the further details—and that is that on the first seven clauses hon. members of the party which the hon. member for Barberton represents were called to order 155 times, hon. members of my party 10 times and hon. members of the PFP 9 times. [Interjections.] The point was made that we caused the delay and I am replying to that now. The NRP was called to order once only. I submit to the hon. member for Barberton that if that had not happened we would have had all the time in the world to discuss the clauses.

Mr. Chairman, you will quite probably not allow me to make this remark, but just let me make this point: Unfortunately there is no possibility, in terms of the rules of the House of Assembly, of appeal against the rulings of presiding officers.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The implication of the hon. member is quite clearly a reflection on the Chair. I maintain the hon. member must withdraw that remark.

Order! The remark by the Hon. member for Brakpan is definitely a reflection on the Chair, and I ask the hon. member to withdraw it.

Sir, may I address you on this matter?

Yes.

There have been frequent arguments with you as the Deputy Chairman and with the Chairman over rulings that have been given. After you or the Chairman have given a ruling, the matter is closed whether or not hon. members agreed with it. All I said was that no provision is made in the rules of the House of Assembly for appeals against rulings of presiding officers in the Committee of the whole House.

Order! The factual position has been correctly stated by the hon. member, but the way in which he said it was intended to be a reflection on the Chair. I now ask the hon. member to withdraw that remark.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I should like to know from you how it can be ascertained whether the way in which a thing is said is aimed at casting a reflection on the Chair.

I should like to point out to the hon. member that if an hon. member says something here which is not true and another hon. member says: “You lie,” it may be factually correct, but it is nevertheless unparliamentary. In the same way if an hon. member says something here which is a reflection on the actions of the Chair, then it is not permissible in terms of the rules. I ask the hon. member for Brakpan to withdraw that remark without further debate.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it. I did not intend to cast any reflection at all on the Chair. [Interjections.] I am addressing you on a point of order and I do not know whether it is permissible for other persons to be Chairmen of the Committee as well.

Order! The point of order has been disposed of and the hon. member may now discuss clause 34.

If the hon. member for Johannesburg West is correct in moving amendment No. 3, it naturally follows that he will have to move the same amendment with regard to clause 34(3). That would only be logical. The Supreme Court of South Africa has the power to pronounce upon the question of whether the provisions of this measure have been complied with in connection with an Act of Parliament, etc. According to amendment No. 3 the Supreme Court also has the power to pronounce upon the question of whether the provisions of this legislation have been complied with in connection with any law which is expressed to be enacted by the State President and Parliament or by the State President and any House. Now we find it strange that this same amendment was not also moved on clause 34(3). It would be logical to use the same wording in clause 34(3) as was used in 34(2)(a). This is actually the purpose of our entire argument with regard to the amendment. We say that juridically, grammatically and for the sake of style, it is not correct to move this in the way the hon. member for Johannesburg West has done.

Mr. Chairman, I consider the time now to be one minute to midnight and I should like to make an appeal to the Leader of the House, which could be considered to be an unopposed motion on behalf of the official Opposition, to ask him seriously to lift the guillotine motion to give the Committee the opportunity to continue with the Committee Stage of this Bill. This Bill consists of 103 clauses and two Schedules and we are now discussing clause 34. We have not yet discussed the clauses which relate to Parliament and the President’s Council. For example, we consider clause 37 to be a fundamental clause in this Bill.

I therefore ask the hon. the Leader of the House to give attention to this motion of mine.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to associate myself with what the hon. member for Hillbrow said.

Order! We are discussing clause 34.

Mr. Chairman, because there is a great deal of uncertainty about the clause at this stage and it has not yet been finally debated and we have almost reached the stage at which the guillotine is to be applied, I want to join the hon. member for Hillbrow in appealing to the hon. Leader of the House to lift the guillotine motion.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to tell the hon. member for Kuruman that if there is any uncertainty about the clause, he need only put his questions to me and I shall furnish him with replies.

Mr. Chairman, I was attacked a little earlier because the hon. the Minister said that I referred to the first section of the clause as being deceptive. He used the word “bedrieglik”, which is not a word I know very well. I would have preferred a word like “misleidend”, which is what I really meant when I said it. The reason why I said that the first section of this clause is deceptive, is because it is couched in positive terms. Subsection (2)(a) reads—

To the layman this gives the impression that a court of law actually has the right to adjudicate upon the processes of the legislature. However, when one reads the second part of the clause, one sees that the very matters on which it can adjudicate, are limited. They are limited in that whereas it appears that the court, upon being petitioned, can pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament, it cannot in fact pronounce upon the manner in which such a law becomes valid. In other words, the rules and orders of the House are excluded and if those rules have not been adhered to no court of law can adjudicate upon that. The positive statement of what a court can do is further limited by the provisions of clause 18, which have already been passed by this House.

Order! The hon. member is now repeating his argument.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that I have ever mentioned that before.

The argument that the hon. member is now dealing with is contained in clause 18 and has already been raised.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to spend one or two moments in trying to resolve an issue in respect of which I believe the hon. the Minister’s interpretation has been consistently wrong. I refer to the role of the courts in testing the validity of an Act of Parliament. The hon. the Minister has tried to draw an analogy between the testing right of the courts in respect of the legislature and the legislative function of the President’s Council in passing laws and imposing them on Parliament. He tried to do so because the hon. member for Sandton sought to move, first in clause 18 and now in clause 34, an amendment that would give the courts the testing right. That had an analogy with the Government’s desire to give the President’s Council the right to impose a law on Parliament. We want to make it quite clear that we see a fundamental distinction between the role of the President’s Council as determined in previous clauses and the role of the courts under this clause as it stands or as it would have been if it had been amended in terms of the amendment of the hon. member for Sandton. The concept of the courts having a testing power in terms of this clause …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Where we are sitting, we cannot hear the hon. member for Sea Point because of all the noise that hon. members of the NP are making. [Interjections.]

Order! I request hon. members to make less noise, please.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May the hon. member for East London North call the hon. member for Rissik a “meid” (cissy)?

The hon.

member for East London North must withdraw that, please.

Mr. Chairman, what must I withdraw? I do not know what the hon. member is accusing me of.

What did the hon. member say?

I said “throw him out”.

Order! The hon. member for Sea Point may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I want to come back to the point I was making when I was so rudely interrupted by one of the clowns of the House. I think we should now proceed to discuss the constitution of South Africa.

The clause as it stands gives the courts power to test the constitution in so far as procedure is concerned. What the hon. member for Sandton wanted was that the courts should not only be able to test the validity in so far as procedure is concerned, but also as far as the content of the legislation is concerned. Quite obviously if there was a Bill of Rights which introduced qualitative criteria which had not been taken into account when framing legislation it would be entirely appropriate that there should be the testing power of the courts. All we are saying is that we want the testing power of the courts to be there, to be available to determine whether in fact Parliament has acted correctly either procedurally or in respect of criteria laid down in the law.

Order! Before I report progress, I want to point out that when the hon. member for Brakpan raised a point of order about the conduct of certain hon. members earlier this evening, I reacted by saying that the hon. member for Koedoespoort had made certain gestures which could have provoked that conduct. The hon. member for Koedoespoort has since explained to me that he was merely indicating that he was going to take a telephone call. I accept that explanation and therefore consider the matter closed. The hon. member for Koedoespoort had no intention of provoking any reaction. I shall now report progress.

Mr. Chairman, is the hon. the Minister not going to reply to me?

No. The time for debate has lapsed.

Business interrupted in accordance with the Resolution adopted on Thursday, 25 August.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.

Mr. Speaker before you adjourn the House may I point out to you that I made a request through the Chairman of Committees to the hon. the Leader of the House to suspend the guillotine motion. Could we get a reply from him before you adjourn the House?

Order! The hon. the Minister cannot react to that request. The time for debate has lapsed in terms of a resolution of this House. In any event, it is time to adjourn.