Mr. Speaker, I move, without notice—

Agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I was not present here yesterday evening when you gave a ruling on a certain matter. I asked for a copy of that this morning, and with your permission, since you have now given your ruling with regard to what is parliamentary and what is not, I withdraw the word “back-stabber”.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to proceed immediately with a further discussion of clause 20, in respect of which we have moved certain amendments. I should like to place on record the attitude of this party in respect of clause 20, particularly since the first part of the clause provides for the President to preside at all Cabinet meetings. Our fundamental difficulty is that we cannot see the role of the State President as reconcilable with that of a member of the Cabinet. We have always looked upon those roles as two separate ones. As far as we are concerned that position should remain. However, I am not going to abuse the privileges of this House by going into this matter in too much detail now.

We have also moved an amendment making clear our objections to the fact that the number of Cabinet Ministers in the new dispensation is going to be unlimited. The hon. member for Johannesburg West denies that fact by stating that the State President will only appoint Cabinet Ministers on merit. That is of course true. We appreciate the fact that they will be appointed on merit. There may, however, be 178 members of this House who will all be appointed to the Cabinet on merit. Furthermore additional members representing the four provinces may also be appointed to the Cabinet on merit. That is why we believe the number of Cabinet Ministers should be limited in terms of this legislation.

The hon. the Minister also accuses us of being inconsistent. He says that on the one hand we want a limit placed on the number of Cabinet Ministers, while, on the other hand, we insist on three Cabinet Ministers being appointed from our own ranks, as well as three members of our party being appointed to the Ministers’ Council. The hon. the Minister also accuses us of not being consistent by virtue of the fact that, according to him, we have failed to move an amendment seeking to limit the number of Cabinet Ministers. With great respect, Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Minister did not hear what I said by way of interjection at one stage yesterday. I want to refer him to my interjection which appears in his own speech in Hansard, and I quote (Hansard, 29 August 1983)—

For this reason I can also forgive the hon. member for Johannesburg West for not realizing, when he spoke yesterday evening, that our amendment on clause 24 had already been on the Order Paper for a considerable period. The hon. the Minister may also just have forgotten about that specific amendment. One cannot blame him, however, because he has been reading almost 200 amendments to this Bill during the past few weeks. Our amendment in which we seek to limit the number of Cabinet Ministers, however, does appear on the Order Paper, and we will move it when we get to clause 24. I hope it will then be acceptable to the hon. the Minister. The fact that the hon. the Minister says we have no legitimate argument, I believe, is not correct.

I should now like to argue our objection in respect of the unlimited number of members for which this Bill provides. The hon. the Minister says our argument in this respect clashes with one of our previous suggestions. I submit that it does not clash. In the first instance we seek to limit the number of Cabinet Ministers, which is exactly what we also state in the suggestion referred to by the hon. the Minister. Whereas, in terms of the clause as it stands, there can be an unlimited number of members altogether, we do indeed seek to limit that number. We also seek to limit the practice of co-opting to apply only to the three Cabinet Ministers to the Ministers’ Council; the three Cabinet Ministers who are the leaders of their parties, and who will have to liaise with each other.

You should argue that point when clause 24 comes up for discussion. The question of whether the number of Cabinet Ministers should be limited or unlimited applies to clause 24.

No, Mr. Chairman, I do not think that is quite correct. The hon. the Minister stated very clearly yesterday, on the same page of his unrevised Hansard, and I quote again—

I should now like to address myself to the question of the accountability of members. We know now that there will be Cabinet Ministers who will be appointed without portfolio. We do indeed object to the appointment of Ministers without portfolio. This Parliament has never before accepted the principle of appointing Ministers without portfolio. When it comes to accountability we believe that all Cabinet Ministers should be elected members of this House because only elected members of this House can be accountable to this House. They should also be accountable to their voters at all times. It will serve no purpose if we should move an amendment here in the House to reduce a particular Cabinet Minister’s salary if he is not accountable to this House at all. By trying to do that I do not believe we will accomplish anything.

I want to ask the hon. the Minister another question. I want him to tell us clearly why he wants an unlimited number of Cabinet Ministers. My second question is the following. I want to know what the hon. the Minister has in mind when he uses the phrases “definite or indefinite periods of time”, as they appear in clause 20(d).

Order! I regret to interrupt the hon. member but I do believe he is repeating the same argument over and over.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, I am putting questions to the hon. the Minister with reference to what he said in his speech yesterday.

Order! I know the hon. member is asking questions of the hon. the Minister. Nevertheless, in formulating his questions he is using the same argument over and over. That I cannot allow.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely reiterating our objections to which the hon. the Minister has not yet replied. Not having received any reply from him yet, I am now calling upon the hon. the Minister to tell us exactly what he has in mind. I am putting crystal-clear questions to him. We merely want to know from him what is meant by the reference to definite or indefinite periods in clause 21(d). We also want him to tell us for what particular purposes this stipulation is intended. It is no good the hon. the Minister merely saying we should understand. As far as I am concerned we have no secrets in this House. This is a Committee Stage, and it is our duty to discuss this Bill in the fullest detail. Therefore the hon. the Minister should spell out to us exactly what he has in mind.

Furthermore we are going to have a situation in which a member of the Ministers’ Council can at the same time be a Cabinet Minister. Is that correct?

Yes.

I should like to know then whether that particular person is going to receive a double salary. Will he be paid as a member of the Ministers’ Council and also receive remuneration in his capacity as a Cabinet Minister? Then there is also a further question I should want to put to the hon. the Minister. If Ministers are going to be appointed for a definite or indefinite period, or for a particular purpose, are they going to enjoy the same privileges as other Cabinet Ministers? I am referring now to official cars, houses, offices, staff, etc. Will they also receive the same salaries? I ask these questions of the hon. the Minister. Perhaps the hon. the Minister can give us some indication of what the financial implications are of implementing this constitution in South Africa with the three Houses, the President’s Council, 308 members and an unlimited number of Cabinet members. What is the cost to the country? How many millions of rand is it going to cost the taxpayers in order to implement this constitution? Many offices are duplicated and many appointments are being made. I think the time has come for us to get down to the nitty-gritty and for the hon. the Minister to tell us precisely what is going to happen and what the costs are.

He also dealt with the question of bringing in Ministers and gave the example of education, saying that a member of a Ministers’ Council could be brought into the Cabinet in connection with that. The present hon. the Minister of National Education may well become the Minister of Education in the Cabinet for general affairs. He may also be on the Ministers’ Council in the House of Assembly for education. Will he then represent both? Surely he can cover all questions of education. Why does one then need outside people in the Cabinet to deal with education when the present Minister of National Education can deal with it? In those circumstances we cannot see why he cannot hold both portfolios.

Our amendment will do away with the uncertainty of the unlimited number and of the indefinite period and it will bring about an improvement in the existing clause because then the Cabinet will at least have on it the chairmen of the three Ministers’ Councils and the views of the Asians and the Coloureds can be expressed in the Cabinet. There will then be direct liaison from the Houses to the Cabinet and from the Cabinet back to the Houses. We shall therefore proceed with our amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I replied to all the questions the hon. member put to me last evening. Clause 20 does not deal with the number of Ministers. The hon. member has therefore indicated, quite rightly, that his party will be moving an amendment on clause 24. I shall therefore not argue with him about that now. I am quite prepared to discuss that particular point with him when we get to clause 24.

The hon. member said a very interesting thing. In fact, it is the essence of his objection. What the hon. member is really opposed to, is the system in terms of which the offices of the Head of State and the Head of Government are being combined in one post. That is his fundamental objection. All the other attempts of the hon. member are really aimed at achieving in a different way what he is unable to achieve with an amendment which would be ruled out of order, since it would be inconsistent with the principles we have already accepted. The hon. member would readily concede that those are the facts.

The hon. member asked me once again what I meant by saying that a Minister can be appointed for a specific period or for a specific purpose. I replied to that last evening, and I should like to reply to that again. I explained that in given circumstances, the State President could co-opt the Chairmen or other members of Ministers’ Councils for the purposes of performing a particular task. For example, when there is going to be a discussion on education which could affect the work of the relevant Ministers in the Ministers’ Councils, they would be attending the Cabinet meeting for a particular purpose. Those Ministers can attend for as long as that particular issue is being discussed and they would therefore be there for a specified period of time. Why does the hon. member find that so difficult to understand?

The hon. member went on to debate a point which is not covered in this clause at all, viz., firstly, the status of Ministers, and secondly, the conditions of service of Ministers. I want to say at the outset that there is no difference in status between Ministers in die Ministers’ Councils and Ministers in the Cabinet.

If a person is only appointed for a month, as well?

Let me first deal with status in general. There is no difference in the status of members of the Cabinet and members of the Ministers’ Councils. Nor is there any difference in their conditions of service. The hon. member wants to know what the position would be if a Minister attended a meeting for a specific purpose. Once again, with all due respect, the hon. member’s argument is born out of ignorance concerning the way in which a Cabinet, a Government, functions. Some Ministers attend meetings of Cabinet Committees every day, whilst others are not involved at all. However, the one is not paid more than the other, unless the hon. member wants to argue that such a person should be paid double. One could then argue about what it would cost the country to implement such a system.

Therefore, the hon. member is arguing that additional expenditure is going to be incurred in putting such a system into operation. In fact, this will be the case as regards the central level. I wonder whether the hon. member does not think that a financial price is a small price to pay to allow others to participate in Government. I wonder whether he has thought of an alternative if we do not succeed in allowing people to participate in government processes. I wonder whether he has considered what the consequences would be in terms of violence. It is very easy to advance this kind of argument across the floor of the House without being expected to advance your own alternative and what it would cost.

Mr. Chairman, in his first reply last evening, the hon. the Minister replied to what the hon. member for Rissik had said. As regards the hon. the Minister’s remark that the hon. member for Rissik was the only member on this side of the House who is happy where he is at present, I want to tell the hon. the Minister that we on this side of the House are all very happy, since, as regards the policy of separate development and the freedom … [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

I just want to refer to what the hon. the Minister said in his speech. He said (unrevised Hansard, 29 August 1983)—

He was referring to the hon. member for Rissik—

The hon. the Minister then went on to say—

How can the hon. the Minister make such a statement? We had the pronouncement of the present hon. Minister of Internal Affairs on this matter before us in 1977, and it does not correspond at all with what the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning is saying now. The present hon. Minister of Internal Affairs said at that time that the White Parliament would retain all powers except those which it decided to transfer, and that the members of the Cabinet who serve on the Council of Cabinets would therefore be consulting as representatives of the population group to which they belong. He said that they would retain their portfolios in their own Cabinets and no portfolios would be allocated to them. [Interjections.]

Order! I cannot permit the hon. member to go into those arguments now. Yesterday evening the hon. the Minister debated the points in consequence of the remark made by the hon. member for Rissik. If the hon. member were to read the hon. the Minister’s speech further, he would see that the Deputy Chairman also asked the hon. the Minister not to elaborate any further on that point. The hon. member can debate that principle further during the Third Reading.

I shall therefore leave the matter at that. I just want to say that there was no question of a super Cabinet in 1977. [Interjections.] Where in the information document does it say that?

I now come back to the clause. The CP is completely opposed to the establishment of a mixed, multiracial Cabinet as provided in clause 20. Such a Cabinet would necessarily be a coalition Cabinet in terms of clause 20(b). [Interjections.]

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that he is now discussing the principle of the matter. The principle has already been accepted, viz. that there will be a Cabinet. Consequently, the hon. member cannot address the Committee on that now.

Mr. Chairman, clause 20(b) specifically provides that those Ministers will be drawn from all the population groups as far as the various Houses are concerned.

The hon. member cannot debate the principle again. The hon. member may only discuss the details of the clause. He is not permitted to discuss the principle of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Your ruling that the principle is that there will be a Cabinet, is quite correct. However, I respectfully suggest that the composition of that Cabinet is a matter of detail, and the hon. member for Pietersburg is discussing the composition of that Cabinet now.

The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, my argument is that due to the very fact that it is a coalition Cabinet, it contains a built-in potential for conflict, as is provided in clause 20(b). Do hon. members opposite think there could be any question of consensus in such a Cabinet? Those are people with widely divergent ideologies.

Order! The hon. member is not debating the details of the clause now. The hon. member must discuss what is contained in the clause, and nothing else. [Interjections.] Order! I appeal to hon. members to give the hon. member the opportunity to discuss the details of this clause. The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed, but I want him to confine himself to the details of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to indicate that clause 20(b) makes specific provision for Ministers who are appointed to administer State Departments for general affairs are Ministers who are drawn from the three Houses. I am merely trying to indicate how this could cause problems as far as the work of such a Cabinet is concerned.

Why is the hon. member referring to it as a coalition Cabinet? [Interjections.]

The hon. the Minister of Law and Order is asking me where it is stated that it will be a coalition Cabinet. The position is that Coloured and Indian leaders are being included in a Cabinet. If the hon. the Minister and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition co-operate against an Opposition in a Cabinet, then surely that is a coalition Cabinet. What is this Cabinet other than precisely that? [Interjections.]

Order! The clause does not mention a coalition Cabinet and consequently the hon. member cannot debate that.

Mr. Chairman, I shall therefore leave the matter at that. I just want to make this statement. I foresee real problems with the functioning of such a Cabinet in respect of important matters. It will be difficult to obtain consensus in such a Cabinet even with regard to less important matters, and I want to mention an example in this regard. It is a pity that the hon. member for Pretoria Central is not present here now, but the hon. member for Bryanston would recall that on occasion, the three of us addressed a student audience at Potchefstroom. One of the students in the audience put a question to the hon. member for Pretoria Central with regard to South Africa’s immigration policy. He asked why immigrants from countries other than White countries were not allowed into this country. The hon. member for Pretoria Central then explained the Government’s policy. As soon as he had resumed his seat, Mr. Jac Rabie, the leader of the Labour Party in the Transvaal, jumped up and told the hon. member for Pretoria Central that he would not take that.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Has the Government’s immigration policy got anything at all to do with the provisions of this clause? The hon. member for Pietersburg is advancing arguments on immigration policy, which has got nothing at all to do with this clause. [Interjections.]

I am asking the hon. member for Pietersburg for the last time to come back to the details of this clause.

I just wanted to mention one example to point out that a joint Cabinet of this nature cannot succeed, since a person belonging to another population group, who has a different philosophy and a very different ideology, will not be able to bring about consensus into a Cabinet. That is the point I wanted to make. [Interjections.]

Order! I just want to say that there are a few hon. members whose quota of interjections is rapidly running out.

Furthermore, if something should happen to the Chairman of the Cabinet—i.e. the State President—or if he should resign unexpectedly, no one will have been designated as Vice State President. In my opinion, and in terms of the clause, there will no longer be a Cabinet, since, in terms of the clause, the State President is the most important component of the Cabinet. It is therefore the standpoint of this side of the Committee that there should, in fact, be a Vice State President.

What I am saying, is that the CP is totally opposed to a mixed or multiracial Cabinet of any nature, and we shall consequently be voting against that.

Clause 20(c) provides that Ministers can be appointed to perform duties other than the administration of a State Department. The hon. member for Hillbrow referred to this. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I rise only to place on record that we shall oppose both the amendments as we opposed them in the Select Committee. I think the basic difference here is that those who oppose the clause are still thinking in terms of the Westminster system whereas we are moving into a new system where there has to be an element of flexibility to deal with a new structure which cannot be planned in detail to the last comma and full stop in advance. We have accepted in principle that in the initial stages, the transitional stages of the new constitution, there will have to be a process of gradualism which it is impossible to spell out in a detailed blueprint. We do not have the objection which the official Opposition and the CP have to Ministers or Deputy Ministers without portfolio—and I shall not repeat myself when we come to that clause. We believe that such flexibility will enable people who may not yet have the experience to administer a department to play a part and perhaps still make a major contribution towards executive government in other ways.

Therefore we shall support clause 20 and we shall adopt the same approach in regard to clause 21 as well and to Deputy Ministers when we come to them. We obviously do not accept the ridiculous baasskap suggestion of the CP that only a White person can serve in the Cabinet. We shall vote for the clause and we shall oppose the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban Point anticipated what I was going to say, since I have not yet moved these amendments. I now move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 3. On page 16, from line 11, to omit paragraph (d).
2. 4. On page 16, after line 14, to insert:
   1. (2) A person shall not serve as a member of the Cabinet unless he is qualified to be elected or nominated as a member of the House of Assembly.

The motion that the Cabinet consist only of White persons, is in accordance with the principle of separate development. It is also in accordance with the principle that there are separate areas which the various Cabinets govern. It is by no means a question of domination, since domination would mean a super Cabinet governing the entire country, and we are opposed to that.

I wish to associate myself with what the hon. member for Hillbrow said, by pointing out that when we come to clause 24, amendments will be moved to limit the number of members of the Cabinet. I think the hon. the Minister anticipated the matter somewhat by criticizing it last evening, since an amendment to that effect by the CP appears on the Order Paper.

That cannot be argued appropriately here.

Then we must have all misunderstood the hon. the Minister.

I want to confirm something, despite the different arguments advanced by the hon. the Minister last evening in respect of the question of coalition. I just want to read one quotation for his consideration, in which a knowledgeable writer had this to say—

The different partners the government wants to involve in this Bill, are partners from different population groups who belong to different parties in the different Houses. If one considers the present situation as the basis, there will be people who endorse the standpoints of the NP serving in that Cabinet, as well as people who are further to the left than the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. That cannot work, particularly if one takes into account the fact that there is a law such as the Prohibition of Political Interference Act. How something of this nature can function under these circumstances, is something the CP simply cannot understand. Furthermore, the hon. the Minister speaks of co-responsibility with regard to the 1977 and 1979 proposals. I just want to make the point that co-responsibility is not power-sharing. The hon. the Minister can argue for as long as he pleases, but it is not power-sharing. We have motivated this statement repeatedly, but it seems to me that we should simply accept that we disagree on this issue.

For these reasons, we cannot associate ourselves with the Cabinet as set out in this clause, nor can we vote for the amendment of the hon. member for Hillbrow.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that I am unfortunately unable to accept amendment 4 as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to state very briefly that we obviously support the amendment of the hon. member for Brakpan, because it is in line with our argument in relation to this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few remarks concerning the composition of tike to make a few remarks concerning the composition of the Cabinet, as set out in clause 20. In passing, I want to refer to the historical events leading up to this composition. In my opinion, this is very relevant to the discussion of this clause.

I want to commence by referring to the Council of Cabinets and I want to quote from the Book Vrugte van die Nasionale Bewind …

Order! I cannot agree with the hon. member that that is relevant to this point. The hon. member must come back to the details of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister repeatedly used the 1979 concept as a frame of reference to discuss clauses. All I am doing, is to go back to the Council of Cabinets to discuss this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I referred to aspects of the Council of Cabinets to reply to the arguments of hon. members opposite.

I want to point out to the hon. member for Jeppe that the Deputy Chairman and I pointed out to hon. members yesterday that the Chair would not permit the 1977 and 1979 proposals to be discussed repeatedly.

I was not referring to them, Mr. Chairman. I was speaking about the Council of Cabinets of 1974.

Order! The Council of Cabinets is not relevant here either. The section in the Standing Orders regulating discussions during the Committee Stage, makes it very clear that only the details of a clause may be discussed. I ask the hon. member kindly to co-operate now.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, my speech is based on a relevant point. However, you will not permit me to make my speech, and consequently, I am unable to do so.

Mr. Chairman, in my speech last evening, I put a question to the hon. the Minister concerning the composition of the Cabinet, with special reference to clause 20(b), (c) and (d). [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, I should like to draw your attention once again to the fact that hon. members of the governing party continually make remarks about hon. members of the CP with the aim of provoking us into disregarding your rulings.

Order! The hon. member may proceed.

One of the matters I brought to the hon. the Minister’s attention, was that the reason for the Cabinet being composed in this way is to give correct representation, on a moral basis, to the three different population groups. The question I asked the hon. the Minister was whether the Government could give us an indication of whether, in the composition of the Cabinet, the proportional basis in terms of which the three Houses are constituted, is going to be reflected.

Order! The hon. member would concede that he advanced that argument yesterday evening.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, you are quite correct, but the hon. the Minister has not yet replied.

Order! I must point out to the hon. member that he is not permitted to repeat arguments. I ask him to cooperate.

Mr. Chairman, I should very much like to co-operate, but we are conducting a debate in which we as an Opposition party are advancing certain arguments and putting questions about this particular clause, and if perhaps the hon. the Minister has forgotten to reply to them, I should just like to bring this to his attention once again to refresh his memory.

The hon. member may proceed.

Another question which arises, is whether the members of the Cabinet are going to be members of their various parties, or whether people with no affiliation to a particular party will be included in the Cabinet. Another question connected to this, is whether the members of the Cabinet will remain members of the various caucuses of the different parties. I think for the sake of the activities of this Cabinet, these are question to which we should very much like an answer from the hon. the Minister. Are members of the Cabinet going to be required to be a member of a particular party, and to what extent will these Cabinet members be bound to the principles of the different parties to which they belong? A final question I want to put to the hon. the Minister, is whether he is prepared to tell us at this stage what kind of ratio there is going to be in the composition of the State Departments, whether the State Departments for general affairs which are going to be administered by the Ministers in the new dispensation are going to be fully integrated, and therefore consist of members of the three population groups.

Mr. Chairman, I move—

Order! Considering the amount of time spent on the discussion of this clause, a clause which basically consists only of details, and with a view to there being a further opportunity to discuss the aspects relating to principles, and since I have had to ask hon. members repeatedly not to repeat arguments, I accept the motion of the hon. the Government Chief Whip.

Mr. Chairman, this clause is yet another departure from the tried and tested democratic practice where power is supposed to flow from the people through their House of Representatives up to the executive.

I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 16, after line 15, to insert:
   1. (a) the Chairman of the Ministers’ Council in terms of section 24(2)(ii);
2. 2. On page 16, in lines 19 to 25, to omit paragraphs (b) and (c).
3. 3. On page 16, in lines 31 to 35, to omit subsection (2).

These amendments are designed to restore this flow of power upwards as is the practice at the present time in assembling the Cabinet which serves this House. The Ministers’ Council, as proposed in the new constitution, is the nearest equivalent we have to the existing Cabinet. At present the power does flow upwards smoothly and in a synchronized way, but the Government’s proposal in this clause reverses that flow. The power will be assigned in large measure from the top downwards on the House by the President except for the provision in subsection (2) which makes some concession to the principle that the majority must govern. It does not go all the way by any means and the discretion in making the appointments rests with the President. It is a back-to-front procedure. At present the man who has the confidence of the House presents himself to the neutral State President and is automatically appointed Prime Minister. After that the State President acts on the advice of that Prime Minister to appoint the Ministers to the various executive positions. The Prime Minister, in making such recommendations to the State President, upon which the State President always acts, takes account of his support base and of the need to retain the confidence of the House.

This proposal reverses that. It does not take account of the need for the power to flow upwards in accordance with the way present conventions operate. The proposed system and assembly of the Cabinet, as set out here, means that the President can appoint anyone to the Council—that is specified in clause 24—and that in his discretion he appoints the majority leader from that council.

There is a very unhappy history in respect of the appointment of majority leaders. We know what happened in the case of the defunct Coloured Representative Council. The Government overlooked the leader of the majority party, the party which had won the most support at the polls, and they appointed their own man through gerrymandering of appointees. When the CRC in the hands of the Labour Party eventually became a bit too hot for the Government to handle, they then went even further and appointed Mrs. Alathea Jansen to run the show.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member allowed to use the word “gerrymander”?

Order! No. A person who gerrymanders is a swindler. Therefore the hon. member must withdraw it.

It is a good old constitutional practice.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask you to reconsider. Gerrymandering is a well-known practice in America and England.

Did the hon. member refer to hon. members?

No, to the Government.

Then the hon. member may proceed.

Thank you, Sir. I am pleased that I am allowed to use that phrase because I believe very strongly that the Government did in fact gerrymander the CRC in its own way to appoint people who were favourably disposed to the Government. Against that background we must judge this clause dealing with the composition of the proposed Ministers’ Councils and the appointment of the chairmen.

The NP in this debate has consistently argued that it wishes to preserve the present convention in respect of the different Chambers. The Government has consistently argued that it wishes to preserve the relationship between the separate Chambers and the State President. In the debate on clause 19 the Government said that the State President’s relationship with the separate Houses will be exactly the same than the relationship between the present House and the present State President. I think I am correct in understanding the hon. the Minister’s position on that. If that is his position, he should really accept the amendments which I have moved. These amendments, taken together with the proposed amendments on clause 24 by the hon. member for Sea Point, would carry the present conventions operating in respect of this House forward to the new system. It is one thing for the Government to have gerrymandered the CRC, and it is even another thing for it to think that it may wish to gerrymander the future Chambers of the Coloureds or the Indians, but in this clause we are discussing the future executive of this Chamber as well. All hon. members of this House must think very carefully before accepting the proposal as it is presently worded. It would mean that the new State President could decide in his discretion who is the majority leader of this House.

Who will decide on the leaders to your convention?

That is not what the clause is dealing with. In terms of our amendment the convention and the present relationship would be upheld. The way it is presently worded, it would even be possible—I am not saying that it would be easy or that it would necessarily happen—that the new State President could decide in his discretion who is the majority leader of this House. One can conceive of different competing personalities in the present, future and past who the State President might have decided to appoint, in a situation where this House might have chosen differently. I think it is the safest, and it is consistent with the way the Government has argued in debates on previous clauses, to preserve the existing convention.

Mr. Chairman, I can see where the problems of the hon. member for Constantia lie with the present formulation of this clause. One must bear in mind that there are, in fact, two things at issue here. Clause 21(2) leaves it to the discretion of the President to decide who should be designated as leader, who, in his opinion, has the support of the majority of members in the Houses at that time. If one did not word it in this way, and it were to appear at a later stage that the President had made a mistake, it would mean that the appointment was illegal, and that any tasks which had been performed in the interim would also be illegal. The clause, as it is worded at present, gives an indication of what the President ought to do. Whatever appointment he makes, is legal, since it is done at his discretion. On the other hand, there are also the workings of the political powers, in the sense that if one were to look at clause 39, which concerns the control over this procedure, one sees that the House in question can pass a motion of no confidence in the Minister’s Council. Very clearly, this mechanism controls the discretion of the State President, so that if the State President were to make a mistake, or to act wilfully in terms of clause 21(2) and he appoints someone who does not really have the confidence of the House, the House can rectify the position, in terms of clause 39, by passing a motion of no confidence in the Minister’s Council. Although the clause, as it is worded at present, could create the impression that the State President can do as he pleases, this is really not the case. It is formulated in this way merely to guarantee the legality of any appointment at any stage. I hope it is clear that this does not empower the State President to prescribe to the Houses who the leaders of their majorities are, but that the Houses are free to prove that the person appointed by the State President does not, in fact, have the confidence of the majority. In this way, the present convention in respect of the Chairman of the Minister’s Council as far as each House is concerned, is being transferred to the new dispensation. I shall leave the matter at that.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 4. On page 16, from line 26, to omit paragraph (d).
2. 5. On page 16 after line 35, to insert:
   1. (3) A person shall not serve as a member of a Ministers’ Council unless he is qualified to be elected or nominated as a member of the House of Representatives or the House of Delegates, as the case may be.

The second amendment I moved, is in accordance with the view of the CP that there should be a Ministers’ Council for each particular population group which should deal with matters pertaining to that particular population group and which should serve it.

As far as the omission of paragraphs (c) and (d) are concerned, I want to point out that this is linked to the argument we advanced concerning clause 20, when we stated that it was a very vague clause concerning which there was not much clarity.

Order! I regret that I have to interrupt the hon. member, but I want to prevent him from speaking unnecessarily. I wish to point out to the hon. member that amendment 5 is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time. Consequently, I am unable to accept amendment 5.

I subsequently want to point out briefly that for a number of reasons, the CP will not be voting for the clause concerned. The first is that although the principle that there is a Ministers’ Council for each of the population groups is correct, and accords with our particular view, I must say that the fact that one has Ministers’ Councils for the three population groups that are not linked to a particular geographic area, does not make sense to us. I believe that there is going to be too much overlapping with the Cabinet which will be appointed in terms of clause 20, and that there is going to be a great deal of uncertainty and doubt concerning its activities.

I must point out that clause 21(2) provides as follows—

This provision does not compel the State President to designate the chairman or the majority of that particular group. The State President will nevertheless make such a designation at his own discretion, even though he thinks that there is no member who has the support of the majority in a particular House. The arbitrariness as far as the State President is concerned, is something we cannot accept.

In conclusion, I want to point out once again that the President could, in fact, be an Indian or a Coloured. He need not necessarily be a White. The CP is not prepared to support a President who belongs to a population group other than the White population group in a future dispensation. In my opinion, the way the governing party is acting, soon a President belonging to another population group will have to designate a leader for the White House. This runs counter to our view of self-determination, and we simply cannot support it.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendments moved by the hon. member for Constantia, and I sincerely hope that the hon. the Minister will reply in succinct detail to the points that have been and will be raised.

In as far as the Ministers’ Council is concerned and the President, I think it has been agreed that the relationship is approximately the same as exists at the moment between the Executive Council and the State President; in other words, we have a Westminster situation in which the Ministers’ Council derives it support and its legitimacy from the support of the particular House in which it serves. I want to say in the first instance that we are opposed to the concept that people can be appointed Ministers who do not administer departments of State. We think that is a wrong principle. On the previous clause the hon. the Minister argued that there could be a variety of functions which the State President would like an individual to perform outside of heading a department of State. That may even apply in respect of the general Cabinet. However, when we are dealing with Ministers’ Councils we are dealing with councils that are locked in to the various Houses for own affairs and we do not believe it should be the prerogative of the State President to nominate people as Ministers other than those people who head departments of State for own affairs. It may be said that there may be somebody who is required to do some work other than the administration of a department. We believe that that is covered by the provisions of clause 21(1)(d) in terms of which the Ministers’ Council is empowered to co-opt additional members. Therefore the Ministers’ Council can co-opt that extra person. What we are opposed to is the President having the right to impose on a Ministers’ Council somebody who is not heading a department of State. If it is necessary to have a Minister without Portfolio, we believe that the decision as to whether it is necessary should rest with the Ministers’ Council and not with the State President. For that reason we believe that clause 21(1)(b) should be deleted and that clause 21(1)(d) should remain so that the Ministers’ Council itself can determine whom it wants.

The next essential element of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Constantia is that as the clause stands at the moment the State President shall designate the individual members of the Cabinet for own affairs—the Ministers’ Council. Having done that, he shall designate one person to be the chairman of the council or the chairman of the Cabinet. That is not the procedure that applies at the moment. At the moment, he designates the Prime Minister, and he appoints the other members of the Cabinet on the advice of that Prime Minister. What we seek to achieve by the omission of clause 21(2) and the insertion of a new subsection (2) in clause 24 is to provide that having designated one person to be the leader of the majority party, he must thereafter appoint Ministers as members of the Ministers’ Council on the advice of that person. But what he cannot do, is to decide who is going to be the Cabinet and then designate one of the Cabinet Ministers as Prime Minister. We believe that essential to this system is that, having designated the Prime Minister—I use the term “Prime Minister” te relate it to the present system—Cabinet Ministers be appointed on his advice. What you cannot do, is to appoint Cabinet Ministers and thereafter say to a Minister that he is being appointed Prime Minister. We have to bring this procedure back to the current procedure, and also to the procedure which we believe has been strongly recommended by all the Coloureds and Indians who gave evidence and who said that they want the appointments to be made on the recommendations of the majority party, because I believe the clause as it stands is flouting the wishes of the Coloured and Indian people. They do not want the State President to have the right to decide who is going to be the Cabinet. They want the majority party to decide who is going to be the Cabinet. We argue very strongly that if we want to make this work and if we want the support of the Coloured and Indian community, the chairman of the council should be designated and the Ministers appointed on his advice thereafter. Let us not first appoint the Ministers and then designate which one of them will be the chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the hon. member for Sea Point and the hon. member for Constantia, who moved these amendments, are missing an important point of the argument which was also advanced before the Select Committee. If I remember correctly, there was an urgent request from both population groups that the chairman of the Ministers’ Council should be the leader of the majority party. Hon. members would recall that we debated that point in the Select Committee for the very purpose of carrying out that wish. In consequence of that, we arrived at the formulation as worded in the clause, which provides that the chairman concerned should have the support of the majority in the House in question. If the hon. member for Sea Point is claiming that we are departing from the convention, it would seem to me that he forgets that we will, in fact, have a new State President as well. After all, he will not only be a State President, but he will be occupying the posts of two people. If the hon. member wants the existing convention to be transferred to the new dispensation, surely the reply to that is that we will not be dealing with the same State President. We were bearing the new system in mind when we came forward with this formulation to carry out the wish that the chairman should be the leading figure who has the support of the majority. In our opinion, the State President, being the head of State, as well as the political leader, is the only person who can exercise the discretion to make that choice. That is why, in view of what the hon. member for Rissik said as well, we have included the words “in the opinion of the State President”. The choice he has to make is determined by his discretion concerning who has the support of the majority. In my opinion, this was an attempt on the one hand to fulfil the wish expressed by both the Coloureds and the Indians, and which is being expressed by the Whites, at present, that that person must, in fact, have the support of the majority in the House concerned, but, on the other hand, that the position of the State President, who, in terms of the new dispensation, will not only be acting as the State President does at present when he instructs the Prime Minister to form a Cabinet, must also be taken into account. Surely the difference is clear, viz. that in the new dispensation the State President will ultimately be the person who accepts responsibility for the Government as a whole, of which the Ministers’ Council forms a part. Due to the closer relationship which will most definitely exist between the State President and the Ministers’ Councils, the position will be different from what it is at present. For this reason, it is my contention that this formulation most definitely best expresses the position as it should be in the new dispensation. I am not quite clear as to why the hon. member for Constantia has moved an amendment to omit paragraphs (c) and (d). For example, I think that the appointment of a Deputy Minister in the Ministers’ Council is a need which could be fulfilled at discretion in circumstances which may arise at a given time.

Consequently, I think that the formulation as it stands here is the best way of expressing the practical function as it will exist in the new dispensation.

Mr. Chairman, I want to indicate at once that the amendments of the hon. member for Constantia are not acceptable. The hon. member’s first amendment also refers to an amendment to clause 24 which is to be moved by the hon. member for Sea Point. I do not intend to debate that amendment now, but in any event it seems to me that it is going to be very difficult to accept such an amendment if the amendment of he hon. member for Sea Point to clause 24 is rejected. See what the hon. member for Constantia says. He makes two statements. He says: This is a departure from a democratic principle.

†On what basis does the hon. member argue in that way? The only possible reason why the hon. member can argue like that is if he still clings to the Westminster system, because what he proposes to do is to apply the convention that will apply in a Westminster system of government. Quite apart from any detailed discussion on that issue for the moment, we have all agreed at some time or another that the Westminister system in an unadapted form cannot be applied to the circumstances of this country. We may disagree as to the extent and in what way we should deviate from that system, but we have all agreed that that system in its present form cannot resolve the conflict situation inherent in this country.

Do you agree that we want to move away from the winner-take-all system?

I have a problem with the hon. Chief Whip of the official Opposition.

You certainly have.

Yes, I have. The hon. member makes speeches without taking the responsibility for them. He does not even get up to make them. The hon. member is in perpetual motion.

*I submit, therefore, that the hon. member for Constantia is proceeding from a totally wrong premise in his argument about what we are dealing with here. The hon. member’s argument is based on an assumption, therefore, which is not in accordance with the system which he knows. It is a deviation from democratic principles. That is the basis of his argument. This would mean that the country which is regarded as the greatest democracy in the world is also undemocratic in respect of the appointment of its Ministers. As far as I know, a totally different system applies in America, and I have never heard hon. members argue that because members of the Cabinet are appointed from outside Congress or the Senate in that country, this is an undemocratic procedure.

[Inaudible.]

I am not dealing with the hon. member for Yeoville at the moment. All I am trying to say is that it is no use arguing in this House on the basis or premise that we are working with a Westminster system and that any deviation from it is a deviation from democratic principles. We all recognize the fact that there is no particular model…

We did not argue that you were getting away from the Westminster system.

Order!

We argued that you were becoming undemocratic.

The hon. the Minister must please not allow himself to be led astray.

No, Sir, I shall not. The point I am arguing is not at all the one which the hon. Chief Whip of the PFP thinks I am arguing. I am reacting to the faulty premise from which the hon. member for Constantia proceeded in saying that this is a deviation from democratic principles. That is all I am dealing with at the moment.

Furthermore, the hon. member says that we keep arguing that we want to maintain the conventions. But, Sir, surely it is obvious that the conventions must be maintained where they fit into the new system. On the other hand, conventions which have come into being under one particular system cannot indiscriminately and under all circumstances be made applicable to a new system. I am now arguing hypothetically. What is the position here? The hon. member for Sea Point has supported the faulty premise of the hon. member for Constantia by attempting to equate the chairmen of the Ministers’ Councils to Prime Ministers. Because in terms of the Westminster system, the leader of the majority party is called in and asked to form a government, he says, we should now take that particular approach, convention if you like, and apply it without any modification to a system which is not comparable in this regard to the system in which the convention arose.

Therefore I cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for Constantia. In the first place I submit that any reference to a chairman of a Ministers’ council is superfluous because in terms of subsection (2) of the clause, the President is obliged to designate a member of the Ministers’ Council as chairman. I say it is unnecessary because the relevant convention is adequately defined in clause 21(2) and clause 24(3)(b)(ii).

The hon. member’s second amendment is aimed against Ministers without portfolio and against Deputy Ministers. The hon. member for Sea Point is now arguing that a need may arise for Ministers without portfolio, but that this does not apply to the Ministers’ Councils. I do not know what grounds the hon. member has for saying this. If no such need arose in practice, one would naturally not fill such a vacancy, but it remains equally true, and the hon. member for Sea Point will concede this without thereby implying that he supports the constitutional proposals, that one of the most important functions that will have to be performed at the ministerial level is a continuous process of consultation between the various institutions. Now it is quite possible that senior members of the various Houses can be appointed Ministers without portfolio for that particular purpose, in order to initiate those processes. I should have thought that the hon. member would have supported me in this connection.

Mr. Chairman, I think there has been an interesting development with regard to the rights, the comparable rights of the State President and the Ministers’ Councils. The way I understood the discussion on the Select Committee and according to my interpretation of the explanatory memorandum issued by the department, the position of the State President vis-à-vis the Ministers’ Councils is the same as that of the State President vis-à-vis the Executive Council today. A Ministers’ Council is in a sense the Cabinet for own affairs of a House and the State President is obliged to act only on the advice of a Ministers’ Council. In clause 19(1)(b) this is very clearly provided. But now we have had a new approach on the part of the Minister. This old convention is now dead and buried. Are these Ministers’ Councils going to be independent Cabinets for own affairs, or are they to be subject to decisions taken by the State President? The hon. member for Johannesburg West said that they were subject to the “choice” of the State President. What does he mean by that? I thought that in this sphere, the sphere of own affairs, there would be self-determination and that the majority party in a House would be able to decide who should be included in their Cabinet. But the Minister says that we must move away from that old convention which no longer serves any purpose. The State President must decide who will be members of the Cabinet.

But that is the position at the moment, too.

Mr. Chairman, that hon. Minister should stick to community affairs. He should stay away from constitutional affairs. [Interjections.] That hon. Minister knows about houses of a different kind; not about this kind of House. We thought that members of Ministers’ Councils, i.e. Cabinets for own affairs, would be nominated by the State President at the recommendation of the leader of the majority party in a House. That is the way we understood it. But now the hon. member for Johannesburg West says that it is in the discretion of the State President, while the hon. the Minister says that they want to get away from the old Westminster convention, in terms of which the leader of the majority party in a House makes a recommendation to the State President and the State President is obliged to give effect to that recommendation. But now, according to the hon. member for Johannesburg West and the hon. the Minister, the leader of the majority party in a House will no longer have the power to decide who may serve in his Cabinet. This will now be in the sole discretion of the State President. The principle here should be that a particular group should have full power through its own executive authority to exercise that authority in the field of own affairs. It can only exercise it if it has control over the appointment of the members of its own Cabinet. Therefore I want to ask the hon. the Minister again whether this is going to be the convention. Is the State President in fact going to make appointments at the recommendation of the leader, or is he going to exercise his own choice, as the hon. member for Johannesburg West says, and compel the House to accept his choice? I think this is extremely …

Order! I get the distinct impression that the hon. member is actually discussing clause 24. If the hon. member wishes to pursue that line of argument at this stage, that is in order. However, I shall then stop him if he wishes to advance these arguments again when we are dealing with clause 24.

Mr. Chairman, in order to remove all possible doubt, please allow me just to point out that if we do not succeed in having our amendment to this clause accepted, my amendment to clause 24 is bound to fall away. For that reason, I believe, we should join issue in the very first round. [Interjections.] I really want an explanation from the hon. the Minister in this connection. Are we going to go back to the basic approach of identifying the leader of the majority party, whereupon the State President makes appointments at the recommendation of that leader, or is he going to make the appointments in his own discretion, whereupon a leader will simply be designated from the particular number of people whom he—the State President—has appointed? I think that this involves a basic difference in approach.

The first one is the dictatorial approach of the hon. member for Johannesburg West. In terms of that, the State President’s choice is binding. We support the democratic principle, in terms of which the State President is obliged to accept the choice of the leader of the majority group in each separate House.

Mr. Chairman, surely the hon. member for Sea Point will understand that if I accept this amendment of his, I shall have to accept his amendment to clause 24 as well. Therefore I believe that it is quite in order for us to discuss both amendments at the same time.

On the Select Committee we amended clause 21(2). The hon. member should remember that. In the original Bill, clause 21(2) only provided that the State President had to designate a chairman of the Ministers’ Council. The amendment provision is specifically intended to provide for the State President to appoint as Chairman of the Ministers’ Council a person who has the confidence of the Ministers’ Council. I submit that it is reasonable to infer that the one who has the confidence of the House concerned will in fact be the leader of the majority party in that particular House. Surely this is an inference which must inevitably be drawn in practice.

If we were to add the provision that his Ministers in the Minister’s Council also have to enjoy the support of the majority in that particular House, surely one would once again be bound to infer that that process will in fact take place. After all, not all the conventions which apply under the present system were written into the present Constitution; we did not formulate rigid provisions with regard to all of them. The hon. member for Sea Point realizes this. To argue, therefore, that we are conferring dictatorial powers on the State President here is simply not correct. It is just not correct.

Let us now examine the argument of the hon. member for Sea Point. In my opinion his argument is unreasonable. In his own view, of course, his argument will be justified. He equates the position occupied by the Ministers’ Council vis-à-vis the President to the position of the President vis-à-vis the Cabinet in the present situation. But surely it is not the same at all. The reason why clause 19 provides for the way in which the State president should act with regard to own affairs, i.e. on the advice of Cabinet Ministers, surely does not detract from the fact that he is also the Prime Minister in the entire system. However, he is not personally present when that decision is taken in the Ministers’ Council. That is why there is a specific wording, which we have accepted with regard to the President’s functioning in connection with own affairs; a wording which in actual fact only means that a physical distance is being created under the new dispensation between the President and his Ministers’ Council, of which he will not be a member. As far as this aspect is concerned, therefore, the position is analogous to that of the present State President vis-à-vis the Cabinet under the present dispensation. This is the only reason why it has been worded in this way.

For this reason, I submit—with great respect to the hon. member for Sea Point—that the relevant convention is covered by clause 21(2). Therefore his amendment and that of the hon. member for Constantia are not acceptable.

I come now to the hon. member for Rissik. He says that he cannot support the amendment because the President may be a member of one of the other population groups. He says that bearing in mind the approach of the Government party, it will not be long before something of this nature happens.

That is a old piece of gossip.

But is it not true?

I want to ask the hon. member what there is in the clause that gives the hon. member the right to draw such an inference. I ask this with all due respect. [Interjections.] I did not interrupt the hon. member for Rissik. I listened to him attentively. Where does the hon. member get such an argument from? You must remember, Sir, that the hon. members opposite, and specifically the hon. member Mr. Theunissen, argued, with regard to the composition of the electoral college which is to elect the President, that it was immoral, unjust and unfair that the Coloured person and the Indian do not stand the same chance of being elected President as the White man. That was the argument. Now I ask: How on earth do the hon. members in that party manage to argue, under one clause, that the electoral college is composed in such a way that it does not afford all the groups a fair chance of having their candidate elected President …

It is against the false intention of the NP. [Interjections.]

Order!

I want to tell you at once, Sir, that I share your displeasure at that remark, especially when one considers where it comes from, and what is more, whom it comes from.

He does not even have a constituency.

After all, the hon. member Mr. Theunissen does not represent the people who chose him. He no longer even lives in the province concerned. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I ask in all courtesy whether this has anything to do with the clause which is being discussed at the moment. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister was reacting to a remark made by the hon. member Mr. Theunissen. However, I concede that it has nothing to do with the clause. Therefore I should be pleased if the hon. the Minister would now regard the matter as closed.

I shall leave it at that, Sir. All I want to add is that when we argue about our approach to the substance of a clause, as we are doing at the moment, we should remember what our records are.

The hon. member for Rissik argued exactly the opposite of what the hon. member Mr. Theunissen argued on another clause. Consequently we have a record here of debate and argument which are not aimed at understanding or improving the provisions of the legislation. On the contrary, hon. members are trying to see during the discussion of each clause whether they cannot score a small political point against others.

Mr. Chairman, I want to refer briefly to what the hon. the Minister has said about me. I am not trying—and I say this quite soberly—to debate the underlying principles. All I am saying is that if this clause is passed in its present form, the stage could be reached—and I said that as I knew the governing party, it would be reached very soon—when the President who comes to the White House and says,“Well, if I have to pick and choose among you, I think that man should be the chairman of the Ministers’ Council”, could be an Indian or a Coloured man. Remember, the legislation is based on the principle that the President can be a Coloured man, an Indian or a White. Then we must bear in mind that if the Bill is passed, it could be an Indian or a Coloured man who could come to this House as President and who could appoint someone in his discretion to act as leader of the Ministers’ Council. That was all I said. Surely it has no bearing on any principle and it is not immoral in respect of the governing party. I did not mean anything sinister by that. All I said was that we were passing legislation for Whites here in terms of which a person who is not a White could become a Minister.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to talk to the hon. member for Rissik. I have a certain way of talking to him. We understand each other. I want to ask the hon. member whether it is not a fact that what the Government is doing with this Bill and with this clause is what the hon. member advocated. Is this not so?

Just complete the point, please.

After all, the hon. member for Rissik advocated that an electoral college composed in the same way as this one should elect a President. The hon. member supported that, after all.

[Inaudible.]

He says he did. I appreciate the fact that the hon. member is at least prepared to grant me that. Surely the hon. member knows, too, that the legislation which was to have been introduced to provide for that policy standpoint which I shared with the hon. member would not have provided for the President to belong to a particular population group. Surely the hon. member will grant me that as well. [Interjections.] What I cannot understand is that the hon. member should blame me for doing what he wanted to do. I do not think it is fair.

There were three different Parliaments.

Really, the hon. member for Brakpan is more intelligent than that. The three Parliaments have nothing to do with the matter, because they were not functionaries with regard to the election which is to designate the Minister in terms of clause 21, except for choosing the delegates to the electoral college.

I want to come back to the hon. member for Rissik. Why does he argue against me now, when I do what he subscribed to? As far as this clause in respect of the President is concerned, I am doing it on the same grounds as those on which the hon. member was elected to this House. The hon. member was elected to this House on those grounds. He is present here by virtue of a proposal which is identical with regard to the head of the Government and the head of State. Now the hon. member joins issue with me on the matter. Surely this is not fair. Surely the inference which he has drawn is not reasonable. It is malicious. The position has not changed, after all.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to tell the hon. the Minister that I did not raise this matter in a spirit of ill-will.

I did not suggest that.

That is the inference which I drew from the hon. the Minister’s words. All I said was that I wanted to point out quite clearly what “President” meant in terms of the present wording of the clause.

This was precisely the question which I asked in the caucus in 1977. [Interjections.]

Order!

Sir, just allow me to complete the sentence.

The hon. member may proceed.

During the discussion on the previous clause, I told the hon. the Minister that there were differences of emphasis with regard to the matter. Perhaps there were much more than differences of emphasis, because our ultimate ideal is not the same. That aspect will have to be clarified in future debates between the hon. the Minister and myself.

There is a second matter which I wish to discuss with the hon. the Minister. [Interjections.]

There is a very clear difference between your ultimate ideal and mine.

Yes, I agree with that, but the error which has been committed in this connection was committed in 1981. There was a situation where the final blueprint in respect of the population problems had not yet been prepared, in any event, not in the way in which it has now been prepared. It may be said that there were in fact several elements which existed with regard to the 1977 proposals, but I also want to state my own standpoint. In 1977, this was in fact one of my problems which I stated in the party caucus, namely that when the electoral college changed, the Whites could find themselves in a situation where they were in the minority. This was one of the aspects that worried me. I want to say, however, that the information documents published by the party at that time, as well as the assurances given to us, were to the effect that as long as the NP was in power, the NP would always choose a White person. This satisfied me temporarily, but it was not a permanent solution. That is why I want to put this question to the hon. the Minister: Would the NP caucus be prepared at this stage to choose a Coloured man or an Indian who is not a member of the caucus and who is not a member of this House, i.e. to choose him on merit because he is better than anyone else, or is the NP going to tell the public ad infinitum that the NP caucus will only choose a White? I also want to refer to the hon. member for Randfontein and the study groups to which the hon. member for Randfontein referred. In this connection I want to say that as far as this clause is concerned, it will remain a White for 67 years by virtue of the numerical superiority. However, they cannot say what will happen when those 67 years have passed.

Order! I have now allowed two hon. members to conduct a fairly general discussion, but the Chair also has an ultimate ideal, and that is to finalize clause 21. If any hon. member now wishes to advance a burning argument, it must be a new one.

Mr. Chairman, I said by way of interjection that in the 1977 proposals …

Order! The hon. member is not allowed to go back to 1977. I have already allowed two hon. members to debate the matter … [Interjections.]

Nor the 1979 constitution?

Nor the 1979 constitution.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much indeed for bringing the debate back to the merits of this particular clause. We have heard so much about what has happened in the past that one becomes rather tired of hearing it.

It is very difficult to argue with the hon. the Minister and other members who keep changing their ground. They seem not to understand or perhaps refuse to understand the arguments that one is trying to advance. [Interjections.] Those hon. members keep shifting their ground. However, let us look at this particular clause. The hon. the Minister says that we cannot argue that the existing conventions which he says are Westminster conventions must apply because as a party we have already said that we must move away from the Westminster system. [Interjections.]

I did not say that.

That was what I understood the hon. the Minister to have said. [Interjections.]

Order! I am afraid the hon. member is repeating his arguments.

Mr. Chairman, I am leading up to a very important point. We argue—and it is a critical principle—that in this clause the Government is seeking to move away from Western democratic practice. I did not once use the word “Westminster”. The hon. the Minister has tried to put the word into my mouth. I was talking about Western democratic practice. The hon. the Minister quoted the USA in support of his argument but the hon. the Minister knows that in the United States, the President appoints the Cabinet after a popular election, but he does not appoint the office-bearers in the Congress and in the Senate. They appoint their own office-bearers. As I understand it, this is a principle that operates throughout the Western democratic world. Every parliamentary chamber elects its own office-bearers. The hon. the Minister is now coming along with a clause that changes that position. This is a golden thread. This clause does not provide specifically for the various Houses for own affairs to appoint their own executives. It will be at the discretion of the State president. The hon. the Minister either cannot understand that or will not understand it. Perhaps he is trying to shift his ground so that this slips through unnoticed …

I am not shifting ground. I am not a Prog.

He is shifting ground continuously. It comes through from what the hon. the Minister is saying that he will only apply the conventions of the present Parliament in the new dispensation when it suits him. The position is not that the conventions will have a status of their own that will continue and be applied in the new system even when it does not suit them. It will only be applied when it suits them. The hon. the Minister has argued that what he is trying to achieve and what we are arguing is more or less the same. He said that the majority leader will be appointed and that the President will take account of the wishes of the majority in each House. He is just saying that; it is not in the law.

What is in the law today?

There is a convention which applies at the moment. It applies with utter rigidity at the moment. The Prime Minister appoints his own Cabinet at the moment. I want to ask the hon. the Minister so that we can have it on record: Will the new State President in the new system be bound to appoint the leader of the majority party as the chairman of the Ministers’ Council and will he be bound by convention to follow his advice in appointing the members of the Minister’s Council? It is a very simple and direct question, and I would be grateful if the hon. the Minister would give an indication. The hon. the Minister is doing his best to look in every other direction and I hope it is not to avoid answering that question. It is an important answer to have on record.

I have already replied to the question.

Will the State President be bound by the convention to respect the majority leader?

Order! That very same argument was advanced by the hon. member for Sea Point.

Sir, I am putting a question because it has not been answered to my satisfaction or to the satisfaction of this side of the Committee.

Order! The hon. member should not repeat the question again and again.

The question is there on the record, and I hope the hon. the Minister will take the opportunity to give us a direct yes or no answer.

Another hon. member who represents a shifting of ground is the hon. member for Johannesburg West. He says in the argument about this clause that we cannot be bound by the existing arrangement between the State President and the own Houses …

Look at page 124.

… because we have a new kind of State President. That was his argument. He said that a new kind of State President requires a new kind of system and a new kind of relationship between the new kind of State President and the own Houses, but that is exactly the opposite to the argument advanced on clause 19 by the hon. member for Randburg and other hon. members. It was said that the relationship of a neutral State President vis-à-vis the own Houses would apply, because at that stage …

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

My time is extremely limited. In any event, I have no time for the NRP. I am therefore not prepared to take a question.

This is an important issue. In clause 19 the Government went out of its way to say that this new State President is not an exceedingly powerful man.

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to discuss clause 19 again.

Sir, I am arguing that the Government shifts ground when it comes to the powers of the State President.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause under discussion.

Slowly but surely the truth comes out. As the hon. member for Sea Point has said: It comes out like the squeezed last drops of a toothpaste tube. The truth is that this proposed State President is a very powerful person. The hon. member for Johannesburg West let the cat out of the bag today. The hon. member said that the new State President should have the power to appoint the Ministers’ Councils and he should have power to exercise his discretion. That gainsays the argument that the State President will be neutral vis-à-vis the own Houses. It completely contradicts that argument. The critical power of the present Prime Minister is that he can assemble his Cabinet; he can hire and fire his own Cabinet. The present State President has nothing to do with that. What this clause is proposing however, is that the Minister’s Council assembled in this term of clause will not be in the discretion of the majority leader but in the discretion of the State President. That means that you are taking away from the leader in a Chamber the critical power which the present Prime Minister, his equivalent, enjoys. That means that you are emasculating the chairman of the Ministers’ Council as compared with the Prime Minister. It would be an intolerable situation if the present Prime Minister could not assemble his Cabinet according to his own discretion, but this is what the clause provides for. It provides for the State President to exercise discretion over the composition of the own affairs cabinets.

If one looks at second tier government in South Africa at the moment, at the provincial councils, even they are able to choose their own executives. The Government appoints the administrators, but the provincial councils of the provinces …

Order! This argument has nothing to do with the clause before the Committee.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, it relates directly.

The hon. member must discuss the contents of the clause.

The contents of the clause provides for a Minister’s Council to be assembled at the discretion of an outsider. We are saying that it is a critical principle in other parts of the Western democratic world, including this country, that the executive is appointed by the Chamber or Parliament concerned. Our amendment is full square in line with that principle, which also operates in other Western democratic capitals besides Westminster. I do not think the hon. the Minister can mention a single Western democratic capital where it does not apply that the Chamber throws up its own executive.

The final argument which still stands, which the hon. the Minister has not replied to—he makes a habit of not replying to our arguments—is the fact that you have to win the confidence of the new people who are going to participate in the system. The hon. the Minister has conceded that the leading witnesses before the Select Committee, namely the Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Party, were very strong on this principle. If he wants to respect their wishes and gain their co-operation, he will accept our amendment, because it complies in all respects with the wishes of those Coloureds and Indians. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member who has just resumed his seat, when I tried to ask him a question, said that he had no time for the NRP. That is fine, but I sincerely hope that since he has another speaking turn left and I intend using a few minutes of what I am entitled to pose a question to him, that he should find the time to answer, because I think it is very important.

I have here the original Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, B 91 of 1983, which was referred to a Select Committee of the House, which I believe met for some considerable time. The clause we are now dealing with, namely clause 21, appeared in that Bill as clause 23. It appears that the clause was amended in the Select Committee to read exactly as we have it before us in the Bill today. I have studied the two clauses very carefully and I want to say that they are identical. I have also looked at the minutes of proceedings of the Select Committee on the Constitution and I find that on page 124 that when the Committee divided on the clause, Messrs D. J. Dalling, C. W. Eglin and Prof. N. J. J. Olivier of the PFP voted for the clause.

So what?

This raises an interesting point in my mind. I wonder why it is that there is this sudden violent opposition to this clause. I should like to know how this sort of thing comes about. This has not come as a surprise to them because their hon. Chief Whip has had plenty of time together with the assistant Whip, the Whip of the day, the duty Whip or whatever it is he calls himself in today’s newspaper, has also had sufficient time to prompt the hon. Prof. Olivier; so perhaps the hon. prof. Olivier would care to reply to the question. But I would be particularly interested to hear a reply from the hon. member for Constantia who has another speaking turn. I would like to hear him answer that question.

Mr. Chairman, I am not quite clear in my own mind …

You are right.

I am not quite sure what the point is that the hon. member for Umhlanga tried to make. I say this because quite obviously the Committee can consider any amendments regardless of what decisions were taken in the Select Committee. We obviously supported this clause for the simple reason that the amendment as introduced by the hon. member for Johannesburg-West constituted a substantial improvement on what the situation was.

But you voted against the amendment.

What I cannot understand about the hon. member for Umhlanga is that his own leader moved as an amendment that, and this is to be found on page 116 of the second report of the Select Committee on the Constitution—

Read the amendment that was accepted. What does it say?

Order!

The Committee then divided on the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point, and the people who supported that amendment were, apart from the hon. member for Durban Point, the hon. member for Rissik and the hon. member for Brakpan and also the three hon. members representing the PFP. Despite the fact that the hon. member for Durban Point moved that amendment and voted in the minority, he also supported the clause when the clause was put in the Select Committee.

We are still supporting the clause.

However, that does not denigrate from the fact that the hon. member for Durban Point did move a substantive amendment that is virtually in line with the arguments put forward by the hon. member for Sea Point and the hon. member for Constantia, namely that what we want and that is why we supported the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point—is as far as the Ministers’ Council is concerned at least a respect for the convention as it has existed in this House with regard to the relationship between the State President and the Prime Minister, i.e. as far as the Cabinet is concerned those members must come from this House and must enjoy the confidence of this House and they have to be appointed in terms of the recommendations made by the leader of this House, which means the Prime Minister.

*May I say that in respect of this matter I did not have the least doubt in my mind—and we can discuss it further under clause 24—that what the hon. member for Sea Point said here, and in spite of what the hon. member for Johannesburg West says, this is also the way I understand the intention, viz. that in respect of the relationship between the Ministers’ Council and the President the same convention will apply as that which applies at present in respect of the Cabinet and the President. That is my honest impression, but I may be wrong. It is for that reason that different wording is indeed being used, viz. that in respect of the Ministers’ Council the President acts on the advice of, not in consultation with, because it is very clearly stated that the President bears a relationship to the Ministers’ Council different to that of the President and the Cabinet.

Mr. Chairman, you will allow me to react briefly to the last argument advanced by the hon. member Prof. Olivier. The hon. member for Constantia also mentioned a reference I had made on a previous occasion to clause 19(1). However, the distinction which must be drawn—and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will allow me to do so—lies in the fact that clause 19(1)(a) refers to acts performed by the President where he is advised by the Ministers’ Council. In this case, the term “on the advice of” is indeed applicable. However, clause 21, which we are discussing at the moment, deals with the composition of the Ministers’ Council, and not with the acts performed by the Ministers’ Council. Hon. members should not confuse these two matters.

In the second place, I want to point out that in my opinion, the hon. member Prof. Olivier has lost the debate against the hon. member for Umhlanga in this connection. The amendment which the hon. member for Durban Point moved on the Select Committee was in fact aimed at achieving the very position which is now provided for in clause 21(2). The hon. member Prof. Olivier can examine it for himself. Clause 21(2) refers to the appointment of the chairman of the Ministers’ Council and provided that he must be the one who has the support of the majority in the House concerned. That was what the hon. member had in mind.

Order! I have now allowed hon. members to cover a wide field with regard to this matter. However, we have digressed considerably from the particulars of the clause. If the hon. member for Randburg wishes to proceed, therefore, he must henceforth confine himself to the particulars of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am in fact referring specifically to clause 21(2) in the argument which I am putting forward. In subsection (2), it is specifically laid down that the person who is appointed as chairman of the Ministers’ Council must be the one who has the support of the majority party in the House concerned.

There is something else I wish to say in this connection, Mr. Chairman. Hon. members, especially those belonging to the official Opposition, have misgivings about the fact that, as they see it, the President can appoint anyone he likes. However, we must read this provision against the background of clause 39(3)(b), which provides that if he does not comply with that requirement, or if he does not act in the prescribed manner, a motion of no confidence can still be moved in the Ministers’ Council, which could result in the Ministers’ Council having to resign or the House having to be dissolved. Therefore the necessary provision has been made in this subsection as well.

Finally, I wish to refer to something which was said by the hon. member for Rissik. The hon. member for Rissik objected to the idea that the President could, for example, come to this House, as it will be constituted in future, and appoint the person whom he thinks should be the leader. I believe that this was more or less the gist of the hon. member’s argument. What does it boil down to, therefore? What the hon. member is actually saying is that when the President is a White, he can go to the three Houses. The hon. member has no objection to that. The objection of the hon. member for Rissik is based on the fact that, as he put it, the President might choose a person who is not White. By implication, the hon. member has no objection to such an appointment being made in either of the other two Houses, however. This is what compels me to ask where the morality of the hon. members of the CP is to be found in this connection. Hon. members of the CP have no morality when it comes to their anxiety with regard to Whites who will take decisions. However, I advise them to cultivate a more consistent approach. As the debate has progressed, it has become increasingly clear that they are happy with White supremacy, but the mere thought of decision-making by people of colour with regard to Whites causes an outcry on their part [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to refer again to what happened on the Select Committee, except for indicating that we tried on the Select Committee to write the existing convention into this clause. That is what we tried to do. Surely we cannot effect amendments which could lead to absurdities, however. In fact, every lawyer could confirm this. In saying this, I am not referring to the hon. member for Constantia, of course. [Interjections.]

Order!

In the light of the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point, which we have also discussed here, I do want to refer to his argument on the Select Committee. His amendment to clause 21 is linked to the amendment which he intends to move to clause 24 as well. I should just like to quote his amendment to clause 24 at this stage, by way of illustration. I quote as follows—

The second leg reads—

Now he argues that the chairman should in the first place be the leader of the majority party in the House and that with regard to the rest of the members of the Ministers’ Council, the President should be bound by the advice of the leader of the House or the chairman. That is what he has argued. Let us just examine the White House to begin with. It is quite clear that if the people were to choose the President according to their group representation in the electoral college, the leader of the majority party would be the President. If we accept this provision in its present form, he will be the President and he will also be chairman of the Ministers’ Council. That is the implication of the hon. member’s amendment. [Interjections.] It will not avail hon. members to protest against this. It is the inevitable implication of the amendments.

Let us examine the circumstances. Suppose we decided to make the leader of the majority party in a particular House a member of the Cabinet. Then he could not be chairman of the Ministers’ Council, after all. It seems to me that the hon. member Prof. Olivier does not understand what I am saying.

What have we tried to do? We have tried to write into the Bill the convention which is applicable at the moment. It is not a written convention, but it exists as a convention in our system. One of the reasons—it may be an important reason—why we cannot simply provide that the leader of the majority party should be the chairman of the Ministers’ Council, as proposed in the amendment, is that such a leader could perhaps become a member of the Cabinet and that another person from the majority party would therefore have to be appointed chairman of the Ministers’ Council. If we were to provide in the Bill that he must be the chairman, that leader would be prevented from being appointed to the Cabinet. Apart from this qualification, the convention has been correctly written into the clause as amended by the Select Committee by means of the new subsection (2).

Mr. Chairman, I must say that the hon. the Minister has completely confused me now. This is an important point, Sir. If I understood the hon. the Minister correctly, it means that the Chairman of the Ministers’ Council can never be a member of the Cabinet.

I did not say that. [Interjections.]

Sir, that is what I understood him to say. If this is not the case, the hon. the Minister should remove this erroneous impression. I very clearly understood him to say that when a person is appointed as a member of the Cabinet, he cannot be chairman of the Ministers’ Council at the same time. Nowhere in this Bill do I find this exclusion. The President can appoint anyone as a member of the Cabinet and he can also appoint any member of a Ministers’ Council as a member of the Cabinet. I do not see why there should necessarily be any conflict between a person’s membership of the Cabinet and his chairmanship of the Ministers’ Council. In fact, I assumed that this would be the obvious thing. The implication of what the hon. the Minister said, if I understood it correctly, is that the Chairman of a Ministers’ Council cannot be a member of the Cabinet. In other words, the chairman of the Minister’s Council cannot also be given a portfolio in respect of general affairs. That is what I understood the hon. the Minister to say. If I am wrong, I should be glad if he would correct me.

Mr. Chairman, that is not what I said.

Indeed it is. [Interjections.]

Order!

That puppy should stop yelping now. When it was suggested during the discussion on a previous clause that the chairman of the Ministers’ Council should be appointed to the Cabinet, I argued that this would most probably happen. I am not saying that it is not going to happen at all. All I am saying is that if a person is appointed to the Cabinet, and as a result of his activities he prefers not to be chairman of the Ministers’ Council as well, he may recommend that someone else be appointed as chairman. In that case it would not be the leader who would become the chairman. That was all I said. If it has to be the leader, in accordance with the present wording, that cannot happen. That was what I said. [Interjections.] I do not wish to debate the matter with the hon. member for Constantia, because he does not understand it at all. I am now speaking to the hon. member Prof. Olivier. Be reasonable now. What are we saying in this clause?

You do not understand it yourself. [Interjections.]

That hon. member is looking for trouble.

Order! I appeal to the hon. member for Greytown to give the hon. the Minister the opportunity of replying to the questions asked by the hon. member Prof. Olivier. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

We all concede that subsection (2) is an improvement on the old subsection. Subsection (2) provides that the chairman of the Ministers’ Council must have the support of the majority. Who is automatically the man who has the support of the majority in a House, other than the leader of the party involved?

Is it not conceivable that someone may even be appointed from outside who may indeed have the confidence of the majority in the House, with the result that it does not necessarily have to be the leader of the majority party? The only qualification is that he must “in the opinion of the President” have “the support of the majority in the House”.

Surely the hon. member knows better than that. He knows that if a person were to be imposed on the people from outside, he would not have that support. Support has another connotation as well, after all—the hon. member should know that—namely the acceptability of the man. What is the position at the moment? After all, it is not written into the present Constitution that the leader of the majority party must become the Prime Minister. However, I would like to see the President who is not going to appoint him, for that would be to destroy the system and the convention on which it is built. Surely the hon. member knows this, in all fairness. All I am arguing is that if the leader has to be appointed, it will be a peremptory provision, as is being proposed. There could even be an appeal to the leader—unless he resigns as leader—to the effect that someone other than himself should be appointed as chairman of the Ministers’ Council. This is a peremptory provision. Surely the hon. member Prof. Olivier will grant me this in all fairness. That is why I say that what will happen in practice will normally be the same as what happens today. When one has a provision—we do have such a provision—to the effect that the members of a Ministers’ Council must have the support of the majority party and that the chairman of the Ministers’ Council must have the support of the majority party in the House, how will the effect of such a provision differ from what the hon. members advocate? Therefore I want to say that it was a wise decision on the part of the Select Committee to effect the amendments contained in clause 21(2) within these particular limits and parameters.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to this clause we adopt the same standpoint that we did with regard to clauses 3, 4 and 5. In view of the new process of nation-building in South Africa and in the light of the policy of the party in power, one can expect that there will also be amendments in respect of this particular matter. I shall content myself with what I said about the previous clause. The CP will vote for this clause.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 23:

Mr. Chairman, there is an amendment on this clause in my name on the Order Paper. This amendment, however, is consequential to an amendment which was defeated in respect of an earlier clause and therefore I shall not move it.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 24:

Mr. Chairman, this clause covers a number of aspects in relation to the appointment of Ministers. We in the PFP find many of those aspects unacceptable. Other hon. members on this side of the Committee will deal with certain subsections and move suitable amendments, but I wish to concentrate on subsection (1) which relates to the appointment of Ministers to the Cabinet.

There are two aspects which give us cause for concern. Firstly, the clause provides for an unlimited number of Ministers. While in the past the constitution has always specified the maximum number of Ministers, the Bill removes that and gives the State President the power to appoint an unlimited number of Ministers. The second aspect, in this subsection, to which we object is the appointment of Ministers without portfolio.

I move the two amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 16, in line 54, after “persons” to insert:
   not exceeding the number decided by Parliament or by the House concerned
2. 2. On page 16, in lines 56 and 57, to omit “or to perform such other functions as the State President may determine”.

Amendment No. 1 provides for flexibility in the number of Ministers over a period of years. It does not require constitutional amendments to alter the number of Ministers, but Parliament or the House concerned will have the power to decide on the number of Ministers. This is the effect of the first amendment.

Amendment No. 2 has the effect of eliminating the words “or to perform such other functions as the State President may determine” which means that a Minister of State of the Republic will have to administer a department. Those are the objectives of the two amendments which I have moved.

I now want to refer to the question of an unlimited number of Ministers. In the very early days of the Union of South Africa there were 10 or 11 Ministers, but over time that number grew to 18 and in 1980 it was increased from 18 to 20 in terms of an amendment to the constitution. The reason given by the hon. the Minister who handled the Bill at that stage was that the number was increased as the result of the rationalization of Government departments. I always considered it strange that when one rationalized an administration one ended up with more Cabinet Ministers having to administrate, but nonetheless that is what happened.

Clause 24 is in fact a request to grant the President a blank cheque, but there is no justification for supporting that request. As a result of these constitutional proposals there is in any event going to be a proliferation in the number of Ministers due to there being a Cabinet as well as Minister’s Councils for each of the three Chambers.

An additional problem we have is that there will be no effective control by Parliament over the number of Cabinet Ministers there can be in future, because the State President is not restricted in any way. This is a further example of the unrestricted power of the new State President. It differs from the existing position, whether you take the Prime Minister alone or the Prime Minister combined with the existing State President. It is in fact a licence to proliferate patronage at great potential cost to the taxpayer. We do not accept it as being reasonable or necessary.

The second aspect of this subsection is the question of Ministers without portfolio. In the years between 1910 and 1943 there were seven persons who were Ministers without portfolio. This position has of course existed in other countries and still exists today, for example in the United Kingdom. However, I believe that the proposed constitutional system is very different from that which prevailed in those earlier years in South Africa and is of course very different from the system in the United Kingdom where you have a Minister without portfolio. I should just like to highlight three of those differences.

First of all, in terms of these proposals, one is going to have four sets of Ministers and not just one Cabinet as one had in the past. Secondly, this constitution provides for nominated and indirectly elected MP’s in each of the three Houses, something which did not apply at the time when South Africa had Ministers without portfolio. This was a feature which was introduced in 1980. The third difference I would like to draw attention to, is the President’s Council, which will have 15 members nominated by the State President—after taking off the ten by which the number is apparently going to be reduced—and 20 members of the President’s Council nominated by the majority White party.

There is therefore plenty of scope in this new proposed constitution for advisers to be appointed who have not had to stand in individual constituencies and who have not had to go to the hustings. For that reason there is no need for Ministers without portfolio, who are normally brought in for a special reason to act as advisers on one or other subject.

There is a further and very serious problem with the concept as contained in this subsection. These Ministers we are talking about, firstly, do not have to be or become members of Parliament. They need not have that popularly elected base which would normally apply. Secondly, the Ministers without portfolio do not have to administer a Department of State. The result of this is that they are neither popularly elected as public representatives nor are they accountable or answerable to Parliament in relation to any department’s Vote. This is unacceptable to us. It is another example of a move away from desirable democratic practices.

Mr. Chairman, it is actually difficult to argue about this clause again, because the arguments the hon. member has now raised, have already been raised repeatedly. However, since we have now ultimately arrived at the clause which deals with the appointment of Ministers, it is probably necessary for us to hold a discussion on this for the record.

The first of the two important arguments of the Opposition is in this measure that there is no of the Opposition is in this measure that there is no limitation on the number of Cabinet Ministers.

The second argument of the Opposition is that members from outside the three Houses can be appointed to the Cabinet. I want to admit at once that both these arguments, which can be considered to be reasonable, should be treated sympathetically. I am not suggesting that these are unreasonable arguments from the Opposition side but there were a few illogical arguments in the motivation of the Opposition. The impression is being created by the official Opposition in particular and also by the CP that the State President would also abuse his powers in the appointment of Cabinet members and that he would either—and I consider this an absolutely absurd argument—appoint no Cabinet members at all or that he would go wild and appoint Cabinet members as if it was going out of fashion.

Just in passing one could mention to the hon. members of the Opposition that we are an African country, but we do not practise African politics here in South Africa. There are certain conventions and certain existing norms which are considered to be of the utmost importance in this country, and which will, I believe, be maintained in the future by whoever is elected President of this country in the interests of South Africa.

Let us consider the first argument of the Opposition, namely the fact that there is no limit on the number of Cabinet members. This is a very serious matter to them and they moved a whole series of amendments in regard to it. I maintain that if the number is fixed now, as was the case in the past, we shall have to amend the constitution from time to time merely to increase or decrease the number of Ministers. Departments of State can be made smaller or larger from time to time, and it may become necessary for to have more Ministers and then an amendment has to be made to the constitution. I believe there has to be an opportunity to appoint Cabinet members for specific purposes and also for specific periods. South Africa is moving towards a new constitution and I believe we can hold out the prospect that amendments will have to be made from time to time in the way one deals with the administration of the country. For that reason I believe that the flexibility …

It seems to me you are groping in the dark.

I do not think there is any suggestion of a groping in the dark. I think any right-minded person reading this clause will be able to understand clearly what the guidelines are. There is therefore no groping in the dark. The hon. member can keep that type of argument for another political debate. I also believe that the State President must be given the prerogative as to how he wants to apportion and deal with the country’s administration. I believe, and I believe with all due respect, that no President will be able to act in an uncontrolled manner because he will remain subject to the democratic process in terms of which the people elected him to occupy that position. We must not base our arguments on the appointment of Cabinet Ministers merely on assumptions, for then we shall back ourselves into a corner and we shall not be able to hold a positive debate on the matter. It goes without saying that in the new dispensation there will also be more clarity in future regarding the matter of own affairs and general affairs and the number of portfolios to deal with those specific matters.

Then there is the second argument of the hon. members, namely that Cabinet members appointed from outside the three Houses, would be such a terribly bad thing. But I believe this creates the opportunity for flexibility in that one can also appoint people from outside Parliament. This creates an opportunity to introduce expertise for a specific purpose, or to perform a specific task.

[Inaudible.]

You see, Mr. Chairman, in the past the NP was saddled with members like the hon. member for Langlaagte, people who could never be used for their expertise of any kind. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, all Ministers appointed to the Cabinet, are responsible to Parliament; are responsible to the three Houses of Parliament, jointly and separately. One thing I want to make quite clear is the following. One of the proposals of the President’s Council was that we should establish an executive Cabinet in South Africa; an executive Cabinet which would be separate from the legislative authority. This is, after all, an old argument, yet the Government did not accept it either.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member for Rissik should rather consider all the old dyed-in-the-wool United Party supporters in his constituency. They are all going to vote “yes” in the coming referendum.

Have you ever heard of a Cabinet that is not an executive one?

Mr. Chairman, I said the President’s Council had suggested that the executive authority should be separated from the legislative authority. That is what the President’s Council said. That is precisely what I said, too. The hon. member for Barberton must open his ears and listen. [Interjections.] The principle of Cabinet members who do not have seats in Parliament is therefore not a new one. [Interjections.]

Order! I should just like to draw attention to the fact that the hon. member for Rissik has appealed to the Chair for protection on a number of occasions now. I therefore want to make a friendly appeal to him please to act in the way he expects of others. The hon. member for Turffontein may proceed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One thing which should be very clearly repeated in this debate, is that the general rule remains, namely that Cabinet members shall form part of the legislative authority. This is the general rule. I therefore do not think that people should try to create the impression that a future State President can suddenly appoint 90% of his Cabinet members from outside Parliament, and only 10% from inside Parliament.

What will prevent him from doing so?

There is nothing to prevent him from doing so. However, a President who does that would be just as stupid as the leader of the party the hon. member for Pietersburg belongs to. [Interjections.] He can only be a person who really does not take the realities into account. Only such a person would do such a nonsensical thing. But what will happen, Mr. Chairman? The caucus of his party, or whoever elected him, will surely lose all confidence in a man who appoints 90% of his Cabinet members from outside. [Interjections.]

I maintain that even if a Minister is appointed to the Cabinet from outside, he will remain subject to Parliament, and in particular to the three separate Houses. Every Cabinet Minister appointed from outside, will, after all, also have to have his own legislation passed by Parliament. He will therefore remain responsible to Parliament.

The last argument raised by the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens concerned the matter of the appointment of Ministers without portfolio. I want to maintain yet again that the general rule will apply that there is no question of dozens of Ministers without portfolio being appointed. However, the legislation provides that a Minister without portfolio may be appointed to perform a specific task. I believe this is what hon. members must accept. They must also accept the bona fides of the approach behind this legislation. I find the argument of the PFP in this regard astounding. In principle the appointment of Ministers without portfolio is generally known in Western democracies to which reference has also been made. There are innumerable examples of this. It is in any case not a general rule, but an exception to the general rule.

In view of this, it gives us pleasure to support the clause as printed, and to reject the amendments that have been moved.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Turffontein can reason whichever way he likes, and raise as many arguments as he likes, the fact of the matter is that as this clause is worded it is an open clause. It is open in the sense that in the new dispensation the State President will have the authority to appoint as many people to his Cabinet and to the Ministers’ Council as he wishes. In this regard there are no restrictions on him. The argument in connection with the from-time-to-time idea, which is supposed to be limiting, simply does not hold water, for the simple reason that, as far as I am concerned, this actually affords the State President the opportunity to realize from time to time that he needs more people to hold more portfolios or to perform some minor task or other in the Cabinet. The idea raised that departments of State can have a restrictive effect is not true either. Departments of State can also increase and the number of Ministers can increase accordingly.

The fact that Ministers may also be appointed to administer or to perform other activities, in addition to the handling of specific departments of State, opens this clause even further so that with regard to these functioning and activities the State President may decide exactly as he pleases how many people he needs to perform functions and activities other than the handling of a specific department of State. The present constitution restricts the number of Ministers. Now it is being reasoned that this openness must be allowed here so that it will not be necessary to come back to Parliament from time to time to request an amendment to the constitution to insert a larger number. The fact that the present constitution restricts this, gives Parliament the right to decide whether it is necessary for more Ministers to be appointed than the number for which the Act makes provision. This clause, in terms of which there are no restrictions, leaves this to the will and the decision of the State President. In other words, he can do as he pleases. We can reason whichever way we like about reasonableness or any other attribute one may care to mention, but the fact of the matter is that he can do exactly as he pleases in this regard. He can appoint as many people to the Cabinet and to a Minister’s Council as he wishes.

As long as it is not your leader

I just want to tell the hon. member for Turffontein that if he had a leader like my party has, he could have thanked his lucky stars. The integrity of the leader of the CP is unimpeachable. One can only say good things about him.

In an earlier debate the Minister of National Education said that in the new dispensation he, for example, foresaw that the general Department of National Education could be such that those functions could be handled in co-operation with, for example, the Minister of Manpower’s department. In other words, in this regard he would actually need fewer Ministers for the Cabinet than we have at present, because there would be certain Ministers in the Ministers’ Council who could fulfil those functions being performed by some of the present Ministers.

Sir, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper as follows—

1. 10. On page 16, from line 61, to omit subsection (3) and to substitute:
   1. (3) A person who is not a member of a House shall not be qualified to be a Minister unless he becomes a member of a House within three months of his appointment.

It is untenable to expect that the State President should be given the right to appoint people from outside the three Houses as Ministers who need never become members of the relevant Houses. They will therefore become members of the Cabinet without ever being members of the House of Assembly, the House of Representatives or the House of Delegates. If the new dispensation ever comes into operation, the situation will be that the House of Assembly will consist of 178 members, the House of Representatives of 85 members and the House of Delegates of 45 members. There will therefore be 308 people elected to Parliament from the various population groups and from among whom the State President can appoint 20 or 30 people as members of the Cabinet and Ministers’ Councils. If there are 308 people elected to these bodies and the State President cannot find sufficient people among those 308 who are really qualified to be Ministers, it is really a terrible state of affairs. If, in spite of this large number of people who have to be paid by the State to serve on this legislative body and in spite of the fact that people can be elected from this larger number, there is still the need for one or more people in the Cabinet who cannot be elected from the three Houses, I feel that such a person must become a member of one of the three Houses at some time or other, depending on the population group to which that person belongs. I feel that the old Act was worded correctly, in terms of which no one was able to serve on the Cabinet for more than three months without becoming a member of the House. In my opinion six months or a year is too long a period for a person to have a post on the Cabinet without being a member of one of the Houses. For that reason I move that members appointed to the Cabinet and to the Ministers’ Council from outside the three Houses, shall become members of one of the Houses within three months, and if this does not happen that person shall forfeit his position as Minister.

The hon. member has now moved his amendment No. 10. Does he intend to move his other printed amendments?

I shall not move amendment No. 9. I shall move the other amendment in connection with the oath later because it has no bearing on this point.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. member for Koedoespoort has undergone a tremendous change since he came here for the first time in 1981. When he was in the NP caucus he was not mistrustful. But suddenly today he is very mistrustful. He alleges that the President will abuse his powers. I want to give the hon. member the assurance that when this side of the House appoints a President we shall have confidence in him.

Are you going to appoint him or elect him?

We are going to elect him. He will be elected by the electoral college.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, I did not ask the hon. member questions when he was speaking.

There is an old adage that one readily recognizes one’s own faults in others. I think the hon. member has become mistrustful during the past two years because he does not have confidence in his leader. That is why he suddenly said today that the President would abuse his powers.

The hon. member for Turffontein replied to the objections of the Opposition. We are entering a new era and we do not know exactly what the requirements will be. That is why the President must have room in which to manoeuvre. There has to be flexibility in the legislation.

In the year or two the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens can move his amendment again once the system is functioning. I want to give the assurance that he will not have to wait too long. Then he can perhaps move the amendment again and we can reconsider it. However, because we do not know what the requirements will be at this stage the President must have the freedom of movement to be able to appoint as many people as he considers necessary.

I should like to refer to the matter of Ministers appointed from outside the three Houses. The hon. member for Koedoespoort said such a person should become a member of one of the Houses within three months of his appointment. I do not think this is possible. I think the President should be given the opportunity to get the best brainpower in the country to govern the country. Let us assume a person filling a position in society, is being considered as State President, then he has to be asked to become a member of one of the three Houses within three months after the post is offered to him. What happens if there is no vacancy? As the clause at present reads, it gives the legislation flexibility and it gives the State President freedom of movement. We therefore support it.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the fact that a Cabinet Minister has to become a member of Parliament upon being appointed a Cabinet Minister, this Bill contains all provision for the nomination of four members by the State President, which we do not support. If the State President wanted to make use of that clause, he could always use it to bring his pals into the Cabinet and in so doing … [Interjections.] That presents no problem. It can be done. It is made possible by clauses 41, 42 and 43.

†I should like to move the amendment printed in my name, on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 3. On page 16, after line 57, to insert:
   1. (2)
      1. (i) The State President in appointing persons under subsection (1) who shall be members of the Cabinet in terms of section 20, shall have regard to the need to secure the support of all three Houses of Parliament.
      2. (ii) The State President in appointing persons under subsection (1) who shall be members of the Ministers’ Councils in terms of section 21, shall act on the advice of the member of the relevant House who enjoys the support of the majority of members of such House, which member shall be the Chairman of the Ministers’ Council in question.

This amendment is an attempt to write what we regard as sensible conventions into the constitution. Firstly, I believe that particularly the hon. the Minister should react to this. We had too many people debating this clause who say that the Ministers will be responsible to Parliament. The hon. member for Durban Point said in connection with the number of Ministers that the budget should be approved by parliament. He seems to accept that under the new constitution Ministers are responsible to Parliament. They are not responsible to Parliament.

Their salaries must be voted by Parliament.

No, not even their salaries have to be voted by Parliament. If the majority of the members of Parliament vote them down and the Coloured House votes them down and the Indian House votes them down, provided that a simple majority of the White House agrees with it, it can go to the President’s Council which can decide on their salaries. There is a fundamental departure in this clause, read together with clauses 19 and 20, from the concept of parliamentary responsibility. The Minister concedes this. It is fundamental. One no longer needs the support of Parliament. One can go to each of the three Houses and provided that one gets support from one of them, the State President can refer that matter to the President’s Council. It is not Parliament per se but an individual House operating via the State President and the President’s Council. The concept of parliamentary responsibility is no longer relevant. There is no way in which for example the Coloured House can vote down the salary of a Cabinet Minister of whom they disapprove. They can vote time and again that his salary be scrapped, but provided the White House had agreed to his salary, it goes to the President’s Council. It is quite clear that parliamentary responsibility disappears when this clause comes into effect as it will then be a single House operating via the President’s Council. Let us not humbug one another. Overall Parliamentary responsibility has been scrapped in favour of the one House of Parliament together with the President’s Council. That is why I move that this matter, which could have been a convention, becomes part of the law. It should be incumbent upon the State President in appointing members to the Cabinet to take into account the need to get the support of all three Houses. If each House could vote a member of the Cabinet out of office, it would not be necessary to have this amendment. However, because it is impossible for any one House to vote a Cabinet Minister out, it is impossible for any two Houses to vote a Cabinet Minister or a Cabinet out and because it is only possible to vote a Cabinet Minister out when the three Houses act collectively, we believe that in appointing a Cabinet, the President should take into account the need to have the support of all three Houses. Were this necessary in terms of the constitutional process, it would not be necessary to have this convention written in to the law. Because it is not necessary in terms of the new system, we believe that it is a very necessary convention to write into this Bill.

The second point I wish to make is merely a reiteration of the view that was expressed by the hon. member for Constantia in relation to Ministers’ Councils. I think that even the hon. the Prime Minister will agree that the concept should be that the Ministers’ Council, let us say, for Coloured Affairs should be appointed by the State President on the advice of the majority leader in the Coloured House. I would assume that that would be the intention. However, every time the Government rejects this amendment, it is saying something else. It is saying that the State President is going to decide on the Ministers and only afterwards is he going to nominate the person who is going to be the leader of the Council.

I replied in this regard a month ago and I do not intend to repeat myself.

Well, then, I should like to know what is wrong with this clause.

I replied at length during the discussion of clause 21.

But, Sir, it was an inadequate reply.

But the hon. member was not here.

Sir, I believe it to be absolutely vital that in order to eliminate any doubt on this matter it should be written into the constitution that the Ministers’ Council must be appointed on the advice of the Chief Minister.

It must be made a law.

Yes, it must be a law. I do not believe that this should be a matter in regard to which there may subsequently be doubt. What we are seeking to do, is to confirm the intention in law. Because we have moved away from old conventions and we are moving away from the concept of Parliamentary responsibility we believe that it is necessary that the President in making these nominations should be bound by the provisions of the law and that he should not be allowed to do as he pleases and make up his own conventions as he goes along.

It is for these reasons that I have moved my amendment to this clause.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member for Sea Point that I am unable to accept amendment 3 as it is inconsistent with a previous decision of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, bearing in mind your ruling, I want to point out to the hon. member for Sea Point that as the Chairman had indicated at that stage, we could discuss the purport of his amendment to clause 24 while we were discussing clause 21. The hon. member will remember that. That is in fact what we did, and I gave a lengthy reply to the hon. member’s argument in respect of this very matter. This will be confirmed by the hon. member Prof. Olivier.

We did not agree with it.

It was not a question of whether those hon. members agreed with it or not. The question is simply whether or not I gave an adequate reply in respect of this matter. However, in terms of the ruling that you have just given, Mr. Chairman, no further reply in this connection is required because the amendment has been ruled out of order.

The hon. member for Cape Town Gardens used basically three arguments in moving his amendments. His first argument was that the President was being given a blank cheque in regard to the number of Ministers whom he could appoint to his Cabinet or to Ministers’ Councils. He was followed in this particular regard by the hon. member for Koedoespoort who also argued that there should be a limitation on the number of members in the Cabinet as indeed also in respect of the number of members of a Ministers’ Council. Although the hon. member did not move any amendment in this regard, his argument was that the numbers should be limited.

The hon. member for Cape Town Gardens went on to say that there was no responsibility to Parliament on the part of members who were not in fact members of Parliament or held no portfolio. That is not true. There are many provisions in the Bill that still have to be discussed in regard to what will happen if a motion of no confidence is moved in a Ministers’ Council or in the Cabinet. Those motions will be moved because of the very fact of their accountability to Parliament or to a House of Parliament of members of the Cabinet or members of a Ministers’ Council. Otherwise those provisions would be completely meaningless. I therefore submit that those arguments are based upon false premises. The hon. member also argued that there were occasions when we had Ministers without portfolio in the South African Government.

*I should like to raise the important point that there is nothing strange about the number of Ministers being left to the discretion of the Prime Minister. It is not the position in all Western democracies that the number of Ministers is limited by statute. For example, this is not the case in the British system. There, too, the number of Ministers is a matter for the discretion of the Prime Minister. For that reason I contend that what we are going to have here does not present a sinister picture in that a blank cheque is supposedly being placed in the hands of the State President as regards the number of Ministers who may be appointed to the Cabinet or the Ministers’ Councils.

It is a fact that in our experience in this Parliament—it is not a very long experience—we have had to amend the constitution on various occasions to make provision for a change in the number of Ministers and the number of Deputy Ministers. Hon. members will concede that that is true. I do not believe that it is necessary, as a practical exercise, that the constitution of a country should be changed from time to time to make provision for a number of Ministers in the Cabinet or in the Ministers’ Councils.

I believe that there are other cross-checks on the State President with regard to the appointment of Ministers. They are the institutions themselves, because if a State President were simply to appoint Ministers to his Ministers’ Councils or his Cabinet on an arbitrary basis, he would be running the risk of being censured by at least three institutions. For that reason I wish to say, with all due respect, that I do not agree.

I now wish to deal with the argument advanced by hon. members to the effect that Ministers need not be members of Houses. I wish to say here and now that a specific standpoint was adopted in regard to this particular matter in the report of the President’s Council. That recommendation concerned the specific system propagated in the report, and that was that the Cabinet or executive authority should be an extra-parliamentary executive authority. Hon members will recall that.

The Government did not accept that recommendation of the President’s Council, but they did recognize, as a general rule, that the members of the Cabinet or the Ministers’ Council ought to be members of the Houses. However, we also foresaw that circumstances could arise which could result in its being necessary for people who were not members of Houses at a specific moment to be appointed to the Cabinet, even on the recommendation of the leadership of the majority party in the various houses. For that reason we made provision for the possibility of appointing Ministers who were not members of the Houses. I want to put paid to this specious argument that there could be any number of Ministers and that this could be a blank cheque. I wish to put it very strongly to hon. members once again that it is not a true that the only discipline or check on the State President is a statutory limitation on the number of Ministers. I have indicated that this is not the case in England. Nor does the French constitution make provision for it. Therefore there are sufficient examples to show that this argument is chimerical. In view of this, and since malicious argument are often advanced outside this House, I am of the opinion that the Committee should decide that a member who is appointed to the Cabinet or a Ministers’ Council must become a member of the House from which he was appointed within 12 months after such appointment. I do not know whether the hon. member for Durban Central is going to move his amendment.

I am going to move it.

Then I shall have to move an amendment to the hon. member’s amendment in order to rectify the situation. I think I should now give the hon. member the opportunity to move his amendment. He need not motivate it, because I have already done so.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 4. On page 16, in lines 61 to 64, to omit subsection (3)(a) and to substitute:
   1. (3)(a) A person shall not be qualified to be a Minister unless he is a member of a House: Provided that a person who is not a member of a house may be appointed as a Minister and hold office for a period not exceeding 180 days while not being a member of a House.
2. 5. On page 18, in line 3, to omit “population group” and to substitute “House”.

The amendment envisaged by the hon. the Minister is in line with the first amendment I moved. The advantage of a provision which makes it imperative for a Minister to be a member of a House is that such a Minister must be submitted to a certain test before being appointed to his office on a permanent basis.

†The important aspect therefore is the fact that a Minister must, if he is to be appointed in a permanent capacity, go through a test of acceptability before that happens. This is nothing new. It is something which is established in the Westminster system and in the system where the concept of an executive President operates. In the Westminster system it takes place by way of election by popular vote, which is the sifting process and testing area through which a minister must go, and of course the experience which he gains in Parliament before becoming a Minister. In the executive President system in the United States we do not have the situation where the President can just appoint someone. There too a sifting process has to be complied with. Any nominee put forward by the executive President in the American system has to be vetted by a Senate committee. It therefore appears to me that in every Western system, be it the Westminster system or the executive President system, there is some sort of guarantee that the executive will not be appointed merely on the whim of one individual, without him having gone through some sort of process of acceptability.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot accept the hon. member’s first amendment as it stands. I have indicated that I accept the principle, but I shall have to word it differently. As an alternative I therefore move the following amendment—

1. 11. On page 16, from line 61, to omit paragraph (a) and to substitute:
   1. (a) No Minister shall hold office for a longer period than 12 months unless he is or becomes a member of a House.

I think this accommodates the amendments hon. members had in mind here.

The hon. member for Koedoespoort introduced a motion on the restriction of the number of Ministers. I have already indicated that there are various countries in which there is no restriction whatsoever on the number of Ministers.

The one right at the bottom is the only one I moved.

Is it only No. 10 the hon. member wants to move?

Yes.

I have already accepted the principle of the hon. member’s amendment. This is an amendment I myself moved and I hope that hon. members will be satisfied in the circumstances that we recognize the principle that people must be members of the Houses or must become members within 12 months.

††I hope the hon. member for Durban Central is satisfied. Is he prepared under these circumstances to withdraw his amendment and to accept mine?

I intend to do so.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address you on the ruling you have just given on the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point. I maintain that your ruling may be correct in terms of subsection (2), but not in terms of subsection (1).

Except that it was moved as one amendment.

Yes. Can I therefore debate it on the basis of subsection (1)?

If you want to move it separately.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I therefore move the amendment printed on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Sea Point as follows—

1. 12. On page 16, after line 57, to insert:
   1. (2) The State President in appointing persons under subsection (1) who shall be members of the Cabinet in terms of section 20, shall have regard to the need to secure the support of all three Houses of Parliament.

My motivation for the amendment is that when a member of the Cabinet is appointed, the President must be satisfied that person will have the confidence of Parliament, in other words of all three Houses. I just want to point out in passing that it has happened more than once—and I think the hon. the Minister is aware of this—that the Prime Minister also held other portfolios. Consequently there is not necessarily conflict between membership of the Cabinet and chairmanship of the Ministers’ Council. The point I actually want to make here is that the Cabinet is a body which must in fact take the initiative on general affairs and is the executive arm of the Government with regard to general affairs. What the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point contemplates is simply to say that when members of the Cabinet are appointed, the President shall be satisfied that those members have the support of the entire Parliament, viz. all three Houses. This is the implication of this amendment. I can hardly imagine a greater conflict arising than when a person is appointed from one House as a member of the Cabinet but does not have the support of the other two Houses. If it is indeed the intention, as has been stated repeatedly, that this dispensation can only work on the basis of consensus, that consensus is built into the system and that if the system is such is to function successfully, this can only take place on the basis of consensus, and in the nature of things this consensus can only be reached if at Cabinet level that Cabinet has the confidence of the majority in all three Houses of Parliament. It is not necessary to refer to individuals. However, I believe the hon. the Minister will agree with me—and of course I am suggesting that the President will make the mistake of doing this—when I say that if a person is appointed as Minister, a person who may be very able, but who has the attitude displayed by some of our hon. colleagues in the CP, it will be impossible to achieve consensus at Cabinet level. To me it is quite obvious …

That is why we are going to hold a referendum; then the CP will disappear.

No, the hon. the Minister is not giving me an answer. If the hon. the Minister really means well when he says that consensus is the key to the successful functioning of this system, he must, as a gesture of good faith, accept this amendment, and say that the Cabinet members appointed by the President shall have the support of the majority in the three Houses of Parliament. I think this is clear enough, and I need therefore not motivate it any further.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member Prof. Olivier moved an amendment, the contents of which would have to be valid in any case if we wanted this system to work. However, that is not the only side of the story. A Cabinet member must not only have the support of all three the Houses in general; he must also enjoy the support of the specific House of which he is a member. In the future dispensation the leaders of the groups must be able to achieve two things; not only one. One of these is in fact to gain the acceptance of the other groups for his person and for his behaviour. The other aspect, which the hon. member Prof. Olivier did not mention, however, and which is in fact accommodated here, but disappears as far as emphasis is concerned, is that he should also be able to bring his own people, the group from which he comes, into prominence.

But do you foresee a conflict?

I am saying this because, in what the hon. member said, the possibility of conflict is not very strongly emphasized. The importance of the second aspect to which I referred, did not in fact emerge from what the hon. member said. This concerns the leader of his own people; a person with his own power base, who must be able to carry his own people along with him. He must therefore be able to represent them very strongly, and at the same time, as far as it concerns his person and his behaviour, he must enjoy the support of the majority in the other Houses.

I should now like to discuss the amendment moved by the hon. the Minister here. I do not think the hon. the Minister will hold it against me if I react to it. I want to state that I personally feel unhappy about it. However, as it befits a good democrat, I shall accept it as it stands. I should also just like to refer to the background with regard to the recommendation on the separation of the legislative and the executive authorities. This originally came to the fore in the President’s Council. I myself hoped that we would move in the direction of a greater separation in an extra-parliamentary presidential system. I am merely referring to this because when the clause is put, I do not want to vote against it. I therefore accept it as it stands.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to return to the aspect of the unlimited number of Cabinet Ministers for which clause 24 makes provision. The hon. member for Turffontein mentioned the fact that hon. members of the Opposition had expressed the fear that the State President would abuse his extensive powers, or would possibly behave irresponsibly. He added that these fears of ours were unreasonable.

What the hon. member for Turffontein, and many other hon. members on the Government side, seem to forget, however, is that we are talking about legislation. That is therefore exactly the sort of fear one should have when one is looking at legislation. If everybody were to behave reasonably, whether in relation to constitutional or other activities, we would have need for very few laws indeed. It is not a matter of questioning the bona fides of individuals or groups existing today. The fact of the matter is that we are making a constitution and that the law must try to provide the best possible situation and must also try to protect the people of this country from anyone who attempts to abuse the system or behave irresponsibly.

The hon. the Minister has mentioned other countries which allow for an unlimited number of Ministers. One of the examples he gave was that of the United Kingdom. My information is that in effect the number of Ministers is limited, and I shall explain how. The hon. the Minister is correct that in terms of the law the number of Ministers is not limited as such. There is no law stating what the maximum number of Ministers is. In recent times, however, I believe that the budgetary rules of the British Houses of Parliament have been altered in such a way that Parliament does effectively have control over the number of Ministers. This change was brought about some years ago and I think that the situation is, therefore, different from what it was a few decades ago.

Finally, the remedy the hon. the Minister suggested in the event of the appointment of an excessive number of Ministers, with or without portfolio, is the fact that there is provision for votes of no confidence in the Cabinet and, in effect, in the President. I would suggest that that is an unnecessarily drastic remedy to have to resort to if it is merely thought that the number of Ministers is getting out of hand. It is in this spirit that I have moved my amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely rising to tell the hon. Minister on behalf of this side of the House that we welcome his amendment. The hon. the Minister will remember that the matter of the appointment of Cabinet Ministers who do not have a seat in any of the three Houses was discussed in depth in our caucus group. There was a great deal of sympathy for the extra-parliamentary idea of the hon. member for Randburg. I also have sympathy with it, but I think that the hon. member for Randburg will agree that we would seem to have gained a victory here.

You gave way to pressure from the joint Opposition.

I should just like it placed on record that it is again quite clear that in the NP there is an opportunity to put standpoints, and that once a decision has been taken we abide by it.

I think this is a very good change that is being effected. The three Houses will know that their Ministers must also be members of the relevant Houses and I think this will create confidence in the Houses. The hon. the Prime Minister has set us a very good example. Recently he has appointed two Ministers to the Cabinet from outside. They are two able people. They sit here in the House and are accepted as colleagues.

Mr. Chairman, with the leave of the Committee, I should like to withdraw my amendments.

Amendments 4 and 5, with leave, withdrawn.

I now wish to move the following amendment to the amendment moved by the hon. the Minister—

The present constitution also provides for a 12 month period just as the hon. the Minister has proposed. When this matter was debated in 1980 the attitude reflected in my amendment was debated in detail. We find the 12 months period excessive. I do not intend to go into that at any length. In the first amendment it was specifically provided that it should be six months and we would prefer that to remain.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment is not acceptable to me. I want to tell the hon. member that I am not prepared to hold an auction regarding the period. I thought we were arguing about specific principles. If we are not adult enough to do this, I am not going to react to the argument of the hon. member any further.

I now come to the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens. I want to say at once that in the British system the number of members is left to the discretion of the Prime Minister. It usually varies from between 15 to 25. Of course there is parliamentary control. There are restrictions which the Parliament can exercise indirectly through the budget. Surely these also exist here. After all, it does happen from time to time that there are motions that Ministers should deprived of their salaries or that they should be reduced. In other words, purely from the viewpoint of parliamentary control the situation also exists here.

I can give a long list of Western countries in this connection and I think I should do so for the record. I have already referred to the British system. The French constitution contains absolutely no provision concerning the number of Ministers who may be appointed. The same applies to the West German constitution. This also applies in Austria, and their Ministers need not even be members of the National Council, their Parliament. There is no restriction on the number of Ministers in Belgium either. Section 14 of the Danish constitution provides expressly that the King decides the number of Ministers. Greece and Italy do not have any restriction on the number of Ministers either. As far as Britain is concerned, I have already indicated that this is left to the Prime Minister, subject to Parliamentary control, as is also the case in this country. I have already referred to the American system.

I maintain that a fixed number of members of the Cabinet or Ministers’ Council is undesirable at this stage. This does not mean that I do not accept the principle that there should be a limitation, but I believe the limitation should be determined by circumstances promoted by the new constitution. With all due respect, not one of us knows at this stage what demands will be made of the executive authority.

It has not yet been scientifically determined.

The hon. member for Greytown has heard somewhere that something can be determined scientifically. I just wish we could get the hon. member’s interjections scientifically removed from this House. He has never made a contribution worthy of note. He is just a nuisance.

After all, the distinction between own affairs and general affairs, which we have already debated, has not yet been finalized. It is going to require a constant process of adjustment and that is going to have an effect on the number of Ministers in the Cabinet or the Ministers’ Council. I want to say at once that it is not foreseen that the Ministers’ Councils of the groups will differ as much in size as the hon. member for Koedoespoort initially suggested. For that reason I feel that all we need say is that the President should be able—as is the position in other countries—to determine the number of members of his Cabinet and Ministers’ Councils according to the demands of the times.

Mr. Chairman, in the first place I want to say that on the basis of the fact that the hon. the Minister has now backed down in the face of pressure from the Opposition parties to get Ministers from outside the three Houses elected to the Houses, I am prepared to withdraw my amendment. The principle has been accepted and although my sympathy lies with six instead of twelve because it is closer to my three, I shall, with leave, withdraw my amendment.

At this stage I want to move the other amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I just want to mention that when we debated clause 11, a great fuss was made about my amendment supposedly being a repetition of the words which already appear in the oath. Clause 11 reads—

My amendment was supposed to have been a duplication, according to the argument. In this particular case …

In all fairness, that is only part of the reply.

… where we are discussing the oath of a Minister, that argument falls away because those specific words used in clause 11 do not appear here. Here the oath is taken and it is concluded with the words “So help my God”. On the basis of the fact that those words, which appear in clause 11, fall away, I believe that my amendment would be very acceptable here because it is merely a linguistic matter. I want to reaffirm that I am and remain convinced that I am correct in this regard, as far as the grammar is concerned, in spite of the fact that an old stereotyped form is being used here. However, I am also aware that, having said this and having pointed out the difference between these two oaths, the hon. the Minister is not going to accept my amendment in any case. For that reason I am prepared under the circumstances to withdraw the amendment I moved.

Amendments 8 and 10, with leave, withdrawn.

Amendments 1 and 2 negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment 11A negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment 11 agreed to.

Amendment 12 negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in the name of the hon. member for Jeppe on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 18, after line 36, to insert:

The only aspect on which the CP would like clarity relates to there being absolute certainty about the fact that a power or duty that a member of the Cabinet must exercise or perform will be exercised or performed by that Cabinet member, and that Ministers will not be appointed, hither and thither, from the respective Houses, to meet Cabinet obligations. In other words, at the end of clause 26 a condition must be laid down to the effect that no power, duty or function vested in a member of the Cabinet in terms of a general law shall be assigned to a Minister of a Ministers’ Council; that no power vested in a Minister of a Ministers’ Council shall, in regard to general functions, be assigned to a Cabinet; and in conclusion, that a Minister of a Ministers’ Council of group (a) cannot act as a Minister of a Ministers’ Council of group (b). If that were very clearly spelt out in the clause, we would have no objection.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member’s amendment is unacceptable, but I should like to give the hon. member the assurance he has asked of me. I contend that it is unnecessary to prevent a general affair from being assigned to a member of a Ministers’ Council, own affairs from being assigned to a member of the Cabinet or own affairs of one group from being assigned to a Minister of another group. I should like to indicate why this is unnecessary. In terms of clause 24(3)(b)(i) the last-mentioned is prevented from occurring. He must be a member of the relevant group and therefore also of the Ministers’ Council. The hon. member will be able to understand my argument in that connection. The first two instances are covered by clause 19. The powers of the Ministers’ Council only relate to own affairs, and the State President can therefore not assign a general affair to such a Ministers’ Council. The reverse is also true; the Cabinet has authority in regard to general affairs, and in terms of the clause own affairs can therefore not be transferred to the Cabinet. The hon. member has that assurance.

Mr. Chairman, there is a lack of clarity because of the fact that in the Bill there are clauses that are at odds with one another. The problem is that we are not allowed to refer to other clauses. A problem I encountered yesterday, for example, was that whilst discussing a certain clause I had to refer to clause 37. It is, however, the Chair’s ruling that one is not allowed to refer to other clauses. A later clause could indeed—because it is not going to be dealt with in the discussions—be changed. Even if, in reading it, one finds it acceptable, it could be changed at a later stage because there will be no debate on it, but merely a vote taken. A clause that is passed now could, at a later stage, assume a different meaning as a result of some other clause.

The problem one generally has with clause 26 is that the State President can assign the implementation of a provision in the Act, entrusting a Minister with a certain power, duty or function, to any other Minister. That is, after all, contained in the legislation. Here we have a hidden model of how a shift in the various Cabinets will take place. Let us take the example of the Minister of Transport Affairs. Supposing the State President is of the opinion that the Minister of Transport Affairs is no longer suitable to hold the post and that he should be shifted. We accept that a man like Mr. Jac Rabie will be a member of the House of Representatives, because he is a distinguished Coloured leader. The State President could then appoint him Minister of Transport Affairs.

Would he then make any profits?

To tell the truth, he cannot make a much poorer showing than the present Minister. The difference, however is that the present hon. Minister is acceptable in all quarters in South Africa, although I do not believe that Mr. Jac Rabie would be accepted by railway men, not at the moment, in any case.

The hon. the Minister may shake his head, but there is a further problem in this connection. Let us take the example of the Minister of Agriculture. Supposing the State President does not like the Minister and appoints Mr. Mayet, a very well-known Afrikaans-speaking Indian leader, as Minister of Agriculture. He would then have to preside at Congresses, agricultural shows and farmers’ days in the Free State, whilst in actual fact he is not permitted to remain there for longer than a few hours. What would the situation then be? No thought is given to these problems that could arise.

That is the problem that can arise if a model is not known to people in advance. The implications are not apparent in this provision. One could almost term it furtive reform. Surely one cannot appoint Indians and Coloureds as Ministers in matters which they themselves, as a group, do not control. Are they all going to sit, without portfolios, in a single Cabinet? Surely that cannot be. What one can therefore expect in the new dispensation is that in order to train these people properly, they will have to be taken up in this Cabinet dispensation. We must not think of those people as being inferior. I am, for example, of the opinion that Mr. Rajbansi would be a very good Minister of Economic Affairs. There are going to be a few of them who are going to make their mark, in the future dispensation, as far as economic affairs are concerned.

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the clause.

If a Minister, as prescribed here, is assigned such a task by the Prime Minister, it is not clear whether that Minister would take all his department heads and other officials with him …

Order! This clause deals with the transfer of powers.

Mr. Chairman, when there is a transfer of powers, such a Minister is assigned certain tasks to perform. He then has a duty to perform. There is, however, a problem involved, because he would then have his own body of public servants that would go with him. I just want to know whether it would also be possible to accommodate those people in the Free State. That is one problem we shall have to look at. There are similar problems, for example, in the constitutions of Singapore, Malaysia and similar places.

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the clause. He must not try to circumvent the Chair’s instruction.

Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to do so. What I am trying to get at is that a moment ago the hon. the Minister said that it was difficult to write things into a constitution, and I agree with him. What is defined here is not viable in this country. One should rather not commit things to paper that are unacceptable to other people. It is for that reason that I am saying that this clause will have to be looked at, because if it is to be a legal directive, it will create problems under this constitution.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot argue with the hon. member for Langlaagte. I immediately want to acknowledge my inability to do so. One could only argue with him if one understood what he was saying, and I really do not understand what the hon. member says.

I gave an assurance to the hon. member for Brakpan, and I want to repeat it. If one were to look at clause 26, one would see that the words “assign … to say other Minister” indicate what the clause is all about. This remains subject to the other provisions referred to in clause 24(3)(b)(i) and clause 19. That is sufficient reply to the point which the hon. member put to me and which, it would seem, the hon. member for Langlaagte was trying to make.

We are not allowed to read one clause in conjunction with another or discuss one clause in conjunction with another.

Amendment negatived (Conservative Party dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Conservative Party dissenting).

Clause 27:

Mr. Chairman, clause 27 provides for the appointment and functions of Deputy Ministers. While it may be necessary for Ministers without portfolio to be appointed, it is of no consequence at this moment because the principle has been accepted under clause 24. However, we are not convinced that it is necessary to appoint Deputy Ministers without portfolio. The hon. member for Durban Point said earlier today that his party was in favour of Deputy Ministers without portfolio as he thought it would provide them with a training ground eventually to become Ministers. We are not convinced, as I said, that this is necessary. It has not been necessary in the past. We believe that there is sufficient training ground in Parliament for members to be trained as Deputy Ministers. There are many opportunities for them to get to know what happens in a department so that when they become Deputy Ministers they will have had sufficient training to adequately carry out their duties. Our concern is that this provision could be abused and, of course, could be costly. It would be costly because it would mean extra staff; it would mean extra office accommodation; it would mean extra housing and, of course, it would mean extra transport. When I say it could be abused, I mean that this provision could be used to create a parking place for political pals. This concept would be totally unacceptable to us. If it is the intention that a specific task is to be allotted to a Deputy Minister, as in the case of the hon. the Deputy Minister of Development and of Land Affairs, who is charged with a specific responsibility, namely to attend to land consolidation, we believe that such a situation could still be provided for by insisting that a Deputy Minister be attached to a particular department.

We believe therefore that, no matter what specific task could be envisaged for a particular Deputy Minister, it is not necessary for him, in the view of the Government, to be attached to a particular department. We do believe, however, that such a Deputy Minister must be attached to a specific department. Therefore I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 18, in lines 40 and 41, to omit “or Deputy Minister of such other description as the State President may determine”.

Mr. Chairman, I in the first place move the following amendments—

1. 4. On page 18, after line 62, to insert:
   1. (c) A person shall not be appointed as a Deputy Minister to exercise or perform on behalf of a Minister of the Cabinet any powers, duties and functions unless he is qualified to be elected or nominated as a member of the House of Assembly.
2. 5. On page 18, from line 54, to omit paragraph (a) and to substitute:
   1. (a) A person who is not a member of a House shall not be qualified to be a Deputy Minister unless he becomes a member of a House within three months of his appointment.

I suspect, Mr. Chairman, that you will not allow amendment 4. I am nevertheless moving it.

In regard to amendment 5, I just want to point out that if the hon. the Minister were to give me an indication that he would like to move a similar amendment, I would be prepared to withdraw it.

Amendment No. 6, is printed in my name on the Order Paper, is a consequential amendment to that which I moved in connection with clause 26. Therefore I shall not proceed to move this amendment either.

Order! I am sorry, but I am unable to accept amendment No. 4 as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the hon. member for Brakpan has indicated that he would be prepared to withdraw amendment 5 if I were to move an amendment similar to the one I moved earlier in regard to Ministers.

For a period of 12 months.

Yes, 12 months.

Mr. Chairman, I therefore move as an amendment—

1. 7. On page 18, from line 54, to omit paragraph (a) and to substitute:
   1. (a) No Deputy Minister shall not hold office for a longer period than 12 months unless he is or becomes a member of a House.

†Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member for Johannesburg North, I should like to state that I have argued this particular issue rather extensively, and, I should add, rather persuasively, when the previous clause was discussed. I am therefore not prepared to repeat all those arguments. The amendment moved by the hon. member is, however, not acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw amendment 5.

Amendment 5, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr Chairman, I merely want to place on record that all the arguments advanced by hon. members of the PFP in respect of the previous clause—the clause in respect of the appointment of Cabinet Ministers—still apply in this instance. Therefore we will be voting against this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 2. On page 18, after line 53, to insert:
   1. (c) Not more than nine persons may be appointed in terms of this subsection.

As discussed in the case of the previous clause, involving the Cabinet and the Ministers’ Council, no limit is placed on the number involved. The State President is free to appoint as many people as he wants to. If this same provision were to apply to Deputy Ministers, this would, I think, be a bit thick. For that reason I now want to ask the hon. the Minister, in all fairness, whether he does not really believe that the number of Deputy Ministers ought to be limited, indeed on the grounds that the number applicable to the Cabinet and the Ministers’ Council is not restricted at all. Deputy Ministers will, in point of fact, be rendering assistance in the services they perform, and on that basis I believe that, as in the case of the present constitution, the present dispensation, the number of Deputy Ministers ought to be limited to nine.

Mr. Chairman, I accept the hon. member for Koedoespoort’s remark, about its being a bit thick, in a figurative sense. If it does happen to be a bit thick, we should appoint Deputy Ministers rather than Ministers. It is cheaper to appoint a Deputy Minister than a Minister.

I want to suggest that we have debated this matter long enough now. I have already argued the fact that there is built-in discipline and control and that that power cannot be abused. For that reason the amendment is unacceptable.

Mr. Chairman, there is only one further aspect I want to refer to. In a previous debate the hon. the Minister said that there should be no limit on the number of Ministers because we were entering upon a new dispensation, etc. He said that in the past the maximum number of Ministers had been increased from time to time. That was done a few times, though not too often. I do not think it has happened more than three times since 1910, and on each occasion the Government furnished reasons why Ministers or Deputy Ministers had to be appointed. The hon. the Minister actually wants to put the cart before the horse in this connection. When the problem arises, Parliament can be convinced of the fact that the State President needs more Ministers or Deputy Ministers. I see the hon. the Deputy Minister is glaring at me somewhat fiercely. Let me tell them that what I am saying is not directed against them; I am merely speaking about the principle.

Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate that the hon. the Minister does not want to go through all the arguments that were raised when we dealt with the question of Ministers without portfolio. I can quite understand that, but the point I want to make is that to have a Deputy Minister without portfolio to a Minister without portfolio seems to be pushing it a bit. I wonder whether the hon. the Minister would address himself to that aspect.

Mr. Chairman, with due respect, no indication was given that there will be a Deputy Minister without portfolio to a Minister without portfolio. The clause does not say that.

Amendment 1 negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment 2 negatived (Conservative Party dissenting).

Amendment 7 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely rising to say that we shall be lodging our objections to this clause. We are doing so because of the fact that the President will not come solely from the White Chamber.

Clause agreed to (Conservative Party dissenting).

Clause 30:

Mr. Chairman, it is a great pity that we are working under the shadow of the guillotine and that this hon. Minister is determined to bulldoze this clause through Parliament.

This Minister?

Yes, this Minister. [Interjections.] I believe this House should in fact devote a considerable amount of time on the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament.

This is a critical concept from a constitutional point of view. We will oppose this clause, for the reasons which I will give. Should the clause be negatived, I shall move as an amendment—

I believe the hon. the Minister owes South Africa some explanation as far as this clause is concerned. The clause now talks of a President and Parliament of a sovereign legislative authority. This is a fundamental departure from the existing situation and the situation that preceded it. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act states “The legislative power of the Republic is vested in the Parliament of the Republic which shall consist of a President and a House of Assembly”. If one goes back to the parent Act, as passed in 1961, one sees it stated “The legislative power shall vest in Parliament, which shall consist of the State President, the Senate and the House of Assembly”. Nowhere in the present constitution is reference made to the sovereign power of Parliament. This clause introduces the concept of sovereignty of Parliament for the first time into the constitution of the Republic of South Africa. I must assume that the Government has some purpose or reason for introducing the phrase “sovereignty”.

Having indicated the departure from the norm let me say that we will oppose the concept of this clause stating that Parliament is sovereign. First of all, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister what the precise legal meaning of the word “sovereign” in the context is. To introduce a phrase containing the word “sovereign” in a law must have a legal meaning. The only other place in this constitution where the word “sovereign” or “sovereignty” is found is in relation to the sovereignty of the guidance of Almighty God. So on the one hand we have sovereignty in the guidance of Almighty God and on the other hand we now have sovereignty in relation to this legislation.

The first question I want to put to the hon. the Minister is: What is the significance, in terms of this constitution, of the introduction of the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament, which is not in the existing constitution nor in the constitution that preceded it? Why is it deemed necessary to depart from the provisions of the existing constitution which defines the status of this Parliament? Why is the new Parliament called a “sovereign Parliament”, whereas this Parliament at the moment is merely called “the legislative authority in South Africa”?

I want to raise a next point. While it might even be valid to call the present Parliament sovereign, by no stretch of imagination could the new Parliament created in terms of the new structures be described as a sovereign Parliament.

First of all, in certain circumstances, it is not Parliament that makes the final decision. In certain circumstances it is a creature of the executive in the form of the President’s Council that makes the decision that is binding on Parliament. One cannot have an outside body making a decision which is binding on a body that claims to be sovereign. It is not only a contradiction in terms but it will also lead to legal action. One cannot write into the constitution that Parliament is sovereign and in the same breath say that another body can made decisions and that when it makes a decision it will be deemed to be a decision of Parliament. Therefore, the first reason why we will oppose this is because of the inaccuracy of the term “sovereign” in relation to the President’s Council.

Secondly, it is in any case limited by the last three lines of this clause which read as follows—

Therefore, even in this clause there is a limitation on the concept of “sovereignty”. Within this clause we have both a statement of sovereignty and a limitation of sovereignty.

Thirdly, sovereignty is limited by the entrenched clauses. If one looks at clause 98 on page 56 of the Bill one will find that the Afrikaans and English languages are entrenched by a two-thirds majority requirement and that a number of other provisions in the draft constitution are also entrenched because they require an absolute majority of each of the Houses voting separately. That is in fact a limitation of the sovereignty of Parliament. One cannot have a sovereign body which at the same time is operating under limitations. I know the hon. the Minister will argue this case and we will be delighted to hear his arguments.

Fourthly, the sovereignty of Parliament is limited by the prohibition in this draft constitution on Parliament taking decisions at a joint sitting; in other words, Parliament which is claimed to be sovereign has in this draft constitution a limitation placed on the way it can take decisions. The draft constitution says Parliament can claim to be sovereign but it may not take a decision when it acts as a Parliament; it can only take a decision when it operates on the basis of three separate Houses.

Fifthly, sovereignty in respect of own affairs—I think this the hon. the Minister will concede without argument—does not rest with Parliament. Sovereignty in respect of own affairs rests with the State President and the House concerned. It cannot be argued that own affairs for Whites rests with Parliament. Therefore, sovereignty in the field of own affairs does not repose with Parliament but reposes with each of the Houses separately for a particular racial category of own affairs. Therefore, we argue that this phrase is a contradiction of the realities stated in this draft constitution. I do not know why the hon. the Minister introduces the phrase “sovereign” at the very time when he detracts from the sovereignty of Parliament. At the very time that he introduces a draft constitution that limits the sovereignty and negates the concept of the supremacy of Parliament in favour of the supremacy of the executive the concept of sovereignty is introduced into this draft constitution.

I want to put a final point. I believe that the word “sovereignty” brings into doubt the effectiveness of the procedures laid down in the Bill and especially the effectiveness of the entrenched clauses. This has been a matter of dispute in South Africa. It certainly was in the 1950s up to the 1960s. The fact is that as soon as one introduces the concept of sovereignty the whole issue is then raised as to whether a sovereign Parliament can bind itself or bind its successors. This is a point on which there is sharp difference of opinion and in regard to which there have been legal actions and which has been fought on one side or the other. Can a particular sovereign Parliament bind a future sovereign Parliament as far as procedures are concerned? This is a fundamental issue because on this rests whether one can ignore the provisions of a constitution or not. The hon. the Minister is aware that in respect of one of the sections in our present constitution which when provincial boundaries are adjusted requires one to follow certain procedures, Parliament has ignored it and it has been deemed that Parliament does not need to follow it.

The courts decided that.

Of course the courts are going to decide it.

No, I said the courts decided that.

One must not assume that the courts are not going to be invoked again. I can promise that this particular draft constitution is riddled with situations in which the courts are going to have to judge on the sovereignty of Parliament, on the sovereignty of particular Houses, on whether procedures have been followed.

Another point at issue is whether future Parliaments are bound by decisions of this Parliament. This is a matter for legal interpretation and legal dispute in regard to which we have as yet had no clarification. Our present Constitution does not say that this Parliament is sovereign. It just says that it is a legislative body. Can a Parliament which in terms of a current law is not sovereign confer sovereignty on its successor? Can a non-sovereign body declare its successor to be a sovereign body? We argue that not only is the word “sovereignty” in relation to this Constitution particularly inappropriate but the introduction of the concept of sovereignty in this clause also opens up a hornets’ nest of dispute and argument on constitutional issues, including the question of the entrenched clauses and the status of Parliament in relation to the Constitution.

We therefore say that we should revert to the simple and direct statement namely that the legislative authority is this Parliament and the State President. However, we do not add the tag that it is a sovereign Parliament because, whatever this Parliament is, the next Parliament will not be sovereign in terms of the definition in this Constitution Bill.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sea Point’s proposal is that the legislative authority should be vested in the legislative authority. This reminds me of my school days when I had a teacher who always gave me this definition of white: White is white. He called this a definite standpoint because one added nothing, saying merely that white was white. The hon. member for Sea Point reminded me of this story, because his proposed definition contains no further delineation and, if I may say so, is rather clumsy in the sense of not explaining it all where the legislative authority shall actually be vested.

The hon. member for Sea Point’s objection is to the fact that in the definition Parliament is described as being sovereing—i.e. Parliament and the State President. That, firstly, is the position. It is true that in the same clause there are restrictions placed on that sovereignty, restrictions which are set out in the following clause, just as the old statute, in its previous form, placed a restriction on the sovereignty of Parliament in the sense of there being certain so-called entrenched sections; they placed a restriction on the sovereignty of Parliament. At the time it was a Parliament consisting of the House of Assembly and the Senate. My argument is that in this particular case a restriction is likewise being placed on such sovereignty and that such restriction is, in point of fact, more securely entrenched in this legislation than was the case in the old legislation Whereas in the old legislation there could be some difference of opinion, as was indeed the case amongst various jurists, I respectfully want to submit that no such difference of opinion could arise in regard to the intention of this clause.

The hon. member for Sea Point made another point. He said that the President’s Council was a creation of the executive authority. That is, however, incorrect. The majority of the members of the President’s Council was a creation of the executive authority. That is, however, incorrect. The majority of the members of the President’s Council are elected by Parliament. They are not appointed by the executive authority. If I may put it in these terms, the hon. member for Sea Point is presenting a distorted image of the truth in this case, and I cannot but take it amiss of him that he should want to present such a distorted picture of this issue. I suggest that the only reason why he wishes to do so in this Parliament, where he would be gainsaid, is because he thinks that he can go on presenting that distorted image to the public, where there is no one to gainsay him, thereby misleading the voters about what is contained in the proposed legislation. Then the hon. member says that the courts would have to decide on several aspects of the legislation. He ought to be glad about that, because their whole argument has been that the courts ought to be given a testing right. If, in terms of the provisions of clause 30, the courts do have to pass judgment, from time to time, on the validity of legislation that is passed, surely this is in accordance with the wishes of the PFP, and he should therefore not reject this, but rather support it.

I should like to support the clause, as printed.

Mr. Chairman, over the past few weeks or so criticism has often been levelled at the PFP and the CP, accusing them of jointly ganging up on the Government. Hon. members of the Government ask how this is possible; both parties cannot be right.

I am no student of constitutional or international law when it comes to such matters, but perhaps it is a good thing for the average man to talk about this. The hon. the Minister must therefore be a little patient with me. I listened to the hon. member for Sea Point, and I do not think anyone can say that the hon. member and I advocate the same principles. I think we are very far removed from each other.

But you both vote “no”. [Interjections.]

Order!

I listened to the hon. member for Sea Point, and I must say that from the theoretical point of view, or the point of view of principle, there are many things on which I agree with the hon. member. [Interjections.]

Order!

Looking critically at this clause, let me say that I can understand what the hon. member for Sea Point is talking about. The things we disagree on we shall be able to discuss further in a year or two from now.

Summarizing this clause in my own words, I want to refer to it as an ironic clause. As far as I am concerned, it is full of irony. Those are the mildest terms in which I can express my opinion about it. I am speaking with great piety when I recollect that in the annals of its history, the NP has come to the stage of being able to say, with this clause, that the legislative power of the Republic is vested in the President and the Parliament of the Republic which will have sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic. One thinks of the struggle in the annals of the NP’s history about the uncompounded concept cherished by a small group of artless farming people about the “sovereignty” of their Parliaments, but now alas, in the name of the NP, there is to be a Parliament and a State President, as described here, as a sovereign institution to reward the trials and tribulations of our people. That is the first point I want to raise.

Secondly I want to point out to the hon. the Minister—this will also come to the fore in later debates—that in his speech at Pietersburg the hon. the Prime Minister said that in character and composition this House of Assembly would stay as it was.

Not in its composition.

I say that what he said was “in its character and composition”. [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must give the hon. member for Rissik an opportunity to put his case.

That is also a matter that can be debated at a later stage, a matter which has never, as far as I am concerned, had a clear ring to it in the past, and which does not have a clear ring to it now either. With a view to the position the State President is to occupy—according to our view he is to be in a very strong position. I do not want to use the word “dictatorial” because I would like to keep the hon. the Minister in a good frame of mine—I also find it incomprehensible that it can be said that the State President and Parliament are to be sovereign. I am very sceptical about the power of the State President and the real power that Parliament will have as a sovereign institution. I have great doubts about this, and I am sure that in this debate we shall still be giving it a great deal of attention. I associate myself with the hon. member for Sea Point in saying that the State President and Parliament are singled out as the specific institutions in which sovereignty is vested. There is one thing about the Government I have never been able to understand since leaving that party.

That is why you are sitting where you are sitting.

I am sitting where I am sitting, but a time may come when I shall be sitting somewhere else. I cannot understand how it can be said that the State President and Parliament are sovereign when there is an institution such as the President’s Council which will in certain cases, when the State President deems fit, deal with certain matters and decide on such matters for these sovereign institutions, the State President and Parliament. That is something I find incomprehensible and inexplicable. There is another thing I find astounding. There are many Government members who, for many years now, have been engaged in a struggle for the sovereignty of Parliament. They were not only engaged in a struggle for the sovereignty of Parliament, however, because the sovereignty of Parliament and the State President do not go hand in hand with these specific institutions, but also relate to a specific population group and a specific geographical area. I find the wording of the clause extremely ironic. As far as I am concerned sovereignty has a much deeper meaning than the mere application to Parliament and the State President would require. It represents much more than just an institution such as the one we envisage today.

Nonsense.

The hon. member is free to say it is nonsense. It remains my standpoint.

There is another matter I want to raise. The proviso in this clause reads—

This proviso, to a large extent, subjects the content of clause 31 to qualification. The concept of sovereignty laid down here is at odds with the struggle and turmoil of the NP from the time it came into being until just last year. What is further at odds with their struggle for sovereignty and self-determination is the fact that in Parliament one will now be dealing with so-called own affairs and general affairs. Here we have a Parliament to whose sovereignty reference is being made—and also to that of the State President—but the contradiction here is that there is no real sovereignty in regard to either own affairs or general affairs.

I therefore want to conclude by saying that this clause is an ironic one, one which on the one hand I find sad and which, on the other hand, I find tragic in the circumstances prevailing in Southern Africa where there is a diversity of peoples and where sovereignty, and the meaning it has in the hearts of the people is here not really … [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to waste the Committee’s time with a very long argument, but I would nevertheless just like to react to two aspects the hon. member for Sea Point and the hon. member for Rissik raised. I do not think it is right of the hon. member for Sea Point to say that “the hon. the Minister is trying to bulldoze this Bill through Parliament”. I do not think that is true because, in all fairness, the hon. the Minister and the hon. the Leader of the House have allocated all the available time to this.

On what clause are you talking now?

I am reacting—if the hon. member for Brakpan would just listen—to a statement made by the hon. member for Sea Point. The hon. member does not mind my doing so, does he? In my opinion the hon. member for Sea Point was not being fair to the hon. the Minister in that regard.

If the hon. member for Sea Point could give me an exact definition of sovereignty, I would be very glad to take cognizance of it too. I think that all of us who have come up against difficult concepts such as that of sovereignty know that it is not a precisely delineated concept and, as such, is therefore difficult to define. The hon. member for Sea Point, however, has specifically chosen it as a point of departure for his argument against this clause. I think the hon. member will concede that when he says that the courts will have to decide on a whole lot of matters in the future, he is not saying anything new. The courts have, on umpteen occasions, passed judgment on Government actions, have they not? That is why what he say is nothing new. The hon. member’s argument, about the mere fact of what sovereignty is and how it should be defined, does not go very far, I should like to give the hon. member some food for thought—about this we can still argue—and that is that there is no precise definition. The hon. member knows that. He is intelligent enough to know it. Let me, however, leave the matter at that.

I now come to the clause itself. Apart from sovereignty, the clause refers to three other aspects. I am glad the hon. member for Houghton is here, because I should also like to address her on this clause. Does the hon. member know what this clause is all about? The legislative authority is fully empowered to make laws for peace, order and good government. Those are the three aspects of the terms of reference given to the legislative authority in terms of this clause. That is the content of the clause. Do hon. members know why I am addressing the hon. member for Houghton? It is because she always puts questions on the Question Paper about how many people in this country are, for example, shot dead by the police. The hon. member does not, however, put a question on the Question Paper about why police-officers are shot dead. [Interjections.] Here it is a question of order and peace. That is precisely what it is all about. That is, after all, the task entrusted to this legislative authority. I also think that is what we all want. I do not think there is anyone in this country who does not want it. [Interjections.]

Preferring, as I now do, to leave the hon. members of the PFP at that, I now come to the hon. member for Rissik. I enjoyed the hon. member for Rissik’s statement about now knowing much about these matters, he does talk about them, nevertheless. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Rissik went on to say that the CP and the PFP cannot both be right. I am not so sure about that. That is something I am not at all sure about. We shall have to obtain clarity about this in the future. They both do, however, always agree. My impression is that they probably think they are both right. Hence their similar decision on one aspect. Whether it was joint decision-making, joint responsibility or power-sharing, I do not know either. One thing I do know, however, is that they only have one thing in mind, and that is to smash the present Government.

It is no longer necessary for us to do it. You are doing it for us. [Interjections.]

Their idea is to smash the Government. That is how simple it all is. They are therefore both pursuing the same goal. I want to allege that there are indeed hon. members … [Interjections.] I am now merely reacting to what the hon. member for Rissik said.

Order! The hon. member for Roodeplaat must focus more specifically on the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I now want to come back to the three components of the clause. What the three components boil down to is the fact that what the Government is proposing is a legislative authority that must make laws. What is the purpose of this? To bring about peace, order and good Government. Both the CP and the PFP, however, oppose this clause. [Interjections.] The hon. the leader of the CP is laughing about this. Is he laughing about this because he and the AWB play in the same team? Is he laughing because he and the AWB jointly want to disrupt peace and order?

Order! If the hon. member would focus more specifically on the clause there would also be more peace, order and good government in this House. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, all that I am advocating on behalf of the Government is that hon. members of the Opposition parties should realize that this specific clause in the legislation under discussion is concerned solely with the fundamental question in South Africa at the moment. That question is whether we want order, peace and good Government. That is the fundamental question at the moment. That is also what the CP is voting against. The official Opposition is also voting against this.

That is the fundamental question we must all answer, and that is why I take pleasure in supporting this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Rissik referred to clause 30 as an “ironic” clause because mention is made in it of a sovereign legislative authority, the sovereign legislative authority which will be vested in Parliament. Personally I do not agree with the use of the word “sovereignty”. The concept of sovereignty has acquired a specific meaning in constitutional law. A sovereign authority is regarded as an authority which acknowledges no superior, which is not a derived authority and which is not accountable to anyone. In that absolute sense sovereignty is no longer really applicable in the present circumstances. Hence the fact that modern constitutional lawyers and authors no longer speak of “the sovereignty of Parliament” but of the “the supremacy of Parliament”.

Explain to us what the difference is.

That is why sovereignty is not really appropriate in the present circumstances. The fact of the matter is, however, that according to the existing Constitution of the Republic, this Parliament is the sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic of South Africa. And if this Parliament is sovereign, then the Parliament for which the Constitution Bill makes provision, will also be a sovereign Parliament. These are the facts. If we were now to argue academically and with legal nicety as to whether the proposed Parliament will be a sovereign Parliament, then I would personally be inclined to contend that it will not be sovereign. If that is meant to imply however that the proposed Parliament will in any way be inferior to, or will have lesser powers than the present Parliament, then that is not true. That is why I repeat: If this Parliament is sovereign, then the future Parliament will also be sovereign.

The hon. member for Rissik referred to an allegation by the hon. the Minister that this House of Assembly would remain as it was at present in its character and constitution.

The Prime Minister, not this Minister.

Very well, the Prime Minister. The fact of the matter is that the Constitution Bill does indeed provide that this House of Assembly, even with the inclusion of the hon. members sitting opposite in the CP benches, will in its composition remain precisely as it is at present. As far as its character is concerned …

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that we can discuss the constitution of Parliament under clause 37. If the hon. member wants to touch on that now, he will have to do so very briefly.

I shall, Sir. I am simply reacting to the argument of the hon. member for Rissik. He argued …

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that in accordance with the practice in this House I allowed one speaker from every party to go a little further than the specific details of the clause. However, I cannot allow other hon. members to react to these speeches, for then we shall never be done.

I accept that, Sir. I am not aware that any member on this side of the House has already tried to reply to this argument.

The hon. member for Roodeberg—I beg your pardon, Roodeplaat—did.

Sir, I say that the hon. member for Rissik tried to turn this into an argument. According to the Constitution Bill, there is no reason whatsoever to argue that this House of Assembly will not in fact, under the new dispensation, remain precisely the same as it is at present as far as its constitution and its character is concerned.

Oh come now, you do not even believe yourself.

The fact that there will be two additional Houses surely does not change the constitution of this House. Nor does it change the character of this House as being the legislative House of the Whites. At present it is also the legislative House of the White voters of South Africa. In the new dispensation it will remain the same. The fact that there will be two additional Houses, one for the Coloureds and one for the Asians …

Order! The hon. member is now debating clause 37. I really cannot allow him to continue doing so.

I am simply replying to the statements made by the hon. member for Rissik.

The hon. member also argued, on the aspect of sovereignty, that the Parliament is sovereign in the State set-up. Surely that is not true. All that is stated in the present Constitution Act is that this Parliament is the sovereign legislative authority …

Order! The hon. member has just said precisely the same thing.

There is a difference between sovereignty in the State set-up and a reference to the sovereign legislative authority.

Order! The hon. member has also used that argument already.

Mr. Chairman, before I react to what the hon. member for Mossel Bay said, I think it is desirable that I react briefly to what the hon. member for Roodeplaat said. We know the hon. member for Roodeplaat to be a skilful debater.

Is it not the hon. member for Roodeberg? [Interjections.]

I bow to the hon. the Minister’s superior knowledge.

You like it, don’t you?

Yes, I never refuse it. Particularly not if Northern Transvaal have won.

Order! I would be glad if the hon. member for Brakpan would address the Committee on the clause.

I repeat: The hon. member for Roodeplaat is a skilful debater. However, I think he lost his bearings a little this evening. We accept that Parliament makes laws for the peace, order and good government of the Republic of South Africa. We are not arguing with him about that aspect. We are ad idem with him about that. He also came to the conclusion that the Opposition parties are seeking to break the Government. I wonder whether there is ever any other idea in the mind of an Opposition party than to break and smash a government. That is the main object.

This is a combined effort.

The hon. member for Mossel Bay discussed the sovereignty, the supremacy of Parliament, etc. We know those arguments of Dicey and others. However, I want to return to the clause. To say that the legislative authority of the Republic is vested in the President and Parliament is incorrect. If we look at the little blue book on the constitutional proposals published by the Government, we see that the President’s council is the final arbiter in the case of a conflict. The power of the President’s Council ought to be spelt out here because it is the final arbiter that has to resolve a conflict. A matter is referred to the President’s council when finality cannot be reached among the Houses and the joint committees.

Order! The hon. member cannot discuss those details now.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to address you very earnestly on this aspect.

Order! The hon. member must please resume his seat. The hon. member will receive every opportunity to discuss the functioning of the President’s Council. At this moment, however, we are concerned with the legislature and its powers. Before he proceeds, I want to point out to the hon. member that the hon. member for Sea Point and the hon. member for Rissik argued that the proposed legislature, this Parliament, was not sovereign. The hon. member for Brakpan is now arguing precisely the same point. I cannot allow him to repeat arguments. Consequently, if the hon. member wishes to proceed, I ask him please not to present arguments about the functioning of the President’s Council, nor to raise the point that the legislature is not sovereign.

Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, we are in the process of defining the legislature here. What we are concerned with here, is what the legislature consists of. It is being said that the legislature consists of the President and Parliament. My argument is that that is not the case, and I want to say in all earnest here that it is wrong to say that it consists of these two elements when in reality it consists of three elements. I am not arguing about the President’s Council; I am arguing about a definition of a “Parliament”.

The hon. member may proceed. However, he may not discuss the functioning of the President’s Council.

Then I also wish to say that in regard to this point which is being made, there is authority for it, not only on the basis of what has already been said here, but also in the memoranda which were before the Select Committee. I have with me a memorandum from the professor emeritus of Constitutional Law at the University of Stellenbosch, in which it is stated, and I quote—

He went on to say and I quote—

This is the argument I wish to advance in this connection. Then I want to refer further to the proviso to clause 30, and I quote—

How can the Government argue that Parliament is sovereign if its sovereignty is already limited by what follows in clause 31. Consequently there is a great deal that can be argued around this entire question of sovereignty and supremacy. We can for example look at section 114 of the present Constitution Act, which reads that a province cannot be subdivided except by petition to Parliament by the province itself. The courts have found that in this connection Parliament need not take cognisance of section 114, because Parliament can make its own rules and is sovereign. I therefore want to argue that the proviso to clause 30 cannot prevent Parliament from ignoring the provisions of section 31, because Parliament is sovereign. It is the supreme authority in regard to legislation. It cannot allow itself to be bound to follow another procedure, as is being done here.

Mr. Chairman, you said that we could argue about Parliament when we came to the specific clause. At this stage I just want to tell you that we shall vote against this clause because Parliament, as it is subsequently defined, will be a mixed Parliament governing a shared territory. We cannot accept that.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the argument over the concept of “sovereignty” will produce very much because the meaning of the concept is in fact very vague. If one considers the way in which it was originally argued, one finds that at the present juncture, not only in South Africa, but elsewhere too, it cannot really be made applicable to legislatures or governments in general.

If one were to accept with that limitation that the word “sovereignty” in the Bill is not being used in that esoteric sense which is sometimes associated with it, but is in fact being used, as the hon. member for Mossel Bay indicated, to indicate what is basically supremacy, then I think it is correct. I want to argue that it is in fact true that there are specific limitations on the power of Parliament, as defined here, to make laws. Inter alia there are limits which are imposed by itself and accepted in the form of procedures which are prescribed for laws to be made and in that way the power of Parliament is indeed being constrained. That is what we have on the one hand. One can argue about whether or not this is really a limitation of its supremacy.

There is another point which I want to argue rather emphatically, and that is that if a Bill which is before Parliament may at a specific stage be referred to the President’s Council for a decision it does not detract from the supremacy of Parliament as far as legislation is concerned. When we talk about the supremacy of Parliament as a legislature, it means in the first place that there is no other body in this State that can make laws to which the laws of Parliament have to take second place. There is no other body in the country which has other powers which limit the legislative powers of Parliament, because all the President’s Council is in fact able to do is make a choice between various proposals emanating from Parliament. The President’s Council itself cannot make laws.

Sir, I notice that you are frowning at me on this point, but that is what this matter is concerned with. I shall nevertheless try to stick more closely to the clause.

The only point I want to make is that if one wants to establish whether Parliament is indeed the highest legislative authority, it is only necessary to illustrate that point, as I have already done, and to indicate that the President’s Council does not in fact have any legislative power and cannot make laws. For that reason Parliament in fact remains the highest legislative authority in the dispensation we are creating.

For that reason I have no problem with this definition of the legislature, apart from the proviso which I stated concerning the specific meaning of the word “sovereignty”. Consequently I believe it is not necessary to effect any extensive changes to the clause, with the exception perhaps of that one word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise merely to record the attitude of the NRP to the amendments which have been moved to clause 30. I want to say immediately that in the Select Committee I supported the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point, should the clause be negatived. I had not at the time appreciated the full implications of the omission which it made from that clause. [Interjections.] Let them make a noise, Sir. If they look at the record they will find that I also voted for the clause as it now stands. However, in his amendment, the hon. member for Sea Point deletes the reference to what are own affairs. This party believes that groups or communities—on a different basis, perhaps, from what the Government believes—should be able to control their own affairs. The amendment proposed by the hon. member for Sea point omits that reference and he seeks to insert new wording in respect of the legislative authority. He also seeks to omit the following proviso—

That proviso deals with own affairs. We believe that there should be own affairs. I admit quite frankly, and I have no shame in doing so, that I made a mistake on the Select Committee in that I did not appreciate the full implications of the new form in which this amendment was couched. Therefore, we will not support the amendment. This party will vote as I voted on the Select Committee …

For a Cabinet post.

… and we shall therefore be acting perfectly consistently. Mr. Chairman, if I were like that hon. member and I had no conscience and integrity in regard to my political ambition …

Order! The hon. member must withdraw that remark.

I withdraw it, Sir. If I were like that hon. member who appears to treat the affairs of South Africa as a joke, who does not appear to treat them with the responsibility which I believe this Parliament demands of its members, then I could make the sort of interjection which that hon. member makes. However, I hope that I am above that level of cheap jibes. The hon. member ought to know by now that after having had 28 years in this House, if I had wanted to do what he has suggested, I could have done it a long, long time ago.

As I have said, we will be consistent and this party will vote as we voted on the Select Committee for clause 30.

What about the amendment?

We shall oppose the amendment because I believe the amendment goes against the principle of own affairs.

Is that also being consistent?

Yes, because consistently, throughout the whole debate, at the Second Reading and in respect of every clause referring to own affairs, this party has supported the principle of own and general affairs. Anybody studying the passage of this Bill through its various stages in the House and also in the Select Committee will find that this is the only variation, because of a mistake in regard to the acceptance of the proposal on own affairs and general affairs. I make no excuses for my actions. When I supported the amendment I did not appreciate that the amendment eliminated own affairs.

After 28 years!

Is the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North infallible?

Mr. Chairman, I make no claims to infallibility. I have never said that Zimbabwe is a miracle of reconciliation. [Interjections.] I have never made statements of that nature. I do not claim to have the foresight of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North. [Interjections.]

Obviously this party will not support the amendments moved by the hon. member for Rissik. We do not accept the concept of total White domination by the House of Assembly. We will also oppose the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. I hope that in view of the attempt to make cheap capital out of my honesty in admitting that we have made a mistake, hon. members of the official Opposition will get up and try to defend the merit and the consequences of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point. They must get up and say seriously that they do not accept the right of a group or a community to have control over its own intimate affairs, so that South Africa can see that they openly reject in this House the right of a community to control its own affairs.

We will vote for the clause and against the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, the clause deals with sovereignty and sovereign powers. But it appears that there is great uncertainty on the Government side as to exactly what these terms mean. The hon. member for Roodeplaat has asked us to define the term “sovereignty”, while the hon. member for Helderkruin has told us that the meaning of the word is very vague. It does not really help us to understand the motivation behind this clause if, from that side of the House, no clear meaning can be given to the term in the first instance.

I do not know of any recent development which has caused the word “sovereignty” to lose the meaning it has had for centuries. I am not aware of any change in the meaning of the word.

Just tell us.

I will tell the hon. member. I want to refer to a book called The British Constitution by Harvey and Bather on page 7, where they deal with the concept of sovereignty. I quote—

This is the definition—

That is the first leg. The second leg is—

That is the classical meaning of sovereignty and, in this case, the sovereignty of Parliament. If, on the Government side, there is no clarity as to what sovereignty is, then that is a recent development. In the 1950s, when the constitutional crisis took place over years under Prime Minister Strijdom, as one block the Government knew what the sovereignty of Parliament meant. There was no single member of the NP who did not know what sovereignty meant. Today not a single member can tell us what sovereignty means and we are being asked to define it. One hon. member even told us that it is a vague concept. Let them go and have a look at the debates of the Joint Session of February 1956 when the constitution and the entrenched clauses were debated. Nationalist member after Nationalist member then came up with definitions of sovereignty. They argued that Parliament was sovereign and that therefore, for example, the courts should not interfere.

What column?

What I am saying therefore is that in order to conceal the weakness which has showed up in this clause, namely confusion as to where sovereignty lies under the new constitution, they pretend not to know what it is all about. I think they know what sovereignty means but they also know that under the new system there will be great confusion because no one can tell us where sovereignty lies. The hon. member Mr. Schutte is a good example. He is a lawyer and a few days ago he was asked in this House where sovereignty lies under this new constitution and he said, and it is recorded in Hansard, that it depends on the circumstances. This again negates what this clause stipulates. [Interjections.]

In my view the hon. member for Rissik has correctly pointed out the problem that we have with this constitution as far as sovereignty is concerned. He has argued that one can even make out a case that a single House has sovereignty as far as own affairs is concerned. I cannot categorically say that that is the case, but I nevertheless think that he has made out a good case. I think one can make out a good case for the fact that sovereignty lies in four different persons or bodies. There is the President himself, the three Houses together, the President’s Council and a single House. If one tests sovereignty against the definition that I have referred to and one just takes the first leg of the definition which states: “The power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds”, then to some extent the President’s powers comply with this definition. What we would like the hon. the Minister or any other hon. member on the Government side to do is to tell us with the same clarity that they had about the concept of sovereignty in the 1950’s, where sovereignty lies in the new system. It is not going to help anyone merely to tell us that we must look at clause 30. They must tell us where sovereignty lies in the new system which we are about to enter.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to react to the speech of the hon. member who has just resumed his seat and debate the concept of sovereignty with him so that we can understand this clause better. The hon. member quoted from The British Constitution, judgments which he himself said dated from the 18th century and then alleged that these had remained unchanged until the present day. What does the concept really mean? All that sovereignty says is that only that body upon which a function has been conferred may exercise that function. That is all it says. No other body may exercise that function on its behalf and no other body may supplant it. It has to follow its own course. But surely sovereignty is also being defined here as being Parliament in cooperation with the President, and the proviso at the end of the clause in fact states how Parliament’s power shall be exercised, which will continue to be supreme in respect of resolutions which are adopted, which cannot be overruled by any other body, nor by Parliament constituted in a different way. In other words, if the procedure in terms of clause 31 is followed and a decision has been reached, that decision remains standing and cannot be repealed in any other way than in terms of the definition of the legislature which has already been defined here. If the hon. member were correct in his standpoint which he went all the way back to the 18th century to find—and this was demonstrated in all the debates pertaining to the High Court of Parliament and the second Harris case—he would in fact have been wrong to accept that clause 99(2), read in conjunction with clause 89, would not have been in conflict with the provisions of clause 30. It again amounts to a limitation; a limitation, though, which is imposed within the framework of the definition of the legislative authority of Parliament. Therefore, what I am trying to say is that sovereignty is nothing else but supremacy, as the hon. member for Helderkruin also indicated, supremacy with regard to that area of operation which has been defined for it.

Now I wish to come back briefly to the hon. members of the CP. The hon. member for Waterberg will be able to explain to us very satisfactorily what the concept of sovereignty in one’s own circle also means. It is a concept which in particular means that the supremacy with regard to decisions situated in the area of jurisdiction are situated only within that specific circle. Consequently, when we talk about the sovereignty of Parliament, as defined in clause 30, we are concerned only with the powers Parliament has at its disposal. It then appears that Parliament also has the only powers, in terms of its own definition of itself in this clause. I maintain that the definition of the legislative authority in whom this function will be vested is correct in this instance, too, particularly in view of the proviso in clause 31, which follows immediately afterwards.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to talk for very long. In clause 30 an attempt is being made to make a statement about where the legislative authority in the Republic is vested in terms of the new constitution. According to the clause the legislative power is vested in the President and Parliament. This is followed by the proviso, however, that it is subject to the provisions of clause 31. That is quite correct. According to your ruling, Mr. Chairman, we may not, of course, indicate now what is stated in clause 31, although clause 31, as a result of the mere reference to it in clause 30, in reality forms part and parcel of clause 30 itself. For that reason I simply want to state now—and the hon. the Minister will know what I am talking about because he knows what is contained in the Bill—that this definition in clause 30 of precisely where the legislative powers in this country are vested, does not go far enough. It should also be added that they are not only subject to the provisions of clause 31, but also to the provisions of clause 32. In exactly the same way as clause 31 prescribes certain procedures, clause 32 also prescribes certain procedures. For example, it prescribes a definite procedure which has to be followed in the case of laws pertaining to matters of common interest if the three Houses cannot reach an agreement.

Therefore I want to suggest that the definition in clause 30 is not substantially correct, because it does not represent precisely what the real position will be when the constitution under discussion comes into operation. Unfortunately we cannot discuss clause 31 and clause 32 now. By the time we get round to discussing clause 32, however, clause 30 will quite probably have been passed, without our having had an opportunity to discuss the limitations placed by clause 32 on the mere statements in clause 30.

Mr. Chairman, I want to begin at once with the hon. member for Barberton. Everyday that hon. member astonishes me all over again. If the member’s argument is correct now—and I want to argue on that assumption—surely he is quite entitled to move an amendment in regard to the clause by means of which the clause will be made further subject to the provisions of clause 32. In terms of the wording of clause 30 this clause is in any event being made subject to the provisions of clause 31. The hon. member can therefore do what he argued. However, this party did not do it.

We are not going to help you to fix up your mess.

Now that is a very interesting statement, Mr. Chairman. [Interjections.] The statement which the hon. member for Barberton has just made, Mr. Chairman, is an extremely important one. He said he was not going to help anyone to fix up a mess. What it amounts to therefore, is that it is the standpoint of his party that they should not help to rectify something which they believe is obviously wrong. I must therefore accept that all the amendments which hon. members of the CP have moved so far in regard to all the previous clauses, as well as the amendments which they are still going to move, were not intended or are not going to be intended to rectify something, but were and are in fact intended to make things worse than they already are, according to them. [Interjections.] No, it is very clear what the hon. member’s statement amounted to. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. the Minister?

No, Sir. The hon. member must wait. I am still coming to him. It is extremely interesting that the hon. member for Barberton, who is a subtle member, should say that the reason why he was not moving an amendment was that he did not want to rectify something which according to his standpoint was obviously wrong. I want to accept—surely there is a unity of thought among those hon. members—that this is also the standpoint all of them adopt. Then no amendment which they have moved so far was intended to rectify anything. Surely there is no other inference to draw. The hon. member has arrived at a moment of truth. He is also quite right…

That it is a mess, yes.

… that amendment moved by the CP was intended to rectify anything.

I want to come to the hon. member for Sea Point. He made an interesting statement at the beginning. He said that in the existing constitution—if I misunderstood him he must set me straight—there was only one reference to sovereignty, viz. the sovereignty of the Creator. That is what the hon. member said.

I was talking about the Bill.

No, the hon. member was talking about the Act. In the Bill there are various references to it. Reference is also made to it in clause 2. The hon. member cannot argue with me in this way now. He said that there was only one reference to sovereignty in the existing Act. [Interjections.] The hon. member says that is not correct. Then he must have said that there was only one reference to it in the Bill we are now discussing.

I said there were only one other reference to sovereignty, viz. in clause 2.

Let us deal with it then. Would the hon. member agree with me that the sovereignty to which reference is being made in clause 2 and the sovereignty referred to in clause 30 are different concepts of sovereignty? [Interjections.] The hon. member says “yes”. Consequently they are different concepts of sovereignty. The hon. member says that that, too, is true. Then we cannot argue that sovereignty as a concept has an absolute meaning which does not change. I think that was the point which the hon. member for Helderkruin and other hon. members also made.

The hon. member for Sea Point made a second statement which was terribly important. He said that the sovereignty—in the Bill, I assume—was being limited by the entrenchments. Did I understand the hon. member correctly?

I shall speak again.

But I should like to reply to the debate. The hon. member is too shy now to allow his arguments to be debated. I can understand why. In the first place, surely it is Parliament that imposes the restrictions. Surely the hon. member also knows that an entrenchment has a certain meaning, in this Bill as well, viz. that there is a specific difficult procedure in terms of which amendments may be effected to a specific section or clause. This applies to the present Constitution Act, but surely it also applies to the proposals contained in the Bill. They do not limit the powers of Parliament. Surely the hon. member knows that. After all, he read the relevant decision in this connection. Entrenchment does not limit the powers of Parliament to amend provisions. It is only prescriptive in regard to the procedure or rules that have to be complied with in order to change the entrenched provisions. The hon. member knows that. For example, the court decisions on the alterations to the provincial boundary were not based on the sovereignty of Parliament but on the fact that section 114 of the existing constitution was not itself being subjected to the limitations contained in the section. The hon. member knows that that was the latest decision in this specific connection.

The hon. member for Sea Point also said we should omit the words “sovereign authority”—that was the first part of his motion—on the basis of his argument with which I have just dealt now. They also argue that, because there are other provisions in the Bill which provide what shall happen in case of a conflict among Houses on general affairs, that some other authority is taking over the legislative power and that it is then no longer vested in Parliament. Hon. members of the Opposition adopted a dual standpoint in respect of what would happen if the legislative institutions were to clash. The hon. member for Sea Point argued that the legislative bodies should in that case meet in a joint session to solve the problem. That was his method of solving the problem. In his turn, however, the hon. member for Sandton said that the court should, in terms of a Bill of Rights, have the right to exercise legislative powers. In other words, the hon. member’s party said that the final arbiter on legislation should not be the legislature …

You are talking nonsense.

It is not nonsense. It is very easy to say that. If a court is given power over the laws of Parliament, it could implicitly mean that the final decision in that regard did not rest with Parliament.

The hon. member and his party were prepared to remove that final decision of the legislative institution. Surely that is a fact.

The hon. member for Durban Point made a very valid point. The second part of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point entailed the omission of the proviso to clause 30, which has to do with the certificate which shall be issued in terms of clause 31, a certificate which stipulates where the legislative power in respect of own affairs is vested. If Parliament decides that in the case of a conflict among its constituent components another body should give a decisive answer—hon. members must listen carefully now—as to which one is right, one is giving that body legislative power. That is also the reply to the argument of the hon. member for Brakpan in this connection. The body which has an arbitrative power—it is a pity the hon. member for Barberton is not here because he ought to know this too—does not make laws, but decides, in terms of its power of arbitration, which component of the Parliament’s decision should apply. It therefore has no inherent power of its own to make laws. Consequently this does not detract from the concept of sovereignty, as it was debated today, in respect of the legislative body. For that reason I do not agree with the hon. member for Sea Point’s arguments at all. I say that a body which settles disputes need not necessarily—in the constitutional proposals this does not happen in any event—be part of the legislature. Just as an hon. member on the official Opposition side would not argue that if the courts have a power of appeal over the validity of legislation, it would detract from the legislative function or it would become part of the legislature, so precisely the same principle applies here. It will not help the hon. member for Sea Point to shake his head. In terms of the power of the legislature, there is no difference between whether the President’s Council gives a decision or whether a court decides on the validity of the substance. No one has ever argued that if the court should receive that function it would become part of the legislature; not even that hon. member.

Absolute rubbish!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member is saying “Absolute rubbish”. Now I want to ask him this: If the motion of those hon. members, the instruction which they moved, had been accepted, would it then have detracted from the legislative function of Parliament? Now he has absolutely nothing to say. [Interjections.]

Order!

With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, surely they could not on that basis have considered the court to be a legislative authority or part of the legislation.

The President’s Council is not a court.

Of course the President’s Council is not a court. It is a different kind of body. But the hon. member for Bryanston will not be able to understand this.

You want to vest the President’s Council with the power of a court. [Interjections.]

Order!

I maintain that the consequential provision that there is a power of decision between institutions—institutions which cannot make their own decisions, but which can ratify decisions—does not substantiate the argument put forward by the hon. member for Sea Point that the concept of sovereign power should be deleted. The President’s Council, which would then be the body, settles a dispute. It chooses the version of a specific House, according to the clause concerned. The hon. member is shaking his head.

Only one is referred to it.

No, it is not only one that is referred to; all three are referred to it. In specific circumstances all three can be referred, and it is able to make a choice. I really cannot understand that hon. member’s argument. He is saying that only one is being referred to the President’s Council. If only one is referred to it, surely there is no dispute. Surely a dispute can only exist if they clash. How on earth can the hon. member then argue that only one is referred to the President’s Council? It is only by a flight of the imagination that the hon. member for Sea Point can come to such a conclusion. Mr. Chairman, I shall leave this argument at that before you tell me that I have argued it sufficiently.

I want to say at once that the hon. member’s amendment is not acceptable. I do not know whether the hon. member for Rissik has put forward his argument.

Mr. Chairman, what the hon. the Minister has not explained, is that our present constitution—and he will argue that our present Parliament is sovereign—does not describe this Parliament as being sovereign. Our present constitution provides that the legislative power of the Republic is vested in the Parliament of the Republic which consists of the State President and the House of Assembly. I asked the hon. the Minister right at the beginning why he wanted to include the word “sovereignty” in the new constitution when it is in fact not included in the existing constitution in which he claims that Parliament is sovereign. Why then include an expression with which the hon. member for Mossel Bay says he does not agree for which the hon. member for Roodeplaat says that there are various definitions, and in regard to which another hon. member said that it is “baie vaag”? It is not a question of why we say that it should be deleted; I am asking why he says it should be included. The one point that he has not explained, is why this expression, which must have a certain juridical meaning for it to be included, should be included when it was not included in the existing constitution. This is the first point I want to make.

Mr. Chairman, secondly, on a couple of occasions the hon. the Minister has tried to suggest a difference in approach between the hon. member for Sandton and myself on the question of the resolution of deadlocks. Let me make it quite clear that nobody has ever suggested that the function of a court should be to resolve deadlocks between Houses. It is a function of Parliament to resolve those deadlocks. Therefore, the first point is that nobody has suggested that the function of a constitutional court is to resolve deadlocks between the various elements of Parliament. No such provision was included in the amendment to the clause or the instruction. The function of the court would be to see whether Parliament has acted in terms of the constitution. Obviously, if part of the constitution is a Bill of Rights it would have to test whether Parliament had acted in terms of that Bill of Rights. Clearly, therefore, it is only testing whether Parliament has acted in terms of its mandate or its charter and has not gone beyond that charter.

The second point is that the hon. the Minister has said that because under those circumstances a court could test a law, therefor the court…

I said the validity of a law.

The validity of a law. He then likened it to the President’s Council. There is one thing a court cannot do. It cannot make a law and then deem it to be a law passed by Parliament. The court can say the law is not valid because it was not passed in terms of the constitution but what it cannot say is: We are sitting now and when we have to pass judgment, that law will be a law of Parliament even if part of Parliament has rejected it. That is the difference. The one aspect is purely testing whether the validity of the law in terms of the constitution has been breached or not and the other aspect is introducing an extra-parliamentary body which will make a decision which will then be binding on Parliament. How can we have a Parliament, part of which has rejected legislation, and then an extra-parliamentary body coming along and making a decision which will then be binding in the sense that, as provided by clause 32, it shall be deemed to have been passed by Parliament? It is an absolute nonsense situation.

The next matter I want to raise is in regard to what was said by the hon. member for Durban Point. I have no objection to people changing their minds or reconsidering their attitude now in relation to what transpired on the Select Committee because I think at the pace at which we were voting on that particular Select Committee, it was very difficult to keep up with the amendments. Therefore, I have no problem in regard to matters of nuances or forgetfulness. However, the hon. member must not advance the specious argument that he has advanced. He now says that he has suddenly realized that we have deleted the reference to clause 31 and that therefore one has deleted a reference to the important concept of own affairs. This was echoed by the hon. the Minister. Let me read what my amendment states. This is the proposed new clause for which the hon. member voted—

Order! I want to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that we are now discussing clause 30.

This is my proposed new clause 30, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, but the hon. member could only move that as a new clause if the present clause 30 were to be negatived.

Well, Sir, I am putting my case for the deletion of clause 30 and for this proposed new clause to take its place.

The hon. member may put his case for deleting clause 30 but he may not at this stage discuss the provisions of the proposed new clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am putting my case for the deletion of clause 30 but I submit that it is important to refer to this proposed new clause because the hon. the Minister was a member of the Select Committee as were the hon. member for Durban Point and myself. The issue is simply if clause 30 is negatived and this one takes its place whether in fact reference to clause 31 has been omitted. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, I understand that you have to intervene but the hon. the Minister went to some lengths in supporting the hon. member for Durban Point on this issue and the hon. member for Durban Point made this major reason as to why he is going to vote differently in this Committee from the way in which he voted on the Select Committee. I am saying that the addition of the words “who shall have full power to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Act” means that clause 31 is included. As the clause stands at the moment, to have the word “sovereignty” and then simply to qualify it in clause 30 in respect of clause 31 weakens the fact as to whether or not the entrenchment stands. I say that if sovereignty means anything in terms of this legislation, it is also qualified by clause 32 which includes the qualification. It is also qualified by clause 99. In fact, if the hon. the Minister is correct in saying that this Parliament is bound by the constitution, then this fact is qualified by all the clauses in the constitution. However, the hon. the Minister says that it is sovereign and it is only qualified in respect of one clause. In saying that I believe that he has added further legal uncertainty both as to the status of Parliament and the efficacy of the entrenched clauses.

Mr. Chairman …

Order! Before I call upon the hon. member for Pietersburg to speak, I want to point out to hon. members that the whole argument revolving around “sovereignty” has in my opinion been thoroughly thrashed out now. Hon. members who wish to discuss sovereignty and the principle and problems in connection with this concept further, will have to advance new and relevant arguments; if they do not I am going to ask them to resume their seats. The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to react to arguments advanced from the opposite side, because the irony of the debate this evening has been that apart from the hon. the Minister, no fewer than four hon. members on the opposite side have debated the meaning of “sovereignty” and have tried to execute an academic exercise around the concept.

I want to agree with the hon. member for Durban Central and also put the question. For decades, for centuries there was no doubt whatsoever about what was meant by it, viz. the right of self-determination the full freedom of a people over itself. Quite suddenly, since last year, we have, however, had the new terminology that sovereignty is a relative concept.

In the definition which the hon. member for Randburg gave of the word, he said it was to perform a function or to uphold supremacy conferred upon it. He went on to say that no other body could supplant it or remove what it had. The hon. member for Mossel Bay, however, argued that the sovereignty of the present House of Assembly was being preserved, that its character and constitution remained. I want to ask him whether that is true on the basis of the definition of the hon. member for Randburg.

Order! I told the hon. member for Mossel Bay that he could not elaborate on that argument because we would subsequently conduct a debate on the three Houses. Therefore the hon. member for Pietersburg may not continue with that argument either.

Sir, I shall leave it at that. I repeat that it is very strange that an issue should arise over this situation in the year 1983.

Clause 30 is a typical Westminster provision where the executive authority and Parliament jointly comprise the legislature. An executive President in the real sense of the word is usually not part of the legislature, but here he is becoming part of that legislature. I therefore maintain that this legislature as formulated in clause 30 does not satisfy the expression “executive President” which this Constitution Bill is trying to define.

The question in regard to the legislature ultimately remains whether the White people and the House of Assembly are preserving self-determination in the fullest sense of the word. Is the self-determination of the White people being confirmed here, or is it being reduced to a House of a Parliament with two other Houses?

I want to argue that in terms of clause 31, in terms of the powers of the State President and in terms of the provisions affecting the President’s Council which bestow certain powers upon it, there is no question of self-determination or sovereignty of the House of Assembly. I want to argue further that the situation of a legislature as formulated here, leaves room for a conflict to arise because there are contrasting groups for which the Constitution Bill makes provision and which have to be accommodated in this Constitution Bill.

Order! Where does the hon. member read that in the clause?

In the future dispensation the Parliament of the Republic will consist of three Houses.

We can discuss that under clause 37.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, then, I should just like to move the amendments which appear in the name of the hon. member for Rissik on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 20, in line 17, to omit “Parliament” and to substitute “House of Assembly”.
2. 2. On page 20, in line 20, to omit “Parliament” and to substitute “the House of Assembly”.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the amendments as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, I just wish to state one point. Clause 30 tells us precisely where the sovereignty will be vested in the new dispensation, namely in the State President and Parliament. A great deal has now been said about sovereignty, but I wish to quote only one authority in this connection. The writer Jean Bodin defined sovereignty as follows in 1576—

In the case of the Republic it was in terms of Act No. 32 of 1961 the exclusive right of the Whites. In terms of the new dispensation the Whites no longer have that sovereign power. Consequently the Whites are losing their sovereignty in the new dispensation.

Mr. Chairman, I want to address the Committee on a certain word which is used in the clause which we in this party feel should be changed. It is a question of the use of the word “who”. The clause reads—

The Afrikaans version reads—

We would like to suggest that the use of the word “who” in this case is not really appropriate. It is a personal pronoun which relates very specifically to a person and in this case it tends to put the emphasis more on the President than on the total concept of the President and Parliament. We feel that the use of the word “which” will be more appropriate, and I therefore move as an amendment—

1. 3. In the English text, on page 20, in line 17, to omit “who” and to substitute “which”.

Mr. Chairman, I accept the amendment.

Amendment 3 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, clause 31 is pre-eminently that clause which—in accordance with the process of legislation—gives effect to the fundamental principles of this Bill, viz. the distinction between own and general affairs and the division of Parliament into three Houses on the basis of race and colour. In that sense this clause is probably the most important in the entire Bill. Indeed, it is the case that in terms of this clause, legislation may be adopted to give effect to the distinction drawn between own and general affairs. Therefore this is the clause that makes it possible to give practical, statutory effect to the Government’s policy of apartheid in the new dispensation embodied in this Bill.

As I have indicated, therefore, this is the most important clause in the Bill. It is pre-eminently the clause in terms of which this Government’s policy of apartheid is embodied at the constitutional level, and in terms of which it can be implemented by way of legislation.

Do you agree, Daan?

With reference to that interjection which the hon. member for Roodepoort has just made, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say …

That question was meant for Daan van der Merwe.

I know. That is why I want to react to it. Hon. members of the CP can really rest assured. In this clause we encounter the final confirmation by the Government itself of its determination to consolidate, preserve, implement and further extend its policy of apartheid within the context of the future constitutional dispensation. [Interjections.] Why hon. members of the CP should trouble themselves to accuse the Government of deviating from its policy is quite beyond me.

I shall tell you presently why we do so.

In this clause, clause 31 … [Interjections.] In this clause, clause 31, this is, after all, stated clearly and unambiguously. [Interjections.] As far as I am concerned, it is stated here quite unambiguously in clause 31.

If you attack the Government from the left and from the right, then they really have problems! [Interjections.]

What is really at issue here, Mr. Chairman? What is at issue here, is that those affairs concerning which the President issues a certificate, are affairs relating to legislation which has to be considered by the various Houses, affairs on which no other House may conduct a debate. Therefore they are affairs that are excluded from discussion and consideration by any other House.

In the evidence submitted to the Select Committee by the representatives of the Coloured and Indian communities—and I should appreciate it if hon. members, particularly those who were not members of that Select Committee, would listen attentively to what I am now going to say—it was very clearly and unambiguously stated that those communities totally rejected any statutory distinction between general affairs and own affairs. They stated that so far from accepting the distinction drawn in clause 31 of this Bill, they fundamentally rejected it. They left no room for illusions on that score. I am now referring to the Coloured and Indian communities. The Indian community, through the Indian Council, went so far as to say that there could perhaps be other institutions at the administrative level to deal with specifically Indian affairs.

[Inaudible.]

I said that they stated very clearly that as far as the legislation was concerned, they rejected any distinction between general and own affairs, viz. that for which clause 31 makes provision.

That is not entirely correct.

That is not true. It was very clearly stated.

I want to go further. It was not only before the Select Committee that this was said. In every statement by every responsible Coloured leader, including the leaders of the Labour Party, e.g. Mr. Hendrickse, Mr. Curry and Mr. Rabie, they said time and again that they rejected the basis of this legislation, the basis as embodied in clause 31, namely the fact that the President has the right to indicate by way of a certificate that only individual Houses can deal with legislation on own affairs.

That is the third time you have said that.

But it is important that I should repeat it. What is this about? I want to say—and I say this with a very heavy heart—that for me, as for all members of the Select Committee, it was a moving experience to have those people before one and hear from them that they reject the statutory distinction between own affairs and general affairs, and this clause in particular. The Select Committee never really gave serious attention—I call my colleagues in the Select Committee to witness—to those people’s rejection in their evidence of this distinction. Why did they reject it? I was sitting there, and I want to say that I eventually reached the conclusion—and I say this with a heavy heart—that the point at issue is not that the Coloureds and the Indians want this separate statutory power concerning so-called own affairs, but that the Whites, we as Whites and the NP in particular, have reserved for themselves the right to say with regard to White affairs: “We want apartheid and we are going to enforce apartheid whatever the circumstances”. That is what this is about.

Daan says that that is not so.

This became even more evident when the amendment on clause 14 was adopted, in terms of which the President’s power to classify matters as own affairs and, in terms of clause 31, to embody this in a certificate, was extended.

I want to say that there is a dichotomy, a rift, a conflict, a clash in the NP as regards clause 31, which will eventually become apparent. We know the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, the hon. member for Randburg and other hon. members who say—I can quote them if necessary—that this is the beginning of the process of reform. They say, therefore, that clause 31 merely constitutes the beginning of a gradual process of adjustment and that the momentum of this process will ensure that reform continues to occur. On the other hand, we know the hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs and others, who say that the President’s power to define own affairs in terms of clause 31, is only the beginning. Therefore, what the hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs and the hon. the Minister of National Education and others have said is that these arrangements merely constitute the beginning of the further implementation of the policy of apartheid. [Time expired.]

Before calling upon the next hon. member to speak, I just wish to point out that I am not going to allow another debate on own affairs similar to the one we have already conducted on clause 14. I have permitted the first hon. speaker of the PFP to state his party’s standpoint concerning the principle. I shall permit the hon. member for Brakpan to state the standpoint and principle of the CP, but after that I shall not permit another debate on principles relating to own affairs as I did during the discussion of clause 14.

Mr. Chairman, clause 31 vests in the State President the power to issue a certificate in which he intimates that a specific matter is an own matter which will be dealt with by an individual House. This certificate is issued by the State President in consultation with the members of his Cabinet, a mixed Cabinet. That is to say, the State President, in consultation with a mixed Cabinet, issues a certificate to give me the power to exercise legislative powers over my own affairs. That is what remains of the right to self-determination after the NP has worked on it.

Having debated clauses 14 and 16 and the other clause that deals with the criteria, we now come to this clause in terms of which the right of self-determination of a population group is finally scuttled, in the sense that it cannot of itself exercise its right to self-determination, but is dependent on a certificate issued by a President acting in consultation with the members of his Cabinet.

But your partners say it is an apartheid clause.

The hon. member for Durban Point is now arguing as if we have partners in regard to this matter. [Interjections.] Surely the angle from which we seek to debate and motivate this matter is quite evident. Surely it is obvious that what I am saying here is correct. Even the hon. the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information will agree with me on this aspect.

No, I certainly do not agree with you.

That means, in other words, that the hon. the Deputy Minister agrees with the hon. member Prof. Olivier.

Nor do I agree with him.

Then all the hon. the Deputy Minister has to do is tell us whom he does agrees with.

With the truth. [Interjections.]

Then you must stand up and say what the truth is.

Even after a House has passed a Bill the President may certify that that Bill is not an own affair. That is stated in clause 31(2). He may issue such a certificate, despite the fact that a House has adopted a Bill after it has passed through the three stages, stipulating that the Bill in question is not an own affair. Then all the work done in a House will be undone.

I should like to quote what one of the persons who submitted a memorandum to the Select Committee had to say about this aspect. He states—

Who wrote that?

I wonder what the hon. the Minister’s reaction would be if I were to tell him that Prof. Sampie Terreblanche wrote it. However, he should just exercise a little patience—

That is from the memorandum submitted by learned professors and lecturers at the University of South Africa. Now, I should like to know whether the 19 learned advisers of the hon. the Minister, or the hon. the Minister himself, can find fault with the correctness of the logic of this argument.

For those reasons we are unable to vote for clause 31.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to react to some of the arguments advanced by the hon. member Prof. Olivier as well as those of the hon. member for Brakpan. What this amounts to is that we shall have to consider the arguments advanced by the hon. member Prof. Olivier. The first striking aspect is the two absolutely conflicting standpoints being adopted by these two parties that are in partnership, but then a question was put to the hon. the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information by the hon. member for Brakpan. He was told: If you do not agree with me then you are obliged to agree with the hon. member Prof. Olivier. I want to reject that and say to him that if he had only looked at the next point and taken the argument one step further, he would have seen that in the whole structure of the NP, and looking at the legislation we are discussing as a whole, there is a third alternative for the NP and that is co-operation, which amounts to joint responsibility of all the various parties and all the various population groups. It is for that very reason that it was so interesting to hear Prof. Olivier exclaim that it was moving to see these people who had come to submit evidence before the Select Committee. It was moving to hear them state their standpoints. It was moving, it was so moving because it was remarkable that people who submitted evidence there displayed a far greater spirit of co-operation in grasping the initiative given in this legislation and the opportunity here being afforded the people of South Africa.

Tell us about the people.

We have debated that already and we shall come back to it. They seized this opportunity to a far greater extent than members of the PFP and the CP have done thus far in this debate.

Order! The hon. member had better come back to the clause now.

Looking at clause 31 we note that it is indeed a very simple clause. It is a clause which sets out the matter simply, from the point of view of procedure, and it refers to procedures to be followed in certain circumstances. Mr. Chairman, since you permitted the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member Prof. Olivier to advance certain philosophical arguments but stopped me from doing so, I want to come back to the procedure involved. The procedure is simple. The situation we are going to have will be unique, and the procedure to be followed is too. On the other hand the legislation is a unique experiment that we are undertaking. Because the experiment and the legislation we are dealing with are unique, the procedure proposed in clause 31 is likewise unique. It is unique because nowhere else were we able to find an example that had been successfully followed in the past. Accordingly we are obliged to consider this unique situation and this unique experiment embodied in clause 31. The differences between own and general affairs is expounded here. The reason for the adoption of this procedure is very easy to understand.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

No, Sir. The hon. member has asked so many questions here which have not been worthwhile answering. In any event I do not have the time to answer his questions. [Interjections.] If the hon. member gives me the opportunity to complete my argument he may ask his question later.

When one reviews the procedure stipulated in clause 31 one notes that its most important aspect appears in clause 31(3), which reads inter alia as follows—

This is the heart of the matter, and in order to give effect to clauses 14 and 16 these procedures are imperative. For those reasons we shall not effect any amendments to this clause because it is a logical result of what is stipulated in the previous clauses. I therefore support this clause and I shall now afford the hon. member for Jeppe an opportunity to put his question.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member has in the interim furnished a very full reply to my question. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to react to what the hon. member for Brakpan said about this clause earlier this evening. Something very interesting took place with regard to the standpoint on this clause the hon. member adopted here this evening. It seems to me as if a secret power clique is developing somewhere around the CP. What is interesting is that in the interim someone has advised the CP. [Interjections.] I am sorry, but I cannot hear what the hon. member for Waterberg is saying. Advice has reached the CP from somewhere, because this clause, as it is worded now and as it came before the Committee, was passed by the Select Committee by a vote of 16 to three. It is of interest to note that those 16 members who voted in favour of the clause included Messrs. F. J. le Roux and H. D. K. van der Merwe. [Interjections.] Therefore the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Rissik voted in favour of this clause in the Select Committee. It seems to me as if at that stage the hon. members had not yet read Booysen, otherwise they would already have displayed their reaction against the clause at that stage. [Interjections.] Perhaps the hon. member for Jeppe had not yet advised them at that stage, because he offered his services as their researcher. It seems to me that the closer we get to the moment of truth, the clearer it becomes …

Mr. Chairman, may I please ask a question?

No, Sir. I think the hon. member ought rather to advise his own members again. It seems to me that the closer we get to the moment of truth, the more evident the concerted stand of the CP and the PFP becomes, the more evident the phenomenon of this “no” coalition becomes, and now opportunities such as these are being seized up on. This evening the hon. member for Brakpan said “no” to this clause. We are hearing a refrain of “noes” from that side, whereas the hon. member voted “yes” for the same wording a mere matter of weeks ago. I think the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Rissik owe this Committee an explanation of this reversal of standpoint.

Mr. Chairman, in the Third Reading we shall, it is to be hoped, have the opportunity to discuss the political implications of clause 31 at length, but at this point I wish to refer to the implications of some of the powers granted in terms of the clause as regards the certificate that must be issued by the State President before legislation on own affairs may be discussed in a House.

In the first place it is relevant to bear in mind that the State President who issues this certificate is elected by an electoral college in which, as we have seen, there is a majority of people representing the majority in the White House. It is important to bear that in mind. Therefore in his actions the State President must at all times be mindful of the people who appointed him. This is important in relation to his actions with regard to the issue of the certificate. In the second place, his decision on the certificate is a general affair and one finds that in clause 16(1)(b). This means that this is a matter about which he has to consult the Cabinet. Therefore he has to consult the Cabinet when he decides on such a certificate in the case of a specific Bill. We know in advance that the Cabinet will consist of the members comprising the majority in the White House.

In the third place, before he issues such a certificate, the State President has to consult the Speaker and the Chairmen of the various Houses in such manner as he deems fit. That one finds in clause 17. All this concerns the certificate, and I hope that you, Sir, agree that I am still entirely in order in my discussion of clause 31. The State President has to consult them, but that does not mean that he has to act in terms of the consultation in making his decision. Moreover, clause 17 stipulates “in such manner as he deems fit”. In terms of clause 16(2) the State President shall advise the Chairman of each Ministers’ Council on each occasion. Once again, he need not ask the Chairman of the Ministers’ Council for his opinion; he merely has to notify him that he has made such a decision, which will then be reflected in the certificate which the State President has to issue in terms of clause 31.

In essence, therefore, the powers of the State President in this regard are unlimited. In so far as he has to listen, he has to listen to the will and the desires of the majority of the people who elected him and to whose advice he has to listen by virtue of Cabinet responsibility; that is to say, the members of the House of Assembly.

Moreover, there is the fact that the courts are being excluded in respect of the certificate issued by the State President. In considering this matter, the courts can only ask whether the State President followed the prescribed procedure, viz. that of consulting the Speaker and the Chairmen of the Houses. No court of law can reach any finding concerning the merits of the decision on a certificate, in terms of the provisions of clause 31.

This emphasizes the importance of the role of the State President in the issue of the certificate. What is more, any legislation adopted by such a House in accordance with the certificate of the State President is deemed to be legislation of Parliament. One finds this in clause 30. Such legislation then falls within the ambit of clause 34, and once again this means that the testing rights of the courts are confined solely to the procedure to be followed. This is further confirmed in clause 33 of the Bill. In terms of clause 31(2), read in conjunction with clause 33, the State President also has the right, in the event of a House making an error in the course of the legislative process by adopting an amendment not covered by its certificate, to return the legislation to that House and state that that amendment is beyond the jurisdiction of the House because it is not covered by its certificate. Therefore, if that Bill is submitted to the State President for his approval, he can return that Bill to the House and refuse to agree to it before that amendment is repealed and the original Bill covered by his certificate adopted.

All these things are of the utmost importance in terms of clause 31. If a specific House, in terms of this clause, turns down an Appropriation Bill covered by a certificate of the State President, the State President has no choice but to dissolve that House.

In conclusion, I wish to point out that in terms of clause 99(3), clause 31 is one of the entrenched clauses. It cannot be changed without an absolute majority in each of the three Houses. This means that the majority of members of the White House of Assembly may exercise a right of veto in the event of any effort by the other Houses to undo this whole system embodied in clause 31. How there can be any question of the possibility of reform in these circumstances I do not know. To put it very mildly, the full implications of this clause are horrifying in terms of the institutionalization of the apartheid policy in our country.

Mr. Chairman, for a brief moment this evening the hon. member for Johannesburg West experienced great pleasure here. I can understand that when a person is in the position the governing party is in, an hon. member of that party would probably want to enjoy such a brief moment of pleasure and score a debating point of that kind.

The hon. member for Johannesburg West did not attempt to deal with the argument of my colleague, the hon. member for Brakpan. In the Select Committee the quality of two members of the CP was faced with the quantity of about 15 members of the NP. Before the hon. member’s pleasure becomes too great, I wish to remind him … [Interjections.]

The hon. Chief Whip of the NP does not know a great deal about what is going on in the debate. All he can do is move the guillotine, in response to instructions issued to him.

The hon. member for Johannesburg West will recall that in the Select Committee we discussed how the President should be nominated. He then put it to myself and my colleague that he should not be called the State President. In other words, he agreed with the PFP. Therefore the hon. member had better give up that kind of tactic. In a Select Committee on a complex measure such as this, two members of a party sometimes find things very difficult. Another thing I want to say to the hon. member is that when one reconsiders matters together with one’s colleagues, one can take a fresh view of them when one comes to the House to state one’s standpoint. Quite probably it will happen again in this debate that there will be certain provisions which we did not vote against in the Select Committee, but which we shall vote against now.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether he regards this clause as being of considerable importance with regard to this Bill?

Mr. Chairman, surely the hon. member knows that the CP fought this Bill tooth and nail at both the First and the Second Reading and he surely also knows that the origin of the CP was entirely due to this. At a certain point we shall adopt our standpoint in this regard and I just wish to add to that that there was more than one amendment concerning which that hon. member adopted a standpoint different to the one he is adopting now.

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to speak after the shadow leader of the CP in the Free State. They have so many leaders in the Free State, symbolical leaders and shadow leaders, that I do not quite know who the real leader is. The hon. member for Rissik, the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member Prof. Olivier said very little about the content of clause 31. The hon. member for Johannesburg West hit the nail on the head when he referred to the power struggle that is developing within the CP. It seems to me that the hon. members are no longer aware of one another; the one does not know what the other has decided; they do not know what they want to decide, nor what they are going to decide. It is also interesting to consider the standpoints of the CP and the PFP which, over the past few days, have coincided time and again, how with equal suddenness they are at loggerheads and how they try to justify themselves to themselves here. One can only reach one conclusion, and that is that the PFP is just as enclosed in this cocoon of fear and lack of confidence as are the hon. member of the CP. This evening we saw how the hon. member Prof. Olivier tried to conjure up the spectre of apartheid. The hon. member said that clause 31 was the clause that gave practical effect to the policy of apartheid. I think those were his words. However, that is in total conflict with the standpoint of hon. members of the CP. Both cannot be right. The fact remains that clause 33 confirms the self-determination of the groups of people. [Interjections.] The point I want to make is that the self-determination of the various population groups is confirmed by this clause. When they were still in the NP, the hon. members of the CP, particularly the leader of the CP—he will concede this—said, when he was with me on a platform at Steynsrus, that he also wished other groups in this country to have what he demanded for himself. Here we are doing just that, and it is being given effect to in clause 31.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.