Mr. Speaker, I move—

I should like to mention for the information of hon. members that the Electoral Consolidation Act, 1946, has been amended 22 times since it was consolidated in 1946. The Government legal adviser who was responsible for drafting the present Bill, has submitted the necessary certificate in accordance with Standing Order No. 83(1) certifying that the Bill re-enacts the existing law, without amending it. The Department of the Interior and Immigration is at present drawing up a comprehensive guide aimed at fully informing everyone involved in elections about the various procedures. This guide will be made available before its publication to all the various political parties for any comments they may wish to make. In addition, the department is already busy consolidating the regulations. That is a comprehensive task in itself, but we trust that it will be completed soon.

If it is decided to carry out the functions of the Department of the Interior and Immigration on a decentralized basis with the purpose of providing, inter alia, more effective voters’ rolls, amendments to only certain sections of the relevant part of the Electoral Act will be necessary, i.e. sections 5 to 23, the part which deals with the registration of voters, and not to those parts which deal with the conducting of an election. The proposed guide and consolidation will not therefore be much changed by those amendments, which will perhaps only be introduced in a few years’ time. It is intended to make the guide in question available before the end of the year.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

Bill not committed.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

It was my privilege about eight years ago to introduce the Act which is to be amended today in this House and to accept responsibility for the provisions laid before the House on that occasion for consideration. I say it was a privilege because, as I shall indicate, the public life which hon. members are a part of, is a harsh taskmaster which often sets those who represent public life merciless demands in terms of both material and spiritual welfare. Therefore, I do not apologize for once again introducing a measure aimed at affording financial relief to those persons who as a rule have to pay a high price to serve their country and their people.

I do not believe it is necessary to analyse or explain the provisions of the Bill in detail. It should be clear to everyone who can speak one of the official languages that the principal issue here is improved pension benefits for members of Parliament. The payment of pensions to members of Parliament is, of course, nothing new, but the payment of gratuities is completely new, since this is the first time they are being paid to members of Parliament. As is clear from the Bill, the way in which the envisaged gratuities are calculated is not a secret and anyone of normal intelligence can establish how the gratuity for which a member will qualify, will be calculated.

However, it would be reasonable to ask what the reasons are for the envisaged changes, and I should therefore like to deal with them briefly for the information of hon. members, as well as for the benefit of the general public.

As is fairly generally known, the salary a man earns and the period for which he occupies a certain post, are important factors in virtually all pensions circles for calculating the pension benefits he may claim when he retires. What is probably not as generally known, however, is that the average period of service of members of Parliament is only about 14,67 years. We had thought it was less, but apparently we were wrong. Therefore, in that short period of time, they have to try to achieve what other people sometimes have 40 years in which to achieve. In fact, several do not even make the qualifying period of eight years, and therefore come and go without qualifying for a pension at all. Moreover, Parliamentary service is not something which falls into one’s lap like a ripe apple. One has to work hard for it, and as a rule long periods of public service are necessary before recognition, in the form of a seat in Parliament, becomes a reality. These periods of service are as a rule not remunerated, and are often accompanied by substantial financial and personal sacrifice.

When the happy day eventually dawns and the glow of satisfaction starts to wane, the member is usually, without exception, confronted by the harsh demands of reality, which require of him to consider how to carry on with his own farming, business or professional interests without prejudicing himself. The new terrain he has entered, makes heavy demands on his abilities, as well as his pocket, and he very soon realizes, particularly if he also occupies one or other post in Parliament, that he has to forfeit so much attention to his own affairs, that low production and a lack of the necessary efficiency are simply inevitable.

He often has to give up at a loss what he has built up with difficulty and at a high cost. If he achieves one of the highest posts in political life, he also has to give up his accommodation. As representative of a constituency, increasing demands are made on him, and right from the outset, the whole of his political career requires long hours, thousands of kilometres and several new cars, and a willing purse to satisfy the relentless demands which public life necessarily makes on him. At the end of his term of office he often has to establish a new home for himself and his family at a far higher cost than before. For the man who feels a calling for public life, it is no burden to give what it takes: nevertheless the facts of his situation are not altered by the fact of his willingness. He pays a high price, financially and otherwise, for the privilege of serving his country and his people in accordance with his abilities.

His quid pro quo is an uncertain term of office, which cuts him off from his former sources of income for a period of time—which could be too short to make provision for himself, but long enough to disrupt his own affairs—and which does him irreparable damage. Furthermore, the kind of life he leads, which requires of him to take the lead financially and otherwise in every good cause in his constituency, makes it virtually impossible for him to save during his term of office.

When he retires, or when the uncertainties of public life check his progress, he often finds himself in an unenviable position, while his neighbour who avoided public service, is far better off compared to him. If we think that this sort of climate and the picture I have just painted, will entice the best talent from the ranks of our people to enter the ranks of the leadership group—which is necessary to serve our country and its people in te particularly difficult circumstances we are experiencing, and to lead them to safety and prosperity—then I fear we are heading for disillusionment.

I do not think it is necessary that I should further motivate or explain a just cause. I think that it was necessary, however, to put the facts on record so that all of us can take cognizance of them afresh. If we do not do what the times and the circumstances require of us in good time, we are in danger of losing the best material for our country and its people. Up to now we have tried to manage without these privileges, at the cost of heavy personal sacrifice, but it would be shortsighted to persist in overtaxing our peoples’ leadership group beyond their means.

The envisaged improvement will require an expenditure of approximately R1,5 million in every cycle of five years. If it is extended to other bodies and persons, for example the Bench and other Government bodies, however, it would of course cost more. Hon. members should take note, however, that the improved benefits will also require higher contributions and that they will have to contribute 25% more towards their benefits than is the case at present.

As I have said, I do not deem it necessary to go into the details of the Bill now, but I shall gladly give any answers hon. members may require during the Committee stage.

In conclusion I should just like to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that, as they will see in clause 6 of the Bill, the formula as indicated in the Afrikaans text, differs from that in the English text, because a “+” appears before the K in the Afrikaans text, while an “X” appears before the K in the English text. We cannot allow discrimination of that nature. The formula which appears in the English text, is the correct one. I should just like to mention that the responsible official of the House of Assembly has indicated that the necessary amendment will be effected when the Bill is reprinted.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister has given his reasons for introducing this new concept of a gratuity, and I do not think I can usefully add to those reasons. I shall, however, come back to the concept later.

Sir, you more than any other hon. member of the House know that in all matters relating to the rights and privileges of Parliament and members of Parliament, consensus is always sought. In fact no major changes are ever made without consensus. I am happy to say that in this case this is also an agreed measure. What happened was that close on two years ago some of the aspects raised in this particular Bill were raised through the proper channels. In fact this measure is the result of some 18 months to two years of negotiation between the various parties and office bearers of the House.

I think it should be placed on record that it can never be contended that Parliament has been over-hasty in taking unto itself benefits of this nature. I should like to remind you, Sir, that it took more than 40 years after Union for MP’s to be granted pensions and that it took even longer for the widows of MPs to be included in a pension scheme. I have in my possession an interesting and rather pathetic document. It is a petition in draft form which was given to me to submit to the House in case a former member of the House, who had served for over 30 years and who never fell under any scheme, should predecease his wife. If that had happened, she would have been penniless, because all he had was a small pension under another scheme. As it happened, she died before he did and I therefore never had reason to present the petition to the House. I merely mention this to indicate that this man, having served for over 30 years, left the House without a single penny. I think the hon. the Minister has indicated not so much the difficulties or the sacrifices, but the situation in which a man in his prime or just past his prime can find himself as a result of service to the House.

There are three main provisions contained in this measure. Two of them are benefits and one is an added onus. The one benefit is a change in the structure of the pension payable to members and the other is the innovation of the gratuity. As the hon. the Minister indicated, there is an increased onus in that the contribution payable by MPs is increased from 8% to 10%. There are also one or two matters of detail which we intend raising. Perhap I could deal with one of them myself right away. If the hon. the Minister would refer to page 6—I have given him notice of this, but I am afraid it was rather short notice—he will see that in line 6, clause 3(c), there is perhaps an ambiguity. I wonder if he could perhaps clarify this now or in the Committee Stage.

This provision should, in fact, only apply to those who elect at the present time, because those who elected some years ago to pay the R40 per month, should not be required to pay retrospectively. I wonder if the hon. the Minister could clarify that as it does not appear to be all that clear.

The hon. the Minister has referred to the slings and arrows of political fortune. It is true that in politics one’s position is never all that secure and I wonder, as a matter of detail, whether we should not perhaps have been a little more generous in regard to the terms in which members might qualify for the gratuity. But as I now understand that the measure is agreed, perhaps we can keep this at the back of our minds for the future.

There is, however, another situation that I am concerned about. Hon. members are aware that the hon. the Prime Minister has the prerogative of calling an early general election, before the five-year period has expired. That means that hon. members of this House could well have fought two, or even perhaps three, elections in the space of five years, certainly in the space of 7½ years, which is the qualifying period for both the pension and the gratuity. It may be that some time in the future we will have to look at the possibility of defining the qualifications, not only in terms of time, but also in terms of the number of Parliaments that a member has served.

This is, however, an agreed measure and I am happy to give it our blessing from this side of the House.

Mr. Speaker, this Bill extends the retirement benefits of members of Parliament. I have considered it necessary for us to emphasize that there is no immediate benefit for any serving member of this House, but indeed that these are benefits that only become operative when a member, having complied with specified requirements, ceases to be a member of this House. I have pleasure in supporting this measure and I also wish to thank the Government for these steps now being taken. It is not a simple matter for a public representative to discuss his benefits, or to ask for them, or to negotiate them. As former speakers have already indicated, that is one of the reasons why measures of this nature can only be carried into effect with the agreement of all the parties which, as we shall see, is the case today.

The underlying principle of democracy is that all components of society should be brought together in the House of Representatives. That is why they are referred to as “national representatives”. To me, that entails that the service conditions of the national representative should be such as to enable him to maintain a reasonable average standard of living and, on retirement after a specific number of years, to enable him to acquire a retirement benefit of some kind. These benefits should not be so meagre that it would only be the wealthy, or else those who are really unable to earn anything anywhere else, who could seek election to public office, because if that were the case, the cynical saying that there are only two kinds of Parliamentarians, those who had never had it better and those who never had it worse, would indeed be true. On the other hand, the benefits should not be so liberal that the candidates would aspire to the public office for purely financial considerations. On the contrary, I believe there should be justification for saying—and I think it should already be possible to say this in most cases—that the people who sit here would most probably have been better off outside this place than inside. But I am saying I believe that is how it should be, because I believe that public office should be clothed with a measure of sacrifice in order to emphasize the willingness of the person offering himself for election to this office, to make a sacrifice in order to participate in the deliberations on the weal and woe of this country. Furthermore, the benefits should not be such as to make the representative impervious to the pinch, to the fluctuation of prices, inflation etc. in the outside world. The representative should feel the pinch of price increases with his electorate. He should feel the anxiety occasioned by sudden inflation, or else he cannot adopt a proper standpoint on those matters in this place.

I believe that during the past decade or two there has been a considerable decline in the average age of members of this House. This is due to the fact that large numbers of comparatively young men have offered themselves for election. I do not believe that this trend is something that can be described as seasonal or as sheer coincidence, because the political parties in South Africa have made it their business to attract some of the younger generations to this palace, to this House. [Interjections.] It is certainly not a palace, Mr. Speaker. I believe that in doing so they have acted wisely, because the political party that underrates the importance of youth in the politics of its country, is, to my mind, doomed to a very speedy downfall. I therefore believe that here in the House of Assembly of South Africa there is excellent representation in terms of age and that there is a healthy balance between the various age groups. But relatively speaking, this will mean that the average number of years of service per member of this House is going to increase and that a considerable number of members of this House are going to spend their best, their most productive, their most fruitful years here. Not one of these will get rich from the office they have to hold. They will not even be able to build up a reserve estate from the office they hold here. Even if they were able to earn a little extra from an alternate source, they would be able to save very little of that and to a large extent, in fact, they would simply have to subsidize their presence here. Years ago I heard an hon. Chief Whip of the then United Party, Mr. Higgerty, say that many men had come to this place with reasonably substantial estates but that while they were here, those estates had dwindled until eventually they possessed nothing. I believe that South Africa and the electorate of South Africa have progressed so far in their approach to public office that we do not want that sort of thing to be said about public representatives any longer. I believe that the electorate of South Africa want to see that their representatives are able to perform their task in public office reasonably free of care and in particular that they are able to do so free of financial cares, because when one is free of financial cares, one is also less vulnerable to steps that can indeed sometimes get one into a serious financial mess. I believe that if representation here is going to be free of care, we are going to obtain some of the best representation in this House, and that is what we want. I believe that this measure is going to be conducive to that and that it is going to encourage it to a very great extent, and I also trust that it will serve as an incentive to the members of this House and indeed to their electorate, to serve the public of South Africa and the people of South Africa even better than before. To the Government, but also to the other colleagues who campaigned for this measure, I “Thank you very much”. I welcome and support this measure.

Mr. Speaker, we in these benches find no fault with the views expressed by the hon. the Minister, by the hon. member for Groote Schuur and by the hon. member for Waterkloof. We are supporting this Bill because we believe it is in the interests of Parliament to do so. We believe it is only right to ensure that those persons who do come into public life, should be given some degree of security in a very insecure profession and career.

The members of the NRP also played their part in bringing about the consensus that was referred to by the hon. Chief Whip of the Opposition, namely to ensure that a scheme does not remain static. A pension scheme should never remain static. Just as any pension scheme in the private sector or in the public sector has to be amended from time to time and improvements brought about, so does the scheme in terms of the Parliamentary Service and Administrators’ Pensions Act also have to be amended from time to time. It is interesting to note that when the scheme was first introduced in 1951, certain objections were raised from certain quarters, but it has been accepted that in entering a career such as being a member of Parliament, it becomes a full-time career and therefore provision must be made to ensure that a pension is paid to those persons who have chosen that career. It is also interesting to note that with the various amendments that have been introduced, these have all been introduced after very careful consideration and negotiation between the various persons concerned.

In this regard the contributions that must be paid in terms of the scheme, are of the utmost importance. It is only fair and just to anticipate that where improved benefits are being instituted, additional contributions should be forthcoming to ensure, to some extent, that those improved benefits are being paid for. I note that the contribution was only 5% in 1965. It was then increased to 7½%, and further increased to 8% by the 1971 Act. In terms of the Bill now before the House this contribution is to be increased to 10%, and it is therefore only fair and just that that increased contribution must go towards the payment of the gratuity, which is a new principle that is now being introduced. This new principle, of paying a gratuity in so far as the parliamentary pension scheme is concerned, is not a new principle at all when one looks at other pension schemes. We have to take into account, of course, that this scheme has to be an unique scheme as it is catering for an unique situation. The payment of a gratuity has been accepted by most pension schemes today, and both the Government Service Pension Fund and the Railway Pension Fund have accepted the fact that a gratuity is an important aspect of any pension scheme. The right of commutation is another right that is exercised by a large number of people when they reach retirement age. Consequently, this principle is to be welcomed because it is an improvement on the existing provision and brings it into line with many other schemes that do provide some benefit from those people who have rendered a service.

There are one or two questions that one would like to ask in regard to this Bill. I am not sure whether the Bill is going to be referred to the Committee of the House. If not, the hon. the Minister could perhaps reply to one or two of these matters when he replies to the Second Reading debate.

In the first place, there is the question of the fixed date as it is referred to in existing legislation, while in terms of this Bill the effective date is 1 January 1979. I should like the hon. the Minister to give some indication as to the reason why 1 January 1979 is the fixed date.

Pensionable service has to be calculated in terms of the formula in clause 4 of the Bill, and also in terms of the formula in clause 6, which deals with persons who have held office and who receive a gratuity. The question is whether the calculation under this formula will be based on years and months, whether years and months will be taken into consideration or not I understand that there could be difficulties in this regard. We all know that the Other Place is to be phased out and terminated at the end of December 1980, and it is possible that a person might fail to qualify for a benefit by a period of only a few days, if days are not taken into account If it is calculated on a basis of months and fractions of months, it will lead to a more satisfactory situation and may allow some to qualify for benefits which they might otherwise have lost.

In the case of someone who has had previous service in a provincial council, the aspect of days and months also affects the transferability of the benefits, and the 90 days which is allowed for election, must also be taken into account. The whole question of transferability in regard to private pension schemes is being investigated by a committee. It is, however, important to ensure that a person is able to protect his pension benefits. Another aspect that must be taken into account when considering legislation of this nature is that there are many people who have to forego their pension benefits. If they are in employment and belong to another pension scheme, they have to resign from that to come to Parliament, and then have to work towards obtaining, if they remain here for more than 7½ years, a pension in terms of this legislation. Consequently we have to take into account that many of these people have to forego pension benefits that might have accrued to them in terms of another pension scheme, when they enter the service of this House or the Other Place.

With these remarks, we in these benches believe that this Bill is a considerable improvement, but one that is justifiable because it is bringing the scheme into line with modern trends and the modern method of assisting people who have rendered a service. We feel that the Bill deserves the full support of the entire House.

Mr. Speaker, I too would like to say a few words about this Bill because like other older hon. members in this House I remember the discussions in former years. I would agree with the hon. member for Groote Schuur when he says that improvements in the service benefits of hon. members of Parliament have not ever been a hasty decision. It has always been a matter of quite long and protracted discussions and negotiations before any Bill was presented to the House by the appropriate Minister. However, it remains always a delicate position that any increase in the benefits attached to parliamentary service has to be granted by hon. members themselves. It is not always pleasant, but there is no other alternative method.

I want to deal with certain aspects of the Bill, but I am not going to speak at length. There are one or two aspects to which I want to draw particular attention. I think that it is not generally realized that a considerable proportion of the income which hon. members of Parliament receive by way of allowance, goes towards expenses incurred by hon. members in their constituencies in service to those they represent in this House. It is also to enable them, as the leaders of the constituencies they represent, to maintain a certain status. Many hon. members, as I know from my years in this House, have no other income as a result of parliamentary service. However, they are being still obliged to support their families, educate their children and maintain a public position in most cases on a relatively modest scale with what can by no means be considered an excessive salary. The salary of an hon. member of Parliament today hardly compares with what one would call a middle-line manager in any public company. It is virtually on par with that type of management level and salary. However, an hon. member of Parliament carries a great deal more responsibility than a middle-line manager in any public company. A point which I particularly want to make here today, is that hon. members come to Parliament because they are motivated to serve their fellow citizens. They do not come to seek a career only, but come with the motivation to serve their fellow citizens with whatever they have and with the desire to make a contribution to the public life of their countrymen. Many hon. members are, as I well know, on the termination of their service in this House, financially worse off than before they came to Parliament. The hon. member for Groote Schuur cited the example of an hon. member who served this House for 30 years and who was afraid of the situation in which his widow would be placed. However, I think that there are one or two colleagues here who can bear testimony to what I now say. It has been my experience that an hon. member who passed away while still a member of this House did not leave enough money in the family exchequer to pay for his funeral expenses. Hon. members of his caucus had to put their hands into their pockets to meet the obligations of the family in that regard. We now have this Bill with the improved benefits it brings. A gratuity is to be a part of the pension benefits of parliamentary service, as the hon. member for Umbilo rightly pointed out If these benefits had existed in those days, such a situation would not have arisen.

There is one other point I should like to raise. One does not speak on a Bill of this nature in order to relate hard luck stories for other hon. members to listen to. We all know the political risks we are running. It is likely that the period of service of a member of Parliament may exceed the average of 14 years, as outlined by the hon. the Minister. Of course, there is always a political risk involved. Therefore that period may be much shorter than 14 years. As we all probably know, at every election the turnover in membership of this House is roughly 33%. The point is, however, that hon. members are prepared to make sacrifices. They actually do that. I believe that the least that could be expected is that hon. members should be able to maintain a decent standard of living. Parliament should not be expected to be a rich man’s club, but a body representative of all interests of the people of our country.

Mr. Speaker, as this measure has been agreed to in advance by all the parties, we will not oppose it at Second Reading.

Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity of drawing the attention of hon. members to a matter which has worried me for a number of years. Some years ago I discovered, to my amazement, that gross discrimination against men existed in the laws relating to the pensions of members of Parliament, Senators and judges.

I have raised this matter on one previous occasion, and I hope very much that with the introduction of this amending legislation today I will see some change to this untenable situation.

In this respect I should like to refer to section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1957, which reads as follows—

1. (a) words importing the masculine gender include females; and
2. (b) words in the singular number include the plural, and words in the plural number include the singular.

Obviously, that is to obviate a lot of confusion and complications in the drafting of legislation. If this had not been so we would have had hundreds of “he/she” provisions throughout all our laws. The Interpretation Act makes it clear that the gender is transposable. However, when discussing a Bill of a similar nature, to the one we are discussing today, I discovered, almost accidentally, that although women members make the identical contributions to the parliamentary pension fund, the widowers of female members of Parliament do not inherit the 75% of the pension due to a member of Parliament when such a female member of Parliament dies after retirement. Equally, I gather, the dependants—the children under the age of 18 or any child who is deemed by the Secretary, presumably of Social Welfare and Pensions, to be unable to support himself or herself owing to physical or mental disability—inherit that portion of pension; 75% of the pension if the wife has subsequently died, and two-ninths of the gratuity due if the widow has died. No such case, however, applies where women members of Parliament are concerned, where women Senators are concerned and where women judges are concerned. I can see no justification for this incredible situation at all. It means, of course, if one is talking about equity—I am not even referring to the human side of the question, a matter I shall be coming to in a moment—that MPs who have paid their equal contributions and, I may add, done their equal share of work in this House, will find that although the widows of their male colleagues will perhaps go on for many years inheriting three quarters of the pension which was due to the male MP, each of the children inheriting two-ninths of the gratuity or pension due to the widow if she dies, this is not so at all in the case of the female MP, judge or Senator. I should like any male hon. member in this House to dare stand up and try to justify that absurd situation. It cannot be justified.

The law could surely only have been made when no one envisaged a woman ever becoming a member of Parliament, or the equally absolutely unimaginable situation of a woman ever becoming a judge. That situation, however, exists in this country. It has existed in the case of women MPs and Senators for many years, and it certainly has existed in the case of female judges over the last few years. I also predict that it is possible that the number of females who will come to this House or to the Senate, or the numbers of them who will grace the Bench, will increase. I therefore think that this is a matter that the hon. the Minister must set right.

I understand, from inquiries I have made, that the same situation does not exist in the Public Service. I have the relevant section of the Act here, and I am quoting from the Government Gazette of 22 June 1973. On page 9 under the heading “Benefits on the death of a member” there is the following passage, and hon. members must please bear in mind that the word “member” is transposable and can refer to both a female or male member of the Public Service who gets a pension. I quote—

And presumably “hers” as well—

So it goes on, setting out the different benefits that shall accrue to the relicts or dependants of members who have contributed to the Public Service Pension Fund. I cannot, as I say, find any justification for this. I remember that when I raised this just in passing on a previous occasion, because I was so stunned by this that I had not had time to do any real investigation into the subject, some male hon. member made the feeble excuse: Oh, well, you see, the wives of members of Parliament help them in their careers. I do not, however, know what he meant by that. He presumably meant that they had to bake cakes for the constituency cake sale, to help raise funds, or had to be his hostess on occasions when the MP was entertaining. I have to inform male hon. members of this House—and I know it is a statement that will be borne out by every single woman in public life, from Mrs. Margaret Thatcher down—that no woman can enter public life if she does not have what I call a supportive husband, in other words a husband who encourages her in her career and is prepared to take on some of the domestic chores and responsibilities which would otherwise devolve only upon the wife. This is, of course, the case with every working wife. The husband has to take on certain responsibilities. Without that supportive husband it would be absolutely impossible for any woman to enter public life. I think any fair-minded man in this House—and I presume there are one or two, though I know that is a big assumption to make—would agree with me that this situation is quite untenable. It is untenable from the point of view of equity in that the woman contributes the same amount as a male member of Parliament. It is therefore quite unfair that the benefits accruing from the Pension Fund to which she has contributed should cease on her death, whereas they continue for the widow of a male MP and his dependants who are under age, in other words his children who are under age.

We are now introducing a much improved pension scheme, including gratuities, in terms of the Bill now before the House. I think it is absolutely unfair, however, that the same benefits, as a result of the increased pensions and gratuities, should not also be extended to the relicts of female MPs. Everything I say applies mutatis mutandis to the Other Place and also to women judges. I hope the hon. the Minister will sort this matter out.

I have a couple of amendments which I have rapidly scribbled out. They are very simple and there is really no need for them to be placed on the Order Paper. When it comes to the Committee Stage I am simply going to move that the words “or widower” be added all the way through the Bill wherever the word “widow” appears.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened attentively to hon. members and I thank everyone who participated in the debate.

†In the first place I want to thank the hon. member for Groote Schuur for his and his party’s support of the Bill. I am not quite sure whether the hon. member for Houghton supports the Bill, but I think she does.

Yes, I do.

Although she has her own particular problems as far as the Bill is concerned.

The hon. member for Groote Schuur has asked about more leniency as regards the time limit. I can assure him, however, that only after we had discussed this matter, did we decide to retain the time limit for the time being. The time limit of 7½ years and one day will therefore remain.

It appears that the hon. member is a bit confused as regards clause 3(c), but I can give him the assurance that it will only apply to certain new members. It will not apply to members who have already made a choice.

*The hon. member for Waterkloof showed a sound perspective about the whole matter. He put it very clearly and advanced apt arguments. It is not easy to speak about matters and benefits which affect oneself, and therefore one does not like to speak about the difficult problems members of Parliament sometimes experience in the course of their careers. Indeed, in my introductory speech I briefly outlined this philosophy specifically to avoid the need for extensive debate on the matter. I nevertheless appreciate the hon. member’s perspective and his argument.

†I want to thank the hon. member for Umbilo, as well as the NRP, for their support The hon. member put two questions as far the fixed date is concerned. Although here is no specific reason, I should like to point out that when we were considering the legislation, it became apparent that certain members would also have to qualify for benefits. In this connection I want to refer to the late Mr. Krijnauw, who qualified for benefits with effect from 1 January. We had to stipulate a date on which the legislation would come into operation and we decided on 1 January. After all, the date on which the Bill comes into operation will not have serious financial implications. Financial implications which arise will be encountered once every five years. It is merely an academic question as to which will have the smaller financial implication: 1 January or 1 April as the date on which the legislation becomes operative. The amount of money involved will in any event not be considerable.

In so far as clauses 4 and 6 are concerned, the period is calculated in years and months, as has been the position in terms of the principal Act. The hon. member mentioned some problems he has regarding the transfer of benefits, but I am afraid that will always cause difficulties. For someone who has not been in Parliament or in the service of one of the relevant institutions for the required period of eight years, these provisions pose a challenge, or perhaps a risk, that has to be met.

The hon. member for Von Brandis elaborated a little on the reasons I gave at the start, although he perhaps phrased it differently. I agree with what he has said and I thank him for his contribution. I also want to thank the hon. member for Walmer for his contribution. He had his own particular problems with some aspects of the legislation. I think it can be said that in respect of the people on whose behalf he spoke for, to me he had very real problems. One could actually speak of hardline cases. I appreciate his acceptance of our explanation.

The hon. member for Houghton had a peculiar problem, one which we have often heard about in the House. Traditionally, the man is the breadwinner. That has been so all along. She elaborated on the question of discrimination against women. If we argue along those lines, I think we will be starting with a debate that will have no end. I can, however, say that, from a practical point of view, what she is proposing will have far-reaching implications. We have one female representative in Parliament and at present there is also only one judge concerned with this problem.

That is going to change.

Two Senators are also concerned.

It will eventually have far-reaching implications if we decide to go ahead with this matter in the way she proposes. I think a debate on this should be postponed until another day. We have had a lot of correspondence and consultations on this issue. The Cabinet has gone into it and I too have quite often had discussions on this with the Minister of Justice.

So that is what it is.

Yes, Sir. As a matter of fact, he is looking after the hon. member for Houghton’s interests.

That will be the day!

The hon. member’s interests are not forgotten by the hon. Minister of Justice. Although we might conclude that there is no love lost between them…

Oh, you are quite wrong.

… I think there is a very human and good understanding between them.

Jimmy cannot wait for Helen to go on pension. [Interjections.]

I think we should leave this matter aside, because it may perhaps eventually cause us a lot of problems with the many women we have in the Civil Service.

Reply to the arguments.

Eventually it will also have an effect on the private sector. Therefore, for the time being, I do not want to enter into any long arguments with her on this. Perhaps the matter can be raised when my Vote comes up for discussion. As I said, for the time being I do not want to enter into an argument with her on this. I do not have all the facts before me and did not know…

Ah! That is the truth. You did not know.

I do not have all the facts with me. I have them available, but I do not have them with me at the moment. If we start arguing about this, I do not think the argument will be concluded by the end of the afternoon. So, I am really very sorry, but I trust that for the time being she will accept my explanation.

No.

Maybe it is only a vain hope. I have tried to explain what I must explain. I do not believe that extensive debate on this, apart from the specific cases the hon. member for Houghton mentioned, is appropriate.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

Committee Stage

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, this is the clause about which I have argued. I want, first of all, to remind the hon. the Minister that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The fact that he did not know what the law was, is absolutely no excuse for him not being prepared to discuss it now. It is a very simple matter. I can understand him not knowing it, because as I mentioned earlier, I discovered this quite accidentally. I happened to inquire about this during a previous discussion on pensions and simply said to the then Minister that I presumed “widow” also meant “widower” and he nodded in assent. The Bill then went to the Other Place and in the interim somebody in his department must have informed him of the true situation, because he came back to the House and said that he had given me the wrong information as “widow” did not in fact include “widower” as far as he was concerned. That is how I discovered it The hon. the Minister has got time between now and the Bill being introduced in the Other Place to get himself absolutely genned up on the law and to make the change. That is really the only undertaking I want from him. I will not embarrass him by moving the amendments now. In any case, I am told that they would be ruled out of order because it would mean increased expenditure. So, there is no point in moving them. I will, however, tell him what the amendments should be and there is nothing in the world to stop him doing something about it in the Other Place.

The argument used by the hon. the Minister was completely illogical. He said that this would have far-reaching consequences. But the number of seats in this House is fixed. If it comes to that, it does not matter whether there are 165 females in this House. [Interjections.] The number is fixed. [Interjections.] “Much too much”, I think I hear hon. members say. But I want to remind the hon. the Minister that there was a time when there were four women MPs, and I am quite sure the time will come when there will be many more than four women MPs in this House. But once the number of seats is fixed, the pensions situation is not really altered. It is the principle which matters now. There can be no logical argument against this at all. As for the hon. the Minister telling us that this will have far-reaching effects on private enterprise, if private enterprise took one look at the Pensions Bill they would close down altogether. So, let us not go into that, because then we will really get into deep water. I do, however, ask the hon. the Minister, instead of just saying in a rather foolish masculine way that he is not even going to consider these arguments, to say rather that he did not know this was the situation, that he understands there is a good deal of inequity in the situation and that there is a lot of merit in the arguments which I have put forward for a changed situation. Then we might come to some reasonable agreement.

Mr. Chairman, we do not differ with the logic of certain of the aspects raised by the hon. member for Houghton. That is not the point I told her that it might have far-reaching implications because we have not yet investigated this fully in all respects, because we cannot see the end of it We are now concerned with two persons, but in many other cases it will perhaps have to be ascertained who is the actual breadwinner. There are a great many problems to consider. We can encounter thousands and thousands of women who might be lawfully regarded as the breadwinners simply because they earn more than their husbands do. Many arguments can be advanced when this matter is under consideration. The hon. member says ignorance of the law is no excuse. We are not concerned with the law here.

†We have nothing to do with the law as such. We are dealing with the factual position. She wants to change a tradition of many years’ standing. It is not for me to argue against it as such. I can only tell her that we are thinking of certain implications, and that we believe problems might arise which the Government is not prepared to and cannot meet at this stage.

*A considerable number of abuses and a lot of uncertainty could arise in the country which we shall simply not be able to cope with. If she wants us to give further attention to the matter, we can do so. But that is the information I have at my disposal. Actually it really has nothing whatever to do with ignorance of the law, because we know what this Act provides. The Act has the effect of discriminating in more than one respect, but of course not at all levels. Over the years the hon. member has rendered her service here in a very dedicated way. One aspect that leads to discrimination against a woman in any sphere of activity, is her uncertain position in the labour community. She gets married and one has to do without her services. Today there are many women who are married and who work. We do not know whether they are the breadwinners or not, or how one must ascertain that, and whether the widower should ultimately receive a pension which he does not really need. Traditionally the husband is the breadwinner. If we were to allow this sort of thing, the men might ultimately lose that superior position. I do not want to argue with the hon. member any longer. She has been kind enough to suggest that I could change the measure in the Other Place. I want to tell her now already that no matter how long we talk about it, I do not see my way clear to changing it in the Other Place. This matter has a far more serious and wider implication. It extends beyond a mere discussion of it in this House and the Other Place.

Mr. Chairman, I am getting annoyed with the hon. the Minister because he is really talking nonsense. Supposing I was to resign tomorrow, everybody would say: “Hurrah” and “hear, hear!” [Interjections.] However, I am not going to. [Interjections.] However, supposing that I did and a male MP took my place, then surely the burden on this Pension Fund would be greater, because when that male member dies after he has served here for 7½ years, or whatever it is, his widow is going to inherit till time immemorial, or until she dies, after which her dependants under the age of 18 are going to go on inheriting a percentage of the pension which she would have received. Where is the hon. the Minister going to get the money from for that? It is going to cost him an awful lot of money. So what a ridiculous argument! I mean, these are the implications, not the ones he is not prepared to tell us about. He does not know what they are—that is the truth of the matter.

The other argument he used was that the male is the breadwinner. I wonder where he gets that from. Do hon. members know that something like 30% of the wives in South Africa are working? Tradition changes every day. New customs have come in and still come in. In South Africa today 30% of the wives are working wives, and that is why there is such a row every year about the joint taxing of husbands and wives, otherwise there would not have been all this argument. Finally, concerning the argument that the male is the breadwinner, I want to ask why there is not then a means test for the widows of male MPs. Will he tell me that? If it now depends on whether or not the family is able to subsist on what they have and whether the widower of the woman MP does not need the money because he is a working male, will the hon. the Minister tell me why it is that the widow of a deceased MP, even if she is a millionairess—and I guess there are some among the farmers’ wives who will be millionairesses…

[Inaudible.]

Why does the hon. member not stand up and support me?

I am supporting you.

Not financially, I can assure you. [Interjections.] And you will not be supporting my widower financially unless you support me in this argument now. Then we must have a means test. To be logical in this breadwinner argument, the wives and the widows of male MPs must be subjected to a means test before they are allowed to inherit three-quarters of the pensions of their husbands. This simply does not make sense.

Mr. Chairman,

Watch out or I shall put your daughter on you.

I was going to support her; must I oppose her?

Rather support me.

One thing about the hon. member for Houghton, I must confess, is that she is pretty consistent, because all the arguments she has raised here today I had already heard a long time ago. I have heard them on every occasion we have discussed a Bill of this nature. I think I am correct when I say that.

Only once.

The hon. member already discussed these matters back in the 60’s when she was still young, a long time ago. [Interjections.] I realize that the hon. member for Houghton is honour bound to rise on an issue such as this today because she is a very prominent women’s libber.

I am a man’s libber today.

But she is known as a very prominent women’s libber. Therefore, as a matter of principle, she must speak on this provision today. Let me assure the hon. member for Houghton that I want to be sympathetic.

I warn the hon. member that we shall call for a division and then he will have to come and vote on this side of the House. What will he do then?

The hon. member will never call for a division on this matter. Her Whips will not allow her to do so. [Interjections.] I want to put it to the hon. member for Houghton that she cannot win her case by putting herself up against 164 males in this House. She must use a woman’s wiles to win her case. She must go about it more subtly.

It would be a sheer waste of a woman’s wiles.

The hon. member for Houghton must realize that if the principle, for which she is asking, is applied, the implications would be so far-reaching as to involve our whole economic life.

What are they?

Surely the hon. member recognizes that? The hon. member spoke about a member’s wife and is now fighting the case for a female member’s male half. Is that not so? A male member is given support by his wife, as the better half, for a specific reason. She supports him, feeds him, helps clothe him, looks after his wants and assists him in his work. She even brings coffee to him in the morning. We do not know in the case of the husband of a female member, however, who the actual breadwinner is. Is it the female member herself, or is it the husband?

Both.

Who is the breadwinner and who maintains the family?

Both.

Does the husband, who is the breadwinner, bring the coffee in the morning?

Order! I see nothing about coffee in this clause.

I merely rose to point out to the hon. member for Houghton that she must not try to kill her case in regard to a matter such as this when she does have some sympathy, because time will tell what the future holds.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that the hon. member for Houghton has raised a point which is really of considerable significance, and the hon. the Minister agrees with me. I am quite certain that there is nothing in his mind that will simply not allow him to accept it out of sheer difficult-mindedness, if I may use that word.

Cussedness.

However, the matter has been raised here. As one of those who was responsible for negotiating a lot of the business that has gone on here, I want to say that I was personally unaware of the problem. If I had been I would certainly have attempted to make some kind of an arrangement which would have met the difficulty of the hon. member for Houghton. We shall get nowhere if we continue our arguments across the floor of the House. The hon. the Minister acknowledges that there is a problem, and I acknowledge that he has a problem in relation to the other people who might be affected outside of this House. There are other implications, a fact which I accept.

The hon. the Minister can either undertake to consider the matter again, and between here and the Other Place come with an arrangement that will meet the objections of the hon. member for Houghton, or we can debate the matter on another occasion, because we are obviously not going to get it into this Bill now. I think it might be a very acceptable arrangement to everybody if the hon. member for Houghton were to come with a private member’s motion next year to allow the House to consider the matter. We would then be able to give our combined attention to what is acknowledged by everyone as a matter which affects the rights of members not only of this House, but of people outside as well. I would like the hon. the Minister to accept the fact that there is a problem in this regard and that it needs to be solved one way or another. There are implications which go beyond the bounds of this House and he obviously has to consider and put his mind to them. I think that if in some way the House were able to consider the problem as such, we might come to an acceptable solution.

Mr. Chairman, as I have said, I have no fault to find with the logic of the hon. member for Houghton’s argument Neither did I say that she did not have a point, because this issue has been discussed for ages. When we compiled this legislation, we did not specifically go into this matter because, after all, it is traditionally so that the husband is the breadwinner. I did not say that he is in all cases the breadwinner. That is not always the case. There are a few isolated cases that are now being raised, that might perhaps have a little or a lot of merit in them. That does not matter. As the hon. member for Mooi River said, I do have problems at the moment, and it is at the moment impossible for me to acquaint myself with all the implications and to come to the fore with all the facts and figures. There are many financial aspects that have to be considered. The only aspect on which I can agree with him, the only suggestion that has merit, is that the matter should be brought before the House in the form of a private member’s motion, because then we can discuss it fully. This thing has been going on over decades and we cannot simply correct it within the confines of a short debate like this. I have told the hon. member what my problems are, and I have not argued too much with the hon. member, because I realize that there are also many female voters.

There are also two female Senators who are going to have a go at you.

We must be very fair to our female voters, but although I cannot at the moment accede to her request, I feel that she should bring the matter to the House on another occasion. It is not only the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions that is involved. This problem has far-reaching implications, also in regard to salaries and many other benefits that accrue to men and women. I therefore do not think we should tackle it piecemeal, but that we should rather approach the matter in a comprehensive way. I therefore appeal to the hon. member for Houghton to be fair—she can be fair sometimes if she wants to—and forget about these amendments for the time being so that we can get on with the Bill. The more we talk about this, the more we get ourselves into deep water.

Clause agreed to (Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, the same argument applies to this clause, and I shall therefore not repeat it here.

Clause agreed to (Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

House Resumed:

Bill reported without amendment.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Chairman, I must remain implacably opposed to clause 2, which deals with the deletion of section 30, which in turn deals with persons to whom, and premises in respect of which, grocers’ wine licences can be transferred. I am very disappointed at the long arguments we have had in this House about the provision of additional facilities for the grocers’ wine licences at grocery stores. I hope that the hon. the Minister of Justice is not really going to be persuaded by so many hon. members of this House who have argued the efficacy of drinking wine, and see wine purely in the light of glittering tables, candlesticks and long, sumptuous menus and people enjoying a nice glass of wine with meals of that nature under those conditions.

We cannot look at this problem in that light at all. We have to see this particular problem in the light of the hundreds of thousands of people who are not in the position to partake of the meals, but are influenced and will imbibe the wine without the food. They will spend their pay-packets, as many do, on the purchase of wines and ignore the food. Therefore I hope that the hon. the Minister will reconsider his view of the provisions of this clause.

I want to raise one other argument which I do not think was raised in this House at all. The mere fact that wine is going to be placed in the various supermarkets, psychologically gives the impression that it is part and parcel of the other food items on the shelves of the grocery shop. The purchaser then sees very little difference between the actual food and the wine to be consumed. Therefore, one is psychologically doing away with the difference. What we are, however, forgetting is that wine contains alcohol. What we are also forgetting is that alcohol is habit-forming. That is what we have to be careful about.

I now want to raise one last argument. I shall not repeat the arguments I raise now because they apply equally to clauses 4 and 8. I remain opposed to those clauses for the same reasons. The hon. the Minister gave us the impression that he is, in fact, promoting the interests of the liquor store owners. On the Reef, during the Easter recess, I had occasion to talk to some of the liquor store owners. As I gathered their impressions, I came to the conclusion that they do not want this legislation. They do not want to be able to obtain, under certain conditions, the leases of wine stalls in supermarkets and grocery stores.

They do not need to if they do not want to.

I know they do not have to. However, they do not want to. I understood the hon. the Minister to argue that he was acceding to their request. They are not concerned about this. Those who will benefit are the supermarkets and the grocery stores. They are certainly going to charge the licence holder for the part of their shop which will be reserved for the sale of wine. Furthermore, staff will also have to be supplied for that purpose. That will involve a further expense to them. This is not what the liquor trade wants. What the liquor trade wants is help in the price war. If the hon. the Minister really wants to help the liquor trade, he should give them some assistance by providing for minimum and maximum charges for liquor. That also includes wine. If he did that, the hon. the Minister would be doing them a service.

Why can they not do that of their own accord?

They cannot do that on account of the price war being waged among them. The competition among them makes that impossible. However, what they want is assistance from the hon. the Minister in combating the price war. They obviously cannot control it. As I understand it, that is their request.

There is a commission appointed by the Department of Commerce doing just that at the very moment.

Well, I am very delighted to hear that. However, in the light of the numerous objections received from the public all over South Africa, from various communities and from various organizations in the country, I again implore the hon. the Minister to take another look at the situation and to try not to proceed with this legislation. I once again express my implacable opposition to this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, while disagreeing with the reasons given by the hon. member for Hillbrow, I too wish to place on record my opposition to this clause. Like the hon. member for Hillbrow, I have also received my share of telegrams supporting my opposition to this legislation. The hon. the Minister will, no doubt, be surprised to learn that I have received a telegram from the Temperance Association which indicates their confidence in my ability to put forward their views. I have also received a message from the president of the Seventh Day Adventist Church of South Africa, as well as from other organizations. I must state, though, that my objection is not based on the moral principle of drinking wine. It is based on what this amendment seeks to be doing to that group of licensees for whom the original section 30 of the Act was designed. It was designed to encourage the sale of wines in areas where wine was not being sold. It was not meant merely to change the channel of sales from one outlet to another.

Where wine sales constitute upwards of 70% by volume of the turnover in the Western Cape it is unlikely—in fact, almost impossible—that the removal of the provisions of section 30 of the Act will increase the quantity of wine being sold. It will merely channel it from the normal outlets which now exist, into grocery shops and supermarkets, and will thus harm the existing trade, particularly the hotels, the owners of which have invested vast sums of money in order to obtain classification and to improve their standards. I am opposed to this measure because it removes a safeguard which was given to this one area in South Africa in which the sale of wine is already being promoted in excess of the 30% minimum provided for by section 30 of the Act. For the same reasons I gave at Second Reading—reasons I will not repeat now—I remain opposed to clause 2 of the Bill, which repeals section 30 of the Act.

Mr. Chairman, I had not intended at any stage to speak on this Bill. I am opposed to it, and I registered my opposition to it by voting against it at Second Reading. I am, however, very disturbed about something I think I can raise under this particular clause. The main reason for my opposition to this Bill is somewhat similar to the reasons outlined by the hon. member for Durban Point, the leader of this party.

Subsequent to the Second Reading we had a most unfortunate and dreadful occurrence in Sea Point when a child was murdered on Rock-lands beach. I am sorry that the hon. the Minister of Community Development is not here now because a lot has been said in the Press about the Fouché Committee which is inquiring into the situation in Sea Point. One of the recommendations is that liquor outlets should be closed down.

For Coloured people.

All right, for Coloured people. I appreciate that. What we are now wanting to do, however, is to establish liquor outlets in grocery stores where anybody can buy liquor.

I do not want to get involved in an argument about whether it is right or wrong. I am just helping you by telling you what they have really proposed.

I thank the hon. the Minister of Justice for that, but I am trying to point out to the hon. the Minister that if ever there has been a ready-made argument against the provision of wine by what I would call a grocery store, this is it, an argument that came to the attention of this House in the short space of time between the Second Reading and the Committee Stage of this particular Bill. I am therefore appealing to the hon. the Minister and to all hon. members in this House, and I am saying this with all the feeling in my heart. We have a free vote on this and I understand that the Government also have a free vote on it I appeal to them to think on these things. This is a very serious issue indeed. We do have a social problem, which has been demonstrated, and we have a committee which is sitting and making certain recommendations in connection with one of our race groups, the recommendations being to close down liquor outlets. Here we are, on the other hand, happily going along and passing a piece of legislation that is simply going to have them wide open. In heaven’s name, let us stop this nonsense about wine not really being alcohol. Wine is alcohol. Alcohol is alcohol and wine is alcohol, and the drunkenness of the individual is only measured by the quantity that he consumes. We all know that if a person wants to get “motherless”—if I may use that expression—he can probably do so on 10 tots of brandy, but he can do it equally well on three bottles of wine. That is what it is all about.

Or on half a bottle of methylated spirits.

Yes, on half a bottle of methylated spirits, as my hon. leader has just said. I therefore do appeal to the hon. the Minister to consider the point I have raised here this afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. House is aware of my standpoint on this matter. This afternoon I really have two objections to the standpoint of the previous speaker. In the first place, we dare not associate the tragic events at Sea Point with this Bill. [Interjections.] Murders of children take place throughout the world and often liquor is not even involved when a murder is committed. There are often other reasons. I do not think it was right for hon. members to raise that matter now.

In the second place, I object to the fact that when hon. members talk about this Bill, they continually drag in methylated spirits, brandy, fortified wine and other alcoholic drinks. That is not what this is about. I think hon. members should be clear in their minds about the fact we are discussing one product and one product only: The natural fermented wine that is derived from the grape.

In the third place, the hon. the Minister, the KWV and other bodies that have been advocating this for years, have stated that they are all opposed to the abuse of liquor. The KWV specially donates a large sum every year to persons and bodies engaged in combating the abuse of liquor. There are individual grape farmers who donate large sums every year to persons and bodies engaged in combating the abuse of liquor. I challenge anybody to tell me that the KWV or the grape farmers and all of us who have been advocating this, are less devout Christians than those who are opposed to it. I grant them their standpoint, but then they must not allege that the legislation is going to cause more murders, more rapes and more drunkenness in the country.

Finally: We have often stated, in and out of season—and the hon. the Minister has also stated this—that what is at issue is the correct, the right use of this type of wine on the right occasion and in the right way. That is something that is important to us.

Order! I must point out to the hon. member that the clause merely seeks to repeal the restriction of 30%. I do not think that the correct use of liquor and related matters are appropriate to a discussion of the clause. The hon. member may nevertheless proceed.

Sir, actually I am merely reacting to the content of the speeches by those hon. members. Perhaps I can enlarge on this at a later stage.

Mr. Chairman, like the hon. members for Hillbrow and Umhlanga who gave reasons why they oppose this clause, I wish to say that I also believe that this clause is perhaps the worst clause in the Bill. It is one of the reasons why I opposed the Second Reading of the Bill.

Sir, as you have quite correctly indicated, the question of the restriction of 30% is paramount. The clause seeks to repeal section 30 of the principal Act in terms of which the 30% restriction became applicable. The repeal of that restriction is now proposed and when the hon. the Minister introduced the Second Reading of the Bill on 29 March 1979, he indicated that one of the reasons why this 30% restriction was to be removed, was that such a removal would bring about a situation that grocers’ wine licences would be permissible in the Western Cape. He said that over the last 15 years no grocer in the Western Cape had even made an attempt to apply for a grocers’ wine licence. The repeal of section 30 will consequently result in the issue of grocers’ wine licences in the Western Cape. The hon. the Minister indicated that when he introduced the Bill. He indicated that the only reason why there were no grocers’ wine licences in the Western Cape was this restriction. He also indicated that the wine farmers had for many years been asking for the repeal of the restriction.

As a result of that we have seen during the Second Reading debate—I am sure we shall see it again during the discussions on this clause—that various members who are wine farmers themselves or represent constituencies where there are large numbers of wine farmers enthusiastically support the clause.

The question of members being allowed a free vote must also be considered. Obviously hon. members should be allowed a free vote when it comes to enacting this clause. The repeal of section 30 will result in a greater number of outlets being permissible. Once grocers’ wine licences are issued in the Western Cape that will be the inevitable result. The people who are involved in welfare work, the churches and the Temperance Union who have adopted a consistent attitude, are vitally concerned and disturbed about the provisions which will now come into existence once section 30 has been repealed. The hon. member for Umhlanga is quite right. There is tremendous concern amongst people because they believe that these outlets can attract an undesirable element. A greater number of outlets can also lead to a greater consumption of wine. We must consider the consequences of passing a clause of this nature. Once the relevant restriction has been removed, the situation will be created that a number of grocers’ wine licences will be issued in the Western Cape, which is where the liquor problem is perhaps the most acute and the most severe. I think most members will agree that that is the case. The figures speak for themselves. There is already a considerable degree of excessive drinking in the Western Cape by certain sections of the community. We know that this is a severe social problem. The Erika Theron Commission found excessive drinking to be one of the most important problems. It is all very well for hon. members to ask: How do we know that additional outlets will result in additional drinking? I believe it is not worth taking a chance to see whether this will bring about excessive drinking or not.

Order! I must point out to the hon. member that the principle in this respect has already been accepted. The only thing at issue, as I see it, is the 30% restriction. The hon. member may proceed.

Sir, I shall abide by your ruling. Obviously, I do not intend making a Second Reading speech. It appeared during the Second Reading that there was not going to be a free vote as far as the Government was concerned. I should like to know whether the Government is going to allow a free vote on this particular clause which affects the conditions that applied when grocers’ wine licences were first granted. We have heard what the Fouché Committee reported in respect of the position in the Sea Point area. We know, too, that when legislation was introduced making provision for the granting of grocers’ wine licences for the first time, there was a free vote and the hon. the Minister of Community Development, Mr. Marais Steyn, opposed the granting of such licences.

The free vote has nothing to do with this matter.

I am just indicating that the hon. the Minister’s colleague, the hon. the Minister of Community Development, who is so concerned about the social conditions in the Sea Point area, opposed the granting of grocers’ wine licences when that provision was first introduced in 1963. If he had been present in the House today, I would have appealed to him to vote against this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that, as you have said, the principle has already been accepted. At this stage I should therefore like to add my support to the objection that has been raised by the hon. member for Hillbrow to this further extension. I am not prepared to support it.

Mr. Chairman, I confess that it somewhat pains me to have to disagree with the three members in these benches who have already spoken on this clause. I may add that it gives me no pain at all to have to disagree with the hon. member for Hillbrow. I am particularly taking part at this stage because I do not want it to be thought at any time that I associated myself with the remarks made by the hon. member for Umhlanga who brought into this debate a matter which I think would have been far better left out of it.

The repeal of the relevant section will without a doubt create additional outlets for the sale of wine in the Western Cape. However, I do not think that any hon. member in the House can prove in any shape or form that restricting the number of outlets will lead to a decrease in drunkenness. We have seen it proved throughout the world that the stricter the licensing laws that apply—we are aiming to repeal such a provision by means of this clause—the more the whole situation is opened up for an unlawful element to step in and sell wine or liquor at unrealistic prices and make it available on beaches, on beachfronts and at all sorts of places where it should not in fact be available.

Order! I do not like being nasty about it, but I cannot allow a general discussion on this clause. The hon. member may proceed.

Thank you, Sir. In view of your ruling, I want to close by saying that this particular clause should be retained in this amendment Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I want to be very brief and merely indicate that I absolutely disagree with the hon. member for East London North. I not only feel no pain about it but actually have some degree of pleasure in being able to say that I disagree with him, particularly as his argument means that one should be able to supply dependence-producing substances freely throughout the world in order to solve the problems. I must therefore presume that in future he will take a line somewhat to the left of that of some of the hon. members in this House whom we know of. [Interjections.] I would imagine that the hon. member has now moved somewhat dramatically to the left in regard to the making available of these…

There is no room further on the left. It is as left as one can be. [Interjections.]

The hon. member has moved absolutely to the left.

Order! The clause under discussion is not about left and right.

It is about right and wrong, Mr. Chairman, and I am trying to indicate where the rights and wrongs are. I want to indicate quite clearly that an extension of these facilities, by removing this percentage, is one that I oppose, and I only regret that the hon. the Minister, when he replied to me during the Second Reading debate, did so with disdain. When one puts a point of view I do not believe that that is the way it should be dealt with.

You are moralizing again.

I am moralizing because this is a moralizing issue.

Do not raise your finger at me.

I will raise my finger at the hon. Minister as long as I choose to do so, and he will learn eventually that when hon. members put bona fide points of view in this House they should be replied to in an orderly and respectful manner.

Mr. Chairman, I want to support my colleagues in the NRP who are opposing this clause. I want to adopt a new approach to this matter and put it in the form of a question to the hon. the Minister. I have a problem which he may be able to help me with. The clause under discussion proposes to repeal the whole of section 30 of the principal Act. In subsection (3) of section 30 of the Liquor Act, reference is made to the alcohol content of wines which are the subject of grocers’ wine licences. This section deals with wines with an alcohol content of not more than 14%. If this section is repealed in toto by the passing of this clause, it will have the effect of raising the percentage of alcohol by volume which will then be allowed under grocers’ wine licences, because section 5(2) of the Wine, Other Fermented Beverages and Spirits Act, No. 25 of 1957, as amended, reads as follows—

The figure of 16% introduces the aspect I think is really relevant. Just to put it in perspective, subsection (3) of the same Act refers to vermouths, wine aperitifs and wine cocktails which have a different alcohol content ranging from 16,5% to 23%. This is the problem which I have with the proposed repeal of section 30. I should like the hon. the Minister to comment on this apparent discrepancy, because we are dealing with highly complex legislation and I am not a lawyer. I might be quite wrong, but as I interpret the legislation it will have the effect I have referred to. I raise this issue because I shall, at a later stage during the Committee Stage, be discussing further the issue of percentages of alcohol, and this might have a certain relevance to the point which I have now raised.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply to some of the points made by the hon. members. In the first place I think it my duty to have to reply to the hon. member for Umhlanga, unfortunately, because of his very unfortunate reference to a very unfortunate incident that occurred in Sea Point, an incident which certainly pains us all very much. I have to reply to it because the hon. member has raised it although I do not think it was apposite in this debate at all. I am not going to say anything more about it. I do not know whether liquor was involved in this particular crime. However, I want to tell the hon. member that in the Act itself there is a section which deals with complaints about liquor outlets and that we have a particular way of dealing with that. The police make an investigation into it, after which there is a hearing where everybody concerned is heard, etc. If it is found that the outlet is obnoxious in any way, we are able to deal with it in terms of the Liquor Act. It does occur often that we close a liquor outlet altogether. It sometimes happens that we suspend that part of the licence which gives rise to a situation which is obnoxious to the community. There are all sorts of things that can take place in terms of the Act. I therefore do not think this is really a problem. I may say to the hon. member that long before this particular incident a tremendous number of people from Sea Point have alleged that there are too many liquor outlets there. That is a matter anybody may complain about. One can simply complain to the Liquor Board about it and they will institute a proper inquiry in terms of the Act. If the situation is found to be obnoxious the number of outlets will be lessened; if it is not so, they must remain. The points is that a proper inquiry in terms of the Act can be made. This is the point I wanted to make.

Another query which I think I must answer, a query which has some substance in it, is the one raised by the hon. member for Berea. The hon. member alleges that by repealing section 30 one takes away the 14% alcohol limit in wine. That is actually not of importance in the repeal of the section, because in actual fact it is dealt with in section 147.

*Section 147 of the Liquor Act reads—

†So there is a provision about this 14% limit.

As far as other hon. members who have spoken in this debate are concerned, I think most of them spoke about the merits of the matter. We have already accepted the principle of this Bill.

The hon. member for Durban Point made the statement that I had no doubt received a letter from the Temperance Society. I want to admit…

[Inaudible.]

Yes, I want to make it quite clear that I have received their petition. I want to tell the hon. member that as far as I am concerned, I do not think the Temperance Society could have a better champion than myself as far as temperance and the non-abuse of liquor are concerned. I do not think this particular Bill has anything to do at all with the abuse of liquor. This is not the intention of the Bill at all. We are dealing with legislation which is really there to satisfy the reasonable requirements of reasonable drinkers. It has nothing to do with the abuse of liquor. I am certainly a protagonist of temperance. I stand on the side of the Temperance Society—I am not against them at all.

*The hon. member for Hillbrow has stated: “We are promoting the interests of the bottle-store owners.” That is not the position of course. There are already grocers’ wine licences in existence. The only thing we found was that the grocers’ wine licences we allowed in the Transvaal did not seriously affect the sales, as the hon. member for Durban Point has already indicated. There was a small measure of agitation on the part of the KWV, and quite rightly so, because the 30% is an arbitrary figure. They rightly point out that it is discriminatory against the wine area of the Cape Province. It does not mean that every grocery store is now going to obtain a licence. It does not in any way mean that every supermarket will now start selling wine. It only means that people may apply for a licence. The Liquor Board will decide about that. If a licence is not granted, the board will say “no”. It will depend upon the needs of the area. The needs of the area will be ascertained in view of existing liquor stores in that area. If there are enough liquor stores, no licences will be issued to grocery stores. However, it cannot affect the interests of the liquor store owners in the sense in which the hon. member has stated the matter here. All that happens here, is that the liquor store owner now obtains the right to have a wine counter; in other words, to have the lighter wines in his store, to have a wine counter in a grocery store so that those wines that did not sell very well in the past, can be available to the public. In reality these are meal-time beverages. Those light wines are in reality the wines people drink with their meals. That is why they are sold in a grocery store. It is actually part of the meal. Many people like having a bottle of wine with their meal because wine gives the food a better taste. For that reason we are making it available where people go to buy their groceries. That is the only reason. It makes a wider distribution possible, but it still remains a reasonable distribution.

Will you concede that this is the kind of liquor…

No, I think the hon. member is referring to something completely different. Distilling wines are not involved here. It is not that type of wine at all. These are the natural table wines, wines that people normally drink in restaurants.

I have already replied to the hon. member for Hillbrow and the hon. member for Durban Point.

†The hon. member for Umbilo said that no attempt was being made to apply for a grocers’ wine licence. That is what I have noted here. Is that what the hon. member for Umbilo said?

I was quoting from your Second Reading speech.

Yes, that is right. Does the hon. member mean that there was no attempt here to apply for a grocers’ wine licence? The reason why no attempt was made to apply for a grocers’ wine licence in the Western Cape was because of the 30%. They knew it was quite impossible to get a licence.

That is why we are now going to open that.

We are going to open that, but it is still subject to the board. The board is not going to issue licences willy-nilly.

Only with circumspection.

Certainly. They are going to do it with the utmost circumspection. I do not think many licences are going to be issued.

I am pleased to be able to agree with the hon. member for East London North. I therefore do not have to answer him at all.

That makes a change, does it not?

It certainly does.

As far as the hon. member for Yeoville is concerned, I do not also want to start moralizing now.

*I can also wave my finger about in the air and tell him what he looks like when he speaks. I can also tell him what he looks like when he pops up every two minutes, angers people and quarrels with everyone. I shall not do so, however, because I do not think it is necessary. In my view it was very improper on the part of the hon. member for Yeoville to become personal again in this debate. He did not discuss a single aspect of this Bill, but was engaged in making personal attacks throughout. That was all he did.

You also do that.

The hon. member’s skin is so thin—I do not know where he gets it from—that one cannot even talk to him…

Order! The hon. the Minister must also return to the clause.

He has no manners; what else can one expect.

I am doing exactly what the hon. member for Yeoville did. He debated on that level, I did not start it. Hon. members on that side of the House can decide on what level they want to debate and we shall meet them on the same level.

I agree with you.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that I must rise to say to the hon. the Minister that I am very sorry if he feels that I raised a rather sensitive subject here this afternoon. It was not my intention to do so, but this is one of a set of circumstances surrounding the conditions that pertain in an area that, to my mind, prove the point I was trying to make in respect of the number of liquor outlets. It is no more than that. It is something that happened, and I am more than terribly sorry that it did happen. In this respect I want to say to the hon. the Minister and to my hon. colleague of East London North: God help me if ever I should raise a shocking event like that in this House just to score a debating point I ask these gentlemen please to accept my explanation as bona fide.

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to the hon. the Minister for his explanation of the position relating to the alcohol content of wine covered by grocers’ wine licences. This does not, however, answer the fact that there is apparently a discrepancy. As I see it, the situation now is that a grocer’s wine licence will cover wines up to and including an alcohol content of 14%, while other liquor outlets may sell wine with an alcohol content of up to 16%. The hon. the Minister is shaking his head, but in this respect I want to refer him to section 5(2) of the original Wine, Other Fermented Beverages and Spirits Act, which I have read out earlier. To my mind this is an anomaly and a discrepancy, because one clearly relates to the 14%, whilst the other allows a maximum permissible alcohol content of 16%.

What section are you referring to?

I am referring to section 5(2) of the Wine, Other Fermented Beverages and Spirits Act, No. 25 of 1957. The second last line of section 5(2) says: “or 16% of alcohol by volume in the case of any other wine”. On the face of it this would indicate that a grocer’s wine licence will allow for the sale of wines with an alcohol content of up to 14%, while other liquor outlets are allowed to sell wines with an alcohol content of up to 16%. I should like the hon. the Minister to give me some sort of explanation for this apparent discrepancy. This relates to an amendment that I shall be discussing later on in the debate and is therefore of some relevance.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have that specific Act in front of me at the moment, but according to a note which I have here, that provision most probably relates to sparkling wine, which may have an alcohol content of 16%. According to my and the department’s information the alcoholic strength of table wine varies between 9% and 14% from year to year. Normally no control can be exercised over that. Therefore, we cannot determine a fixed percentage, as the hon. member intends to do by requesting 9% by way of an amendment. We cannot do this, because as far as table wines are concerned, the alcoholic strength varies between 9% and 14%. We cannot exercise control over that. We cannot fix the content at under 9%. The various processes it undergoes, results in a content of between 9% and 14%. Usually it is never higher than 14%, and for that reason we laid down 14% in the Act. That is the maximum percentage of alcohol to be found in that type of wine, and this has been proven by tests.

Mr. Chairman, I again thank the hon. the Minister for his explanation. Let me say that I do not intend to pursue my argument on limitation of percentages at this stage. However, I shall be discussing the matter fully when dealing with clause 8. I hope that the fact that I accept the hon. the Minister’s explanation does not exclude the possibility that we may debate that matter again more fully when dealing with clause 8.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

As fewer than 15 members (viz. Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, C. W. Eglin, G. N. Oldfield, B. W. B. Page, W. V. Raw, H. H. Schwarz, Dr. F. van Z. Slabbert, Messrs. W. M. Sutton, R. A. F. Swart, S. S. van der Merwe, H. E. J. van Rensburg, A. B. Widman and N. B. Wood) appeared on one side.

Clause declared agreed to.

Clause 3:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to oppose this clause as well. This is the clause which creates a new form of licence. I want to make it clear that I am not opposed in principle to this form of licence. The effect of this clause will be that a group of 15 or 20 wine producers, each making his own wine, could form an association and sell the wine of every one of the members of such association under a wine producer’s licence. I have no objection to that being done. However, it then becomes not a question of selling one’s own product I believe, therefore, that it should fall under the same conditions and the same controls and the same limitations that are applicable to any other licence. In the first instance, the cost of a wine producer’s licence is very much lower than the cost of any other form of licence. There are innumerable other qualifications and conditions by which those other licencees must abide.

This simply creates a new form of licence under the title and conditions of an individual wine producer’s licence. I do not believe this is fair. It creates an unfair advantage for certain producers against other producers. I have no objection at all to a person selling his own wine under this licence. I have no objection to the co-operative which is a producer and which makes the wine, having that right because it comprises only one production source. However, this creates an opportunity for the producers of estate wines or special wines to come together and to offer for sale, under a licence designed for another purpose, products which then compete on a different market. I believe that if one wants to have this sort of wine outlet, it is all very well. Fine, let us have it. I have no objection to that. However, it must then be under the same conditions under which any other liquor licence is granted, the same conditions as the grocer’s wine licence, for instance which we have just approved. The House has just made it easier to obtain such a licence.

There we have a licence which may be granted under control determined by the Minister, with recommendations by the Liquor Board, a controlled licence to sell wines. Now, why should any group of people be able to get together and sell their wines in bulk, wine of a wide variety, without those restrictions applying? If one wants to, let one then have a new class of licence, but do not camouflage it under the provisions which are designed for a man to sell his own product. I, therefore, remain opposed to this amending clause.

Mr. Chairman, I can understand why the hon. member for Durban Point has made this statement. However, I do not think he realizes that these licences, too, are subject to the approval of the Liquor Licence Board, that conditions may be laid down and that licences may even be refused. The only thing that is envisaged here, is the application of the well-known principle that someone who has made his own wine, or a group of people who have made their own wine, and who formed a cooperative, are entitled to sell their wines where they want to. As the hon. member rightly said, those wines are not sold per bottle, but in other quantities. I want to give him the assurance that even in this case…

Surely it may now be sold in bottles.

No. I want to give him the assurance that in these cases, too, the Board will ensure that there are not too many of them, that there are not too many groupings, etc. I can give the hon. member the assurance that we are fully aware of the fact that the one section of the liquor industry does not leave the other alone. They tell the Liquor Board and me exactly where the problems lie. We are totally independent of the people and we shall ensure that those problems will be borne in mind when licences are granted. We shall also determine the conditions under which people may sell. Therefore, I want to give the hon. member the assurance that I appreciate the point he raised. We shall attend to it through the Liquor Board. I shall ensure that the Liquor Board reads all the speeches in these debates and that they are aware of these points. We shall ensure that great circumspection will be exercised when we receive applications for licences or when we grant licences.

Clause agreed to (Messrs. G. N. Oldfield, W. V. Raw, H. H. Schwarz, R. A. F. Swart, S. S. van der Merwe, H. E. J. van Rensburg, A. B. Widman and N. B. Wood dissenting).

Clause 4 agreed to (Messrs. H. H. Schwarz, R. A. F. Swart, N. B. Wood and A. B. Widman dissenting).

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

In motivating a case in support of this argument, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister and hon. members to consider the case on its merits. Listening to the wide variety of speeches during the Second Reading debate, one could not help but feel that there were many people in this House who felt that the consumption of wine, under certain circumstances, is a social event, is desirable, is an old habit and is pleasurable. Many reasons, in fact, were advanced for why such a habit should not be restricted.

We have accepted that principle, and obviously we cannot now take the arguments of the Second Reading debate further. Listening, however, as I did, to many of those Second Reading speeches, I wondered whether it would not be an opportune time, in the Committee Stage, to make a suggestion like the one envisaged in my amendment, and that is that if we are increasing the outlets through which wine is available, it might be an idea, when we extend such licences, to consider, as one of the conditions for the granting of such licences, that the wine which is so sold be of a new, lighter, lower alcohol content nature. This is the motivation for my amendment. I have suggested that the alcohol content be restricted to not more than 9%.

In the course of our discussing an earlier clause the hon. the Minister expressed the opinion that it was not possible to define clearly the alcohol content of a wine. He said that was why the present legislation made provision for the alcohol content to vary between 9 and 14%. I am still not totally happy about the 16% mentioned in the clause I have referred to. It clearly does not refer to sparkling wines which are referred to in the subsection which precedes that provision and, in fact, stipulates a 16,5% content. I do not wish, however, to open that argument again; I am sure you, Sir, will not allow me to do that.

At present there is on the market, I believe, a new range of light wines which have an alcohol content of approximately 9%. As the regulations and the Act provide at the moment, it is technically possible, although difficult, to produce a palatable wine with an alcohol content of below 9%. This is why I have chosen the 9% and why I have suggested that we use that percentage.

I believe that the reduction of the alcohol content of the new light wines or low alcohol wines was made possible by using a grape variety which ripens early, and then fermenting it with a special yeast culture which enables the wine to fulfil all the requirements of the Act and to have a lower alcohol content. I think this is a move which most of us will welcome. We live in a wine producing country and those who enjoy wine for the sake of the wine and do not take it for the alcohol content and the kick, should have the opportunity to choose from a variety of wines, some of which can contain a lower quantity of alcohol. I think that this is a highly desirable trend towards the production of ultra-light wines with an acceptable flavour, but with a low alcohol content.

I have briefly outlined the reasons for my amendment and I hope the hon. the Minister and other hon. members who may have something to say on this particular aspect will express their opinion. I really feel it is a point worthy of serious consideration. I do not raise it purely as a technical matter or as a lighthearted matter, but in all earnestness and seriousness. I would be interested to hear the reaction of the hon. the Minister to the amendment which I have moved.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Berea motivated a case for his amendment very calmly, but I have difficulties with his argument On the one hand he says that the consumer of light wine should have a choice. He should be able to choose to buy wines with an alcohol content of 9% and less. This is how I understand the hon. member.

That is quite correct.

Why does the hon. member now want to discriminate against the other wine? If it is true that we are going to get wine with an alcohol content of, say, 8½%, surely it will be on the market in any case. It will be available at the liquor store, the restaurant and, ten to one, on the wine counters in supermarkets as well. I really felt like asking the hon. member: Where is one going to get the wine that we want to sell? He should remember that of all dry wine produced in South Africa, only 0,5% has an alcohol content of approximately 9%. In addition, that grape variety is only to be found in certain areas. One finds it, for example, in the constituency of the hon. member for Worcester, in the vicinity of Nuy. Wine from that area generally has a low sugar content The wine’s alcohol content depends on the fermentation of the sugar in the grape. On a previous occasion the hon. member quoted from Act 25 of 1957. He is therefore aware that in terms of that Act certain regulations were promulgated. Perhaps he only read it after he had sent in his amendment. In terms of that Act one may not add any diluent such as water to wine in South Africa. In terms of the regulations in question one may also not allow wine to ferment so that it has a sugar content of less than 3%. If the sugar level permits, one can allow it to ferment to an alcohol content of 9% and then bind the rest of the sugar. But if the balance of the sugar content is more than 3%, it is illegal. If, on the other hand, you allow it to ferment till there is an alcohol content of, say, 13% and you then break it down with water to, say, 9% to accommodate the hon. member, that is also illegal.

Let us examine for a moment the wine which South Africa produces. We could perhaps take the products of the KWV as an example. In the first place there are the generally popular types of white wine such as riesling, the late harvest wine and stein. The average alcohol content of our white wines is 11,5%. In the case of cabernet, which we all know, the figure is 12%, in the case of pinotage it is 12,5% and in the case of cinsaut, the old hermitage, 12,5%. The hon. member should remember that we are not only producing wine to be sold here in supermarkets, but that we also export wine. We export a great deal of wine to the EEC countries which stipulate certain requirements which have to be met. Let us for a moment examine the average alcohol content of wine in the old winelands. In France the content is approximately 10,5% to 11% for white and red wine, which compares well with our own white wine. In Germany the alcohol content of white wine is approximately 10%—they do not really produce red wine comparable with ours. Italy’s lightest wine, their lightest vino verde, has an alcohol content which varies between 8,5% and 10%, but some of their other wines have an alcohol content of as much as 13%. The South African product is, therefore, entirely within the limits of what is acceptable throughout the world.

The one thing one should never forget, is that one cannot make wine in the same way as one makes patent medicines by a chemist. You cannot apply a prescribed formula and weigh out a quantity of one thing and add a certain quantity of water, as when one makes “help me” drops or anything of that nature. We do not make wine in that type of factory. Wine-making does not simply entail the application of a formula—it is also an art, a form of wisdom. Wine is alive. Wine is something which is alive from the moment the grapes are pressed until one drinks it, and perhaps even somewhat longer. Sometimes it also gives a little life. Since we have had the so-called gas-atochromograph, we have found thousands of substances which can be analysed in a glass of wine. What are we drinking when we drink a glass of wine? Have you ever considered, Sir, that a glass of wine contains alcohols, esters, aldehydes, lactoses and fatty acids? These are but a few of the more than 300 volatile elements in wine. How, then, can one say that we should accept the instruction that wine which is sold by supermarkets and grocer’s shops, must have an alcohol content of not more than 9%? I can just imagine how we should advertise wine in that case. We shall have to break down wine to an alcohol content of 9% and then talk of a Cabernet a la Steenbras, a Cabernet a la Wemmershoek or a Cabernet a la Vaaldam. That is what that would result in. The hon. member has a very good idea, but I do not think that it should be laid down in an Act. It should be left to the industry itself. If there is going to be a market for that type of light wine—and I do think that will be the case—the farmer himself will first have to cultivate that variety of grape and make that variety of wine. If there is a demand for it, I am convinced that this wine is going to find its way to the shelves, but there should not be a legal restriction preventing the producer’s other product from finding its way to the shelves as well. Unfortunately I cannot support the hon. member’s amendment for that reason.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make the submission that grocers’ wine licences should not be made available for residential areas. I ask the hon. the Minister to consider this on its merits and not to fly off the handle again. Perhaps when he looks at his Hansard he might even consider withdrawing what he said earlier.

Is the hon. member starting that again?

I am being very gentle with the hon. the Minister. I could be very nasty, because I am tired of the racialism in that man’s speech.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am tired of that racialism. I cannot deal with a case on its merit without the hon. the Minister replying in that fashion.

I want to make it very clear that in so far as these licences are concerned, any extension of the sale of liquor in residential areas is to my mind undesirable.

Harry, have you already received membership of that club?

Order!

It is to my mind undesirable, and I should like to hear what the hon. the Minister’s views actually are on whether one should, in the circumstances, have an extension of the sale of liquor in residential areas. I made the point during the Second Reading debate. It was my submission, and I was talking with some degree of experience because there are difficulties with outlets for liquor in residential areas in my own constituency. It is a very real problem. To therefore extend the further sale of liquor to residential areas is, to my mind, utterly undesirable. This Bill has had its Second Reading and the principle has been accepted, but the restriction as to where sales should take place, and what the conditions for such a licence should be, are still open questions. I therefore move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yeoville. The problem that he has regarding liquor outlets in his constituency is a problem I also have in my constituency. I referred to this matter during the Second Reading debate on this Bill, and in particular to a liquor outlet which exists in the Milner Road-Belvedere Road area where there have been tremendous problems. There have been all sorts of petitions which have got nowhere. This is going to be extended to supermarkets, so I must point out that there are several supermarkets in residential areas within my constituency, and I assume that my constituency is not very different from other urban constituencies.

The difference is that they vote.

They are obviously much more progressive. That being the case, we are simply compounding the problem. During the Second Reading debate I asked the hon. the Minister whether he would tell us about some of the representations he received, not only from the KWV and other organizations, but also from churches and organizations which are particularly concerned with the excessive consumption of alcohol. Since that time, and since this was reported in the Press, I have received 23 telegrams which I want to assure him I have not sent to myself. I am sure that the hon. the Minister has also received a number of further representations. I want to say…

Do they congratulate you on becoming the leader of your party?

No, not at all. These are telegrams from people representing a wide spectrum of opinion, people actively working in this particular field who have expressed their very strong opposition to this further extension. Clause 8 in particular is a fundamental provision of the Bill. I want to refer to the hon. the Minister’s introductory speech, and I quote (Hansard, 29 March 1979, col. 3632)—

He is referring to clause 8—

In this case we are not only saying to the owner of a supermarket that he can now do this as a part from his own business, but we are also saying to the off-sales owner that he can have a counter in a supermarket where he can make these table wines available. I do not think we must dismiss very lightly the various organizations that are very upset and concerned about this. I do not think the hon. the Minister would want to do that. The telegrams I have received do not only come from Cape Town, but from all over South Africa and from a vast variety of people. One telegram spoke for 2 000 people belonging to a union with branches all over the country. I have received another telegram from people who work amongst young people. I have received one from an individual who says that in the name of the Year of Health and the International Year of the Child we are urged to continue fighting legislation of this nature. Any number of telegrams came from various organizations, churches and individuals. I do not have the time, nor is it necessary, to read all of them. I simply want to make the point—and I hope the hon. the Minister will reply to this—that by way of an interjection I asked whether we were not ignoring church and other groups who made representations by proceeding with this legislation. In 1963 there was a number of protests, which set this aside. Once again the voice of a very considerable number of people has been heard, people who do not have vested interests, but who are deeply concerned and are working in this area all the time. I want to ask the hon. the Minister to suspend, even at this stage, this legislation and to reconsider it. I believe that clause 8 must be strenuously opposed.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to point out in a friendly way to the hon. member for Pinelands who has just resumed his seat, and to this House that grocer’s wine licences were granted as far back as 1957, when the Wine, other Fermented Liquor and Spirits Act was passed. In the northern provinces of South Africa, grocer’s wine licences are freely available if applied for, but of course the Liquor Board first has to meet to decide on the matter. This board decides whether a licence is essential or not. It was, in fact, here in the Western Cape that discrimination took place—the hon. the Minister pointed this out—because this was where consumption exceeded the 30% mark. I am straying from the subject somewhat, but I just want to point out to him that as a result, these licences have been freely available in the northern provinces 13 years now.

I should also just like to point out to the hon. member for Berea that, as I understood his Second Reading speech, he felt that the sale of natural wine could promote alcoholism. He is really opposed to it in principle.

Order!

Sir, I shall come back to the Bill in a moment. Does he realize that his amendment, by which he wants to decrease the percentage of alcohol, could, in fact, indirectly promote alcoholism, in that people will have to drink much more before they are affected in any way by the alcohol in that natural wine? This is true. I just want to point out to the hon. member that this amendment may just indirectly frustrate the aim he wishes to achieve.

I should like to deal with the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville and point out to him that in terms of clause 1, which has already been passed, applications first have to be submitted to the local authority, to the local boards. There is a very good reason for this. It is for the local board to decide whether they may allow a grocer’s wine licence to be granted in that particular area of their territory. It is obvious that the local board will first examine whether it is a residential area or a business area. For that reason the hon. member’s amendment is totally superfluous. I want to refer the hon. member to the clause itself.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member which local boards he is referring to since they were abolished by the previous amendment?

This is not a question of whether there is a board which can be referred to.

There are no local liquor boards.

The local boards are there to decide.

There is no longer one.

What about the municipality? In terms of this legislation they must receive notice. Clause 1 of this Bill provides that.

Oh, you mean the local authority?

Yes, the local authority.

Not the liquor board?

No, this has nothing to do with the board. It is the local authority, the municipality. Clause 8, line 55 provides very clearly—

In other words, it is very clear that a grocer’s wine licence will not be granted unless there is an ordinary grocer’s shop or a place where groceries are sold. In view of this it is very clear that it will not be in a residential area. For that reason the amendment put forward by the hon. member for Yeoville is quite unnecessary. This is not applicable to residential areas, but only to business areas.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Aliwal in justifying his support for this clause only quoted the first part of the clause. But this is where the main difference lies and this is certainly the reason why I intend voting against clause 8. It is because it extends the situation. The hon. member for Aliwal did not quote the little word “or”. It must be remembered that we are dealing here with the special conditions relating to a grocer’s wine licence. The provisions contained in section 146 of the principal Act are the provisions we raised on a previous occasion, because we wished to see that these special conditions for a grocer’s wine licence were strictly abided by. The hon. member for Aliwal merely quoted—

He stopped there. The next word is “or”. Paragraph (ii) states further—

This is an extension, because previously this was not possible. Under the special conditions relating to a grocer’s wine licence, the hon. member for Aliwal only specifically outlined the one aspect, but now an extension is being given, because the new subsection now allows the person who has a liquor store licence to obtain permission to have a grocer’s wine licence in a grocery store. So it is an extension. It is for this very reason that I am certainly opposed to the passing of this clause. I believe an extension is a matter which requires the greatest consideration by this House in view of the present social circumstances. When I was speaking under a previous clause, you called me to order, Sir and said that the principle had been accepted in regard to the question of the restriction of grocers’ wine licences to the Western Cape, etc. The hon. the Minister has, however, indicated that there is to be an extension in certain aspects. This facilitates a greater number of grocers’ wine licences to be granted. In this respect the hon. the Minister said earlier on that he had every sympathy with the temperance unions and the churches, but he has failed to indicate what action he has taken to show that sympathy. He is proceeding along the same lines and is not taking into account the very objections that these organizations are raising. In this regard the hon. member for Pinelands is quite right when he says that this is a matter that this House has to take into very serious consideration. Earlier on the hon. the Minister said that he had every sympathy with their cause. I say that we should see some of this sympathy. We would hope that he abides by their request, i.e. that this Bill should not be proceeded with. The clause that we are now dealing with is one of the clauses which many of these people find obnoxious, because they believe the granting of a grocer’s wine licence, and the easier availability of such licences, constitute a serious danger.

The hon. member for Yeoville has moved a reasonable amendment, and I believe it is necessary to try to ensure that in residential areas where a number of hypermarkets and grocers are doing business, the situation will not develop that these places will be regarded as places where one can buy light wine, be it light wine or not, because this will mean that another avenue, for the selling of alcohol and beverages will be opened. That is basically the point. There is no doubt that, when one regards these off-sales, an undesirable element is attracted to such liquor outlets. I think that this Committee will be making a grave mistake if they pass this clause in its present form. I intend voting in favour of the hon. member for Yeoville’s amendment, and if it is not accepted, I shall certainly be voting against this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Aliwal mentioned two aspects to which I want to refer in particular. In the first place he referred to this type of licence which has been available for years, and I can understand that a problem now arises in this regard. In the second place, the hon. member also said that when the alcohol content of wine is less, one will drink more. I do not accept that argument.

In my previous speech I referred to the fact that there are people who drink wine because they like it and not because they merely want to experience the effect of the alcohol.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

Yes, certainly.

I should like to ask the hon. member whether he realizes that if this amendment goes through, the person who wants to abuse the privilege of drinking alcohol will have to buy more wine to do so, and will consequently have less money left for food.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for East London North does not know at all what it is all about. I should like to thank the hon. member for Pretoria East for his support in this regard. However, the hon. member made a few mistakes in his argument.

†The hon. member for Pretoria East had done only part of his homework, and I do not think his argument invalidates my amendment I should like to motivate my case further. The hon. member for Pretoria East referred to several facts, but first of all he posed the question: Who would sell wine with an alcohol content of more than 14% if we restricted grocers’ wine licences to selling wine with an alcohol content of 9% or less? The answer to that is obviously that all the other liquor outlets will sell the other wines exactly as they do today. We are extending this provision, and I thought that if we are to accept this—the principle has already been accepted—whether there is any real reason why we should not accept that a whole new generation of wines can be made—it is technically possible to prepare them—and to restrict the sale of those wines to the extended provision that we are making in this Bill.

To return to his other point about the dilution of wine with water, I want to say that this point is not tenable. I have no intention of suggesting that wine should be diluted in any way. If one speaks to the people who make wine and who know everything about fermentation processes, one finds that they are of the considered opinion—this is recent opinion, and I mention it for that reason—that a palatable wine with an alcohol content of between 5% and 6% can be made if the regulations are changed. I mention this because the hon. the Minister is empowered to change the regulations.

The hon. member for Pretoria East quite rightly referred to the regulation pertaining to the fact that wine may not contain more than 3% of sugar. Am I correct? The hon. member seems to agree with me. The hon. the Minister is empowered to change that regulation. If the hon. the Minister does change such a regulation and allows the production of wine with a sugar content of higher than 3%, a very acceptable end-product can be produced with a low alcohol content of approximately 5%. This is technically absolutely possible. However, the reason why I moved an amendment relating to the figure…

Do they need a preservative?

The hon. member asks whether a preservative is needed. My answer is that the technical people to whom I spoke did not mention the necessity of a preservative. However, I would accept that it is a possibility, but not an absolute necessity. I take the hon. member’s point, however. If one is going to have to add a preservative, one is going to have to change the regulations again. Is that the point? The hon. member seems to agree with me. I say that it is possible but not absolutely essential. I believe the relevant technology is improving all the time and I must say that the people to whom I spoke did not mention the necessity of a preservative.

However, this is really only a detail. I am trying to establish a principle which is one on which we have had an interesting discussion. I have not yet heard one good argument to indicate why we should not accept the principle which will give rise to conditions under which wine with a lower alcohol content can be produced legitimately by the industry. The industry is in a position to do so, having developed new techniques. There are the new yeast cultures to which I referred. With the developments that can come…

They are doing it already.

I agree with the hon. member for Worcester. They are doing it already. Therefore it is not a technical impossibility. I am consequently not talking about a pie in the sky idea, but about something which is possible now and which can change in the future. One can reduce the alcohol content further as technology develops. I believe that the case I have put forward is a reasonable one and I therefore ask hon. members who spoke against it to reconsider. I am still waiting for the reply of the hon. the Minister of Justice who is smiling at me. I am sure that he is going to accept my amendment. In any event, I think he is going to have to have a very interesting argument against it if he does not accept it.

Mr. Chairman, I do not feel very strongly about whether the alcohol content of wine should be 14% or 9%, because I am against it whatever it is. [Interjections.] I am prepared to accept, however, that a reduction to 9% is better than 14%. It is the lesser of two evils, but even with that alcohol content wine can become habit-forming, and that is what I am against. I must therefore remain implacably opposed to clause 8 because whatever way the hon. member for Aliwal likes to look at it, we are extending the facilities of these grocers’ wine licences to liquor-store owners and hotel owners who have off-sales licences. That is what we are actually doing. Under no circumstances can we accept the extension that is being granted.

That was accepted at Second Reading.

Yes, but I am stating why I am opposed to it. I am just putting forward an argument.

I strongly want to support the amendment by the hon. member for Yeoville with regard to the sale of liquor in outlets in residential areas. I want to state categorically that the Hillbrow area is the Soho of South Africa. That is where the lights bum until two or three o’clock in the morning, an area which attracts visitors from Kempton Park and Randfontein, a most horrid area which is even more alive than the central part of Johannesburg at midnight, or the centre of any other city in South Africa one would care to name. [Interjections.] For those reasons I remain implacably opposed to this clause. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member is not dealing now with a Tourist Bill. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, it is the tourists who partake of the wine. They will have more outlets where they can buy wine in terms of the extensions envisaged in this provision. That is the point I am trying to make. In the Hillbrow area there are grocery shops that are open 24 hours a day. Now, I want to know from the hon. the Minister what conditions will apply to supermarkets and grocery stores that are open 24 hours a day, and in which customers will have at their disposal wine counters run on behalf of the owners of hotels or bottle stores? What is the position going to be? Will wine be sold only during certain hours, or throughout the time those grocery shops or supermarkets remain open for business? Will that mean that people will be able to buy wine at any time of the day or night? What is the position going to be? That is what the hon. the Minister must tell us.

If there is a member of the Liquor Board present here, I want to give notice now that I will oppose the creation of any further wine or liquor outlets in the Hillbrow constituency. [Interjections.] There are more than enough of them. There are also more than enough bars. We do not need any more outlets.

We also have to take note of the social problem involved here. I remember when the principle of the sale of wine in grocery stores was first discussed here…

Order! Social problems are not under discussion now. This clause does not deal with that.

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing now with the possible or likely effects of this clause. I should like to point out what happened in Lourenço Marques when wine was sold there in grocery shops. Moreover, there is sufficient provision in present legislation for grocery shops to continue to sell wine. Why should we extend those provisions? However, while this was allowed in Lourenço Marques, I was told it had no effect on the incidence of crime or drunkenness…

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause. He has to discuss the contents of the clause.

The details of this clause…

The principle has been accepted. Maputo is not even mentioned in the clause.

I am addressing you, Mr. Chairman, on the consequence of the principle being accepted at Second Reading.

Order! The hon. member can do that at Third Reading.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I am telling you… [Interjections.] Be it as it may, I remain implacably opposed to the provisions of this clause, because I already know what trouble and problems this is going to cause in my constituency and in other areas throughout the country. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to remain silent on this clause, even though I find myself in strange company. I find myself having voted against clauses for totally different reasons from those that have been put forward by hon. members. However, it pleases me to be able to say that I support this clause. [Interjections.] I support the clause because I am not opposed to the principle. I am opposed to the transference of outlets from the established trade points and the hotel off-sales. I am opposed to the removal of existing channels of outlets and the creation of new ones in their stead.

You are fighting for vested interests.

I am for vested interests, because those vested interests have been forced by this Parliament to spend tens of thousands of rand to provide quality hotels, and the quid pro quo was their off-sales. I believe this is unfair to those people who took Parliament on trust, who did what they were asked to do and are now having the benefit of that reduced. I am in favour of the amendment by the hon. member for Yeoville. I support his amendment because it is a reasonable one. However, I am equally—with or without the amendment—in favour of the clause, because this does at least give existing licences an opportunity of holding the licences which, it has now been decided in principle, will be available. Therefore, since we cannot argue about whether they should or should not be available, the question in this clause is now only: To whom shall they be available? I support this clause as it stands, but I believe that the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville is reasonable.

Mr. Chairman, the greatest amount of tension in regard to this clause obviously relates to considerations about those people who overindulge in wine. With respect, I really do not think that by voting against this clause one is going to prevent anybody, who wants to overindulge, from doing just that. What hon. members fail to take into consideration is that the provisions of this clause will make it far more convenient for many, many people, who wish to purchase the odd bottle of wine to have with their dinner party, to be able to get that wine without having to go to a genuine bottle store outlet.

The answer to the problem of abuse does not, in my view, lie in voting against the clause under discussion. I think the answer lies in the hon. the Minister of Justice’s hands. I should therefore like to appeal to him at this stage. I should like him to go through the various Statutes relating to drunkenness…

Order! Drunkenness is not under discussion.

Why not?

Order! The only point that is under discussion relates to the special conditions attaching to grocers’ wine licences.

But people get drunk as a result.

Order! Those are the only conditions that can be discussed and I shall not allow a discussion of anything else. Has the hon. member for East London North finished speaking?

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid you have cut the ground out from under my feet.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to reply to the hon. member for Umbilo. I did not stop at the proposed new section 146(a)(i) as he apparently did. I should like him to go further, to line 55 in the English text and line 58 in the Afrikaans text. There he will see very clearly—

In other words, a person to whom this grocer’s wine licence has been granted, will not be able to open a bottle store in a residential area as such. He will have to add it as a branch of a grocery shop.

That is the problem.

No, I shall come to the point by referring to the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville. There will be no problems, because a local authority will not allow this in a residential area. Therefore his amendment is totally unnecessary.

But they are already there.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to refer very briefly to what the hon. member for Yeoville raised as an argument in support of his amendment, and perhaps also elaborate on what was said by the hon. member who has just resumed his seat. I genuinely believe that the hon. member for Yeoville is deliberately trying to mislead this House.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order:…

Order! The hon. member must withdraw that.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I only said he was trying to mislead the House.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order…

Order! No, the hon. member must withdraw that.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it. I should like to indicate to the hon. member for Yeoville that the amendment he has moved is of very little consequence at all…

That is nonsense.

… because the residential shopping centre areas, as indicated by the hon. member who spoke before me, have licences granted for the commercial use of certain premises, only one of which may perhaps have a grocer’s licence. Therefore, to suggest that in all residential areas grocers are in fact going to receive these licences, is erroneous thinking. To give the impression in any case that the sale of wine in a residential area is an undesirable practice, I believe is also not worthy of consideration as the truth. [Interjections.] Listening to the points raised by the hon. member for Yeoville, I was not sure whether he is aware of the fact that modern residential development is such that the residential areas are separated by buffer zones from the commercial trading sections. To attempt to sweep under the carpet the so-called undesirable practice of buying liquor is not going to solve the problem which he is trying to prevent by moving this amendment. Therefore, despite the attempts by the hon. member for Yeoville, I find it very difficult indeed to see any merit in his amendment and I shall certainly not vote for it.

As far as the hon. member for Berea is concerned, I should also like to point out to him that he has based his whole argument, and therefore his amendment, on an erroneous assumption. I shall not say—you, Sir, will not allow me to say it—that he was trying to mislead the House. [Interjections.] The erroneous assumption is that everybody who buys wine is going to become a drunkard because of the percentage alcohol in the wine. He went on to say that all people who become drunk will eventually become alcoholics. [Interjections.] The erroneous assumption the hon. member has made, as ridiculous as it may sound as a result of my repeating it, is that the alcohol level is going to lead to socially undesirable behaviour practices. I believe that assumption is incorrect since it is not the level of alcohol in the wine which is undesirable; surely it is purely the misuse of wine, but that has nothing to do with this clause. Therefore, unfortunately I cannot support his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to deal with the two hon. members who have dealt with the amendment which I have moved. I want to say immediately to the hon. member for Durban North that I do not believe he is trying to mislead the House deliberately; I think he is merely ignorant in the circumstances. I am really quite kindly disposed towards him. [Interjections.]

I should like to point out to him and also to the hon. member for Aliwal that there are areas which are purely residential where one has grocery shops and dry-cleaning shops in the form of neighbourhood shops and in no circumstances can one have a wine counter installed in them. I am not saying—I have not suggested the argument—that every single comer tearoom in South Africa which in fact is a grocery shop in terms of this definition, would have a licence. I think such an argument would be a gross exaggeration. What I am saying, however, is that there should not be the opportunity to have it in that kind of shop which is situate in a residential area.

There are large residential areas in South Africa—one can point them out to hon. members—where there are not vast shopping centres, but where there are purely what are called the comer shops, the neighbourhood shops which are normally to be found in a residential area. I think it is undesirable to increase the number of outlets by allowing them to move into purely residential areas.

The point which the hon. member for Aliwal has made, is, with respect, not of substance because the local authority does not decide whether there should be a grocers’ wine licence; the local authority only decides whether there should be a grocers’ licence. Grocers’ licences are granted quite independently of the issue of liquor. In other words, the local authority will grant a grocers’ licence to a comer shop, to what is colloquially called the comer tearoom, for example in a residential area thinking that that is something which is needed in that residential area. Thereafter comes the question of granting a grocers’ wine licence. Therefore, with respect, those two things are quite separate issues.

The issue which I put before the House in this amendment is whether it is desirable to extend the sale of liquor, albeit only light wines or not which is the present case, to areas which are purely residential areas. In my submission that is an extension which I regard as undesirable and that is why I have moved the amendment to seek to limit it. I ask the hon. the Minister to consider it on its merits.

Mr. Chairman, before the hon. the Minister replies, there is one further point I should like to raise which the hon. the Minister might like to deal with. In America the Schaeffer Commission of Inquiry appointed by President Nixon was given $1 million to investigate the whole question of the use of marijuana. After a year of study they came up with the fact that one of the reasons for the increase in the use of it was ready availability. That is what is being established here: Ready availability. That is the reason why we cannot agree with this clause.

Mr. Chairman, in the first place I should like to refer to the amendment by the hon. member for Berea. I want to tell him immediately that I am not unsympathetic towards his suggestion of an alcohol content of 9%. However, one has certain problems with this. The hon. member tried to explain, in a highly technical manner, how the regulations could be changed to produce such wine. The hon. member for Pretoria East, in turn, gave a very complicated and interesting explanation, to my mind, of how the different wines are produced. I must say that in this sphere I am totally ignorant. In the first place I want to say to the hon. member for Berea that it is not possible for me to change the regulations since they fall under the Minister of Agriculture. Then, too, those regulations are highly technical and this Bill does not have a bearing on that. Therefore I cannot change them. The regulations concerning the production of wine falls under the Minister of Agriculture.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether the regulations to which he refers are the regulations relating to the sale of wine or those in connection with the sugar content of wine which must not be more than 3%?

The regulations with regard to the manufacture of wine do not fall under the Liquor Act as such, but under agricultural legislation. This also applies to the percentage, etc. I can assure the hon. member that I have no control over that. I do not have the power to change those regulations. They are, in any case, not relevant to this Bill. An amendment which seeks to tamper with those regulations cannot therefore be considered at this stage. Consequently I cannot accept such an amendment. Even if I could change the regulations, I have to point out that they are not relevant here. Therefore I cannot accept the amendment.

The other problem I have, relates to percentages. I received a note from my department in which they assure me that they consulted with one of the best winemakers in the valley concerned—I shall not mention his name—and that he said that if it was possible, which he doubts, to make a table wine with an alcohol content of 9% or less, it would probably be undrinkable. That is the opinion of an expert on wine.

The hon. member for Worcester said that it was already being manufactured.

Wait a moment. The wine with a lower alcohol content which is being manufactured these days—I have the name of the wine, but I am not going to mention it because I am not here to advertise wine—has an alcohol content of 10%.

No, it is generally less than 10%.

Well they say that the lightest wine they can make has an alcohol content of 10%. If I mention the name of the person concerned, the hon. member will admit that he is someone who knows how to make wine. He says that wine is in any case made according to a secret formula. Therefore the hon. member’s suggestion is not a practical one.

I have another problem in this regard. The provision contained in section 147 which was placed on the Statute Book in 1963, was that in the case of table wines, an alcohol content of 14% was the ceiling for such wines in South Africa I am now speaking about table wines. This has nothing to do with the Wine, Other Fermented Beverages and Spirits Act to which the hon. member referred; it falls entirely under the Liquor Act. That is why we included the provision of 14% for the groceries in section 147 of the Act. Unfortunately for me and the hon. member, section 147 is not affected by this Bill. Therefore we cannot tamper with the 9% in section 146 if reference is already made to 14% in section 147. I think the hon. member accepts my argument. He asked me why I could not accept it. I want to say to him once again that in principle I have nothing against it, but since I do not know how to make wine, I have to accept what I am told. Furthermore, I want to say to the hon. member that as far as I am concerned, grocery stores are only used for the supply of light table wines which we know. I would not like to have beer or any other strong drink there. I can assure the hon. member that no provision will be made for strong drink in this legislation as long as I have the authority to exclude it. I hope the hon. member is satisfied with my explanation.

I want to say to the hon. member for Yeoville that I am in favour of no bottlestores in a residential area. Unfortunately the hon. member moved an amendment in which the word “residential area” appears. However no definition of a residential area is given. A layman knows what a residential area is, but when it comes to a residential area in a legal argument, the hon. member for Yeoville knows as well as I do that there will be many problems in determining exactly what a residential area is. For example, if many people live in flats within the shopping area, will it then be a residential area or a shopping area? How will this be defined? In any case, that issue is not contained in the Bill before the House.

Suppose it were possible for me to determine at this stage what a residential area is and the amendment could be drafted so that the definition of “residential area” could be included in the legislation. Then it would have to be determined how many ordinary grocer’s wine licences are already in residential areas, because if I were to accept this amendment, it would also mean that I should have to withdraw those licences. I would make the licence of the licence holder illegal. I do not think the hon. member can expect of me to accept at this stage such an amendment which might influence so many vested rights. We will in any case have problems defining a residential area. For these reasons I regret that I cannot accept these two amendments.

The hon. member for Hillbrow asked me how the selling times of wine in supermarkets will be determined. I referred the hon. member to section 150 of the Liquor Act which already determines the selling times. Section 150 of the Liquor Act stipulates that the holder of a grocer’s wine licence may sell wine from Monday to Friday only between 09h00 and 18h30, on Saturday from 09h00 to 13h00 and not at all on a Sunday. The selling times of liquor under a grocer’s wine licence is therefore stipulated in the Act, regardless of the selling times of commodities such as milk and sugar.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister what the position would be in respect of those shops that hold tourist licences and are open to trade on a Sunday?

It makes no difference whatsoever. It is laid down in section 115 of the Act that the people who hold grocers’ wine licences cannot sell wine outside of these hours. During these hours the wine counters is closed. It is as simple as that. It is just a case of “Time gentlemen”.

*I do not know whether the hon. member for Hillbrow put any more questions.

†He is now busy with something else. Is there another question the hon. member for Hillbrow would like me to answer?

The question of availability.

The question of availability is actually the principle of this Bill. I do not have to answer that.

*I do not want to score points off the hon. member for Pinelands, but the other hon. members will know that I have replied to the hon. member for Durban Point on questions the hon. member for Pinelands also put. I suppose he was busy in his office, or perhaps in the coffee room, but he was not in the House. Although I have already replied, I shall repeat my reply. Probably I, too, have received all those telegrams the hon. member has received, and I have the highest respect and a feeling of reverence for the people who sent those telegrams. I said to the hon. member for Durban Point that when it comes to striving after temperance, I do not take a backseat to the hon. member for Pinelands, not even when he is at the pulpit. I am in favour of people drinking moderately. The hon. member for Pinelands admitted the other night that he also has the occasional drink. I am against people drinking too much and getting drunk. That is a social evil I shall fight against with everything in my power.

Why then do you not take advice?

It is not a matter of taking advice. This Act falls under my department. The whole purpose thereof is the distribution of liquor for reasonable use and to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a reasonable public. I am therefore not talking about liquor abuse when I deal with this Act.

They consider this to be part of it.

No, it is not so.

That is why they sent the telegrams.

They sent the telegrams because they had the same idea as the hon. member for Pinelands. He wants to have a drink and does not want an Act that curbs it.

No, that is not fair.

That is the trouble. [Interjections.] I am not being unfriendly towards the hon. member now.

I am going to answer you on that.

Order! The hon. the Minister is speaking wide of the mark now.

If it bothers the hon. member, I would rather withdraw it, because I do not wish to hurt him. All liquor consumption falls under this Act. If hon. members wants teetotalling and prohibition as in America, they must tell me to repeal this Act and introduce total prohibition. However, as long as we have this Act, hon. members must accept that I am not opposed to temperance when I effect amendments to this Act, because I am dealing with the question of a reasonable distribution of liquor to the reasonable consumer.

Mr. Chairman, I must rise to reply to the hon. the Minister’s comment. I do not mind him attacking me. He has been very vociferous. His comments about me do not worry me, but when he says these people who sent telegrams are like me and then criticizes me, he is also criticizing these organizations.

I said that I had the greatest respect for them. That is what I said. The hon. member must not start making propaganda now.

Order! I insist that both the hon. the Minister and the hon. member must come back to clause 8.

That is right, Sir. I agree with that. I just wish the hon. the Minister would also do it. The only point I was making…

Mr. Chairman, on a point of explanation: I merely now want to say…

Order! The hon. the Minister is not allowed to give explanations now.

I am not going to take this matter any further. I just want to say to the hon. the Minister that if he looks at his Hansard, he will see that this is what he has said. I am taking exception to it I am quite sure he did not mean what he said.

I told you I would withdraw it.

If you would…

No, you did not want it.

The hon. the Minister gets very worked up about this sort of thing. All I am trying to say to him is that there is not necessarily only one point of view. This point of view is represented by a very considerable section of South Africans, caring people who work in this area, people who have made representations and have made them with the very best motives. They have not made these representations because they want to hide behind something. They genuinely have a case.

I accept that in the same spirit.

Fine, Sir. As long as we can share the same spirit, then I am happy.

We are talking about wine, not spirits.

I regret very much that the hon. the Minister is unable to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Yeoville. I think his was a well-reasoned argument. I have already stated that an exact parallel exists in my own constituency, and I am quite sure in other constituencies as well.

Finally, I want to say that I am very sad that the hon. the Minister is not able to reconsider the terms of clause 8, which means that bottle store licensees can now get a counter in a supermarket. This constitutes a further extension. That is what this clause says, and I am very sorry that he cannot accept our representations in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply to the allegations of the hon. member for Pinelands. In reality I have tried to conduct this debate in the friendliest possible spirit. I said something to him in a friendly manner, but apparently it got under his skin. I then said that I would withdraw it.

I did not hear that.

I said I would withdraw it because I did not want to spoil the spirit of the debate. But immediately afterwards the hon. member tried to make political capital…

No, that is not so.

Just wait a minute. He then tried to make political capital by blaming me for saying something against the temperance societies. That is a misrepresentation of the position. I said very clearly to the hon. member for Durban Point—he accepted it immediately—as well as to the hon. member for Pinelands that I am the first to support temperance societies. How can the hon. member now twist my words and say… [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister must withdraw the word “twist”.

What else did the hon. member do with my words? I repeated them in this House. [Interjections.]

Withdraw!

I shall withdraw it, Sir, but first of all I want to say to the hon. member that I want nothing to do with such clergymen. I like another type of clergyman. It is clear that one can no longer conduct a debate with the official Opposition at any higher level higher than that of a quarrel.

Mr. Chairman, what has this got to do with the clause?

I only want an opportunity to reply to what the hon. member for Pinelands said. If hon. members want to conduct this type of debate, we can meet them at that level.

Mr. Chairman, if I may I should like to come back to the amendment which I moved and to which the hon. the Minister replied. I should also like to put a number of further submissions to him. Firstly, I would ask him to react to the submission that where there is no definition in the Bill itself, the courts and the body which has to make the decision, have to have regard to the ordinary meaning of the words. In other words, what will happen is that if a decision has to be made as to whether or not the licence should be granted in a residential area, the authority that would make the decision would have to have regard to the ordinary meaning of those words. What I am therefore suggesting is that according to the law as it stands, it would be quite proper to refuse a licence on the grounds that it was in a residential area. In other words, one does not actually need a definition in this regard.

The second point which the hon. the Minister made, in advancing the reasons why he does not agree with this amendment, was that it would mean that licences that had already been granted, would all fall away. The hon. the Minister also knows that legislation does not have a retrospective effect unless it specifically states so. Vested rights would therefore not be affected, however much I might like them to be affected. The vested rights would not be affected because the courts have held that legislation has no retrospective effect unless it is specifically stated. What I am therefore saying is that the two reasons the hon. the Minister advanced for not accepting the amendment I should like him to deal with specifically because I submit, with respect, that neither of those reasons has any validity in law.

Mr. Chairman, initially I want to thank the hon. the Minister for giving attention to the detail of the points I raised with him. I also wish to thank his officials who have obviously studied my proposals in detail. I thank the hon. the Minister for accepting, in principle, an idea which, to my mind, was worthy of consideration, whether we accepted the amendment before the House or not. I felt that if we were to extend the availability of licences for wine we could, at the same time, accept in principle that as technology develops, there can be a move—everything possible could be done—to encourage people to move towards the drinking of wine with a lower alcohol content. I thank the hon. the Minister for accepting that principle.

There is one more issue that I should like to raise with the hon. the Minister. He very kindly pointed out to me that the Minister who takes the decisions about regulations dealing with the alcohol content of wine is the hon. the Minister of Agriculture. I thank him for telling me that. It is on page 443 of Butterworths, and I have now found that reference. I do not think the hon. the Minister gave the page reference, but he did assure me that it was so. I think that this indicates once again that when we discuss legislation here there is, at times, a certain degree of overlap. The section in Butterworths on intoxicating liquor, the section which covers the legislation we are now amending, comes under the overall umbrella of the ministry of the hon. the Minister of Justice, who is dealing with the matter. In view of the fact that he accepts the principle of the amendment which I shall be prepared to withdraw if the hon. the Minister is able to answer me in a reasonable way, I wonder whether he could, at some stage, consult with the hon. the Minister of Agriculture and recommend that no obstacles be placed in the path of people who technically and commercially are able to produce a wine with an alcohol content of less than 9% or 10%. I accept his point about the new range of wines with an alcohol content of slightly more than 9%. It is not quite as high as 10%, and my information is that it averages out at slightly more than 9%. Let us not be tied down, however, by technicalities, because the hon. the Minister has accepted in principle what I have put to him. What I am asking of him in good faith is that he should, when the opportunity arises, consult with the hon. the Minister of Agriculture with a view to making it known that the regulations relating to sugar content and alcohol content will be investigated. The two of them should discuss the matter with a view to making it possible for companies which are marketing wine to produce a wine with a lower alcohol content.

I do not wish to be technical either, but technically speaking the hon. member is not confining himself to the clause now. He is now making new wine.

I thank you, Sir, but it is a consequential argument following on my earlier point, on which the hon. the Minister kindly put me right. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend taking it any further and I thank you for your ruling. Perhaps, in view of the fact that the hon. the Minister agrees with me that there is a certain amount of overlapping, he would comment briefly in reply, and if the hon. the Minister is able to satisfy me, I might be prepared to withdraw my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have already told the hon. member for Berea that I am not unsympathetic towards the idea of an alcohol content of 9%. That hon. member says I should negotiate with the hon. the Minister of Agriculture and that one or two wines with such a low alcohol content might then be produced, and that only those wines should be sold in the grocer’s shops. That is asking too much. I can say that generally speaking, I am in favour of wine with a low alcohol content being sold in grocer’s shops. I have told the hon. member that as a matter of policy I would in any case go no further than the present light wines, whatever their content may be. I cannot take it any further, nor can I promise the hon. member that I will see if a wine with an alcohol content of 9% can possibly be produced and that the Act will then be changed to provide that only that wine can be sold in grocer’s shops. I do not want to make that promise, because the hon. member may blame me later if I cannot keep that promise. Therefore I would rather not do it.

There is no doubt about the fact that the hon. member for Yeoville is correct in saying that we can insert the words “residential area” and leave it to the courts to struggle with that. However, that has practical implications and is bad legislation. A great deal of research still has to be done before such an amendment can be accepted. I have said that it is a difficult thing to define and that I should like to have a proper definition in this Bill.

As far as the other aspect is concerned, that is a legal argument. It may happen that the legislator may simply abolish that type of licence. This may be interpreted as an abolition of that type of licence. These are legal arguments which I do not want to take any further now. However, I should like to give the hon. member another reason. Although I personally do not like the idea of licences being given to bottle stores or grocers’ stores in residential areas, I have to admit that such licences are needed there in certain circumstances. I should like to leave it to the Liquor Board to decide in its wisdom what recommendation it will make. That is what I should like to do. Therefore I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment in principle, because I do not fully agree with it. However, I am sympathetic towards it.

Amendment moved by Mr. H. H. Schwarz negatived (Mr. B. R. Bamford, Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, I. F. A. de Villiers, C. W. Eglin, G. N. Oldfield, W. V. Raw, H. H. Schwarz, Dr. F. van Z. Slabbert, Mrs. H. Suzman and Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, A. B. Widman and N. B. Wood dissenting).

Amendment moved by Mr. N. B. Wood negatived.

Clause put and the Committee divided.

As fewer than fifteen members (viz. Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, C. W. Eglin, G. N. Oldfield, B. W. B. Page, H. H. Schwarz, Dr. F. van Z. Slabbert, Mr. W. M. Sutton, Mrs. H. Suzman, Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, H. E. J. van Rensburg, A. B. Widman and N. B. Wood) appeared on one side,

Clause declared agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported without amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I promised the hon. member for Umbilo that I would say a little more about the Parole Board with reference to the Viljoen Commission. If you will allow me, Sir, I shall tell the hon. member that I am satisfied that the system of prisons boards as it functions in the Department of Prisons at the moment is working well, that they are doing a good job and that it is therefore not necessary at this stage to introduce such a parole board. A uniform policy is conveyed from prisons headquarters to the existing prisons boards at all times. Guidance is also given to all these boards. The latter two functions are the most important ones which the Viljoen Commission wanted to entrust to the Parole Board. The prisons boards are already carrying out those functions.

The amendment proposed in clause 2 related to the release on parole of prisoners whose sentence is less than two years. It will therefore not be affected by the hon. member’s objection.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the hon. the Minister for clarifying that.

Clause agreed to.

House Resumed:

Bill reported without amendment.

Bill read a Third Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

The implementation of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, is proceeding very smoothly. However, a few problems have arisen in practice which should be removed. The necessary adjustments are being proposed in the Bill.

In clause 1 of the Bill, provision is made for the further detention of arrested persons where they cannot, because of their physical condition, be brought before a court within the prescribed period.

In clause 2, an erroneous reference is corrected.

Section 75 of the Act provides that an accused may only be referred from one court to another for trial if the first court does not have jurisdiction. This means that in cases where the former court does have jurisdiction, the Attorney-General cannot use his power in terms of the Act to designate another court for the trial of the accused. This matter is being rectified in clause 3.

It sometimes happens that details of the previous convictions of an accused are received after he has already pleaded in a magistrate’s court, and it then becomes evident that he should appear in a regional court with a view to a heavier penalty. At the moment, such an accused can only be referred to a regional court after conviction. In clause 4, provision is now made for the accused to be referred directly after plea in order to make it possible for the same magistrate who hears the case to impose the penalty as well.

The wording of section 119 of the Act, which refers to the plea of an accused in a magistrate’s court on a charge which must be tried in a superior court, is adjusted in clause 4 in order to make it clear that accused who have been released on bail or on warning by a police official may also be told to plead in a magistrate’s court.

In terms of section 121 of the Act, the magistrate may stop proceedings after a plea of guilty on a charge which must be tried by a superior court, and the Attorney-General may then refer the accused to a competent court. Practice has shown that there should also be provision in such cases for a trial in another court, or for the institution of a preparatory examination. Provision is made for this in clause 6.

One of the objectives of the Act is that accused should be enabled to plead before a court of law as soon as possible, after which they can be examined by the court in respect of the plea. Chapter 19 of the Act therefore provides that when a charge is to be tried in a superior court or is of such a nature as to justify a penalty which can only be imposed in a superior court, it may be put to the accused in a magistrate’s court and he may be required to plead to it forthwith. It has been found that this procedure works well. Because regional courts only sit from time to time in certain centres, the need has arisen for such a procedure to be applied in respect of those courts as well. A proposed measure in this connection is contained in clause 7.

The amendments proposed in clauses 8 and 9 are merely consequential upon clause 6.

In section 144(1)(b), there is an erroneous reference to section 121(4), instead of section 121(3). However, it appears that all the references in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are in fact superfluous, which is the reason for clause 10(a). Clause 10(b) is also consequential upon clause 6.

†In terms of section 170(1) of the Act, an accused who fails to appear in court at the place and on the date to which the proceedings have been remanded, is guilty of an offence. Accused who have been released on warning have for some reason been excluded from this provision. As it is now uncertain whether there is any sanction for such cases, the amendment in clause 11 is proposed.

Section 239(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955, provided for proof of certain facts by affidavit by any person upon whom a law conferred the power or imposed the duty to register or to record such facts, and did not require the person making the affidavit to be the same person who registered or recorded the facts concerned. The wording of section 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 apparently requires the person who registered or recorded such facts to make the affidavit. It was not intended to amend the 1955 vision. Section 212(3) of the Act is therefore brought into line with the previous provision by clause 12.

The provisions of section 217 of the Act in many cases render it unnecessary for a magistrate to give evidence in respect of a confession heard by him. The anomaly that the interpreter must in such cases still give evidence, is removed by clause 13.

In terms of the said section 217 a confession made before a magistrate is, under certain circumstances, upon the mere production thereof, admissible in evidence against the accused. The word “confession” does, in law, not include an admission, with the result that a document containing an admission cannot be dealt with under the provisions of section 217. In clause 14 it is proposed to make similar provision for admissions.

In terms of section 296 an accused cannot be referred to a rehabilitation centre established under the Coloured Persons Rehabilitation Centre Law, 1971, of the Coloured Persons Representative Council. The insertion of a reference to the said law is proposed in clause 15.

From time to time applications for compensation exceeding R2 000 and R1 000 are made to regional courts and magistrates’ courts respectively. Merely because the jurisdiction of the said courts in such matters is limited by section 300, the cases concerned must be tried in superior courts. By clause 16 the jurisdiction for awarding compensation will be increased to R10 000 in the case of regional courts, which amount is equal to their criminal jurisdiction, and R1 500 in the case of magistrates’ courts, which is equal to their jurisdiction in civil cases.

The conditions of bail pending review cannot at present be amended. The necessary provisions are proposed in clause 17.

A difference in the wording of the previous Criminal Procedure Act and the present one, has the effect that an offence in terms of an enactment or regulation promulgated for or by a divisional council, can no longer be compounded. This omission is rectified in clause 18.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. the Minister has introduced a very important piece of legislation concerning criminal procedure. It is very directly concerned with the procedure followed by the courts in South Africa, a procedure which affects the magistrates and the officers of the courts, including the practitioners, a procedure which will affect every single person who has the misfortune to be brought before a criminal court, be it the magistrates’, the regional or the superior courts. It covers a number of aspects of court procedure involving people who are on bail, pleas delivered in a court of summary trials, please of not guilty and what subsequently happens, the sentence itself, confessions and admissions and the extension of awards of regional courts, something I shall be touching upon.

One of the most important provisions is, to our way of thinking, contained in the very first clause. It is important because it affects the rights and the liberty of an individual who, after having been arrested, must in terms of section 50 of the Act be brought before a court. In terms of section 50 exemption is only granted when the accused cannot be brought before a court within 48 hours because of the fact that the period expires on a day which happens to be a public holiday. However, this principle that he must be brought before a court within 48 hours, is something the hon. the Minister seeks to extend. This gives us great difficulty, such difficulty that we find ourselves having to oppose the Bill because of it. Let me explain further how we see this. The clause stipulates, inter alia—

However, what it does not tell us, is who decides that his physical condition or his physical illness is of such a nature that he cannot be brought before a court. Is it the investigating officer who has made a report to the Public Prosecutor who is handling the case and who then has to make the submission to the magistrate, or is it a district surgeon? Is it done with the consent of or without the consent and against the will of the accused himself? We do not say that every person who is arrested suffers a fate he should not suffer, but we know, as does the hon. the Minister—we do not bluff ourselves because some of us have had many years of experience in the criminal courts—that sometimes there are unfortunately prisoners or accused who are arrested and beaten up. Let me be as frank and brutal as that. When an accused has been beaten up, what is to stop the investigating officer from simply reporting to the prosecutor that the accused cannot be brought before the court because he has, for example, a burst eardrum or a black eye. The accused may, in fact, want to appear before the court and show it what his condition is, but he is denied the right. The accused needs protection. We are dealing with habeas corpus, a fundamental right granted to the accused person to be brought before the court within 48 hours. That is the problem that is facing us in this regard. True enough, the hon. the Minister may say that prima facie, as provided for in the clause in this Bill, it may well happen that an accused may become ill between the time of his arrest and the expiry of the 48-hour period.

He may have been genuinely ill; for example, he may have suffered a heart attack and can therefore not appear before the court. Obviously, if the person is ill to begin with, I do not think that any investigating officer would, in all fairness, arrest that person if he thinks, at the time, that that person cannot appear in court within the 48 hours stipulated in terms of section 50 which we are discussing at the moment. So we are actually dealing with a person who becomes ill between the time of his arrest and the time that he has to appear in court What if the investigating officer feels in a slightly punitive mood and keeps on making reports to the public prosecutor, time and time again, for extensions of the period? Although it states that the person should be brought before the court the next day he may nevertheless, in terms of the provision we are being asked to agree to, be able to put his illness or other condition before the court, depending upon the circumstances, and the court then makes an order as to where that accused person is to be detained. The period that it is necessary for him to be detained is also specified by the court. In practice one might well think that the district surgeon or a medical officer should have to testify before the court, and one would hope that in a genuine case, of a person becoming ill and not being able to appear in court, this would be supported by medical evidence, subject to cross-examination, if necessary, by the accused or his attorney, that is if he has an attorney, because there is no provision indicating that once the accused has been arrested, anyone has to notify his family or his attorney if he himself has not had an opportunity to do so. So there can be complete abuse of the situation. In the light of what has happened in some cases—and I think the hon. the Minister of Justice would be the first to recognize the difficulty to which I am referring—I think we are treading on very, very dangerous ground if we are going to allow extensions of time for an accused person to be brought before the courts.

A pertinent question arises from the foregoing. Perhaps the hon. the Minister can help us in this respect What, in fact, has been the position up to now, all these many, many years that the Criminal Procedure Act has been enforced? What has happened to an accused person who, within the 48 hours laid down in terms of section 50, has not been able to appear before the court? What has been done? If the situation had been handled adequately over the many years, we can see little reason for a change being introduced now. Nor did the hon. the Minister of Justice help us in his introductory speech by saying very briefly, with regard to such an important provision “weens hul fisieke toestand nie binne die voorgeskrewe tydperk voor ’n hof gebring kan word nie”. Those are hardly grounds for persuading this side of the House to support this particular measure. Therefore we shall oppose it.

However, there are two other aspects with regard to the 48-hour provision and the extension of the 48-hour period because of illness. Hon. members will appreciate the importance of a person’s liberty. One appreciates the necessity of bringing them before the court within 48 hours. Though one understands that in the case of a public holiday, to which reference has been made, an extra day will be granted, I am still most disturbed because of an experience I personally had over the Easter weekend. An innocent Bantu woman was walking down Eloff Street and she and her friend were arrested on the Thursday afternoon before the long week-end. Their employer phoned to find out what had happened to them and was told by the police that due to the Friday being Easter Friday and the Monday being Easter Monday, the Bantu would have to remain in custody until Tuesday. She had to remain in custody over the long week-end simply because she was walking down Eloff Street and did not have her pass on her. It was a fortuitous event. I went to the police station and the police were most helpful and released her and her friend immediately. But what about the many, many others who were sitting in custody over the long week-end and who did not have a friend to help them? I think the hon. the Minister must be very careful with regard to this matter.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h00.

Evening Sitting

Mr. Chairman, I want to continue where I left off. I wish to conclude that part of the argument that relates to clause 1 and to the question of the payment of bail. I want to do this by stating our point of view in this regard very clearly and succinctly. If the accused cannot be brought before court within 48 hours, or within the extra day allowed in terms of the existing law, he should be released. This is our standpoint.

The rest of the Bill before us involves several aspects that I should like to touch upon. It involves matters of procedure, e.g. the amendment to section 75 which deals with summary trials. Whereas the Transvaal had previously taken a restricted view of a case being taken from one court to another, a summary trial can, in terms of the Bill, be held and the matter be referred from a magistrate’s court to a regional court. This is a procedure with which we can agree.

The amendment that deals with section 115 of the Act, results from the plea of not guilty in a magistrate’s court. A case like that can now be tried in a regional court where the plea only needs to be taken, after which the matter can be referred to a regional court if, in the opinion of the magistrate, it is of such a serious nature that it should go before the regional court. The record of the proceedings in the magistrate’s court then becomes part of the proceedings in the regional court.

The amendment to section 119 of the principal Act also relates to a plea in a magistrate’s court. The amendment is being introduced to clarify the position of an accused who is on bail in terms of the provisions of the existing section 59 or is on warning in terms of the provisions of the existing section 72. If such an offence can only be tried in the Supreme Court, the magistrate can require the accused to plead. We can see no difficulty in that.

The proposed amendment to section 121 of the Act deals with the plea of guilty. The provisions of this Bill enable the Attorney-General, who was previously bound when an accused was arraigned before the Supreme Court, to disagree with the decision of the lower court. He himself can change the decision or hold a preparatory examination. On the basis that the Attorney-General will act in the interests of justice at all times, we shall accept the amendment proposed in this respect.

When an accused is brought before the magistrate’s court, he can only be made to plead before going to the regional court, or if the accused has pleaded guilty, the case can be adjourned for sentence in the regional court. If the magistrate is not satisfied, however, he can change the plea to a plea of not guilty and then send the records straight to the regional court. He can then proceed with the summary trial. When an accused has pleaded not guilty, the magistrate can commit the accused for summary trial in a regional court. The regional court can then try such a person, the record becoming part of the trial proceedings. The Bill also contains a few incidental amendments that bring about changes to sections, but we do not have any difficulty with them.

The proposed amendment to section 170 is fairly important in the sense that sanctions are imposed if an accused who is set free on warning—I have already stated that that is not the same as on bail—fails to appear in court on the appointed day. There were previously no sanctions if a person who was warned to appear in court, failed to appear in court. Now such sanctions are being made part of the sentence as well. I think that is fair enough, because if the court sees fit to release a man on his own recognizance, or on a warning, and such a man then fails to appear in court, we feel that such a man has committed an offence and that we should support the relevant provision.

Section 212 of the Act is amended by clause 12 of the Bill which deals more with the law of evidence. This clause relates to the proof of facts, and provides that proof in regard to affidavits must be obtained. The existing law provides that if Mr. A is the person in charge of a specific record, then normally he is the only person who can hand in that record, because he will have to certify that he is the person in charge. We are widening the law of evidence and procedure in this clause to some extent because if he is not available another person, who has satisfied himself that that record is genuine and is part of the record, can then certify, although he was not personally responsible for it, that evidence should be admitted.

We are extending this a little bit, and one has to be very careful in extending the rule of evidence, especially the admission of evidence. It is subject to cross-examination by the accused, being accepted only as prima facie proof because it can be tested on cross-examination.

I now want to deal with the very important provision with regard to Section 217. Before I come to that, I want to make a point in passing. We have just discussed the importance of regional courts and, in a way, the new and more meaningful role that they are to play. In section 300 we are, in fact, going to extend their powers—a matter I shall be dealing with in a moment—giving them compensation of approximately R10 000 as opposed to R2 000. I want to comment very favourably, at this stage, on the role of regional courts in South Africa since they were introduced, if I am not mistaken in 1952. I have seen practice in the courts. In the past an accused was brought to a magistrate’s court and, if the crime were serious, he was then referred to the Supreme Court, Counsel was required and a lot of expense was involved in fighting the case. The advent of regional courts has definitely improved the role played in seeing justice done. Quite frankly, I want to comment favourably on the standards of regional court magistrates, who have passed examinations and only become regional magistrates on high academic qualifications. They qualify themselves and are thought very highly of—and I can say this without hesitation—by the legal profession and the persons in practice in the regional courts, their judgments being examined very carefully by other regional magistrates. This has stopped a lot of cases from going to the Supreme Court. It has made things easier for the accused and, what is more important, it has been less expensive. It has been less expensive because the accused can, instead of engaging counsel, engage those who practice at the Side Bar to appear for him. If he can afford it, or if it is necessary, members of the Bar can appear for him as well. Therefore I believe that regional courts have an important role to play.

I now turn to the question of the law of evidence and the question of confessions, as dealt with in clause 13. Up to now the magistrate had to testify that the written confession was, in terms of section 217, that made by the accused person himself. The law was amended so that that written confession could be handed to the court. In terms of the proposed amendment that confession can be handed in without the magistrate being present.

The same thing applies to the question of admissions. Where admissions were made, that also applied. However, when a confession or admission was made through an interpreter, the interpreter then had to go to court and certify that he had interpreted and that his interpretation was a true interpretation of the statement made. What we are being asked now is just to allow an interpreter’s certificate to be sufficient for a confession or admission to be submitted. However, confessions and admissions are very important parts of a trial. As hon. members know, a confession is an admission that the crime took place.

Such an admission can also be a valid plea of guilty, as is proved by, for example, the case of Rex v. Barlow, 1926, and a host of other cases dealing with confessions. Hon. members will appreciate that this is a very important principle in our law, because it provides that such an admission amounts to a plea of guilty. Most important, of course, is that any such admission should be freely and voluntarily made. In his The Law of Evidence, Scoble deals at great length with this principle, as does Phipson and other authors writing about this principle in the law of evidence. However, when the Act was amended, in 1977, we in fact allowed for a prima facie introduction of this principle into our legislation. We allowed it to be accepted as evidence, and the only safeguard that the accused now has is that such a confession or admission of guilt is only prima facie admissible and that the accused can still subsequently challenge it in court. Because we agree that this should be so, that the accused should be in a position to challenge such a confession in court, we will support this clause.

Section 296 of the Act deals with referring people to rehabilitation centres. Clause 1 of the Bill, which amends section 50 of the Act, contains a similar provision. There is one aspect, however, which I should like to draw to the attention of the hon. the Minister, and I hope he will consider it. That is the fact that the provisions of clause 15, which seek to amend section 296 of the principal Act, only relate to Coloured persons being referred to rehabilitation centres in terms of the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, 1971. As it only refers to Coloured persons, I believe this is a shortcoming in the legislation.

As far as I know, there is only one detoxification centre in the country. I think it is situated at Roodepoort, near Johannesburg. That is the only centre to which a person can be referred who is under the influence of drugs. However, I do not know of a single centre to which a person who is addicted to or under the influence of intoxicating liquor can be sent if he is in such a state of intoxication that he requires drying out between the time of his arrest and the time he has to appear in court.

I listened to a very interesting radio talk recently. I do not know whether the hon. the Minister of Justice also listened to it. It was about a new experiment undertaken in this regard in a certain town in England. I think it was Liverpool. A detoxification centre was established there for detainees who were too inebriated upon arrest to be brought before court. This experiment was found to work very successfully. In the first instance it prevented the overcrowding of prisons by inebriates, people who, for various reasons, did not belong in the prison. It was found that the drying-out, so to speak, of inebriates at the detoxification centre worked perfectly and that these people could be assisted there in a far better way than was customary in a prison cell. I would suggest to the hon. the Minister that he give this idea serious consideration. Perhaps a similar sort of procedure could be introduced into our legal system as well.

As I have already mentioned, we have no objection to the greater powers which will be given to regional courts in terms of clause 16, which amends section 300 of the principal Act This means that regional courts will now be empowered to award damages to an aggrieved person to an amount of R10 000, instead of the previously stipulated amount of R2 000. An important result of this will be that aggrieved people who have up to now been obliged to institute civil action in respect of claims exceeding R2 000, will no longer be forced by circumstances to take recourse to this sort of action unless the amount involved is in excess of R10 000.

Clause 17 seeks to amend section 307 of the principal Act. This clause deals with the granting of bail pending the review of a criminal case. In terms of present legislation bail conditions have been found to be somewhat too stringent. Because provision is now also made for conditions of bail to be reviewed on appeal, we believe that the situation is being ameliorated. Therefore we have no objection to clause 17.

The last clause I want to deal with is the one amending schedule 3. This is purely a compensation clause enabling local authorities to get some funds into their kitties as a result of vehicles exceeding speed limits or driving without lights, for example. Apparently there is a gap in the existing schedule. In the Cape Province, as hon. members will know, we have divisional councils. This provision enables divisional councils to be included in the definition as well. Certainly, there is no reason why, of all the local authorities in South Africa, we should discriminate against the divisional councils in the Cape.

Those then are our views on a Bill which involves many aspects of criminal procedure. At this stage we remain opposed to it for the reasons I have stated.

Mr. Speaker, I inferred from the speech of the hon. member for Hillbrow that the gravamen of the PFP’s objection was to clause 1 of the Bill. When I come to this in the course of my speech, I hope to argue with the hon. member about his interpretation of this clause.

Since we are dealing with the Criminal Procedure Act, it is perhaps appropriate to outline the background against which we should evaluate this amending Bill. The Criminal Procedure Act really contains those formal legal prescriptions as to how a trial should be conducted, how the person should be brought before the court, how the evidence should be led and how he should be protected. It lays down the way in which the accused should be dealt with from the time of his arrest until his case has been finally disposed of after having been dealt with by the highest court of appeal. Therefore the Criminal Procedure Act of a country is of vital importance as an indication of the lawful manner in which the liberty of a citizen of the country should be dealt with. Let me say at once that the way in which the accused citizen of the country is dealt with is in fact also an indication of the civilization of a legal system. Therefore I should like to quote from the book Suid-Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg by Hiemstra. Referring to habeas corpus and Magna Carta, one D. J. Meader, as quoted by Hiemstra, said—

To put it differently, the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy lies in the Criminal Procedure Act and its implementation. The way I have outlined it, even the most ideal legal process would not work unless there were competent magistrates and officers administering justice who desired to carry out the dictates of the Act in the way the legislator intended. The flexibility of a Criminal Procedure Act is particularly important, as well as its fairness, the speed with which a case can be disposed of and the fact that there are firm rules.

We have always been proud of our criminal system, our criminal procedure. Even our bitterest enemies have always said that if there is one thing we can be proud of, it is our legal system. When I discuss clause 1, I shall come back to that. I should like to know whether the PFP is also proud of our legal system, as we are on this side of the House.

I shall tell you later.

The system is all right; the laws are bad.

The image of our legal system in the outside world is very important, and I believe it to be the duty of every South African in all fairness to proclaim as far as possible the equity and justice of our legal system and legal process. Therefore I want to convey a word of special thanks to the courts, because it is not only the legislation which makes the law, but also the courts which apply the law with the required impartiality from day to day. When we look at the latest report of the Department of Justice, we see that almost 6 000 cases per working day are recorded in the magistrates’ courts. In every case, the Criminal Procedure Act must be carefully studied and implemented in the interests of everyone in this country. The Criminal Procedure Act which is to be amended by this Bill came into operation in July 1977. Therefore the Criminal Procedure Act has been in operation for more than 18 months, and to very good effect. The Bill which is before the House contains only 18 clauses, 6 of which are merely formal, while the other 12 clauses do not propose any very drastic changes.

When we look at the proposed amendments, we find that we can very easily classify them. We can classify them by saying that one amendment is meant to ensure that cases are expeditiously disposed of, another amendment is intended to lend greater flexibility to our legal system, and yet another is meant to make our law more equitable and to ensure that it is implemented in an orderly way and according to the rules. Having said this, I want to look at the clauses in the Bill.

Objections have been raised to clause 1. The objection to clause 1 expressed by the hon. member for Hillbrow is that if the police were to assault a person, there would not be any protection for the person who had been assaulted. Who is to say that the person is indisposed and that he has not perhaps been assaulted? That is the real objection of the hon. member for Hillbrow. On the one hand he praises our regional courts and says that these people keep a watchful eye on things. He says that there are many good magistrates, but on the other hand…

I said regional court.

Oh, the hon. member is now differentiating. He is not satisfied with the magistrates’ courts. He is only satisfied with regional courts. That is what he said. However, I want to allege that the magistrates’ courts are just as important a part of our administration of justice as any other court, if not more important. Now a seed of distrust is being sown by the PFP. It is being said that the court should not really be trusted, because a policeman can assault someone and then the policeman will cooperate with the prosecutor and he will cooperate with the magistrate in concealing everything and covering it up. That is the insinuation made by the hon. member for Hillbrow. Can one imagine that anyone could have such a low opinion of the administration of justice in his country that he could insinuate that if a person were assaulted, it would be kept a secret?

I want to tell the hon. member that no party in the history of this country has ever taken a greater interest in or has ever had more faith in or greater regard for individual liberty than this party. The liberty and the rights, the human rights of an individual or an accused, are of the utmost importance to us.

If the hon. member had taken cognizance of the purpose of the proposed amendment of this section, he would have realized that the section had replaced section 28 of the former Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. I want to advise the hon. member to go and look what it says in section 28 of the 1955 Act. The effect of that is that if a person is ill and cannot appear before the court, the prosecutor must request a further warrant of detention. He need only make a request, then the person is detained. It is as simple as that. Now we are improving the position by providing that the prosecutor must say in the application he makes to the court why he wants this further warrant of detention. If one has any faith in the administration of justice, surely one should say that the magistrate would not grant such a request unnecessarily and without good grounds. We must not think that the period of 48 hours within which the person has to be brought before the court is a holy cow. We should all like this period to be shortened. The fact of the matter is, however, that a period of 48 hours was decided on for administrative reasons. This has been the position for years. It is not something new. Are we now to take a sick person from his hospital bed and rush him to the magistrate’s court to have him appear before the magistrate there? Is that what the hon. member for Hillbrow wants?

Now the hon. member for Hillbrow does not trust the police, however. Does he trust the police or not? He does not say a word. He must not make insinuations, because the times in which we live in South Africa are too dangerous. He must say what he means. Does he trust the police or not? He says absolutely nothing. However, he is brave enough to insinuate that he has no confidence in the police. I want to ask him now whether he trusts our courts and prosecutors.

You are talking rubbish.

I am talking rubbish? I do not believe that he trusts them.

Clients of mine have experienced that.

The hon. member says his clients have experienced it. There are the insinuations! I have also had many clients and I have found that I cannot believe everything they tell me. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Sandton who is sitting there agrees with me. He too knows from experience that one cannot believe everything one’s clients tell one.

You cannot assume that. You gave up law because you do not understand it.

Does the hon. member believe everything his clients tell him?

I think that this clause will improve the existing situation, a situation in which a question can merely be put to the magistrate without going into detail. When one puts the question to the magistrate, he helps one and gives one a further warrant of detention, but in this case, precisely because this party wants to make the matter as equitable as possible, we have decided to make this improvement.

It is wide open to abuse and you know it.

In this situation the question is asked of the hon. member for Hillbrow what requirements the magistrates’ courts are now going to set and how they are going to decide whether they will grant an extension or not. The standpoint of our courts in this connection is quite clear. In the case Ganyile v. The Minister of Justice (1962 (1) SA, p. 654(B) (O.K.)), the following is said—

That is when someone submits the habeas corpus application—

The hon. member for Musgrave said that this situation was wide open to abuse. It is the duty of the courts to provide protection against potential interference with a person’s liberty. I now want to say that the hon. members of the PFP are knowingly or unknowingly engaged in a campaign to obstruct the administration of justice.

That is absolute nonsense.

They are creating a climate of distruct in our administration of justice. They are also creating a climate of distrust in our police force and in our courts. Without going into detail, I want to refer to their comments on the Mahlangu case. Does that case not prove that there is in fact a lack of confidence in the fairness of our legal system? Is a climate to be created which will give people outside this House the idea of acting in an extra-parliamentary way? Is that the idea of hon. members of the PFP? If that is the idea, I want to tell those hon. members that this idea of theirs has been expressed before. It was spelt out by their leader a long time ago, where he himself said in September 1976 that the PFP would engage in politics in such a way that Government policy would be influenced to move in the direction of the PFP policy. That means extra-parliamentary action.

Order! The hon. member must confine himself to the Bill.

When I consider the Bill, it is very important to see this clause in the right perspective, so that it may inspire confidence in the absolutely reliable legal system we have in this country.

I also want to refer to the other clauses which the hon. member dealt with. I want to dwell especially on clause 5, which deals with section 119. Section 119 actually contained two lacunae. The first deficiency is the one to which the hon. member for Hillbrow referred. This is now being rectified in the sense that an accused who has been released on bail can also be required to plead in court. However, there is a second aspect as well. A careful reading of the clause shows that the person will only have to plead in the magistrate’s court if the offence cannot be tried by a supreme court. Now, the position in respect of the offence of rape is such that the way the section reads at the moment, it was quite uncertain where a plea of rape could be taken. There have been various unreported rulings on this aspect, and now we actually find in clause 7, which deals with section 122A, etc., that this aspect is also being rectified. We whole-heartedly support the flexibility which is a characteristic of the amendments.

I agree with the other aspects to which the hon. member for Hillbrow referred. I do not think I need go into them any further. I believe that there are other hon. members on this side of the House who will certainly discuss them. I just want to add that I gladly support the Bill in its entirety, the more so because I am fully convinced that clause 1 is the best under the circumstances and is an improvement to the previous position regarding the freedom of the individual.

Mr. Speaker, it was my intention to speak for a very short period of time on this Bill and to rise merely to bless it on behalf of those of us in these benches. However, in view of the objection to this Bill raised by the hon. member for Hillbrow, the spokesman for the official Opposition, I believe it behoves me to do rather more than simply bless the Bill but to give my reasons why we in fact approve of this particular clause to which the official Opposition is objecting. I must confess, however, that it worries me that for the second time today I find myself on the same side as the hon. the Minister of Justice. [Interjections.] I am not sure whether I am getting better or whether he is getting worse.

I do not intend to comment on clauses 2 to 19 of the Bill because I believe that they have been covered very extensively by the hon. the Minister himself and also, as that hon. member puts it, clearly and succinctly by the hon. member for Hillbrow. I therefore have no intention of going into those clauses in any shape or form. Suffice it to say that I have consulted with people within the legal profession who have also consulted the Law Society in connection with this Bill, and it is quite apparent that in their view and in the view of the Law Society there are no problems of any major nature. These clauses are predominantly an attempt to streamline the criminal procedure process. The steps that have been taken by the hon. the Minister in this Bill appear to do just that. The proof of the pudding, however, is always in the eating, and I am sure that if any problems arise, in due course, in respect of any of the provisions of clauses 2 to 19, they will be sorted out in the course of time. At this stage they appear, however, to be an improvement, and we feel that they will bring about some form of streamlining in the process of criminal procedure.

If we understand the hon. member for Hillbrow correctly, clause 1 of the Bill gives the official Opposition sufficient cause to vote against the Bill at Second Reading. We see the Bill primarily as a Committee Stage Bill, but I believe that we must now react to the point of view of the official Opposition in respect of clause 1. As I understand their objection, it is in regard to the physical illness of a person about to appear in court on a charge. The amending clause states that in the event of such a person not being able to appear before a court because of his physical condition, that court may make an order that he should not be brought at that particular time, but there must be sufficient reasons set out for the court to do so. The official Opposition is of the opinion that this is an infringement of the right of habeas corpus.

Tell us what you think of it.

There is certainly a point to be made out for the fact that it is an infringement of the right of habeas corpus. At the same time it is, however, an extremely “commonsensical” amendment—if I may use that term—because frankly, in the event of a prisoner being in a very poor condition in hospital, where it could be dangerous…

Not in hospital. He is in a police cell.

He might be in a police hospital, but he could also be anywhere else. [Interjections.] Despite the interjections coming from my right, let me say that the situation, as I understand it, is that in the event of this particular prisoner, who is due to appear on a charge, being in such a condition that it would be unwise to bring him before the court, the provision is now being made that he does not have to be brought before that court at that time.

Why can he not go home?

I believe that this has been the situation, and the hon. member for Hillbrow mentioned, on several occasions, what has happened in the past. I understand that in the past there was a similar kind of arrangement, but it was not exactly regular. This amendment is, however, now regularizing the situation in regard to such a prisoner. We have heard talks of police brutality from the hon. member for Hillbrow, and it appears to me that they see a skeleton in every cupboard, a ghost behind every bush…

Or a spook in every cell.

… or, as the hon. member for Mooi River has just said, a spook in every cell.

Let us look at the situation in a realistic and sensible light. The situation is not that the police are entitled not to bring the person before the court, nor that the prosecutor has the right not to bring the person before the court, but it is the court itself that must hear evidence as to the physical condition of the prisoner. The clause reads—

The prosecutor in the court case therefore has to put a case to the person in charge of that court, presumably a magistrate in most of these cases. I believe that we in this country have to have some basic trust in our legal system. I do not believe that we can work from a viewpoint that our judges or our magistrates are corrupt and will intentionally make incorrect decisions.

Nobody said that.

There are, of course, cases of incorrect decisions being made. This does happen in any system in the world. To err is human. I believe, however, that our legal system, our judges and our magistrates, are predominantly upright, honest men who make the decisions they have to make in the light of the circumstances presented to them. We in these benches cannot work from any other viewpoint, because if one does not work from this particular viewpoint, one might as well give up right here and now. One might even wonder, in fact, why one is sitting in Parliament at all if one is not prepared to accept that the people who have to administer the laws of this country, laws we pass in this House, do so, for the most part, fairly and justly and certainly attempt to arrive at the right decision in every case. [Interjections.] I have read clause 1, and it definitely states that it is the court which makes the decision on whether the prisoner appears or not.

Or whether he is detained for life.

Detention does not come into this at all, because as the hon. member for Pinelands knows the 90-day detention clause is something that is totally beyond the scope of this Bill. As he also knows well, we in these benches do not agree with the 90-day detention clause as it now stands. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry I was sidetracked. I realize that it has nothing to do with the Bill. [Interjections.]

The situation, as I have said, is that it is the court which will make the decision on the evidence, set before it by the prosecutor, relating to the illness or other condition of the criminal concerned. If these proceedings take place I assume—and I think that I assume correctly—that the magistrate will satisfy himself that the circumstances detailed in the Bill do obtain and that there are good reasons why the prisoner should not appear. I also assume that at the particular hearing—and I should like the hon. the Minister to react to this—the prisoner would have the right to have his attorney or his legal representative appearing for him in the event of the prosecutor calling… [Interjections.] I am asking the hon. the Minister this question. I am not stating that I know it to be so. I should like him to reply to this. [Interjections.] Therefore we cannot agree with the contentions of the official Opposition. If we had a basic distrust of our legal system in South Africa, we would agree. However, that is not the case in these benches. We have that basic trust in the people who administer our laws, our judges and our magistrates, and therefore we in these benches will be supporting this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for East London North has set out a case with which I do not find myself in disagreement. I should like to point out that hon. members of the PFP opposed the 1977 Act and are now opposing this amending legislation.

I listened very carefully to the hon. member for Hillbrow and came to the conclusion that his only basic objection was to clause 1. For the rest, I understood the hon. member to be in favour of the Bill. His basic objection was only to the one particular clause. Personally I think that the members of official Opposition are seeing ghosts where they do not exist. However, if the hon. the Minister can find a way of amending this clause to meet their particular objections, that can be done in the Committee Stage. I myself do not believe that that is sufficient reason for opposing the Bill as a whole. There I disagree with the hon. member for Hillbrow. I think it is merely a case of the PFP, which opposed the legislation in 1977, also opposing the amending legislation which is improving the situation. However, if the hon. the Minister can find a method of safeguarding or improving the situation even further, that can be done in regard to clause 1 quite adequately. I think that the courts will arrive at the just decision and that the decision they will arrive at, in terms of clause 1, will be in the interests of justice. I have no doubt that the court will exercise its discretion to the best of its ability. [Interjections.] If hon. members of the official Opposition have any objections to the way the judiciary administers the courts, they must stand up and say what their specific objections are to the judiciary or to the courts. [Interjections.] They must give examples of where the magistrates, the judiciary or the courts have gone wrong in various matters. They must not just take the whole matter and cloud the issue. He should give us specific examples. [Interjections.] Well, back it up with evidence. [Interjections.] When the original legislation was introduced in 1977, vast changes were made in the procedures. I may say that we then updated the legal procedures to a large extent. The practical implementation of the 1977 Act would obviously show that there were deficiencies. I remember that it took a long time debating the 1977 Bill. We in the SAP supported that Bill, but also said that when that legislation was applied practically it would be found that there were deficiencies, that there were problems, and we also predicted that the legislation would have to be amended at some future stage.

Now the hon. the Minister has introduced this amending legislation which seeks to improve the situation and to streamline the procedures even further. In our view our courts are overloaded, the whole system is overloaded, and I believe that anything one can do to streamline the procedures, provided the interests of the accused person are safeguarded—and I believe they will be safeguarded—should be supported by hon. members on this side of the House. However, the hon. members of the official Opposition reveal an attitude to law and order which causes me to understand their reaction to this Bill. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in supporting this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I have no fault to find with the attitudes of the hon. member for East London North and the hon. member for Walmer. We appreciate their support.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member for Groote Schuur will be amazed when I really start talking to them. [Interjections.] The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, has now been in force for nearly two years, and there is ample proof that it is good legislation and that it works excellently. It was envisaged at the time that certain minor amendments and adjustments would have to be made in the course of time. I believe it is a feather in the cap of the hon. the Minister and his officials—the draftsmen of the legislation under discussion—as well as for those who have to apply it—magistrates, prosecutors and other officials—that so few problems are in fact being encountered in the implementation of this Act.

Certain less important adjustments have, however, become essential. They are therefore now being effected and one need have no hesitation in supporting them. The hon. member for Hillbrow, however—although we are grateful for his support in respect of certain parts of the legislation—again made a big fuss about the supposed possibility of abuse of the envisaged new powers in the Bill. The hon. member said that we were now supposedly on dangerous ground. I believe it is a pity that the hon. member used these specific words tonight. It creates the impression outside—and it is a false impression—that our police and our other judicial officers abuse the powers they possess. What hon. members opposite have said, is another proof of the type of insinuations they make, without substantiating their allegations.

How many people have died in detention?

They are just gossiping again, as the hon. member for Groote Schuur is now trying to do once again.

How many people have died in detention?

They gossip without advancing proof of the truth of their allegations.

You said the same about Eschel Rhoodie.

Those hon. members must tell us tonight where and when prosecutors and judicial officers have abused their powers. They must state clearly to us why they are in fact opposing the insertion of this clause. The standpoint of the hon. member for Hillbrow and the hon. member for Groote Schuur, who are both carrying on so… [Interjections.] The attitude of the hon. member for Hillbrow sounds so similar to the attitude we have had to hear from the hon. member for Houghton for so many years.

You are going to hear it again.

She has propagated this attitude in the House for many years and it seems to me as if the hon. member for Hillbrow is under her influence completely. It seems to me as if she has him well under her thumb. I wish to say to the hon. member for Hillbrow that it is a dangerous influence she is exercising over him. I think that he should rather try to support the hon. member for Yeoville, because he has a different type of influence, an influence which is a little more responsible. To my mind, the standpoint of the hon. member for Hillbrow in respect of this Bill is not beneficial to our administration of justice or to South Africa. I am sorry, therefore, that the hon. member spoke today on this matter in the way he did.

The hon. member for Hillbrow asked, inter alia, who is going to decide about granting exemption. The hon. members for East London North and Walmer also referred to that. I think that the hon. member for Hillbrow simply did not read the Bill any further; as both the hon. member for East London North and the hon. member for Walmer pointed out to him. If the hon. member would just read it, he would see that the court has to take into account certain circumstances which have to be fully explained to the court. Moreover the court will investigate them in full. Furthermore, the court has no obligation to grant exemption—it may grant it. I cannot imagine that, as the hon. member for Hillbrow said, if a man’s eardrum had burst and the prosecutor presented the evidence, the court could accept that such a man must be detained in the police cells or in hospital for that reason and be brought before the court only one or two weeks later. It is ridiculous to come up with such an example.

The other side of the coin, as the Act reads at present, is that if a man is ill—and nobody can deny that a man can in fact be seriously ill—the court has to visit him in hospital and that, as the hon. member for Hillbrow said, if the court is unable to visit him and it is impossible to bring him before the court, he has to be released.

What has happened up to the present time?

What a ridiculous proposal that is! Surely one cannot simply release a criminal just like that. Does the hon. member really want that? Does he want such a man to be released even if he is a criminal?

What has happened up to the present time?

We can take it that up to now the court has had to visit such a man at great expense and inconvenience to the court itself. Does the hon. member want it to stay that way?

Yes.

Oh, really, sir, we are not children, after all. Let us be reasonable. Practical experience has been gained in this regard. Our people have found that this is a problem which occurs in practice and therefore it is now being proposed that the provision be amended in such a way that the court itself must decide whether the man should be detained after evidence has been heard by the court. We really must not be so childish as to object to this.

My colleague, the hon. member for Pretoria West, referred at length to the other clauses. He spoke about them in a knowledgeable way. He showed that he has a great deal of practical experience in this regard. At any rate, he knows far more about this than the quasi-lawyers on that side of the House. Therefore I just want to refer briefly to a few more clauses. In terms of clause 4, an accused has to plead as soon as possible. That usually happens in the magistrates court. This works very well and we must retain this system. The problem arises, however, that at the time the accused pleads, no record of previous convictions is yet available. It can happen that when the record becomes available, it is evident that the accused should not be heard before a magistrates court, because of the seriousness of the crime and previous convictions. In terms of the provisions of section 116 of the Act such an accused can, however, be referred to the regional court, for example, only after he has been convicted. The magistrate then has to sentence him without having had the benefit of the whole hearing taking place before him. We think that this is not in the best interests of the administration of justice in South Africa. Therefore the proposed amendment is reasonable in that it provides that the prosecutor can ask after pleading, but before evidence is led, that the accused be referred to a higher court. After all, the prosecutor has the information, and therefore we think that he is the person who is best able to make the request so that the accused will be heard before the correct court right from the start.

I also want to refer briefly to clause 13. In terms of section 217 of the Act, an admission taken down by a magistrate, is admitted as evidence simply by submitting it to the court. In other words, the magistrate does not have to give evidence himself. As the hon. member for Hillbrow rightly mentioned, there is no doubt that this saves a lot of time and money. It is totally unacceptable that an interpreter, if one has been used in such a case, should go and give evidence and present his statement to the court. Therefore I venture to support this amendment as well.

In conclusion: Clause 16 is aimed at increasing the damages fines which may be imposed. Certain problems are experienced in practice with regard to the amounts which may be imposed. It is to the detriment of the prejudiced persons, and therefore it is reasonable that this be rectified. Therefore it is right that the amount for the regional court be increased to R10 000—which is equivalent to the criminal jurisdiction of that court—and that for the magistrate’s court increased to R1 500—which is equivalent to its civil jurisdiction. We have no hesitation in supporting this amendment either.

This Bill is an effort to improve further a really excellent piece of legislation, which already works well in practice. We on this side of the House have no difficulty supporting this Bill and we appeal to the official Opposition not to single out this one clause and create unnecessary problems in this regard. They are creating unnecessary problems, because there are no dangers, no “dangerous grounds” in this Bill. They are conjuring up spectres unnecessarily. Therefore we ask them to support this clause too. They need not be afraid; they can trust the judicial officers in our courts completely.

Mr. Speaker, I enter into this den of lawyers with a fair amount of reluctance, but after the speech by the hon. member for Verwoerdburg I consider it very necessary to reply to some of the things he has said, not to mention the hon. members for East London North and Walmer. For a change, I think they require answering more than the hon. the Minister. The hon. the Minister was very mild in his presentation of this Bill. It was hon. members of the NRP and the hon. member for Walmer who leapt to his defence with any enthusiasm.

I want first of all to say to the hon. member for Verwoerdburg that it is not a case of seeing spooks or casting suspicion where there are no grounds for suspicion. We have had experience over the years in this House of asking a number of questions and getting a number of replies, and it is clear that the cases mentioned by the hon. member for Hillbrow do occur. In other words, there are cases where prisoners, or persons who have been arrested, have been assaulted. Indeed, year after year I put the same question to the hon. the Minister and I get a list of well over 100 people who have actually died in police cells, most of them not as a result of…

Over 100?

Yes, 128 last year.

Where do you get that?

It was the hon. the Minister’s reply to a question I put to him.

What was the question?

I asked whether any persons, other than persons detained under the security laws, died in 1977 while in detention. The hon. the Minister’s reply was “Yes, 128”.

For what period was that?

For 1977. It was a question I asked last year. I have just put another question on the Order Paper asking the hon. the Minister to give me the figures for 1978. I do not for one moment want to create the impression that these people died as a result of assault by the police. They did not. They died as a result of a number of reasons. They died as a result of suicide, wounds inflicted before arrest, natural causes, self-inflicted cerebral haemorrhage, wounds inflicted during attempt to escape, and so on. A number of people were wounded or injured while being arrested and these presumably also landed up in the police cells and were possibly not well enough to appear in court within 48 hours of their arrest. But if this number has died, one can safely assume that a larger number have been injured. I think that is a reasonable assumption to make. It is not as if one is sucking ideas out of one’s thumb in order to cast suspicion on the courts, the administration of justice, the prosecutors or the police. These are the facts of life in South Africa. However, leave that to one side. I simply wanted to dispose of that argument. These figures are available and I think they are very revealing. These figures are about deaths. I am talking about people who are injured, as the hon. member for Hillbrow has mentioned. But surely it is the principle of this that we ought to be discussing and nothing else, nothing about the spooks that we are supposed to conjure up, and so on. I was amazed to hear the hon. member for East London North say that he was going to support this Bill. His party says very loud and long that they are in favour of the rule of law. They keep saying it.

Correct.

The hon. member says that it is correct. He says the 90-day detention clause as it now stands, is something that he opposes. Well, I have news for him: The 90-day clause was suspended many years ago; so it does not stand any more.

You know what I meant.

Of course I know what the hon. member meant. His knowledge of the laws which allow detention without trial in this country seems to me to be rather superficial.

Order! That is not in this Bill at all.

Mr. Speaker, if I may, I just want to submit to you that the main reason why the PFP is opposing the Bill we are now considering, is because we submit that this is a further infringement of the rule of law in that it undermines the whole principle of habeas corpus. I think the hon. the Minister himself will agree that it does change the principle of habeas corpus.

Of course not.

Who said “Of course not”? Which ignorant hon. member said that? [Interjections.] Well, it looks as if I, who is not a “regsgeleerde”, must now give a lesson in the law to the hon. member over there, who I understand is supposed to be a “regsgeleerde”. [Interjections.] Was he a briefless barrister? Well, it does not matter whatever he was. I want to ask the hon. member whether he knows the law as it now stands, I do not think he does. The section we are presently amending is section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. We are now dealing with the procedure after an arrest. It reads—

Is that the first time you are reading it?

No, for years I have been reading it over and over again, but this is the first time the hon. member has heard it. The section continues, and this is the important part—

That is habeas corpus, the sacred law in all democracies, that protects the citizen, the individual, against the might of the State. At any time the State can send its police or its armed forces to the home of individual and arrest him, unless he is protected by habeas corpus. The hon. member is leaving the Chamber now, because he does not want to hear any more. I can tell him that we have had enough incursions into habeas corpus, which is basically the rule of law, the right of a man to his liberty if he is not duly charged and brought before a court of law in terms of the correct procedure. There are already many laws on the Statute Book which allow the hon. the Minister to arrest and hold people without charging them. There are two such provisions, which do not apply to the security legislation, one being section 185…

The hon. member is not speaking to the Bill.

Sir, I am stating that this is another incursion into the rule of habeas corpus. Surely I am allowed to point out that we already have several such laws on the Statute Book. I am developing my argument that we do not need any more such laws. Therefore I submit that this is perfectly relevant. We have two provisions already which do not apply to security legislation. One is section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Act. That applies to witnesses in cases outside of security legislation, but who fall within the schedule of the Act. Then there is section 13 of the Drugs Abuse Act, which allows the Minister to detain anybody whom he suspects of knowing anything about possession, use or peddling of drugs. Then there are four other laws which also abrogate the rule of law or habeas corpus, and those are the four laws which fall within security legislation. That is section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act…

You must come back to the Bill.

I am on the Bill.

Order! The hon. member is not speaking to the Bill. This Bill deals with illness and other physical conditions and not with the matter she is dealing with at present.

It does not deal specifically with these matters, but it does deal with the abrogation of the habeas corpus, and that is exactly what those other six laws deal with. However, I shall leave it at that. I have made the point that we already have more than enough laws on the Statute Book that go beyond the normal rules of democracy and habeas corpus. I am absolutely amazed at the NRP, but I am not at all amazed at the SAP, because they support the Government in everything, it makes no difference what.

Do not be amazed at what we do; do your own thing.

But I am amazed at the NRP and in future they must stop claiming that they stand for the rule of law, because from now on, if this law is passed—and I have no doubt that it will be since the Minister has the majority in this House—the 48-hour rule falls away if the prosecutor, who, after all, is not on the side of the accused…

Go and send a telegram to somebody.

The hon. member cannot rattle me in any way about that; so he can stop wasting his time. The fact is that the prosecutor, who is not exactly on the accused’s side, but is on the side of the State, can present a case to the court stating that the man is physical ill or that his physical condition—note those words—is such that he cannot be brought before the court within the 48 hours as laid down by habeas corpus, laid down, I might say, since 1917, when the first Criminal Procedure Act was passed in this country and has served this country well for over 60 years. Hon. members must still explain to me why they need to change this now, what we did before this clause was introduced and why the hon. the Minister has such difficulty about allowing the normal law to stay. The prosecutor comes to court and says that the accused is in no fit condition to stand trial. Then the court may—not shall, I agree with the hon. member for Verwoerdburg that it is permissive—decide to keep him locked up in a prison cell, in a prison hospital or in any other place, as laid down by the clause, for as long as it likes until he recuperates. If I am an arrested person I am an accused person, but I am not yet a guilty person. Why should I have to recuperate from an illness in a prison cell or a prison gaol? Why can I not recuperate at home? What is to stop the State from re-arresting me, or what is to stop the State from telling me that I have to appear in court at a later date? This is exactly, I presume, what the procedure has been from 1917 until April 1979.

What if he is in for murder?

That hon. member has murder on the brain! It has nothing to do with murder. Anyway if one is ill after being arrested, one can stay in a prison hospital or a prison cell for weeks on end until one is ready. The truth of the matter is that hon. members have not read the Bill and can therefore not understand its implications. The hon. member for East London North has said he presumes that such a man’s legal adviser can after all present the case… Incidentally, there is nothing in the law that says he may…

Let us hear the hon. the Minister’s answer in this respect.

That is not the point Does the hon. member not know how many people in this country are undefended?

Everybody is entitled to a defence. [Interjections.]

The hon. member should pay a visit to a Commissioner’s court to see what takes place there, almost every two minutes of every day. It happens every two minutes of every day that the court sits, yet that hon. member still tells me that everybody is entitled to legal defence. Does he know how many people in South Africa know their legal rights? Does he know how many illiterate people appear in the courts in South Africa? [Interjections.] I think it is a disgrace that the hon. member for East London North, who ought to have known better, puts such a ridiculous… [Interjections.] When these hon. gentlemen have finished, I might be able to join in. It is a ridiculous argument, because a vast majority of the people who appear in South African courts are undefended, many of them cannot afford legal defence, many of them are illiterate and many of them do not know their legal rights. That is therefore an absurd argument, and I dismiss it as such.

The hon. member for Walmer used that wonderful political expression that he thinks is so valuable, against this party, but it did not help his party very much in the overall results of the last election. He says that we are weak on law and order, but he is weak on the rule of law.

You have always been weak on law and order.

He is weak on the rule of law, which is what this Bill, that he is supporting, is all about.

Nonsense.

The hon. member for Verwoerdburg has told us that the existing procedures are expensive. He is quite right in this respect. They are expensive because democracy is expensive. I believe that that is an expense which a country like South Africa can well afford to sustain, and ought to sustain.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to express my thanks to hon. members for supporting this Bill. It is true that the hon. official Opposition does not support clause 1 of the Bill, but the rest of the clauses meet with their approval, and one is grateful for that at least.

Consequently I only want to refer to clause 1, since it is the only disputed clause. I want to agree with the hon. member for East London North, the hon. member for Walmer and hon. members on this side of the House that the clause, as it stands in the Bill, is quite sufficient to protect the rights of people. In the first place, hon. members have asked me persistently what has happened in this regard from 1917 up to now. In actual fact the position is that the repealed section 28(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 provides, inter alia, that a judge, a magistrate or justice of the peace may issue a warrant for the further detention of a person arrested without a warrant. This is the wording which we are now including here. Therefore, we have always had this authority. The omission of the provision in section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 means that the accused that have been taken into custody, have to appear before a court within 48 hours. This provision was omitted from the old Act, but now we have found that we have to bring such a person before a court within 48 hours. In practice there are cases where an arrested accused has to be admitted to hospital owing to a physical indisposition and consequently cannot be brought before a court within the prescribed period. We now find ourselves in the uncomfortable position, which did not exist at all before 1977, i.e. that we now have to take the magistrate to that hospital so that the accused may appear before him there within 48 hours. We are now being regaled with examples of people who steal bicycles, commit pass book offences, etc. There may, however, be a case of serious rape, where a person is hurt while resisting arrest, and consequently lands up in hospital. The hon. member for Houghton made great play of the fact that before 1977 and after 1917 such people could recuperate at home. However, one cannot allow a serious rape to take place just because there is nothing in the law which can bring such a case before a magistrate because the rapist first has to recuperate at home. Then one has to tell him in a friendly way that once he has recuperated, he should be careful and must please not rape another person and must see to it that he appears before the court on such and such a date. It simply does not work that way.

Why can’t you rearrest him?

It simply does not work that way. [Interjections.] That hon. member really should read his Butterworths again and get up to date. That is why the old section is being re-introduced by this Bill—because we need it.

I want to tell hon. members that I am not here to score political points on this matter. We all know that if someone becomes indisposed in a prison, sooner or later he is visited by a medical practitioner. If it would satisfy hon. members of the PFP, I am, despite the fact that I agree with the two other Opposition parties that this is unnecessary, quite prepared to consider an amendment to the effect that in cases where the indisposition is an illness, a medical certificate must be submitted to the court. What happens in practice, is that a prosecutor has to go to court in any case in the absence of that person. For this type of trial the lawyer may go along. The accused is charged.

The lawyer of the accused?

Of course. Which other lawyer would go along? The prosecutor is there after all, and therefore there may naturally be a lawyer for the accused as well. Surely a lawyer will not arrive there in vacuo. A lawyer is entitled to put his client’s case. The prosecutor must satisfy the presiding officer that something has happened to this person preventing him from appearing in court. Then a ruling is issued. One can imagine that magistrates would not be satisfied with any story told there. Even the prosecutor would not be satisfied with any story dished up to him by the police. Surely it is facts that these people have to submit to the court.

I do not want to be dogmatic on this point, because I am quite willing to consider an amendment as far as physical indisposition is concerned. I will go as far as to prove our good faith in this matter. What is involved here is the administration of justice. I understand that hon. members of the PFP are very busy, that they do not have the facilities which the executive on this side of the House has at its disposal, and for that reason I am quite prepared to allow the hon. member for Hillbrow to use some of my officials to convert his proposals into an amendment. My officers can assist him in smoothing out rough edges.

We accept your offer.

With thanks, I hope! It must not be a long amendment, that is all. I suggest that it should be related more or less to the submission of a medical certificate.

With the permission of the accused?

Why is the permission of the accused necessary? What nonsense is this? I said that I was prepared to have a medical certificate submitted to the court if the accused was too ill to appear before the court. I am not prepared to wait for the permission of criminals, because if we do not obtain permission, the whole business falls away. I am prepared to allow a district surgeon or medical practitioner—I do not mind which—to certify that the accused concerned cannot appear before the court at a given moment. Let this then be submitted to the magistrate, and let him then decide what is to happen with regard to that accused. Allow all other documents to be submitted as usual and allow the lawyers to advance their arguments as usual. I am in favour of that.

I should just like to thank other hon. members who also participated in this debate. The hon. member for Pretoria West said fine things about our administration of justice in general. He also praised the work performed by magistrates and judges. I thank him for that. The same applies to other hon. members on this side of the House, as well as other hon. members who participated in this debate.

Question put,

Upon which the House divided:

As fewer than 15 members (viz, Messrs. B. R. Bamford, J. D. du P. Basson, Dr. A. L. Boraine, Messrs. D. J. Dalling, I. F. A. de Villiers, C. W. Eglin, H. H. Schwarz, Mrs. H. Suzman, Messrs. R. A. F. Swart, S. S. van der Merwe and A. B. Widman) appeared on one side,

Question declared agreed to.

Bill read a Second Time.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Our law of divorce, except for certain rules of procedure and a single statutory enactment which makes provision for divorce on the ground of mental illness and habitual criminality, is of a common law nature. Under common law there are two grounds of divorce, namely adultery and malicious desertion. Both grounds of divorce are based on the guilt principle. This means that the innocent party may obtain a divorce on the ground of the misconduct of the guilty party. It also means that the guilty party normally cannot sue for divorce because he has no recognized ground of divorce. We know from experience, however, that the blame for the failure of a marriage seldom lies with one of the spouses only. For that reason the guilt requirement which applies in our present law of divorce is the principle cause of problems which are being experienced in the law of divorce.

It has been clear for a considerable length of time now that our law of divorce is not satisfactory in all respects. That is why the S.A. Law Commission commenced an inquiry into the law of divorce during 1975. The commission made a study of the existing law of divorce and compared it to present-day developments in other legal systems. The commission consulted a large number of persons and bodies and also heard oral evidence. The problems and the unsatisfactory aspects of the law of divorce were identified. The Bill now before this House is the product of the commission’s inquiry and deliberations.

It is an indisputable fact that marriage as an institution continues to be one of the cornerstones of a healthy society. That is why there is concern in all quarters at the high divorce rate in South Africa. However, I must emphasize at once that the Bill is not aimed at curbing divorce. The breakdown of marriages is a social problem which cannot be solved by the legislature. It must be accepted that the law as such can achieve little to counteract the problem. However, the law must be constructed in such a way that it will not be an obstacle to other resources which are being utilized to counteract the breakdown of marriages, but tends instead to supplement such resources.

The principles embodied in the Bill are dealt with in some detail in the report of the commission. The report was tabled on 10 May 1978 already. Since then it has been freely available. Consequently I shall deal only with the most important principles for which provision is being made in the Bill, and I shall do so very briefly.

The Bill seeks to make irretrievable breakdown of a marriage the basis for divorce. By irretrievable breakdown of a marriage is meant that the marriage relationship has disintegrated to such an extent that there is no reasonable prospect of a normal marriage relationship being resumed. The court has to be satisfied that the marriage has indeed disintegrated to such an extent. In order to determine the degree of disintegration of a marriage relationship the court may take the attitude of the spouses to one another and to their marriage relationship into consideration. In this way the guilt principle is being abandoned. Adultery and malicious desertion will no longer constitute grounds of divorce per se. They are being included in the comprehensive ground of divorce of irretrievable marriage breakdown. However, they may still be taken into consideration as factors which indicate an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

Although it must be accepted as a fact that reconciliation cannot be forced upon the spouses, it is important that they be afforded sufficient opportunity to become reconciled. Provision is being made for this in clause 4(4).

In clause 5 provision is being made for divorce on the ground of the mental illness or continuous unconsciousness of a spouse. The principle is the same as the present one, but the stringent requirements, particularly in regard to the prescribed period that has to elapse, are being relaxed to some extent.

In clause 6 the principle is being laid down that the interests of children of the marriage should be accorded the highest priority. The granting of a decree of divorce is being made subject to the requirement that the best possible arrangements in the circumstances shall be effected in respect of the children. The court may of its own volition cause an investigation into the interests of the children to be carried out and may order that they shall have independent legal representation.

In clause 7 provision is being made for the maintenance of the parties after divorce. Under our present law only an innocent party is entitled to payment of maintenance by the guilty party. As a result of certain apparent problems on the clause which were submitted to me, the Law Commission was asked to reconsider the proposed arrangement. A supplementary report on the views of the Commission in this connection was tabled on 18 April 1979. An amendment which may be deemed necessary on this aspect will be dealt with during the Committee Stage.

When it comes to the forfeiture of the patrimonial benefits of a marriage the blameworthiness of a spouse in connection with the disintegration of the marriage cannot of course be disregarded. However, the present legal position in terms of which the court is obliged to make an order that the benefits be forfeited if this is requested and the divorce action succeeds, is unsatisfactory. Clause 9 seeks to give the court a discretion. In addition it is being envisaged that the conduct of a spouse shall only be taken into consideration as a factor, but not necessarily the only or determining factor. Provision is also being made for the court to order the partial forfeiture of benefits.

As far as litigation costs are concerned, the Bill seeks in clause 10 to soften the strict rule that a successful party is entitled to costs. Provision is being made enabling the court to take into consideration the means of the parties, and their conduct, in so far as it may be relevant, and to apportion the costs between them. This idea is bound up with the new dispensation under which not only the so-called innocent party but either of the spouses may institute the divorce action.

In clause 12 provision is being made for limitation of the publication of particulars of divorce proceedings. The object is to eliminate sensational reporting of intimate, personal matters which could be extremely prejudicial to the parties and particularly to the children of the marriage. The general public only has an interest in a divorce in so far as it affects the status of the parties. Provision is being made for the fact of the divorce to be published. Representations on the clause were submitted to me by the Press Union. The Law Commission was requested to consider these representations as well and to receive a delegation from the Press Union. The findings of the commission are also dealt with in the supplementary report to which I have already referred. An amendment has been proposed in the report which could also be considered during the Committee Stage.

Judicial separation is the result of the inflexible requirements of the common law grounds of divorce. It is in conflict with the idea that dead marriages ought not to be maintained. Nor is it in keeping with the ground of divorce of irretrievable marriage breakdown. Consequently provision is being made in clause 14 for the abolition of judicial separation.

According to the Law Commission report the object which the commission set itself was to recommend realistic rules for the law of divorce—i.e. rules which, in the words of the commission—

I submit that the commission succeeded very well indeed in its aims. In my opinion the commission deserves the thanks and appreciation of this House for a major task which it has performed extremely well.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the hon. the Minister that we owe a debt of gratitude to the Law Commission for the two reports which they have submitted. I particularly want to commend the Law Commission for the very down-to-earth and sensible first report which it produced last year, and for its comments on the role of the law with regard to marriage breakdowns, which are contained on page 3 in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4, as well as to the objects of the law of divorce which appear on pages 3 and 4 in paragraph 4.

I want to state that the PFP has decided that divorce, like a number of other subjects, is not a subject for caucus decision. It is very much a matter of individual conscience and therefore we are allowing members of the party a free vote to decide for themselves whether they are going to support or oppose this Bill. This principle will also apply in the Committee Stage where each individual member will decide for himself—or herself—as to which clauses they are going to support, and which amendments which will be placed on the Order Paper they wish to oppose or support. I want to say at once that I intend supporting the Second Reading of this Bill, because I believe it is an advance and that it is bringing the South African law of divorce more into line with modern practices. I have, however, a number of amendments on the Order Paper which I shall be moving at the Committee Stage. I believe that the commission’s analysis of the defects and shortcomings of the existing law of divorce deserves support, the main objection being, as the hon. the Minister has mentioned, that the common law grounds are simply based on adultery or malicious desertion—which two grounds are therefore based on the guilt principle—which in turn greatly affects the whole question of maintenance and costs of the case, etc., and engenders a great deal of bitterness in the disputes that take place between couples during the divorce case. Furthermore, the so-called innocent party can keep the other party indefinitely bound to the marriage. If the innocent party does not want to agree to a divorce, the marriage can be maintained indefinitely, even though the marriage is to all effects and purposes a dead marriage. I think too there are valid objections to our present system in that it does not sufficiently safeguard the interests of children. I think the new Bill is a big advance in this respect and that the statutory provisions as far as mental illness as a ground for divorce is concerned, is unrealistic in that the seven year requirement, which obtains at present, is far too long. I also believe that the requirement concerning habitual criminality is an anomaly.

The commission comes out very strongly—and the hon. the Minister supports this—against divorce by consent, but I have to say in all honesty that there is a great deal of pious hypocrisy about this subject. After all, as the commission points out, malicious desertion has for years accounted for by far the greater number of divorces in South Africa, and I think everybody admits that collusion is the basis of malicious desertion in divorce cases.

The legislation which is now being introduced, is based on the grounds of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. What, I wonder, is better proof that a marriage has irretrievably broken down than the fact that both spouses consent to wanting a divorce. I mean, it must be obvious that if both parties agree that they want to separate and the marriage to be brought to an end, the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Well, we can argue about that. I know there are religious objections to admitting that there are logical grounds for divorce by consent, not only in South Africa, but in England as well. I know that the Law Commission is, of course, not the only body which has objected to this. Nevertheless, I have to say that in all honesty I believe it would have been more honest to say that if both parties want the marriage to be dissolved, i.e. divorce by consent, that is the best ground for irretrievable breakdown. Well, anyway, I know too that this is all based on the religious concept of “let no man put asunder…”, but I have to point out that in South Africa we put a lot of people asunder who are lawfully married by Christian rights in South Africa. We do it all the time with our influx control laws. The hon. the Deputy Minister over there shakes his head. Does he not know that people who are married by Christian rites are not being allowed to live together because of influx control? [Interjections.] He shakes his head. He does not know. Well, I can assure him that thousands are affected by it. Anyway, let us keep away from that. The commission points out that the ground of irretrievable breakdown (para. 8.2 of the report)—

I would say that all of us will agree with that. In para 8.3 on page 11 of the report the commission points out that—

That is now to be incorporated in the law and I think that that is a very good idea.

I have one or two queries about the way in which the law is framed. First of all, the commission says on page 16, paragraph 9.5—and I am not quoting; I am merely paraphrasing—that, strictly speaking, it is not necessary to lay down guidelines to help the court to decide whether or not a marriage has irretrievably broken down. Nevertheless, the draft Bill which the commission presented last year and the Bill which we are discussing tonight contains three guidelines to determine irretrievable breakdown. Clause 4 sets out, firstly, continuous separation for at least one year prior to the institution of proceedings, secondly, adultery which the plaintiff finds irreconcilable and, thirdly, habitual criminality as subjects on which the court may accept evidence as proof of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage. Although other factual circumstances are not excluded—clause 4 specifically says that—I must say that I think that the Bill would have been better without the guidelines set out in clause 4, because I am told by legal luminaries, in whom, I must admit, I steadily lose faith day by day and whom I have consulted on this, that guidelines will inevitably become the only grounds for divorce. They say it is inevitable that, if the Bill actually specifies guidelines, in the end the court will find that those guidelines become the only grounds for divorce. I think it is quite likely to be so.

The law becomes calcified.

Yes, the law becomes, as the hon. member says, calcified.

Ossified.

Or ossified—whatever word one likes to use. I believe it would be far better to encourage the court to consider the marriage breakdown in its entirety and not to have regard to certain aspects thereof. I have placed amendments on the Order Paper which I hope will give effect to this argument. I must say that, if the House does decide to retain guidelines, I want to put up a strong plea for the inclusion of drunkenness and habitual cruelty as additional guidelines so that the court will take these into consideration.

Particularly, if the drink was bought in the grocer shop.

I now come to a surprising change which has appeared in the Bill since the original draft Bill was published in the Gazette of 21 April 1978. I submit that clauses 3 and 4 have been amended in the new Bill in such a way as to affect the whole functioning of the new divorce law. Clause 4(1) of the draft Bill contained a mandatory instruction to the court that it “shall” grant a decree of divorce where irretrievable breakdown of the marriage has been shown to its satisfaction, even if the dissolution of the marriage is against the wishes of one of the parties and even if the defendant would suffer exceptional hardship if a divorce were to be granted in those circumstances. The reasons for the commission’s recommendations are argued quite specifically on page 17, paragraph 10.1 and 10.3, of the commission’s first report. Inter alia, the report says that the majority of the respondents who replied to the questionnaire on the subject were not in favour of the court being given a discretion to refuse the divorce in such a case. It said that public opinion deems that the interests of the reluctant party must yield to the interests of society, and that the commission agrees with this view. Despite this and for no apparent reason that we have heard, the mandatory “shall” that appeared in clauses 3 and 4 of the draft Bill has been changed to “may” in the Bill which we are now discussing. It is my contention, based on the advice of experts in family law, that there are now no certain grounds for divorce in the new Divorce Bill, because, surely, “grounds” should mean an entitlement to judgement in favour when proved.

It is at the discretion of the court.

Yes, that is the point, it is at the discretion of the court, but I want it to be left as it was in the original draft Bill that the divorce “shall” be granted once it has been proved to the satisfaction of the court that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. I wonder how lawyers are going to advise their clients of their chances of success in a divorce case with this “may” left in the law, because one may come in front of a judge who is against divorce, for whatever reasons, whether it be religious or other reasons, and even though one can prove quite definitely that the marriage is irretrievably broken down, the court may still refuse to grant the divorce.

You might have to prove something more.

That is right. I think that the main reason may have been that representations were made—they were made to me as well—that one should leave it to the discretion of the courts, because the matrimonial property law is not being changed at the same time. I am full of sympathy for the aging wife—and who should know that better than me!—who suffers because she is left by her husband for a younger person and finds herself financially insecure. I am not saying that I am in that position, but I am an aging wife, if I may put it that way. This is admittedly a tough case. I appreciate it that this is a situation with which any woman could be faced. If the matrimonial property law is not amended—and it is presumably not going to be amended this session—the woman can be left in a pretty precarious financial position. The court may therefore decide to withhold the divorce, even though the marriage is irretrievably broken down, until some satisfactory agreement can be reached whereby she is provided for. I think we could amend one of the clauses of the Bill, such as clause 7, the maintenance clause, to provide for the taking into consideration, by the courts of various benefits which the wife would enjoy if she maintained her marriage, for example, the share of a pension, the share of a paid-up insurance policy, etc. I see no reason why the court should not be asked to take an annuity, for instance, into specific consideration before granting the divorce. As I say, I have the fullest sympathy with these tough cases, but I think people should ponder on the fact that, in order to regulate the consequences of a divorce, we are now nullifying the grounds for a divorce. I do not think that makes good law. I think it makes for uncertainty in the law in regard to grounds for divorce, and it can therefore not be good law-making. I think it is better to cope with the position of the unfortunate discarded spouse—it might, incidentally, be the husband—by enjoining the court to pay particular attention to any benefits which would have accrued to that person. A way out of the dilemma might be to delay the promulgation of this new Divorce Bill until the matrimonial property law is amended.

In the meantime I have a few amendments to the Bill that I am going to move during the Committee Stage. I hope these amendments will go some way towards meeting the problem of the discarded spouse. I believe that the amendments that I am going to move to clause 7 will not violate, as the present Bill does, the basic premise in the commission’s report, i.e. that there is no point in keeping a dead marriage going. I believe that the change violates that basic premise.

In regard to the rest of the Bill, I have only a few more comments to make. In the first place, I must say that I heartily agree with the proposal to abolish judicial separation, and I am very glad indeed that we are going to do that For the information of hon. members who were not here in 1963, I want to remind them that this matter was discussed in the House previously. It was introduced in a private member’s motion by Mr. Froneman, the then member for Heilbron. He introduced the subject of the abolition of judicial separation, but he got very little support and the matter was disposed of in a very short time. Unfortunately, the House was not ready for it at that time. It has taken 16 long years to bring the South African House of Assembly into the mood and the mind to abolish judicial separation. I believe the arguments used by Mr. Froneman are just as valid today as they were then. His arguments were that judicial separation fails in its objective…

Was he a Nationalist?

Yes, he was a Nationalist, and for once I found myself in total agreement with him, and told him so. He argued that judicial separation fails in its objective of bringing about reconciliation between the spouses, it is in conflict with the objectives of marriage, it has a very cruel effect on the parties themselves and an even more cruel effect on the children, and it is abused by people who use it as a method of extortion to get more money than they are entitled to from the other party who does want a divorce. I am glad that this outmoded legal instrument of maintaining what is a moribund marriage is being abolished by the Bill.

I briefly want to turn to the second report of the Law Commission, which was tabled last week. It deals with two issues. The hon. the Minister says that amendments are going to be introduced during the Committee Stage. May I ask him if they are the amendments suggested by the commission in this report?

It is actually subject to what arguments are being brought forward.

Naturally. I hope that we can persuade the hon. the Minister on several matters, because this is not a political issue at all.

The two issues discussed by the Law Commission in its second report are, firstly, the limitation of publication of the particulars in a divorce action and, secondly, the question of blame in determining maintenance. As far as the first issue is concerned,

I think the commission has reached a reasonable compromise on this issue. The memorandum published in the Law Commission’s second report makes strong objections to the fact that particulars of divorce cases could no longer be published, and I do think that they put up some good rational arguments for it. I might say that I at first agreed with the total prohibition. My first reaction was that salacious details of divorce cases are nobody’s business but the parties’ concerned. To a great extent I still feel that way. However, on the other hand there is a point in the NPU’s argument that we are introducing a new law and new precedents and that it is important that the public must be able to understand how the new law is going to work. They can only really do that if they can read judgments on divorce cases. The public does not read the law reports. Therefore, the only way one can do it is to read the cases reported in the newspapers. I think the commission and the hon. the Minister presumably have reached a reasonable compromise by allowing on the publication of judgments, not the evidence, which is where all the salacious details come in. I think in that way the public will understand what sort of new precedents are being laid down for the new South African law of divorce.

The second issue that the Law Commission considers in its second report is the question of blame regarding clause 7(2), which is the clause that deals with the division of assets and maintenance of parties. I must say that considering the first contention of the Law Commission, made in paragraph 8(3) on page 11 of the first report, that it wanted to eliminate the element of guilt because, inter alia, this creates a much more favourable climate for the discussion of a divorcee settlement—the parties are not so bitter, they are not busy blaming each other, fighting over the custody of children, the amount of maintenance, etc.—I find it a very valid argument. It would help, as the commission put it, to create a climate favourable to the dissolution of a marriage in a more peaceable manner. I must therefore say that I was surprised that the elements of guilt, fault or blame were in fact introduced in the Bill in clause 7(1). I have an amendment on the Order Paper which will remove the words which ask the court to consider the conduct of the parties in its decision as to maintenance, etc.

As it stands, the second report re-examines clause 7, but it does not make any material recommendation to remove the element of guilt. What it does, as far as I can see, is to remove any ambiguity as to the duration of a maintenance order. That is all I can see it does. However, I hope the hon. the Minister will give serious consideration to the amendments which I have placed on the Order Paper, not only concerning clause 7(1), but also other clauses.

Finally, I want to mention two other matters which are indirectly involved in this Bill. Firstly, I wonder whether the hon. the Minister is giving consideration to the suggestion, made by many people, that family courts be set up to deal specifically with matrimonial affairs, decisions on the custody of children, maintenance, etc. I was wondering whether it would not be possible, if we could not have family courts, to set up a special division of the Supreme Court, under a different tariff of fees as it is too expensive for the average person to employ counsel and go to the Supreme Court for instance for a variation of a maintenance order made by the Supreme Court. I wonder whether the lawyers would not be willing to utilize rule 43 in order to set a lower tariff of fees so that people do not have this enormous expense when they want a variation of a maintenance order. It often happens, because circumstances change all the time. Incidentally, another amendment I have concerning clause 7 is that one does not have to have token maintenance in order to come at a later stage and ask for maintenance. I think that is ridiculous, because circumstances change, and a court should be able to decide on maintenance at the time of the divorce or any time thereafter without the necessity for a token maintenance being laid down.

My last query about the Bill concerns the position of African women married by civil rites. Originally a Black widow or divorcee was not allowed to be a lessee of a township house. That, fortunately, has changed over the last few years, and providing a woman qualifies under section 10(1)(a) of the Urban Areas Act and provided, of course, she is able to afford the rental, etc., she may take over the lease of a township house, either on the death of her husband, or, if she is a divorcee, has been given custody of the children.

I will refer that to the hon. the Minister of Plural Relations and Development.

Well, I am pleased to hear that. Indeed, I have had a letter to that effect from the hon. the Minister of Plural Relations and Development in which he tells me that he is considering the whole question of altering the regulations which often make it necessary for people to apply for a divorce in order to retain their house. If the tenant himself retains the house the deserted wife—if I may put it that way—is thrown out of the house and is often forced to sue for divorce in order to retain the tenancy of the House. I gather that the regulation is going to be changed. I am very grateful, therefore, to hear that from the hon. the Minister of Justice as well.

I do not know whether the regulation is going to be changed.

Well, I have news for the hon. the Minister of Justice. The hon. the Minister of Plural Relations and Development tells me it is going to be changed. So, that is fine. We can leave that aside.

I just want to remind the hon. the Minister that, a few years ago—I think it was in 1975—when I introduced a private member’s motion on the whole question of the rights of women, I did ask him to set up a special commission of inquiry into the whole matter of the very ambiguous position of African women as far as the marriage laws, the inheritance, the Natal code, etc., were concerned. I can only put it to the hon. the Minister that this is an urgent request. Very many women, particularly women living in the urban areas, live under great hardships because of this very ambiguity. I hope he will reconsider the request which, at that time, he rejected. He has come a long way now in changing the divorce law, and I hope he will also look at this again.

That also falls under the hon. the Minister of Plural Relations and Development.

No, it does not. In fact it falls under this hon. Minister. [Interjections.] It does fall under this hon. Minister and I hope he will give the matter reasonable consideration.

Mr. Speaker, in recent years it has been my privilege quite regularly, I may say, to follow the hon. member for Houghton in debates in this House, but it did not happen very often that we were in agreement with each other on a measure, that we were ad idem as we are this evening. I am pleased that we are in fact able to agree on such a very important measure as the divorce legislation in South Africa. And since she occasionally expressed her concern at a measure, I want to tell her that I do not, for example, share her concern over clause 4 that those prescriptive or guiding points, as specified in subsection (3), will ultimately become the only grounds for a divorce. Our courts are dynamic and our judges are capable of reading and applying the law, and this subsection states very emphatically that the court may, in specific cases, accept this as evidence of the irretrievable disintegration of the marriage.

My view in this connection I want to illustrate on the basis of adultery. I have always felt very strongly that adultery as such should still be a ground for divorce, but if one were to retain adultery as a ground for divorce, then one would be retaining guilt as an element for divorce. Because the commission wishes to by-pass that obstacle, they have removed the guilt factor entirely, but we are now going to provide that if the plaintiff’s evidence is based on the adultery of the defendant, then the plaintiff may testify that for him the single act of adultery of the defendant is an action which is incompatible with the continued marriage relationship. Then the court will in fact accept it per se. That is how I interpret it. However, this is not going to mean that those three examples that have been furnished are eventually going to deteriorate into the only three grounds on which it will be found that the marriage is irretrievable,

I also agree with her in respect of the other point. This is that it is a good thing that we have eventually arrived at the point where we are doing away with judicial separations. I do not agree with her criticism. I shall quote to her in a moment a passage written by Prof. Hahlo on the conservatism of our marriage law. Judicial separation is an element which goes back a long way in the Roman-Dutch law of marriage. One does not readily tamper with the law of marriage, and consequently the law of divorce, until one reaches an actual stage at which one says that one is now doing away with this measure. I think that since we are now introducing a completely new piece of divorce legislation, this is the opportunity to do away with it. Just as adultery was for many years an offence, but then for years adultery was no longer prosecuted or punished as an offence, it nevertheless remained an offence until 1914 when an appeal court formally ruled that adultery was no longer an offence and that only after that would it formally no longer be an offence.

Our divorce laws form a subdivision of our marriage law. In the preface to the fourth edition of his work, The South African Law of Husband and Wife, Prof. Hahlo says—

The previous edition to which he is referring here appeared in February 1969. The highly learned gentleman is correct when he says that the law of marriage is one of the most conservative branches of our law. Its origin probably goes back more than 2 000 years to early Roman law. According to Hahlo, there were three stages in the development of our marriage law. He maintained that the phase of the first stage ended approximately in the year a.d. 1000. Up to that time it was exclusively a private matter between the parties and their families, both as regards contracting and dissolving a marriage. The second phase extended from approximately 800 b.c. to the middle of the 16th century a.d. when a marriage was under the jurisdiction of the church, the conclusion as well as, in extremely rare cases, the dissolution of the marriage. Subsequently marriage became State-controlled and has remained State-controlled until the present. In the earlier times—and it would be interesting for the hon. members to know this—a Western marriage could also be terminated by the husband sending his wife back to her family and informing them that he no longer wanted her, but in most cases the parties dissolved the marriage by way of agreement because there were very frequently matrimonial considerations which also had to be arranged as a result of the dissolution of the marriage.

The present basis of our divorce law is well known. This is the basis which we are probably going to change soon and this is in fact what the hon. the Minister dealt with in his speech this evening. It is fit and proper that we should occasionally review our administration of justice and our legal system or certain subdivisions to see whether they still satisfy the demands of the time. There is one thing I do want to say and that is that the South African divorce law as it stands at present, developed over a period of many centuries, and there was a very sound reason for every legal rule. That is why it is necessary for us to decide upon changes with the utmost circumspection. In this case I want to submit that these changes were only decided upon after very careful consideration. As indicated, the changes or the amendments we have to put into effect, are the outcome of a report of the Law Commission, and this Bill is indeed the result of a long inquiry by the Law Commission after hearing evidence and considering memoranda received from a very broad spectrum of South African society. In fact, after the Bill had been drawn up and notice of the Bill had been given, a further, supplementary report was requested by the hon. the Minister as a result of certain points that had been raised after publication.

The hon. the Minister has already referred to the most important changes which we are now effecting in our divorce law by means of this Bill. It is the elimination of the guilt element from the actions of one of the parties as grounds for the dissolution of the marriage. Other speakers on this side will take this matter further. During the period prior to the report of the commission, a very extensive public debate on the divorce law was conducted, a debate which sometimes bordered on the hysterical and sometimes verged on being agitation. On the one hand there were the proponents of legislation that would make it much easier for a party to obtain a divorce, and on the other hand there were those who, by means of provisions in a new divorce law, wanted to make the marriage almost indissoluble. The former in particular, those who wish to facilitate divorces, were in my opinion encouraged in their representations by the wave of permissiveness which swept across most of the West during the ’sixties.

Before I venture into the maze of arguments on these considerations in respect of making divorce easier or more difficult, I shall content myself with a few specific comments on a few points.

The first is that I do not believe that any divorce law can make or break, save or scuttle a marriage. The divorce legislation as such and the common law of divorce contains the cold grounds for divorce. This Bill will also contain provisions in respect of the processes, etc., which are to be adopted, as well as what is consequential to the divorce as such. A law can in fact establish means enabling the Bench to give the marriage another chance, for example in the case of juveniles and/or other over-hasty people, in other words to establish an opportunity for reflection which could lead to an imminent rift being healed. However, we who are or were engaged in the profession know that by the time a marriage reaches the attorney or advocate or the courts, the chances of saving it are very remote. By then it has already been through all the emotional processes of the efforts of the parties themselves, the efforts of the parents and family and sometimes even the children as well as the clergyman to save the marriage. If all these efforts have been to no avail and the parties persist in their decision to get divorce, that is when they usually turn to their legal representatives, and by then very few marriages still have a chance of being saved, although it does sometimes happen.

I do not think there is any member in this House who will say that he does not believe in a strong and healthy marriage and that strong and healthy marriages form one of the pillars of a strong and healthy community. The foundation for that cannot, however, be laid in a law of divorce. Perhaps the time is near when sociologists are going to tell us that in order to reduce the number of divorces, or to make divorces more difficult, one will have to make marriages more difficult. In concluding a marriage one is dealing with the irrational factors of human nature. These are that love is blind, physical attraction and all kind of other irrational considerations. Yesterday a father told me that his son, who is a student, came to him and told him: “Dad, I want to get married.” He said: “Man, every conceivable argument I had against it, my son anticipated and persuaded me that it was not a good argument and that he had a better reason as to why they should get married.” In the end he told his father: “Dad, if you tell me that we may not get married, we will get married in any case and do so without your blessing, but I believe that you will still give it your blessing.” Those are the kind of factors one has to deal with when two people want to get married. But I do want to say this: The closer and stronger a marriage is, the greater the chances are that death, rather than the courts, will separate that couple.

I believe that a great deal can be done to reduce the number of divorces, but this is not primarily a task for the legal practitioner and the court. It must be dealt with in another sphere. I do believe that serious consideration should be given to the factors which give rise to the dissolution of marriages, and I believe that it will be found, inter alia, that cultivating a correct attitude to marriage from a very early stage in one’s life could be a preventive step to the dissolution of marriages. I also want to say that I think too many people are too quick to run to court with their marriage problems and that i they would, instead, make extra efforts of will and intellect in an effort to straighten out the failing marriage, they would succeed. However, we are living in a free country and our people are free to get married, within the law of course. Nor will we allow marriage partners to be allotted to us in any other way except through our own choice, but what we can concentrate on is in the educational aspect, the laying of a sound foundation and the cultivation of a sound attitude in respect of marriage. I believe that this education should begin at home, but then we shall first have to educate some of the existing homes in this connection as well. It is an education which must be continued in the school and in the church, and in this way I believe we shall definitely lay a sound foundation for marriages and this will eventually be reflected in fewer divorces.

Secondly I am also pleased at the emphasis which is being placed in clause 6 of this Bill on the protection of the interests of minor children. Those persons who have dealt or are dealing in practice with dissolved marriages are aware of the interminable suffering and disruption to which the children of such marriage are subjected. These children are frequently a problem to the parents, and then they try to deal with the children and reach an agreement on the children in the same way as they agree on their patrimonial benefits. They try to apportion them. They try to use the children to annoy each other to obtain certain things from each other. This is a major problem for the courts. The court is dependent on the evidence, usually from only one of the parties, and then, too, if the court requests it, on the report of a probation officer. It is not easy in that way to determine properly what is in the best interests of the child. However, I believe that through this new provision such emphasis will be placed on the interests of the child that eventually our courts will be able to develop it in such a way that it will be to the benefit of children as such, who are the victims of broken marriages. As a community we must at all times know that the security of a happy and closely-knit family is best for the child’s development.

This Bill contains quite a number of new and, to the practitioner, strange measures and I foresee minor problems emerging at the outset. Eventually it will be the profession as such which will be able to demonstrate the success of this measure. I believe that the professions will give it a chance to work and, as experience has taught us, if there are minor snags these will soon be ironed out.

I should like to refer to a specific aspect of this Bill and with that conclude my speech. I wish to refer to clause 5(2) and I wish to welcome this measure in particular. It has to do with the continuous unconsciousness of a party to a marriage. Clause 5(2) reads—

1. (a) that the defendant’s unconsciousness has lasted for a continuous period of at least six months immediately prior to the institution of the divorce action; and
2. (b) after having heard the evidence of at least two medical practitioners, of whom one shall be a neurologist or a neurosurgeon appointed by the court, that there is no reasonable prospect that the defendant will regain consciousness.

At present both these cases still fall under section 1(1)(a) of the Divorce Laws Amendment Act of 1935, and in fact under the Mental Health Act, because the Divorce Laws Amendment Act states that a spouse may at present only divorce such a person if he or she “has been subject to the provisions of the Mental Diseases Act, 1916, for a period of not less than seven years and is incurable”. These are the actual words of the Act itself. What it amounted to was that such permanently unconscious person first had to be declared insane and then had to remain so declared for a period of seven years before such a marriage could be dissolved. For the other party to such a marriage this is a very delicate matter. I do not think we are aware of how many persons are living under these circumstances, for little publicity is given to such cases. But I suspect that there are many such cases because we know that there are many people who lose consciousness permanently. As a result of the progress made in medical science it is possible to keep such people alive for longer periods. But the other party, the healthy party, has drawn back from declaring his or her wife or husband insane. Sometimes they waited years for such an unconscious partner to regain consciousness.

In any event there were many who out of compassion for the other party were not even prepared to consider declaring that person insane. Because they are only human, however, illegitimate relationships, with the normal consequences, developed. When they eventually decided to proceed to have the person so declared in terms of the Act, they discovered that it would be necessary to wait another seven years.

With this new proposed measure a person may now, if his marriage partner loses consciousness permanently, choose his or her own time to cause the marriage to be dissolved at any time he or she wishes to do so. It is such amendments which we introduce into our common law from time to time which are necessary and good amendments and which are welcome. I wish to associate myself with and support the hon. the Minister in his thanks to and fine tribute which he paid the Law Commission. I think we are really dealing with a Bill here which is a good point of departure in the twentieth century in respect of the law of divorce, and we should like to support it.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Waterkloof has made a very interesting speech… [Interjections.]… if a somewhat lengthy one, on the subject. [Interjections.] I think one should have the opportunity to study the hon. member’s speech further, but in order to put the hon. the Minister of Justice at ease and perhaps make him sleep a little bit better tonight, I like to inform him at the outset that we in these benches will be supporting this Bill.

As a party.

We shall be supporting this Bill as a party simply because we have no dissension within our ranks in connection with it. [Interjections.]