as chairman, brought up the report of the Select Committee on Position of Ex-Republican Officials and others.

Report and evidence to be printed and considered on 5th May.

as chairman, brought up the second report of the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders, as follows:

1. (1) Your committee, having had under consideration the question of the procedure in relation to the annual Pensions (Supplementary) Bill, begs to recommend that for the future all resolutions of this House embodying recommendations made by any select committee that may be appointed by it for the consideration of petitions for, or minutes in respect of, pensions, grants, gratuities or other pensionable benefits not authorized by law, and intended to be included during the current session in the Schedule to a special Pensions Bill, shall be transmitted to the Senate for concurrence. Should the Senate disagree with any recommendation or recommendations contained in any such resolution, such recommendation or recommendations shall not be included in the Schedule to such special Pensions Bill, but, should this House think fit, any such recommendation or recommendations may be embodied by it in a separate Bill, which, if passed by this House, shall be transmitted to the Senate for concurrence as in the case of any other Bill: Provided that the foregoing provisions shall not apply in connection with any pension, grant, gratuity or other pensionable benefit approved by this House in respect of any parliamentary officer or employee.
2. (2) Your committee further recommends that, with a view to facilitating the consideration by members of Bills, a brief explanatory memorandum in both official languages may, if the member in charge of a Bill so desires, be prefixed to the Bill as printed for the first time after introduction, but such memorandum must not be argumentative.

stated that unless notice of objection was given on or before Monday, the 3rd May, the report would be considered as adopted.

When we reported progress on Monday evening, I had just indicated our plans for having training squadrons, and had pointed out to the House the advantages we hoped would accrue from that. I go on to deal with our plans with regard to the whole commando system, commandos in general. Just as in the other formations, so in this, our plans involve greater degrees of responsibility upon the unit commander. As in the active citizen force so here, a great deal depends upon the energy, ability and enthusiasm of the commanding officer and officers in all these formations. I would like in this connection, to mention one thing which has impressed me very forcibly, and which I do not think is realized by the bulk of the citizens in South Africa, and that is the very great amount of time and self-sacrificing work put in by officers of active citizen force units and by officers of the commando system. People do not realize—they would realize it soon enough in time of danger—the great amount of hard work put in purely out of public spirit by these officers. With regard to commandos, what we propose is this. Hitherto commandos have received £50 a year to cover travelling, subsistence and transport. With the endeavour to place upon it more responsibility for training, administration and such quartermaster work as has to be done, we propose to raise it to £60, and to pay £24 to the adjutants in the ordinary commando and £50 in those commandos in which training squadrons are instituted. I have discussed this matter with those best able to give me competent advice and they, believe it will be satisfactory. In order to encourage the work of rifle associations in general, we are increasing the range grant from 1s. 6d. per member to 3s. per competent member. By the latter we mean a member who puts in two official shoots or one official shoot and one wapenskou. Personally, I should prefer to make it three official shoots and two wapenskous. But I think the wisest plan is the one we have adopted, with the hope that we, in time, may be able to tighten that up when they see that we are trying to encourage them. We also provide for two days’ wapenskou a year. The department will supply tent equipment, and will supply ration allowance at the rate of 5s. a day for officers and 4s. for other ranks. We are also providing cash prizes to the extent of £5 per 100 men for shooting at these wapenskous. With regard to rifles, what we are aiming at is that every rifle association shall have 10 per cent. on loan for the benefit of those who have not got rifles. We are putting aside £14,500 on the estimates, and in two or three years I feel we shall have the rifle associations supplied in this way. I am just going to deal briefly with the rifle question. We have had almost insistent requests to supply every man in the commandos with rifles free. We have considered this very carefully. There have been two suggestions ; one that they should have these free, and the other that they should be allowed to buy them by instalments. With regard to the latter question, that was raised a year ago. I went into the matter very closely. We circularized all the district staff officers for their opinions, and I have consulted quite a number of authorities, and the conclusion the Government have come to is that it is impossible for us to comply with that request. The effect will be that to begin with if you carry it out you will have very greatly to increase your clerical staff and inspection. A considerable increase of your clerical staff would be required to keep track of the way in which the instalments were being paid ; and, secondly, you would have a very large number of cases of men falling behind in their arrears. That was our experience in 1913, and as soon as the Government takes measures against such persons you have an outcry that here a man wants to defend his country, and the Government is prosecuting him. We have come to the conclusion that the measure is not justified by the situation, and is not one which we can defend to this committee or the country. Then there is the question of free rifles. Every member of the Defence Rifle Association can apply for a rifle from us at cost price. He can get a long rifle for £6 13s. 9d., for which he would have to pay more in the shops, and the short service rifle, which is our service rifle for the whole of the troops, he can get for £5 8s. 9d. I feel confident, from enquiries I have made, that there are few men who cannot afford to buy a rifle at £5 8s. 9d., which is the cost price. Over and above that, we are trying to get up to that point of 10 per cent. rifles on loan, and that is, according to the commandants I have consulted and who, I am perfectly certain, are tendering me proper and sound advice, quite sufficient for these men who come up to the butts to shoot who cannot afford to have their own rifles. I hope hon. members will assist the Government by showing to their constituents that this desire for every man to be armed and have his rifle by him is one which is not only not necessitated by the circumstances of the country, but one the results of which they would be the first to complain about when the costs appeared on these estimates. We consider we are doing all really required by the circumstances by the provision we have made for the Defence Rifle Association. We have enrolled in the Defence Rifle Association 157,000 in 143 commandos and 163 ungrouped rifle associations. We further provide a course at the military college for a number of officers from the commandos who volunteer to go for instruction. Again, in that particular department, the committee must be prepared at some future time possibly for an increase of expenditure; in point of fact, we are asking for an increase for that college this year. That more or less disposes of the adult training of the population. I am now coming to the cadets. The change we are making there is that we are calling upon cadet officers to take again more responsibility for the training and looking after of the cadet detachments. Hitherto we have had more instructors than to-day going round the cadet detachments. As it is, we have unattached instructors who will be available for this duty, but we want to throw more responsibility on the cadet officers, and we are paying to cadet officers an allowance of £24 per annum; that is, the officer who is acting as adjutant and quartermaster of a detachment of 200 of less, increasing up to a maximum of £48 in respect of a detachment of 300 or 350 cadets, We are also giving a clothing grant of 10s. a year, instead of the old uniform allowance. I think that was £1 7s. 6d., which was supposed to last each cadet for three years, and we are making provision, not for camps, but for week-end bivouacs.

Are the cadet officers schoolmasters?

We have two yearly courses in the college for cadet officers. We are giving all this instruction, and we feel we are entitled to get the benefit of that in them giving instruction to the cadets in their charge. I know there will be criticism under this plan, which is not new. In the old days in the Cape Province, it was to have two instructors for the whole province.

What was the result?

I am not going to hide behind that fact. In Durban during the war they had no instructors at all and they got on very well. The whole machine is going well. Don’t let the committee run away with the idea that we are taking something away and giving nothing in return. In this district here a number of schools are devoting the grants I have mentioned to the engagement of an instructor, who was recently in our service. I am pretty confident that our judgment is right, and that the hon. member’s fear is unfounded. A number of schools are combining together, and possibly it will be improved training rather than worse training. We also have not only here, but in Johannesburg and elsewhere, three unattached instructors, and we can make very considerable use of those. We are far from starving the cadet movement ; in point of fact, the vote this year is £14,000 more for cadet instruction than last year. No doubt hon. members opposite will criticise this plan of ours, and say you are throwing away a good thing and you are going to deteriorate. But the greater interest and responsibility which they take in the schools will not only keep the cadets up to standard but improve them. I want to pay tribute to the efficiency in shooting. The cadets of South Africa in that inter-dominion and imperial competition which has been instituted have twice won the Imperial challenge shield and this year the King’s trophy, upon which they are very much to be congratulated. It certainly shows that rifle shooting in South Africa, which is rather traditional with us, is not going to suffer at the hands of the rising generation. Before sitting down, I will deal with the question of the disposal of the artillery. I alluded to it earlier in my remarks on Monday. We propose to have one battery in the Free State, in two sections. The two sections will be on the same line of railway so that the officer commanding the battery can conveniently inspect the detached sections as he desires. And pace, the dismal forebodings uttered, I am quite satisfied that it will not result in any deterioration in our military efficiency. Another battery we propose to distribute, and there the plans are not so complete, but there will be one section in the Eastern Transvaal and one in Northern Natal. Again we will hope that they will be on one line of railway and able to concentrate. The whole brigade will come together for training once a year, and I feel confident that we shall be able to make much more use of our artillery by training our citizen batteries than by brigading them at Roberts Heights and, so to say, hidden from the public eye there. Referring to the citizen batteries, in the original plan there were six or seven provided for, but we only had one, and I am sure hon. gentlemen opposite and other hon. members, who know something of the performances of that citizen battery, will agree that it was behind no other battery in efficiency and usefulness. I think we cannot do better than encourage that movement, and I feel it will, so to speak, spread the feeling throughout the country of these armed forces belonging to the whole country, and not being simply hidden away in one particular corner of it. Then I come to the naval vote. There is no change there, except that on account of the “Protea” having to carry out survey operations further from port, and having to use dearer coal, there is a slight increase there which is practically for coal. In regard to the R. N.V.R., that is slightly increased—outnumber provided for is 760. I know I shall have criticisms from hon. gentlemen opposite that we ought to be making a greater effort in the direction of naval defence. One thing we have to be clear about. We may have the most laudable aims and ambitions, and I am not going to deny that in future South Africa will have to develop more of her sea going possibilities, but it is no use blinking the fact that we have as much hay on our fork as we can carry, and that that is something which we must leave to a future date. We must develop our sea-sense as opportunity offers. Coastal defence has been confined to this coastal defence that existed. The Committee of Imperial Defence is giving attention to the whole of these matters and, under the circumstances, I prefer to wait until we get more information and advice before making any proposals.

What about Durban?

Durban is in no worse a position than any other coast town in South Africa, except Cape Town. It is poor consolation, but I do not think the hon. member need be apprehensive that the navy is going to be wiped off the seas in the next three or four years, and that you will have an enemy bombarding Durban.

What are you doing about the navy?

I have always held that our contribution should be to develop our own naval defence. I am perfectly candid. I do not, myself, feel that the effort we are making is anything like one would like, and to those naval experts—with whom I have every sympathy— I merely point out that we have to walk before we can run, and have to bide our time. Then, in regard to other parts of the vote, in headquarters administration there is a slight increase. They are normal increases. Cost of cash in lieu of rations has enabled us to reduce our supply vote. The only change I have made at headquarters of any importance is the institution of the military board there—the same institution as prevails in the other dominions. That is set up by regulation, and consists of the Minister as president, the chief of general staff, the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general, the director of air services and the financial undersecretary, a board in which we discuss matters of general policy connected with defence and administrative matters from time to time. It is an innovation and a good one. It does not derogate in the least from the authority of the chief of the general staff, and I am satisfied it will be of the greatest assistance to me and to any succeeding Minister, and also to the service itself, by keeping the heads, the chief army officers, in thoroughly close contact with the schemes of organization and general discussion of military affairs. The quartermaster-general’s department remains in the same position. In the general administration there may be room for smaller economies when we get into our new building, but I think if the committee were aware of the wretched sort of rabbit-warren buildings in which the defence headquarters has been housed, they would not think the greatest possible economy in office work is obtainable, but when we get into our new building there may be opportunities here and there of economizing. In regard to medical service there is a slight decrease due to the abolition of one or two posts. I want to ask the hon. member for Pretoria (South) (Dr. van Broekhuizen)—I gathered from his remarks that Roberts Heights hospital was a terrible thing, but I must entirely disagree with him. It is an admirably-run hospital.

It’s the building?

I think it would be the best thing for both of us to get ill and go there. I wish Providence would arrange that synchronisation some time or other, but I am afraid that won’t happen! In regard to the military college, that shows another increase of £3,100, consisting of an increase of £4,500 to make provision for more students.

How many students are there?

I cannot give that at the moment, but there are continual courses throughout the year, and we are as full as we can be for every course. When we tried to fit in another course we found the calendar for the year did not allow it. I can assure the committee that the greatest possible use is being made of that college. I do not think we can expect any economy there. Hon. members must not place too great hopes on economizing at the college. I think that completes what I want to lay before the committee as to facts. I just want to deal with one or two accessory points. In making all these arrangements we have had to retrench a certain number of officers and men. We have retrenched 25 officers and 105 other ranks, and transferred to the police 139 riflemen and N.C.O.’s. It is a painful necessity, but I felt that the real need of the country was a most efficient military organization, with money spent in the most justifiable way, and with our plans we had to do it, and it has been done. We have done it in as fair a way as we could, and I feel it will be for the benefit of the whole service to carry out the whole of the alterations we have made. There is no satisfaction whatever obtainable if it is on a scale beyond that which you can afford. It must have been most unsatisfactory to all ranks to feel during the last few years that they were continually scamped and denied in things that were necessary for their efficient working. I know there will be some criticism of these plans ; we are all desirous of arriving at the best possible solution. Under the circumstances I believe the plans I have sketched are those most in accordance with the needs of the country and the limits of our financial resources. One of the criticisms will be: “Where will we get staff-officers, having abolished our regiments?” My answer is to begin with that two squadrons of C.M.R. were not in any sense a sufficient regiment for that purpose, and further that we cannot afford to keep up an expensive regiment for no other purpose than training officers. We shall have to train our officers and to depend, as we have before, on the efficiency and hard work the men put in to make the best of the available training. There is another line of criticism which I don’t think is helpful and which does really more harm than good, and that is criticism based on the suspicion that we are not “playing the game.” I have had complaints that in retrenching the instructors we have retrenched only the Bilingual ones. That is absolutely contrary to the fact. Our retrenchments were based on suitability, and a larger proportion of unilingual than bilingual men were retrenched.

How are yon going to get your staff-officers in the future?

How did you get them before? You had not your regimental officers in those days—you trained them. I ask hon. members not to criticize these matters and not to adopt an attitude towards the defence force which really might have justification if all our officers were engaged in running a party political game. I can assure hon. members on all sides of the House that, coming into office after the long predominance of hon. members opposite, I have found nothing in the spirit of the officers I have had to deal with but a real desire to help and to improve the defence efficiency of the country. It is most unfair to assume that because officers happen to have been known to have certain political proclivities that they are always going to carry those opinions into their ordinary professional duty, which is trying to work for the efficiency of the defence force. As far as I can judge they are really endeavouring to do so. They would not be doing their duty if, when a proposal of mine were put before them, they did not represent to me quite candidly their views, even although they were quite opposite to mine, but that is what I want, and I take the responsibility for any changes made in the service. I have received, and am receiving, from the officers of the defence force nothing but the most loyal service, and they are increasing the efficiency of the force to the best of their ability.

I beg to move, in order to discuss the defence policy and to take advantage of the 40 minutes rule—

The hon. member cannot get the benefit of this rule by just drawing attention to the Vote. The rule is very clear and the hon. member must challenge a particular question of policy. Rule 104. sub-section (3) says—

and so on. It is clear there must be a bona-fide challenge.

My challenge is absolutely bona fide. In spite of the fact that the Minister has anticipated criticism and answered it, and is apparently deprecating further criticism, I am afraid I must indulge in a little. I wish sincerely to congratulate the Minister on his new departure in presenting his Estimates. As far as I know this is the first time a Minister has prefaced the discussion of his Estimates by an explanatory statement regarding the finances of his department, and it is a precedent which I hope will be followed. I am glad the Minister of Finance is here, because there are a few points he would be well-advised to pay attention to. When we vote money for the Public Service it is in exchange for services, which should form a definite entry on the other side of the ledger. But it is not so here. We have not in the defence Estimates practically any information to enable us to discern what we are getting for this expenditure. If we vote £895,000 to provide an army, we ought to know definitely what size army we are getting and it ought to be expressed in units. An army consists of definite units, but there is no information whatever to show what our army consists of or what the strength of it is.

You mean the Citizen Army?

The Citizen Army, of course. We rely for our defence on our citizen forces, and we ought to know what their strength is. It is not disclosed in the estimates. I would invite the Minister’s attention to the manner in which the Australian military estimates are presented to their Houses of Parliament. There you will find definitely and precisely the number of men being trained, they are even divided into ranks, so that the country has a very clear and definite idea not only of the amount of money which is voted, but of the services that the country is getting in return for that expenditure. I hope that the Minister of Finance will see that the public is definitely informed of these matters. One of the most interesting items is that the central administration part of the Australian services costs £28,000. compared with ours costing £53,000.

I think you will find that there is a kink in the comparison somewhere.

No doubt adjustments have to be made, but the figure is striking, and it is worth while looking into. Again, it undoubtedly is the case that the Defence Department, above all others, is being strangled with red tape. It must inevitably develop into a sort of bureaucratic institution where there are a large number of individuals, if I may say so, completely out of touch with the actualities not even in touch with troops, and whose tendency is to develop bureaucratic methods and to run the whole force by regulation, referring everything as far as possible to headquarters and allowing little or no initiative at all. I have here a copy of the regulations of the defence force. They are formidable in number and weight, but, if you come to examine them in detail you will fina that they are even more formidable still. We have a series of regulations with corrections and interpolations which I would defy anyone but an expert in the Defence Department to make head or tail of. No wonder that the headquarters staff is vastly overloaded with officials, or ratner has a very large number of officials. Amongst the reforms that are wanted is certainly a devolution of responsibility to a greater extent in that department than is perhaps possible, or even permissible, in any other department of State. The Minister has told us that the Defence Department exists for preparation for defence in case of war. It is not right to expend one pound or one penny unless it has some connection with preparation for war. Would the Minister suggest that this is part of the preparation for war? I would like to ask the hon. member for Cape Town (Central) (Mr. Jagger) how he would like to run his establishment with a series of regulations of this sort with innumerable corrections and interpolations. A system of this kind leads to multiplicity of useless work, and to discouragement of initiative. In war you have officers put in responsible positions, responsible not only for the conduct of operations and the safety of their men, but also responsible for the expenditure of a good deal of money. What training do they get in that direction? They have no training whatever. It develops a laziness of mind when everything is done by regulation. It is a bad preparation for war when we know that the most wasteful expenditure of money takes place chiefly because the officers entrusted with those great powers have had no training in these matters and no encouragement to develop initiative and self-reliance in such matters.

That is just the direction of the changes I am making.

I am very glad to hear it, and I hope that these changes will result in this series of volumes being reduced to the size of one.

That is the accumulation of several years.

The Minister’s chief difficulties, I hope, are largely based on the fact that the public are very ill-informed about the Defence Force. I do not want to take advantage of any loose phrasing of his, but it seems to me that there is a little bit of loose thinking. I am unable to follow his reasoning as to the possible dangers that may or may not be presented to South Africa. He said that there was no possibility, as far as could be foreseen, of invasion from outside.

Oh, no. What I meant, obviously, was that, of course, there may be all kinds of possibilities, but I said that within the reasonable limits of probability there did not seem to be any reason to defend ourselves against any sudden invasion by a first-class power from the sea.

I am going by the newspaper reports. The minister, as reported, said something quite different. He was reported as indicating to the committee that our country need not be afraid of any sea invasion of our coast, even if there was an emergency. That disposes of external aggression. He went on to say that as to our land borders, whatever 25 years might bring forth in regard to central Africa, there need be no apprehension of invasion. What do we want a Defence Force for, if we are safe from internal and external trouble? The Minister, I ought in justice to add, went on further to say that—

Those dangers were not specified, and I find no great fault with the Minister for not specifying them. I believe the Minister and other public speakers will not do wrong if they draw the attention of the public to this—that possessions of any sort need protection in the most civilized community, whether the possessions of a State or the possessions of an individual, and the more valuable the possessions, the more likely they are to be coveted and attacked, and the greater, therefore, the necessity for adequate protection of them. It is absolutely necessary that, having great responsibilities and great possessions, we should take adequate means to protect them. He, therefore, should urge that, while it is a laudable ambition to be self-reliant and so on, the ambition must not rest with saying so or thinking so. We must act. It is well recognized that self-government always carries with it the responsibility of self-defence, of local self-defence. I do not think that the Minister’s optimism about external aggression being out of the question is wholly justified. One does not want to look for trouble, but we know that future wars are as certain as anything else, as certain, for instance, as death to an individual. They will occur ; they always have occurred. Let us hope they are far distant, but we must necessarily take precautions in time in order to avoid the worst results of them. There is another matter that the public ought to understand, and that is that the nature of modern wars has changed. Within the lifetime of some of us, and certainly for centuries before, when nations had a disagreement and resorted to the arbitrament of arms to settle their disputes, it was largely a war between two comparatively small bodies of professional soldiers on each side. We have changed all that. It is curious to think that we have reverted to tribal methods now in our wars. When we know that when countries are at war the whole adult population are engaged, surely that ought to modify our arrangements for the future, and that is further confirmed by the fact that we, in South Africa, a white population of 1,600,000. are controlling a vast territory and incidentally controlling a large number of our fellow-men, and it has been laid down in practice—and I hope always will be the case—that whatever our disputes, whatever our national emergency, we will not seek to settle it by training any of our native population to arms. It is recognized as a principle for good or evil—I think for good—that our native population will not be expected to take any part under arms in the defence of their country. That throws an even greater responsibility on the white population, who have to carry the whole burden. Having those possibilities, we are led to the fact that we must have universal training as far as possible, subject, of course, to such modifications as finance demands. I address myself with great confidence to this committee, because there are a vast number of members of this committee who have been on active service themselves. It does not matter what uniform they wore, or on which side they fought, they necessarily have come back with some very definite and, I hope, correct ideas about war, and preparation for war, and above all, the necessity of training the individuals who take part in war. No sane person ever admires or desires offensive warfare. The whole function of a defence force should be to preserve our land and liberty intact, and to enable us to go on progressing peacefully, in the way we intend to go, without serious interruption from outside. I regret to say I am unable to follow the Minister’s reasoning or his attitude with regard to these new proposals. I would once more remind him of the terms of the report of the Lukin Commission. In the late General Lukin we had one of the greatest and best soldiers South Africa has produced, to whom we are indebted not only for his military exploits, but also for the wonderful example he provided to his men ; and I have never come across an officer who had the unswerving devotion of his men as he had. Apart from his personal qualities, it is generally admitted that he was a very sound soldier. I have never seen his considered views on any matter seriously contested. When he writes in his report, which was signed by two other members, that—

we must feel concerned when the Minister, by one stroke, practically sweeps away the whole of that foundation.

By one stroke? I beg your pardon ; your friends did four-fifths of it by one stroke.

I do not think perhaps we will dispute as to who is responsible. I am endeavouring to make this non-party and non-political. However, when we see a Government in one, two or three strokes—it does not matter ultimately—sweeping away the foundations of the permanent force, it does not say much for the stability of the edifice that has to be built up. I am still at a loss to know where the supply of staff officers and instructors is to come from, unless they are imported from outside. I hope there will always be that interchange, not only in the defence department, but other departments, but I think it ought to be accepted as a principle in the defence service, as in the railway service, that we should try and build up our own staff and instructors from within our own borders as far as possible. If you sweep away the necessary machinery, it augurs very badly for the future. I cannot see the necessity on any ground whatever, least of all economy, for the latest stroke of the Minister. We think, in the preservation of our permanent force, we are doing a great service to the country. We would, for instance, in our rank and file provide a fine means for recruiting our police. I think, by putting a large number of men through the permanent force, we should produce, after their three or five years’ service, a number of men who would be simply invaluable. In addition, in times of emergency you would have large reserves of these well-trained men who would rejoin the forces for military service. Where are we to get our instructors from? Does the Minister think seriously that the large number of instructors required for the defence force is provided by men sitting down with books and perhaps playing with tin soldiers on a level board? Surely that is what it amounts to. No, if they are going to train men to be soldiers, they must be soldiers themselves, and they must have belonged to definite units which have been well organized. Otherwise, how are they to acquire the information and instruction they propose to convey to others? With regard to our staff, where are our staff officers to come from? How can you expect enterprising young fellows to join our permanent force, small as it is, if it is obviously to be not only a blind alley occupation, but also one from which they are liable to be summarily ejected on the shortest notice owing to some financial stringency or re-organization and so forth? We must endeavour to attract a considerable number of our finest and best young men for the performance of these important duties. They must have that prolonged training which would enable them to perform such intricate and essential duties. I cannot see that you can make a staff officer by taking a man from a bank or a lawyer’s office, who perhaps has never worn a uniform before, and expect him to follow the very intricate course of training necessary to become a good staff officer. I think that is a very bad and retrograde step. I am not at all convinced by the details of the Minister’s commando system. He regrets, as I do, that so little use was made of the unsurpassed material we have for soldiers in the country districts of this province, in the Orange Free State, and in the Transvaal. It has apparently never been possible to give full effect to the excellent qualities these men have, or to help them to develop and train into efficient soldiers. The pity of it goes on still, as the commando system proposed by the Minister will not, in my judgment, meet the position. Will any member, particularly those who have been on active service, consider the Minister’s statement seriously when he said in reply to an interpolation by the light hon. member for Standerton (Gen. Smuts)—

Surely it is terrifying to think that these fine young men are supposed to be soldiers with that amount of training. I would like to read what a very distinguished American general said on this matter—

That is what the Minister proposes to do. Four days’ rifle practice is not training; it is practice ; and a couple of days’ wapenskou is not sufficient to turn them into soldiers. It requires a great deal more to make a soldier than the art of pulling a trigger correctly or even hitting the mark. That part of the scheme gives one much misgiving. I appreciate the fact that there are to be training squadrons, which are a little better than nothing, but very little for all practical purposes. I would like to give the Minister an instance. An officer of high rank had to withdraw his men from a position in the East African campaign. He was as stout-hearted as a lion, but he simply did not know the A. B. C. of the job he had to perform in face of the enemy. He had his men in line, and had to withdraw. He actually told his men to withdraw man by man from the flanks, and they were shot down like rabbits. This officer had a splendid personality, and was a man of intellect, but he was not trained in that function of human endeavour, and he made a mess of it. If that takes place on a small scale, what is likely to take place on a large scale when you have officers put in responsible commands, handling large bodies of troops, and perhaps they have never had the opportunity of seeing even as much as a brigade under arms at one time. This system of command is one that must be carefully looked into. I would like to give the Minister a few suggestions as to this. If our defence force exists for war, and no other purpose, we must contemplate war at some time. That means the exercise of command, large or small, by individual officers. What opportunity are we giving even the senior officers for the handling of men? We are giving them none. That ought to be remedied. I suggest in each military district there should be two officers, a titular commanding officer and a second-in-command, so to speak, carefully selected. They would, of course, be experienced officers of the defence force as far as possible. Their experience and their known aptitude for that kind of work should be considered. They should be given every opportunity, not only in our local camps, but elsewhere, of seeing troops handled. It would be a wise expenditure for these officers to see troops exercised in British India or Switzerland, but preferably in the British dominions. There are, as it happens, many men in South Africa who have a natural aptitude for command, or that portion of the military art. I won’t mention names, but they will readily occur to hon. members who are listening to me. These men are to be found still, and are quite different from a staff officer who has to possess other qualities which must be developed by patient work and study through a series of years. It is still possible to get a satisfactory result from commanding officers who have an aptitude for command. This scheme would dispose, to some extent, of a crying drawback. What military future is there before an officer of the citizen force who has put zealous years into the training of his men, and who has retired under the four years’ rule? The information and the knowledge these men have would be invaluable for the State. They ought to be given an opportunity of perfecting or improving their knowledge for handling men. It is as hopeless to expect any officer to handle men without actual practice, as to expect a gifted musician to play without actual practice on his instrument. Hon. members will agree with me that if we decide upon having an army at all, we must take over a reasonable means of having that army firmly based on sound principles and, above all, disciplined in all its ranks. It is impossible to conduct operations with half-trained men, and I would say to the Minister it is not quite right or fair to suggest to the public that, although the air force may deal with the situation in the way the Minister stated, he is in a position now to put 10,000 men in the field, all properly mobilized and equipped.

Why not?

It is impossible to get an additional 15,000 men which the Minister proposes. You can get 10,000 individuals, and another 15,000 individuals. You can take the voters’ roll and muster them as we do on election day—but they are not soldiers. You may put rifles in their hands, but they are not soldiers—they are individuals. It is misleading to the public to read the figures given by the Minister, and it is not right to say that he can put 10,000 trained men in the field, and then another 15,000. As a military machine that would be practically useless, and if the Minister would refrain from giving misleading information of that sort to the public, he would be doing a good service to his department. I still maintain that, until he has a sound cadet system throughout the country, we cannot build up a military force. The cadet system has this merit—it has many merits—that, first of all, it will be highly inexpensive ; it will need no further legislation, and that also is an advantage, and it will be easily put into operation. If hon. members have followed me, they will agree with me that, in this country, some form of universal service is necessary, or highly desirable. Is it right that, in South Africa, only one boy out of four is a member of a cadet corps? The State pays practically for all the education in this country, and it has a right to insist upon military training as a duty of the citizen as well as his ability to read and write, and it is just possible that the ability to handle a rifle and to take his place in the ranks of an organized unit may, at a particular juncture, be as important to the State as the ability to read, write and figure. The advantages are so well-known that it is not necessary to enumerate them. It is a disquieting fact, as I pointed out the other day, that the physique of our people is in a very bad way indeed, and is not what it should be. Out of every 1,000 men who apply to the recruiting sergeant or recruiting officer for the permanent force, who are accepted—we have no knowledge of the rejections—but of those who are accepted as likely to make good soldiers, 500 are immediately rejected by local medical practitioners. The remaining 500, when sent to Pretoria, have their numbers cut into two, and only 250 pass the doctor. This is a very serious matter. Under the cadet system, at all events, these disabilities may not be so pronounced perhaps, and in the early stages will be brought to light and may be cured. Many of the ills which hamper men afterwards, may be prevented by judicious training and exercise. [Time limit.]

I move—

I may be wrong, but I am not convinced yet that the money voted for defence purposes is spent to the best advantage.

What is the point the hon. member is discussing?

Defence.

Yes, but there must be some definite question.

The policy of the Minister of Defence.

I assume it is the reorganization of the defence force?

Yes. It is of course very difficult, in the absence of a departmental report, to make observations with regard to the re-organization of defence forces, but if I judge from the speeches of the hon. the Minister at Port Elizabeth, and the outline given in this House, there seems to me to be neither aim nor object in the re-organization, and on that account I must to a large extent, agree with the hon. member who has just sat down (Brig.-Gen. Byron). It gives one the impression, if one may judge from the outline, that the pruning knife has been applied rather spasmodically, without due regard to efficiency or system. The first point to which I would invite the Minister’s attention is that the organization is still suffering from the same complaint as before—and this complaint has drawn criticism, not alone from all parts of the Union, but from members of this House—and that is, that it is top-heavy—too heavy in the head, and too weak in the body. It was therefore, rightly anticipated that economy would be effected in this direction, but to our surprise we now find, if I am correct in my figures, that only 25 officers were retrenched and about 105 of other ranks excluding the S.A.M.R.

Twenty-live officers and 109 other ranks retrenched, and 139 (riflemen) transferred—a total of 25 officers and 248 men.

I believe that the Minister said that among the other ranks there are about 37 instructors.

Thirty-four.

Now we feel that here the Minister is touching the very heart of efficiency, a touch felt right throughout the country, because these instructors are, after all, the live wires of the whole organization, and I do not see that we can do without them, if there is any intention of introducing the required efficiency and discipline in our defence organization in so far as our cadet and commando systems are concerned. Apart from this cut in the lower ranks of the force, the estimated expenditure for headquarters is considerably higher this year than for the previous year, so that, while we are seeking to economize, by a reduction in our instructional staff, the expenditure as far as the headquarters staff is concerned, is higher. Our old complaint, therefore, that the force is top-heavy has been overlooked. Taking the figures which the Minister has given us this afternoon the headquarters administration is now heavier than ever before both numerically and financially. In regard to the district staff, if the reduction of 15 military districts to six is for the sake of economy I can only say, from the little experience I have had of defence matters, that that economy is wrong; in fact I can only say it is false economy because there again the Minister has gone to the very heart of the whole organization. The force must have a certain number of wheels for efficiency and if you remove one wheel the whole is affected. That this will affect our organization as far as military efficiency and supervision is concerned I feel sure, and it might have been wiser, if it were found that the military districts were not of such importance as was anticipated when the organization was commenced, that it was perhaps better to say the system was wrong and to replace it by another. If that were done and we were to accept the commando system, by having the Union demarcated into command areas and the officers in command of such areas with a full staff of competent instructors were responsible for the organization and discipline it would be infinitely better. I think we would then have something nearer efficiency. But by doing away with the military districts as now constituted and concentrating the work on bigger centres proficiency and supervision must inevitably suffer. I think the Minister has acknowledged that we are practically falling back and that the training will be quite insufficient for our young men. In regard to the expenditure on defence rifle associations and cadets I consider this is entirely inadequate to give anything in the nature of efficiency. Yet these defence rifle associations or commandos are and always will be the alpha and omega of our whole defence machine. We have no other units to call on to defend our rights and therefore whatever machinery we may bring into being should be machinery that will deal efficiently with our commando and cadet systems There are at present about 160,000 members of defence rifle associations and out of this £895,000 say £900,000 on the Estimates, as far as I can make out, only £112,000 is set aside for the commandos, and according to a note on the Estimates this works out at about 16s. 7d. per registered unit. What can we expect for this small expenditure for such a large body of men. I feel always that in dealing with matters of this kind as the re-organization of our forces, we should have our attention concentrated on the machine that will be used should eventualities require us to do so, and that is our commando. Therefore I feel that the amount on the Estimates is quite inadequate to expect anything in the nature of proficiency from our commandos. This deplorable state of affairs, if I might call it so, is most dispiriting to our agile and willing citizens and I fear if we are to continue along these lines then all interest in our defence rifle associations will be lost and eventually also in our cadets organization and our whole defence organization will boil down to nothing. I think we should do more in the way of arousing national enthusiasm and to bring something about which is more in the nature of a national army. After all, a national army is the cheapest in the world. As to the cadets, the Minister knows that is my sore point. I quite agree with the hon. member for East London (North) (Brig.-Gen. Byron) as to the time and money that should be devoted to our cadet organization. What disappoints me in the re-organization is that our cadets in future will be left in the hands of unprofessional instructors, and I think that this is wrong because the cadet is the material out of which we are going to build up the machine for the future and therefore it is necessary that the cadet organization and training should receive the undivided attention of the Minister. If the cadets are to be left in the hands of unprofessional instructors, I am afraid we are going to neglect them to such an extent that they will eventually not be turned out to be such a useful part of our defence machine as is expected. If it is the intention of the Minister to extend the cadet organization and if it is to be left in the hands of the schoolmasters only I feel it is like building a large number of schools and filling them with children without teachers. By having professional instructors one does not only get uniform instruction but when these cadets in later years are called up for active service they win understand one another, they will know where to go, what to do and how to do it. Surely since the promulgation of the Defence Act there has been ample time and opportunity both in war and peace to determine whether the training methods adopted are good or bad. Every military expert will admit now that the training of our forces is inadequate and will fail them when called upon to do their duty for the defence of the country. The consensus of opinion therefore is we should be no longer tethered to a fallacious policy whereby four-ntths of our youths are allowed to grow up without any military education. A policy which is directly responsible for an ever-increasing deterioration of the militant capacity of an erstwhile soldierly and vigilant people. The taxpayer is prepared to contribute his share towards the maintenance of a national army, but at the same time finds no delight in paying for what we have at the present time. The taxpayer is willing to pay provided he gets something in return for what he pays, and I feel that throughout the country, if we are to follow the lines of this reorganization, we are going to lose that interest which we have had up to the present, and which is so indispensable for a national army. This reorganization, whereby our young men in the rural districts are left untrained and without any idea of their national obligations, is wrong. I therefore make an appeal to the Minister not to devote all his time and attention to the present, but to prepare for what the future may demand from us ; to make a fresh start right now by laying the foundation of a national army. For that, after all, is the vital part of our national existence. I might remind the Minister that national existence is not merely a haphazard passage of the people from an unknown beginning to an unknown end. It is not merely an erratic phantasm of dreams that has fallen upon the sleeping consciousness of a fictitious world beyond the law of time and evolution. It is a part of life itself governed by the same definite and unalterable laws. Ever since the first dawn of national existence, nations were built not by statesmen who, for want of courage, followed the road of least resistance and practised economy at the expense of armaments, but by architects who were generals ; by masons who were soldiers; by trowels that were swords ; and out of the stones that were the ruins of decadent states. If we follow the annals of history from the beginning up to now, we will find this has been the case all over the world with the rise and fall of nations. There is not a nation that has not been born out of the womb of war, and greater the labour and pain in their delivery, the greater the victory— the greater the nation. We must not allow decadence to permeate our militant capacity. We must follow the maxim that to be prepared in time of peace is a good guarantee for success in war, unless we wish to perish on the same field on which we have risen. There are those who argue that while South Africa is enjoying the protection of one of the most powerful navies in the world, there is no need to elaborate on our present feeble attempt at national defence, but no true patriot can argue like that. We cannot tolerate that, for, apart from the internal and external dangers that threaten our western civilization, there is a wider field of operations in which South Africa is called upon to do her share. If every member of the commonwealth of nations were to act up to such pitiful arguments, then I am afraid the end of that commonwealth is well within sight. We cannot disregard the natural law of self-preservation unless we wish to court disaster. If from the earliest times nations preferred to perish, rather than profit by the lessons of those who went down before them, there is no reason why we—having wiser counsels at our disposal—should follow the road to destruction. I cannot agree with the Minister that we have only to deal with normal dangers. I think our duty extends much further than that. We have a national duty, and that is self-preservation. As far as normal dangers are concerned, we can leave those to the police force, which is quite competent to deal with them. The responsibility South Africa seeks to assume by widening the scope of its operations industrially and politically are vast, and intimately affect the nations of the world in their struggle for the potentialities of power. These are not without their attendant dangers; dangers equally great, if not greater than the responsibilities, will have to be faced when the alarms of war are sounded to defend our present defenceless possessions. With the military machine at present at our disposal, I do not see how it can be done. This may, however, be in our favour that we are rather fortunate in having a large man-power with practical experience, which we can place in the field with effect, but ten or fifteen years later these men will no longer be available, and then we shall have the young men of today, of which four-fifths are growing up without any idea of their national obligations. Unless the Minister provides for a cadet system whereby we can educate them to be good soldiers and citizens, he would be guilty of an omission for which posterity will not forgive him. A war in which South Africa may be called upon to defend herself will not be determined by naval but by land battles, and the success of those operations will depend on the quickness with which an equipped army can be placed in the field. At the beginning of hostilities the prime factors will be the securing of such points of vantage as will command every sector of importance for the operations of the campaign. Unless we have a sufficient number of men who are trained, and a larger number of men to do that training than we have at present, this factor in successful warfare will be nullified. That there is lots of room for improvement in our present organization goes without saying, and I hope the Minister will not rely too much on the fact that Great Britain was able, during the great war, to put a large army into the field in a very short time. Great Britain paid a very big price in Belgium and Flanders for its unpreparedness, and I hope the day will not dawn for South Africa when we shall have to pay in like manner. Germany’s great advantage was that she could, in a very short period, place nearly the whole of her manhood, not only equipped, but well trained, in the fighting line. That is a preparedness of which we cannot boast to-day. If the Allies had been equipped and armed in the same way a Germany was, the great war would have lasted months instead of years. In South Africa the handful of republican men could never have done what they did if they had not been well organized and armed. We have all this experience, yet we do not profit by it. I appeal to the Minister to consider the question of an effective cadets system very seriously. We would like them to be brought up to be useful citizens in every walk of life. The citizens of the Union are beginning to realize that the time has come when they should no longer look to extraneous help to defend their rights. They want to do this themselves ; what they want and have been clamouring for is a good system of training and an effective organization. If we are to switch over now from professional instructors to schoolmasters, it will take years before we reach the stage when schoolmasters will be able to give efficient instruction to cadets. It is quite possible that in another year the Minister may be looking for the instructors he has discharged. They have excellent training, and are as competent as any military instructors in the world.

This subject of defence is one which in time of peace very few people are inclined to take an intelligent interest in. When war is imminent, of course, we are all very alive to the necessity for the soldier and to the expenditure of money to unlimited amounts for the protection of the country. The history of South Africa shows us that we have never, during my lifetime, at any rate—and I have been in this country longer than probably half the members on the other side of the House—we have never gone more than ten years without a fight of some description or another, a war of a more or less serious character. If there is one country in the world that should always be prepared for emergency it is this Union of South Africa. Now the scheme propounded by the Minister and elaborated in great detail, can be described in a very few words as providing for this country with primarily a paper army. Apart from the few trained regiments—and they are few, and not by any means over-encouraged—to be found in Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape, the bulk of the defence force, which it is dependent upon, will be untrained men. Four days’ rifle shooting with a couple of days inspection of arms is no training for a soldier, and I would commend to the Minister, in embarking upon a policy of this sort, which is, after all, going to cost a considerable amount of money, to consider the history of those people in other parts of the world and in other times who have depended upon untrained levies in times of emergency. If there is one analogous case illustrated in history which, I think, South Africa might take to heart and consider carefully it is the experience of America during the Civil war in the sixties. There you had the north pouring into the field troops, uniformed and armed, of course, but absolutely untrained, and I would commend to the personal study of the Minister the book written by General Henderson and known as “Stonewall Jackson,” and to study particularly the battle of “Bull Rim.” We know the disaster that followed as a result of turning these untrained men into battle, or depending upon troops of that description. They are not only useless ; they are a positive danger to their side. What is our first line of defence as I gather from the speech of the Minister? The first line appears to be our air force. That practically, apart from the Cape Garrison Artillery, is the only standing army we have got. He had a small striking force of a couple of hundred men in the S.A.M.R. who were always kept in a high state of efficiency and utilized primarily as training squadrons. They were also a small nucleus for quick action on a small scale. But the Minister has parted with that force and handed it over to the Minister of Justice who, I have no doubt, will proceed at once to form a small striking force of his own, because if there is one thing that is required in this, country it is a mobile force in the hands of a commanding officer or general which he can quickly use on an emergency. That force, instead of being in the hands of the Minister of Justice, should have remained in the hands of the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence has parted with it in order that his vote may be cut down, and that some semblance of economy, which has been forced upon him I have no doubt, may be shown on paper as a saving oh the army. He has got rid of the officers. Those officers were highly trained men. More than that, he has got rid of the instructors—about 34 of them, at any rate. If there is one body of men which a staff lays great store by, it is an efficient staff of warrant officer and N.C.O. instructors. It is a great pity that these men should have been got rid of. Behind the air force comes a scattered force of artillery. I have not yet heard from the Minister as to where he intends to dispose of his guns, but I understand that they are to be dotted about the country and used as training centres for citizen artillerymen. A good deal depends upon where he places these guns. Behind that force there is practically nothing. Then comes the citizen army, which, as I say, consists of a few brained regiments in Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape. The whole of this policy is based on the assumption that South. Africa is liable to no outside attack, that whatever enemies or whatever potential enemies may arise will be enemies within our own border. [Time limit.]

I think I may say without fear of contradiction, that I have taken, and do take, a great interest in the defence force of the Union. There are very many generals in this country—I am only a colonel — but what I lack in rank I, perhaps, may make up in experience. No one begrudges expenditure on the defence force. What we are concerned about more than anything else is how the money is spent. I do think in regard to the cadets that it was a mistake—I said so before and I say so again to-day—that the Minister has commenced economizing at the wrong end. I noticed from the Minister’s speech that he intends paying the adjutants of the different commandos, but there is no provision made for adjutants of the active citizen force regiments, who do much more work, some of them, and more useful work than some of the officers at Roberts Heights. They are a smart lot of men too. They receive no pay.

The commanding officers of the active citizen force units receive that capitation grant for expenditure in assistance, and in the case of the commando units it amounts to much the same thing, but it is paid in the other form.

The active citizen force officers receive nothing to-day. They devote a lot of time to their duties. The total vote for cadets is £35,000 for the current year, and there is provision for only one part-time drill instructor. I think it is tinkering with the thing. The first-class drill instructor must be born. I have never yet come across a good amateur drill instructor in the whole of my experience. If you deprive the cadets of the professional drill instructor, you might just as well take away the alphabet books and the arithmetic books from the youngsters. If the Minister will make enquiries, he will find that all the very best regiments that attended the camp at Potchefstroom last year were those that had experienced officers, men who served in the war, and also first-class drill instructors. If you take away these drill instructors from the defence forces of this country you will be raising the whole of the force on a weak foundation.

I do not intend pursuing the same method as the hon. member for East London (Brig.-Gen. Byron) and the hon. member for Marico (Mr. J. J. Pienaar). They criticized various points from a detached standpoint. Unfortunately, I have not had the privilege of a military training like my hon. friends, but I want to place my finger on a few weak spots that I see from a practical standpoint. All my experience is practical, as I have had no training. I cannot show, like the hon. member for East London, how you must retire your army to prevent losses. I had to use my common sense and learn by practical experience to make losses as light as possible. From a practical standpoint, however, I regard the defence force as top-heavy and compare it to a tree which is too heavy on top and must be thinned out. If the tree is to grow you must thin it, otherwise it will die. I am glad the Minister has commenced the thinning out, but sorry he has not completed it. It is wrong to do too little and to cut the wrong branches. That is what I see in the retrenchment of the Minister. The great thing was to thin out, so that it should be proportional and bear proportionally the burden demanded of it, and the Minister should have commenced from the top. That is the difficulty. He commenced with reorganization, and I am not quite satisfied with it. Some years ago, when the old Government was in power and since this Minister has occupied the post, we had people on this side of the House getting up and saying that the Minister should retrench a good deal in his department, and that he should see that the department was made as efficient as possible. Now I am sorry that the Minister has apparently gone wrong, and has not gone the whole length. He knew that there would be criticism, then why did he not completely reorganize, so as to place the thing upon a sound basis? I do not know who advised the Minister, but understand that Col. du Toit was asked to make recommendations.

You are a member of the Defence Council.

The Defence Council is the fifth wheel of the coach, and means nothing. We were never consulted at all with regard to reorganization, but when the matter was completed it was submitted to us. I know that departmental organization does not come under the jurisdiction of the Defence Council, but I understand that Col. du Toit was asked to submit a defence system to the Minister.

That is not so.

Then I will leave the point. Further, I just wish to go into the expense of the defence force and make a comparison between the cost of the headquarters and the headquarters of the police in Pretoria. The permanent force consists of 1,993 white men, and for that there is a financial department containing 42 persons that cost annually £19,319. The police force, consisting of 10,000 men, use a staff of 75 men for paying out salaries and only costs £25,745 a year. Defence headquarters at Pretoria comprise 375 officers and other ranks, and 193 natives, and cost £133,795. Police headquarters comprise 131 officers and other ranks, and natives and cost £49,755. We, therefore, see that defence headquarters in Pretoria with 437 officers and other ranks are larger than the police headquarters, and expend more by a sum of £84,039. This amazing difference is instructive. I do not quote the figures because we think that not enough or too much is spent on defence, but our grievance is that most of the money is used at headquarters, etc., and that, in time of need, we shall not get value for our money. I now come to staff officers. The Minister must tell me if I am wrong, but here also I ask him whether he thinks we are getting value? According to my information, staff officers get about £1,200 a year, plus travelling expenses. I think they get 1s. per mile travelled.

Why don’t they travel by train?

I am coming to that. To a question put to the Minister last year, he replied that some staff officers use their own private cars and got an allowance of 1s. per mile.

I would like to ask the Minister a question with regard to the clothing grant to the cadets. What control is exercised over that expenditure? I want to give information of a transaction which took place in my district some time back when equipment was purchased by the officer commanding cadets from an Asiatic storekeeper. The Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce took this up, and endeavoured to get information from the Minister.

After many unsuccessful attempts to get information from the Minister’s subordinates. I tabled a question in this House as follows—

To which the Minister replied—

Later I called at the Minister’s office hoping to obtain information there. The Minister was out, but I saw one of his clerks who informed me that this order was placed with the Asiatic because his price was the lowest quoted. I want to say to the Minister that, if that is the explanation it is a very lame one, and one which the Minister will find it difficult to substantiate in this House. The purchase was made apparently without any consideration of the price at all, and I can substantiate what I say by papers which I have in my possession, which show that no other quotation was obtained. The officer commanding the cadets made a bee-line to the Asiatic storekeeper when he required those shirts. No tenders were called or quotations asked for. It is therefore not competent for the department to say the purchase was made from the Asiatic because they could obtain the goods at a cheaper price. I would like to ask the Minister why the department’s requirements were purchased from an Asiatic at all? The Asiatic is not the man to whom the Minister would appeal if the country were in danger. Why not give some consideration to those who at considerable sacrifice to themselves in time fit themselves for military duty. The Asiatic is not required to perform any military services. He remains safe and snug in his store in time of war, accumulating wealth, which he uses for the economic destruction of his European competitor. I think it is a disgrace that when a little material advantage might be given to those men who are required to make such sacrifices they should be ignored in favour of those who are not so required. The Chamber of Commerce have been trying for twelve months to get details of this transaction, without success. As I have said, I made an effort in the House, early in the session, to obtain information from the Minister, but it seems he is just as disinclined to make any disclosure as his subordinates? I can only say that it would appear that the Minister is making common cause with his subordinates to keep the particulars of this transaction from the public, and I am sorry to have to say that. I have a letter here in which the Minister repudiated all knowledge of the transaction, and I therefore acquit him of any participation in the transaction, but I do not acquit him of making common cause with his subordinates in trying to keep this matter from the public. The correspondence shows that this purchase was not made to save a few paltry pence or shillings, but apparently for some other reason. The first letter on the subject was written by the Chamber of Commerce on the 5th March, 1925, directly to the Minister. The communication was acknowledged and then on the 18th March the Quartermaster-General wrote saying nothing was known of the transaction and asking for further information on the subject. The Chamber of Commerce then wrote the district staff officer in Maritzburg on the 9th April, as follows—

1. 1. The name of the responsible person authorized to make purchases on behalf of the Ladysmith Boys’ Government School Corps.
2. 2. Are the purchases called done so by tender.
3. 3. The name of the firm with whom the last order for shirts was placed.

I think I can reply to the hon. member right away. Not guilty, my lord. The position is this. I have not tried to hide anything from the House or the hon. member. The answer given by me was quite correct. The Government had not been purchasing any shirts or ties in Ladysmith. We hand over to the officer commanding so much per cadet for him to buy shirts and ties, and as long as they are bought our responsibility is finished. He apparently bought them from an Asiatic store. I should think public opinion in Ladysmith might possibly have an influence on him.

Is not he an officer of the Defence Department?

Yes.

Was it not public money?

The way in which that public money is disbursed in a case like that is as we are doing it. Of course, we could purchase and stock these things at Pretoria and distribute them to the cadet detachments, but I do not think that would be very agreeable to the local people. We never do lay down any directions as to where the officers should purchase them. That is the whole story. There was nothing to hide. It was the ordinary way of doing things. That cadet detachment officer went out and bought where he could get them best. We do not follow the matter up further than making the grant and seeing that he buys.

He can do what he pleases with the money?

So long as it is used for the purchase of cadet requirements. I take this opportunity of replying to some observations of my hon. friend opposite (Brig.-Gen. Byron) and the hon. member behind me (Mr. J. J. Pienaar). It is difficult to reply to the former because we start from different standpoints. I am not quite sure that we do start from such very different standpoints, but if you analyse his remarks, he belongs to the category of the soldier-critic, who would like, as a soldier, to see a very complete state of preparedness in the country for dangers which undoubtedly are within the bounds of possibility, but are not dangers which we should, as prudent persons, look upon ourselves as sudden dangers to be guarded against. When you take his proposals, he says, in regard to cadets, not one child in eignt is receiving cadet instruction.

My statement was that of the children attending schools in this country only one in eight was a cadet.

I suppose 50 per cent, of the children attending schools are girls. Are there approximately 328,000 boys attending school? I do not think the hon. member will find this is the case. And, as we have 41,000 cadets in our detachments, it would take that to make his statement true. I do not think the hon. member has any real right to attack me on the subject, for we are increasing their numbers every year and are trying to encourage the movement. He suggested that the estimates should give more information as to the numbers of the various units, and I will bear that suggestion in mind. As to his comment that our system does not provide sufficient training and responsibility for officers, his ideas and mine are on all fours. However, the changes I am making are designed to improve and extend the facilities for training. As to the alterations of regulations, even the British War Office finds it necessary continually to alter its regulations. Then the hon. member for East London (North) wants all adults to be ready for war.

That is not my phrase exactly.

As a soldier I agree with him, but you have to cut your coat according to your cloth, and only Continental countries—and that before the great war—have ever attempted to put that idea into practice. If you fix your aim too high, there is considerable disgruntlement about expenditure, and you have to fix your aim on a reasonably practical object, and that is what I am trying to do. We try to do our best to give as much training as we can, but South Africa cannot afford to have a large standing army to do its fighting for her. The whole object of my plan is to provide for as large a number of men such practical training as it is possible to impart, so that when war comes they will require comparatively little additional training in order to enable them to take the field. I agree with the hon. member when he spoke of the necessity of citizen force officers having opportunities of handling larger bodies of troops. The active citizen forces are trained to a very reasonable degree of efficiency. I do not say they are as good as men who devote their whole time to military duties, but for citizen troops they show exceedingly well, and a comparatively short period will enable them to be licked into shape. With the reserves we can call to the colours, we can put 10,000 men in the field in probably about 96 hours. It is most unfair to describe the mounted regiments and the commandos as a mob armed with muskets. The hon. member thinks it desirable to have formations amounting to 20,000 men up to the standards he contemplates, but that is beyond our mark. What I am aiming at is to perfect a scheme so as to have something really efficient to mobilize. The delay in the publication of the departmental report is due to delay in translation and printing. As to instructors, I am afraid we must agree to differ. We have retained a sufficient number to serve all the purposes of the plans we have laid down, and should we want more we still have the Cape Garrison Artillery and the citizens’ forces to recruit from. We have been able to build up this corps of instructors. I do not see myself any difficulty, and the competent advice which I have taken leads me to believe that we shall have no practical difficulty in that respect. The hon. member for Marico (Mr. J. J. Pienaar) spoke as if we were falling back upon target practice and no training at all. I rather take exception to that from my hon. friend, because, in point of fact, we are going away from a position in which nothing at all was being done, and we are now providing training for 8,000 young men, and as to the four days a year which the hon. member scoffs at, what do the active citizen force get in non-continuous training? They get ten days in their first year, six in their second, and three in their third. He also spoke about four-fifths of our young citizens growing up without any instruction. We have about 16,000 young men registering each year when they come to the age of 17, and between the active citizen force and the other squadrons we aim at having 16,000 trained for four years, which provides for 4,000 boys a year out of the 16,000 registering. That is a very great step in advance of last year, and therefore. I think we should be commended for getting along in the right direction without greatly adding to the expenditure, rather than criticized. The suggestion was made by the hon. member for Beaconsfield (Col. Sir David Harris) that we were spending some absurd sum, £35,000, only, on cadets. As a matter of fact, the expenditure we have on the Estimates is £45,300. The two hon. members have criticized us for having in this retrenchment, retrenched, as they said, at the wrong end. I do not know that 25 officers to 248 men is so very unfair a proportion in a retrenchment like this. The hon. member for Hoopstad (Mr. Conroy) spoke of my machine being “top-heavy.” and is disappointed at my pruning knife not having been more used at the ton. I am sure that if the hon. member were in my place, and carried out the investigations that I did, he would find that we are not top-heavy, and that the administrative brains and force that we use are no more than you require for the proper conduct of our defence, and I would warn hon. members and this committee about making those comparisons between the headquarters of the police force and the headquarters of the defence force. We are exercising all reasonable economy, but I am being continually confronted with this practice of giving the number of police on service and saying that the administration of that number costs so much, and then coming to the permanent men in our service, and saying that the administration of this in the defence department costs so much more than the police. They leave out the fact that all the work in connection with our citizen force and commando forces also falls on the headquarters administration.

You have not given me time to say what I intended to say.

I am willing to meet the challenge of any hon. member in this regard.

I would like to say a word upon a subject which was dismissed by the Minister in his address this afternoon in a somewhat apologetic way. That is in connection with the question of naval defence. This matter was discussed last year, and a concrete suggestion had already been made that we should show the necessity of doing something more in the way of making naval defence adequate by asking the British Government to lend us a cruiser and to maintain it here. I should have thought that practically to all hon. members opposite, who are so fond of talking about “South Africa first,” and “South Africa alone,” it would have been apparent that something more should be done to maintain the position of South Africa on the question of naval defence. So far as I can see, the total amount provided is under the head of H on Vote 19. It provides for 230 men, or rather less, including coloured people, and a comparatively small expenditure. There are one or two minesweepers, which doubtless do useful work, and people employed on them. I am aware that under the arrangement which was made by the late Government, when the British Government handed over a large quantity of defence assets, this Government undertook to carry out certain works. I understand certain works have been carried out in Simonstown, and are in process of construction. It is very difficult to find out exactly what the cost of these works is, and, so far as I can see, there is no mention of it on the Estimates.

On the Loan Vote.

Another thing difficult to see is what proportion the expenditure upon these works bears to the amount of money received indirectly from the British Government. I do not know where that information is to be obtained. I put down some questions on the paper which doubtless the Minister will be good enough to answer at the proper time. If he could tell us more or less how this fund stands, what is the value of the works and of the material, ships and so forth, taken over from the British Government, what the cost of upkeep has been to us, and what money we have obtained by the sale of ground and in other ways, then we could form a proper opinion as to whether we are really doing something reasonably in proportion to the assistance we have received from the British Government. I do not know what we are spending, nor what is the value of the assets we have taken over, and it would be very material if we could have that information. I do not say the Minister is to blame that we do not spend much more, because I quite recognize that public feeling in the country has not been sufficiently alive to the importance of the matter to afford the Minister the necessary inducement to get more money than appears on the Estimates. Personally, I think there are Other matters on which we could spend less money in order that we could spend more money on this particular object. It was stated last year that about £160,000 a year would be necessary for the upkeep of a British cruiser if it were loaned to us. If that were done, it would be of great advantage. We have a training ship which does good work, and if we could send them on to a regular cruiser, that would be an excellent thing ; we should be providing them with an outlet and a career, and we should be doing something to show that it is up to us to take a reasonable share in naval defence. I know there are people who say there is no urgent need for this defence, but the only reason there is no urgent need is that we depend entirely on the goodwill of the British Government. I am not altogether inclined to give the Minister credit for haying exerted himself very much in this direction, but it would help if we could have the information I have just mentioned in order that we may see whether we are really carrying out our bargain.

When my time expired, I was pointing out to the Minister what the various staff offices cost. According to the estimates and other information I possess, a staff officer costs £1,200 a year in salary alone, besides travelling expenses calculated at 1s. a mile when he travels in the district. Then the staff officer has a captain as adjutant, who serves as private secretary and gets £800 a year. Then there is a quartermaster lieutenant who, I am told, gets £600 a year, and he is the person with the great responsibility in every staff office. The staff officer is there to Sign cheques—

And to draw the salary.

The quartermaster-lieutenant is responsible for every penny, for the, sale of cartridges and rifles, according to my information, He is the responsible man in the office. Then there is the instructor’s staff of five men who are paid £35 a month, which makes a total of £2,100 for the instruction staff. Further, there is a magazine master at £25 a month. That is £300 a year, and two clerks at £300 a year each, that is £500 a year, and a typist at £150 a year and two other persons at £456 the two, and a messenger at £48 a year. The total for the staff is, therefore, £5,984 in salaries alone, apart from travelling allowances to the staff officer. According to my information, the pay-and quartermaster is the man who bears all the responsibility. Now I ask, if the chief work the staff officer has to do is to sign cheques and to go about in his district forming rifle associations, and if the greatest responsibility does not rest on his shoulders, why is he not retrenched? As to the organization of the rifle associations, it is surely the commandants and field coronets who are responsible.

The number of staff officers has been reduced by three.

Then it has been reduced from fifteen to twelve, and those twelve officers cost £71,808 a year.

There are now ten staff officers.

If I am out in one or two staff officers, it does not change the position. The expenditure connected with each office remains the same. I hope the Minister followed me. If I am possibly out in one or two staff officers, then he must not use that in his reply to camouflage the position. My chief point is the expenditure connected with the various staff offices, and where I am wrong I hope the Minister will enlighten me. I have mentioned figures to show that I think there can be retrenchment in the salaries of the officers, that the defence force can be made cheaper and more effective, and that we could get more value for our money than is the case to-day. There is no war, and we are not expecting one, but as the Minister said, we must be prepared for contingencies if war should come contrary to our expectations. According to our present system, as the hon. member for Marico (Mr. J. J. Pienaar) said, the great majority of our fighting burghers do not get the training they ought to have. That is my great complaint. Those of us who have had any military experience know that fighting burghers and soldiers who cannot use a rifle are no good in the fighting line. It is a great grievance that when the fighting burghers are called up to defend the country, they are hopelessly unfit, because they do not know how to handle a rifle. That brings me to the question of armament. I have tried for two years to make the Minister understand how necessary it is for the people to be armed. I agree that the financial burden which will be caused is too heavy, and is not justified with a small population. I hoped, however, that he would adopt a scheme which was put before him, from all sides gradually and in course of time to arm about 5,000 or 6,000 citizens a year so that, at the end of about eight or ten years, we should have an armed force of 50,000 men or more. I had hoped that the Minister would adopt that scheme. Recently I thought we had converted him to our point of view and that he would take steps in that direction, but the Minister has finally said this afternoon that he cannot do so. We also proposed to the Minister that if a man could not pay for his rifle, and belonged to a rifle association, he must get his rifle on the instalment system. We do not ask for a gratis issue. The man can, e.g., pay off £2 and the balance over a period, say, 10s. every three months until the full amount is paid. The Minister said that this would necessitate too much bookkeeping, and that it would be costly, and he could not adopt it. In my turn, I said that every commandant and officer of a rifle association knew his men well, and the officers said they were willing to do the work involved. If the Minister thinks the system will cost too much on account of bookkeeping, I can assure him the officers of the rifle associations, who are doing their work without any payment (the Minister will possibly see that in the past they received £50) will also be able to do that work. The £50 a year which the commandants got was very little in comparison with the work they did.

I want to come back to this question of the purchase by the department of 150 shirts from the Asiatic. I am not going to allow myself to be put off by the plea of not guilty which was entered by the Minister. He says this is a matter over which he has no control. Let me remind him that the officer who made that purchase is an officer in his department, and the matter involves expenditure of public money, and the sooner the Minister makes it his business to exercise some control over such expenditure the better for this country. I want to show that the attitude which the Minister is taking up this evening is a complete change of front, that before he Knew that this matter was likely to come before this House his attitude was a different one. It was only when I tabled a question in this House early in the session that he took up this attitude. A letter was addressed by the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce to Colonel Giles, district staff officer, who passed it on the officer commanding the cadets, who replied—

That was the attitude adopted by his subordinate and it has been impossible to get any information. This matter has already got into the public press, and the Minister has been severely criticized. I hope, in his own interests, that he will make a full disclosure. On the 14th May the Chamber of Commerce wrote a further letter addressed to the quartermaster-general in regard to this purchase of shirts. Further correspondence passed. Another letter came from the quartermaster-general in which he stated that the matter was still receiving attention and then a letter dated 12th June was addressed to the chairman of the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce and this is the one on which I base my statement that the Minister has to-day taken up a totally different attitude from what he did previously. This letter states that the shirts although purchased from a local Asiatic dealer were not obtained at a higher price than that quoted by Europeans. The O.C. did not take the trouble to get quotations from the European storekeepers, so it is inconceivable how it can be said the price was not higher. How can the Minister reconcile this letter with the attitude he takes to-day. I know the Minister has one tender from a European among the papers and I want to explain how that tender came to be there. On the 27th of January, 1926, it appears that a traveller called on one of the European stores and informed an assistant that an Asiatic had been asked to quote for the Defence department 150 shirts and the assistant in the store immediately went to the officer commanding the cadets and asked if he might be allowed to quote. He got an evasive answer but eventually took upon himself to tender at landed cost plus 6d. each. The O.C. did not even ask to see the sample. That is the explanation of the tender. The shirts purchased from the Asiatic were got from a Durban wholesale house. The O.C. was asked whether the tender had been accepted and he said he was still going into the matter. A letter appeared in the “Natal Witness” addressed to the editor, and I think the Minister’s attention should be called to this letter which I will read—

I ask the Minister now to let the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce know what the Asiatic charged for those shirts. He has the file in his possession. I would like the Minister to explain also why the officer commanding these cadets—an officer of the Minister’s department —went direct to an Asiatic store to make the purchase and disregarded the Europeans entirely. [Time limit.]

We feel that the Minister is attempting to treat the population of the outside districts better in connection with defence matters, and as representative of a country district I feel that that is necessary. The hon. member for Standerton (Gen. Smuts) recently said something with which I entirely agree, viz.: that young men in the country districts should not only learn to ride, but also how to handle a rifle. I feel that it is necessary to give them a chance to learn in me defence force how to handle a rifle, and I am glad that an attempt is to be made to teach the young fellows between 18 and 21 years how to handle weapons, and to put them under discipline. We feel that they should not only learn how to handle a rifle but that they should also undergo discipline. That is indispensable. Another thing which the people feel is dissatisfaction with the defence force in its present state. When we insisted on a commission of enquiry into our defence system, the Minister was hesitating. Now, however, that the enquiry has taken place, everyone feels that it was necessary when we consider their recommendations and conclusions. A thing we found fault with, however, is that an officer of the department was secretary of the commission, and much of the dissatisfaction in the defence force is attributable to that. No one will deny that there is dissatisfaction, because we know that in one year 350 of the men at Roberts Heights resigned and went to look for work on the railways. They were willing to go and work there with pick and shovel. That shows that there had been victimization. At the commencement of the defence force promises were made by the late Gen. Beyers, the then commandant-general, and by the then Minister of Defence (the hon. member for Standerton). They promised the men who joined that they would be promoted in future to commissioned rank. What is the result? The men who joined in the hope that they would some day become officers are to-day in the streets. And what is to become of them? They are to-day practically professional soldiers, men who know the defence force from A to Z. I am not posing as a military expert. Many of them in the past were the unfortunates of our people. South Africa has in the past been the graveyard of the reputation of many a military expert. The Anglo-Boer war taught us on the Boer side that we had men who at first were ordinary burghers, but who became historical characters. I can mention Generals Botha, De Wet and Beyers, who were promoted from the ranks, and at the end of the war occupied the highest posts. Unfortunately it is a fact that we have military experts to-day who will find in South Africa a churchyard for their reputations. I want to warn the Minister against the people who say that they are military experts. The result of non-fulfilment of the promise regarding promotion is that we have not got the services of people who are capable of teaching our young men how to behave as soldiers, and who know the defence force from A to Z. There is something wrong with the organization if these men cannot be used in the service of the population, especially in the cadet system. I believe in the words—

I do not believe in the man who only flatters me, but the man who tells me when I go wrong. I hope the Minister and the military people will take this in the spirit intended. We want every son of the soil to be proud of our defence force, which should be an honour to our people. If we cannot get that, I am afraid the future will be a sad one. I should be sorry if the Minister thinks we want to find fault. The reason why we are criticizing him is that we are looking for the best for the defence force for every officer and for every man. The position to-day is that we are trying to retrench and reorganize, and we are gradually giving the defence force a Swelled head instead of legs to walk on. Everything is now centralized in head quarters at Pretoria, and that is wrong. The hon. member for Hope Town (Mr. Conroy) has referred to the position. I have the figures here. What is the trouble? I have a letter about the evidence given before the commission of enquiry by men and officers, and the following statement is made—

That is from one of the officers who gave evidence before the enquiry commission.

Business suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed at 8.5 p.m.