House of Assembly: Vol19 - MONDAY 7 SEPTEMBER 1987
as Chairman, presented the Report of the Standing Select Committee on Public Accounts (Own Affairs: House of Assembly), dated 29 July 1987.
Vote No 7—“Foreign Affairs”:
Mr Chairman, in the first instance I should very much like to extend a cordial welcome to the hon the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, who is back after having given us something of a fright a week ago.
Hear, hear!
I should like to welcome him sincerely on behalf of all the hon members on this side, and wish him everything of the best as far as his health is concerned.
Mr Chairman, while the Foreign Affairs Vote is being discussed here in the House of Assembly today, one of the greatest dramas of our day and age is being enacted in Maputo at this very moment. That, of course, is why the hon the Minister cannot be present in person here today. Accordingly he has asked me to apologise on his behalf to all hon members of all parties here. Hon members will realise that his absence today is the result of extraordinary circumstances. It is also the culmination of months of intensive negotiations, the outcome of which has been that the exchange has to take place on this particular day. I think this is the first time in ten years that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has not been able to be present in person for the debate on his Vote, and hon members will realise that it is a matter of deep regret for him; and also a very difficult situation. He has requested me to thank hon members sincerely, and in particular the hon Whips of the opposition parties, for being so accommodating by postponing the debate from last week to this week. However, at that stage no one could have thought that the final drama would take place on this specific day.
It has been agreed with the hon the Chief Whip of Parliament that the hon the Minister will be allowed a further thirty minutes tomorrow under the relevant vote, and all aspects that have not been dealt with by the adjournment today will be dealt with tomorrow by the hon the Minister himself.
This is the first time that I myself have had the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the Foreign Affairs Vote since my appointment as Deputy Minister in December last year. I should like to begin by thanking the hon the State President sincerely for the exceptional privilege he has accorded me, enabling me to attempt to make a modest contribution, in this highly interesting post, to project the reasonable voice of South Africa. It is my privilege to co-operate in this vote with the hon the Minister and to experience the weal and woe of the successes and the frustrations—there are many frustrations, too—of our diplomatic efforts. I also wish to thank him for the opportunity of meeting the most interesting people imaginable.
Permit me, too, right at the outset to convey my most cordial congratulations to the new Director-General of the department, Mr Neil van Heerden, and the new Deputy Director-General, Mr Glenn Babb, who are attending this discussion of the Vote today for the first time in their new capacities, and to thank them for their assistance. The same goes, too, for all the other staff members in Cape Town and Pretoria, but in particular to all those staff members throughout the world who often have to endure the acrimony of the world, often under difficult circumstances.
Today the department has just over 2 850 staff members abroad, 1 400 of whom were recruited locally. It is the task of this small but valiant band to try to convey South Africa’s efforts to create a new South Africa, to an often hostile world. I should like to pay tribute to these men and women who keep South Africa’s flag flying abroad.
While I am welcoming people I should also like to extend a welcome to our ambassadors in the TBVC countries, and pay tribute to Mr Marais Steyn who recently retired as ambassador in the Transkei. I also wish to extend a special word of welcome to Mr Gert Terblanche, former MP for Bloemfontein North, who is now ambassador in Transkei. [Interjections.]
The foreign affairs scene is of course totally overshadowed today by the events in Maputo. At this moment aircraft are heading for Maputo from different directions and the exchange is to take place in just over 90 minutes. If all goes well Maj Wynand du Toit will be home this evening, and we wish that family well in their happy reunion. [Interjections.] Of course these events have far, far wider implications than a mere family reunion. What happened in Maputo today is a triumph for the politics of negotiation. These events originated solely in South Africa. South Africa has always been in favour of negotiation and co-operation rather than confrontation and violence. There is nothing that we in Southern Africa want more than peace, stability and order. We should like peace to come to our neighbouring countries through negotiation. We should like to achieve peace in South Africa through negotiation—peaceful negotiation without violence.
I myself come from the private sector and the private sector is built on negotiation. There is no doubt in my mind that this is the solution for Southern Africa’s problems. If one considers what is happening in Maputo today and what gave rise to it, one sees that several countries of a diverse nature with differing principles and ideas came to a decision which has culminated in this event today. South Africa, Ciskei, Angola, Mozambique, Holland and France, plus Unita and the Red Cross, among whom there are tremendous differences, were after all able to come together and achieve this result. I want to say that if this could happen and could build up to what is happening in Maputo, then the same could happen in South Africa as far as the politics of negotiation are concerned.
There is a second lesson to be learned from today’s events, and that is the consequences for the stabilisation of the whole of Southern Africa. South Africa does not want to destabilise, as its enemies often contend. South Africa wants to stabilise because in that lies the only hope for this continent. South Africa is often accused of destabilisation, but if we really wanted to destabilise, then Escom need only throw one switch to leave a city like Maputo in the dark forever.
As far as Mozambique alone is concerned the RSA has already granted more than R100 million in loans and credits. We have established refrigeration facilities. We have sent them fresh food and fruit. One could carry on in this vein. We have helped them to upgrade Maputo harbour, and we are still getting a growing number of mineworkers whose salaries are partly paid in Maputo.
If we wanted to destabilise we could simply close the railway lines; it would be as easy as that. However, that is not what South Africa wants to do. We must not forget that Frelimo and Renamo at one stage occupied two rooms in the Union Building while Ministers shuttled between them in an effort to bring the two sides together. Surely that is not the work of destabilisers. Unfortunately the fact is that this aid is never mentioned in Mozambique. To an extent that is human, because they have derived so much benefit from acting in an unfriendly way towards South Africa that it is not funny.
There is a third lesson that can be learned from today’s events. From a macro-economic point of view it simply does not make sense to build up South Africa financially in a sea of poverty. This can only lead to the decline of our economy and our civilisation. The accumulative effect of a prosperous economic region can only be to the benefit of all of us. It is no use a person or a country or a people going to sleep in a warm bed with a full stomach if one’s neighbour is hungry and cold.
There is a fourth implication, which is that South Africa must and can solve its own problems. It is true that both the French and the Dutch played a part to some extent, but ultimately it was Southern Africa itself that was prepared to sit around a table and negotiate. What happened here was a pointer to the future.
There is a fifth implication. The Republic of South Africa has tried in various ways to persuade its neighbours over the past decades not to assist the ANC. However, experience has taught that the best way of surmounting this problem is in fact to have friendly relations with our neighbouring states. We have many examples of this around us today.
There is a sixth implication, and that is credibility. South Africa is often accused of lacking credibility. I think that this is a wonderful example of credibility. Trust creates trust, and that is exactly what has culminated in Maputo today.
In his announcement over the weekend the hon the State President paid tribute to various Ministers and heads of state for their role in these events. I want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to and thank our own State President as well for what is happening in Maputo today. The hon the State President and the Government have always believed in foreign and domestic negotiation. Today we are reaping the benefit of this policy. Various other persons have also earned our appreciation. The hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was the architect of this whole agreement, has already achieved stature overseas for his negotiating skill. By means of this agreement today he has achieved a diplomatic tour de force.
For his share in this process President Sebe of Ciskei deserves recognition for his statesmanship. Dr Savimbi deserves praise as a negotiator, a stabiliser and—hon members who are acquainted with him, know this—as one of Africa’s best leaders. Up to the present we have not yet met President Chissano, but he has shown that the Nkomati Accord is not dead. By his share in this agreement he has increased his international status as well. President Dos Santos, Prime Minister Chirac of France and the Dutch deserve appreciation for their negotiating skills and their perseverance.
What is happening in Maputo today is a breakthrough for the politics of negotiation. The policy of the NP has always been to talk, to negotiate and to sit around a table, but then there must be a preparedness on both sides to seek solutions in peace, sincerity and honesty.
What happened in Maputo today can and must usher in a new era in Southern Africa. To me the message of Maputo today is one of reason as against one of conflict. When I say that it ushers in a new era I have not the slightest doubt that one of our greatest and most important tasks is to be able to live in peace with the people, the nations and the countries around us. I have little doubt that the success of our contact with our neighbours will be decisive in the normalisation of our foreign relations and for that reason we are trying to go out of our way to make the necessary contacts.
The mistaken impression exists that South Africa is relatively isolated here on the southern tip of the continent. In practice the opposite is true. There are more than 50 independent states in Africa. Most of them are members of the OAU and endorse the implementation of sanctions against the RSA.
I have before me the latest statistics relating to the RSA’s trade with Africa, and I should like hon members to guess how many of those countries do not trade with South Africa. There is precisely one. Last year there were still two, but one of those two has now also begun to trade with us. Our total exports to these regions have increased by 90% over the past two years.
As far as I am concerned, interdependence is the keyword. I do not for a moment wish to say that South Africa can be the saviour of the continent, but with its strong economy and its will to be successful, South Africa can undoubtedly help to bring about peace in interdependence with the countries around it.
The ideal—our greatest task in Africa—is to create the perception that the RSA wants to extend the hand of friendship to the entire continent and make a contribution towards escaping from the impoverishment and starvation of the post-colonial era.
The question is how this can be done. I hope that we shall find the solution to that question in this debate today.
Mr Chairman, I want to congratulate the hon the Deputy Minister on his appointment to that post. It is a very important appointment, and I want to wish him everything of the best in the performance of his duties. On our part we also wish to convey our sincere congratulations to Mr Neil van Heerden on his appointment as Director-General, and wish him everything of the best. His post is a very demanding one, and South Africa expects a great deal of him.
†I also wish to record our appreciation to Mr Ray Killen who served as Director-General of the department for a short term. He is an able diplomat for whom I personally have a high regard. We wish him well in the very important position he has taken up in the meantime as Ambassador to the Court of St James.
*We also appreciate the fact that the hon the Minister cannot be present today. I do think there needs to be a more adequate reason than the handing over of Maj Wynand du Toit.
We, too, would like to express our rejoicing at the release of the major. He bore the burden of being a prisoner of war with dignity. We can only have the vaguest idea of what he went through. It was a terrible experience for him and his wife. We want to express the confidence that he will speedily adapt and adjust again in South Africa and that the reunion with his wife will be joyful and permanent. His release was worth the price paid. As far as the release of De Jonge is concerned—I shall let this suffice, because one of my own colleagues will refer to it further—it is a matter of good riddance to bad rubbish.
Do you agree, Alex?
Mr Chairman, South Africa is the dominant power in Southern Africa today. Indeed, it is a regional power. It is most likely that the CP’s perception and the Government’s perception of how South Africa should play its role here differ. I gather from what the hon the Deputy Minister has just said that the Government’s perception is apparently that the approach should be a holistic one. However, the CP’s perception is that there should be completely independent sovereign states co-operating in matters of mutual interest, and following a policy of non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs.
Economic interdependence is a matter that can be debated, but political independence is not negotiable. However, I do not want to labour this point today.
Over a long period South Africa has made tremendous contributions to the development and well-being of all the inhabitants of this region. For example, our neighbouring states are not only linked to the South African transport system’s network but they also benefit from the management and maintenance services provided by the SATS to such an extent that, I make so bold as to say, without this assistance it is very probable that their own services would be non-existent. Similarly, our neighbours benefit from our health, veterinary, agricultural, economic and industrial know-how and availability.
What is more, they know full well that they have only to ask and they will get a positive response from South Africa.
Similarly, South Africa—and here I emphasize that it is the South Africa as it is still constituted today, namely as a State where the White man’s guidance and influence prevail and where this is recognised and safeguarded—is an indispensable member of the Western community of nations. It is that first of all in the sense that it is the main stabilizing factor in this part of the world. I think the hon the Deputy Minister made mention of that too. This stabilizing factor can only be maintained, however, if South Africa remains internally more or less the same as it has been over the past decades—with the exception, of course, that the other nations in South Africa should be enabled to become independent and sovereign in their right.
I said South Africa is also an indispensable member of the Western community of nations because of its importance to the community’s economy, both as supplier and as buyer. At present the importance of South Africa manifests itself more because of its strategic situation in any defence system of the West, be it land, sea or air. This important aspect of South Africa, which has been played down a lot lately, manifests itself today specifically in the exchange taking place in Maputo now, and generally in the situation that is developing in the Persian Gulf.
I know that outside and inside South Africa, in the State Department and in the Foreign Office, people often scoffed when the strategic importance of South Africa was mentioned. South Africa has a strategic importance in any Western defence system and we cannot deny South Africa’s importance if matters should worsen in the Gulf and even if only one ship should be sunk in the Suez Canal. Therefore—not in the sense of blackmail, but purely as a matter of self-respect, right and pride—South Africa should make it known that she will no longer tolerate abuse and harassment either from our immediate neighbours or from those further away.
*I think I am linking up with what the hon the Deputy Minister said when I asked that we tell the world at this point that with White influence and self-determination guaranteed in South Africa, the West has an ally it can rely on; without that it simply has yet another African burden on its shoulders. If that statement is paternalistic, then it will just have to be paternalistic.
At the same time I believe we can consider becoming a little less closely attached to the West. Academics are currently writing a great deal about South Africa’s situation in the world community. One of the words used nowadays in the writings of the academics is the word “pariah”. It is said that South Africa is a pariah state. Examples are then mentioned of the symptoms of a pariah state. For example there is the weak diplomatic bargaining power of such a state and its increased vulnerability owing to a lack of reliable support by major powers. The economic systems of pariah states are predominantly free-market orientated and they regard themselves as important international trading partners. They usually place considerable emphasis on their strategic situation, presenting it as of decisive strategic importance for the West in particular. It is also said that pariah states are always waging a struggle against isolation.
Order! I regret to inform the hon member that his time has expired.
Mr Chairman, I rise merely to afford the hon member the opportunity of completing his speech.
Mr Chairman, I thank the hon NP Whip.
South Africa is not a pariah state. It is striking that specifically in this diagnosis of the symptoms of pariah states reference is made to the emphasis they place on their “so-called” strategic situation. This shows very clearly that this is the kind of argument that comes from a source that wants to turn South Africa into a pariah state. It is said that South Africa is trying to present itself as being of great strategic importance. As I have already said, what is going on in the Persian Gulf at present, confirms beyond all doubt that South Africa has strategic importance. Our strategic importance is a fact. Therefore I think we can say to our friends in the West, particularly the “Big Brother Friend”, that we insist being treated with the respect and esteem that we are entitled to as a result of our strategic importance.
I want to take this further and say that in the context of the West, too, we should not put all our eggs in one basket. As far as I am concerned, it still makes very good sense to keep our relations with the old part of the West as sound and healthy as possible.
On the one hand there may be an effort to isolate South Africa, but on the other South Africa may of its own accord say that it is going to withdraw a little from the hurly-burly from the international scene, not closing down or withdrawing totally but doing so to such extent that it is not so prominently in the limelight.
I think that as far as diplomatic relations are concerned, South Africa can say to our friends and to some of their diplomats here, those who are accredited here, that they should act and conduct themselves as diplomats in South Africa. I do not think we have to put up with statements such as those made in particular by a specific Ambassador before his arrival in South Africa and after his departure. There is a specific area in which diplomatic missions can move in South Africa and if they overstep those bounds we must step in and insist that normal diplomatic conventions are upheld. Just as Britain and Moscow will not tolerate any overstepping of those diplomatic bounds I do not think South Africa should tolerate them either.
I have almost finished. I see that there is considerable speculation in the weekend Press about the Soviet attitude to South Africa, which is moderating. That was in yesterday’s Sunday Times and in one of the daily newspapers earlier in the week. This is interesting speculation. We should like to hear the hon the Deputy Minister or the Minister himself say something about this. An Eastern diplomat once said to me: “When you sup with the devil, you must use a long spoon.” We must bear that in mind when we are faced with this situation.
Mr Chairman, I would like to say that we, on this side of the House, are obviously delighted at and indeed very appreciative of the prospect of the release of Maj Wynand du Toit. We appreciate the role played by the South African Government in this gesture of peace and co-operation in this part of the world.
We on this side of the House echo the sentiments expressed by our State President regarding the exclusion of the self-interest pursued by foreign powers in this subcontinent. We sincerely hope and pray that what is hopefully transpiring today will only be an introduction to the normalisation of good neighbourliness and peace and tranquility in Southern Africa.
What is so important is that negotiation remains the key word. We would like to add our best wishes to Maj Wynand du Toit and express our sincere hope that he will shortly be reunited with his family—a well-deserved reunion. This again proves that this NP Government will not let down the soldiers who are fighting the cause of South Africa.
Mr Chairman, since the last Budget Vote on Foreign Affairs in May 1986, we have had some structural changes to which I should also like to refer. Firstly, we welcome the new Deputy Minister, Mr Kobus Meiring, to this portfolio. We sincerely hope that the good relations already established with this side of the House will even improve. We also appreciate that he has been thrown into the deep end today with the absence of the hon the Minister, but we are confident that he will do his job as well as he always does.
Secondly, Sir, we welcome the new Director-General, Mr Neil van Heerden, whom we know as a well-balanced, articulate diplomat in the South African context. We have already made use of his wisdom and of his particular knowledge of foreign affairs, which, we sincerely hope, will always be available to parliamentarians. We also want to welcome his right-hand man, the new Deputy Director-General for Africa, Mr Glen Babb, on whom we rely heavily with regard to what I would describe as the most important issue, viz that of Southern African relationships, in particular in this part of the world. Furthermore we should like to pay our respects to the previous Director-General, Mr Ray Killen, and we also wish him well in his very important new job in London.
Thirdly, Sir, I should like to pay a special tribute to my predecessor as chief spokesman on Foreign Affairs of the NP. At the same time I want to wish Ambassador Gert Terblanche and his good wife all the very best and good luck in Umtata, in Transkei. Simultaneously, Sir, I want to congratulate the hon member for Soutpansberg. Although he is not the new spokesman of the CP, he is now the new chief spokesman of the Official Opposition. Furthermore, I want to congratulate my good friend the hon member for Berea, who, I believe, is now the chief spokesman on Foreign Affairs for the PFP.
Mr Chairman, last but not least, it is my great pleasure, particularly today, to express the heartfelt gratitude and the sincere appreciation of hon members on this side to the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs for his tireless efforts to improve South Africa’s relations with the rest of the world, and in particular with Southern Africa. This is undoubtedly the most thankless portfolio any hon Minister could possibly hold in South Africa. He is a man who has to deal with the double standards applied against this country, a man who has to contend with the lack of acknowledgement of the socio-economic and political reform which is taking place in South Africa, a man who has to deal with the exploitation of every negative issue in its ugliest and most severe form. We hail him and we thank him for his continuous efforts to fight off the relentless attempts from so many quarters to promote only the ANC while rejecting and belittling the most deserving moderate Black leaders in South Africa. It is in the light of this that we hail him and his hon Deputy Minister, the department and our diplomatic staff for a job well done on behalf of South Africa.
The hon member for Soutpansberg did not speak very long. I believe, however, he did not say anything about which I should want to argue with him today. The hon member gave an example of the importance of South Africa to the Western World, and in particular to Southern Africa. We have no dispute with that. On the solutions he holds out, however, for our internal situation, I can only say that that will involve a debate which we will be prepared to conduct with him during the discussion later this week of the Vote of the hon the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. The hon member pleaded for a more non-aligned situation as far as South Africa was concerned. Unfortunately, Sir, no country in this world can prosper in isolation. We have stated this categorically from the Government side. We have heard it said so often that we in this country will not allow ourselves to be dictated to by the outside world in relation to the finding of solutions to our internal problems. If that was what the hon member meant, I believe we could still talk with him about the issue. We cannot, however, afford to abandon our friends, and we still have friends in the outside world whom we must look after and cherish for the benefit of South Africa.
Sir, I should like to turn now to the important role which South Africa plays and can play in the peaceful and prosperous development of this sub-continent. The hon the Deputy Minister has already referred to this matter, and I am very pleased with the way in which this Government is handling that particular problem. We believe the Government is sincere in its efforts in this regard and we appreciate what is being done. The hon the State President, during the discussion of his Vote, pointed out the Nkomati type of accord was the ideal example of how South Africa should like to associate with its neighbours.
I should like to deal with the example of the multilateral co-operation within the South African TBVC situation, which I believe is proof of the already-established solid mutual relationship of trust. That shows the benefits which can be derived by countries in and around South Africa from the involvement of this country. Should other African states south of the Sahara, with the encouragement of the West, allow South Africa to enter into Nkomati-type accords or the TBVC type of multilateral co-operation with them, one can imagine how beneficial that could be to this continent that we live in. Compare the results of Southern Africa to the futile and fruitless attempts from within the Organisation of African Unity. Only with confidence and only with proper communication can meaningful development take place in this part of the world.
Facts speak for themselves. Two basic issues by which South Africa and the TBVC countries—which are so heavily criticised by those who are ill-informed about South Africa and are continuously trying to criticise South Africa—can be judged are the economy and the literacy rate in this part of the world. I want to refer to the 1983 per capita gross national product in US dollars according to a document in my possession. Region-wise, West African countries have an average gross national product per capita of a mere $582; East Africa as a region, an average of $293; Central Africa, an average of $398. Compare this to Southern Africa—of which South Africa is the major component—where the figure is $2 271. That includes the RSA, the TBVC countries, the BLS countries as well as South West Africa-Namibia.
South Africa’s influence in Southern Africa is phenomenal. When one looks at the RSA’s situation, including TBVC, one sees that the gross national product per capita amounts to $2 450, compared to Botswana, $920; Lesotho, $470; Swaziland, $890; and South West Africa, $1 760. The latest figures—those for 1985—relating to the TBVC countries, show the following. In Transkei, the per capita gross national product amounts to $448; Bophuthatswana, $598; Venda, $442; and Ciskei, $509.
I mention these figures because it is interesting that the TBVC figures and the BLS figures are all higher than the average for both the East and the Central African regions on this continent that we live on.
Order! I regret to inform the hon member that his time has expired.
I am merely rising to give the hon member an opportunity to complete his speech.
I thank the hon Chief Whip.
†They are also virtually on a par with, and in three cases higher than, the average in West Africa. Countries that could in fact benefit from the healthy South African influence are, inter alia, countries situated close to South Africa in the eastern region—countries like Madagascar, with a per capita gross national product of $290; Malawi, with only $210; Mozambique, no figure even available; Tanzania, $240; Zambia, $580; and Zimbabwe, $740. In the Central African regions there are Angola, with no figure available, and Zaїre, with a mere $160. All these have figures below that of the Republic of South Africa, including the TBVC countries, the BLS countries and South West Africa. Factual figures prove the type of interstate relations which can be beneficial to Southern Africa.
Now we come to the literacy situation. There are 10 African countries with a literacy rate of below 10%; 11 between 10% and 20%; 13 between 20% and 30%; 6 between 30% and 40%; 3 between 40% and 50%; another 3 between 50% and 60%; and 2 between 60% and 70%.
That accounts for almost all of the nearly 50 independent African states to which the hon the Deputy Minister referred and South Africa has a figure of 89% as far as literacy is concerned.
Including Blacks?
Of course, everybody!
Furthermore, for the edification of the hon member for Groote Schuur, the literacy rate of the TBVC countries is 66%, which is 24% higher than that of the BLS countries, which is 42%.
The reason why I quote these figures is because this side of the House contends that the influence and importance of South Africa’s infrastructure in Southern Africa can be to the benefit of the entire region if the outside world, in the words of the hon the State President, would exclude themselves from this region and not force their self-interest on this part of the world.
The question remains—and that question has been posed time and again by the hon the State President and by the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs—which African “model” should South Africa follow. Which African model in respect of only these two issues, viz economic strength and literacy rate, should South Africa follow? All of these states are free but poor, free but bankrupt, free but hungry and free but economically ruined. Knowledgeable people talk about sub-Saharan Africa as the poorest region in the world. They talk about a sub-Saharan tragedy which is taking place at the moment. All that we on this side of the House are pleading for is that the RSA-TBVC model should be given a chance in this region. In this part of the world very close co-operation is taking place at ministerial level, at director-general level and at senior official level. The Development Bank of Southern Africa was established as a result of this multilateral system. A permanent Secretariat for Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa has developed out of this system of multilateral co-operation in South Africa. A large-scale transfer of knowledge and skills takes place by an intensive programme of negotiation. We on this side of the House pay tribute to the South African Government for their achievements in this regard.
I want to conclude with an appeal to the opposition, the Press and the private sector in this country and to all our diplomats and their staff abroad to use their influence together with the RSA-TBVC countries to promote closer co-operation on the sub-continent of Africa. Together we can prosper and keep the self-interest, interference and the abuse of the forces of communism out of this part of the world.
Mr Chairman, I wish to claim the privilege of the half-hour.
I want to commence by welcoming the hon the Deputy Minister to this post. As he has reminded us, this is the first time that he will participate in this capacity in the discussion of the Budget Vote of Foreign Affairs. We on this side know him by his manner and by his personality to be someone who should be very well qualified to fill what is a very sensitive post in a very sensitive department. We wish him well in his career as Deputy Minister in this portfolio.
I should also like to join other speakers in welcoming the new Director-General, Mr Van Heerden, and his deputy to their posts and to wish them well in the performance of their duties in what are very arduous posts.
I should also like to congratulate the hon member for Turffontein on his appointment as chairman of the Foreign Affairs group of the Government party.
I shall come back presently to some of the aspects raised by the hon member for Turffontein and particularly his commitment to the Nkomati Accord and to the spirit of negotiation which is represented by that accord. Other speakers on this side will deal with the question of the TBVC countries and their responsibility in the overall situation in Southern Africa.
I want to deal with a matter which is of great importance and topical interest at this stage, viz the prisoner exchange.
I want to say that the exchange, as announced in the Press this morning and again by the hon the Deputy Minister this afternoon, will clearly lead to a great deal of satisfaction in many respects in South Africa. I think that everyone who was involved in what was obviously a delicate and protracted negotiation deserves to be commended for his efforts.
I think the immediate and primary reaction of many South Africans will be a human one of joy and relief over the release and return of Maj Wynand du Toit after being held captive in Angola for over two years, and his reunion with his family. We in these benches wish to associate ourselves with the good wishes which will flow to the Du Toit family at this time on their release from the trauma, the tension and the anxiety which they have obviously suffered for so many months. We wish them well in the future.
The release of Maj Wynand du Toit, satisfying as it is to South Africans on purely humanitarian grounds, is, however, only one facet of what the exchange of prisoners means to us in this region. There are two other factors of broader national significance. In the first place there is the immense diplomatic relief for South Africa in respect of its association with the Netherlands and France respectively, arising out of the situations relating to Mr Klaas de Jonge and Mr Pierre Albertini. I think the governments of all three countries will be greatly relieved that what was a very delicate situation which almost seemed to have reached an impasse, has been removed from the problems on the agendas of those countries. In many ways I think all three countries have been let off the hook in what, as I said, was an extremely difficult situation. From that point of view, the exchange is obviously a very great plus factor in our foreign affairs at the present time.
The other impact of what is taking place in Maputo at present is what I see as the restoration of a degree of hope that even in a severely troubled region such as this Southern African region, the power of diplomacy can apparently still be effective in preserving some sanity and moderation when it comes to dealing with human values.
That is perhaps the most encouraging message from the exchange which is presently taking place.
When one considers—I noted the remarks of the hon the Deputy Minister in this regard, and he is correct—the background of the relationships of the various parties to the arrangement with each other, the point about this being an achievement for the power of diplomacy is made very effectively. One thinks of our already strained relationships with France, which were severely aggravated by the Albertini affair, and the status of the Ciskeian authorities in the whole matter. One thinks similarly of our diplomatic association with the Government of the Netherlands—never an easy one in recent decades—which has been strained considerably by the whole question of Mr Klaas de Jonge. I think that both governments—as I have said—must be relieved that that strain is now a thing of the past. Add to these international components the regional components involved in the exchange, namely the Angolan Government, the Unita movement, the Government of Maputo and the South African Government—disparate influences, if ever there were disparate influences—then one’s hopes for the power of diplomacy in resolving issues must increase. So, we recognise all these aspects in what has been announced today.
Although the issue was limited to the exchange of a limited number of people, one wonders if it is too much to hope that in future the major issues which threaten continued conflict in this region can be resolved in a similar manner. We in this party have always been deeply committed to the principle of real negotiation in resolving both the domestic and the outside problems of South Africa. We believe in this and it is fundamental to our thinking and our philosophy when we look at the problems which afflict South Africa internally and externally.
We also believe, certainly insofar as our external relationships are concerned, that there is a great need for quiet diplomacy. We believe that the less we are involved in empty posturing, the better. We believe that the more we reduce fiery rhetoric in dealing with issues, the greater chance there will be of resolving the conflicts within this region, and resolving South Africa’s international problems generally. That is why I must say that we are very often concerned about the style and attitude of the Government in its conduct of foreign affairs. Despite the commitment to continued negotiation, which I noted and welcomed by both the hon the Deputy Minister and the hon member for Turffontein, I believe their style in the past has been considerably lacking in bringing about effective negotiation in this part of Africa. I am sorry that the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot be with us himself this afternoon, because I must say that he very often is the chief culprit when it comes to producing fiery and often irresponsible rhetoric and indulging in futile posturing.
Must you ruin a friendship?
I am not ruining a friendship at all, as my hon friend says. I have said this to hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs in previous debates, and I do not think that his style has changed a great deal since then.
I want to say that he is often rivalled in this attitude of posturing and fiery rhetoric by his colleague the hon the Minister of Defence, who does not make our diplomatic tasks any easier with some of the utterances he makes in his capacity as Minister of Defence. So, while I welcome the Government’s continued commitment to the principle of negotiation, as stated by both the Government speakers, I believe that there is an urgent need for us to review totally our diplomatic strategy and tactics in connection with the situation which exists in the Southern African region at the present time.
One of the first lessons we should learn from this is that we should resist the temptation to try to make short-term party-political gains out of delicate international issues.
This is a matter in respect of which the Government and the hon the Minister himself can be criticized, because very often one suspects that for the sake of a local internal audience in South Africa he adopts a posturing position which I believe is detrimental to our international interests.
In my opinion we must by now accept that whether we like it or not, our international problems arise out of our internal policies. They are the consistent and invariable factors which bedevil our relations with our neighbours in Africa, as well as the rest of the international community. We must realize this and I am sure that our Department of Foreign Affairs realizes that it is the internal policies of South Africa which are the root cause of most of the problems with which South Africa is afflicted in so far as our relationship with the international community is concerned.
In this respect one must immediately have sympathy with those charged with formulating and forging diplomatic links and improving our international standing, because the race policies of this Government are an ever-present impediment of enormous proportions to their efforts.
However, I believe that even within the confines of this impediment we must show far more finesse and sensitivity in our dealings with others, particularly in the region of Southern Africa. We should much more often take into account the perceptions which others in Africa have of us as an African power, because particularly in relation to foreign affairs one is often dealing with images and perceptions.
In this regard we must not underestimate the extent to which this country’s economic, technological and military powers overshadow those of its neighbours. We know, for example, that our gross domestic product in the RSA is four times that of the eight member states of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference that have combined to try to oppose South Africa’s economic dominance in the Southern African region. Our GDP is four times that of the eight member states involved.
The result is that we may be seen—and we are being seen—as a nation in Southern Africa with considerable power in this region. While we can take pride in that fact—we know it is a fact—the perception as to how we use that power and strength becomes, I think, all important. When one looks at what has been experienced in other regions, one realises that more often than not a preeminently strong regional power is rarely popular with the weaker communities and countries surrounding it. In this regard one can think of Nigeria, or the USA for that matter. Strength and power are very often resented by the smaller nations around those strong countries.
As I have already said, we clearly have an impediment regarding our foreign policy, arising out of our domestic policy. At all costs we must, however, not add to that by trying to heighten a perception arising about this country outside South Africa where we are viewed with fear by our neighbours as a dangerous and unpredictable bully, intent upon destabilising, impoverishing or intimidating our neighbouring countries. This is a danger, and this is a perception existing outside of South Africa. It is a fact that our enemies even now depict South Africa as a much greater menace than the Soviet Union insofar as international matters in the Southern African region is concerned.
I believe our reaction to this must be actively to forge bonds of co-operation in every possible sphere in Southern Africa, and in particular in the economic and trade spheres in this region. We have to be seen as doing everything possible to avoid the polarisation which appears to be overtaking us so often in this region.
This brings me to an issue the hon the Deputy Minister touched on himself, namely the very sensitive area of destabilisation. This debate has been taking place over a decade, I suppose, with allegations and counterallegations on all sides as to who is doing the destabilising. Because of the reasons which I have stated, South Africa must not in any way be involved in any activities which may be considered as contributing towards the destabilisation of our neighbouring states. As I have said, that merely serves to encourage the accusation that we are the bullies in this part of Southern Africa.
For this reason I want to say that the statement made last June by the hon the Minister of Defence, for example, to whom I referred earlier, that South Africa is prepared to give assistance to rebel groups in our neighbouring states, was highly irresponsible. I think it must have been a great embarrassment to the whole of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In what was seen by observers on all sides to be a definite reference to the Renamo movement in Mozambique and to Unita in Angola, the hon the Minister of Defence said:
Gen Malan, the hon the Minister of Defence, then went on to ask whether South Africa could be expected to withhold such support because it might be accused of destabilisation, and he came to the conclusion that we would not withhold that support.
These comments were made only a few days after Dr Chester Crocker had told a Senate subcommittee that South Africa continued to support Renamo in spite of the Nkomati Accord, and had been responsible for the recent raid on Maputo which had left three people dead. Dr Chester Crocker’s testimony before that Senate subcommittee on that occasion was attacked immediately by our hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs as being unfactual and unfounded. He attacked that statement, but a few days later his Cabinet colleague, the hon the Minister of Defence, made the statements to which I have referred, lending credence to the statement that South Africa was in fact not above involving itself in destabilisation tactics regarding our neighbouring states. It is this sort of posturing which does South Africa no good regarding our relations with our neighbours and/or the international community.
I believe that statements of this kind must tend to destroy our credibility, as do some of the statements made by the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs on local issues, when it suits the needs of his party. I think these are sensitive matters and I believe, as does the hon the Minister, that if he is sincere and he believes—which I think he does—that we should not involve ourselves in destabilisation, we have to take a very hard look at the kind of image we have at present outside South Africa. I believe this requires a review of our entire strategy and our tactics so that we may pursue a policy that can produce a degree of the co-operation and peace we all seek within this region.
Mr Chairman, the hon member for Berea made a calm and collected speech here today. I would not like to become involved in a dogfight with the hon member. I, too, am certainly looking forward to the day when we shall successfully solve our major problems on the subcontinent, and our domestic problems, too.
I should also like to thank the hon member for the kind words he expressed towards the officials, the hon the Deputy Minister, and my colleague the hon member for Turffontein. I must, however, take issue with the hon member on one point and that is that I think the international scene is a little more complex than merely the internal policies of this country. I do agree with the hon member that our internal policies are certainly a bone of contention.
I do not think we as South Africans should shy away from explaining and debating our point of view, and telling people what we are trying to achieve in this country. However, one should remember that there are, I think, almost four shades of opinion viz people who demand that we dismantle apartheid; people who demand that we include Black South Africans in the decision-making process of this country; people who demand a constitutional dispensation of one man, one vote; or—short and sweet—that we should hand over power to certain power cliques.
I think, with great respect, that as far as the third and fourth options are concerned, we certainly cannot be seen to be talking or negotiating with such groups, or embarking on those particular courses of action. However, as far as the first and second options are concerned, namely the dismantling of apartheid and the participation by Blacks in the decision-making that affects their lives, that must surely be our case. We on these benches say it certainly is.
In this regard I should like to associate myself with the sentiments expressed by Maj Wynand du Toit—they were brought to our attention again this weekend in the Press—when he categorically stated that apartheid was not our case. This was said by the hon the State President as long ago as 30 September 1985 and reiterated on 31 January 1986 when he said that the concept of apartheid was outdated and that all South Africans should be in a position to participate in government through their elected representatives.
Apartheid is alive and well, Leon!
The hon member says that apartheid is alive and well. Sure, we are not arguing on that score. We are saying that we have not yet achieved our objectives and our goals. We are also saying that we have come a long way and we still have a long way to go. That is our objective. [Interjections.]
Let me say to the hon member that one must appreciate that South Africa’s domestic policies have become a bone of contention in the domestic politics of other countries in the respect that no politician, whether he be from the USA, Britain, Germany, France or wherever, can be seen to be taking sides with anything that they perceive to have racial connotations. It is no longer a case of judging us in isolation, therefore, but the way they perceive us in respect of their own domestic policies. In that respect we certainly have a very complex situation to deal with.
*I should like to bring two matters to the attention of the hon the Deputy Minister. When we talk about the fluctuating relations which exist between South Africa and Western countries, specifically the USA, I actually want to issue a word of warning that we must not have a simplistic approach towards this. Many South Africans are of the opinion that one can sum up America’s attitude towards us in what takes shape in Trans-Africa through the mouth of Randall Robertson or what takes shape in Britain through the antiapartheid movements.
I feel any person who adopts that standpoint is not only over-simplifying matters but is also failing to understand the reality. As far as I can see the shades of opinion vary from extremely hostile to so friendly that it is almost an embarrassment to us. I therefore believe our target must be those people who are experts on South Africa’s problems and those people who are sympathetic towards South Africa.
When one also takes into consideration that the ANC and many other organisations have now challenged us in the diplomatic sphere, one must realise that we are dealing with a well-orchestrated effort with people whose aim it is to establish a government in exile as it were. Now we must develop a counterstrategy.
The American system is particularly complex, and because we are on the eve of their next session of Congress during which further punitive measures may possibly be imposed against South Africa, I should like to refresh the memory of the hon the Deputy Minister and remind him of a visit a group of Parliamentarians made to that country in 1985.
I am of the opinion that we cannot allow such a long period of time to elapse before two things happen. In the first place politicians in that country must be exposed to the ideas of politicians in this country; and in the second place we cannot allow a generation of politicians on the back benches—with all due respect to my hon colleagues in those benches—to experience all these frustrations on their way to the front benches, before they have been given the opportunity, on the one hand to be exposed to the ideas of overseas politicians and, in the second place to have practiced and become skilled in putting South Africa’s case.
I think there are two constructively critical remarks I want to make. In the first place such a delegation must never leave South Africa again if some members of that delegation are not Black. I am not advocating a Dakar safari or an impressive group of people as regards numbers, but I am asking for a small task force. There need not necessarily be a representative of every political party in this country in every group, but Black people must form part of that delegation.
In the second place it must also consist of important people, not as regards numbers, but as regards the quality of participation. They must be able to make a contribution in respect of the business world, academically and so on. I think in this way we can inform our friends and see for ourselves how complex the system is against which we are working. We can take cognisance of what the opinion makers say about us. At the same time the interaction between the South Africans in that group will certainly be of the greatest importance.
Mr Chairman, may I ask the hon member a question.
Mr Chairman, I only have two minutes at my disposal and I want to mention another point. The hon member must please excuse me.
The final point I want to mention to the hon the Deputy Minister concerns cultural treaties, cultural relations and cultural attachés. I am well aware that cultural attachés are administered by another department, but also that the Department of Foreign Affairs is that organisation’s patron department.
I want to address myself specifically to the TBVC states, and bring the tremendous goodwill which exists in those states to the attention of hon members. These Black neighbouring states sell their cultural products to overseas countries through interaction and the tremendous desire to learn more about one another’s history and culture. The tremendous respect which a country like Bophuthatswana has for Afrikaans as an official language is apparent from the way in which it is used in official notes and documents.
I think one is entitled at least to make out a case for the department giving attention to the idea of appointing people who are eager and expert and trained to improve cultural relations between these states and us. Even if these appointments are only on a temporary basis, this will leave highly paid officials, such as ambassadors and diplomats, with more time to perform other tasks. I think this can be advantageous and profitable to both us and the respective countries.
Mr Chairman, I listened attentively to the contribution made by the hon member for Krugersdorp. I associate myself with the sentiments which he expressed here and which can be regarded as an extremely constructive contribution to this debate. On this occasion I also want to associate myself with the words of welcome to the hon the Deputy Minister in this capacity, and also those to the officials who have been promoted.
The hon the Minister deserves our congratulations for one of the biggest and most important international exchange operations ever undertaken, an operation which is taking place today. He also deserves our unconditional thanks for his tireless services to all our people, services which he has rendered in the international sphere in the interests of South Africa.
These events, particularly as far as Mr De Jonge is concerned, have again focused attention on the question of diplomatic immunity. [Interjections.] The basis of diplomatic immunity resides in the doctrine of exterritoriality, its representative character and its functional necessity. The International Law Commission, which dealt with this whole question, basically divides this immunity up into three categories, that relating to premises and archives, that relating to the work of the mission, and that relating to personal immunity and privileges.
South Africa is known for the fact that it conducts its international relations in strict accordance with the rules of the game, honouring the international conventions, even though it was not a co-signatory to some of those conventions. Apart from the Vienna Convention, there are statutory provisions of this Parliament dealing with certain aspects of diplomatic immunity. It is specifically section 9 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act which makes provision for the fact that in spite of restrictive and other legal provisions, diplomats are entitled to acquire and/or occupy land or property wherever they wish, on condition, however, that this is exclusively employed for the purposes of the chancellery, office or residence of the relevant diplomat or rightful owner.
In the course of time, and with the increasing employment of diplomats of colour by Western countries, and also the extension of our diplomatic services to countries in Africa which have declared their independence, with more Black governments and officials, more Black envoys and envoys of colour have been sent to South Africa. I think the time has come for less of a fuss to be made by certain people here in South Africa about this reality.
We are part of the international world, and it does nothing whatsoever to promote our image abroad and our relations with the outside world if we make a great fuss of the fact that these diplomats live in White areas. Society must develop a greater understanding of these international rules. I am convinced that an understanding of these principles would also result in an understanding of the fact that the children of diplomats are permitted to attend White schools.
Perhaps it is a good thing for attention to be focused on the fact that South Africa also employs diplomats of colour to do work of outstanding quality. It would therefore be a good thing for us to pay tribute to them and express our gratitude for the selfless way in which they put South Africa’s case to the outside world.
Diplomatic immunity has never meant that diplomats can involve themselves in activities aimed at undermining the government of the country to which they are sent. A diplomat is specifically an envoy who acts as an intermediary between his head of state and the head of state of the country to which he is sent. Section 41 of the Vienna Convention of 1961 specifically provides:
The provision goes on to state:
The Vienna Convention also takes into consideration how each country’s security situation should be dealt with, and off-limits areas for diplomats are also acknowledged. Section 26 reads as follows:
A misconception that sometimes exists is that diplomatic immunity with regard to certain premises means that an envoy is entitled to harbour a criminal. For the sake of clarity, I should like to quote what the writer, B Sen, an authority in the sphere of international law, a senior advocate in the Supreme Court of India and law adviser to the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs, says in his work, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, page 95, under the heading “Surrender of Criminals Taking Shelter within the Mission Premises”:
It is, however, contrary to the convention for the receiving state to enter the premises and remove the criminal. If a country is complying with the rules, the state who has sent the envoy will immediately hand over such a criminal or allow for his removal. In regard to the De Jonge incident, it was again South Africa and the hon the Minister who consistently acted with dignity.
With the increasing involvement of the Press and other media in the foreign policy of various countries, diplomats are constantly being exposed to the scrutiny of the general community by an inquisitorial type of reporting. South Africa is no exception; on the contrary, our diplomats are exposed to such scrutiny to a greater extent, even being exposed to verbal attacks and condemnation. At times outsiders are hypocritical and are then party to this condemnation. Meeting this challenge necessitates greater professional training, background experience, insight and a greater rounding-off of presentational skills. For the work our diplomats do, and the way in which they perform their duties, they deserve the utmost praise.
With the increasing violence throughout the world, and the concomitant hostility towards South Africa, our diplomats are in the firing line. They are put to the test mentally by the threats of violence, even against themselves. Apart from a large number of peaceful demonstrations at our embassies since April 1986, there have also been reports of numerous telephonic bomb threats in several cities. Those who do not regard these threats seriously are being foolish. It is specifically after repeated idle threats that security measures are relaxed and it is easy for the assailants to strike. Some missions have also had instances of damage to property. Although the aggressors or criminals have their own motives for the actions they take, in accordance with the convention a special duty is imposed upon a state to take the necessary steps to protect the premises of missions in their countries and to prevent inroads being made, those mission premises being damaged or their dignity being encroached upon. That is why it is so lamentable that as recently as 25 August of this year—very recently, as it happens—there was a demonstration at the embassy in Athens by approximately 2 000 students and members of left-wing organisations. In spite of a strong police presence, window panes were smashed and demonstrators were apparently permitted to write anti-South African slogans on the walls of the building. [Time expired.]
Mr Chairman, I think we can all associate ourselves with the idea that there are certain rights and privileges attaching to a diplomat’s period of residence in a specific country, and also to the relevant embassies. I nevertheless think that we would also agree that such an embassy, and the relevant embassy staff, are not free to undermine law and order in the country concerned or to attempt to subvert the country’s social or political structures. I think that our recent experience with Mr Klaas de Jonge clearly confirms the embarrassing position in which such conduct placed our country.
Mr Chairman, I should like to associate myself with the congratulations expressed here to the Director-General and other members of his staff. We also convey our congratulations to the hon the Deputy Minister on the occasion of his first active participation in a debate on the Foreign Affairs Vote in his new capacity as Deputy Minister of this department.
I think we can also associate ourselves with the emphasis placed on the importance of negotiation, and also with the fact that the negotiations were so very successful in facilitating the release of Maj Wynand du Toit—a matter in connection with which the CP and speakers on this side express their wholehearted satisfaction.
When we speak about negotiation, I think there will also be certain limits. Negotiation certainly has a place in the relations between respective states. I am nevertheless reminded of the words of President Roosevelt of America, who once said the following in regard to the relations between one state and other states: “Speak softly but carry a big stick.”
One can therefore, in one’s verbal negotiations with other countries, display all the courtesy and affability possible, but I think it would nevertheless be of little value to display that friendliness if the country with which one is negotiating knows that one actually has nothing to back one up and that one has no power.
In speaking about power, I am not referring to power in the political, military or security sense. I am also speaking about economic power, industrial power and so on. An impoverished country is not sought after in any quarter and is not a danger to anyone either.
With reference to that, let me say that when we speak about the accusations about South Africa destabilising its neighbouring states, to my way of thinking it is very clear that South Africa—that view is shared by all of us—should not play the kind of role that would make it a threat to its neighbouring states. This should not mean, however, that South Africa should in any way neglect to build up a stronger economic position, be strong industrially, agriculturally and in all other facets, and also strong in the spheres of defence and security.
Mr Chairman, the hon the State President reacted to my speech, in the debate on his Vote, in which I referred to certain statements by President Reagan and the State Department. In the few minutes at my disposal this afternoon I briefly want to say a few things in that connection.
The CP’s approach, in our relations with a country such as the USA, is that we realise the unique position of the USA in the Western World. We recognise the very strong role the USA has to play in the Free World and in the protection of freedoms and rights. At the same time we are also saying that it should play that role in a positive sense in the interests of South Africa and in the interests of the peoples of South Africa, and not merely globally in relation to a territory over which certain other people must be able to gain control. The question is whether the USA respects our unique position as we know it in our internal relations in this country.
I also want to say that the CP does not blindly intend to wage a campaign against Americans as if all Americans are an evil manifestation. Nor do we blindly intend to wage a personal campaign against President Reagan. Not at all. We nevertheless want to state very clearly that we shall not permit ourselves to be misled by President Reagan’s friendly overtures on television. Yes, he is very friendly. He is definitely an actor. President Reagan’s utterances are nevertheless, in certain respects, disconcerting as far as South Africa is concerned.
I also want to state that this side of the Committee does not glorify isolation as such; we do not advocate, as far as the USA is concerned, an attitude of “we can get along without you”—even if Dr Crocker did, on one occasion at a conference in America, say: “South Africa can survive without us; South Africa has a strong economy.” I do, however, think it is a good thing for us to hear, in South Africa too, that those people realise that South Africa has a strong economy and could, if need be, survive without them—they say it themselves.
As far as the utterances of President Reagan are concerned, I think one should examine them for a moment. Let me quote him from an Information Service document dated the end of last year. The President stated:
†Thus spoke the President.
Hear, hear!
I would not be so quick to say hear, hear because if one does not analyse this with some discretion, one finds oneself echoing the American way of thinking, and that is something different to what we advocate in South Africa, ie separate freedoms and self-determination. The American way of thinking does not make provision for White self-determination in South Africa. I would not second that hon member’s “hear, hear”.
Let me quote further:
If we speak of the goodwill of that country, we should view this with discretion. My contention is that the benevolence of the USA is not unqualified benevolence, and if this is what good is, I do not know what bad is. If this is a friendly attitude, I do not know what a hostile attitude is, even if the difference is only one of degree.
The hon member for Krugersdorp referred to the demand from outside “to end apartheid” and so on. I got the impression—I do not know whether I misunderstood the hon member—that he was saying that apartheid had not yet been abolished completely, but that they should give us a bit of a chance because we were working on it. I think that if that is to be our approach—if apartheid is to be eliminated—then the fruits of apartheid, in the form of separate, sovereign, independent, self-governing states in South Africa should also be eliminated, because those are the fruits of apartheid and that is the basis on which we are continuing to build. On that basis we are asking the NP to go on building, because that is the recipe for success.
I want to speak about the alarming picture of the role played by the State Department in South Africa. Let me say again that this is not a question of an attack on everything that is American, but America’s State Department is playing a role that has various disquieting elements. I want to refer to a few aspects.
Let us look, for example, at the support of the Marxist government in Mozambique. I know that we have entered into an accord with Mozambique. That accord was perhaps far less a process of negotiation than an agreement not to allow one’s territory to be used for attacks against the other party. That was the basis, the essence, of that accord. Now they are still granting assistance to that country.
President Machel was a bedfellow of the Russian communists, but the State Department still advocates greater subsidies to that country, and is still assisting with the training of the Frelimo army. A country which is well-disposed towards South Africa does not do that kind of thing in a neighbouring state.
Let me refer to the support being granted to the Marxist government in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is a one-party state which has phased out White participation. Zimbabwe is still being subsidised by the USA. That is a dangerous campaign. Its support of political planning in South West Africa so that Swapo can take over the country is, in our opinion, a dangerous activity which they are engaged in.
South Africa’s follow-up action as a result of the terrorist onslaught here in Cape Town was severely condemned by America. They took certain steps. They recalled certain of their people. That was not a friendly gesture on the part of America.
The recognition given to the ANC is another example. Let me refer, for example, to the reception given to Oliver Tambo by Mr Schultz in America, thereby granting recognition to the ANC. In his speech Mr Schultz went further and said that they recognised members of the ANC as “key players” in the politics of South Africa. He also said that those Black people should be prepared for leadership in South Africa. What leadership? Not leadership in their own constitutional context, but leadership of South Africa as a whole.
That is very clear from what Dr Crocker said in America some time ago. He was asked whether he advocated majority rule in South Africa. His answer was “yes”. He was then asked whether that meant “Black majority rule”. His answer was “yes”. Those are the people who are presented as friends of South Africa. I think that that should be examined in the same way that other phenomena in South Africa are being scrutinised.
One thing is very clear: No reform except the handing over of political power to a Black majority government would be acceptable to America. America is making conspicuous efforts to put an end to White political control in South Africa. We cannot sanction that. America is supposedly anti-communist, but it grants assistance to every conceivable communist organisation, including the ANC.
I think it is time to tell our friends in America, particularly in the State Department: You are waging a cold war against South Africa. Your sanctions and the other steps you have taken against South Africa are efforts aimed at destabilisation. You are extortionists and you are acting in conflict with your own Pres Woodrow Wilson’s principal of the sovereignty and self-determination of all peoples. If you continue along those lines, you cannot be trusted as far as the freedom of a specific people, ie the White people of South Africa, is concerned. You are using the political tension between White and Black South Africa for your own internal political ends, and we can never condone our people and our rights becoming a tool in the sphere of domestic politics in America.
Mr Chairman, the Leader of the Official Opposition…
The hon the Leader of the Official Opposition!
… the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition focused his attention on the USA, in particular, and I agree with him that one should not negotiate from a position of weakness, but rather from a position of strength. I want to assure the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition that this Government will definitely only negotiate from a position of strength, which is in any event the position in which it finds itself at present.
What I found very disturbing about the speech of the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition, however, was that he said specific things about the USA which, to my way of thinking, should not form part of the present discussion on foreign affairs. [Interjections.] We are looking for more friends and more understanding, not more enemies and more critics.
Now you are crawling your knees through to the bone.
Let me tell the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition that we should, once and for all, get away from the encapsulated way of thinking about world politics. We are encapsulating ourselves in our own prejudices and ideologies. That is why there is no expansiveness in our thinking and why we exude an aura of narrowmindedness.
Speak for yourself!
That is precisely the image that the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition presents to the outside world when it comes to matters involving this country and all its people. [Interjections.]
The hon the Leader of the Official Opposition really should know that it is impossible for the USA to condone or agree with everything that happens in this country. And it is only logical that we would not agree with everything that happens in the USA. Surely that is why we are sovereign independent states, so that within the boundaries of one’s own state one can do what one wants to, in whatever way one wants to and to the degree that one is allowed to do so by the electorate.
I think that the criticism of Pres Reagan was unfounded. Pres Reagan was the first person who publicly took a very strong pro-South African stand. It is very clear that this president has wanted to develop some understanding for South Africa, and I think we should give him credit for that.
The last point in regard to the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition’s speech relates to his objection to the USA maintaining specific foreign relations with a country such as Mozambique. I merely want to ask the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition whether he is trying to say that because a government is Marxist, there should be no foreign relations with such a country simply because one does not agree with the government’s ideology.
He was there when the signing took place.
The hon the Leader of the Official Opposition was in fact at Nkomati when the Accord was signed, and the late Pres Samora Machel was an acknowledged communist. The hon the Leader nevertheless thought fit to be present there in an official capacity.
In conclusion I merely want to tell the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition that if he had followed the media reports on the visit of Oliver Tambo to the USA, he would have discovered what a failure it was. He did more harm than good to himself and to the ANC by going to the USA. I want to leave the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition at that.
Mr Chairman, it is a known fact that South Africa is the target of a concentrated and co-ordinated international campaign aimed at isolating this country politically, economically, militarily and scientifically and bringing it to its knees. It is not a campaign which has only just commenced. It actually began in the forties and fifties when specific individual members of the United Nations and other international forums began to exert heavy pressure to have South Africa isolated politically and economically, in particular. India, which obtained its independence in 1947, was in the vanguard of this campaign, and there is proof that behind the scenes Russia was actually masterminding the campaign to isolate this country.
Since then the pressure has increased each year, reaching a peak in the eighties. Notwithstanding all these efforts to isolate South Africa, by thorough planning and hard work the RSA has effectively succeeded in warding off the onslaughts to a large extent, and this country of ours is still playing a role on the world stage.
In the short time at my disposal it is impossible to mention all the work being done by the Department of Foreign Affairs. I should, however, like to pay tribute to the hon the Minister, the hon the Deputy Minister and all the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs for the outstanding work they are doing and for the key role they are playing in combating the international onslaught against South Africa, an onslaught aimed at isolating our country in so many spheres. Not only are these people very successfully doing their duty, but they are doing it with a professionalism and a thoroughness we can all be proud of. We should not, however, expect the impossible from the ministry and the department. Every inhabitant of South Africa should be motivated and inspired to participate in efforts to free South Africa from the bonds of international isolation.
I want to call upon the private sector, in particular, to make more of an effort than ever before to counteract the isolation of the RSA. In their own, unique way they must work to restore ties wherever such ties have been broken. They should also work at strengthening already existing ties and forging new ones where none exist. Here I am not only thinking of economic and political ties; I am also thinking of ties that can be forged between cultural, service, sports and scientific organisations. I want to ask whether consideration could not be given to the creation of an effective infrastructure and to making manpower offices and so on available for use by the private sector with a view to overcoming that isolation via these channels and with this infrastructure. My plea this afternoon is therefore for greater privatisation and professionalisation in order to develop the RSA’s image abroad. We must realise that the State cannot do everything, and that we should also play our part.
In conclusion let me say that our programme of inviting guests to South Africa is an excellent one for which we should commend the department. Those people return as ambassadors for our country. They also do excellent work in counteracting this isolation in which our country finds itself. We want to commend the department for the work it is doing via these selected guests who are invited.
I want to refer to an article in Rapport of 23 August in which Piet Muller states that we should guard against living, working and thinking within the confines of our own cocoon. He referred to the Spartan empire which was tremendously disciplined and, owing to the order and the discipline, a very introverted society, but it choked and died because it was encapsulated in a web of isolation and did not want to move out into the outside world. We must ensure that this does not happen to this wonderful country of ours.
Mr Chairman, during the course of my brief address to this Committee I will make some comments relating to the points which the hon member made about isolation.
I too would like to welcome the changes at the top in the Department of Foreign Affairs, not just because personalities have changed, but because I believe that we have at the top of the Department of Foreign Affairs a team of, what I call, a new breed of younger, modern technocrats. It is about time that that happened. I believe that that team has the makings of being tough and effective in dealing with others. I hope that that team will see to it that the Department of Foreign Affairs has its full say in the corridors of power within the South African Government, and in particular, that they are not overshadowed by the input which the Department of Defence might make from time to time. I hope that they will bring a new touch of creativeness to South Africa in the whole field of foreign affairs. We have become stodgy in many ways. I hope they will become creative and look beyond the stereotyped concepts that have so often limited our thinking in the field of foreign affairs.
It is inevitable on a day like this that the debate should be dominated by the prisoner exchange that is taking place. I just want to say that while the politicians will be dominating television’s handling of this particular event, we should not forget the technocrats and the officials who worked behind the scenes to make this possible. It is those people who have worked on it for months who are, I believe, the real architects of this prisoner exchange. I want to pay tribute to them across the floor of the House.
It does show once again that provided that one can establish that there are mutual interests between countries and people, there is a certain power in diplomacy. We ought to try to develop those mutual interests both here in Southern Africa and around the world. However, the events of today bring to the fore a number of factors. One is that the Nkomati Accord has been brought back almost from the brink of collapse. I put some questions in this House to the hon the Minister on 16 June this year, and it was quite clear from the replies that in spite of the efforts by the South African Government the Nkomati Accord was delicately poised between survival and disaster.
Today’s events have brought the Nkomati Accord which is not just a neutral accord, back to the fore. This requires of us that we take a positive attitude towards Mozambique and vice versa.
Today, once again, the hon Leader of the Official Opposition did an egg-dance. He must say whether he wants the Nkomati Accord or not and whether the South African Government should fulfill its commitments in terms of the Nkomati Accord—Marxist government or not—and be positive as far as the future development of that country is concerned.
That is not included in the Nkomati Accord.
This brings to the fore the whole question of the Cahora Bassa Agreement. I should like to ask the hon the Deputy Minister whether the 1984 Cahora Bassa Agreement is still intact. Has South Africa been called upon to play any part in protecting the powerlines or is it going to play any important part in the whole question of the Cahora Bassa Agreement so that another area of mutual interest can be developed between Mozambique and South Africa?
Next is the question of Angola. The release of Maj Du Toit and the release of 133 Fapla prisoners by Unita has certainly improved the climate of communication between the South African Government and the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. It would be a tragedy if we did not follow through this opportunity for improving communications so that we can get on with the whole task of negotiating further on the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the implementation of Resolution 435 and the bringing about of an internationally recognised independence for Namibia.
I am glad that the hon the State President happens to be in the House at this time, because the release of Maj Du Toit raises in very specific terms the question of the release of Mr Nelson Mandela. I remind the House that on 31 January 1986 while he was dealing with the fact that he would be prepared to consider the release of Mr Nelson Mandela on humanitarian grounds, he said the following:
He said if those three people could be released he would be able to think very seriously about releasing Mr Nelson Mandela. He said:
All three of those people have now been released. One is now living in the West, one has been released and is living in Moscow and one at this very moment is flying down to Cape Town to meet the hon the State President. Those three people have now been released. The hon the State President in his own intervention last year said that that would be a precondition for him to consider the release on humanitarian grounds of Mr Nelson Mandela. I want to know whether he is taking any specific steps in this connection in the light of his initiative last year.
If mutual interests cause countries to negotiate I want to suggest that the one country with which we surely have the greatest mutual interests here in Southern Africa is Zimbabwe. There is significant inter-trade between these two countries. It is the most important trading partner for South Africa on the African continent. There is practical co-operation in the fields of trade, transportation and security, but so far there has not been co-operation between the governments or the Ministers. If it has been possible to achieve co-operation between the Ministers of South Africa and Mozambique, I believe that in the interests of peace on the Southern African continent every effort should be made to achieve the same co-operation between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
We cannot ignore the threat of sanctions to South Africa simply because of the prisoner exchange. It is correct that the intense pressure and the emotional debate about sanctions which we experienced last year has abated to a certain extent. I should like to see that abatement continuing permanently until sanctions fade away, but I also believe that to expect that is to misread the situation in the rest of the world.
The rhetoric and the posturing have indeed given way as the realities of South Africa have become more obvious to the Western World in particular and as more and more people debate the effectiveness of sanctions as a means of bringing about fundamental change in this country.
There are other factors which have caused this debate to recede. Yet, I believe we would be very wrong not to assume that sooner or later that pressure would build up again against South Africa. It is going to build up. It may be unreasonable and counter-productive, it may even prolong the life of apartheid, but it will happen.
There is only one thing that can counter sanctions effectively. Incidentally, I agree with the hon member who has just spoken in that we need professional public relations and to get a message across. However, until there is a fundamental political breakthrough, that brings Black South Africans into the political decision-making process of South Africa, there is no long-term answer to sanctions.
The distressing part of this past year is that we have had all kinds of other action taken. We have now had a breakthrough on the question of the exchange of prisoners. We have had the emergency regulations and censorship of the Press, but so far this country has been denied that political breakthrough. The hon State President has this obligation. The whole country looks to him for a lead as to where this fundamental breakthrough is going to come so that Black people may be brought into the political system, so that all South Africans, Black and White, can face the rest of the world and say not only that apartheid is dead but also that group domination is dead in South Africa. If group domination in South Africa dies, I believe we will be able to face the rest of the world. Then there will be no problem about public relations.
Yes, there will be people on the Marxist fringe and way out on the left who will never accept that, because they might have their greedy eyes on South Africa, but South Africans will then be able to stand together and to give a message to the African continent and to the West. I believe the African continent will understand. It is far easier to talk to Black Africans than it very often is to talk to White Europeans. They understand the situation in Africa.
However, until we make Africans an integral part of South Africa, and of everything that they want for themselves in terms of being Part of the power structure, we are going to e faced with the problem of arguing across the floor of the House on matters such as how to improve our image and how we should professionalise. The fundamental problem is how to change the character of our political system so that it is possible to sell that image abroad. We must find a way of becoming part of Africa once again, so that it may be possible to face the rest of the world and say, we are all South Africans. [Time expired.]
Mr Chairman, the hon member for Sea Point has raised a number of issues which I honestly feel do not really belong in the debate on foreign affairs.
I think you are being rude to the Chair!
Among other things he referred to the position of Mr Mandela. The hon member for Sea Point is well aware that the hon State President in his recent appearance in this House made it clear that a new and possibly more scientific way of dealing with the release of prisoners is being introduced in this country, which will make it easier for Mr Mandela and others to renounce violence. I do not, however, propose to deal with that.
The hon member also referred to the question of Black participation in the political life of our country. May I ask the hon member, however, when he and his party are going to stop calling on the Government only to effect Black participation? When is he going to call on Black leaders to participate? When is he going to stop calling Black leaders who are prepared to participate in the process, “Uncle Toms” and “sell-outs”? [Interjections.]
Bringing Black leaders to the conference table is not the responsibility of the Government only; it is also that of all well-meaning South Africans to contribute to that process. [Interjections.] We have heard that in the next few weeks a Bill will be dealt with in this House that will make it possible to establish a national council. Will the hon member give his support to that Bill, and will he indicate that he will call upon members of all population groups to participate in that process? [Interjections.] No, I think there will be other times to discuss those matters.
I do, however, want to thank the hon member for his very positive way of expressing his support for the Nkomati Accord, and for his calling on the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition to indicate clearly his views on the Nkomati Accord. I think the hon member has shown that it is not love or affection that dictates the relationships between states, also in Southern Africa, but that it is mainly self-interest.
That self-interest, both on our own part and on the part of Mozambique, dictated the agreement now known as the Nkomati Accord. I think that self-interest was in turn the result of the powerful infrastructure of our country. When one considers the importance of South Africa and its infrastructure to this subcontinent, one is aware of the risk of being motivated by boastfulness or even by spite. Compared with other countries in Southern Africa, South Africa is such a towering colossus that one seems to overstate the obvious. Nevertheless, our country has so many detractors who would have the world believe that the issue was a simplistic one; that if South Africa could be forced, through punitive measures, to abandon its traditional way of life, the whole of sub-Saharan Africa would experience an eternal and prosperous peace.
It remains important for us in this House from time to time to remind the world of the enormous and very strong infrastructure that South Africa has built up despite serious obstacles. I want to refer to only three of those obstacles. In most countries, basic facilities have developed from natural harbours and navigable rivers from the hinterland. However, South Africa’s coastline is smooth, and her rivers are fast-flowing and unfit for deep-draught vessels. Nevertheless, of the 15 harbours of note in Southern Africa, six are in South Africa and there is a seventh in South West Africa.
The second obstacle is the fact that the country’s vast mineral deposits are situated far inland and are separated from the harbours and from the coastline not only by distance but also by a high mountainous escarpment. Despite this, South Africa today has 57% of the railway lines in Southern Africa, and 63% of its tarred roads.
Thirdly, the development of our infrastructure was complicated by the fact that we had a relatively small population. In 1910, when most of our infrastructure started to expand, we had only some 6 million people.
Despite these inhibiting factors and with only 4% of the territory of Africa South Africa consumes 60% of its electricity, uses 84% of the telephones in Southern Africa, produces 66% of its steel, provides 40% of its industrial production, and accounts for 45% of its mineral output. South Africa uses 40% of its cement, conveys 63% of its rail cargo, and has 46% of its vehicles. It stands to reason that an infrastructure of such sophistication would have a major effect on the neighbouring countries of Southern Africa.
Despite the establishment of organisations such as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, and despite the fiery rhetoric of African leaders in Zambia and Zimbabwe, the cold logic of Southern Africa has taught them that sanctions against South Africa would possibly harm them more than they would harm South Africa.
Time does not permit me to give a full analysis of the measure of our neighbours’ dependence on the South African infrastructure, so I will mention only one or two examples.
Firstly, South Africa is the region’s cargo transporter. Despite the fact that all nine SADCC countries, except Lesotho, have other routes for their exports and imports, the SATS handled more than 6 million tonnes two years ago. Alternative railway lines are so unreliable owing to terrorist activity that even Zambia moved only 450 000 tonnes through the alternative line in 1979 as against 637 000 tonnes through South Africa.
Our neighbours are also heavily dependent upon us for rolling stock. In September 1985, there were 6 195 South African freight cars in neighbouring territories as against 944 of theirs in South Africa.
A similar pattern manifests itself in respect of air cargo and air travel. South African Airways and its partners handle more than 500 000 passengers and 6 million kg of air freight. South African Airways has also produced the technical know-how for most of the subcontinent.
Secondly, South Africa is also the main trader of the region. Despite the fact that the SADCC was developed particularly to lessen these countries’ dependence upon South Africa, South Africa’s trade with these countries is seven times that of intra-SADCC trade.
Thirdly, South Africa is also the main employer of Southern Africa. The annual migration of hundreds of thousands of unskilled workers to South Africa is ample proof of this dependence.
So one could go on as far as this is concerned: South Africa is the major water and power supplier. It is the region’s telecommunications exchange. It is also the region’s banker and tax collector, and is the provider of most of the entrepreneurs.
*If there is a lesson for Africa in the fact that our powerful infrastructure is important to the countries of Africa, there is an important lesson for us as well. The hon the Leader of the Official Opposition said in this House that we had a strong economy. However, it is also true that a strong economy is our best defence against the attacks from outside, from all over the world and even from Southern Africa itself. If it had not been for that defence, we would have been much more vulnerable to these attacks. That is why this country can never be grateful enough for the infrastructure built up in South Africa by the NP Government; that is why it can never be grateful enough for the way in which the economy of South Africa has been developed and nurtured by this Government for years. That is why it is the most dangerous thing imaginable for hon members of this Committee and for people outside to say, as hon members of the Official Opposition also do from time to time, that the economy of South Africa must simply be made to conform to ideologies.
Mr Chairman, at the start I wish to thank the hon Whips of the NP for giving me this short time in which to participate in the debate on this Vote.
I too want to express my warm congratulations to the hon the Deputy Minister who is defending this Vote, and also to the officials, Mr van Heerden and Mr Babb, who have assumed the responsibilities of the top officialdom in this department. I want to associate myself too with the comment that the hon member for Soutpansberg made with regard to Mr Killen. Those of us who know him well know that he is a man ideally suited to fulfilling that very important role that he now has in London.
I too want to touch very briefly on the question of the exchange agreement that is taking place in Maputo this afternoon. Obviously, like everyone else who has participated thus far in this debate, one is impressed by the excellence of this exercise in the whole negotiating process. This agreement will obviously be welcomed by all South Africans.
One is conscious of Maj du Toit’s courage. It is greatly to be admired and is deserving of the unstinting international respect of everybody. May I just say to him: “Ons is baie trots op jou. ”
Hear, hear!
I also want to compliment the department on the responsible manner in which they handled the De Jonge affair. I think this was a great tribute to the dignity and restraint of the department. In the eyes of many South Africans it was handled correctly and with the responsibility that was necessary at that time.
The hon member for Sea Point mentioned possible new initiatives and a more dynamic approach in regard to the functions of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This is the particular issue I wish to address in the course of the few minutes I have available. I want to raise the question of South Africa’s apparent inability to transmit its message adequately in countries with which we enjoy diplomatic relations. From feedback received, both from my own visits overseas and from those of others, it is disturbing to note that we are not succeeding in getting as positive a message through to these countries as we should. Whether we like it or not, this is an indictment of the strategies that have been pursued by the department in the past.
It is cause for great concern that it seems as though we are losing the propaganda war against the so-called anti-apartheid organizations. There are cases where our overseas friends are deserting us. I want to read briefly from a letter that I received from one of the more prominent sporting journalists in Great Britain. I shall quote the following extracts from a letter which bears out the point that I wish to make:
This is the point that I would like to stress:
This is the most disturbing point:
Mr Chairman, I think this indicates very clearly that we must have a completely new look at the whole position of our strategies. We should endeavour to sell South Africa’s message in terms of those countries which are to receive that message and not in terms of what we in South Africa would like to see transmitted.
Mr Speaker, the hon member for Mooi River will forgive me if I do not deal with his speech. I am sure that the hon the Deputy Minister will deal adequately with it in his reply.
Over the years the Department of Foreign Affairs has scrupulously shown and respected international diplomatic practice including the immunity of foreign diplomatic missions. Recently the Republic of Ciskei established a fully accredited diplomatic military attaché Col Joshua Gqozo and his family in a Ciskeian diplomatic residence in Extension 2 of Monument Park in Pretoria. What was the CP’s actual response to this appointment? I quote from the Daily Despatch of 22 August 1987:
None other than the hon member Comdt Clive Derby-Lewis was there! Unfortunately, he is not in the House this afternoon. He said the following:
That was the hon member Comdt Derby-Lewis’s comment and I regard it as absolute tripe and nonsense. The hon member should know, if he does not know, that Col Gqozo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. He is not a squatter; he is there legally. However, the hon member gives the impression that Monument Park is going to be thrown open to hundreds of Blacks. What a deception this is, and how misleading! What was the reaction of the local community? I quote again from the Daily Dispatch of 21 August:
As for the HNP, I am so grateful that the Pretoria City Council had the good sense to reject the recent motion inspired by them, requiring compensation to be paid to Whites wherever Black diplomats actually moved into their areas. I want to ask two questions of hon members of the CP, more particularly of the hon member Comdt Derby-Lewis who unfortunately is not present. At the meeting to which I previously referred, and I quote once more—
I want to ask him what he thinks he can really do. I do not think there is anything that he can do. He must comply with international diplomatic practice as South Africa does. He must stop misleading the public. I also want to ask him were he to be a Cabinet Minister one day—heaven forbid!—what on earth he would do with Black diplomats from the United States of America or from Black Africa should they wish to live in Southland. Will he provide for them? Will he comply with international standards and practices, or will he just live in a White country in isolation in Africa? He and the CP owe us an answer to these questions.
I wish in the short time left to me in this debate to deal with the TBVC countries. The establishment of these independent states amounts to the practical recognition of concentrations of different Black peoples in certain identifiable geographic areas in Southern Africa—Black peoples who originally formed distinct nations with their own language and culture, and controlling their own land. Nobody can deny that these peoples have an inalienable right to their own self-determination and to command their own destinies within the framework of Southern Africa.
Any government in power in South Africa has to recognise the TBVC countries as a fact. Their existence and their independence is a fact, something that Mr Jacques Chirac has recently discovered. Anyone who has any close contact with or knowledge of the TBVC countries, their leaders and their people, cannot but be aware that since independence they have developed from nondescript, non-represented and unrecognised peoples into nations with self-respect and dignity, nations with their own parliaments and legal systems, nations that have developed an intense national pride and nations which in the course of a few years have surpassed many other African states in size, development and wealth.
The hon member for Turffontein today has clearly shown the wide gap that exists between the gross national product and the per capita income of the people living within the TBVC countries and that of those living in the rest of dark Africa. The simple question is: What has enabled these fledgling TBVC countries, part of the Third World, to achieve growth rates of 6% and more? What has enabled them to undergo industrial revolutions such as Dimbaza in Ciskei?
I shall deal with Ciskei very briefly because I am aware of the development taking place there. I am sure it mirrors what is happening in the rest of the TBVC countries. Ten years ago Dimbaza was a squalid squatter camp that prompted the making of a film Last Grave at Dimbaza which received world-wide publicity. Today it is a modem township, housing thousands of people, served by a town council, and all the necessary facilities—a thriving community.
There were two things that sparked this change. Firstly, there was the Government’s development aid programme channelled to Ciskei through the Department of Foreign Affairs; and secondly, this Government’s lead taken in establishing the Development Bank of Southern Africa which has created the climate for development and growth in the TBVC countries.
The first catalyst is the development aid to Ciskei. In this financial year direct financial assistance consisted of an initial amount of R300 million, further industrial incentives of R33 million, special employment assistance of R10,8 million, transfer payments that will also form part of Ciskei’s budget such as tax compensation of R26,8 million, R156 million from the customs union, and R3,34 million from the Rand Monetary Union. In technical assistance the RSA through foreign affairs has provided manpower and a flour subsidy for bread to Ciskei, and has also contributed to the payment of salaries of judges seconded to the Ciskei Supreme Court. All this assistance has been done by way of bilateral agreements between the two states.
The second catalyst for growth and development has been the Development Bank of Southern Africa. First mooted by the hon the State President, Mr P W Botha, at the Carlton Conference in 1979, it was established on 30 June 1983 by agreement between the RSA and the TBVC countries. It began its operations in February 1984, and has risen in a dramatic two and a half years from a situation where the original loan value at takeover was R354 million, to the present point where the estimated loan value is R5 197 million. Its development in Ciskei included livestock farmer support programmes, agro-technology for crop farmers, irrigation schemes, construction of factories, electricity supply to Bisho, housing and urban development—20 projects involving loans of R153 million. All these are in the Bank’s report of 1986.
The Department of Foreign Affairs’ Development Aid Programme and the Development Bank of Southern Africa are playing a herculean role in assisting the TBVC countries to develop into stable, successful, self-sufficient, free-enterprise states. They will be shining examples to the rest of Africa and the outside world, and will prove the wisdom of this Government’s investment in the future of Southern Africa and all its people.
Mr Chairman, at this stage I want to say that there is only one member of the Cabinet, except the hon the State President, in the House. In the course of the afternoon there were two, or at most four, present. [Interjections.]
† As far as the hon member for King William’s Town is concerned, I want to tell him—perhaps he does not know—that all over the world separate areas of land are set aside for diplomatic residences. That is the case in the Netherlands, Washington, and South Africa as well. We make certain land available to diplomatic representatives for residential purposes by way of agreement. [Interjections.] So I do not know what his problem is and whether he thinks diplomatic representatives can live anywhere they want to in South Africa. That is not in accordance with international arrangements.
As far as the hon member for Sea Point is concerned, I just want to say to him that he reads more into the Nkomati Accord than it contains. It is merely a non-aggression pact. An Nkomati-type accord is not required to enable us to negotiate with Angola or Zimbabwe. It is merely a non-aggression pact. That is all my hon Leader submitted when he addressed the House. Therefore I do not know why the hon member should refer to him as having performed an egg dance.
* Although we have said more than once this afternoon that we appreciate the fact that Maj Du Toit has been reunited with his family, and that this particular achievement was reached, we want to emphasise one thing in this regard, namely that tremendous demands were made of Dr Savimbi. Perhaps the hon the Deputy Minister could, when he replies to this debate, tell us how it happened that Dr Savimbi had to make such a sacrifice in order that this exchange agreement could be reached.
As regards Mr Klaas de Jonge, who cost South Africa approximately one million rand, I just want to make the following point. Even if we were to accept that Mr De Jonge was arrested illegally in the Netherlands Embassy, the fact that he was returned to the Netherlands Embassy did not rectify an illegal action or an offence under international law. If it was an offence under international law—and we deny that it was—it had already been committed. When one has stolen a watch, one cannot say that the offence has not been committed if one gives the watch back. Our charge against the Government is that it handed Mr Klaas de Jonge back to the Netherlands Embassy at all. The Government should have held him and left the Hollanders to scream and shout. In the first place we were entitled to take him, and if we were not entitled to do so, returning Mr De Jonge did not rectify this illegal action.
You will therefore break diplomatic rules?
No, it is not a matter of breaking diplomatic rules. The fact of the matter is that we deny that we broke a diplomatic rule. If a diplomatic rule was broken, the handing back of Mr De Jonge to the Netherlands Embassy did not rectify an offence under international law. Do the hon legal experts not understand that point?
We also want to say that this exchange again illustrated the argument that we have a unique role to play in Africa and that we must force open the channels of communication with African countries. This was a point which was raised throughout this debate today. We must re-emphasise that we have no motives of conquest but that our aim is stability in this region, for the sake of our interests and those of our neighbours.
This brings certain anomalies into prominence. Neither this country nor the USA—my hon leader referred to this—conceal our patronage of Dr Savimbi, but we deny involvement with Renamo. Like Unita, Renamo is also fighting a communist foe. Dr Chester Crocker nevertheless stated categorically in an international television and press interview on 22 July 1987, addressed to journalists in Lisbon, London and Paris, that the SA Defence Force was giving assistance to Renamo. The hon the Deputy Minister referred to this. These allegations which are made against South Africa are the kind of allegations which prejudice our credibility. They undermine our good intentions and motives in this region. They undermine our credibility and cast a shadow over our efforts at communication with our neighbours.
The negotiations which led to the release of Maj Du Toit illustrate the importance of the RSA in this region. Mr Erich Leistner emphasised this fact in an article in Afrika-Bulletin vol 27, No 6 (1987). The title of the article was “Kommunikasie met Afrika”. I am quoting from the article:
I shall return to this subject later if I have the time. A further point I want to raise is that our charge against the Government is that it is too sensitive about so-called world opinion. Together with this I want to refer to the hon member for Krugersdorp, who said this afternoon that our problem was that the entire world opinion was against us and that we had to take this into consideration. We say that the world must take the provisions of the Human Rights Manifesto into consideration, namely that it is not permissible to poke one’s nose into the domestic affairs of South Africa.
I have here a very interesting collection, Die Volksraadsverkiesing 1987, compiled from the National Press-cutting Service by Messrs Mosterd and Scott. It deals with a whole series of reports on the international reaction to the South African election. It refers inter alia to the Japanese ambassador in the UNO, who said:
Dr Crocker is quoted as follows:
Mr John Carlisle, a British member of Parliament, who wrote about the South African situation after he had visited South Africa as a friend of South Africa, was quoted as follows:
I can go on like this. There is Mr Reagan for example—
Arap Moi visited him in America. He went on to say:
We then get Mr Herman Nickel:
He carries on in this vein and he mentions Mr Clarke of Canada, who distributed a petition.
We say that we are opposed to foreign intervention being tolerated in the domestic affairs of South Africa. We must close ranks and make a stand against this.
And march out of the world!
In this connection I just want to ask in passing why an amount of approximately R12 million is being spent on erecting buildings in Maputo for office space for the Department of Foreign Affairs, while we do not have diplomatic relations with Mozambique. I would be glad if the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs could reply to this. [Time expired.]
Mr Chairman, in the short time I have been in Parliament, this is the second time I have had to speak after the hon member for Brakpan has spoken [Interjections.] I do not know whether it is a privilege, and I am not going to react to his speech, but there is one point of his that I do want to dispute. He spoke about only one Cabinet Minister who was present. He deliberately used the words “Cabinet Minister” in an effort at disinformation, because whilst he was making his speech I counted three Ministers and three Deputy Ministers.
Of the Cabinet? [Interjections.]
The hon member s deliberate use of the word “Cabinet” was an attempt at disinformation. There were three Ministers and three Deputy Ministers present.
Of own affairs!
Order!
I also want to say a thing or two in connection with his speech. No demands—as he put it—were made on Dr Jonas Savimbi. What is more, he was guilty of a factual error which I should like to correct. I want to make it very clear to him that during the past two years Klaas de Jonge’s living expenses were financed by the Dutch government and not by the South African Government.
What did it cost to keep an eye on him?
That is a security task. We are now speaking about the costs to the Dutch government, which were much higher.
This afternoon several hon members referred to the exchange operation taking place in Maputo today. Hon members will understand my saying that this exchange operation is perhaps of more significance to me personally than to most of the hon members sitting here. When Wynand du Toit was taken prisoner I was Director of Public Relations of the SA Defence Force. In that capacity I was involved in the initial communiqués issued about his capture, and as such I came to know many of his next of kin. Therefore I hope and trust—as the hon the Deputy Minister indicated earlier—that the goodwill evident at present between countries on our subcontinent will lead to greater peace and stability on this subcontinent and will be to the benefit of everyone in this region.
I specifically want to address this Committee on a subject which has been of great importance to me for many years now, and I am referring to the disinformation campaign against our country. The Department of Foreign Affairs has a superhuman task to perform, because it is responsible for our foreign information endeavours. I used the expression “superhuman” because never in the annals of world history have we had such an orchestrated disinformation campaign launched against any country as this specific campaign against South Africa. Those officials who have to counteract this campaign are already so punch-drunk that the half-truths and blatant lies with which they are confronted every single day hardly make any impression any longer. The Eastern bloc’s news agencies and mass media have by now perfected their efforts to such an extent that in many instances the Western mass media not only go along with them, but are actually used by them in the disinformation campaigns against South Africa. These efforts are endorsed by the UN and its agencies which employ millions of dollars and a vast staff in efforts to condemn South Africa and apartheid as such. This Committee is aware of the fact that opposition to apartheid has already become an industry and that people in the UN and elsewhere would be left without jobs if the campaign were ever abandoned. The disinformation against South Africa therefore takes root in fertile soil, so much so that we are being linked to neo-Nazi movements.
I occupied a post in which I faced the full brunt of the disinformation onslaught. Many of our people have no inkling of the ferocity of this onslaught against our country, because the South African media give scant attention to the rhetoric from our neighbouring countries and their propaganda agencies. Reports always begin with the old stereotyped expressions such as “The racist South African Government” and “The racist South African forces” and so on. Such reporting is so obviously a disinformation effort that in our own media more than 90% of these reports find their way into the waste paper basket. That is no reason for sitting back and taking things easy, however, because there is such a consistent flood of those reports to the masses on our subcontinent and on the rest of the continent that there is a growing perception amongst the masses in Africa that the tyranny of the “Boere” is unparalleled in the annals of world history. As far as that expression is concerned, in African terminology all of us sitting here—even the hon member for Houghton, who is not here at the moment—are “Boere”. The image of South Africa amongst the masses throughout the world is determined by the disinformation propagated at a cost of millions of rand by our enemies who make use of the mass media to launch an orchestrated campaign.
But it is a racist Government!
Against this background my plea to the hon the Minister is that we should intensify our efforts, not to counter this campaign—as a small country in the context of the world powers we do not have the ability to match the onslaught against us in the present climate. We must do everything in our power, however, to arm those people, the more developed groups and our millions of friends in our country, with facts. What I am advocating—I should also like to associate myself with what was said by the hon member Dr Sampie Golden—is that we should do more to bring opinion-makers in all spheres of society from our countries of origin and the other Western powers to South Africa so that they can see for themselves what we are doing here and act as ambassadors for South Africa.
Mr Chairman, I have confined my contribution to this Committee to the disinformation onslaught against South Africa. Please permit me, on the strength of a few examples, to demonstrate to hon members how events are presented with a view to discrediting South Africa. I should like to refer to the recent Machel disaster and the transparent, reprehensible efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to place the blame on South Africa’s shoulders. There are dozens of other examples, for example the recent murders in Mozambique, unrest in neighbouring states and every conceivable form of violence taking place in such neighbouring states, for which South Africa is consistently blamed, because it is the easiest thing in the world to blame another country for one’s inability to govern one’s own country. A moment ago I heard the interjection “But we are a racist country” from the opposition ranks. They agree with that. The Machel accident…
They like to help the enemy.
Yes, they help the enemy. The Machel accident, however, is a clear example of the sinister onslaught against South Africa, but because we are dealing here with concrete facts, it was an easy matter for us to refute this allegation. A commission of enquiry summarily and scientifically rejected every claim that South Africa could in any way have been involved. In aviation circles, amongst aviation experts and Western governments there can no longer be any doubt, but South Africa has nevertheless been discredited by the mass media and the orchestrated propaganda campaign waged by Russia and its agents, and subtly and directly, too, suspicion has been cast on South Africa. Here is an example of South Africa having taken all possible steps—steps for which the hon the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his department deserve to be commended—to have international experts join Mr Justice Margo in examining all possible causes of the accident.
It was a great embarrassment to the Soviet Union, however, and it did a masterful job of harnessing all its agents in an effort to cast suspicion on the commission. Immediately after the accident Russia immediately realised the potential danger to its ambitions in the region, the image of its staff and the capabilities of its equipment and immediately began to exploit the situation. The initial effort involved creating the impression that the aircraft had been shot down, but when the foolishness of that became evident, the theory of a portable radio beacon was used in an effort to place the blame on South Africa. All the technical evidence refuting that theory was simply waved aside, because Russia could not acknowledge that its crew had made mistakes, particularly after another Russian aircraft, with 48 passengers on board, had crashed in Northern Mozambique.
That was a danger to Russia’s image because of the shortcomings in their equipment and staff. The Russians made large-scale use of AIM and the Zimbabwean news agency to spread its disinformation. AIM is under the control of a certain Mr Cardoso who was suspended from Wits owing to his leftist activities. Hon members therefore know how very leftist he must have been. Cardoso, however, does not have the ability to coordinate or administer a disinformation campaign. That large body of disinformation which is repeatedly disseminated abroad involves a technique which the agencies of the eastern powers have perfected. The news front is therefore completely dominated by disinformation, and millions of Western television viewers, newspaper readers and radio listeners are bombarded by Soviet-inspired propaganda. There is clear and demonstrable information about the blatant disinformation techniques adopted against South Africa.
And by South Africa.
Russia has nevertheless succeeded in reaching the masses. I have just heard a few cries here from the Dakar side of the House. All that hon member needs to do is stand up and say that he regrets having made such a fool of himself by going to Dakar, and I am sure everyone will forgive him. [Interjections.]
There are so many examples of disinformation that in the time at my disposal I can hardly refer to them or even mention them. I should like to refer generally, however, to another orchestrated effort by our neighouring states. I am referring to the effort to brand South Africa as the destabilising agent on the subcontinent. That effort has been so successful that there are members of the PFP who have served as adjuncts in this disinformation campaign and fouled their own nest. The worst example of this was the speech by Mr Graham McIntosh a year or so ago in this House. Today, by referring to the hon the Minister of Defence’s statement, the hon member for Berea came very close to branding South Africa as the destabilising agent. [Time expired.]
Mr Chairman, the hon member for Germiston District spoke on disinformation and he is no doubt something of an expert in this field. What concerns me is that he did not say whether he believes we should meet disinformation with the plain truth or a form of counter-disinformation. Maybe a spokesman of the Government will at some stage tell us what their reaction is to that. [Interjections.]
This debate is a little like the proverbial Hamlet without the prince without the hon the Minister. It is the first time that we have the opportunity to consider a number of things including the performance of the hon the Minister last year when the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 was passed in the American Senate.
I should like to argue that the hon the Minister at that time mishandled the situation to the detriment of this country. I wish to remind the House that the hon the Minister made some highly publicised telephone calls to Senators from the US farm belt. He made a great show of phoning up these Senators, even calling them out of the Senate Chamber and threatening them, among other things, with the cutting off of grain sales. [Interjections.]
I cannot conceive of a more ham-handed exercise in bull-in-a-china-shop diplomacy. What self-respecting US Senator could have afforded to allow himself to be seen by the US voters as being dictated to or dancing to the tune of a SA Government Minister? [Interjections.] The view from Washington was quoted as follows in the Sunday Times of 5 October 1986:
Far from being able to block grain shipments to Zimbabwe and other neighbouring states as was threatened at the time, I understand that at the time of those telephone calls South Africa was actually importing maize from those countries which had surpluses. As far as threatening to cut our wheat purchases from the US is concerned, that too was an empty threat. Where else would we get the grain? In October 1986 Canada cut itself off as a supplier of grain to us. In fact, on 11 July 1987 the hon the Minister of Agriculture was quoted as saying:
The hon the Minister may think it is smart to treat local voters, by courtesy of the controlled media, as ignoramuses, but he is going too far when he treats US senators in this way. The US grain belt senators really know the score when it comes to the world grain market, and to use this, or to attempt to use it as some form of leverage was foolish. [Interjections.]
What I am leading up to is that this hon Minister goes to great, blustering, aggressive lengths to promote a misleading impression of our position vis à vis sanctions. He promotes the impression that we are largely immune to sanctions, that we have massive counter-measures available, that we can hold the West to ransom with our minerals and our Cape sea route, and that sanctions can be evaded easily by back-door import and export routes. [Interjections.]
The truth is very different, and we in this House must grasp the reality if we are going to make good policy. The truth is that the West can obtain alternative sources of supply of key strategic minerals—maybe at a higher price and with more difficulty, but they can do so if they have to.
Secondly, the fact that our non-gold exports exceeded our non-gold imports considerably—by over R3,4 billion—in 1985 clearly indicates our vulnerability if there were a full-scale trade war against us.
The truth is that tightened sanctions will eventually, in the fullness of time, wear us down, just as they wore down Rhodesia, especially since the sanctions net used against this country would be wider than that used against Rhodesia when it was mainly focused on a few particular countries. We do not have a big brother to fall back onto as Rhodesia did, and our trade volumes would be much more difficult to disguise through potential sanction-busting third parties. [Interjections.]
This brings me to the point of the Commonwealth Accord which was signed at Lyford Cay, Nassau, on 20 October 1985, almost two years ago, by the Commonwealth heads of government. That led to the EPG mission to South Africa, and that EPG mission, as we know, led to the proposal of a five point package deal for peaceful steps designed to lead to a peaceful resolution of the South African conflict. The Commonwealth, with the EEC and the USA in support, has ever since then been turning the screws tighter and tighter, one ratchet at a time. At each step along the way, however, they have pointed out that there is still a way out of the bind for this country, and that way out is the five point package deal which still stands.
The question I ask the hon the Minister and the Government is, what is being done about that potential way out of the sanctions bind?
If nothing is done, section 7 of the Heads of Government Accord will come into play which provides for a further eight sanctions to be imposed on us. They served notice in that accord almost two years ago that those measures would be implemented progressively against us.
These measures include the total severance of air links, a total ban on agricultural imports from this country, and a total ban on the promotion of tourism to this country, among other things. I ask the hon the Minister what hope he is holding out for South Africans, for this House, to remain on good terms with those who are still our friends and allies and of avoiding yet another round of tougher pressure and further sanctions emanating from the next Heads of Government summit which will be taking place in Vancouver in only a few weeks’ time?
What is being done to prevent further sanctions from being imposed on us at that time? I want to take this opportunity to call upon the hon the Minister and the Government to take some positive action in terms of the Commonwealth package deal before the next Heads of Government meeting takes place. There are only a few weeks left.
Firstly, the package peace plan requested a positive demonstration that apartheid was to be dismantled. I quote one leading US expert on foreign relations, Alan Sabronsky, speaking at RAU. He says:
If we were to do something dramatic with regard to the Group Areas Act, that would be progress in terms of point 1 of that peace plan.
Point 2 refers to the state of emergency. There are other measures available to the Government on a short-term basis. The state of emergency could be lifted.
With regard to point 3, the hon member for Sea Point has said that Mandela could be released. The terms laid down by the hon the State President last year have been met; and the mechanism set out in the discussion of the hon the State President’s Vote makes this possible. I believe that releasing Mr Mandela would be the single most important thing this country could do to avert further sanctions as a result of the Vancouver summit. It should be done in the interests of this country.
With regard to the other parts of the peace plan, for example, the unbanning of certain political organisations; they have virtually unbanned themselves at this stage so what purpose is served in maintaining those bans? It is beyond me. [Time expired.]
Mr Chairman, the hon member for Constantia referred to this debate as being Hamlet without the prince. I quickly thought which character in Hamlet his state of mind most resembled, and it reminded me very much of Ophelia. [Interjections.]
The hon member’s remedy for sanctions is that we should give in to international blackmail. We should succumb to the five-point plan as drawn up by the nations of the Commonwealth, excluding the United Kingdom, at Nassau.
He is a quitter.
I believe that if we want a continuous process of the moving of goal posts, we should give in to this kind of blackmail.
What is your alternative?
Mr Chairman, the subject of my address to you today is sanctions which are being used as a diplomatic tool to bring pressure to bear on South Africa. There exists the naive idea that if the economy of our country is weakened, the Government will be forced to make changes that would otherwise not have been made.
Let me state categorically that this Government was elected on a reform ticket. Reform will therefore continue to take place irrespective of the actions of the outside world. [Interjections.]
I think it is necessary, however, to analyse the morality of sanctions and to examine their efficacy in recent history. Two examples spring to mind. The first is the British blockade of the continent of Europe during the Napoleonic wars. One interesting result of this strategy was the development of the sugar beet industry in Europe. France was cut off from the subtropical colonies where sugar cane was grown, and an alternative had to be found. Necessity thus became the mother of invention.
A second example was the attempted application of sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations following her invasion of Abyssinia. This was a dismal failure. One can only recall the words of the philosopher who said that “those who fail to learn from the mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them”. [Interjections.]
The former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Claude Cheysson, in his evidence to the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee, stated that history shows that an embargo has never succeeded against countries with natural resources, whereas their weaker neighbours who are affected by it suffer horribly.
I think we should take a close look at the morality of sanctions. The morality, motivation and objectives of these sanctions are ostensibly twofold: To coerce the South African Government into applying reformist policies; and to do this by what are purportedly peaceful means of persuasion. This view is based on two fundamental fallacies. The first is that South Africa will change because of foreign pressure. This is fallacious, because we are already changing, have changed and are committed to further change.
We are changing, not because of foreign pressure, but because we are cognisant of domestic need.
Secondly, we are faced with the fallacy that economic sanctions are peaceful instruments of policy and not only peaceful, but also precise. They supposedly only affect the South African Government and its supporters while no one else gets hurt and everyone else will benefit. The fact is that sanctions are indiscriminate, just like napalm bombing and just as ethical. Sanctions cannot distinguish between Black and White, young and old, rich and poor or guilty and innocent. It must further be remembered that South Africa is the economic engine room of Capricorn Africa. If sanctions are to harm South Africa it stands to reason that the rest of the subcontinent will also be hurt. Other countries will possibly be hurt to a greater degree than South Africa itself, because the economies of those countries are far more fragile than our own economy. Many people regard the harm done to these economies as mere statistics. However, they lose sight of the fact that statistics have to do with people, and sanctions are all about jobs, welfare and livelihood. Nowhere is this more true than in Africa. Everybody knows about the starvation in Ethiopia and some know about the starvation in Chad. However, how many know that half of Africa is on the United Nations Emergency Food Aid list and that an estimated five million children will die of starvation in Africa this year? Africa’s population has increased by 10% over the past decade while food production has decreased by 10% over that period. Those who advocate sanctions must say what responsibility, if any, they accept for adding to these miseries and for encouraging the descent to chaos.
The Economist of 22 August said in an article entitled “The Spiral down to Chaos”:
It is therefore somewhat incongruous to find an organization like Cosatu lending its voice to encourage those who are applying or are considering applying sanctions. Cosatu is a trade union confederation that purports to stand for the economic well-being of its members and the enhancement of their status. However, at the same time they are calling for the destruction of all those jobs that are bound up with the export industry.
One has only to look at the economy of the Western Cape where the export fruit industry is one of the main suppliers of jobs. It has been calculated that one and a half million people are reliant on the fruit industry for the earning of their daily bread. Is it logical, therefore, that the Food and Allied Workers’ Union which is affiliated to Cosatu should join their call for sanctions and the termination of so many people’s employment? One wonders if the left hand always knows what the right hand is doing and whether the leaders of Cosatu in the north are trying to dictate measures to the south which are against their best interests.
In conclusion I would like to quote the words of Inkosi Buthelezi who said the following:
Mr Chairman, in the very few minutes at my disposal there is one matter I want to deal with because we in these benches have not had time thus far to do so, and that is the subject of our relationship with the TBVC countries. The matter was raised by the hon member for Turffontein in his speech earlier this afternoon, and I think also by the hon member for King William’s Town.
There are certainly some good elements in the situation in the TBVC countries but there are also some very bad characteristics which cause a great deal of concern and which ought to cause the department a great deal of concern in its responsibilities towards these countries. I think one could list three of these characteristics in particular. Firstly, there is the growing incidence of political violence; secondly, the growing number of examples of the violation of civil liberties; and, thirdly—there ought to be a great deal of concern about this—the reports of financial imprudence and corruption in these countries.
I think this a matter which is of concern to us in this debate and ought to be of concern to the people of South Africa, the taxpayers in particular. We know that these countries are very much dependent upon South Africa for their economic viability. One sees for example from the estimates this year that budgetary aid to these countries has been considerably increased. In 1986-87 it was R704 million and in 1987-88 it is R1 375 million which is an increase, I think, of about 92%. We are concerned not only about these moneys and the other vast sums of money which come from the Republic to these countries, but also about the growing allegations of mismanagement in regard to financial matters. When one looks at newspaper headlines—we do not have time to go into them into great detail—one will find headlines such as, “R51 million housing probe rocks Transkei—fraud and corruption charges”.
There are others such as “Curfew farce in Transkei—Supreme Court slams police for ‘irregular’ fining methods”; “Transkei firms owe Government more than R22 million”; and “Transkei will lose millions”. Here I should like to quote from a rather staggering allegation made by a former employee of Transkei, Mr Peter Wakelin, who is described as a top economist related to advising Transkei on customs negotiations:
There is also a comment on the situation with regard to customs in Transkei by Mr Wakelin himself, and I quote:
These are the sort of things one hears, and they are most disquieting. I should like the hon the Minister to tell us what his department is doing particularly in regard to funds that have been advanced by the RSA Government to get some form of guarantee that these funds are properly spent and properly managed. This is a matter that has been raised before, and I should like the hon the Minister to deal with it when he replies.
Mr Chairman, the hon member for Berea will forgive me if I do not react to his speech. It appears that the PFP opposition has wisely decided to drop the subject of the ANC, in this debate at any rate. I shall take the plunge and raise it on their behalf, perhaps with a different answer.
As far as the ANC is concerned, they have bases in a number of our neighbouring states. By virtue of our association with neighbouring countries, it is probably appropriate to say a brief word about the ANC.
The ANC is the result of a tidal wave of Black nationalism. I can tell the CP that just as one cannot stop Afrikaner nationalism, one cannot stop the tidal wave of Black nationalism. If one does not channel it properly, it becomes overwhelming. The association between the ANC and the SA Communist Party is just as strong and just as detrimental to the ANC as the association between the AWB and the CP will ultimately be to the Official Opposition. This is a friendly warning that they should keep in mind.
The Communist Party was established in 1921, and in 1922 it played a key part in the strike that took place, although some hon members on the opposite side do not know that. After the Second World War there was a sudden spate of Black African nationalism which eventually led to the emancipation and independence of a number of African states.
The ANC has co-operated with the PAC since the sixties. In actual fact they have absorbed the PAC’s motive of violence completely, and have been to a great extent inspired by the communist ideology.
In the introduction of their Freedom Charter they emphasise the so-called “people”. In the vagueness of their definition of the so-called “people”, they decline to say exactly who the “people” are, and who the so-called anti-“people” are. They go on in their Freedom Charter to talk about the realisation of “the will of the people”, but remain vague and obscure in their descriptions.
After the long association between the Marxist teachers and the ANC, one derives the interpretation of the concept from the communist definition. One wonders whether that is the wish of the revolutionary minority that they talk about. Another element to which they refer is the question of prosperity and freedom. The prosperity and freedom of the Western World is nothing like the prosperity and freedom envisaged by the ANC. The ANC vision of freedom is a classless community, in which the State does not exist and in which capitalism, as a method according to which the economic life of a community is organised, is rejected.
They also refer to a democratic state in the Freedom Charter. What does the ANC’s democracy look like? Will their democratic state have the same degree of freedom that is prevailing in the spheres of the Press, of speech and of movement in South Africa at present? In their democratic state they are striving for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The ANC-SACP alliance is regarded by the outside world at present as being the so-called National Liberation Movement. To the ANC-SACP alliance “democratic changes” do not mean a free, multiparty parliamentary democracy, however. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be established by means of development via the usual democratic processes.
An analysis of the introduction of the Freedom Charter leads one to the inevitable conclusion that the ANC-SACP alliance’s interpretation of freedom is a completely different concept from the one the advocates of talks with the ANC have in mind. The expression “The people shall govern” is used as well. They then say, “The right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws” will be the privilege of everyone. It is not clear what sinister motives are contained in this objective. Are they striving for a one-party state? Is that why they do not want to negotiate, knowing that they cannot force the Government into that kind of future course?
A very interesting point in the Freedom Charter—whether the CP wants to know this or not, but I think even they will agree with this point or with elements of this point—is the following:
If that is not group rights in the ANC idiom, I do not know what it is. It is an acknowledgment of group rights, but with the difference that they will pursue this objective only as long as it serves their own interests.
In respect of the people’s participation in the prosperity of the country, the ANC claims inter alia that the land belongs to those who cultivate it, and that the Whites will remain here in a managerial capacity at most, for the benefit of those who cultivate the land. The same ideal applies in mining and in the business sector—the Whites will stay on as managers. When the business sector had talks with the ANC, they had already accepted, therefore, that the ANC would take over. The only thing they wanted to determine was what the ANC’s business policy would be. The message was that they would continue in a managerial capacity. The question of the redistribution of land comes down to the same thing.
They emphasise that equality before the law is a generally acceptable statement. It is the right of the governing class. They also propose a human rights charter, in terms of which they emphasise freedom of speech, organisation, religion, education for children and freedom of movement and privacy. Nevertheless it is very important that they do not at any point guarantee the independence of the judicial bench. They also talk about the question of work and security. Their ultimate ideal is a utopian one which reminds one once again of some of the statements made by certain parties in this country. In addition they talk about making education and training available, and about the issues of housing, peace and friendship.
I want to conclude with this thought. Until the ANC not only denounces violence, but shows that it is doing so, until it reveals the hidden motives in its Freedom Charter, until it severs its ties with the Communist Party and until it accepts the sincerity of the Government party in respect of reform, talks of any kind will merely amount to one huge abortive effort.
Mr Chairman, I should like to congratulate the hon member for Turffontein on his election as his party’s chief spokesman on Foreign Affairs, as well as on his election as chairman of the standing committee. I apologize for having forgotten to do so earlier today.
I now want to refer to a less agreeable aspect, but I think it is the task of the Official Opposition to broach it. I am referring to my information that there is a great deal of unhappiness in the Department of Foreign Affairs about what has been referred to as the hon the Minister’s “favouritism”: Fifteen of his top officials have indicated that they would prefer to retire early rather than to serve under one of his favourites.
I do not think it is undesirable that when, from time to time, there is an exceptional person in a department, a person who has merit, he be promoted. When, however, the family connections of certain fortunate people and the personal friendship of others with the hon the Minister become obvious, when the minimum requirements for promotion are ignored and promises that people who have left the department to work elsewhere and in doing so have acquired higher rank, are no longer welcome in the department, are broken, the statement “the net result being that the morale at Foreign Affairs is extremely low and explosive” does not seem at all far-fetched. I suggest that in the interests of the department, the hon the Minister should display greater sensitivity in dealing with these matters.
The hon member for Krugersdorp advocated a parliamentary mission abroad to expose hon members to foreign countries. I see nothing wrong in that, but he also said that Blacks should be included. If the hon member is appealing for a parliamentary mission, I want to know who will represent those Blacks. Must they be members of Parliament and if so, which House will they be from? Who is going to represent them?
I can reply to that.
Order! The hon member may not reply now.
A great deal has been said about the Nkomati Accord this afternoon. It is true that we were present when the agreement was signed. The Government wanted us to be there. We went as members of this House to observe what was happening there. Now, however, things are being attributed to the Nkomati Accord which had nothing to do with it. The railway agreement, the maintenance of the harbours and the improvement of the export facilities there, as well as arrangements with reference to coal, have nothing to do with Nkomati. These are agreements that ensued from the agreements which were probably concluded in the time of Paul Kruger. These agreements go back a long way. I do not think, therefore, that the Government should try to reap the fruits of trees it did not plant.
†The hon member for King William’s Town touched on the matter of residences for diplomats. This is a matter which causes problems all over the world. Brazil, when it was developing its new capital, Brazilia, provided for a diplomatic suburb. In the days of the late Dr Hilgard Muller and Mr John Vorster the Government started a diplomatic suburb in Waterkloof Heights and built a few houses and a guest house there. That worked well but unfortunately the Government did not proceed with the further development of the project. That is the root cause of today’s problem. [Interjections.]
Order!
The matter must be dealt with sensitively but there are other ways in which the Government can resolve this situation.
Mr Chairman, let me start by thanking hon members for the kind words that most of them expressed towards me personally and to the senior members of the staff. In response to that I immediately want to react to the last point the hon member for Soutpansberg made here.
I have been in the department for 10 months now and have made a point of trying to establish as much contact as possible with the senior members of the department and also with other members, as far down in the hierarchy as possible. In this Committee today I want to attest to the fact that the Foreign Affairs’ team consists of really outstanding people who have progressed on merit to the positions they occupy at present. As far as this is concerned I do not want any false note to creep into the debate at this late stage. [Interjections.]
Secondly let me say that hon members will be interested in the progress that has been made in Maputo. My information is—the matter is constantly being monitored—that everything is going well and that all the aircraft are en route to Maputo. It is to be hoped that there will be no problems whatsoever and that Maj Wynand du Toit will arrive safely in Cape Town later this evening.
†A number of hon members, inter alia the hon member for Turffontein, the hon member for Berea in his first speech, the hon member for Umlazi and the hon member for Brakpan, referred to the situation on the subcontinent of Africa. I want to make this point as far as Africa is concerned. I ended my first speech this afternoon by asking how we could in fact make progress in Southern Africa.
I have no doubt that the answer to this is that we have to build bridges to Africa.
Twenty or thirty years ago, Africa found itself in a revolutionary decade, beset by political upheavals, and liberation took a heavy toll in many countries. Today, twenty years later, the situation is even worse. Many of our neighbours are now on the brink of economic collapse, with little hope of survival. The fact is that while political freedom—this is so important—can be given on a platter, economic independence has to be earned. This is the lesson which Africa is learning the hard way. We have seen political changes in Africa over the past thirty years, apparently for the good, but we have also seen economic degeneration such as never before.
For most African countries poverty is nothing new; in fact, 29 of the 36 poorest countries in the world are in Africa. When we take into account accepted indices of development, such as gross national product, food production per capita—some of my colleagues here mentioned that specifically—education and infant mortality, most of them, despite many years of intensive effort, are going backwards or, at least, are standing still. It was said by a former Secretary General of the OAU, Mr Kodjo, that Africa is a dying continent, and we live on this dying continent.
The long-term deterioration in food production in Africa can be attributed to, three well-established trends: The fastest population growth of any continent in history; widespread soil erosion, deforestation and desertification; and the failure of African governments to give agriculture the support it deserves, coupled with totally inappropriate aid programmes. In 1970 Africa was nearly self sufficient in food, but according to the FAO the continent’s food production has been falling by 1% per annum since that year. Coupled with the unrivalled population growth we find an energy crisis of ever-increasing dimension.
Firewood is the main source of energy for cooking and heating for 90% of Africa’s population. It is estimated that over the past 25 years since independence nearly half of Africa’s forests have been destroyed. All of this adds up to a political, social and economic nightmare.
Over the past two decades many attempts have been made to help the needy in Africa by schemes of economic aid funded mainly by the governments of the more affluent northern hemisphere. I believe that one can only help others permanently by helping them to help themselves. The Chinese know better. They have a proverb that states: “Give a man a fish and he profits but a single dish. Teach him the art of rod and reel and he will never lack a meal.”
Governments cannot possibly solve the problem of economic hardships through handouts. What Africa needs most today is not charity which saps initiative and removes the urge to succeed, but opportunity and the kind of assistance that will lead to self-development—the only form of development which lasts.
*What I have just said is, in my view, a full resumé of what the Department of Foreign Affairs is doing in Africa. Each year its Development Co-operation Division utilises approximately 80% of the overall foreign affairs budget which runs into billions of rand, precisely because of what I have just tried to sketch for hon members here. This is employed in the form of aid to the TBVC countries, as project aid to other countries around us in Africa, for example the BLS countries, and even further to the north. Hon members would be astounded to know where in Africa we are actively engaged in extending the hand of friendship. We do not do so by giving away weapons or dishing out food or money, but by giving countries the most important asset that any person or people can have, ie its knowledge or know-how, so that those countries can help themselves. To my way of thinking that is the essence of the whole situation. That is how we can ultimately remedy our situation in Southern Africa.
I should very much like to react briefly to a few remarks made by hon members on this side of the Committee. I shall also endeavour to get round to what hon members of the respective opposition parties had to say. Let me reiterate at once, however, that tomorrow the hon the Minister himself will also be present.
The hon member for Turffontein referred to inter-state relations. He referred to the multilateral system being implemented in South Africa. I do not think there can be a better example of mutual assistance than this multilateral co-operation secretariat. We can see how they are capable of extending the hand of friendship.
Arising from what the hon member for Turffontein said, I want to refer to one of the most positive series of articles I have yet come across in the Press. Now I want to compliment Business Day. Last Monday, 30 August, Business Day devoted an entire supplement to the work being done in South Africa’s self-governing and independent states. The hon member for Germiston District spoke about disinformation. This is one of the finest examples of information I have ever come across. The article has the banner headline: “Policy looks to be working”. I think that is a wonderful compliment for Government policy which, by way of either independent or self-governing states, is voluntarily leading people to independence, as far as this is possible, not only in the constitutional and political spheres, but also in the economic, educational and social spheres, with everything that entails. I want to thank the hon member for Turffontein very sincerely for his kind words. I want to congratulate him on his designation as chairman of the Foreign Affairs caucus group and thank him for the fine spirit of co-operation that exists between his group, the hon the Minister and myself.
The hon member for Krugersdorp made his customary good contribution, for which I want to thank him very sincerely. I want to give him recognition for his constructive recommendation in connection with representatives on tours. I think it is vital that when there are tours overseas they should really be representative of the country’s population. He referred—I am now merely dealing with odd aspects to which hon members referred—to the promotion of Afrikaans in Bophuthatswana. I wonder whether hon members realise that that is the only country, other than South Africa, in which Afrikaans is an official language. The ambassador of that country has arranged a special function for 31 October, a function at which that idea will be taken further.
The hon member for Port Elizabeth North referred specifically to international rules in connection with accommodation for diplomats. I should like to associate myself with his appeal that there should also be understanding for the position of diplomats of colour serving in the RSA. As for equipping our officials professionally and mentally for the important and challenging task, there is an extended training programme, which is adapted on an on-going basis. I thank the hon member.
Then I want to thank the hon member Dr Golden very sincerely for his contribution. I agree with him. If we cannot involve the private sector and have that sector co-operate in the development of our image, we are going to find ourselves struggling. In their own interests people must definitely achieve the required standard. I also want to thank him very sincerely for his reply to the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition on the question of the USA. Let me tell the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition that I think one can so easily make the mistake of simply judging all Americans by the same standard.
That is specifically what I did not do.
No, I am not saying that you did. I am merely issuing the warning that one should not do so. One can so easily do so. Let me tell hon members that I myself was there for a month last year, and it is astounding how many Americans one encounters who are completely sympathetic towards South Africa.
The hon member for King William’s Town furnished some very interesting information about the TBVC countries, and for that I want to thank him very sincerely. The hon member himself plays a major role in King William’s Town, which sometimes looks like a suburb of Ciskei.
I want to thank the hon member for Germiston District for his contribution on disinformation. On many occasions I have thought what an absolute stroke of luck it was that President Machel’s aircraft crashed 200 metres this side of the South African border. Hon members can imagine what amount of disinformation would have been blazoned abroad if that aircraft had crashed 200 metres beyond our borders.
I want to thank hon members of the NP very sincerely. I want to thank the hon member for Wynberg and the hon member for Bloemfontein North very sincerely for their contributions in connection with economic sanctions and the ANC respectively.
Then I just want to refer briefly to a few of the points made by the hon members of the opposition parties. I do not have much of a quarrel with the hon member for Soutpansberg’s remarks on the maintenance and protection of South Africa’s interests in the international sphere. We have a difference of opinion, however, in our interpretation and conclusions. The Government has taken note of the remarks in the media about an alleged shift of emphasis in the Soviet Union’s thinking in regard to events in South Africa. Let me give the hon member the assurance, however, that it has always been the attitude of the department and the Government to adopt a balanced approach, keeping its eyes and ears open for any new developments, wherever they take place throughout the world. Be that as it may, we have definitely taken note of that and shall be examining the situation with great sensitivity.
†I should like to thank the hon member for Berea for the kind remarks and sentiments he expressed regarding the role and participation of our foreign affairs officials in negotiating our way out of a sensitive dilemma and enterprisingly securing the release and exchange of prisoners, among whom is Maj Du Toit. He spoke about Africa and I think I replied to that question as far as my view of the situation is concerned.
*The hon the Leader of the Official Opposition also referred to the whole concept of countries and peoples gaining independence. I want to tell him that I do not have the slightest doubt that from the very outset the NP’s policy has been one of granting peoples and nations an opportunity to develop to the point of gaining independence. There are, of course, a few conditions attached to this. For example, as far as possible the people concerned must live in one homogeneous area, it must be a really homogeneous community and it must have its own history, its own language and culture and to all intents and purposes its own religion.
One cannot, however, force them to accept independence. Even if a country such as KwaZulu met all those requirements, but did not ask for independence and did not want it either, one could not force it down their throats.
I have briefly referred to the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition’s reference to the USA.
†The hon member for Sea Point made a specific point in connection with Cahora Bassa. I should like to assure him that in the past month two discussions took place concerning the Cahora Bassa Agreement. Another discussion should take place within a month and will bring together the three parties concerned. The agreement is still in force and I want to assure the hon member that this agreement is as much in force as the Nkomati Accord is. Nothing will give us more pleasure than really to get going on this one.
*The hon member for Sea Point also raised several other points, but by his leave I am not going to refer to them now.
†I thank the hon member for Mooi River. I asked him for a copy of the article to which he referred in the Daily Telegraph, and I should like to respond to that later.
*The hon member for Brakpan asked me about the sacrifice Dr Savimbi had to make. Let me assure him that no demands were made as far as Dr Savimbi is concerned. He immediately reacted personally to a request which was made to us by the Angolan government and which we then conveyed to him. I can give the hon member for Brakpan that assurance.
He also asked a question about Mr De Jonge. The fact of the matter is that it does not matter how De Jonge got into the Dutch embassy, but the authorities could not remove him from that embassy without being guilty of infringement of recognised diplomatic law and custom. That is the point. The Government, therefore, acted quite correctly and with dignity.
On a later occasion I shall reply to other hon members. In the last five minutes of today’s discussion I would just very much like to make a point in which, to a certain extent, I associate myself with the hon the Leader of the Official Opposition.
The aspect I want to raise, in conclusion, involves the fact that inevitably the Department of Foreign Affairs can only convey an image of what is actually taking place in the RSA. One is grateful for the opportunity we have to convey South Africa’s image by means of our missions in foreign countries and through the stream of visitors who come to South Africa of their own accord or by invitation. I want to call upon the private sector, as the hon member Dr Golden has done, to meet their responsibilities in this regard too and to invite as many people as possible—opinion-formers—to South Africa.
It is a privilege to explain to the world the progress that has already been made in the sphere of reform, and the fact that it embodies far more than merely constitutional or political reform. It is a privilege to convey a picture of South Africa attempting, at all costs, to maintain decent, civilised Christian norms, desiring to narrow the gap between the Third World and the First World by uplifting people and being prepared to share power with everyone who regards South Africa as their fatherland and has its future at heart.
I have an ideal, a dream, that we shall ultimately succeed in convincing the world that we are sincere in our efforts at creating a fatherland for all 30 million of the people in South Africa. We nevertheless all have a task to perform and a responsibility in this regard. We must not narrow the gap between the First World and the Third World by lowering standards, as happened in the rest of Africa when the small First-World component disappeared. We must narrow that gap in an upward direction by uplifting people and having them share in the prosperity in South Africa.
I think the wheel has started turning. I think the world is beginning to understand this message. In order to narrow the gap we need prosperity, more investments and a greater inflow of capital, not sanctions and disinvestment. I get the impression that we are increasingly coming to realise that the few South Africans advocating disinvestment and sanctions are focusing on their own shortterm political interests as a priority and not on what is in the best interests of South Africa and its people. The 5 million Whites in this country need the 25 million people of colour. Likewise the 25 million people of colour have little chance of a future without their White compatriots in this country. Even the Russians are beginning to realise this. It is frequently necessary to attempt to explain these concepts in concrete terms and to convey the options open to South Africa. The First-World and Third-World elements in South Africa form a partnership, each one having to learn to supplement the other and to learn from it. Power-sharing in theoretical terms means partnership in practical business terms. If this can be implemented with great success in the private sector, it could also work in the political sphere.
Just a final thought. This is the kind of honest, practical message we are trying to convey to the world. Hon members of the opposition parties must also help us to convey this message to the world, because it is in the interests of everyone who shares this country with us.
Chairman directed to report progress and ask leave to sit again.
House Resumed:
Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.
Mr Chairman, I move:
Agreed to.
The House adjourned at