I move as an unopposed motion—

Agreed to.

The clause under discussion is one which makes two changes in the existing law. Firstly, it applies to temporary liquor licensees the necessary stocking provisions which apply to other types of licensees. It lays down, inter alia, that any licensee shall stock the products of not less than eight independent wine manufacturers and of three independent brewers. Temporary licensees were not subject to that particular provision. Secondly, it increases the number of brands of beer which must be stocked from three to seven. Dealing with the second alteration first, because that is to be made applicable to temporary licensees as well, this measure before us asks us to make criminals out of all the liquor licensees in South Africa. There are at the moment six independent brewers in this country, six independent companies, including South West Africa. We have S.A. Breweries, Old Dutch Breweries, Stag Breweries, the new Whitbread’s Breweries and the two South West African breweries, Hansa and Windhoek. We are now by law making it compulsory for every licensee to stock seven brands of beer excluding the one which you may yourself manufacture. That means that a Whitbread Breweries’ hotel or bottle store must stock seven brands other than Whitbread. A South African Breweries’ hotel or bottle store must stock seven brands other than their own, which is impossible. We want to know what is the purpose of this creation of a compulsory market, this forcing of private enterprise to buy the products of every single brewery in South Africa, and what is more, to open the door for the creation of a new brewery with a compulsory market. It means that by law we are creating a protected market for any person who wants to start a brewery, because he starts it with the knowledge that every single hotel, every bottle store and every club and every single other licensee in South Africa has got to buy its products. We regard that as unrealistic and unreasonable and in fact as highly suspicious. These existing breweries, as it is, restrict their market. Whitbreads are not selling their beer in the Cape. Hansa and Windhoek do not normally sell their beer in the Transvaal. Stag is not normally sold in the Cape, and yet we by law, contrary to the free choice of the breweries, say a bottle store or a hotel must stock these products. With the rail age from Johannsburg to Cape Town it is ridiculous to expect a Johannesburg producer to be able to sell in competition with a Cape Town producer here, or a Windhoek producer to sell in Johannesburg in competition with a Johannesburg producer. Yet every single licensee has to stock all brands. I have tested it in this House. In our own catering department in this House you cannot buy Stag or Old Dutch. I challenge the hon. the Deputy Minister to go into the bar in this House and to buy a Stag or an Old Dutch beer. They stocked it until it went bad, and then they had to send it away because nobody bought it. Yet we are forcing people to supply goods for which there is no demand. I call as my witness for the fact that this is a ridiculous measure the hon. the Prime Minister himself, who only last year, on 3rd June, in respect of quite another issue, referred to this compulsory stocking provision and said—

The Prime Minister himself does not regard this as a realistic provision and yet we are making technical criminals of people. If they contravene this provision they can be fined up to R1,000 or sent to prison for five years, or both. We are strongly opposed to this provision. Its extension to temporary licensees is equally unacceptable. It means that every Nationalist Party Stryddag which has a temporary licence has got to display eight types of wine and seven types of beer. It means that every sporting club which gets a temporary licence for one day must do so also. I was at a function on the edge of the hon. the Deputy Minister’s constituency over a long week-end where a temporary liquor licence had been granted to cover a sporting function attended by members of a club. At that function, in terms of the licence they were selling wine and that wine was purchased and consumed. Under this provision which is now proposed here, that temporary licence granted to that club would have obliged them, if they sold wine, to sell eight different brands. Automatically they would then have said, “We are not going to sell any wine at all because if we sell one brand we must offer eight”. Therefore the very thing which the hon. the Minister wants to encourage, and that is the sale of wine, would be prevented because of the unnecessary and unreasonable demand which would be made on any club getting such a licence. Temporary licences can only be granted for a few days at the most. They usually cover one single sporting event. I admit that there are some functions like agricultural shows which may last longer, but 99 per cent of temporary licences are granted for one night for a dance or for one day for a sporting function, and again in 99 per cent of the cases those licences are run at a loss. Sir, if you talk to any hotelier and ask him to transfer his licence for a dance you will find that he will be most reluctant to do so. I have had that experience with our own party functions where we have tried to get a licensee to transfer his licence temporarily for a dance. They do not make a profit on it. This provision is going to make it almost impossible for sportsmen or societies to get people to give them the use of their licence in order to obtain a temporary licence for any function. What is going to happen therefore is not that you are going to encourage the offering of wide varieties of liquor but that you are going to penalize every sportsman in South Africa, every sportsman who at a rugby match wants to be able to sell beer under a temporary licence. If the licensee has to stock seven brands of beer he is going to refuse to run a pub at a sporting function. Sir, how can you display and sell eight types of wine and all types of beer at a sporting function? [Time limit.]

I think I should perhaps give some explanation at an early stage. The hon. member for Durban (Point) has had a great deal to say about the fact that there are, in fact, only six independent brewers in South Africa, including South West Africa, and that this measure now lays down that the beer of seven different brewers should be stocked. There seems to me to be an agreement between the hon. member and myself to give pro amico advice to each other, and I will have to do so again. If the hon. member refers to Section 114bis (ii) he will see that the following very significant words are used—

And then follow the important words—

Who decides when the circumstances are beyond his control?

In other words, even if we say he has to stock seven different brands of beer of different brewers, he will be perfectly within his right if he should stock only three brands if only three are available. That is the answer to the first problem raised here by the hon. member. The fact that we require that seven brands of beer should be stocked, while only six kinds are available, is no problem. We may just as well have laid down that six brands should be kept, but in cases where it is necessary to have a provision such as this inserted in the law, one has to create circumstances in which it will not be necessary to amend the law every year. In fact, it was found essential to insert this provision, in the first instance because we have the position in South Africa that the manufacturers and producers also have retail licences on a large scale, and as a result of those circumstances the public may actually be caused a great deal of inconvenience as far as the supply of liquor is concerned, and that is what we are concerned about, namely the convenience of the public.

I should like the hon. member to realize that liquor licences in South Africa are not free; they are protected; they are limited, and because they are limited the liquor licensee enjoys a great deal of protection. If we had free liquor distribution in South Africa, if any business in South Africa were allowed to stock liquor, it would have been unnecessary to introduce this provision, but it is for the very reason that the liquor licensee is protected that we feel compelled to protect the public, otherwise the public can be caused a great deal of inconvenience. The licence is made available to the licensee by the Department through the local magistrate; the licensee is protected so that he cannot be pushed out by a competitor in that particular place. Why should the public suffer the inconvenience of finding, when they go to that person to whom we have granted a licence, that the licensee cannot make available to them the other brand of beer? We are aware of the fact that we have very large companies, manufacturers and producers of liquor in South Africa who are bent on promoting the sale of their own products and that it is essential for us to afford the public this protection, because we protect the liquor licensee as well.

The hon. member also referred to the fact that it is a temporary licence. In fact, it has been brought to the attention of the Department that temporary licences have been abused in the past. In cases where a temporary licence has been granted and where the licensee has been prepared to take out a temporary licence to provide liquor facilities at a particular function, the Department has found that the licensee has laid down as a condition that he will sell only his own liquor. That is the very abuse we want to combat, because we already have monopolistic tendencies in the liquor trade. The tendency is for very large undertakings to force out the small ones. The result is that monopolistic conditions are created in South Africa, and that is all that we want to prevent here. I do not agree with the hon. member when he says that no profits are made on temporary licences.

A licensee does not take out a temporary licence if it is not worth while. A temporary licence is take out when liquor is sold in reasonably large quantities and in many cases enormous quantities of liquor are sold under these temporary licences. I have considerable experience of this; licensees at certain shows in the Western Cape have said on previous occasions that they should be subsidized because they do not make a profit, and what has happened? The licence was subsequently taken over by the show itself and it now makes an enormous profit. When this kind of licence is taken out, it is not a question of only a few bottles of beer or wine being sold; dozens and dozens of cases of liquor are sold and for that reason the person concerned should be able to comply with the requirement laid down here. The hon. member has said that it is usually the licensee who takes out the temporary licence. I agree with him. It is usually taken out by him, but he has no problems for the very reason that he is the person who takes out the temporary licence, because his hotel or bottle-store is in the vicinity and he has to comply with those conditions in his hotel or in his bottle-store in any case. In other words, he only has to transfer the liquor from his hotel or from his bottle-store to the premises in respect of which he has taken out a temporary licence. After all, he has to stock that liquor in his hotel or in his bottle-store. Why cannot he make it available at the function in respect of which he has taken out a temporary licence? As I have said, it has been found in the past that temporary licences have been abused, and this provision is intended to eliminate abuses. As a matter of fact, there are no practical problems as far as the implementation of the provisions is concerned.

Sir, I believe that we have heard one of the most extraordinary and unconvincing arguments here this morning from a man of the intelligence of the hon. the Deputy Minister. The argument that we have hard to-day make this clause even more suspicious. There are obviously reasons behind it which the Government are not prepared to disclose, if the arguments put forward in support of the clause are those advanced by the hon. the Deputy Minister.

Sir, let us examine these arguments. I deal first with the provision that the beers of seven different brewers must be stocked. The hon. the Deputy Minister justifies this, despite the fact that there are not seven independent brewers in operation at the present time, by referring to Section 114bis (ii) and particularly the portion of that clause which says, “except insofar as he may be unable to do so through circumstances beyond his control”. Surely it is a crazy way of legislating when the only protection that a person has, when an inspector comes around to see whether he has complied with the law, is to put forward an explanation to prove that he is not able to comply with the law through circumstances beyond his control. But, Sir, there is a more important argument against the hon. the Deputy Minister and it is this; How does he justify passing a law which cannot be complied with? Surely that is the simple answer. It is no good saying, “It is quite true that this law that we are passing cannot be complied with but anybody who transgresses can simply say, ‘look at Section 114bis (ii); the circumstances are beyond my control and therefore everything is fine’ ”. Sir, what a crazy way of legislating! It is not surprising that the hon. the Deputy Minister is blushing so much. We do not want to be referred to Section 114; we can read it and we can understand it. This Government seeks to put through this House to-day Clause 2(b) which will make it obligatory for the beers of seven independent brewers to be stocked. What we want to know from the Government first of all is why this is necessary; we want a clear explanation as to why this is necessary and secondly how the Government expects compliance with this law to-day. We do not want to be told that in the future another independent brewer may come on to the scene. Sir, if that is the explanation that this law is being passed in order to enable another independent brewer to come into the field, then we say that this is scandalous.

Why not make it ten?

Yes, why not make it ten instead of seven? Why not give the opportunity to a few more groups of people to get into the field and to be protected to establish a business which in unprofitable except through this type of measure? Sir, one does not like to resort to personalities, but the hon. the Deputy Minister is not inexperienced in this field. He was a past Chairman of Robertson’s Distillers, a past Chairman of Union Wine, and he has had very close interests in the liquor field, particularly in this general field that we are discussing now, and he is in a position to give us intelligent reasons for this law, if intelligent reasons exist. The very fact that he is unable to do so,

proves that we are entitled to be highly suspicious of this measure.

There is a further reason why we are entitled to an explanation from the Government. Ever since this Bill was published, there have been comments from the trade and from chambers of commerce and industry, and not one single comment—not one—has been favourable towards this Bill. Every one of them has condemned this provision. In those circumstances this House is entitled to a clear explanation.

Coming to temporary licences, once again the explanation of the Deputy Minister is no explanation at all. The whole object of a temporary licence is to provide liquor at a particular function, in many cases a social function, by a club or a particular group of people just for one evening. Surely the whole object of such a provision is to provide reasonable alcoholic refreshment for the people who are attending this function. Why should it become necessary in regard to functions of that sort that there should be all sorts of problems, technicalities and difficulties placed in the way of the people who want such licences? Frankly, Sir, the Deputy Minister is trifling with this House when he expects us to accept the sort of explanation which he has given. I hope that we are now going to have either from the Minister introducing the Bill or from the Deputy Minister the cards on the table. Let us hear why they want this measure and then we can deal with the matter on the merits. [Time limit.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to say that this provision creates a very bad impression indeed. It creates the impression of a personal vendetta almost on behalf of somebody against somebody. When you take this together with the fact that we had in the taxation provisions the virtually penal taxation upon beer, it becomes doubly striking. I think that the Government really should consider whether they think the game is worth the candle, whether they want to bring their legislation and their administration into grave suspicion in connection with this one matter of beer. We do not know why there has suddenly been a set in this way; why these measures which appear to be a set, have been introduced. We had a provision for compulsory stocking only recently in any case, and now we suddenly have it extended from three to seven in circumstances where there are not even seven independent brewers in existence. The Deputy Minister comes with the lame excuse that there is a provision in the Bill whereby in fact it will not have to be complied with. He referred to the words in the provision, namely “except in so far as he is prevented by circumstances beyond his control”. It is highly uncertain what that means. It will be very difficult for a company to say that they are not able to obtain, though with some difficulty, these extra stocks?

Now, the hon. the Deputy Minister has pretended that he is acting in the public interest here. I say on the contrary he is going to put up the price of liquor to people, he is going to put it up appreciably, because if these temporary licence-holders are going to stock these extra brands and if everybody is going to have to stock the beer of seven independent producers, this is going to add appreciably to their costs. It is entirely uncommercial to act in this way. It seems to be the lone case where the ordinary play of economic factors is not being allowed to operate. Even if one can concede that reasonable measures of this kind can be considered, this goes far beyond what is reasonable. We are entirely unsatisfied with the attitude of the Government on this point.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Deputy Minister read to me the proviso to Section 1146/5 (2). I have read that, but I also read a little further than the hon. the Minister went. I wonder why he stopped. He stopped at the point at which this really started getting ridiculous when applied to temporary licences. He quoted that—

Then the Deputy Minister stopped. But the clause continues—

and then there are the limitations.

For a temporary liquor licence in respect of which let us say in advance usually the facilities are very primitive, in terms of the proposed new Clause 1146/5 of the Act a person must not only have available but must display, and have a wine list for, eight different types of wine. The Minister and the Deputy Minister will know that with the recent mergers that have taken place it is almost impossible in the first place to know who are eight independent manufacturers. The law lays down that on written application a manufacturer shall indicate with whom he is connected. But the Deputy Minister may have found from the files and from earlier debates that when this provision was originally introduced in 1963 a promise was given that the police would provide lists of independent manufacturers. I challenge the Deputy Minister of Police to deny that the police have been unable to supply that list of independent manufacturers. His own department has been unable or has failed to supply a list of independent wine manufacturers, for the simple reason that mergers are taking place, takeovers are taking place, new barons are arising —no longer sugar barons or land barons, but wine barons—new companies are being formed, old companies are absorbed, and even the trade to-day is unable to obtain a clear indication of who are independent and who are not when it comes to wine. The Minister’s own department, after a promise that they would provide this list, have not done so. I challenge the Deputy Minister to deny that any policeman to-day doing an inspection of a liquor firm would be unable to name eight independent manufacturers to the licence-holder. Yet this law was passed in 1963, and is now not only being retained but being extended.

The Deputy Minister carefully avoided my quotation of what the hon. the Prime Minister said two years after this law was introduced, saying that it was not working. The Prime Minister himself said it was not working last year. Now, instead of scrapping it because it does not work, the Minister is creating more technical crimes. I want to ask him to say that the Prime Minister did not know what he was talking about when he said it did not work. Or does he accept the Prime Minister’s word that this does not work? Either he does not agree with the Prime Minister, or he accepts that it does not work, but despite the fact that it does not work he wants to keep it on the Statute Book and extend it. I would suggest that it would be far better if the amendment said that “Section 114bis is hereby repealed”. That would be more sensible. Leave it to the law of supply and demand for people to supply what the public want. If a person does not supply what the public wants, the public will stop going to that person. Of course they will. That is private enterprise. The Minister has power to grant additional liquor licences now over and above the quota. That was introduced to deal with the person who was not meeting public demand, and if a licensee is not meeting public demand, the Minister by a specific power in the Act has the right to grant another liquor licence. And there are lots of people who would jump at taking it up. Lots of people would do anything in order to obtain that extra licence. So there is the greatest possible sanction available, namely that of the granting of an additional licence over and above the quota, where there is unreasonable restriction of supplies.

The Deputy Minister referred to the one instance of the large function where large quantities of liquor were consumed. But what percentage is that? Can he deny that that is a fraction of not more than one per cent of the temporary licences granted? At least beween 90 and 99 per cent of temporary licences are granted for dances, braaivleis functions, yacht club functions, rugby matches, motor car races and sporting events of that type, where they are granted to deal with a small function only, apart from the major functions. Now, most of the major functions are held at premises where sporting licences are granted, or where club licences are granted, and they are already subject to this provision. So, for the sake of one or two instances, every sporting and social club in South Africa is to be penalized. Every single organization must be penalized because of one or two exceptions. Surely that is not the way to deal with this problem.

Order! The hon. member already raised that point when he spoke the first time. It is a repetition of what has been said.

The hon. the Minister replied to it and I was disagreeing with the hon. the Deputy Minister’s reply.

The hon. member is just repeating now that he disagrees. He said so in the first instance. The hon. member must please make a new point.

I will certainly make a new point, Sir, and I will await with interest the Minister’s reply.

The other point to which the Deputy Minister did not reply was the fact that many manufacturers restrict the area of their sales. The proviso here is that a person, unless he is prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond his control, must stock the maximum quantity. I should like to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister whether “circumstances beyond control” involve the non-availability of supplies in the normal course of events in an area, or whether it is not correct that, technically, those liquors, although not normally sold, are available, and therefore they are not “circumstances beyond control”. Because, although they are not normally supplied there, by writing to another brewery in another town and sending a cheque you could get a case of that beer sent to you by rail. So, although it is not sold in the normal practice, yet technically—and legally—it is available. Legally it is available to every licensee if he wants to have it specially railed to him, whereas the local breweries will deliver at short notice and in whatever quantities are required. The other breweries make their liquor available, but without the advantages of the local brewery. Therefore it is available, but it is available at less convenience. That aspect does not, in my submission, exclude or give a person the right to say, “Circumstances were beyond my control”, if in fact he could obtain the items concerned.

Sir, I should like to hear the Minister’s or the Deputy Minister’s view in regard to these additional problems.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister a question or two. The first is: “Does this apply to the licence of a bowling club, tennis club, or golf club? Does it apply to them as well, if they have a licence?”

Yes.

It does apply to them. If I go back to my constituency and tell a bowling club that this will now apply to them, they will think I am crazy. They will ask me what we have been doing down here. It seems to me to be quite absurd. Here we have people running a social club and they are now being told that they must stock a certain amount of liquor. I should like to ask the hon. the Deputy Minister another question.

Are imported beers also included? If they are included, then the obvious answer is that they will say that they are going to stock two different types of beer and they will import five types of beer. The prices will be prohibitive for the ordinary beer drinker at the club. They will be told: “Here are five imported beers and these are the two you can drink.” The whole position is impracticable and it is quite absurd to say to members of a club, whether it be a golf club, a bowling club or a tennis club, where they have their own licence, that they must stock this amount of liquor. I sincerely hope that the Minister will go so far as to give notice to all clubs that he is going to introduce this provision in a Bill next session. We shall then have an opportunity of discussing it with them.

Mr. Chairman, first I should like to reply to the two points raised by the hon. member for Kensington. At the moment the present subsection (1) of Section 114bis of the Liquor Act reads as follows—

The licences I have just mentioned to this House are not affected by or brought within the purview of the legislation for the first time, except as regards the larger variety of beers which they now have to stock. In other words, sports club licences remain subject to the provisions of this section to the same extent as in the past. We are not introducing anything new as far as sports club licences are concerned except, of course, the provision relating to the larger variety of beers. However, the provisions relating to the variety of wines, brandies and other liquors to be stocked remain applicable to the various licences in precisely the same way as before. The only change relates to beer. The other provisions are already applicable and have been applicable in the past.

It is ridiculous.

The hon.member may try to explain again what he meant. At the moment I cannot understand what he is trying to tell me. The provision is not applicable as regards imported beer. Imported beer is not included in the variety to be stocked. It is obvious that the hon. member for Kensington heard us discussing the matter here but that he has made no prior study of it. That is quite understandable. It is specifically laid down here that it must be the beer of at least seven different brewers of malt liquor in the Republic and South West Africa.

While I am on the topic of imported beer, I want to say that the hon. member for Durban (Point) gave out that it was such a terrible thing and that it was so difficult to obtain liquor. He said liquor was so expensive to acquire. The hon. member for Pinelands also said that liquor would become more expensive. But go to any concern for the sale of liquor here in the Cape and just see how many brands of foreign beer are kept in stock. There are, for instance, Tuborg, Heinecken and Amstel, although I admit that Amstel now is a local beer. A large variety of imported beers are available here in Cape Town. It is a good thing that they are stocked.

There is a demand for them.

There may be a demand. How can hon. members say that there will not be a demand for the other beers if they are available?

That has to be proved.

As regards the suspicion to which hon. members have referred. I want to ask them: “For whom are they fighting here to-day?” If hon. members have such strong objections, they should now get up and tell me. [Interjections.] If hon. members have such strong objections, let them tell me for whose interests they are fighting now.

Why do you want this law?

I am not ashamed to say why I want this provision. I have already said so before. By means of this legislation we are ensuring that the beers of South African Breweries will be available anywhere in the country. We are ensuring that Whitbread’s beer will be available everywhere and the same applies to the beer of the Windhoek Brewery. That is all we are doing. If hon. members say that we are now trying to assist in selling Whitbread’s beer, let them say so. They may just as well say that in respect of the beer of Stag Breweries. We are not excluding anyone. If the hon. members for Pinelands and Musgrave think that there is something sinister in this amendment, they must mention something to me which shows that we want to promote the interests of any business or brewery. That is not what we want to do. In the interests of the public I regard it as being essential, while we are protecting the holders of liquor licences, to protect our public too in this respect in view of the possible abuse of liquor licences.

The hon. member for Durban (Point) pointed out that certain breweries restricted their areas of sale. He then asked me to give an exposition of the particular paragraph in the Act. It is not possible for me to give the hon. member a legal opinion on this matter in the time at my disposal, nor is it the purpose of this discussion. However, the onus will be on the holder of the licence to furnish the necessary proof that it is impossible for him to comply with the provisions of the Act. Whatever the circumstances, if he can furnish such proof, everything ought to be in order. What the reason is does not matter. We know that at present seven brands of beer cannot be available because there are only six breweries. One can understand that and it is sufficient reason. It is not necessary for the holder of a licence to explain that in court. It is accepted. It is common knowledge.

But why pass this law when there are only six beers?

If the hon.member wants us to make it ten, we may just as well do so. However, we want to make provision for seven in view of the possibility of another brewery being established and in such case we want there to be seven. It may subsequently be necessary to increase this number. At the moment, however, it is not necessary to make it more than seven. I would have had no real objection had we made it six.

Are you expecting a seventh one?

No, at the moment I am not expecting that. The hon. member asked me a specific question. At the moment I have no reason to believe that a seventh brewery may be established. It is possible. For that reason we are making provision for seven, but we do not want to make it less than six in any event.

Mr. Chairman, I find the last remark of the hon. the Deputy Minister most interesting. As we now understand the position, this Bill is being passed despite the fact that there are at present only six independent brewers. But he has suggested that there is the possibility that a seventh might come into the field, although he does not know of any such brewer. One wonders whether he has perhaps a sixth sight, or perhaps a seventh sight is more appropriate. We wonder whether he perhaps knows a thing or two regarding the companies in which he is presumably still a shareholder, despite the fact that he is no longer the chairman. Perhaps he might tell us whether they have any specific plans at the moment. However, this I think is really a scandalous situation. The Government admits that at the present time there are only six independent brewers in South Africa and in South West Africa. Nevertheless, we are passing a law compelling dealers in beer …

Would you rather we made it six?

I am not interested in what the number is. My point is that it is making a farce of Parliament to expect Parliament to pass a law which cannot be complied with. Surely that is making a farce of Parliament. It is no good the hon. the Deputy Minister trying to be flippant. In addition to this interests in the liquor field, the Deputy Minister is also a lawyer and one would expect him above all others …

You are talking the biggest nonsense now.

… above all others not to make a farce of Parliament. If the hon. the Deputy Minister is disputing my statement that he is a lawyer, I am quite prepared to accept that.

You know that I cannot practise now.

The law as it stands at the moment requires dealers in beer to stock the beers of three different independent South African brewers. I challenge the hon. the Deputy Minister to deny that, despite the legal provision as it is at present, it is impossible to buy in many parts of South Africa the beers of three independent South African brewers. Will he deny that? If it is impossible in most parts of South Africa to comply with the law as it stands and to provide the beers of three independent South African producers, what is the point of adopting a provision whereby the beers of seven producers must be stocked? The position becomes more and more ridiculous, the more one goes into it. As for the Deputy Minister’s argument that this provision is intended to protect the public, that is nonsense. As the hon. member for Durban (Point) has pointed out, if the public seriously required protection, then the Government has the power to do so by creating further …

Order! That argument has been used before.

Mr. Chairman, I was about to say that that is the whole basis on which the hon. the Deputy Minister rests his case, and it has no foundation whatsoever. Furthermore. I would point out that there has been no demand whatsoever from the public for this legislation. How can the Deputy Minister suggest that this provision is being introduced in the interests of the public? Surely if the public wanted this, there would have been a demand for it. There has been no demand whatsoever. On the contrary, Mr. Chairman, all the public agitation, if I can put it that way, in connection with this Bill, has been the other way, has been to condemn this clause.

What do you know about the opinion of the public?

I propose to ignore the hon. member for Umhlatuzana. He does not know much about this subject. Mr. Chairman, once again we on this side of the House challenge the hon. the Deputy Minister and the hon. the Minister of Justice to answer the arguments on the merits that we have raised in this matter. At the moment, as it stands, it is perfectly clear to us, and I say it will be clear to the country, that there is no justification for this law.

I rise to deal with two aspects that appear to me relevant in regard to the discussion we are having with the hon. the Deputy Minister. The first one is the necessity for laying down at all any number of different brands. If the hon. the Deputy Minister feels that some monopoly has been established in an improper way in South Africa and that it is not in the interests of good business practice, there are means by which he can through the Department of Economic Affairs cause an inquiry to be made to see whether a monopoly has been established. If on the other hand, and that probably is the case, he could not use existing legislation in a manner which could make some difference to the business of the largest brewers in South Africa, then surely this is not the way to interfere with free enterprise by introducing compulsion …

This is not free enterprise.HON. MEMBERS: Why not?

I will reply to this point later, but I want to say that surely one of the evils in the economic life of South Africa at the present time is the growing interference by legislation with normal trade practices which have been in existence for generations, the attempt to direct where and how business should be conducted by means of legislation, instead of letting free competition, letting legitimate trade competition, carry on as it has done, and let the public buy where it can get the best value for its money. This is, as I see it, another attempt by the Government to interfere with normal trade practice where it is not necessary to do so.

The principle was adopted before and is enshrined in the existing law. That principle has been accepted.

One realizes why at that time that principle was introduced. But I want to ask, with all respect, the hon. the Deputy Minister, and I do so as a new member of this House, is there any justification for asking us on this side of the House to support an enactment which we know to-day cannot be carried out, but has to be dealt with under the exception or the saving clause somewhere else in the Act.

The hon. the Deputy Minister has asked for whom we are fighting on this side? I know of no principle to apply whereby I must legislate, whereby I must exercise my power of voting in this House because the hon. the Deputy Minister says: “It is possible that an additional brewery might be established.” Surely we are legislating for the position as it is to-day, and to-day with six available independent breweries, surely it is asking sufficient from the persons who deal in liquor that they should have three of these brands available …

Why must they have all six?

That argument has been used repeatedly.

I accept that, Mr. Chairman. The compulsory availability of all six brands can only be construed as a further interference with the normal competition that exists at the present time as between the various breweries who produce beer for sale in our market in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister of Justice, because we cannot get a reply from the hon. the Deputy Minister, in the interests of fairness to name now to the House and to South Africa eight independent wine manufacturers producing eight brands which must be stocked by every sporting club that gets a temporary licence? I feel that we are entitled to ask this from the Minister who is responsible for this legislation. He is asking that this particular provision be applied to sporting clubs who get a temporary licence. Secondly, I would like to put it to the Minister who is asking the question: “Who are you fighting for?”, that we are fighting for the sporting clubs in South Africa, the sportsmen of South Africa, and the public of South Africa, who are going to be harmed by this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I am now going to confine myself strictly to the amendment before the Committee, namely, to substitute “seven” for “three”. That is the only thing which is before the Committee as well as the extension of the principle to temporary licences. Those are the two points. Nothing else is before this Committee. Now I readily want to admit that this House has previously accepted the principle that as many brands of beer as exist should be made available to the public at all times. That has been accepted before.

The Prime Minister says that it does not work.

That has been accepted before. Now, because more brands of beer have come on the market, we have decided that it is fair to afford them the same opportunity to compete on the market. We have gone further, I readily admit that, and we mention “seven” instead of “six”. The idea was that a seventh one might possibly become available in which case it would have been necessary for us to come back to this House to substitute “seven” for “six”. But if it would give this Committee any satisfaction, I am quite prepared to substitute “six” for “seven”.

As regards the extension of the same principles to temporary licences, I can see absolutely no objection to that. If one must stock all brands of beer, of liquor, at an ordinary bottle-store, at an ordinary place for the sale of liquor, why should it not also apply in the case of temporary licences? One need not stock them in the same quantities. One knows in advance what quantity people are going to drink and one can then make provision to stock every kind of liquor, but let us not allow, as has happened in the past, there to be only one brand of beer, or two brands of beer, and that ten people who ask for another brand of beer simply cannot obtain it; or that one brand of liquor is requested and two brands are supplied but that the brand requested by the public is not stocked there. I know from experience that that has happened and I can really not see that we are being unfair with the two amendments we are proposing in this connection. I repeat, that if it would satisfy the Committee I would substitute “six” for “seven”.

Can you mention the brands of wine?

I am sorry, but I am not in a position to mention the brands of wine, nor is it relevant under this clause. All that is relevant here is whether the existing legal provisions, on which no reflection may be made and which may not be discussed either, are being extended so as to apply to temporary licences, yes or no. That is all that is before the Committee.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—101: Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, P. W.: Brandt, J. W.; Carr, D. M.; Coetzee, J.A.; Cruywagen, W. A.: de Jager, P. R.; de Wet, J. M.: de Wet, M. W.; Diederichs, N.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, A. S. D.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Frank, S.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C; Grobler, W. S. J.; Haak, J. F. W.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Horn, J. W. L.; Janson, T. N. H.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Langley, T.; le Grange, L.; Ie Roux, F. J.; le Roux, J. P. C.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, W. T.; Maree, G. de K.; Maree, W. A.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J.C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pelser, P. C.; Pienaar,; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rail, J. J.; Rail, J. W.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, H.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Steyn, A. N.; Swiegers, J.; Torlage, P. H.; Uys, D. C. H.; van Breda, A.; van den Berg, G. P.; van der Merwe, C. V.; van der Merwe, H. D. K.; van der Merwe, S. W.; van der Spuy, J. P.; van Niekerk, M. C.; van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Tonder, J. A.; van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; van Wyk, J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Venter, W. L. D. M.; Viljoen, M.; Visser, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Vosloo, W. L.; Waring. F. W.; Wentzel, J. J.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. S. van der Merwe and B. J. van der Walt.

Noes—42: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bennett, C; Connan, J. M.: Eden. G. S.; Emdin, S.: Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Higgerty, J. W.: Holland, M. W.; Hourquebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs, G. F.: Kingwill, W. G.; Lewis, H.: Lindsay. J. E.; Malan, D.G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell. M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.: Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Raw, W. V.; Smith. W. J. B.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Taylor, C. D.; Thompson, J. O. N.: Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

On a point of order. Sir, may I ask on which side the vote of an hon. member is counted if he is sitting in No Man’s Land?

It has never happened before. I will leave the choice to the hon. member. I shall ask him on which side he wishes to vote.

On a point of order, Sir, I submit that the hon. member had an opportunity to sit where he could vote for the Government. I submit, with respect, that his vote cannot be recorded.

Order! The rule is that all members in the House must vote. The mere fact that the hon. member has moved to one side now is an indication that he wishes to vote for the Government and therefore I rule that it is in order for him to do so.

Clause accordingly agreed to.

Clause 3:

I would like my vote recorded against this clause. I do not like the inclusion again of these far-reaching powers. I think it is very far-reaching indeed to say “until the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt”. Normally our law contained the phrase “on the balance of probability”, where the onus is on the accused. That is one of the reasons why I object to it. The other is that it seems to me to put a tremendous burden on a person who is accused of this very serious crime to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that just because at some previous time he left South Africa without the proper documents it cannot be assumed that he left to undergo training in sabotage. For these reasons, and because I believe it is a very heavy burden indeed on a person accused of a most serious crime, which entails the heaviest penalties, I wish my vote recorded against this clause.

We will support this clause, as I said yesterday when the second reading was taken, mainly because the information is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. When the original clause was passed it will be remembered that we supported the provision making it an offence to go out to be trained for sabotage, although the hon. member for Houghton then opposed it. We felt at the time that a person who went out of the country for training in sabotage should be punished, and we supported the clause at the time, although he had not committed any act of sabotage in the country.

Very flimsy evidence could be used against him.

It does not matter. We are still of the opinion that if a person leaves the country to train for sabotage, he should be punished and we must be consistent. If people leave the country without the proper documents it throws the suspicion on them that they are leaving for an unlawful purpose, because otherwise they would get the proper documents. What they have done outside the country is peculiarly within their own knowledge. If they have gone out for some lawful purpose, they should be able to prove that easily. Therefore we support this clause, although we admit that it goes very far.

The hon. member for Transkei has forgotten how often it happens that people leave this country without documents. A lot of students have had to leave the country without passports. If, 20 years later, they happen to be arrested on the accusation that they left the country in order to undergo training, the very fact that 20 years before when they left they did not have the necessary passports, places an additional burden of proof on them. I think this goes very far indeed. It should be left to the prosecution to lay charges in the normal way, as is normally accepted in our courts, but this additional burden goes very far.

Clause put and agreed to (Mrs. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 5:

I move the amendment standing in my name—

The effect of my amendment is to exclude house arrest. In any democratic country the citizens are very both to give up their freedom in any way to arbitrary action by an official. We have opposed many of the restrictive measures passed in the past where we have thought that they were not necessary. We have also given powers, very reluctantly at times, because we thought they were necessary for the maintenance of law and order. But the House is well aware that one provision of the criminal procedure rode which we have always opposed is this matter of house arrest. We are adamant that this measure goes too far, that it cannot be justified, and that a man should be given a chance to prove his innocence before some Tribunal before he is restricted to that extent. Therefore we are not prepared to extend it to South West Africa now, even though the Minister says it will be applied only for technical reasons. We still say that we are opposed to house arrest and we shall vote against it if necessary. I would point out that especially at this time, in view of what is happening at UNO and in South West Africa, we should be both to extend harsh measures of this nature to that territory.

Why did you not oppose it yesterday?

I made it clear yesterday that we were going to move this amendment. I do not know how the hon. member for Houghton can pretend that she does not know about it. I made it clear yesterday that although we accepted the Bill there were so many different principles included in the Bill that we would support the second reading but that we would move our amendments and vote on them if necessary, and that is what we are doing in regard to this clause.

The hon. member for Transkei knows perfectly well that there are three or four clauses in this Bill which form the principle of this Bill, and that this is one of them. He voted for the principle of this Bill yesterday, but to-day he is going to oppose this clause, so his argument makes nonsense. I used the argument yesterday that I thought it was quite wrong for South Africa at this particular tricky stage at UNO for us to introduce into Parliament a measure which is going to extend to South West Africa some of the more objectionable laws that we have in this country. In regard to this particular clause the Minister told us that he wanted to make assurance doubly sure, to see that the Communist Act applied to that territory. That is one of the reasons why I voted against the principles of this Bill. There is this clause and there is Clause Ster, and Clause 19 and Clause 22.

Order! The hon. member must confine herself to Clause 5.

Yes, but I am replying to what the hon. member said. He said that one of the reasons why he was going to object to this clause …

Why does the hon. member argue with the hon. member? He has his own mind.

With respect, surely we are in this House in order to debate and I am countering the arguments used by the hon. member. May I not reply to something which was permissible two minutes ago when it was put by that hon. member? I am answering his argument in the debate, and I put it to you, Sir, that that is the purpose of this Committee. Anyway, exactly the same argument that I used yesterday when I opposed the principle of the Bill is now being used by the hon. member in opposing this clause, which forms one of the principles of the Bill and therefore I am going to vote against this clause. I shall vote for the hon. member’s amendment because to some extent it lessens the effect of this clause, but to my mind his amendment does not go nearly far enough. Even if the Minister accepts that amendment —he told us yesterday he would not accept it, but supposing he has changed his mind for some reason—I am still going to vote against the clause. It is not only the house arrest clause in the Suppression of Communism Act that I object to. I object to the whole of that Act and I object to the fact that all these powers are taken by the Minister without any reference to the courts, and I object not only to the house arrest clause but to the restrictions and banning. As far as I am concerned the whole of the Suppression of Communism Act is a bad one and I do not like its extension to South West Africa.

I do not like the retrospectivity of this clause. This is a retrospective clause. It applies to the past. People who have been guilty of offences under amendments to the Suppression of Communism Act, in South West Africa, can now be arrested and charged under this clause, and I do not like retrospective legislation of any kind. In America it would be unconstitutional to introduce retrospective legislation and for a very good reason, because if one committed a deed which at the time of its commission was lawful, I think it is absolutely wrong for Parliament subsequently to amend the law and to make an Act which, when it was committed was legal, illegal in retrospect. For all those reasons I shall vote against this clause.

I do not think the matter is quite as easy as the hon. member for Houghton puts it.

It is not easy at all.

Everything to the hon. member is very simple. Sir, there are many amendments to the Suppression of Communism Act, as the hon. member for Transkei has indicated. The original Act is applicable to South West Africa; there is no question about it. The principle of confinement to a certain area and not being allowed to leave a certain district and the other principles involved are all applicable now in South West Africa and always were applicable there. The fact that we were opposed to that does not enter into the picture now. There was one significant change which was made; in fact there were two significant changes, and the one, as my hon. friend has pointed out, related to house arrest. This went much further than the original principle and we were bitterly opposed to that, and if there is any doubt as to whether that should apply in South West Africa, we say that we object to its being applied in South West Africa, or anywhere.

But, Sir, there is another very important amendment which was made; it was made to the Suppression of Communism Act; that is why it is not quite so simple. It could have been introduced as an amendment to some other Act, or it could have been introduced as a provision of the General Law Amendment Act, in which case it would not have come into the picture here to-day. But the fact is that the Suppression of Communism Act was amended to provide that it was an offence for a person to go out of the country for the purpose of receiving training in sabotage or for the purpose of receiving training to promote the aims of Communism or any other unlawful organization and then to return to this country for the purpose of perpetrating these offences. Sir, that is an amendment to this Act as well, and as far as we are concerned we say that with the situation that is developing in South West Africa, this provision must be applied there. Surely if these activities are going on in South West Africa they must be dealt with. Our attitude now is no different from what it was when this provision was originally passed. It makes no difference whether people leave from a territory committed to our care or from South Africa for the purpose of receiving training in sabotage abroad. This is not something that is not real.

The hon. member for Houghton must go to the Supreme Court here in Cape Town and listen to some of the cases there. There is a case being heard now in which the accused wanted to blow up the Blue Train. They went out of this country into one of our neighbouring countries and they were trained there. As far as we are concerned, if there is any doubt that this offence is an offence on the borders of South West Africa, then we feel that the matter should be put beyond doubt and that the law should be applied there. After all, it is an offence which carries with it, in the discretion of the judge, the death penalty. But if there is any doubt as to whether the provision in regard to house arrest should be applied in South West Africa, we feel that no case has yet been made for the extension of this provision to South West Africa unless the courts have some say in the matter; unless the individual concerned has the right to have his case reviewed by an impartial Judge. In the case of the other provisions, we are prepared to extend them to South West Africa.

I do not think this is a simple matter at all. I am beginning to think that the hon. member for Durban (Point) is simple.

He is not here.

I am sorry; I apologize. I was referring to the hon. member for Durban (North). The hon. member for Durban (Point) is certainly not simple. The hon. member for Durban (North) is trying to infer— the sort of thing that I usually expect from Nationalist Party benches, but which I am happy to say for once in these debates has not come forward—that because I am against this clause, I must be in favour of Communism, I must be in favour of sabotage, I must be in favour of terrorism, and now he is implying that I am in favour of blowing up the Blue Train. This is a new departure …?

I did not say that.

Well, the hon. member inferred it.

Who is being simple now?

I want to put this to the hon. member. Why do you have to leave the country to get training in sabotage? After all, in previous examples we have had of actual sabotage—not intended sabotage, sabotage which might never take place, but actual sabotage—the people concerned were people who had received their training right here in South Africa. The argument which was then advanced by the then Minister of Justice about house arrest, which was bitterly fought by hon. members on this side, including the hon. member for Durban (North), was that we had to keep these people under constant surveillance, and that these were people who were likely to attempt subversion and sabotage, and therefore we had to keep such people under house arrest so that he could keep a close eye on them. Sir, it makes no difference whether you leave the country to receive training in sabotage or whether you get it in this country; the object is the same.

Yet hon. members on this side opposed the house arrest provision, despite all the so-called reasonable explanations offered by the other side, explanations which I did not accept for five minutes, because I know perfectly well that people who have nothing to do with sabotage have been confined to their houses under the house-arrest provision. I could name 20 such people right now if hon. members wished me to do so. Equally, Sir, the same argument applies to people who left the country and therefore must be assumed to have left the country for subversive reasons. It is a nonsensical argument. It was advanced by the Government in respect of the house-arrest clause and hon. members here were not prepared to accept that, but they are prepared to accept this other argument as far as the Suppression of Communism Act is concerned. I still intend therefore to vote against this clause.

The powers that we are prepared to give the Government under this Bill are Dowers which we think the facts justify. The facts vary from time to time. We have seen certain facts reported in the Press; we know to a limited extent what is going on in South West Africa, and we know what is planned for us in other parts of the world. Therefore it is perfectly correct for us to view the powers sought against the facts of the situation. We have done that, and we are prepared to support the proposition that the bulk of the amendments to the Suppression of Communism Act should be extended to South West Africa. But in the case of this provision relating to house arrest we do not feel that the facts justify the extension of this provision to South West Africa. We do not feel that a case has been made out for it and we therefore do not support this provision. Why the hon. member for Houghton should find this strange is past my comprehension. She was perfectly happy in her lonely limelight yesterday, and she now seems to be determined that we should follow her into it too.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say at once that I have the highest regard for all the arguments that have been used here this morning, including the arguments advanced by the hon. member for Houghton. I want to start with the official Opposition. I know that the official Opposition was very strongly opposed to house arrest, and it would have seemed strange to me if they had acted differently on this occasion, where they think the slightest chance exists of having the house arrest provision deleted. I readily concede that to them. I said yesterday that I proceed from a different standpoint, and I want hon. members to respect my point of view too.

I say that this provision is already applicable in South West Africa, but a measure of legal doubt has arisen in this connection. As hon. members know, lawyers always differ with one another, and if that had not been the case there would have been no court cases. I should like to have 100 per cent certainty. While I therefore have the highest regard for hon. members’ arguments and also expect that they will vote against this provision, and while I do not blame them for going to vote against it, we on this side of the House feel that all the amendments to the Suppression of Communism Act are already applicable in South West Africa. All we are now doing is to make 100 per cent sure that there is no doubt about it.

As far as the hon. member for Houghton is concerned, I readily concede that she made one good point, and that is that this clause is of retrospective effect. It would have been a good point if I as Minister had intended to go back 15-16 years and raise old spectres and place under house arrest people who did certain things 15-16 years ago. However, I assure the Committee that we have only one thing in mind in making this clause of retrospective effect, and that is that we want the power to deal with recent cases. We are compelled to make this clause retrospectively effective in order that we may take action against people who left the country perhaps a year or two ago, or even three years ago, to receive training in sabotage and who are now filtering back. However, I once again assure the Committee that our intention is to confine ourselves to only those cases, and not to go back 10-15 years and raise old spectres. The hon. member for Houghton made a good point, and I have now explained why we are compelled to make the clause of retrospective effect.

I would like to thank the hon. the Minister for his courteous reply to me. It is not usual for me to experience this when we deal with a Bill of this nature and I am very grateful. I do accept the hon. the Minister’s personal assurance and I would like to tell him so but unfortunately we are considering a law here; we are enacting a Statute here to-day, and as the law is written into our Statute Book, so it will be applied by future Ministers of Justice. Therefore despite the fact that I accept the hon. the Minister’s assurance, I must still oppose this and I hope he will understand it, because this law is not going to apply for the duration of the hon. the Minister’s term of office but for as long as this measure is on the Statute Book.

Amendment put and the Committee divided:

Ayes—40: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bennett, C.; Connan, J. M.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E. L.; Graaff, De V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hour-quebie, R. G. L.; Hughes, T. G.; Jacobs, G.F.; Kingwill, W. G.; Lewis, H.; Lindsay, J. E.; Malan, E. G.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M. L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.; Smith, W. J. B.; Steyn, S. J. M.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Taylor, C. D.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.; Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Noes—102: Bekker, M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. C.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, P. W.; Brandt, J. W.; Carr, D. M.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; De Jager, P. R.; De Wet, J. M.; De Wet, M. W.; Diederichs, N.; Du Toit, J. P.; Engelbrecht, J. J.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Frank, S.; Greyling, J. C.; Grobier, W. S. J.; Haak, J. F. W.; Havemann, W. W. B.; Henning, J. M.; Hertzog, A.; Heystek, J.; Horn. J. W. L.; Janson, T. N. H.; Jurgens, J. C.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; Langley, T.; Le Grange, L.; Le Roux, F. J.; Le Roux, J. P. C.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, W. T.; Maree, G. de K.; Maree, W. A.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G.de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pelser, P.B.; Pienaar, B.; Potgieter, J. E.; Potgieter, S. P.; Rail, J. J.: Rail, J. W.; Rail, M. J.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Raubenheimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reyneke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C.; Roux, P. C.; Sadie, N.C. van R.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. J.; Schoeman, H.; Schoeman, J. C. B.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Steyn, A. N.; Swiegers, J. G.; Torlage, P. H.; Uys, D. C. H.; Van Breda, A.; Van den Berg, G. P.; Van der Merwe, C. V.; Van der Merwe, H. D. K.; Van der Merwe, S. W.; Van der Spuy, J. P.; Van der Walt, B. J.; Van Niekerk. M. C.; Van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; Van Staden, J. W.; Van Tonder, J. A.; Van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; Van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Viljoen, M.; Visser, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, B. J.; Vorster, L. P. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Vosloo, W. L.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Amendment accordingly negatived.

Clause, as printed, put and agreed to (Official Opposition and Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to move the following amendment appearing on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Transkei—

The reason for this amendment I think will be clear to the hon. the Minister. I should like briefly to explain to the House why we consider this amendment necessary. This clause is to be amended to make it possible to compel persons who are not accomplices to give evidence. That is to say, persons who the prosecutor believes may be able to give evidence which would assist in a particular trial. This provision is very wide. It covers any type of offence, any type of charge, even of a very minor nature. The power is quite unlimited. And we believe that this power should not be extended to the limits in which it is being extended. We consider that in respect of serious charges, serious offences against the security of the State, this proposed amendment is necessary or may be necessary and therefore is reasonable. But we do not see the necessity to extend it as widely as it is. For that reason we propose that it should be limited to offences arising from Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act, which is the so-called “sabotage clause”. Section 11 (b)ter of the Suppression of Communism Act also contemplates serious offences, namely the offence of going outside the Republic for the purpose of training in sabotage activities or for training to further the aims of Communism, etc. Finally, we propose that it should be limited to the offence of leaving the Republic in contravention of any of the provisions of the Departure from the Union Regulation Act. These would seem to us to cover the situation which the hon. the Minister had in mind when he introduced the Bill at second reading. He told us that it was intended mainly to cover the situation where you have people, such as terrorists and so on, who leave the country for the purpose of training in sabotage and terrorism, and then return. In many cases both their exit from and entry back into South Africa is unknown. But the police may perhaps pick up somebody who has been out at the same time and who would be in a position to give evidence to explain or to prove that the other person was also out to train in sabotage and subversive activities. This is the situation which the hon. the Minister said that he wished to cover by the proposed amendment. And we believe that the amendment which we moved will cover this completely and will give the hon. the Minister and the police the powers which they specifically wish to have without extending the new provisions to all offences generally. The hon. the Minister will I am sure appreciate the reasons why some limitation we feel is necessary. We have the principle of compelling a man to give evidence against another person with the threat hanging over him that if he does not give evidence or if he does not give satisfactory evidence he will himself be charged for an offence that the police may know about that he has committed. This is a situation which can very easily give rise to the incrimination of somebody else in order to get yourself out of trouble. Particularly with the type of criminal one is dealing with here— that is the criminal who commits serious offences—this sort of thing can quite easily happen. We feel therefore it is important that this clause should not be passed in the wide form in which it is but in the limited form which we propose. If the hon. the Minister feels that even our amendment does not entirely cover the cases to which he referred during his second-reading speech, perhaps he will indicate to us some further addition to our amendment which he may feel would be necessary. We may perhaps then be able to agree to some form of amendment which would satisfy us and which would also meet the cases to which the hon. the Minister referred. I would also point out that in the case of the evidence of accomplices there is a provision in the Criminal Procedure Act that there shall be evidence aliunde before there can be a conviction. In other words, the court does not rely simply on the evidence of that accomplice who implicates the accused. The court is obliged to have before it some other form of evidence before it convicts. This is the law in regard to the evidence of accomplices. It has been the law throughout our history and is a very good principle. Now, when one introduces persons who are not accomplices into this category then that principle, as we see it, will not apply. Therefore, the court, in dealing with the evidence given by the persons who are being included in this amendment, will not be obliged to have evidence aliunde before convicting. This is a further reason why we consider it essential that there should be limitation such as we propose. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment standing in the name of the hon. the member for Transkei.

This amendment, as has been clearly shown by the hon. member in whose name it appears on the Order Paper, precisely proves the difficulty which we experienced. Let us now examine the amendment as moved. In Clause 8 there appears, inter alia, the following—

In other words, the prosecutor in his charge sheet mentions a. specific offence, and it is in respect of that specific offence that he may now possibly incriminate himself and in respect of which he is to be indemnified. That was our intention with this provision. The hon. member now asks us to omit the words “mentioned by the prosecutor” to have it read as follows—

Does the hon. member realize what he is now asking of me? He is asking me now that the prosecutor should indemnify this person beforehand in respect of any possible offence which can be committed under these Acts. That is quite impossible. That is exactly the same difficulty as was experienced by my Department in defining this matter if you wish to provide for it in that way. I said yesterday that I had gone out of my way to see whether we could accommodate the hon. member for Transkei. But we have just not found it possible. If the hon. member read this section very carefully and read his amendment very carefully, he would see that we would land ourselves in a ridiculous position. We would be indemnifying this person in respect of anything he had done under the Sabotage Act, in respect of anything he had done under Section 11 (b)ter, and in respect of anything he had done under the other Act. It would mean that we would be going too far. We simply cannot do it.

What exactly is wrong with the legal rule which we have at present? Surely it is reasonable to expect any person—and that is our present law—if he knows of any offence, to give evidence in regard to such offence. That is our general legal rule, our general rule of procedure. We provide for one exception, namely in the case of an accomplice. If a person is an accomplice, he cannot be compelled to give evidence. We lay down this one legal rule that if he might incriminate himself the obligation which he has towards the State to come forward and to state what he knows about the case, disappears. We are prepared to grant him indemnity if he is prepared to state what he knows about the case. If he tells us that he would be incriminating himself, he has to tell us in respect of what he will incriminate himself, and we will indemnify him in that respect. What is wrong in expecting of him to give evidence in the State’s interest? If he refuses to give evidence after he has been indemnified, why should he not be compelled to do so? He has that obligation to the State. There is some confused thinking on the part of the Opposition in regard to this amendment which they are moving. They wish to narrow down the provision, whereas they are in fact extending it. They are widening its scope. It is exactly the same difficulty as the one we experienced. In view of these circumstances, much as I would like to meet the hon. members half-way, I do not see my way open to do so. If they would reconsider the matter carefully they would not insist on this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with interest to the hon. the Minister’s explanation. I think that in fact he is correct, on further consideration. But there is one aspect of the case that he had not dealt with adequately, and I should like to draw this further to his attention. I am referring to the question of evidence aliunde.

I very much wanted to discuss that aspect, but for the moment it slipped my memory. It is a fact, and I readily concede it, that in the case of accomplices one has to have evidence aliunde as well in order to prove. We do not provide for that here. But as a legal practitioner the hon. member will realize that any evidence of this nature will be treated with the greatest circumspection by any court of law. My knowledge of legal practice convinces me that if a person gives evidence against another person to obtain indemnification for himself, the court will most certainly not accept it holus-bolus, but will treat it with the greatest circumspection. That is all that I can say to the hon. member in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, I am obliged to the hon. the Minister for his explanation. I agree with him that any court of law obviously in dealing with this sort of evidence would look at it very closely. But I would draw this point to the hon. the Minister’s attention, namely that any court of law interpreting its attitude to this provision would have to have regard to the law as it stands at present and to see what changes this brings about. If it brings about a change to this section only, without at the same time introducing a corresponding amendment to the section dealing with evidence aliunde in regard to accomplices, the court could well take the view that the legislature did not intend that same principle to apply. I think that would be a dangerous situation. I do not want to press this matter at this stage, but I do think the hon. the Minister and his Department might give further consideration to this aspect of the matter with a view to introducing a corresponding amendment in the Other House in relation to the clause dealing with evidence aliunde. But I think that the hon. the Minister and I are agreed that, as I understand his explanation, evidence given in a court of law by persons of this sort who are going to try, as it were, to get their freedom by incriminating somebody else, is dangerous evidence and must be looked at carefully.

My Department has just sent me a note saying that in the case of Xoswa the court has already decided that evidence of this nature has to be treated very carefully. The court has already accepted that. But I am prepared during the recess to go into the principle of further evidence. I do not know what the exact circumstances are. The hon. member must remember that we are of course dealing here with persons against whom it is very difficult to obtain further evidence. I do not want to make any promise, apart from saying that we will pay attention to the matter during the recess.

On this point, namely the need for evidence aliunde, I take it that the hon. the Minister will reinforce the attitude as expressed here by perhaps getting a circular sent to magistrates on the point. I think this is permissible. Just as circulars do go from the Department of Justice on the interpretation of various points, I do not think it would be improper in any way if this clause is drawn to the attention of judicial officers and in particular the point made that this is evidence of a nature similar to that of accomplice evidence and should therefore be scrutinized particularly carefully.

There is just one other point I should like to get clarity upon. As I read this clause, where a person is to get an indemnity and he is not an accomplice but falls into this new category, he would get an indemnity where he is giving evidence in respect of a person charged with a certain offence because he could be implicating himself in connection with the evidence in respect of that charge. My belief is that if such persons had committed some completely separate offence, he could not possibly be given an indemnity under this clause. When I say it is a completely separate offence, I mean an offence which has no connection with the evidence which will be led against the accused person in this case. I am seeking the hon. the Minister’s assurance in this respect, because, as I read this clause, that in fact would be the case, namely that the person obtaining this new type of indemnity could only obtain an indemnity against a charge which could come out during the course of the evidence against the accused. It would not apply where a person receiving this new indemnity had committed some completely disconnected offence, completely disconnected from the incidents in respect of which the accused has been charged, and for which the prosecution might otherwise be tempted to offer him an indemnity. I do not know what the hon. the Minister’s interpretation is in this respect but it seems to me that that definitely is the case.

Order! The hon. member seems to be discussing the clause itself and not the amendment. We wish first to complete the discussion of the amendment.

If you so wish, I will do that.

Mr. Chairman, I want to record my objection to this clause. It is a broadening clause, this substitution of the amendment which we had in 1964 to the Criminal Procedure Act which provided that accomplices could be compelled to give evidence and that if they did so to the satisfaction of the court, they would be discharged from all liability to prosecution for the offence dealt with in their evidence. Now as I see it, Clause 8 broadens this provision and extends it to witnesses as well.

People who could be incriminated.

Yes, Sir, but not only accomplices but witnesses as well. I am against the principle of compelling a person to give evidence while offering him an indemnity, because I think this lends itself to abuse in so far that it would tend to tempt people, in order to get themselves out of trouble, to incriminate other people.

A court will apply this very carefully.

I realize that, but at the same time it is a broadening of an amendment which I objected to in 1964 and therefore I must ask that my objection be recorded.

In view of the hon. Minister’s explanation …

I regret to interrupt the bon. member, but he has already spoken on three occasions to this clause.

I am rising merely to withdraw the amendment which I moved, and may I merely say that I do so in view of the hon. the Minister’s explanation and undertaking to have a further look at the whole proposition during the recess.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Hourquebie withdrawn with the leave of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I was discussing the clause when I was asked by the Temporary Chairman to confine myself to the amendment. I had however stated my position in regard to the clause and raised a point with the hon. the Minister. I do not think he will want me to repeat what I said then, and if he is in a position to answer me now, I will not repeat what I said. Otherwise, if he would like me to, I will gladly repeat the point that I raised. I may say that my interpretation is that the indemnity can be of a restricted kind only, and therefore I have, one might say, as far as this Act is concerned, the feeling that it is well to have this limitation; it is well that there is a limitation that a person called as a witness, and who might perhaps say have committed a speeding offence cannot be asked, against an indemnity promise for such speeding offence, to give evidence in relation to something else where he had committed no offence and which might implicate the accused. The hon. the Minister nodded and I think his interpretation is therefore the same as mine, but perhaps he will be kind enough just to indicate that that is actually the case.

It is stated specifically here—

So, if he mentions one particular offence, the witness who is granted indemnity can be granted indemnity only in respect of that particular offence. That is the interpretation I place on it.

Mr. Chairman, the point I am trying to make, I think, is slightly different. I think the cause for my complacency, as it were, upon this aspect is the result of other words, namely the words—

The point is that that governs the position, and it seems to me to indicate that he could only be required to answer relevant questions if there is a charge against an accused person.

Quite.

It must therefore be connected with the evidence he would be obliged to give against the accused person.

Clause put and agreed to (Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 19:

I want to vote against this clause for the same reasons that I have advanced in regard to the other clauses, that this extends the provision to South West Africa, and that I think it creates a perfectly unnecessary situation of emergency and panic and inability of our police force to deal with any of the difficulties that may occur in the territory, which, I might say, have been considerably played down by our representatives overseas. I objected to the original Sabotage Act of 1962 which amended Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act, and I want to record my objection to the extension of this provision to South West Africa.

Just for the record, we are not objecting to this Clause. We also, when the original clause was before this House, objected to it because we attempted to get a different definition of the crime of sabotage at the time. We were unable to do so. We are here being asked to apply to South West Africa the existing provisions of the law relating to sabotage, and it seems to us unrealistic in the light of what is happening in South West Africa that we should withhold our consent to applying the law relating to the prevention of sabotage in the territory.

Clause put and agreed to (Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

Clause 20:

As regards Clause 20. I should like to leave a few ideas with the Committee and I want to request the hon. the Minister to comment on them if he deems it fit to do so. Actually this clause is an extension of what the position used to be in that the hon. the Minister may now direct, upon good reasons shown, that for a certain period “the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply in respect of such hotel liquor licence”. The position is that as far as the holders of hotel liquor licences are concerned they must apply for classification in terms of the Liquor Act before or on a certain date, namely, 31st December, 1968, and the classifications are as published in the Government Gazette. If such licence-holders are not classified before that date the licences may be renewed for the next year on certain conditions, but in such case it is renewed as a wine and malt liquor licence in general. This position requires attention, but I leave the rest of my argument at that, because I understand that this is a matter to which the hon. the Minister will give attention during the recess and the hon. the Minister will then be able to give an explanation by means of a statement during the next session.

Clause put and agreed to.

Clause 22:

I move the following amendments—

to insert the following paragraph to follow paragraph (a) of sub-section (3):

to omit paragraph (c) of sub-section (3) and to substitute the following paragraph:

to insert the following sub-section to follow sub-section (5):

I think the amendments are self-explanatory. They just amount to this, in the first place, that the Judge will now also have the right to hear arguments from the detainee concerned as to why he should not be detained. The other amendment I am moving amounts to this, that the documents relating to the application in terms of sub clause (1) shall not be open for inspection by the detainee or any member of the public. This is merely a consequential amendment.

We find that we can accept the amendment proposed by the hon. the Minister. We approve of the extension of the principle contained here, that the Judge is entitled to call for a statement from the detainee in writing and to get a reply thereto from the commissioner. As I indicated before, the principle contained here is a different principle in as much as the detention for these purposes is now to be determined by a Judge rather than the police.

Not for the first 14 days.

That is so, but the fact of the matter is that a court comes into the picture. Without any doubt this is an improvement on the existing procedure. Sir, if you are going to use a court for the purpose of determining any matter at all, and once one accepts the principle that a Judge should determine, it seems to us that a Judge of the supreme court in the exercise of any of the functions of a judicial nature, and especially in relation to a function of such an important judicial nature (perhaps the most important function under our constitution that a Judge could perform, namely to determine the liberty of the individual) and the court should not in any way be fettered in the exercise of its discretion. It is, we think imperative that a Judge in determining a matter of this sort should have all the information which he himself feels should be produced. I therefore move the amendment which stands in my name on page 396—

In lines 53 and 54, to omit “from the Commissioner such further information in writing” and to substitute “the Commissioner to produce such further information or evidence”; and in line 56, after “Commissioner” to add “and such other evidence as has been adduced”.

The effect of this amendment will be to change the Bill as it is printed now, with the amendment of the hon. the Minister, to provide that instead of the Judge having to require from the commissioner such further information in writing as he may deem necessary, he should be able to call for any evidence that he may deem to be necessary, evidence or information. Likewise it will amend the position in subsection (3) (c) which says that the Judge “shall consider the application solely on the information furnished to him by the commissioner”. The effect will be that the Judge may call for any evidence whatsoever and that he will then consider the matter in the light of the information given to him by the commissioner and in the light of any further evidence that has been adduced.

It does not mean that he can call a detainee.

Yes, it does; he may demand that the body of the detainee be produced.

Not the body!

The hon. member is not a lawyer.

Thank heavens, no.

Well, that is the expression which is used, habeas corpus. What I want to stress is this: The hon. the Minister in replying to the second-reading debate indicated that he could not accept this because it west so far that there would be legal representation and that there would be all sorts of trials within trials, etc. I want to say that this does not arise in this case. We are not saying here that the detainee shall have all the rights of an accused person. What we are saying is that the Judge should have a complete discretion. In other words, we are not saying that we must now import into this all the ramifications of a trial for the accused person. All we say is: Let the Judge in his sole discretion decide whether he wants the detainee, whether he wants a statement from him. and whether he is satisfied generally with the information he has. In other words, if the Judge is going to make a decision he should have at his disposal all the information, not what the detainee thinks he should have but all the information the Judge in his discretion thinks he should have. That is different from the picture I think the Minister had during the second reading in regard to this matter. That is the one amendment I move. There is another amendment I wish to move, but the hon. member for Houghton has an amendment on the Order Paper, so I will not move it until I have seen what the attitude of the Minister is in regard to that. I hope the Minister will appreciate that this does not in any way import into this procedure a trial within a trial requiring that the accused should be represented and that he can bring evidence, but rather that the Judge himself should be able to decide what information he thinks he should have. I think the hon. the Minister will agree that we should not ever restrict the discretion of a Judge in so far as the hearing of evidence is concerned if we can possibly help it.

I do not think I would be in order if I moved the amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Is the hon. member moving it?

No, I wish to move another amendment instead.

Then the hon. member must withdraw that amendment.

No, I am not moving it. I am moving another amendment, as follows—

You will see, Sir, that this embodies a large part of the amendment which I would have moved. The reason is self-evident. I do not want the same situation to arise as has arisen under the 180-day law, where it is not made incumbent on the Minister to lay the names of persons on the Table and one finds it difficult to get information. The last time I wanted information in that regard I was told that it was not in the public interest. Under the 90-day law, on the other hand, the names of persons were laid on the Table, and I think that in laws like this, to which in any case I object in principle, because it means that they are implemented behind closed doors and not in the full light of an open court, we can minimize their effect to some extent anyway by at least having the information tabled when Parliament is in Session. Therefore I move that amendment.

Now I want to talk against this whole clause which, of course, to my mind is the very essence of the Bill and which I oppose in principle, largely, may I say, because of this Clause 22. It is part and parcel of the general type of legislation we have had in this House over the last six years, of giving arbitrary powers to Ministers and their officials, where the courts are excluded. I will come back to the argument used by the hon. member for Durban (North), and although I agree that it is not as far-reaching as the previous legislation of this kind it nevertheless is of the same general type, and therefore I object to it in principle. It is not as bad as the 90-day law which I must say has not been repealed; it is simply suspended. It is not as bad as the 180-day law which is still in operation. Hon. members here have argued that his law is better than those laws and they argue in such a way that one would think that this law is a replacement of those two laws, but it is not. Those laws remain on the Statute Book.

The one is suspended and the other is still in operation. When the hon. member for Durban (North) asked me yesterday whether I would rather have the 90-day law or the 180-day law, that was quite irrelevant because, firstly, those two laws are still on the Statute Book, and secondly I do not see why I should have to make this choice. It is rather like asking me whether I would rather have cancer of the finger instead of cancer of the arm. The answer is that I do not want cancer at all, and therefore it is not an argument that I consider relevant at all. I do not like this law, whether it means 14 days’ or 90 days’ or 180 days’ detention without trial simply on the say-so of a lieutenant-colonel of police.

The hon. member argued that the courts come into it now because a Judge has to decide whether or not the detainee may be kept for a period exceeding the first 14 days. The hon. the Minister has moved an amendment to-day which to some extent helps in so far as the Judge does not only have to listen to the evidence of the commissioner but is also obliged to receive evidence in writing from the detainee, and the Minister has told us, although he has not embodied it in his amendment, that he will see to it that the detainee has access to a magistrate who will take down what he says and act as a sort of pipeline or liaison between the detainee and the Judge. It still is not the same as allowing the detainee to appear in person before the Judge. This is the amendment which the hon. member for Durban (North) has moved. I think that the court as it stands is not a real court at all, because there is no real opportunity for the detainee to know what the charges against him are. Surely this is the most important thing of all, to know what charges are made against one so that one may refute those charges.

This clause does not relate to charges.

No, it may not relate to charges, but it does relate to persons being held because a lieutenant-colonel understands that he is going to commit an offence or has committed an offence. Now the Minister went a little further in the second reading in interpreting this clause, and I would like him to explain what he meant when he said: “We cannot wait for a man to commit an offence while the police obtain evidence. We must prevent the commission of crime and so we must also be able to obtain information from people who know about terrorist activities in order to prevent terrorism.” But that is not how the clause reads at all. As I interpret it, the clause deals only with a person who is a terrorist or who has committed an offence or intends to commit an offence. It is not meant to deal with people who have information about other people committing these offences.

The Minister is interpreting the clause in a much wider way than the language of the clause allows. The clause specifically relates to a terrorist or persons who have committed an offence under Section 11 of the Suppression of Communism Act or who intends to commit such an offence. It has nothing to do with persons who have information about other people who have committed those offences. So it is very confusing indeed and I think the Minister ought to explain this. My point is that any such person who is held should know why the police officer believes that he is a terrorist or intends to commit such a crime or, even in terms of the Minister’s wide interpretation, that he has knowledge of other people committing such crimes. Therefore this is not a court in the normal term, as we understand it, the audi alteram partem, this golden maxim of law which is that you have to hear the other side and you have to know what the charges are against you. To my way of thinking, although this is an improvement on the 90-day clause, which I repeat is suspended but is still on the Statute Book, and it is an improvement on the 180-day clause, which is still in operation, this is another law of the same kind, and to me it is objectionable and therefore I shall oppose it and I will ask for a division on it because whether the amendments are accepted or not this goes against the normal rule of law. The amendments of the Minister may assist, but they do not vitiate my objections and even the amendment of the hon. member for Durban (North), which will assist, still does not remove my main objection, and therefore I will vote against it. His amendment will not make a court of this because the man will never know what the charges are against him and the Minister’s amendment equally does not do this.

I rise to support the amendment of the hon. member for Durban (North) and I hope the Minister will see his way clear to accept it. I think, with respect to the hon. the Minister, that he has gone a little too far in suggesting that implicit in this amendment is the fact that a trial will result, in other words, that the detainee will be entitled to appear with legal representation before the Judge to deal with the order in regard to his dentention. I feel that if the Minister wants to get the best value out of the proposal contained in the Act, then everything must be done to ensure that the Judge’s discretion is complete and unfettered in any way. There must be no suggestion or no suspicion of any suggestion that an incomplete picture may be placed before the Judge and that he is to have no powers of probing the facts given to him.

The Bill, as I understand it, gives the Judge the widest possible powers with no fetters to his discretion at all in regard to the decision he can make on the application. In other words, he can order that this person shall be brought back to him or that the matter will be reviewed periodically. I welcome such a provision, but I hope the Minister will see his way clear not to limit the Judge to such information as the police officer sees fit to place before him, plus the written statement the Judge may ask for, but that he should have an unfettered discretion in adjudicating upon the application before him.

Then, as regards the principle of the clause as a whole, I, with respect, do not agree with the approach which has been adopted by the hon. member for Houghton. It does not seem to me that the crux of the problem before us is the question of detention without trial. That cannot be divorced from the period of the detention. Detention without trial takes place over and over again, but there are provisions that the person shall be brought before court within a certain time. The normal provision is that the detained person shall be charged within 48 hours. But one must look at the circumstances in which this provision will be applied and ask whether 14 days is an unreasonable time.

Was 90 days an unreasonable time?

The hon. member for Houghton is well aware of the attitude which was adopted by this side of the House in regard to the 90-day clause, but we are debating now whether 14 days is reasonable in the circumstances and with the safeguards of the Bill.

Business suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 2.20 p.m.

Afternoon Sitting

When business was suspended I was dealing with the question of the reasonableness or otherwise of the period of 14 days provided for in this clause. One must look at what is to be done and what is contemplated in this particular clause. The clause first of all provides that the authority for the arrest must be furnished by a commissioned officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or upwards of the police force. The period for which the arrest may be made has to be determined by the Commissioner of the S.A. Police. An application in writing must be prepared and must be submitted to the Commissioner, who must sign it and that application must then be submitted to a Judge of the Supreme Court, Sir, when one realizes that in a city such as Cape Town or in a city such as Johannesburg, if a week-end intervenes, a person may be detained without trial and without being charged for up to three days, one must then look at the position as to whether 14 days is an unreasonable time.

From my limited experience and knowledge of the area in which the terrorists are infiltrating into South West Africa at the present moment, it seems to me that 14 days is a very reasonable period of time. I know that recently, driving on one of the highways of South West Africa, I had travelled some 165 miles and I felt that I had an exciting experience because I passed one other motorist in a distance of 165 miles. Sir, the terrorists are not going to be found on the main thoroughfares or in our main cities. They are going to be found in the most isolated spots on our borders. They are not going to use the highways; they will be using the by-ways. For that reason we on this side of the House feel that the approach of the Progressive Party that detention for a period of 14 days when dealing with terrorism in South West Africa is unreasonable, is an unreasonable approach, and we are prepared to accept the period of 14 days as being reasonable.

It is very seldom that one gets the opportunity of agreeing with a law introduced by the Government without any comment, but in this case I would like to support the hon. member for Green Point. It is a simple matter to place a law on paper, but it is an entirely different matter to implement that law. I was a police officer, a district commandant, in charge of the whole of the north of South West Africa.

That is why it is in such a mess.

Sir, I thought that was coming. However, it must be realized that if these saboteurs or the people who are detained are arrested on the boundary, several hundred miles of scrub and semi-desert country, has to be crossed before you get to civilization. In this case, it is not a case of bringing the person who has been arrested to the nearest magistrate; he has to be brought to the nearest seat of a Judge and that is Windhoek, which is several hundred miles from Ovamboland and the South West Africa border. I think that the period of 14 days is very reasonable indeed, on one condition and that is that it does not rain.

Sir, I want to raise a few matters on this clause. The first one concerns a matter of clarity. As the Bill is drafted at the moment Clause 22 (3) (b) provides that a Judge may require from the Commissioner such further information in writing as he may deem necessary. We have had an amendment from the hon. the Minister of Justice, an amendment which is printed on page 388 of the Order Paper and which reads as follows—

namely paragraph (b), which provides, inter alia, that an opportunity may be afforded by the Judge to a detainee to submit to him reasons in writing as to why he should not be detained. I understand from the hon. the Minister that the existing paragraph (b) is still going to be retained but it will become paragraph (c). I do want to be quite certain about that because paragraph (b) as it stands here now, does give the Judge the power to require such further information in writing as he may deem necessary, and this goes well beyond the mere power, if he considers it necessary, to afford the detainee an opportunity of submitting reasons to him in writing. I should like to have it quite clear that this power which is given to the Judge in (b) to obtain further information will in fact be retained. I regard this as an important matter.

There are one or two other matters on which I should like the hon. the Minister to give us clarity. This clause provides that a detainee may be detained subject to “such conditions as the Commissioner may from time to time determine”. We are supporting this; but I should be glad to know how the hon. the Minister intends to handle this particular aspect. Will those conditions in fact be made known or will it be possible to ascertain them?

At present, for example, under Section 215bis the hon. the Minister is given power to make certain regulations and it is known that he has indicated in the Government Gazette what those regulations are. I should like to know whether a similar position will obtain here. Of course, there is the safeguard in any event that these conditions are laid down by the Commissioner of Police himself, and one assumes that such conditions will be reasonable. There is the further safeguard that these conditions will be reviewed by not one Judge but I assume by many Judges in the course of time. I am certain that the Commissioner of Police will be careful in any event and will be almost bound, with the assistance of the Judges, to ensure that those conditions are reasonable in the circumstance. One knows, of course, that in terms of the decision of our courts, inter alia, in the case of Gosschalk, which was decided in the Cape Provincial Division, that an individual may be questioned even without his consent under the ordinary police powers, without any special powers; but we know that in terms of that decision the questioning must be reasonable in the circumstances, and what would be reasonable in any particular case would depend upon the circumstances. I should like to know what is proposed in regard to making known these regulations. I am assuming too that they will be reasonable in the circumstances. The circumstances may be different in relation to different individuals.

The clause also provides that application must be made to a Judge of a Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court. I think one is entitled to deduce that that might mean any Judge of any division. I shall be glad to hear from the hon. the Minister whether it is the intention that the papers should be filed with the registrar of the court in question and that the papers will then be sent through in the ordinary course to one of the Judges of the division? It would be interesting to know, if the Minister can tell us, how this will operate in South West Africa, because the Judges there are centred in Windhoek. Sir, nothing has been said of this aspect, but I should be glad to know whether it is possible to include a provision similar to the provision that we had in this other detention legislation, namely, a visit once a week to a detainee by a doctor, or a visit from time to time. I do not know whether that is in the contemplation of the hon. the Minister, but I think that is a safeguard from the point of view of the State as well as something of a safeguard for the detained person. I shall be glad to know whether it is the intention that the conditions governing the detention shall include something of that kind. I think it has often been stated by members of the Government that the fact that detainees may not have made any complaints to a visiting doctor is an important indication that they are being detained under satisfactory conditions.

In conclusion I would simply like to hope that the police will be fortunate in apprehending people who do infiltrate across our borders or who do contemplate actions of this kind although commencing such actions within our borders. There have already been examples of infiltration into South West Africa and I think the indications are that we must and that we may find infiltrators coming from expect that sort of trouble to be intensified other sources. Of course, we know that many of these people have gone from within our own borders to receive training overseas. I would be glad, if the Minister has facts and figures at his disposal in this regard, if he would tell the Committee how many people have in fact gone from within our borders to other territories to receive this training, how many have come back, how many have been apprehended and what future prospects are in this regard. Sir, we are supporting this clause, subject to certain improvements that we are attempting to introduce. We know that the hon. the Minister realizes that he is taking a big responsibility upon himself. Naturally these powers can be abused. One realizes that it is not possible to have perfect supervision either on the part of the Minister himself or on the part of high-ranking officers in the police, but we are confident that they will be astute enough to maintain their own good names and the reputation of our police and that they will ensure that there is fine discipline and fine supervision so that abuses can be kept down to the minimum. Having said that we wish the police well in their efforts.

It may be easier if at this stage I moved the amendment, of which I have already handed a copy to the hon. the Minister. I therefore move—

Where it is provided in the Bill as it now stands that the determination by the Judge of the conditions of detention are not subject to review or appeal and that no court of law shall be competent to order the release of a detainee, the effect of this amendment is to provide that if the conditions are not complied with there shall be a right of appeal or a right of review on the part of the court. I move this amendment for the insertion of these words after the word “detainee”; if the hon. the Minister is prepared to insert these words after the word “appeal” in line 65, then I will suitably amend my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there is one matter that I wish to raise in connection with this clause, and it relates to sub-section (2). The House will note that what is required of the Commissioner when he makes an application particularly under sub-paragraph (a), is that he shall state that from information taken upon oath there are reasonable grounds of suspicion against the detainee.

It would seem clear that the Commissioner is not obliged to put before the Judge the information which he has available and which causes him to detain the person concerned. As the clause reads at the moment, all he need do is to state that he has information on oath and that from this information he considers that there are reasonable grounds of suspicion against the detainee.

In view of the fact that the whole object of this clause is to put the facts before the Judge and to leave it to him to decide whether further detention is justified or not, it seems to me that the Judge ought to be put in a position of having available all the information which the Commissioner has. There seems to me to be no reason why he should not have that full information. Furthermore, I would point out that if the amendment proposed by the hon. the Minister is accepted and a new sub-section (6) is introduced, reading that—

there is complete protection, because, Sir, I can appreciate that, without that, the Minister might have said that there may be information which is available to the Commissioner which it would not be in the public interest to have disclosed. I can appreciate that that situation can arise. But this can no longer arise once this amendment is accepted. So, in my submission, there can be no objection to the suggestion which I make and, on the contrary, every reason in my view to accept it. Because then one has the position that it will be known to the public and to everybody concerned that the Judge has before him all the information available to the Commissioner. He would have the power—if the Minister’s amendment is accepted—to call for such further information as he may wish to have, and he is then seized fully of the matter.

So I would urge the Minister to amend subsection (3) (a) to read—

This is not an alternative proposal to the one made by the hon. member for Durban (North)—this is an addition. Because, Sir, I think that even if the Judge has this full information, he should have the right, if he wishes, to ask that the detainee himself shall be brought before him for questioning. Here again I would repeat that we do not envisage a full trial. This is merely an opportunity for the Judge to question the detainee if he considers it necessary in the light of all the information which has been placed before him, both by the Commissioner and by the detainee himself.

I would therefore urge the Minister to give serious consideration to this suggestion that I have made. I do not propose at this stage to move it as a formal amendment until I have heard what the Minister’s reaction is. It seems to me that there is no reason why the Commissioner should not be compelled, in terms of the law, to place all the information before the Judge.

Before taking my seat I wish merely to add that so far as the official Opposition is concerned. we would support the amendment moved by the hon. member for Houghton which requires that the information as to the persons detained and so on shall be placed before the House.

Mr. Chairman, various amendments were moved and it will be a little difficult to deal with all of them. I want to start with the amendment moved by the hon. member for Houghton, particularly in view of the fact that the hon. member for Musgrave said that the official Opposition would support it.

As far as that is concerned, I do not think that this is the right thing for us to do. The whole starting-point of people of this type is this, namely that they would like to know who has already been caught, who has already been questioned, and who has already been questioned and released since being questioned. That is why I do not believe that it is in our best interests to lay a whole list upon the Table of this House at the beginning of a session, and to say that those are the people we have questioned recently.

On previous occasions the hon. member put the question and wanted to know who were being detained in terms of Section 215, and sometimes the information was furnished, whereas on other occasions it was said that it was not in the public interest to furnish such information. The other day I replied in that manner. I want to add something as far as that is concerned. One is usually prepared to furnish numbers, but it is not always desirable to say who those persons are. As I have said, one runs the risk that outside forces are only too eager to know who has already fallen into the hands of the police, what such a person has possibly said or, if he is free once again, whether he has perhaps given away secrets or what has happened. It is for that reason that I am afraid that I shall not be able to accept the amendment of the hon. member for Houghton, even though it is supported by the official Opposition.

Next I come to the amendments moved by the hon. member for Durban (North). He moved quite a few. The first one really concerns sub-section (3) (b), and in its final form reads as follows—

and (c)—

He goes further and in the case of sub-section (4), it amounts to this—

Now, we must remember that what happens here, is the following: The Commissioner of Police can, when he makes an application, ask for certain conditions on which the man is to be detained. I think he will most definitely ask to be held incommunicado. I think so—I am not sure. The Judge may—and we are specifically granting him the right—vary the conditions of detention as he may deem fit. Once this has been disposed of, if the application has been made and the Judge has said that he should be detained in such and such a manner, and deviations from those conditions of detention were to occur, we immediately have a sanction, because contempt of court amounts to such a sanction. That is why I really fail to see the necessity of this last amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban (North), namely “save on the grounds that the said conditions have not been complied with”. The act as a built-in sanction to the effect that, if the conditions are not complied with, it amounts to contempt of court, with all the consequences arising from contempt of court.

As regards the first part of the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban (North), it deals with “introducing such further information in evidence”, and then again “such further evidence as has been adduced”. To me this matter smells too much of a trial if it comes to a question of evidence. The whole starting-point is that this is not a preliminary hearing. The starting-point is that this is merely an application for detaining the man. And that is done in the most reasonable manner. This is at the same time my reply to part of the questions put by the hon. member for Musgrave. The Commissioner of Police must say—and he is a high-ranking official— that he has information taken upon oath, that it happened in such and such a manner, and that he is requesting detention on those grounds. If the Judge is not satisfied, he says, “Wait a moment, let me have the detainee’s version as well”. Another objection raised here, was that the detainee would possibly not be able to write, and I undertook to place a magistrate at his disposal merely for the purpose of transmitting to the Judge what the detainee had had to say. Should the Judge be satisfied on the strength of the documents submitted to him, he may order further detention for such a period as he may deem reasonable. If he is not satisfied, he simply says, “No, I am not satisfied that the man should be detained—the information you gave me, is simply insufficient, nor have the documents even been signed, and so forth. I am simply not satisfied that it should be confirmed.” That discretion I want to leave to the courts, namely that the court may say, “I want further information before I order that the detention last longer than 14 days”.

I repeat that to me this “evidence” and this “such evidence may be adduced” smell too much of a preliminary hearing, and that is not the intention with this legislation.

Let me come to the hon. member for Green Point. I thank him for the attitude he adopted.

The first question the hon. member for Pine-lands put to me was whether sub-section (b) would be retained. The reply is a very definite “yes”. It will be retained. It is merely numbered differently. I think it now becomes (c), if the amemendments moved by me are agreed to. Reference was also made here to the conditions of detention, the police and the Judge. There I may just repeat what I have only just said. The Judge will deal with each case on its merits. One cannot lay down preconceived rules to the effect that he will be detained in this manner, That a magistrate will visit him and this that and the other. It is my honest opinion that if the man is asked for his account of what happened and why he should not be detained, and if the magistrate visits him and he says to the magistrate, “I should like you to tell this or that to the Judge, and that I am not receiving good treatment …” the Judge will take all these facts into consideration. However, we cannot lay that down in legislation, and I cannot give you the assurance beforehand that we shall lay down a fixed set of rules as to how detention will take place.

The hon. member also asked me how it would be done. She asked whether application would be made to the Registrar of the Court. My reply is that, as I understand the position, it will not happen. I think the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (City) has given the reply. For instance, if somebody is caught in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, one will have to go to the Registrar of the Court in Windhoek first. There one will have to hear whether he would not be so kind as to appoint a Judge. At the first opportunity that presents itself, one will go to the first Judge one can find, and simply tell him the following: I have here a very urgent case and I should like you to issue me with the order. That is how I imagine it will happen. I also think that that is how it will work out in practice.

The hon. member for Pinelands and other hon. members asked me whether I could give them an indication as to the number of people. That is difficult, but it is generally accepted that more or less 2,000 have left this country. At various times and over quite a number of years, 2,000 people have left the Republic of South Africa and South West Africa in order to undergo training. Details as to how many of them have already returned, and the rate at which they are infiltrating, were furnished by the Deputy Minister under the Police Vote. At the moment I do not have the exact figures at my disposal. As a matter of fact, I think that hon. members on the other side welcomed this, namely, that Justice and Police were separated. That is why it is a question which should rather be put to the Minister of Police. From common knowledge I know that more or less 2,000 people have left. Exactly how many of them have infiltrated back, how many of them have already been caught and how many of them are still at large, I do not know.

The particulars were furnished under the Police Vote.

Mr. Chairman, it amounts to this, namely that on this occasion I am unfortunately unable to accommodate any one of the hon. members in respect of their amendments. I am very sorry. On future occasions I may perhaps be able to do so, but not on this occasion. However, I think that we are very reasonable. We are leaving the position here in the hands of the highest police authority. We are not merely allowing any police official to make these arrests. Such a person must at least be a lieutenant-colonel, and that is a very high official. In the first instance, he is the one by whom it must be ordered. In the second instance, the man who has to make the application, is a most responsible official, i.e. a man who holds the highest office in our Police Service. He has to make the application. Provision is being made here for a period of 14 days. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (City) told you why it had to be 14 days. It may be impossible to have such a person appear in court the next day. He has therefore already given you the reply. Subsequent to that, if we want to detain him, the authority for doing so has to be obtained from a Judge. We are not simply detaining such a person as we deem fit. The Judge will ask the police: What is your version? Why do you want to detain the man The police will say: We found him in a certain place. He was armed to the teeth, and so forth, and we should like to find out more about him. He will ask the man: What is your version? Then he may say: Fine, I am detaining him. He may also say that the man should be released.

As regards the last clause, that is very important. If there is one thing on which these people are bent, it is that they are out to know exactly what the police know about them. That is why we say that the documents will not be open for inspection. Nobody will know anything about them. As a matter of fact, I wanted to go somewhat further. I wanted to say that the documents had to be burnt, but I merely went as far as to say that they would not be open for inspection. I nevertheless want to say that I am very sorry that I could not accept the amendments of the Opposition or those of the hon. member for Houghton.

Mr. Chairman, this is probably my last point. I am just as keen as hon. members to get home, but I must say a few words on this particular clause. I am sorry that the hon. the Minister does not find himself able to accept the amendment I moved in regard to the tabling of the names. The reason he gave is that he does not want information made public about who has been arrested and so on. I must point out to him that the 90-day clause, which I objected to very strongly, nevertheless did have this provision. Presumably the same argument would apply, since these were people held for interrogation in connection with charges of sabotage.

These are people who are infiltrating into the country.

Yes, but it is not only dealing with people infiltrating into the country. I do not know why the hon. the Minister keeps saying that or why hon. members on this side say that. That is not what the clause says.

I grant the hon. member that, but it is primarily aimed at them.

It may be primarily for them, but it does not say that. It is not only for a terrorist, but for anyone who has obtained any information or training which can be used in the furthering of the objects not only of Communism but any of the aims of any banned organization. It is much wider than hon. members appear to have understood it to be. Therefore it is no good just tying it down to these ilfiltrators because this is not the class of people to which this particular clause applies. It applies to a much wider field. That is why all these words of praise that we hear from the Opposition about the Minister being very reasonable and so on do not ring very true as far as I am concerned. The 14-day period is not for the purpose of capturing people and therefore the size of the territory, as mentioned by the hon. member for Green Point, is quite irrelevant. It may take three months to capture this man. It makes no difference. Once you have him, there is nothing to stop you from immediately claping him into a police cell and thereafter bringing him before the courts. I therefore do not see why this period of 14 days and the size of the territory and even the remoteness of the territory or its climate, as mentioned by the ex-policeman who is now the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg (City), has anything to do with the matter. It may take anything up to nine months to capture a man under such conditions, but once you have got him there is nothing to stop you taking him immediately to a police station and then forthwith charging him. This is my whole point. These arguments do not therefore mean anything and I do not echo the words of thanks that have been offered to the Minister. I may say that this is a very different line from the line taken by their leading speaker on this matter yesterday during the second reading. The hon. member for Transkei made it quite clear that the acceptance of this Bill in principle—and after all this is the clause which contains the essence of the Bill—goes against the grain. I use his own words. He said it was with reluctance that the Opposition accept measures like this. It goes against the grain. This is not what we have heard to-day. The hon. member for Transkei has not taken part in the debate on this clause. He is not here. Other members who have spoken on behalf of his party have thanked the Minister. They have said that they consider him to be very reasonable. All in all, there has been a very cosy atmosphere. This is quite different from the attitude of the hon. member for Transkei who still apparently retains some sense of balance about this matter. The argument he advanced is one that I at least can understand. The hon. member thinks that circumstances require such a measure. I do not agree with that part of his argument, but if he believes that, at least this is a reasonable argument. However, suddenly to come along and give us the impression that the hon. the Minister is bestowing largesse on us, is to my mind so much nonsense.

The hon. the Minister has not yet clarified the question I put to him, namely: Does this clause in fact relate only to people who have committed acts of terrorism, or who intend to commit acts of terrorism or who have obtained information or training for the purpose of furthering the objects of Communism or of any banned organization, or does it also apply, as he told us he thought it applied, to persons who might have information about such persons? I think this is a matter which ought to be clarified. There is another matter which needs clarification. I presume—I hope I am wrong—that the detainee has no access to legal advice at all.

That is correct.

The hon. member for Durban (North) ought to take note of the fact that there is another considerable difference between a normal court and this court, namely that the detainee has no access whatever to any legal advice. I should imagine that he, as an officer of the court, would know that this is a considerable difference from the normal proceedings.

I do not like the final amendment which the hon. the Minister has moved, namely the amendment to sub-section (6), in regard to no document being open to inspection. I can understand that this should apply to anybody else, but surely the detainee, the man himself, should have some inkling of what is held against him. The fact that he can make a statement to a magistrate who then takes it down in writing and submits it to the Judge does not meet the case at all. Supposing that an innocent man is arrested. This can happen. It has happened in other cases under the 90-day law and under the 180-day law where people have been arrested by virtue of false information that has been given to the police. Nobody knows where this information comes from. One is never confronted with one’s accusers. If an innocent man is taken and he is held in solitary confinement or incommunicado or in segregation or whatever you wish to call it, he is told: The magistrate is coming to see you to-morrow. You may make a statement to him. I must confess, Sir, that if I were confronted with this situation—and I have a certain amount of education and by virtue of my years in this House I have a certain amount, willy-nilly, of legal training—I would not know what to tell the magistrate because I would not know what I was accused of. I could certainly reiterate over and over again, “I am innocent. I have done nothing.” This statement is not going to make any difference. This is not going to help the Judge. I would not be able to say where I was nor would I even know over which period I was supposed to have committed the offence, or obtained the training or whatever it is, or had in the back of my mind intended to commit sabotage. This does not relate only to a man who has committed sabotage. It relates to a man who intends to commit terrorism or sabotage. I would have no knowledge as to why I have been arrested except that I would have been arrested in terms of this clause. If this is my predicament … [Interjection.] No, it has nothing to do with leaving the country without papers. The hon. member for Heilbron must read the Bill before he interjects. This has nothing whatever to do with leaving the country without papers. He should read the clause again. If I have this difficulty, how much more difficulty will an illiterate person, particularly a non-White, have when confronted by a magistrate after he has been taken and kept in gaol. He does not know quite where to start to make this statement. The Minister’s amendment makes things a little better. It might perhaps help certain people, but it will certainly not help everybody who finds himself arrested under this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member asked me three questions. The first question is to which people will this clause be applicable. She can read it just as well as I can. The clause reads as follows—

Surely, that is clear enough.

“Any person who had information about these people.”

No, the hon. member probably understood me wrongly. What I meant, was that some of them could in fact have information, for instance, about a training camp in another country. If we believe that somebody is a terrorist, and we capture him, such a person may have information. Then he may talk. If he talks, he is granted indemnity.

Now I come to the second question the hon. member asked me, namely that such a person had to be granted legal aid. That is precisely the very thing we want to eliminate. The legal aid people of this type obtain is simply too wonderful for words. It is always the same type of people who turn up there to render legal aid. And those are always the people who are being told exactly what the police already know, what has already been admitted, what has to be guarded against and what persons had to be informed that such and such should not happen. And it is for that reason —I make no secret of it—that such a person will not obtain legal aid. That is quite out of the question. Then the hon. member asked me about the documents. The purport of that question was not very clear to me. Apparently it amounted to the fact that it would be reasonably useless for the Judge to ask the detainee for his version of the case, by means of a magistrate who is sent to him Now you must imagine what will happen. You must remember that he has already been detained for 14 days. You must remember that he has already been interrogated for 14 days. You must also remember that at this stage the application is made to the Judge, and by that time he will in fact know very well what the suspicion against him is. When the magistrate comes to him, he will say to the magistrate, “Look, Mr. Magistrate, the people are accusing me of this or they want to know this or that from me, but I can tell you now and I want you to tell the Judge that I have never been there, that that is not the case at all, and so forth.” It is therefore my contention that in practice he will be 100 per cent aware of the purport and the trend of the interrogation and of the possible charge which has been made against him. This is my reply to that.

First and second amendments proposed by the Minister of Justice put and agreed to.

Question put: That the words “from the Commissioner such further information in writing”, in lines 53 and 54, stand part of the Clause, and the Committee divided:

Ayes—88: Bekker. M. J. H.; Bezuidenhout, G. P. C.; Bodenstein, P.; Botha, H. J.; Botha, M. W.; Botha, P. W.; Carr, D. M.; Coetzee, J. A.; Cruywagen, W. A.; de Jager, P. R.; de Wet, J. M.; de Wet, M. W.; Diederichs, N.; Engelbrecht, J. J.;Erasmus, A. S. D.; Erasmus, J. J. P.; Froneman, G. F. van L.; Greyling, J. C; Henning, J. M.; Heystek, J.; Horn, J. W.C.; Janson, T. N. H.; Keyter, H. C. A.; Knobel, G. J.; Koornhof, P. G. J.; Kruger, J. T.; le Grange, L.; le Roux, J. P. C.; Loots, J. J.; Malan, G. F.; Malan, J. J.; Malan, W. C.; Marais, J. A.; Marais, W. T.; Maree, G. de K.; Maree, W. A.; McLachlan, R.; Meyer, P. H.; Morrison, G. de V.; Mulder, C. P.; Muller, S. L.; Otto, J. C.; Pansegrouw, J. S.; Pelser. P. C.; Potgieter, J. E.; Rail, J. J.; Rail, J. W.; Rail, M. J.; Raubenheimer, A. J.; Rauben-heimer, A. L.; Reinecke, C. J.; Reynecke, J. P. A.; Rossouw, W. J. C; Roux, P. C.; Sadie, N. C. van R.; Schlebusch, A. L.; Schlebusch, J. A.; Schoeman, B. L; Schceman, J. C. B.; Smit, H. H.; Smith, J. D.; Steyn, A. N.; Swiegers, J. G.; Torlage, P.G.; van Breda, A.; van den Berg, G. P.; van der Merwe, C. V.; van der Merwe, S. W.; van der Snuy, J. P.; van der Walt, B. J.; van Niekcrk, M. C: van Rensburg, M. C. G. J.; van Staden, J. W.; van Tonder, J. A.: van Vuuren, P. Z. J.; van Zyl, J. J. B.; Venter, M. J. de la R.; Viljoen, M.: Visser, A. J.; Volker, V. A.; Vorster, B. J.: Vorster, L. P. J.; Vosloo, A. H.; Vosloo, W. L.; Waring, F. W.; Wentzel, J. J. G.

Tellers: P. S. van der Merwe and H. J. van Wyk.

Noes—37: Barnett, C.; Basson, J. A. L.; Basson, J. D. du P.; Bennett, C.; Connan, J. M.; Eden, G. S.; Emdin, S.; Fisher, E.L.; Graaff, de V.; Higgerty, J. W.; Hour-quebie, R. G. L.; Jacobs, G. F.; King-will, W. G.; Lewis, H.; Lindsay, J. E.; Marais, D. J.; Mitchell, D. E.; Mitchell, M.L.; Moolman, J. H.; Moore, P. A.; Murray, L. G.; Oldfield, G. N.; Radford, A.: Smith, W. J. B.; Streicher, D. M.; Sutton, W. M.; Suzman, H.; Taylor, C.C.; Thompson, J. O. N.; Timoney, H. M.: Wainwright, C. J. S.; Waterson, S. F.; Webber, W. T.; Wiley, J. W. E.; Winchester, L. E. D.

Tellers: H. J. Bronkhorst and A. Hopewell.

Question affirmed and first amendment proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell dropped.

The omission of paragraph (c) of sub-section (3) proposed by the Minister of Justice put and agreed to and second amendment proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell dropped.

Substitution of new paragraph (c) proposed by the Minister of Justice put and agreed to.

Remaining amendment proposed by Mr. M. L. Mitchell put and negatived and remaining amendment proposed by the Minister of Justice put and agreed to.

Amendment proposed by Mrs. H. Suzman put and negatived.

Clause, as amended, put and agreed to (Mrs H. Suzman dissenting).

New Clause 23:

I move—

23. The provisions of Section 12 (1 )ter of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950), shall apply in respect of any offence committed at any time after the commencement of the Departure from the Union Reguation Act, 1955 (Act No. 34 of 1955), and Section 18A (2) of the first-mentioned Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on the date of commencement of the General Law Amendment Act, 1963 (Act No. 37 of 1963).

Agreed to.

Bill reported with amendments.

Report Stage.

Bill read a Third Time (Mrs. H. Suzman dissenting).

To be brief, we know the background against which this Bill was introduced, but unfortunately there has been no consultation with the trade unions. There is a certain amount of confusion amongst trade unions as to the effect of this Bill. The Minister has taken the opportunity to explain over the radio what the purpose of the Bill is, but there is still this confusion and the general impression seems to be gaining ground that this is a measure to prohibit strikes. I think it is very necessary that the Minister should make a very clear statement in regard to that. There is no doubt that certain trade unionists arc very worried about it. The Minister should make it clear that it is not our intention to interfere with the rights of the workers to strike.

Order! That is a second-reading speech.

Clause put and agreed to.

Bill reported without amendment.

I move—

I just want to make one announcement in regard to moving the third reading; since this measure is to a large extent corollary to the recent strikes, the House will undoubtedly be interested to hear the very latest news about the strike position. The announcement I have just received from the parties concerned, indicates that, as compared to yesterday, the number of workers on strike has been reduced by approximately 90. The number for the Free State is 194, and in the Transvaal it is 293. Nor are there any new strikes, and according to other reports there is a marked tendency amongst the strikers to return to their work. Therefore I want to avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks and appreciation to the dissatisfied workers who initially went on strike and have now returned to their work, perhaps in response to the appeal I made to them on behalf of the Government. I want to express my thanks to them, but I also want to express my thanks to the large majority of miners for the responsible attitude they adopted in these times. If one considers that there are 11,000 miners working in the gold mines of our country and that only 487 of them are on strike at present, I think it really bears testimony to the fact that that large group of miners have a very great sense of responsibility, and to them I want to express my appreciation along with my thanks to those miners who returned to work, and I want to appeal to those who are still on strike to return to their work and to avail themselves of the opportunities, which have been made available to them on this very day, to elect their shaft representatives, then their district representatives, then the general council, then their executive council and then to appoint the person whom they want as chief secretary. I think that we have afforded them a unique opportunity to organize their trade union to their liking, and that is why I am making this appeal.

Then, in reply to the hon. member for Salt River, I just want to say that this Act will not have the effect of prohibiting strikes about wages and working conditions. That is not its object. It does not interfere with that right to strike and it is still an integral part of our entire Industrial Conciliation Act, and it is the policy of this Government to acknowledge that right to strike. Those people who want to go on strike as a result of internal trade union difficulties only, as was the case here, will fall under this Act, but not those who are striking about wages and working conditions.

To that I want to add that it is remarkable that in these times we did not find a single trade union or trade union leader raising any objection to this measure, which is to my mind an indication that the trade unions in the country are satisfied with fie state of affairs; in other words, that they do not regard the strike weapon as a means to fight out internal trade union affairs, but that it is a weapon one must use for obtaining better wages and working conditions if all the other channels have failed.

Bill read a Third Time.

I want to deal briefly with this measure. I believe that the Bill as it has emerged is now in far better shape than it was before it went into the machine, and I believe it will be a measure with which the Minister can control the symptoms from which we are suffering at the moment in regard to the availability and the rental of flats and houses. I believe that if he applies it properly he can do that very well, but I still believe that this measure will only serve the purpose of dealing with the symptoms. It is quite impossible to use it for dealing with the disease from which these symptoms arise. I believe that in fact it might well aggravate the disease. I believe that it will, because by the very application of this measure, by the very existence of this measure, I am sure that the average investor is going to be frightened off. He will not easily invest his money in the properties that the Minister is looking for in such a big way. So I want to say that I am going to make another appeal to the Minister to apply this measure judiciously to deal with the symptoms now, but for goodness’ sake to deal with the disease also. We do not like restrictive measures, but we agree to this Bill because we believe that the symptoms at the moment are so bad that they have to be dealt with.

I agree wholeheartedly with the statement of the hon. member that this measure will not remedy the existing shortage of housing and that it can only deal with the consequences of the shortage of housing. However, I cannot agree with him that this measure will have a hampering effect on investors. As a matter of fact, I have had discussions with various investors in this field— and I am now speaking of the big investors in the country—and they have informed me that they would continue with all their plans in connection with the provision of housing notwithstanding this measure, and that they were of the opinion that the improvements we had effected here, together with the undertaking which had been given that the value of rentals would be calculated on the real value of the buildings, plus the undertaking I had given them that I would receive representations from them in connection with the revision of the rate at which rentals might be charged, would function very well. Therefore I already have the assurance from the entrepreneurs. In addition I want to say that as far as measures for the future are concerned, hon. members need not be concerned. The State is doing what should be done, and one of the most interesting phenomena in this connection is that the loans made available to individuals by building societies and which reached a very low level six or seven months ago, reached a higher level last month than during the previous 16 months. There has been a very rapid increase in the granting of loans by the building societies. I want to welcome that trend and I want to accept that building societies have been able to do so because they have found more money for investment as a result of various circumstances. To a considerable extent that will assist in coping with the problem. In addition the State and the municipalities are continuing their crash building programmes and those programmes will be taken even further in the course of the coming year. Therefore hon. members need not be concerned that we are not taking the necessary steps and that the problem will become worse. Whereas I was very pessimistic a few months ago I am, as a result of circumstances, quite optimistic at present about the future of housing in South Africa.

Bill read a Third Time.

Business suspended at 3.35 p.m. and resumed at 8 p.m.

Mr. Speaker, just before moving the adjournment of the House I want to announce that a proclamation will be issued summoning Parliament to meet again on 20th January of next year, for the informal opening. Sir, I wish to express our sincere thanks to the Chair and, through you, to the officials. I move—

Agreed to.