Mr. Chairman, when the House adjourned yesterday evening I was indicating how, in terms of clause 16, the question of whether a matter is an own or a general affair would be decided. I had also pointed out how the State President would have powers of decision in this connection. I advanced the argument that, as the Bill had been amended by the Select Committee, it had now been written into the provision that he had to do so in consultation with the Cabinet. But what does this mean in reality? My argument was that ultimately it would still lie in the final analysis with the State President because he was also able to appoint Cabinet members from outside. I want to motivate this statement of mine. When we take note of the original report of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council, we read on page 55 of that report, and I quote—

That is my argument, Mr. Chairman. The power of final decision on delicate matters will therefore be vested in the State President, in the same way as the own affairs of a specific population group area. Furthermore, the members of the Department of Constitutional and International Law of Unisa submitted the following evidence on this matter to the Select Committee. I quote once again as follows—

Mr. Chairman, I have quoted here what legal experts had to say. [Interjections.]

Order!

They said—

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to indicate that this is in fact the case. I want to use the example of a matter which intimately affects the traditions of a people—specifically the Afrikaner people. It has to do with the national public holidays of the Afrikaner, such as Kruger Day and Day of the Vow. I want to ask the hon. the Minister how the report of the future Commission of Inquiry into Public Holidays is going to be formulated in legislation in terms of the provisions of clause 16. [Interjections.] Now hon. members who were formerly members of such a commission know that in the previous commission, for example, doubts were expressed in regard to a day such as Kruger Day. Some hon. members who are now sitting in the Government benches themselves expressed doubts there as to whether it was wise to retain a day such as Kruger Day … [Interjections.]

Order! I request the hon. member for Pietersburg not to discuss the activities of that commission in regard to Kruger Day here. I allowed the hon. member to mention it as an example, but I cannot allow him to discuss it now.

Mr. Chairman, I submit to your ruling. I just want to warn the Government that this is a matter which is going to become an issue, and if there is any tampering with a day such as Kruger Day, a day which symbolizes the formative process of this people, with all the sentiments and emotions attaching to it, the Government is definitely going to run into problems. I want to know specifically from the hon. the Minister how such a matter is going to be dealt with. Will those specific few days be discussed by this little House, and the … [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member is circumventing my ruling. I ask him now for the last time to confine himself to the clause under discussion, which is clause 16.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I submit that what the hon. member is doing is to talk about the ability of the President to decide what are own and what are general affairs. I suggest that this is definitely the most important aspect to be discussed in this Committee, and I therefore request you not to constrain the hon. member, so that he can discuss fully that choice in regard to the determination of whether matters are own or general affairs. It is, after all, very important.

Order! I want to draw the hon. member’s attention to the fact that the question of own and general affairs has already been debated in this Committee for almost 10 hours. I allowed the hon. member for Pietersburg to indicate that that was an example of a decision which the President would have to take. However, I am certainly not going to allow him to argue that example again. That is my final ruling.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: In the discussion of clause 14 we had an opportunity to classify into watertight compartments …

Order! No, the hon. member for Jeppe is repeating arguments now.

No, Mr. Chairman …

Order! The hon. member for Jeppe is repeating arguments. I have given my final ruling on that matter. The hon. member must please resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: At the beginning of today’s business I should like to ask courteously please to afford hon. members of the CP an opportunity to state their case without constant intervention from hon. members on the Government side. We would appreciate being able to participate in this debate without the stream of interjections and rulings from those benches.

Order! The hon. member for Rissik is addressing a fair request to me and I request hon. members to accede to it, and not only as far as hon. members on the Government side are concerned, but in regard to every hon. member in this House. Therefore I courteously request hon. members to ensure that we conduct the debate here on a proper level, and that we limit interjections to really good interjections.

Mr. Chairman, with reference to what the hon. member for Pietersburg said, I find it truly deplorable that in a debate such as this which deals with very important matters, we should have to listen to such an unsound argument as the one which the hon. member put forward. The hon. member for Pietersburg quoted from the report of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council to indicate what the relationship might have been between members of the Cabinet and the State President. However, the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council recommended a completely different system. It recommended a system of an executive authority totally separated from the legislative authority, and comprising people who were not members of the legislative authority. It was for that very reason that the Government rejected that viewpoint. In its constitutional proposals the Government did in fact make provision that the Cabinet could be made up of people who were not members of the legislative authority. The implication of that, however, is that the executive authority is going to remain rooted in the legislative authority with which it has to co-operate. That quotation was not one which clarified the debate but was a quotation which clouded the whole issue and created confusion in regard to it. I deplore this.

I should like to come back to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point. To be able to assess the procedures which he proposed, it is necessary to give an account once again of precisely what the decisions are which the State President has to take in connection with the question of whether or not matters are own affairs. It is true that the decisions which he will take in respect of own affairs in terms of clause 14(1) may entail the creation of new categories of own affairs, but these will be the decisions in regard to specific population groups. It is significant that clause 14(1) deals with own affairs specifically for a population group while in the other cases one is dealing with own affairs in regard to population groups in general. For that reason it will be relatively exceptional cases that are concerned with specific population groups, and in the nature of things the President will in those cases act on the initiative of those population groups and in close consultation with them. The decision in terms of clause 16(1) which deal with matters which are own affairs in terms of the categories already specified in the Schedule, however, will not entail the defining of new categories but will actually entail classification decisions to ascertain whether or not specific matters, specific cases, fall under own affairs. We are therefore concerned with a great variety of decisions here in connection with the classification of individual cases in regard to which legislative or executive or administrative actions have to be carried out. Naturally it would be impracticable to submit that ongoing diversity of cases in a formal way every time to a complicated procedure of consultation.

May I please ask a question?

I should very much like to complete my argument first, and then the hon. member may put his question. The decision-making of the President in terms of this clause will, in the nature of things, have to take place in consultation with his Cabinet in terms of the provisions of clause 19. In his Cabinet there will also be persons who either have close contact with or might even be members of the specific Ministers’ Councils. From the nature of the entire structure of executive Government there will be close liaison and consultation among the Ministers Councils and the Cabinets, and the decision-making of the President will in practice therefore take place in very close consultation with them. I should now like to give the hon. member for Jeppe an opportunity to state his question.

In view of the formula prescribed in clause 16(1)(a) which the President has to adopt in order to determine what an own affair is, can the hon. the Minister mention one important matter to me which he thinks will be an own affair?

Sir, that is a question which has nothing to do with my present argument and I consider it to be a wilful disruption of the debate. [Interjections.] I should like to emphasize that if the State President is expected to subject every individual decision to the proposed procedure, it will result in a virtually unmanageable situation. His decision will, for example, deal with determining whether the proposed legislation is an own affair or not. As far as this is concerned, clause 17(1) already provides that he has to follow a specific procedure of consultation. Decisions on matters on the level of legislation which are own affairs or not will not occur every day.

However, as I have said, we are also concerned here with decisions in connection with administrative actions, decisions in connection with executive actions which will occur virtually on a day to day basis. If this is subjected to a strictly prescribed procedure, I want to suggest that the State machinery will grind to a halt. I would suggest further that the situation in which the State President is going to act, is inherently such that if he does not consult—but then not in accordance with a prescribed procedure, but in accordance with his ordinary, sound common sense—he will in the long run simply be unable to govern. Under such circumstances he will not even be able to govern in the short term.

It is inherently likely, as I have already argued, that the State President will consult the chairman of the Ministers’ Councils, because his decisions which affect own affairs, affect the Ministers’ Councils. Moreover, it is inherently likely that in his consultations with the Cabinet, something which is prescribed, because these decisions are general affairs and therefore have to take place in consultation with the Cabinet, his consultations will, as it were, branch out to further consultation with the Ministers’ Councils as well, owing to their liaison with the Cabinet.

If the State President, as one simply accepts—and this must be one’s point of departure—is a sensible person, he will in any event make use of the useful procedure which is an inherent part of clause 17(1) of referring difficult and contentious cases to the President’s Council for advice, a forum in which it is in fact possible for representatives of the various population groups to hold joint consultations in a rather more remote and reserved way than in the full hurly-burly of politics in order to obtain a greater possibility of consensus and agreement in connection with points at issue.

I would therefore suggest that the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point brings about an unnecessary prescriptiveness, unnecessary because the inherent nature of the circumstances and the situation of government in which the State President acts, will force him in the direction of consultation with the Ministers’ Council.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister whether, apart from the procedure, it brings about any additional burden if instead of consulting the Speaker and the chairmen of the Houses, he consults the chairmen of the Ministers’ Councils on the same basis? Would that be more difficult than what is now being proposed in the clause?

If I understand it correctly, consultation with the Speaker and the chairmen of the Houses is built into this legislation in any case. It is expressly being included.

Instead of that.

I do not think it is necessary to do it instead of that. On the Select Committee the governing party in fact accepted ex abundante cautela duplicating or additional consultation. It accepted that clause 19 would be so amended that there would have to be consultation with the Cabinet. I argue that it is self-evident that the Ministers Councils will be involved in this. It accepted in clause 17(2) that there would also be consultation with Mr. Speaker and the chairmen of the Houses. The Government really went out of its way to specify expressly that there should be consultation.

I want to argue that it would be unwise to make this structure too precise with all kinds of prescribed procedures. I would suggest that in this Constitution Bill we might already have too much prescriptive details as to how actions are to take place and that the inherently revolutionary developing capacity of practical government can be constrained if we make too many prescriptions of this nature. Let us remember that if the State President cannot maintain practical confidence among his governmental bodies and the legislative bodies, he cannot govern, because to be able to govern he must have legislation passed and he must have budgetary legislation. He must therefore ensure that there is very close consultation between himself and the legislative bodies. I want to suggest that if we make too much use of formal prescriptions, we are going to constrain natural development. I would almost say the development of conventions, if I may express it in that way, in this new system. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I was not present last night when the debate on this clause began. It is certainly not my intention to take up the time of this Committee unnecessarily, and if I therefore repeat arguments which have already been stated, you will just have to point it out to me.

This clause completes the argument which began in clause 14. It concerns the question of self-determination, or put another way, the identification of own affairs by a group. Here a mechanism is being created by means of which own affairs are created for the Coloureds and the Indians. This mechanism is of course the executive State President. In this respect it is clear to me that the principle of self-determination, the principle of voluntary association, is being denied here. It is being denied by the fact that the right to decide on a voluntary basis what is an own affair for a specific group is being taken away from that group by this clause and that right is being conferred upon a person, the State President. In a certain sense it is the proposal of the CP that that right should be the right of Whites to decide what the own affairs of the Coloureds and Indians should be. In this case that right is being conferred only upon a person. Here it is possible for anomalies to arise, and the hon. the Minister of National Education has just discussed this. The question is what does one do if the group in regard to which it is decided in terms of clause 16(1) that there should be own affairs, states that for them those matters are not own affairs? That is where the fundamental anomaly emerges. Who settles that dispute? Procedures aimed at settling that dispute are now being proposed by the hon. the Minister; he has just been discussing them. I do not wish to refer to them now because they relate to a subsequent clause which deals with the entire question of the President’s Council, the body which, in these circumstances, has to settle the matter. That, in itself, once again contradicts the principle of self-determination because the settlement of what are own affairs for a specific group should be the responsibility of that group. That group should state what own affairs for that group are and it is of no avail taking the case to a so-called depoliticized body and asking that body to indicate what own affairs for that group are. In the final analysis it is after all the group itself that should decide. Who can tell the Afrikaners how their language should be preserved? Surely it cannot be an outside body because it is something that has to be done by the Afrikaners themselves. Who is going to tell the Jews what the substance of their religion and education should be? Surely it cannot be a person or a so-called depoliticized body. That is why this kind of dilemma arises i.e. that if we are really in earnest about what own affairs for a specific group are, the mechanism which should decide the question should in the nature of things be that group itself. In this clause we are therefore contradicting the entire principle of self-determination by depriving that group of the right to decide its own affairs.

Mr. Chairman, various hon. members discussed this clause last night and I should like to react to what they said in the order in which they participated in the debate. It is very clear, according to clause 16, that what is being done here actually entails two things. In the first place it is concerned with giving the State President decision-making powers over what are own affairs. Such a decision, therefore, will also have an effect on what general affairs are. Secondly it is concerned with the question of making provision for the procedure he adopts in these specific cases. In this connection the Select Committee, in the first place, introduced a consultation mechanism by means of amendments to the original clause.

The hon. member for Durban Point has given notice of an amendment. I do not wish to spend much time on it since I have indicated that I cannot accept the amendment, because I think it must inevitably have a delaying effect on the decision-making process in this specific connection. We must also bear in mind that this decision also has a bearing on day-to-day management, and on everyday administrative matters, and we are also concerned here with the decision as to who should deal with specific legislation. It is not a legislative function, but the decision leads to an identification of which House should deal with a specific piece of legislation. The hon. member says in the first place that the State President should give notice that he is about to make such a decision. He has to give 14 days’ notice of the fact that he has to decide on a specific subject and after that he must hear objections. After he has done so, the hon. member proposes that he should give notice of his decision in a specified way. As far as the notification is concerned, the hon. member will recall that we have already accepted an amendment to the effect that he shall notify the chairmen of the Houses of decisions affecting those legislative bodies. This has already been accepted.

The chairmen of the Ministers’ Councils.

Yes, they are the people who deal with own affairs. That is the basic point on which the President has to take a decision.

I think the hon. member will concede that it really is a long procedure if it has to take 14 days or longer to come to a decision. In respect of the State administration and legislative programme, one would, in terms of the hon. member’s motion, be building in a delaying element here which I do not think is necessary. What is in fact important is that provision is being made here for a consultative process. Moreover, it is important that the President acts in terms of the powers conferred by clause 16 in consultation with this Cabinet.

Would it not drag the Speaker into the political arena if consultation had to take place with the Speaker and not with the political leader of the House?

I think that is a fair question. My reply to that is that we decided that the presiding officer may not vote. In other words, as soon as we have elected him to that specific office, we all accept his impartiality in respect of the procedure in that House. The hon. member will concede that point to me. In this connection I maintain that it is in fact the presiding officer who will make an important input in considering whether a matter is an own affair or not, because he is responsible for the proper functioning of the House which ultimately has to pass the legislation.

†The hon. member for Berea made, as usual, certain statements which I submit are imaginative. He firstly referred to the supposedly awesome powers and responsibilities which are conferred upon the President in terms of this clause. Secondly, he comes to the conclusion that if this clause is accepted we will have, as he puts it, a one-man regulator of the racist policies entrenched in the constitution.

[Inaudible.]

I am merely reacting to the hon. member now. He also says the President will have little support because, he suggests, it is only the White majority that elects him.

In the electoral college.

Yes, in the electoral college. Let me deal very briefly with these allegations.

It is quite obvious to me that the hon. member for Berea does not have the foggiest idea of how an executive operates. Firstly, it is quite clear that if the proposals contained in this Bill are to work effectively the President would not be able to become a dictator, as the hon. member suggests. In fact, the converse is true. If the new system is to work it is going to work on one basis only, and that is to get the co-operation of the other groups involved.

By reaching for the moon.

Well, Sir, I believe that in this life one must always strive for better. Not that one can attain it but maybe one can come near it. I can however understand that the hon. member for Barberton has no idealism in this particular regard. I say that if the constitution is to work …

If …

That is the point.

Of course, Sir. But is that the find of the century now?

It seems that you have doubts about it.

Order! The hon. the Minister is replying to the speech made by the hon. member for Berea and I ask hon. members to give him an opportunity to do so.

The hon. member for Sea Point talks about doubt. What else is he and his party doing than to sow doubt in the minds of people throughout the country? The whole point is that the actions of the hon. member for Sea Point has been directed throughout at sowing the doubt which he referred to in people’s minds. And then he makes an interjection about doubt. I have said how many times, and I want to repeat, that the chances of success in this country are fewer than in most other countries. Surely that is now new statement. The fact of the matter is that no hon. member, if he thinks about the problems of this country and takes the complexity of the country into consideration, will fail to concede that it is extremely difficult to maintain democratic systems and values in this country. Then the hon. member must not make such a nonsensical interjection. [Interjections.]

Order!

I do not know whether this will work, but what I do know is that we will have to try to make it work, and that applies to all of us.

There are lots of dangers.

But it is a dangerous world we live in.

It is a dangerous clause.

No, it is not a dangerous clause. It will only be dangerous in the hands of people with the perceptions of the hon. members for Sea Point and Berea. I gain the impression that, should they ever come to power, they would operate the way they suggest the clause will enable them to operate.

The hon. member for Berea said the President will be a one-man regulator of a racist policy to be entrenched in the constitution. I want to make only one observation in this regard: On what basis does the hon. member suggest that the minority groups will be represented in his constitutional dispensation on a proportional basis? Is he not going to entrench in his constitution that he will submit to his national convention proportional representation, and does proportional representation not mean that minority groups have to be represented on that basis? Is that racist, or is it an acknowledgement of the diversity of the population in this country with the resulting complexity in accommodating people in the decision-making processes?

We agree on that.

The hon. member for Berea does not agree. He will have little support because he will govern with the support of a White minority.

Apparently the fact that the hon. member and his party are present in the House makes them completely ineffective. The hon. member argues that, because a particular group is in a minority position in an institution, it is not participating in that institution.

No one said that.

First let me reply to the hon. member, please. The hon. member said he is not going to receive support because he was elected by a White majority. Surely this constitution is not being made for a specific party or for a specific policy, but for a country. Surely that hon. member is free, if he has the ability and can gain the necessary support, to form the majority here. If his progress has been such that his party forms the majority here, they will also form a majority along with the Coloured people and the Indians. That is his policy and the constitution allows him to pursue his policy. The fact remains however that those hon. members are displaying such a defeatist attitude because they realize that they will never find themselves in that position.

The hon. member’s last question was: “How will he act?”

I asked you to explain how it will work.

He will act in terms of the Bill. He will consult with his Cabinet and with his Ministers’ Councils.

*The effect of this is that after the State President has taken a decision on own affairs, the House to which he refers the legislation has to deal with that legislation.

If he were to act arbitrarily and failed to consult anyone, how is he going to get the legislation approved by a House? Surely the argument of the hon. member is absurd. Surely he knows the legal principle in that connection. The State President cannot read the clause in isolation from the remainder of the Bill. After all, the constitution of this country is not going to consist of one clause only.

I come now to the hon. member for Brakpan. The hon. member put three questions to me. In the first place he spoke about the unbearable burden which one fallible person would have to bear when he took such decisions. In this connection the hon. member stated basically the same point as the hon. member for Berea. The fact of the matter is that in our present system today that responsibility, divisible to a lesser extent, also rests on one person. The hon. member knows that that is true. In this Bill it is being proposed that that decision-making responsibility should be exercised in a specific way so that that fallible person is also able to receive inputs from other people to help him to take decisions and they therefore share the responsibility with him. In this connection the position does not change for the worst. The State President is being told statutorily what he must do, which in terms of the present system he does by way of convention.

Previously the hon. member supported the alternative, namely that the Council of Cabinets should take those decisions. Is it more acceptable to him that the Council of Cabinets takes those decisions over what are own affairs or that the State President should do so in consultation with Mr. Speaker, and chairmen of the various Houses? The hon. member can tell us. I want to ask him whether it is more acceptable to him that the State President should take the final decision on legislation in terms of the proposals which he supported, because in terms of those proposals the State President would have been able, in the case of conflict between the Parliaments, to decide that the legislation of any particular Parliament shall become law. He could do so through the Indian Parliament or through that of the Coloureds or the Whites. That was more acceptable to that hon. member. It is unacceptable or acceptable to him that the President shall consult his Cabinet?

I come now to the hon. member for Pietersburg. Do hon. members know what he did? The hon. the Minister of National Education also referred to this. The hon. Minister argued the matter and therefore I do not wish to argue it any further. Consider the way in which the hon. member for Pietersburg conducts a debate in this House. He did not refer to the explanatory memorandum which he has in his possession. He did not refer to the well-known guidelines of the hon. the Prime Minister, of the Government, in consequence of the President’s Council’s report. He referred to the President’s Council’s earlier report—as the basis of his argument because he is opposed to the clause—on a recommendation which was rejected. Now I ask him: What motive causes people to act in this way? The hon. member has been doing precisely the same thing throughout this session. It is an established pattern of that hon. member to build up arguments on recommendations which ceased to count a long time ago or which were not accepted.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. Minister a question?

No, I am replying to the hon. member. I want to tell that hon. member, and he can make of it what he likes, that this is the most deplorable method of conducting an argument that I have ever encountered. If he does that in this House where he is heard, what does he do where he is not heard? [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, you allowed the hon. member merely to refer to Kruger Day. I am going to abide by your ruling, by replying to that point in a single sentence only. The national holidays, including Kruger Day, were approved by a commission of inquiry led by Dr. Gericke and Coloured and Asian people agreed to those holidays. Just look at the deplorable kind of argument that hon. member is now introducing. It is intended for no other reason than to make cheap politics. The hon. member was a member of that commission himself, and he ought to know that. He condemned himself out of his own mouth. He said he knew what happened there, but he knew the fact of the matter was that Coloureds and Asians agreed that Kruger Day should be a national holiday. But he did not say that. Do hon. members know why?

He is a “skinderbek” (gossip-monger).

It did not suit him.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May hon. members on this side of the House be referred to as gossip-mongers?

Order! To the best of my knowledge, the word “skinderbek” is not unparliamentary. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Chris Heunis is a “skinderbek”.

You are “skinderskilpaaie” (gossiping tortoises).

I shall leave the hon. member for Pietersburg at that. I hope he derives satisfaction from his behaviour.

The Government did not accept the recommendation of an extra-parliamentary Cabinet because of the fact that the Government adopts the standpoint that Cabinet members should as a rule be members of the Houses of Parliament. That is why it did not accept that recommendation. Therefore, to argue on a false premise now is surely not fair.

I come now to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. He indicated that he would not be able to be present here, and I should like to place this on record. He said that we were now completing, by way of this clause, the process begun in clause 14. The Government’s standpoint is that in this country the group existence of society should form the building blocks of the constitution. We make no apology for that. Nor do we make any apology for the fact that the constitution of the country …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: We should like to listen to the argument of the hon. the Minister, but the private conversations which hon. members on the Government side are holding among themselves are such that we cannot hear the hon. the Minister properly. [Interjections.]

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member for Rissik that I, too, am sitting here, listening to the hon. the Minister, and that I am therefore very aware of the conversations which hon. members are holding among themselves. However, I am of the opinion that the conversations are not of such a nature that they justify a point of order.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order …

Order! The hon. member must please resume his seat. I want to point out that I think we are wasting more than enough of the valuable time of the Committee by raising unnecessary points of order. The hon. member may now raise his further point of order.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask you courteously, since we, here where we are sitting, want to listen … [Interjections.]

Order! That is not a point of order at all. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I shall now address myself to the hon. member for Rissik so that he can hear me properly. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition argued that we were destroying self-determination by means of the provisions of clause 16. Consequently he was acting as the champion of self-determination. That astonished me. He also added, however, that we were destroying voluntary association. How did the hon. the Leader of the Opposition arrive at that idea? Surely those are just so many words. The fact of the matter is that self-determination in this specific context means that the House has legislative power in respect of what is peculiar to that specific group.

Subject to general law.

I shall come to that when we discuss the Schedule. Then I should like to discuss it with the hon. member for Groote Schuur.

Apply the guillotine!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Jeppe’s concept of …

Order! The hon. member for Jeppe saw to it with that interjection that he filled his quota of interjections for the present sitting day. The hon. member may therefore make no further interjections during the present sitting day. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member for Jeppe had used this debate to make a contribution in order to discuss and improve this Bill, the guillotine would not have been necessary. In any case, I am not arguing about the guillotine now. A decision in this regard has already been taken.

In reply to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, I want to point out, however, that the position is such that the legislative authority, precisely as a result of this decision, must entail that the specific groups acquire a final say over their own affairs in their own institutions. What we are dealing with here is surely not decision-making on legislation. It is concerned with the identification of certain things. After all, the hon. member for Sea Point was present when we introduced this very consultative mechanism into the legislation so that all the groups could make inputs to the decisions via the chairman of every House. Can the hon. member not understand, however, that when one has to give a group absolute freedom, that freedom can come into conflict with the freedom of other groups? Surely one is then increasing the potential for conflict; one is not reducing it. I really do not understand the way the hon. the Leader of the Opposition argues. Nor do I know what he was told by his hon. colleagues who deliberated with us for days on these aspects. That is why it is not a valid statement which he made, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You have just given a ruling in respect of the hon. member for Jeppe. I want to ask you to keep an eye on the hon. member for Kimberley South and the hon. Chief Whip of the NP in particular, in regard to the way in which they are now trying to provoke the hon. member for Jeppe into making interjections.

Order! That is not a point of order. I have already given my ruling.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to reply to one or two matters raised by the hon. the Minister. I do not know why the hon. the Minister is so testy and edgy this morning. I realize, of course, that this is a very important clause, a clause that is opposed by every Coloured and Indian organization …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I want your ruling now, please. A constant stream of remarks about the hon. member for Jeppe have lately been forthcoming on my left. I ask you for your ruling in respect of this matter, please.

Order! I heard the expression “Koos Box”. Who said it?

I did, Sir.

The hon. member Mr. Vermeulen’s quota of interjections for today has now also run out.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. the Minister realizes that this provision that the President should decide on what are own affairs has been opposed, and representations have been made in this regard by every Coloured and Indian organization that made representations to the Select Committee. We are therefore dealing with a clause in regard to which the Government says it is giving people the opportunity for self-determination and yet the very groups of people with whom we are dealing are saying that they do not want this method of self-determination. They feel that if there is going to be self-determination then they want to have some say in regard to the matter.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member for Brits is constantly calling out to hon. members of the CP to start up a conversation. I now want to ask you for the last time to give a final ruling on this matter please so that we can listen to the debate.

Order! Did the hon. member for Brits call out to an hon. member for the CP?

Mr. Chairman, I complimented the hon. member for Germiston. I said the whitest lily grows in the blackest mud. [Interjections.]

Order! I do not regard that interjection as at all relevant to the debate, and the quota of interjections of the hon. member for Brits has also run out now.

Mr. Chairman, as an Opposition member who in spite of not liking the Bill is trying to make some effort to communicate with hon. members opposite and to discuss this Bill, I want to say that I find the general behaviour of Government members on a Bill which they maintain to be such an important constitutional issue to be quite disgusting. [Interjections.] I find the general noise and the lighthearted banter that is being bandied about to be quite disgusting.

I want to put this point to the hon. the Minister. He says that they stand for self-determination. Groups must decide. The hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs has told us that “mense moet besluit oor sake wat dierbaar en sensitief vir hulle is”. Clause 16(1)(b) provides that the question as to whether a matter is an own matter shall be a general affair. When one looks at clause 19(2) one finds that general affairs are very clearly determined as matters that are not decided by ownness. They are not decided by the group concerned. They are decided by the White President. Therefore, clause 16(1)(b) is in fact a negation of everything this Government has claimed to believe in regard to self-determination. I say this because they are not going to allow the people to decide for themselves what is “dierbaar” or what is “eie”. They are going to allow the White President to decide on their behalf.

The next point I want to make is that the hon. the Minister of National Education and, to some extent, the hon. the Minister who has just sat down, say: “Ja, maar daar sal oorlegpleging wees”. I do not think the hon. the Minister for National Education understands his own constitution. I really do not think he understands what it is all about and how it is going to operate. The fact is that originally clause 19(2) did not make this a matter that had to be considered in consultation with the Cabinet. It was the prerogative of the President. It is now something that has to be considered in terms of clause 19(1)(b); in other words, it is a general matter in consultation with the Cabinet. That specifically excludes its being dealt with in terms of clause 19(1)(a) because where the clause provides that the provisions of clause 19(1)(b) shall apply in consultation with the Cabinet, one cannot say: Oh, but in fact he is going to do it on the advice of or in consultation with the Ministers’ Council. In fact, in terms of this he is bound to do it in consultation with his Cabinet and he is not allowed to do it on the advice of his Ministers’ Councils. [Interjections.] The clause makes this quite specific. Is the hon. the Minister now saying that clause 19(1)(a) is going to apply to this?

I did not say that.

As it stood before, the President was quite free to talk to whom he liked. Now it has been changed and it specifically says …

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, I have not time because of all the “tussenwerpsels”.

It specifically says it is a “general” matter, and “general” matters have to be considered in consultation with the Cabinet. That specifically excludes clause 19(1)(a) which says that the State President has to deal with own matters on the advice of his Ministers’ Councils. Therefore he has to go to the Cabinet and not the Ministers’ Councils. He can chat quietly to them, but I want to know from the hon. the Minister what happens if there is a difference in the advice that he gets from the Ministers’ Councils and the advice that he gets from the Cabinet. In law he is bound by the advice of the Cabinet.

In law, yes.

Therefore, what one is saying is that he can get advice from somebody but he is bound by somebody else’s opinion.

The fact is that on things which are own affairs it is not going to be the group who will decide; it is going to be the White State President who is going to decide on the advice of the Cabinet whom he appoints and not the Ministers’ Councils. The hon. the Minister asks: “Maar hoe kan hy regeer as hy nie met hulle raadpleeg nie?” How can he get Bills through? It is very simple. If the Coloured and Indian Houses do not like a Bill and they do not deal with it, clause 37 says that Parliament shall be deemed to be those Houses which do act. So he just ignores them. If they refuse to touch his Bill, he can govern without them.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, not at this stage.

He can in fact ignore them in terms of clause 37. He does not have to take those Houses into account. Let us presume that they do take that Bill into account and they vote it down. Let us presume too that they vote the budget down. The hon. the Minister should know that it is quite easy for the State President. He refers it to the President’s Council and the President’s Council passes it. Then it shall be deemed to have been passed by the other Houses. The hon. Minister’s argument is nonsensical. He does not have to consult. He can get every law concerning a general matter through Parliament without the support of either the Coloured or the Indian House. Therefore, to say he cannot get it through is nonsense. I suppose it will then be asked how he can get Bills concerning own affairs through.

Mr. Speaker, may I now ask the hon. member a question?

I am afraid I do not have time. If the hon. the Minister would raise a point by way of another speech, I shall have a crack at him.

This makes nonsense of the Government’s concept of self-determination. They cannot determine; it is the State President who will determine. Every non-White group that has come to the Select Committee said: We resent this; if you want to impose self-determination upon us, then let us make the decision. Certainly the law says that he is going to be bound and that he is going to do it in consultation with the Cabinet. It specifically says for general affairs he has to do it in consultation with his Cabinet and not in consultation with the Ministers’ Councils. Furthermore, he can get laws through Parliament without the support of minority groups. If the Coloured and Indian Houses do not touch it, then clause 39 applies. He will then act with the House which is prepared to touch it. If the Coloured and Indian Houses oppose it, he sends it to the President’s Council and he gets it through.

Order! The hon. member is going too wide now.

Mr. Chairman, it is wide, but the hon. the Minister said: “Hoe kan hy wetgewing deurkry as hy nie beraadslaag nie?” That is not the case; he does not have to consult. I think the hon. member is quite correct—he is a one-man band. He can decide, provided he has the support of the White majority, and the White majority together with the State President is in terms of the whole of this constitution the decisive factor. This clause makes an absolute mockery of self-determination. In fact, this clause is the entrenchment of White baasskap over the other groups.

Mr. Chairman, I rise merely to react to a remark which the hon. member made when he said that the behaviour of Government members was—to use his terminology—disgusting.

Have you not heard it all morning?

Let me say there is no hon. member in this House who makes more speeches in this House without getting up to make them than the hon. Chief Whip of the official Opposition. Let me say this to him straight. I should like to tell the hon. member that his attitude is disgusting. I am disgusted at his holier than thou attitude in every debate in this House. Sir, I shall deal with the amendments later on.

Mr. Chairman, I want to return to the provisions of this specific clause and I want to point out something I find strange. I have done this already, without receiving any reply to it. In clause 16 decision-making powers are given to the State President, powers which he can exercise in co-operation with his Cabinet. What I find inexplicable, however, is that the State President is not expected, in clause 16, to comply with the provision of clause 14. On the contrary, a new criterion is laid down in clause 16 which the State President has to comply with in his decision as to whether a matter is an own affairs or not.

What is the criterion which is being inserted here?

I can quote it. I am quoting from clause 16—

That is a confirmation.

It may be a confirmation, but I want to know why it is not provided in clause 16 that the provisions of that clause are subject to the provisions of clause 14. There is a reason for this, and the reason is quite simple. By the insertion of clause 16, with the provisions which it contains, the legal force of clause 14 is being totally nullified. No other conclusion can be drawn from this, and I do not think the Government has any other intention with the insertion of this provision.

Furthermore, I find it a little strange that the State President may in terms of subsection (2) make his decision known, if he deems it expedient, in the Gazette but is also able to make it known in such other manner as he may deem fit. He can make it known to Christo Kritzinger who will tell us about it on “Monitor”. I should like to know why this specific provision—and I am not being frivolous—was included here. The simplest proclamation which a Minister has to make in terms of the law must be published in the Gazette. Why is it not being required in the case of a decision by the State President, a decision which is of vital importance and from which a House in specific cases is going to derive its legislative authority, that it shall also be published in the Gazette?

Mr. Chairman, earlier on the hon. member for Sea Point referred to clause 16 as a dangerous clause. That was also the underlying theme of the criticism levelled by hon. members of the CP. I have never in my life seen a more fear-ridden bunch than the hon. members opposite.

Particularly Koos.

Fear is an element of life that one…

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May the hon. member for Johannesburg West refer to the hon. member for Jeppe as “Koos”?

Yes, I think that was a case of provocation. The hon. member for Johannesburg West has now made enough interjections for one day. Moreover he may not make any further interjections. The hon. member for Mossel Bay may proceed.

Danger is an element of life that one cannot always avoid, specifically because it sometimes attaches to those very things to which one attaches the greatest value. No one on this side of the House is trying to imply that the implementation of the Constitution Bill will not present us with exceptional challenges, or that there will not be any problems. That is not, however, any reason for us to cast aspersions on the Constitution Bill, and in particular on clause 16.

I involuntarily get the impression that the criticism from hon. members of the CP, and also from the PFP is based on the view that the executive authority will, of necessity, be in the hands of the NP. They are thereby revealing their total inability to envisage the possibility of their parties perhaps controlling the executive authority. They apparently do not realize that this constitution has not merely been designed for the present situation in which the NP is governing. The State President could just as well come from their ranks. Let me now ask hon. members of the official Opposition and hon. members of the PC: If the State President were to be elected by a majority of their parties in the House of Assembly, would the criticism they have been levelling in the House over the past few days still be valid? [Interjections.] If the State President were to be elected by a majority of their parties in the House of Assembly, would the criticism they have been levelling in the House over the past few days still be valid? [Interjections.] If the State President were to come from their ranks, would they still be levelling the disparaging criticism about the Ministers supposedly being straw drolls? Earlier on the hon. member for Pietersburg intimated that the Ministers who would be serving in the Cabinet would, in any case, simply be straw dolls of the State President and that it would actually be the State President, in consultation with the Cabinet, who would decide.

Surely that is the case.

If those Ministers were to be members of the CP, would he still say so? No, Sir, the criticism is based solely on the supposition that those Ministers will be members of the NP, on the view that the State President will be an NP nominee. What do we therefore have here on the part of the official Opposition and the CP? Nothing more than blatant politicking. For them it is not a matter of the merits of the clause in the Constitution Bill, but solely a matter of the party affiliation of the person occupying the position of State President.

From the hon. members of the CP we have heard a great deal about representations and submissions to the Constitutional Committee. A great deal has been made, amongst other things, of the so-called submission made by the Department of Constitutional Law of Unisa. I think that here Unisa has been done a gross injustice. This submission was, in point of fact, merely the submission of Prof. Herklaas Booysen.

That is not true.

Yes, Sir, and Prof. Booysen’s political affiliations are well-known. In fact, I have a suspicion that Prof. Booysen is actually the hon. member for Jeppe’s mentor. I would not be surprised if Prof. Booysen were the author of the speeches the hon. member for Jeppe makes here.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May the hon. member for Mossel Bay make the insinuation that the hon. member for Jeppe’s speeches are written by Prof. Booysen?

Order! That is not unparliamentary.

It has nothing to do with the clause.

Order!

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: The insinuation that was made was that members of the CP get up here and make speeches that they themselves have not prepared.

Order! No, it is not a reflection on hon. members. The hon. member for Mossel Bay may proceed.

The hon. member for Barberton has left the Chamber, but I do nevertheless want to refer to his allegation that a new criterion is being introduced by clause 16(3). The hon. member for Barberton cannot make me believe that he does not realize that what is contained in that provision is simply there to emphasize the fact that the protection of one group’s interests should not go so far as to adversely affect those of another group. Surely that is not another norm. If one sets down the limits of certain powers, adding that those powers should not go beyond those limits, surely one is not laying down another norm. It is the same norm that one is merely approaching from the opposite angle. It is—if I may put it like that—simply the other side of the coin. So that allegation does not hold any water at all.

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member?

Yes, if it is relevant.

I just want to repeat: Why is not stated that the provision in clause 16 is subject to the provision contained in clause 14?

There is no sense in again referring to clause 14 in clause 16. Clause 14 lays down the general principle of own affairs and affairs of common concern. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition has rightly pointed out that clause 16 contains the machinery to decide on questions about whether matters are own affairs or general affairs. Surely there is no sense in repeatedly harking back to what has already been provided. Surely one does not draft a constitution in that fashion. The hon. member knows that, does he not? That question of his was merely being used as a lightning conductor. Clause 16 does not, in any way, limit or change the legal force of clause 14. It does not detract from it in any way.

The hon. member for Sea Point made an equally unjustified statement, i.e. that the State President would not be able to consult with the Ministers’ Council about own affairs. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 3. On page 14, in lines 13 to 22, to omit subsection (2) and to substitute:
   1. (2) The State President shall publish his decision on any question contemplated in subsection (1) or taken in terms of section 31, including the reasons for such decision, in the Gazette.

Last night I motivated it very briefly and pleaded with the hon. the Minister to accept it on the strength of the logic of my argument and also its brevity.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to put forward a few ideas about the question of the right to decide which is being granted to the State President in clause 16.

In pursuance of what the hon. member for Barberton said, I want to state that in this clause there is, in regard to the State President’s determination of what is an own or a general affair, a built-in norm or criterion that could become an absolutely decisive factor. I should like to demonstrate this.

When one looks at the definition of guidelines laid down for own affairs in clause 14, one notices a specific link-up between two matters that are tremendously wide in scope, in fact as wide in scope as life itself. The first is the question of the preservation of identity.

Where in clause 16 does one find that?

I am in the process of developing my argument.

Order! I can only allow the hon. member to refer very briefly to clause 14.

I just want to point out how this wording is nullified. If I cannot refer to this, I cannot deal with its nullification in clause 16. The factor of identity, which is built into clause 14, and thereby also the maintenance and promotion of people’s ways of life, are very wide-ranging concepts. When one relates these two guidelines or norms in clause 14 with what is contained in clause 16, where it is a matter of the norm stated there, i.e. that they should not affect the interests of any other population group, it is clear that problems can arise. Clause 16 provides, amongst other things, for the fact that “the interests of any other population group” should not be affected by the decision about whether an affair is an own or general affair. Since the definition of own affairs is such an all-embracing one, taking the identities and ways of life of people into consideration, what wisdom would not be needed to determine where the line should be drawn and whether there would not be any overlapping? What are involved here are the entire lifestyles of three different population groups. Somewhere or other there is, in any event, some overlapping, and one would have to determine what, if allocated to one of these population groups as an own affair, would not overlap within a single system of State or system of government and within the context of any individual lebensraum. Whenever that overlapping takes place, the question that arises is what is individual to a specific population group or when does this also become a matter involving another population group. If one compares the word “raak” in the Afrikaans text with its equivalent “affect” in the English text, one sees that it is actually given the full depth of its significance in the Afrikaans. Here it is therefore a question of “affecting” and therefore “influencing”. There is, of course, also the question of detrimentally influencing. If the influencing is not of a detrimental nature, mutual interests are not affected. Mutual interests will only be influenced, and then detrimentally influenced—if one were, at those overlapping points, to grant one group something as an own affair which the other two groups, or one of the other groups, claims for itself as an own affair. This question of the point of overlap, or the negative or detrimental factors operative at this point of overlap, is aggravated by the provision in clause 16(1)(b), i.e. that in deciding about whether something is an own affair or a general affair, it is provided that anything is included. The point of departure is that something is, in the first instance, a general affair. One therefore proceeds from the question of general affairs. The State President must therefore proceed from the presumption that something is a general affair and then decide that it is no longer a general affair, but actually an own affair of one of the three population groups. My argument is that this further increases the problem. This complicates the decision that must be taken, because if one proceeds from the supposition that a matter is a general affair, and all three population groups can claim this to be an own affair—it does not only need to be one that is doing so; two or three can claim the same aspect as an own affair—one is immediately creating a point of friction, a point of conflict, a point at which consensus and co-operation are completely nullified, because a decision will have to be taken favouring one or other of the three groups by stating that the aspect concerned is its own affair, even though the other two groups also lay claim to it. From that point onwards the other two, or the one which has been eliminated, will continue to claim that aspect as its own affair. At this point it becomes extremely difficult for me to follow the hon. the Minister of National Education’s argument in connection with clauses 17 and 19. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will concede that the hon. the Minister’s argument on those clauses was so tangential that if one had to reply one would have to ignore the Chair’s ruling. In other words, one cannot therefore reply before one comes to those clauses. The fact of the matter is, however, that when it has been decided that a specific aspect is the own affair of a specific population group, with the other two groups also laying claim to it, legislation has to be passed in connection with such an own affair for that specific population group, even though the other two have also laid claim to it. My argument is that under these circumstances friction and conflict would be increased, and that would would be the end of the whole idea of co-operation and consensus. In this connection I also want to say that the hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs—and here I am again in the position of venturing very close to the edge—referred yesterday to the fact that the defined own affairs in Schedule 1 could be extended in terms of clause 16. If, in terms of the provisions of clause 16, a population group were to discover that there was something that it considered to be an own affair, but which was not contained in the schedule, that population group was free to come forward. In this way a population group would extend the purview of its own affairs. My argument, however, is that the moment one makes clause 14 subject to the provisions of clause 16, one eliminates that possibility, because of the arguments I advanced in connection with the points of overlap, that a specific population group could lay claim to more own affairs than had been allocated to it. If it would not have been considered out of order, I would have been able to argue that because of the point of overlap the schedule would also be totally nullified by the provisions of clause 16. The State President would have to take that point of overlap into consideration. He would have to determine whether having it granted to the one would not affect the other two detrimentally. It is therefore my conviction that it is impossible to implement the provisions of this clause in practice; that this is an untenable situation which will not work out in practice.

Order! Before giving the next hon. member the floor, I wish to confirm that I do not intend putting a damper on the debate or on the questions put by hon. members in any way, but I must point out to hon. members that we have been discussing this clause for more than two hours now. I am therefore now going to expect hon. members to come up with new and relevant arguments.

Mr. Chairman, I think that in the discussion of clause 16 it has also become clear to all of us by now that here, as in the discussion of the preceding clauses, we are actually engaged in a futile exercise. Hon. members of the CP and of the PFP have, after all, voted against the principle contained in this Bill. Since we are now busy with the content, the mechanics, of this clause, hon. members on the other side of the House—and here I include both the CP and the PFP—have thus far made no fundamental contribution or proposed any adequate amendments that could lead to the improvement of the mechanics or the contents of this clause.

I believe that hon. members of the CP are engaged here in setting up a smoke-screen to justify themselves to members of the general voting public to whom they have told half-truths. Now they also want to try to justify their actions in the eyes of the voters, the people.

In his argument on clause 16 the hon. member for Koedoespoort—I believe for the very first time—joined other hon. members of his party in perceiving the realities that do exist. He referred to points of overlap. I must say that I find it a miracle that they have eventually perceived this; that they have eventually realized that there are indeed points of overlap. Each facet of our lives in this country in which we are living, in this country with its diversity of population groups, gives rise to points of overlap in every aspect of everyday living. That is the very reason why clause 14 clearly provides for certain affairs to be own affairs. Clause 15 provides for the other affairs to be general affairs. In clause 16 we have the State President’s power to decide, specifically to regulate and administer issues relating to aspects provided for in clause 14 and in clause 15.

The hon. member for Barberton, however, has now been trying to make the preceding two clauses subject to the provisions of clause 16, and to make clause 16, in turn, subject to clause 14. What, however, is the CP’s problem, Mr. Chairman? What concerns them is the person who is going to occupy the position of State President. Those hon. members are of the opinion that the State President in the new dispensation is going to be a dictator who will lock himself up in a dark corner of some room and take decisions solely off his own bat. That is, of course, because those hon. members are afraid of not being able to maintain their position in a new dispensation in the future.

It is also a question of hon. members of the CP not having the right man to hold down that position in the future. It is by the grace of God, and the will of the people, that the NP is governing this country today: “Cometh the hour, cometh the man”. The NP does, in fact, have such a man. We also believe that in future we shall have the right man. In support of this argument of mine, let me just point out how the hon. the leader of the CP—we saw it here yesterday—tried to find excuses for himself and levelled accusations, left and right, at the hon. the Prime Minister.

In the discussion of clause 16 it is not a question of the content of the clause, but rather a question of the principle that has already been confirmed in this House. Hon. members of the CP, however, are now also trying to relate the mechanics to a principle they have, in any case, completed rejected. That is what is involved as far as hon. members of the CP are concerned.

Hon. members of the CP have frequently asked what own affairs and general affairs actually are. In the discussion of clause 16 they are now fighting the Government on the decision in regard to what are general affairs and what are own affairs. Hon. members of the CP, however, have been actively engaged in telling voters that they are the great champions of self-determination in this country. Here in this House …

Order! The hon. member must now please confine himself to clause 16.

Mr. Chairman, it is part of my argument that in this House the hon. members of the CP try to justify their actions in the light of what they have already tried to sell to the voters. They have, however, given the voters of South Africa a wrong impression of the content of this Constitution Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I just wish to react to the speeches made by a few hon. members.

The amendment advanced by the hon. member for Edenvale is not acceptable to me. The clause makes provision for notice to be given in one way or another. It could either be published in the Gazette or done in some other way. There could be innumerable decisions, which would mean that if one had to publish all of them in the Gazette one would have to publish volumes. We are governing a country, and I am sure the hon. member will grasp that. Nor can one give reasons for decisions, because if one does so that coincides with the question of the challengeability of the decision, because then people would begin to argue about the reasons. The hon. member will grasp that. It will be said that those reasons are not acceptable, and then a debate on the merits of the matter will develop, and this will in fact become challengeable if one wants to give the courts the right to hear appeals. The hon. member will grasp that.

I have already indicated that the amendments moved by the hon. member for Helderkruin are acceptable to me for the reasons he furnished in his speech.

I have also indicated to the hon. member for Durban Point that I cannot accept his amendment, either wholly or in part. He will understand what I mean by that.

As far as the hon. member for Sea Point is concerned he reacted to a statement I made by saying that the success or otherwise of this entire constitution was built on the question of co-operation among the Houses. That is not correct, because in terms of clause 37, Parliament consists of the Houses that are functioning. The hon. member states that I argued that the President was dependent on Houses to accept legislation on own affairs. He says: No, if they do not want to do that …

Not own affairs, but general affairs.

Order! I appeal to the hon. member for Sea Point to give the hon. the Minister an opportunity to reply to this point.

Now the hon. member is arguing with me. He says that they are general affairs. However, my argument was specifically that if he made a decision that amounted to a House having self-determination as regards those own affairs, he is dependent on the House, as far as own affairs are concerned, to agree to it. That was the whole basis of my argument and of the argument of the hon. the Minister of National Education. After all, one cannot distort these things so.

Clause 37 is clear in this particular regard. It is not when people vote against a Bill that the others function. They may refuse to function. That is what is stated there. After all, the hon. member knows better than to argue along those lines. However, I must compliment him because he was well acquainted with the Bill when he was on the Select Committee. He must not argue along these lines.

I now come to the hon. member for Barberton. He says that clause 16 introduces a new criterion. Clause 16 vests a specific power in the President and he has to take the criteria as specified in clause 14 into account when deciding what is an own affair. Clause 16 vests in him the power to decide and stipulates how he has to exercise that power. There are two elements involved here. He has to consult, and his decision must not affect other people.

I now come to the hon. member for Koedoespoort. I want to say to the hon. member here and now that actions affecting the interests of other people are deliberately formulated in this way. This was not done in error. It was done deliberately so that actions to the detriment of other people could be excluded. As regards actions to the benefit of other people, the hon. member must take note of the provisions of the clause itself—for example, actions by Whites that are to the benefit of other people as regards rendering a service to Indians and Brown people on an agency basis. In the first place the reason for this standpoint is either a plea for supremacy or it is paternalistic towards other groups. Nowadays we have the phenomenon at the level of local education that people do not wish to identify the own affairs of other people but want to make general affairs of everything and then seek to exercise control over them. That is what is happening in practice nowadays, and that is what the clause seeks to prevent, because if we want to permit this then all our arguments fall away, even those in regard to which we agree with one another, viz. that there are own affairs that affect groups.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to convey my sincere thanks to the hon. member for Kroonstad for what he said today. He said that every facet of a people’s setup is affected. This means only one thing: All affairs are general affairs. We are very grateful to him for that statement.

I now come to the hon. member for Mossel Bay who said two things. In the first place he said that my speeches were written by Prof. Hercules Booysen and in the second place, he created the impression that the paper delivered by Prof. Hercules Booysen was suspect because he is supposedly a member of the CP. The hon. member paid me a great compliment, because he apparently thinks that my speeches are at a professorial level. I just want to say to him that I write my speeches myself.

The integrity of Prof. Hercules Booysen is at issue. I want to point out to the hon. member that this paper came before the Select Committee of which he was a member. It is now incumbent upon me to quote to the Committee the following, which concerns the paper submitted by Prof. Booysen—

He then goes on to mention the names of his team, and I want to quote them to the Committee.

Order! I have now permitted the hon. member for Jeppe to react to the remark of the hon. member for Mossel Bay.

Sir, I have thirty seconds left during which I just wish to quote the names.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order …

Order! The hon. member for Rissik must resume his seat. I am giving a ruling and I regard it as contempt of the Chair for the hon. member for Rissik to rise to speak while a ruling is being given.

I wish to point out to the hon. member for Jeppe that I permitted him to react and to state his standpoint that this was a document written by those lawyers and other professors at the university in question. I am not going to permit the hon. member to discuss that matter further. It has nothing to do with this clause. Does the hon. member for Jeppe understand the position?

Yes, Sir.

Does the hon. member for Rissik wish to raise a point of order?

Yes, Sir. The hon. member for Mossel Bay cast suspicion on the integrity of the professor who submitted a paper to the Select Committee on behalf of his department.

Order! I quite agree with the hon. member and that is why I afforded the hon. member for Jeppe the opportunity to make a full statement to the Committee concerning the status of the professor whose name has been mentioned. That disposes of that aspect of the debate, because it has nothing to do with the clause under discussion. The clause concerns the decision of the State President concerning own or general affairs. That is my final ruling. The hon. member for Jeppe may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May I point out that I had not finished my point of order when you gave your final ruling? I should like to finish my argument with you. Having said that a slur had been cast on the integrity of the professor by the allegation made by the hon. member to the effect that he had written it alone, I also just wish to say to you that in a spirit of rectitude towards that esteemed professor and for the sake of the record, it is of importance that this House take note of the names of the academics who submitted that paper. That is all I ask.

Mr. Chairman, before you give a ruling may I just make the statement that I do not think that a slur is cast on a person’s integrity when it is said that he is a member of the CP. [Interjections.]

Order! The names of the professors who drafted that paper are totally irrelevant. I permitted the hon. member for Jeppe to react with regard to Prof. Booysen and that disposes of the matter. The hon. member for Jeppe may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I entirely agree with you that that settles the matter; that there were 10 scientists who were responsible for that and that we therefore reject the proposal of the hon. member.

Just look how you are putting the tortoise in overdrive. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, you have already ruled that you will not tolerate personal remarks such as the one that the hon. member for Vryheid has just made.

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I personally have a considerable problem with clause 16. Because the clause does not prescribe the method whereby own and general affairs will be created, this means that this will create the proceedings of the future Parliament as regards general affairs and the proceedings of the three Houses in regard to own affairs. Therefore it is particularly important.

Order! The hon. member is now advancing arguments in regard to what are own and what are general affairs. However, the issue here is the decision of the State President.

Mr. Chairman, if you would permit me, I wish to say that the issue here is the method. In the marginal note the words “Decision of questions … appears. How is a decision taken as to what are general and what own affairs?

The hon. member will concede that the State President, not Parliament or the Houses to which the hon. member is now referring, will decide in accordance with the procedure prescribed in this clause.

Mr. Chairman, if the State President were to decide today that a certain matter was an own affair, that would mean that it would form the subject of the proceedings of the three Houses. Therefore what I am saying is that this clause is the effective generator of the proceedings in the future dispensation. The question is: How is a decision reached? This is entirely relevant. Clause 16(1)(a) provides that the President shall decide. As regards the question of how he decides, two formulas are available to him as specified in clauses 14(1) and 16(1)(a). He can consult two sources. The President may consult his Cabinet or he may consult the President’s Council.

Order! This procedural argument that the hon. member is now advancing has been used repeatedly by other hon. members. The hon. member must resume his seat.

Mr. Chairman, I move—

[Interjections.]

Order! Taking all the circumstances into account, and bearing in mind that I asked hon. members half an hour ago to advance new arguments, and since I am of the opinion that all hon. members of all the parties have had ample opportunity to state their real problems and have them discussed, I am prepared to put the motion of the hon. Chief Whip.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to know whether you are yet in a position to give your ruling on the remark made by the hon. the Prime Minister last night concerning the hon. member for Waterberg.

The hon. member will realize that because I have been in the Chair the whole morning I have not yet had the opportunity to give sufficient attention to the matter. It is still being attended to.

Clause 17:

Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments on the Order Paper which are in effect consequential … [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs entitled to refer to the hon. member for Rissik in a personal way as a “Bloedsap” and a “Sap”?

Order! The hon. member for Durban Point may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, amendments Nos. 1 and 2 in my name on the Order Paper are consequential upon my amendment to clause 16. In view of the rejection of my amendment to clause 16 these are no longer appropriate and, therefore, I shall not move them. However, both in the case of my amendments had I moved them, and amendments Nos. 3 and 5 of the hon. member for Pinelands, which I am now able to support, I have one basic problem which goes to the root of clause 17 and a number of other clauses still to follow. I refer here to the composition of the President’s Council to which it is proposed that the President may refer any question being considered by him in terms of clause 16. That body is the body which would have to advise the President and the President would then, after having received advice from the President’s Council, issue a certificate. That body will contain no representation of Opposition parties in Parliament.

Order!

I realize I cannot debate that matter. I mention it simply as a fact—I am not going to debate the merits of the fact that in terms of clause 17 there is no Opposition representation on the President’s Council. However, it affects our attitude materially in regard to the referral in clause 17 of matters to that council. We find ourselves in a difficult position. If we had confidence in the President’s Council as being representative of all parties, we could support this referral. Without it we are asked to refer a question in terms of clause 17(1) to a body on which we shall not be represented. No opposition party will be represented on that body. I put this problem to the hon. the Minister as a problem which colours our approach to this matter. I shall take the matter no further than to state the problem that we have with this referral.

Mr. Chairman, I too have amendments on the Order Paper in terms of clause 17. Quite rightly the hon. member for Durban Point has indicated that the composition of the President’s Council—and I shall say no more than that—may well determine how people vote on such a clause and such an amendment. It would be very helpful to have some indication from the hon. the Minister, if he is in a position to do so, as to whether there is going to be any proposed change to that. He will appreciate, however, that in terms of my amendment it will make no difference to the actual composition of the President’s Council. Therefore we shall still move the amendments that stand in my name.

Clause 17 refers back to clause 16 which hon. members on all sides regard as a vital clause, particularly as it refers to the powers and the role of the State President. Therefore we approach clause 17 with the same degree of seriousness because it has relation to how the President acts in terms of any question arising from the application of this Act. For that reason I imagine that the hon. the Minister may well be inclined to accept at least part of the first amendment that I shall be moving, the force of which will be to alter the word “may” to the word “shall”. The hon. the Minister in his own arguments throughout the debate in the Committee Stage has made the point that we simply have to make this Bill work. He knows that there has been considerable misgiving expressed—he would say without foundation, but nevertheless—by this side of the House and by people outside of this House in respect of the wide powers of the President. Anything that would give less cause for disquiet, which would encourage consultation, which would make it pre-emptory rather than permissive, I would submit to the hon. the Minister, would be an improvement, even from his own point of view. I hope the hon. the Minister will consider very carefully the change I recommend in my amendment, namely from “may” to “shall”.

I consequently move amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 3. On page 14, in line 29, to omit “may” and to substitute “shall”:
2. 4. On page 14, in lines 30 and 31, to omit “the President’s Council” and to substitute “Parliament”;
3. 5. On page 14, in line 31, after “advice” to add:

In terms of the second amendment, which seeks the omission of the words “the President’s Council” and the substitution therefor of “Parliament”, the hon. the Minister will know from the arguments advanced by hon. members of this party in the Select Committee that we believe that the sovereignty, the powers of Parliament, should come into play here as well. The President’s Council, even with the changes envisaged, other than the ones the hon. member for Durban Point has already referred to, is a nominated body, and has therefore a much narrower base. Perhaps I should be more correct and state that it is largely a nominated body. It does not, however, have the same force as an elected body, representative of the people. Of course, the hon. the Minister will concede that the majority of members of the President’s Council will be nominated; nominated by the State President. What he is doing in actual fact therefore is more or less to talk to himself. I do not believe it is good for anybody to indulge in that kind of approach.

Quite seriously, we believe it would be preferably that the President should refer questions considered by him—and I refer back to clause 16 now—to Parliament rather than to the President’s Council. We have made that presentation over and over again. I shall therefore not belabour the point any further.

The third point arising from my first two amendments is that this advice ought to be binding. If the State President is going to consult—and we submit that he has to consult—with Parliament, which is the force of our amendment, the third aspect of that, we would say, is that the advice that he receives on any question relating to matters of own affairs of a specific population group should be binding. The President should not be able to set it aside.

Clause 17(2)(a) reads as follows—

In the first instance he only consults after he has made his decision. Moreover he consults on a certificate. We believe that this is highly inadequate. Secondly he consults the Speaker of Parliament and the chairmen of the respective Houses. The Speaker and the chairmen of the Houses are of some significance in this instance. This is not a political decision. It is a procedural decision. We are saying that the major force of the certificate or the question is a political one. Therefore the President should be consulting with the Ministers’ Councils. He should at least consult with the chairmen of those councils, which would bring this clause into line with clause 16. I believe that that also would be a great improvement.

Finally, it provides that the President shall consult in such manner as he deems fit. The force of the clause is that he has to consult the Speaker of Parliament and the chairmen of the respective Houses, but in such manner as he deems fit. I should like to know from the hon. the Minister what precisely that means. Does he simply tell them? How does he interpret the word “consult”? Is it a formal matter? If so, should it not be stated much more clearly than simply “in such a manner as he deems fit”?

Mr. Chairman, the provisions of clause 17 provide simply that the President may refer any questions which could arise in terms of clause 16, to the President’s Council for advice. I just wish to say to the hon. member for Pinelands that if his motion were to be accepted we should be politicizing the power of decision-making as a whole. The institution of the President’s Council is pre-eminently based on the idea that it should play a consensus-seeking role. If one deprives the President of that power or right, the right he has to approach a consensus-seeking body to assist him in reaching a decision, to advise him, and gives it to Parliament, which, in the nature of the matter, is a more politicized body, then I really think that we shall be making the situation very difficult.

I believe that the point of departure or philosophy of this entire measure is basically consensus-seeking. We are also trying, in terms of clause 17, to depoliticize the decision-making power as much as possible. Therefore I believe that the President’s Council is the appropriate body.

One sympathizes with the sentiments uttered here by the hon. member for Durban Point, but the present arrangement appears to be the most depoliticized one and for that reason we propose that the clause as it stands be retained.

Mr. Chairman, during the discussion on the previous clause the hon. the Minister did not reply to certain arguments advanced by hon. members on this side. I shall refer to them again in the course of my speech.

The CP can support neither the amendments nor the clause itself. Therefore we are not prepared to vote for the amendments or for the clause.

Why do you not want to support my amendment?

The first reason why we cannot do so is that we …

I should be glad if the hon. member for Brakpan would at the same time reply to the hon. member for Pinelands on my behalf.

Sir, I hope it will be for the same reasons. In the first place, we reject it because we do not think it would be in order for the President’s Council to have to take a decision here. We say that the President’s Council is an indirectly elected body, it is a mixed body, it is a body which is not accountable to the people, and therefore it is not desirable that a matter of this kind should be referred to the President’s Council.

The second point I wish to make is that the fact that clause 17 requires the President to consult the President’s Council in his discretion serves to strengthen the argument of the hon. member for Barberton, namely that the State President is not obliged to give consideration to clause 14 in taking the decision in terms of clause 16. One would have expected clause 16 or 17 to provide that certain things should be done in considering this matter in terms of clause 14. The hon. the Minister has not given a proper reply to this.

I have replied to it.

Next I come to the question of proper consultation. He has to consult certain persons in such manner as he deems fit. I want to argue that this method of consultation represents the smallest obligation which can be imposed on the State President. If one said that he had to act in consultation with the Cabinet or some other body, it would mean that he was legally obliged to obtain that advice and to act on it. When it is said that he must act after consultation with, this has a less stringent juridical meaning, and when it is said that he shall consult in such manner as he deems fit, it falls in the third category and it has an even less stringent juridical meaning, and in actual fact it means nothing.

I dealt with this argument in detail during the debate on the instruction concerned, pointing out that when it is said that one has to consult A, B, or C in such manner as one deems fit, it is meaningless.

What has this got to do with clause 17?

It seems to me that the hon. member for Turffontein has not read clause 17, because it provides that the State President shall consult in such manner as he deems fit. The words “consult in such manner as he deems fit” are actually meaningless. Furthermore, it is provided that he has to consult the Speaker. The Speaker is a person who is unprejudiced. He administers justice impartially, and for that reason I do not have much fault to find with this, except that the wording is so woolly. The two Chairmen of the Ministers’ Councils, on the other hand, are intimately involved in the political matter to which the hon. member for Turffontein referred when he said that the matter should not be depoliticized.

On the contrary, I said that it should be depoliticized.

There is something else which we must consider. I am going to deal with this for the third time now and perhaps the hon. the Minister should say whether he is going to reply to it during the Third Reading debate. How does the hon. the Minister see the State President? Does he see the State President as part of the caucus, as part of the political machinery, as part of the political instruments which will exist under the new dispensation, or is the State President going to be supra-ethnic, as the President’s Council suggested?

What does that mean?

The hon. the Minister should put that question to the President’s Council or to our Ambassador in Australia, because these are the words used in the report of the President’s Council.

Tell me what “supra-ethnic” means to you.

I shall tell the hon. the Minister how I would define it. Perhaps I would have to use terminology which is not parliamentary language, but one could also put it this way: He is outside politics—he is not in the scrum, he is not in the caucus, and he will not be the leader of the governing party in any of the Houses. I think this is more or less the approach of the President’s Council with regard to this matter.

We are still concerned with the 1979 draft Bill, and I should like to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention once again to the letter which I wrote to the previous Minister of Internal Affairs. He says I accepted clause 26 and the procedure of clause 26 in 1979. The real aspect on which I differed with the previous Minister of Internal Affairs was precisely the fact that I objected to the idea that the Council of Cabinets should have a decision-making power with regard to this matter.

For the reasons which I have just set out, the CP is not prepared to vote for the clause or the amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with the points raised by the hon. member for Durban Point. He has stated that his position in relation to this particular clause is to a large extent dependent on the composition of the President’s Council. At this stage I wish to indicate that I shall effect an amendment to the clause to provide for the opposition parties in the Houses on a proportional basis to nominate 10 of the 25 members to be appointed by the State President.

Could you explain the term “proportional basis”?

With a transferable vote, just as the hon. member does it at the moment, except that it will take place among the opposition parties alone and not in the governing party. I therefore intend moving an amendment to the clause concerned to provide for 10 of the 25 members to be nominated by the State President to be nominated by him on the basis of nominations submitted to him by the opposition parties in the respective Houses after the nominations have been determined by them on a proportional basis with one transferable vote, in accordance with the system.

†I now come to the hon. member for Pine-lands and let me say immediately that I have never heard the hon. member address the House as quietly. Although the hon. member’s amendments are not acceptable I hasten to say that this is not because I do not believe that there is any merit in the principle that a body should be consulted. However, I believe it would be unwise to make such consultation peremptory because that would entail that the smallest decision about the smallest detail must be referred to a body, and I believe that can delay, to a large extent, the functioning of the administration of this country.

The hon. member’s second point was that this body should be Parliament and not the President’s Council. However, this is not a parliamentary function that is involved here. The parliamentary function becomes operative after the decision has been taken.

*The decision-making power of the President in terms of clause 16 is not a legislative power, but an administrative, executive power to determine the legislative process and the legislative instrument and to enable it to do its work.

It could be a Bill.

The point is that he does not approve of the Bill. All he does is to decide as to whether that Bill should go to Parliament—and by that I mean all the Houses—or whether that Bill should be referred to a particular House. However, he does not adjudicate on the merits of that Bill. He merely indicates where it should go if it is to be approved. Therefore, I submit that that decision is an executive decision, not a legislative one and therefore Parliament cannot, in my opinion, function on that decision. I personally believe that once the constitution comes into operation a major element for success would be consultation and negotiation over a broad spectrum. I think that will be the name of the political game in the future. I say that we must not formalize that process so rigidly that it becomes cumbersome and delays the decision-making process.

*I know the hon. member for Pinelands and his party do not agree with the system, but we are not arguing about the system now. I do want to tell the hon. member, for what it is worth, that I am one of those who say that no constitution can be successfully implemented unless the process of consultation and negotiation constitutes an essential element of that constitution. In the second place, I want to say in this connection that I do not think it will be possible to govern in terms of this or any other system if those processes do not succeed. Thirdly, I want to say that I approach this Bill and the proposals contained in it with real optimism. Whether it meets the constitutional criteria of the developed world is not relevant. What is relevant is whether there are enough people and whether the system will produce enough people who will be prepared to make the system work. I want to say quite frankly: If they do not exist, they do not exist for this system or for any other.

Under a fully democratic system they will exist.

Sir, surely I do not have to react to the perception of that hon. member’s party with regard to these matters. [Interjections.] I should prefer not to react to that. There is not a single hon. member in this House who does not argue that the system for this country cannot be a transplanted one. In other words, that is a premise on which we are all agreed. There is not a single hon. member who does not argue that all people should have the right to participate in the decision-making process. We are all agreed on that.

The NP says that the Black man should not have any share at all.

No, that is not correct. It is not true. I want to say in passing in this connection that there are more Black people participating in decision-making processes today than ever before in the history of this country. However, I do not wish to argue the matter with the hon. member now. We can do that later.

I say that this constitution which we are proposing does not prevent any change which people may want to bring about within the system. If it were to be argued that this is not really a step which deserves our support, there is nothing I can add to convince hon. members. I have argued that it is not a parliamentary function to take these decisions, and therefore I cannot accept the amendments moved by the hon. member for Pinelands. I think he and I should agree that I simply cannot do so under the circumstances.

If “President’s Council” were replaced by “Parliament”, the hon. member would in any case have to effect a consequential amendment to clause 67, for then it would be possible to adopt resolutions. That clause provides that no resolution may be adopted. If one accepts that conflicting advice could be given, it would eventually be necessary to take a vote. That is not acceptable to us. I do not wish to discuss that clause now. I just want to say that it is not acceptable. Therefore it is simply not possible for me to accept the amendment. I therefore suggest that the clause should remain as it is.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome very much indeed the fundamental decision announced by the hon. the Minister. [Interjections.] I do not intend to debate it, because it would be out of order. I do want to say, however, that it makes a tremendous difference to this clause and other clauses. I certainly welcome it and I think the country will welcome it.

It is tokenism.

I disagree. I do not believe that the presence of opposition is tokenism. I believe that the presence of the PFP in the House is often pure tokenism, and it will be very interesting to see whether they reverse their attitude to the President’s Council and accept representation on it in terms of this.

That is a different body.

Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with the clause before us. I want to say that I intended supporting amendments (3) and (5) of the hon. member for Pine-lands, but I do not support amendment (4) because, when there is a conflict in Parliament, I believe it would be stupid to refer that conflict back to Parliament for a decision. The hon. the Minister made the very valid point in regard to amendment (3) that all matters must then be referred to the President’s Council. I take the point. It is a point I made in my original amendment to clause 16, namely that it should only apply in cases where objections were lodged.

I should like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he will not consider instead of amendment (3), viz. that the President “shall” refer every matter, to insert—I have sent a copy of this to the hon. the Minister—after “may” on page 14, line 29,—

In other words, the routine things to which the hon. the Minister referred would not have to be referred to the President’s Council, but if there was a dispute and an objection was lodged, the same procedure would obtain as applies when there is a dispute between the Houses on a Bill…

Objection by whom?

By the chairman of a House by indicating that the House was opposed to it. If three Houses are in conflict on a Bill or an amendment, or if two Houses pass it and one does not, that matter is referred to the President’s Council for resolution. I will not even go as far as pressing for resolution of these disputes by the President’s Council.

In terms of this clause a conflict does not emanate from the Houses. It is a question of deciding which House shall deal with the matter.

Yes, but if the decision is disputed, if in terms of the consultation provided for in subsection (2)(a) the President consults with the Speaker and the Chairmen of the three Houses and from that consultation it becomes clear that there is a dispute over the decision of the President, then this proposes that the same procedure will apply in respect of a dispute over a decision on own affairs or general affairs as will be followed when there is a dispute over a Bill. If there were no dispute, it would go through and there would be no referral. The State President has to consult the Speaker and the Chairmen of the Houses. If that reveals that there is going to be conflict, this amendment proposes bringing into operation the conflict-resolving mechanism. I agree with all the rest about the State President seeking consensus, but the ultimate resolution of conflict is done by the President’s Council. What I am saying, is that if there is a deadlock in the run-up to a decision and the announcement of a decision to the Houses and there is a dispute, instead of that dispute then leading to confrontation, that it is referred to the President’s Council which is the deadlock-resolving mechanism. The amendment proposes that in the event of the consultation in terms of subsection (2)(a) revealing an objection, the State President shall refer the matter to the President’s Council. I will await the hon. the Minister’s reaction to the amendment before I take it further. I move—

1. 6. On page 14, in line 29, after “may” to insert:

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the amendments I have moved, I am very sorry indeed that the hon. the Minister cannot find his way clear to supporting them. I really feel that his reply and the reasons he advanced are not convincing.

In terms of clause 16 we are talking here about “Any question arising in the application of this Act as to whether any particular matters are own affairs of a population group”. It is therefore a very important decision and the hon. the Minister clearly concedes this. If the hon. the Minister, as he has stated, is in favour of consultation and negotiation and believes that it cannot work unless that takes place, he ought to at least acknowledge that we should change the word “may” in clause 17(1) to “shall”. We have argued many times in many ordinary Bills, and this is no ordinary Bill, where there has been a reference to a Minister, that it is not a personal reference and that we are not making a law for the current Minister. I think the hon. the Minister also made the point earlier that we are making a constitution for a country. We therefore have no thought about who the first State President or his successor is going to be. We are talking about what he should be doing under force of law. When it comes to this very vexed matter—and I have put it to the hon. the Minister that there is no significant Coloured or Indian leader who is in favour of this distinction between own affairs and general affairs—should we in this House not make it clear that the State President, in terms of what is provided for in clause 16, “shall” refer? This will extend the consultation and give force to what the hon. the Minister himself says he wants to do. He advances as the reason for turning away from this, although he feels it has some merit, that there is going to be some delay and that it is too cumbersome, I do not think so. I think the major force of this has to do with own affairs.

The other point the hon. the Minister makes is that this is not a parliamentary matter. The moment the State President makes the decision, that in itself affects the people in the various Houses, because they may have a fundamental difference of opinion as to his actual decision. Therefore it is a parliamentary matter.

I am not consulting on a Bill now …

I do not think that is a really good answer. The hon. the Minister himself argues that he believes this cannot work unless there is genuine consultation and negotiation. Let me take the matter a little further. This is not the time to debate the announcement made by the hon. the Minister regarding Opposition members on the President’s Council, but it does not alter the fact that the majority of people on the President’s Council will be people selected by the major party in the House, today the NP, and the President. Therefore there is a clear majority, if I may put it that way, of Government supporters on the President’s Council. Secondly, the President’s Council is not directly elected, certainly not in direct proportional terms. Also they are therefore not directly responsible to voters, whereas Parliament is. Therefore members of Parliament have to go and face their voters and may well in turn be rejected because of what they have done or have not done. Therefore I do not think that the arguments advanced by the hon. the Minister are adequate and I would hope that he would think again because I think this is an important measure in order to ensure the very thing that the hon. the Minister wants, namely negotiation and consultation.

Mr. Chairman, it would appear to me that with the necessary co-operation, we shall be able to finalize this clause before the morning is over.

I want to begin by replying to the hon. member for Brakpan. The hon. member put certain questions to me and he also made certain statements. He said that they were not in favour of the amendments, nor were they in favour of the clause itself. He said it was a mixed body and they did not believe in mixed bodies. There are other reasons as well, but I think this is the essence of his objection. I do not wish to conduct a debate with the hon. member now on what we have already said. I just want to make a remark in this connection. In the course of the discussion, repeated references have been made to his letter. I do want to tell the hon. member that after he had written his letter, his leader in the Transvaal took a stand within the NP.

Order! Does this letter have anything to do with the clause under discussion?

The hon. member referred to it, and I am arguing in response to that.

It does not have a bearing on this clause. I should therefore appreciate it if the hon. the Minister would not react at this stage to arguments which have been put forward and which are not relevant.

Mr. Chairman, I am arguing about the question of whether a mixed body is acceptable or not. This is the main point on which the hon. member took issue with me. He said that this was one of his principal objections to the clause. With all due respect, I must react to it. However, I shall leave it at that.

The hon. member also asked me what the position of the President would be. I shall be glad to discuss the matter with him when we come to the relevant clauses. Meanwhile, there is only one point on which I wish to reply to him, and that is that if he examined the clauses dealing with the legislature and the clauses dealing with the executive, which we have not yet discussed, he would see that the President’s position as executive President, but also as President who forms part of the legislative system, is clearly spelt out. My own standpoint on this—other Presidents may adopt different standpoints—is that he remains the leader of the party which he leads, just as the position is in other countries where there are executive Presidents. Therefore I cannot understand why the same should not apply here.

Finally, I come to the hon. member for Pinelands. I do not wish to devote a great deal of time to him, because we could go on arguing about this aspect. All I want to say is that the way the clause reads at the moment, consultation is in his discretion. However, that is discretion is not so absolute that the President can simply do whatever he likes. In terms of the system he has to consult. However, I do not believe that we can make it so rigid that he has to consult on everything under the sun.

Unfortunately, I cannot accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point either, for a different reason. As soon as one decides that an objection can be raised, one also has to provide in the legislation for a procedure according to which this must be done. One cannot simply say that when an objection is raised, this or that should be done. In such a case provision has to be made the raising of objections. No such provision exists at the moment in the clause concerned or in the amendment. Therefore I cannot accept the hon. member’s amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have now said all I am able to say. For the rest we shall just have to agree to differ. I have nothing to add at this stage.

Mr. Chairman, there are two questions I want to put to the hon. the Minister, and I hope he will be willing to reply to them.

The first one concerns the matter of consultation with the Speaker of Parliament and the chairmen of the respective Houses. What I should like to know from the hon. the Minister is why he considers it necessary to consult the Speaker and the chairmen. I ask this in view of the fact that the Speaker will in fact be elected by the same electoral college that elects the State President. That means that he will in effect be elected by the White majority party. Therefore he is de facto the Speaker of the White House although he is the Speaker of Parliament. The chairman of the White Chamber—the House of Assembly—will in fact be the Deputy Speaker. Why then is it necessary to consult the Speaker when a question about whether something is own or general affairs could be sorted out simply by the chairmen of the respective Houses?

The second matter which I should like to raise with the hon. the Minister concerns the following matter. Clause 17 could well be called the sandwich clause, because it refers back to clause 16 and also refers forward to clause 31. In terms of clause 16 the question of whether a matter will be own or general affairs relates to a population group which may not be defined in terms of this legislation. It means that that is clearly a reference to the Black population group. Because of the decision to close the debate on clause 16 we could not debate that particular aspect. What I should like to know from the hon. the Minister is whether he anticipates that Black affairs will be regarded as general affairs or as own affairs. I ask this question because in terms of clause 16 it is clear that clause 17 stipulates that questions relating to Blacks will have to be referred by the President. I hope the hon. the Minister will be willing to reply to these two questions.

Mr. Chairman, the answers are very simple. The Speaker will be the Speaker of Parliament irrespective of the way in which he will be elected. I believe therefore that as Speaker of Parliament he should be consulted. I do not believe the hon. member could argue that because the majority party elects the Speaker in the present system he is not also the Speaker in respect of hon. members of the Opposition parties. I do not believe one could ever argue that way. The same principle will apply in terms of the Constitution Bill.

[Inaudible.]

But that does not matter. I simply give the hon. member my view. I do, however, think that Black affairs will be general affairs as far as Whites, Coloureds and Indians are concerned.

Amendments 3 to 5 negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Amendment 6 negatived (New Republic Party dissenting).