Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.

QUESTIONS (see “QUESTIONS AND REPLIES”)

Mr. Speaker, I thank you for the opportunity to make the following statement:

In view of speculations on the possible date for the proposed referendum for White voters, I deem it in the interest of the country that finality be reached on this particular matter.

In June 1983 I undertook to make an announcement on the date and question for the referendum approximately two months in advance of such date. Furthermore, climatic conditions and prospects in large parts of the country have improved to such an extent … [Interjections.] … that I now deem it appropriate to make an announcement on the date for the referendum and the referendum question.

The Government has consequently decided that the referendum for White voters shall be held on 2 November 1983 … [Interjections.] … and that the question on which the voters will be asked to express themselves will be the following: Are you in favour of the implementation of the Constitution Act, 1983, as approved by Parliament?

The proclamation to give effect to these decisions will be published as soon as possible in terms of the Referendums Bill which is at present before Parliament.

As far as Coloured and Indian voters are concerned, I announced on 14 April 1983, after discussions had been held, that a suitable opportunity would have to be created to ascertain the opinion of Coloured and Indian communities with regard to their participation in a new constitutional dispensation. I announced further that the method and the date would be negotiated with the leaders of these communities at a later stage. The hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning will consequently proceed with such negotiations.

I am deeply conscious of the significance of this decision for the future of our country and I trust that I can rely on the support of all reasonable voters for these measures of reform.

Mr. Speaker, regardless of the outcome of the referendum and the campaign which will precede it, I think we all welcome the fact that the hon. the Prime Minister has removed the uncertainty by informing this House and the country of the date on which the referendum will be held. This enables us to plan accordingly. We on this side of the House have repeatedly made it clear that if the question in the referendum were simply to be based on the proposed constitution in the form which it took at the commencement of the debate on it, we would vote “no” in the referendum. We shall have to await the conclusion of this debate before we can adopt a final standpoint in this connection. [Interjections.] We have said that if it is a simple question which is linked to the constitutional proposals of the Government, we shall not be able to support it. For that matter, we shall also be interested to see the nature of the question which the hon. the Prime Minister will put to the Coloureds and the Indians, if such a question is in fact put and if a referendum does in fact take place.

Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say on behalf of this side of the House that in the first place, we welcome the announcement by the hon. the Prime Minister concerning the date of the referendum. In the second place, we welcome the simplicity and clarity of the question, i.e. the fact that it deals only with the acceptance or otherwise of the new constitutional proposals. In the third place, I want to say that whatever amendments may be accepted during the Committee Stage, they will not play a major role, since the principles of the legislation have already been accepted, and these principles are unacceptable to the Conservative Party. Therefore we shall oppose them with every means at our disposal.

Mr. Speaker, we too welcome the clarity which has been given in regard to the date. The different political parties will now be able to make their decisions and prepare the groundwork and fieldwork for the referendum.

In regard to the question I can say that it is clear and straightforward and satisfactory as far as this party is concerned. It gives a clear indication of what must be answered; it is not linked to the Government itself or to Government policy … [Interjections.] Hon. members can laugh, but what I am saying is what responsible South Africans will be saying. It is a clear question. All that it asks is whether the Constitution Bill should be implemented or not. I believe this is a neutral question on which people can take a non-party decision and decide on the merit of the Bill as such. We will wait until the conclusion of the proceedings in Committee to see the final shape of the Bill. However, I believe I can say now that this question can be approached in the referendum on a non-party basis, on the merits of what emerges from this House and the quality of the debate which will determine the final shape the Bill will take.

Mr. Chairman, when the discussion of this specific clause was adjourned, I was replying to the discussion up to that stage. I should like to make a few further observations with reference to the discussion which has taken place and which is most probably going to be resumed on the first order of the day which has now been discharged.

I used to be under the impression that the Minister who was in charge of a specific piece of legislation was expected to reply here to the speeches made by hon. members. My impression of the discussion so far, however, has been that it is taken amiss of the Government whenever it replies to questions. Hon. members must therefore give me an indication, and I shall take it into account, of whether they wish to use the Committee Stage solely for adopting standpoints, without any need for the Minister to react to them.

When business was interrupted on Monday I was replying to the hon. member for Jeppe. The contributions of hon. members, and more specifically those of the hon. members of the CP, actually make up an anthology of inanities and absurdities, and I shall try to demonstrate this.

That is the fine and humble Christian for you!

Order!

Let us examine the statements which were made by the hon. member for Langlaagte if he wants a reply to them. The hon. member for Jeppe said that according to his standpoint, every House was entitled to a President. Hon. members must remember that we are now discussing the Committee Stage of the Bill, the principles of which have already been accepted, but within those principles the hon. member for Jeppe advocates three Presidents for one and the same country. The hon. member wanted to know what the relationship between the House of Assembly and the head of State, and between Parliament and the head of State, was going to be. I do not see this item in schedule 1. It is not stated there. It is contained in the specific clause in which the President’s powers are defined and in which the powers of the head of State are defined and in which the legislative and the executive authority are described. The hon. member will therefore not find it in Schedule 1. The hon. member said that he had wrestled with this matter all weekend and that he was in your hands, Mr. Chairman. At least I am glad that he is not still wrestling! The hon. member went on to say—

Is that not an absolutely absurd standpoint? Then the hon. member went on to say the following on the same subject, and hon. members must listen to this—

The hon. member advanced no argument to demonstrate that they were unclear—

How the hon. member can conclude that they are dictatorial and unclear, no one can understand. The hon. member for Langlaagte said—

Sir, is this the level on which hon. members conduct debates in this House and then expect replies? [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. members of the CP must remember that their objection to this Bill is that it will lead to the downfall of the White man. But let us see what the hon. member for Brakpan said about the clause which is now being discussed, i.e. clause 7 (Hansard, 22 August 1983)—

Sir, must we reply to those hon. members on such contradictions? The hon. member for Brakpan went on to say—

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, is the hon. the Minister now discussing all the clauses again, starting from clause 1, or only clause 7?

I gather that the hon. the Minister is quoting from speeches made on clause 7.

Mr. Chairman, the quotations I am making are from the speeches of the hon. members for Jeppe and Brakpan on clause 7. The quotation from the speech by the hon. member for Langlaagte was made simply to illustrate further the inanities uttered by those hon. members.

Sir, it is untrue. The hon. the Minister cannot …

Order! The hon. member may not make a speech now. I shall be glad if the hon. the Minister will confine himself solely to quotations from speeches which were made on clause 7.

Sir, I am continuing to quote from the speech made by the hon. member for Brakpan on clause 7—

The hon. member had just been saying that it was not domination per se, but that if one read the Bill in its totality, then it was domination, White domination. But, Sir, how can it be White domination and at the same time surrender and capitulation?

That is your problem.

No, it is not my problem. The hon. member had just been saying that it meant surrender and then went on to say that what we were dealing with here was pre-eminently a case of “winner takes all”. He had spoken about a State President whom we were going to appoint and who was going to be a dictator for five years. Then the hon. member went on to say—

It was a White State President whom he was talking about here. How the hon. member, who is a lawyer, can reconcile all these things I do not understand.

The hon. member for Jeppe asked me a question to which I should like to reply. He wanted to know whether we were dealing here with an extension of democracy and whether this was a new principle in the place of the principle of self-determination. I should like to reply to the hon. member on the basis of standpoints which he himself adopted. He will obviously not be able to understand mine. What is the standpoint he adopted in respect of clause 7 when he asked whether there was an extension of democracy here? He said that up to and including February 1982 he had wanted a State President who was elected in precisely the same way as this clause now makes provision for.

But in a different dispensation.

No, Sir …

Yes, Sir.

Mr. Chairman, I did not interrupt the hon. member for Jeppe while he was speaking. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member accepted a dispensation, and the proposed legislation for the election of a head of State in that dispensation would not contain a provision to the effect that the State President would be a White, a Coloured or an Asian. The hon. member accepted that. The hon. member’s party also accepted that. Of course it is entirely possible for people to change their standpoint. All I am alleging therefore is that the honourable way is to admit when one has changed one’s standpoint. However, one cannot … [Interjections.].

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No. Mr. Chairman, I am not replying to any question from the hon. member now. [Interjections.] The elucidation of that proposed dispensation was provided by the former Prime Minister of South Africa. On the same date—12 April 1978—Mr. Vorster said here in this House that as far as the NP was concerned, its candidate would be a White person because the NP was a White party. He added that the guarantee for that in future—and I am only referring to this in order to state historic facts—would lie therein that the NP had to remain in power. At the time those hon. members applauded him for saying that.

In a different dispensation, yes.

Mr. Chairman, even the hon. member for Jeppe applauded him here. In my opinion the hon. member is arguing, quite erroneously, that the acceptance of one standpoint of principle excludes any other. Let us see what it means when I say that these proposals, whether they are adequate or inadequate, whether they go too far or fall short, represent progress. What does it mean? What does it mean when I say it is an extension of democracy?

Not in terms of this clause, no.

Surely I am replying, Mr. Chairman, to the argument of the hon. member for Jeppe. Surely I am either in order or out of order, and as far as I know, the hon. member for Sea Point is not the chairman of this Committee.

I asked you whether you thought this clause represented an extension of democracy. That is all I want to know.

I shall reply to the hon. member for Sea Point on this matter in a moment. First I just want to complete my reply to the hon. member for Jeppe.

The State organs in this country comprise inter alia, the executive authority and the legislative authority. Let us now see whether the hon. member’s standpoint in regard to the executive authority, the standpoint which he adopted up to and including February 1982, does not represent an extension of participation in democracy. Let us examine this, Mr. Chairman. Once again the hon. member need not of course accept my standpoint as authoritative in this connection. However, the hon. member must accept the standpoint of the former Prime Minister, a man whom he applauded here, and whose standpoints he claims for himself in a certain respect here—quite erroneously of course. What are the facts? The facts are that hon. member and the other hon. members of his party voted in favour of a Council of Cabinets, something which would extend the participation on the executive level to other population groups, and would therefore imply an extension of democracy. It was to have been a Council of Cabinets consisting of seven Whites, four Coloureds and three Asians.

What Bill are you referring to now?

I am not referring to any Bill.

Yes, I should have known that. [Interjections.]

I am referring to the standpoint which the former Prime Minister adopted here in this House on 12 April 1978.

What exactly is your argument?

I am referring to the question of the head of State, and to the question of whether it implies the extension of a principle. I am replying to this question, Mr. Chairman, and I maintain that I am entitled to do so. The problem, Mr. Chairman, is of course that as soon as a person begins to reply to the arguments of those hon. members, they begin to complain about it. [Interjections.]

The fact of the matter is that the Council of Cabinets, according to the former Prime Minister, would have had the same power in respect of general affairs as the White Cabinet has today in respect of all affairs.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I am not certain of the rules, but I just want to ask you … [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. the Minister is now discussing the Council of Cabinets. I am merely asking for your ruling in good time as to whether it means that I will be able to reply on that point.

Order! Hon. members in the Opposition benches argued widely about whether or not this clause was an extension of democracy. The hon. the Minister is reacting to that, and I am allowing him to do so. However, I am not going to allow other hon. members to debate the matter any further. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Surely the Committee will proceed with its business after the hon. the Minister has spoken … [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member for Langlaagte must be allowed to state his point of order.

The hon. the Minister is now replying during the Committee Stage and because he raised certain arguments, and hon. members have the right to speak after him, I am simply asking you to take into account that the hon. the Minister may raise matters to which we have to reply, because the Committee will proceed with its business after the hon. the Minister has spoken.

Order! We shall solve that problem when we come to it.

Thank you, Sir.

The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Sir, I do not wish to make your task more difficult than it already is. For the sake of the correctness of the debate, however, I should like to reply to questions which hon. members put to me. I am doing so. Since the hon. member for Jeppe has left the Committee, I want to tell the hon. member for Langlaagte …

But there are reasons for that. [Interjections.]

Order! I am now making a final appeal to hon. members to put a stop to these conversations across the floor of the House—everyone is trying to talk at once. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

The President, who was to have been elected in accordance with the previous proposals would have been chairman of the Council of Cabinets.

[Inaudible.]

Sir, the hon. member for Lichtenburg is putting his foot in it again, unless he wants to say that Mr. Vorster was telling a lie. In that case he should have the courage to rise to his feet and say it here. I did not define the Council of Cabinets. Mr. Vorster did. I suggest that the hon. member should read what he said. He said that the Council of Cabinets …

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. the Minister?

No, Sir, I do not wish to reply to any questions now. I am showing other hon. members the courtesy of replying to their speeches.

That Council of Cabinets, for which hon. members voted …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I cannot recall that we discussed the Council of Cabinets under clause 7. What we are concerned with here is the composition of the electoral college.

Sir, may I quote what the hon. member for Jeppe asked under clause 7? He asked: Has the extension of democracy become a principle? Or is self-determination the principle? He was allowed to ask it, and under the circumstances I maintain that I owe him an answer.

Order! As I have ruled, what we are dealing with is the question of whether democracy is being extended. The hon. the Minister is motivating his argument in this connection. Hon. members must now give the hon. the Minister an opportunity to reply to the questions.

While you are about it, talk about… [Interjections.]

Order!

Yes, I shall. If the hon. member thinks it is part of this issue, I shall gladly do so. I just want to give the hon. member for Lichtenburg a reply in this connection. The two of us were good friends.

Were?

I did not sever the friendship. Mr. Vorster said in this House on 12 April 1978 that if the present Cabinet had executive power—and there is no one who denies that—then the Council of Cabinets would also have it.

Mr. Vorster explained it further.

Mr. Vorster’s words appear in Hansard.

The hon. member for Jeppe went on to accuse me of something I never said.

Where is he?

No, I do not know where he is at the moment. He said that when I replied to the debate I used the argument of a total onslaught. I did not talk about a total onslaught at all.

The hon. member for Pietersburg asked whether the composition of the electoral college would change when the population structure changed. One hon. member on that side of the House pulled out a little blue book …

It is not ours, it is yours.

Surely I did not say it was not ours. I do not know what point the hon. member wants to make.

[Inaudible.]

It seems as if the hon. member has used it. [Interjections.] It really looks as if the hon. member has used the blue bottle. If he has not used it, he may as well do so. He might rid himself of a great many impurities. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The other day the hon. member for Jeppe said that the hon. the Minister should take a pill, and you called him to order, but now the hon. member is saying that we should use the blue bottle. What is the difference between those two statements? [Interjections.] With all due respect, Sir, are you going to allow the hon. the Minister to get away with a remark like that, while you asked the hon. member for Jeppe to withdraw his remark? [Interjections.]

Order!

In all fairness, the hon. member for Kuruman began this business of the blue bottle, not I.

I ruled that hon. members should stop making these personal remarks about one another. Apparently there are hon. members here who did not hear it. I am now making a final appeal to hon. members to stop making personal remarks about other hon. members. The hon. the Minister must withdraw that remark.

Sir, I withdraw the remark, but then you must also ask the hon. member for Kuruman to withdraw his remark.

The hon. member for Kuruman must withdraw his remark.

Sir, I was talking about the little blue book, and not about the blue bottle. [Interjections.]

The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Let us test the validity of the argument for a moment. In the publications to which reference was made it was stated that the number of representatives of the various population groups in the President’s Council would be roughly proportional to the population figures.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member must give me a chance. I am discussing the electoral college. The same applies to the number of members of the various Houses. Let me indicate how approximate it is. The Asian population numbers approximately 853 000 and the Coloured population 2 715 000. The hon. member for Pietersburg will concede to me that 853 000 is not 50% of 2 715 000. It is not even a third. The White population numbers 4 677 000. According to my arithmetic 50% of that is not 2,715 million. The argument that an exact formula is being laid down here, is not correct.

I said it was approximate.

In all fairness, I want to say this to the hon. member for Pietersburg. What was the attitude of the hon. member when, up to and including 1982, he supported the numbers pertaining to that same electoral college? He cannot adopt a different attitude now.

Circumstances have changed.

No, Sir. The circumstances have not changed. The hon. member himself has changed and his standpoint has changed as well. The hon. member also asked: What is going to happen in future? If the hon. member had read the Bill he would have known what the position was, namely that this specific clause, if all the other clauses relating to this matter are passed, will be an entrenched clause. The implications are very clear. Because it is an entrenched clause the numbers can only be changed if all three Houses agree. Just as I cannot do so, so the hon. member cannot dictate or prescribe what can happen in future. What will happen in this specific connection will depend on the members represented in the various Houses. For that reason the rest of his question is relevant and completely hypothetical.

May I ask a question?

No, I am replying to the hon. member and now he also wants to put questions to me.

I wish to conclude this discussion by saying that there is nothing in this clause which has changed since it was eagerly and with great enthusiasm propagated by the hon. members of the CP. If they were to read the election manifesto which they helped to distribute during the election they would see that this provision is clearly set out in that document.

Mr. Chairman, you will understand it when I say that I am rising to speak with a great degree of caution. After yesterday morning’s heated debate and also after the important announcement by the hon. the Prime Minister this afternoon you will understand it when I say that everyone will henceforth participate very cautiously in the further discussion of the Committee Stage. I have not been a member of the House of Assembly for long and I once asked one of the longer-serving members what approach one should adopt when participating in the debate in a Committee Stage. At that stage I was not well acquainted with the rules and procedures. The hon. member told me there were basically only three things I should take into consideration. In the first place one’s footwork had to be nimble; secondly, one had to be well-acquainted with the rules and the Standing Orders; and thirdly, one should keep one’s eye on the Chairman. After a long discussion of this clause we have now reached the stage where in my opinion you are keeping an eye on us. It is therefore not necessary for us to keep an eye on you.

I should now like to react to what the hon. the Minister said and I got the impression that the hon. the Minister felt that we were aggrieved because he had replied in detail, thoroughly and at length to our contributions. This is the impression I got, namely that the Opposition parties took it amiss of the hon. the Minister. I should like to clear up that misunderstanding and give the hon. the Minister the assurance that is not the case. We have no objection to that. I think our problem is that we do not know when the hon. the Minister is going to stop. I want to tell the hon. the Minister in all honesty that we have no objection to that.

At this stage of the discussion of clause 7 I feel that we have discussed the clause very thoroughly, and that there is really very little more one can contribute to the discussion. [Interjections.] However, I do want to take this opportunity to make a few more observations on why this clause is unacceptable to us in the CP and why we shall vote against it.

The election procedure set out in the clause has to be such that the persons participating in it will feel that it is worth while to make use of that procedure. The method for the election of the State President must therefore contain a value-giving element for the citizens participating in that election and therefore making use of the procedure. The election of a State President must therefore have a special meaning for those persons participating in the election. It must mean that their candidate has as much of a chance as any other candidate of being elected. If this is the case we say the election has real value for the relevant voters. It will encourage a feeling of obedience and loyalty in them.

However, this is not possible in terms of clause 7. I am saying this because no Coloured and no Indian will have a feeling of pride and appreciation for a State President elected according to the procedure prescribed in clause 7.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

Sir, I do not want to reply to a question. We are already being accused of delaying the proceedings and I am therefore not going to cause further delays by replying to questions.

On whose behalf are you speaking, Louis?

On behalf of the Heilbron constituency.

If the population group to which the relevant voters belong knows in advance that they do not have any hope of having a State President elected and particularly a State President who owing to his rights and powers will become a focal point for conflict—a storm centre—they will not find a value-giving element in the procedure. I have used the expression “storm centre” because we cannot get away from the fact that he is going to be a political figure. Consequently there will not be the pride and the degree of respect there should be.

We maintain that the machinery established for the election of a State President is one of the most serious deficiencies in the Constitution Bill.

The second point I should like to make is that clause 7 even provides that the representatives of one House only may elect the State President. This is possible. If one reads clause 7 carefully one comes to that conclusion. In my opinion this is a monstrosity which is being an integral part of this election mechanism, and for that reason it is understandable that people of colour are already cynical about the election of a State President. One is therefore justified in saying that clause 7 is and will be the single factor, particularly considering its entrenchment, that will cause more polarization between the various population groups than any other clause in this constitution.

Do you have a proposal that will satisfy everyone?

The hon. member knows just as well as I do that I cannot elaborate on this. My task in this Committee Stage is to point out the deficiencies in this particular clause. This method which will mean that only one House will elect the State President, is a manipulation method and an out-manoeuvring technique by means of which the Whites are assured of domination in the election of a State President. It is nothing else but a blueprint for revolution.

Order! Will the hon. member Mr. Theunissen please keep quiet for a moment. I should like to give the hon. members for Rissik, Brakpan and Innesdal an opportunity to finish their discussion before we continue with the Committee Stage debate.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize.

Mr. Chairman, so do I, but the hon. member for Innesdal …

Order! I am not going to allow a dialogue with the Chair. The hon. member Mr. Theunissen may proceed.

The procedure set out in this clause creates an untenable situation and causes a manipulation of power which is dangerous and indefensible. The conflict inherent in the composition of the electoral college as we find it in clause 7, simply means that the image of the State President who is going to be elected in this way will be that of a one-party President. This will merely stimulate conflict.

Whereas the Coloureds and the Indians may have expected to enjoy effective participation in the election of a State President, this expectation is now being completely destroyed by the provisions of clause 7. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister elaborated on the matter of the extension of democracy. I should like to reply to him very briefly with reference to that standpoint.

The hon. the Minister’s standpoint is that democracy is being extended because there was a extension of democracy in the Council of Cabinets in the sense that it would have been an Executive Council of Cabinets. I think the hon. the Minister said on another occasion—he must tell me whether he did in fact say this or whether I inferred it—that the Ministers of the Council of Cabinets would also be Ministers of general affairs. The hon. the Minister is shaking his head and I shall therefore not pursue this argument.

Our standpoint is that it was not an extension of democracy because the Council of Cabinets would not have been an Executive Cabinet. It would have been a place where consultation would have taken place. In the Council of Cabinets deliberations would only…

Order! I allowed the hon. member for Jeppe to say that the Council of Cabinets would not have been an extension of democracy. I am not going to allow the hon. member for Jeppe to discuss the Council of Cabinets, as contained in the 1977 proposals, any further.

Mr. Chairman, just allow me to quote one sentence to lend authority to my statement.

The hon. member for Jeppe may do so in one sentence.

The sentence comes from the minutes of the NP congress of 3/4 November 1981, in which the present hon. Prime Minister said—

Mr. Vorster also said that. That is my argument therefore and that is why I am saying this, and that is all I am going to say about this matter, that for this and many other reasons the Council of Cabinets was not an executive Cabinet, and the present hon. Prime Minister confirmed this.

Mr. Chairman, to start with I want to tell the hon. the Minister, and I am doing so with all due respect, that the reply he gave me when he spoke a while ago was not a reply to the question I asked. My question was: If the population ratio were to change, as it is going to change between 1990 and 2000 according to demographers—and that is not many years from now—will the hon. the Minister be in favour of the electoral college ratios being changed accordingly? [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, I hope you will allow me to reply briefly to two specific questions the hon. the Minister asked me earlier this week. The hon. the Minister said, and I am quoting from his unrevised Hansard …

Was it on clause 7?

It was on clause 7. Earlier this week the hon. the Minister asked me—

In the first place I feel that we should leave the questioning of each other’s expression of Christianity out of this debate. In the second place, the point that I made was in the last sentence of my speech when I said—

Does the hon. the Minister want to argue with me about that? Surely it is a valid argument.

I now want to come to the difference. In 1977 there were guidelines, but in 1979 clause 7 was written into the Bill for the first time and it was entrenched in this Bill. Since this Constitution Bill appeared, this side of the House has never had an opportunity to state its standpoint or to help to arrive at a decision on this, and the hon. the Minister knows this just as well as we do.

I also want to argue that the major change which occurred, was in clause 26 of that Constitution Bill. Initially it was stated that the legislative authority of the Republic vested in the House of Assembly. This has now fallen away. The sovereignty of this House of Assembly is going to disappear. This is what has happened. In other words, the entire situation has changed.

Order! The hon. member is now discussing the sovereignty of the House of Assembly. This does not form part of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I merely want to indicate that the circumstances surrounding clause 7 have changed as a result of a radical change in policy. However, I shall not pursue this matter.

I also want to say that in view of the circumstances I have outlined, we find clause 7 totally unacceptable. The same argument also applies in regard to the already hackneyed statement of the previous hon. Prime Minister on 12 April 1978. Sir, I just want to quote the following from what members of the Department of Constitutional Law and International Law at Unisa had to say about clause 7—

Order! In accordance with Standing Order No. 130 I cannot allow the hon. member to make quotations of this nature.

Then I shall not pursue the matter, and I shall conclude by saying that clause 7 as it stands here in my opinion lacks one of the requirements the hon. the Minister put for the successful application of this constitution, namely that it has to meet all reasonable expectations. This is where the issue is going to arise because it affects the main point, namely who is governing. The position is that the majority in the electoral college elects the State President and the State President will govern the country. And allow me to point out that the entrenchment of a White majority vote in the electoral college cannot succeed. It cannot succeed in the African context. Just look what happened in Rhodesia and at what is happening in South West Africa at the moment. There we find that the attempts which were and are being made to entrench a White minority, have crumbled away to nothing. The CP wants to and will prevent this from happening in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, the arguments advanced by the hon. members of the CP with regard to this clause, as if they were champions of justice, are absolutely astonishing when we consider the amendment to the clause which has been moved by the hon. member for Rissik. Although you have ruled his amendment out of order, I just want to point out that what it boiled down to was that the election of the President should be in the hands of the White Chamber alone …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member allowed to discuss an amendment which has been ruled out of order?

I am listening to the hon. member. I shall allow him to complete his statement.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of the spirit of the amendments which have been moved by members of the CP and which are not relevant now…

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member of Innesdal is still arguing about an amendment which you have ruled out of order.

Sir, may I point out that the present argument concerns the amendment moved by the hon. member Mr. Theunissen about a procedure for the election of the State President? In my opinion, the hon. member for Innesdal is entitled to refer to the alternatives proposed by those hon. members to the procedure set out in this clause.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is any hon. member allowed to discuss a matter which has been ruled out of order?

No. It is a rule of this House that such motions may not be discussed. The hon. member for Innesdal must confine himself to the content of the clause.

Very well, Sir. We are discussing a clause which lays down the way in which the electoral college is to be constituted. Hon. members of the CP say that the proposed composition of the electoral college is unfair and that it does not conform to the concept of justice. Now I should like to know from them whether it would conform to their concept of justice if we were to provide here that the State President should be elected by the White Chamber only. Would the hon. member for Rissik have approved of such an arrangement? Sir, the supremacist slip of the CP tortoise is showing. We can all see it. Everyone in this country can feel, hear and see what they are about in this House. On the one hand, they accuse us of injustice. At the same time, it is their approach that they have to be the masters. The hon. member for Pietersburg argues that it has been proved in African countries that this kind of thing does not work. But, Sir, we are dealing here with an electoral college in which the Coloureds and the Indians are also going to participate, and yet the hon. member for Pietersburg sees fit to advance his racist arguments about what is supposed to have happened in Africa. The Minister has repeatedly pointed out that we should not read this clause in isolation from the rest of the Constitution Bill. Our standpoint is that the composition of the electoral college, as proposed in this clause, is equitable because the Indians and the Coloureds are also being given a say in the election of the State President.

A second point that I wish to make is that the arguments, advanced by hon. members of the CP in regard to this clause reveal an approach to politics in South Africa …

On a point of order, Mr. Chairman: The argument which the hon. member is now advancing has repeatedly been advanced by other hon. members of the NP and the hon. the Minister in particular. Is the hon. member allowed to waste the time reserved for this measure by repetition?

Order! The Chair will decide when there is unnecessary repetition. The hon. member for Innesdal may proceed.

Sir, I conclude by saying that we must get away in South Africa from the arrogant paternalism shown by the CP. We must nor rise in this House and pretend that we are going to dictate to the Indians and the Coloureds what we believe to be in their interests. If we can abandon that paternalistic approach, we shall have gone a long way towards creating good relationships. We must stop making political capital out of provisions such as this one. What do we actually achieve by making political capital out of a provision such as this one? On the one hand, members of the CP come along, and, Sir, we must repeat this point; they keep repeating it, and therefore we must repeat the reply to it; we must repeat it ad infinitum if necessary …

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to repeat arguments which have already been advanced.

I accept that, Sir. Allow me just to point out, Sir, that by arguing in this way, we are arousing emotions among people of colour. Those people can speak for themselves and they are quite qualified to say what they think of a provision such as this one. The CP does not have to do it for them.

Mr. Chairman, I have been listening to the hon. member for Innesdal with some degree of surprise. What the hon. member was actually saying—if I understood him correctly—was that the State President would in fact be elected by the Whites alone—the majority party in this House—just as he is at the moment. Therefore he is advising hon. members of the CP not to get agitated about this. If I understood the hon. member for Innesdal correctly, he was alleging that under the proposed new dispensation, the House of Assembly would indeed have the right—the perfect, absolute and undeniable right—to elect the State President. Nevertheless, in a certain sense I appreciate the honesty of the hon. member for Innesdal.

However, I want to come back now to what the hon. the Minister said in the debate on this clause. The hon. the Minister referred to the need to refrain from doing things which would undermine the sense of security of the Whites. Basically, what he said was that every arrangement that was made would have to comply with the requirement that it should make the necessary provision for the security of the Whites, while at the same time it would have to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the other population groups. I want to concede at once that no constitutional arrangement in this country would be feasible if it did not provide for the security of the Whites as well.

Was that all I said?

I just want to put it to the hon. the Minister that this is not all that is relevant.

Of course it is relevant.

Very well, then it is relevant. As I have already said, no policy can be feasible if it does not provide for the preservation of a sense of security among the Whites.

However, two problems have now been raised here. The first one is that it will not be possible to preserve that sense of security at the expense of other groups. It is simply not good enough to say that it must satisfy the reasonable expectations of the other groups. This Constitution Bill, providing as it does for the numerical superiority of Whites, as is clearly laid down in clause 7, a built-in superiority which is indeed entrenched, can most certainly not be regarded as a measure which will preserve the sense of security and meet the expectations of the non-Whites. After all, there is not the slightest doubt about the fact that in terms of these formulae, those other groups will eventually, if not from the outset, be placed in an impossible position, because they will constantly find themselves in a minority position as against White members of this House of Assembly and the Whites in the electoral college. Therefore we cannot get away from the fact that relative to the other groups we are dealing here with White domination. The hon. member for Innesdal conceded that. The hon. member for Randburg also conceded it the other day. It is in fact correct.

I want to point out once again that nothing is going to pose a greater threat to the security of the Whites than the creation of a constitutional dispensation under which other groups will still feel that they are being put in a minority position as against the Whites; that it is indeed a continuation of White domination. [Interjections.] Of course, there are other possible models, Mr. Chairman.

Tell us about them.

There are many possible models in terms of which the security of all the groups could be guaranteed without the possibility of domination. Such models are in fact possible. However, I shall not be allowed to elaborate on these during the discussion of this clause. [Interjections.]

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition has indicated, of course, that although the Government claims that its constitutional proposals amount to a movement away from the Westminster system, the Government is actually reaffirming one of the fundamental principles of the Westminster system, namely the majority principle, in this clause. I want to tell the hon. the Minister quite frankly that in my opinion, he has violated the process of constitutional reform in South Africa by basing his whole new system, in this clause and in this Bill, on the majority principle. I honestly believe that if we continue with that system, we shall be cutting a rod for our own backs. The problem has already been highlighted. What will happen when there is a change in the relative numbers of the populations groups? If we are moving away from the Westminster system—Sir, I am reacting to the statement made by the hon. the Minister …

Order! I concede that the hon. member is reacting to what the hon. the Minister said. However, the hon. member is repeating arguments which have already been used.

Very well, Sir. Allow me just to say that I think the hon. the Minister is doing the process of constitutional reform in South Africa a disservice by introducing the principle of majority rule in this way.

Sir, the argument has repeatedly been advanced by the hon. the Minister, as well as by the hon. member for Randburg, that the criterion which is going to be used here in respect of the election of the President is the criterion of what is attainable in the present political situation. I should very much like to know from the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Randburg how they define that attainability and who will determine what is attainable.

Your own leader has defined it.

Sir, that argument is being used repeatedly.

I also want to reply to an argument advanced by the hon. member for Pretoria Central which I cannot understand. Referring to the ratio which is being laid down with regard to the electoral college, the hon. member said that we were not dealing with numbers here, but with groups. In order to substantiate his statement, he then referred to the representation in the Senate of the States in the USA. The hon. member is not here at the moment, but I must quite honestly say that I cannot understand how on earth one can quote the representation of the American States in the Senate and say that it is groups that are represented here. The principle of that representation lies in the equality. As the hon. member rightly indicated, every State, irrespective of the number of inhabitants of the State, is entitled to two representatives in the Senate. In the light of this, how can he try to justify unequal group representation in the ratio of 4:2:1 on the basis of his example of the representation in the American Senate? This quite frankly mystifies me.

In this connection I want to say that I listened with great interest to the hon. member for Randburg. I think he is an honest debater. He confronted the problems and said he readily admitted that this was not the ideal solution. He admitted that if we had sought the ideal solution we would have had to make other arrangements. That was what he said. I honestly believe that rather than maintaining this majority principle and placing the other groups in a perpetually subordinate position, a different procedure should be devised for the election of a State President, especially in view of the great powers which he will have.

Mr. Chairman, I am not prepared to comment on the opening remarks of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen concerning his own intellectual capacities. Therefore I shall leave his statement at that. However, I should like to enter into a debate with him about certain other statements which he made. He said that he was basically opposed to the election procedure, because the election procedure should be such as to make participation worthwhile for all the members who participate in it. The hon. member nods in agreement. He said the criterion for determining whether it was being made worthwhile for them was whether any member could have his candidate elected. Is that correct? He said the criterion was whether any member had an equal chance of having his candidate elected.

He is deaf. He cannot hear.

I am prepared to argue with the hon. member on the basis of his statement.

[Inaudible.]

No, I am not holding him up to ridicule.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: An hon. member on the Government side has held an hon. member up to ridicule for being hard of hearing.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw that. I did not intend any ridicule. I apologize.

The hon. the Minister may proceed.

I shall speak slowly. I did not know that the hon. member …

I was not referring to you.

Never mind, I am not quarrelling with the hon. member either. I am just saying that since he has now drawn my attention to the hon. member’s physical handicap, I shall speak more loudly and clearly. I do so as a form of courtesy to the hon. member. The hon. member told me that the criterion for determining whether participation was worthwhile was to ascertain whether the participating group had an equal chance of having its candidate elected. Is that correct?

Yes.

He says that at the moment this is not possible. If the hon. member’s conscience really tells him that this should be the position, he can try to achieve it by way of amendment. He can propose that the numbers be changed. He can propose, for example, that the numbers be changed to such an extent that they will have equal representation.

Would you accept that?

That is not the point. The point is what the hon. member wants. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Rissik does not find himself in a kindergarten at the moment. I am conducting a debate about the standpoint of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen and I accept the sincerity of his standpoint. He says his objection to this clause lies in the fact that a particular group is being placed in a dominant position and that all groups are not being afforded an equal opportunity to have their candidates elected. The rules of this Committee provide for a method in terms of which hon. members are enabled to demonstrate what they would like to happen. With all due respect to the hon. member for Rissik, my standpoint is clear. As far as the numbers are concerned, my standpoint is contained in the clause.

We are opposed to it in principle.

No, the principle has been accepted. The objection of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen—with this I conclude my remarks on the subject—concerns the fact that the election procedures and consequently the composition of the electoral college do not give the candidates of the minority groups—he is now their champion—an equal chance of being elected. I should like to put the strength of the hon. member’s intention to the test. I suggest that there is only one way in which it can be tested, and that is for the hon. member to produce an amendment to the clause, which will be in accordance with the rules and will not be out of order, to the effect that the numbers be changed. Then the hon. member would not only be paying lip-service to this idea.

Make it 50:0:0.

I take it that what the hon. member for Barberton has in mind is that the number of 50 should apply to the Coloureds.

That is what you would like.

No, my proposals are here. I do not want to argue with the hon. member for Jeppe. I am prepared to take the hon. member Mr. Theunissen at his word. He should demonstrate his intention and ask for a division. He should demonstrate his standpoint by moving that the numbers be changed. I ask the hon. member to do so. It would be the practical demonstration of the standpoint which he has stated in this House. [Interjections.] From his point of view, the hon. member argued very persuasively that the President would not command the necessary loyalty unless the people had equal opportunities. This is the second way in which he could illustrate his standpoint, but until he does this—and I suspect that the hon. member is not prepared to do it—he must not think that we can attach much importance to his defence of justice.

I now want to examine the merits of the hon. member’s argument. Surely we are not making a constitution for a particular party. Does the hon. member agree with that?

If I have another turn to speak, I shall answer you.

No, Sir, I have no problem with the hon. member’s opportunity to speak. If I remember correctly, the hon. member has two more turns to speak. For the sake of this debate, however, I just want to ask him whether the hon. member does not agree with me that we are not creating a constitution for any particular party. There is nothing in the constitution or in the clause which we are discussing at the moment to prevent the official Opposition, for example, from coming into power. If their philosophy were to be applicable then, the position would be different. Does participation in decision-making mean that one must of necessity have an equal number of representatives? Since when has the idea of participation in decision-making meant that one has to be either in the majority or on an equal footing? That would mean that those hon. members have no say in this House. Let us see whether such a statement could be true. Have hon. members of the Opposition parties never produced any proposals in connection with legislation which were acceptable, and through the acceptance of which they became part of the decision-making process? I am now arguing with the hon. member about the principle of the matter. How can the hon. member substantiate the argument which he has advanced? I ask this with great respect.

The hon. member also went further and made a disturbing statement. The statement which he made had a bearing on their conduct. He said that their task was to point out the defects in legislation. Is there any other hon. member in this Committee who thinks that the only responsibility of a member of the Opposition is to point out defects? I was under the impression that the entire debate which was conducted yesterday—in the House and not in the Committee—dealt with the opportunity to discuss the clause with a view to improving it. Now I am informed of the disturbing standpoint of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen—and he is a lawyer …

But the hon. the Minister points out a defect in order to improve it, after all. [Interjections.]

But the hon. member made that statement in context, because he was reacting to an interjection. He had been asked: What is your proposal? The hon. member then replied that it was his task to point out the defects. I am saying that surely this is not the only task of an Opposition, because that would mean that the hon. member Mr. Theunissen wanted to play a purely destructive role in the Committee Stage.

If our amendments had been accepted they would have remedied those defects.

Mr. Chairman, you ruled that I could not discuss the hon. member’s amendment. I could not accept it either, because it had not been put.

The hon. member showed a certain attitude in the statement he made.

That is an inference which you have drawn.

No, it is not an inference. I shall tell you presently what the inference is.

Sir, you will allow me to say, in reply to the hon. member’s statement that the Committee Stage is there to enable us to consider the clauses and to improve them if we can reach agreement, that he only wants to point out defects. This also explains another approach to this clause. [Interjections.] I am talking to the hon. member Mr. Theunissen and I did not think he was a straw doll. In any event, I did not set him up; I am reacting to what he said.

The standpoint of the CP on this clause is in line with the standpoint adopted by the hon. member for Waterberg a short while ago, when he-said that whatever amendments might be made by the Committee, the CP was against it.

The principle.

Forget about the principle.

But it was in connection with the referendum.

Order! Hon. members must afford the hon. the Minister the opportunity of replying to the questions.

The hon. members of the CP have made some proposals which are in order. I have a question for the hon. members: If we accept those proposals, will that cause the CP to change its standpoint?

Some of them have already been accepted.

Will it cause the CP to change its standpoint?

But we are opposed to the Bill in principle.

But in that case, why are we debating the merits of the clauses in the Committee Stage? [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. member for Pietersburg said that the statement about the function of the Council of Cabinets—the hon. member for Jeppe also reacted to this by implication—had been repeated ad nauseam. The implication of this is that the truth is less true because it has been repeated. I think it is more true. Sir, you will allow me to read one sentence in this connection, and with that I shall conclude my remarks on this subject. The following said—

Now I have finished with the subject; I am not going to take it any further.

The hon. member asked me what we are going to do in the year 2020.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No, Sir. I am replying to a question and now the hon. member wants to ask a further question. The hon. member has put questions to me, and now I want to ask him a question in turn: When Parliament debated the present constitution in 1961 and when it was dealt with in the Committee Stage at the time, was it possible for those people at that stage—22 years ago, I believe—to say what the situation would be in 1983? Now one can see how silly the hon. member’s question is. The hon. member asked me what our standpoint would be in 30 years’ time.

And in ten years’ time?

Very well, in ten years’ time. What a ridiculous question. Just think of all the things the hon. member has done since February 1982. Just think of all he has done. Suppose I had had to adopt a standpoint on his behalf in 1982—where would that have landed me? Surely he knows that this is a silly question. The hon. member will also allow me to refer to the following. The hon. member referred to the comment of certain academics on the clause and its entrenchment. I just want to make one point. The entrenchment is not at issue now, because this clause does not provide for it. The hon. member will have an opportunity to pursue his argument about entrenchment when the clause which deals with it comes up for discussion. Then he can move that the entrenchment of this clause be removed. I am waiting for the discussion of that clause to see whether the hon. member is going to move an amendment to that effect.

If we get there.

Yes. I come now to the hon. member Prof. Olivier. I have repeatedly said that our society is not an ideal one in terms of the definition of homogeneous developed Western countries. That is why it is not possible for “ideal” solutions or “ideal” models which have evolved over decades and centuries in developed countries to be transplanted unchanged onto the South African body politic. The hon. member knows as well as I do that body politic would reject such a system. The hon. member knows that from experience; he knows it from his own professional experience. The hon. member agrees with me that this is so.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition, who, I take it, was speaking on behalf of his side of the House, conceded that orderly constitutional development had to take place through this House. The hon. member Prof. Olivier will concede to me that it must also take place through the people who elect the members of this House. The hon. member agrees with this as well. What is attainable in this connection? The hon. member has indicated that he agrees with me. The test of attainability is determined by that with which we are able to convince people to agree with our proposals. Would the hon. member say that this is a good test?

Go on.

It is important. The hon. member must not tell me to go on. It is a consequential statement which flows from the admissions which the hon. member has made. If it is correct, what has been the result of that test? It has been that the hon. member’s formula is rejected and that my proposals are accepted. Because this is so, these are the limits of attainability and of what is politically feasible, regardless of the utopian dreams which we may have.

Will the hon. the Minister concede to me, when he refers to rejection by way of a general election, that many other factors come into play, apart from constitutional policy, in such an election? Does the hon. the Minister wish to suggest that if the Government had gone to the electorate with proposals other than these, they would necessarily have been rejected?

Order! I have allowed the hon. member’s question, but I just want to point out to the hon. the Minister that we are dealing here only with the election of the President and not with all the proposals. Therefore I do not know how the hon. the Minister is going to reply to it.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to reply to it, but I shall try to remain in order.

The hon. the Minister may proceed.

My proposal for the composition of the President’s Council was specifically tested on two occasions, in 1977 and in 1981. This is my reply to that. We are going to give the hon. member yet another opportunity. It has been announced today that support for the constitution is going to be tested in a referendum. Let us await the outcome of this referendum. In my opinion, the hon. member is also basing his argument on the standpoint that there should be equal numbers. I submit that this is not correct. I am speaking theoretically and academically now; I am not talking about what happens in practice. I submit that the premise from which the hon. member proceeds in his argument is wrong. But I want to go further. If those hon. members were to come into power—and there is nothing in the constitution to prevent this—they will be able to change that composition. Surely the hon. member knows that this is so. In the final analysis, the hon. member knows perfectly well that it is not possible to protect minority groups solely on the basis of equal numbers for minority and majority groups, for then we would be paying lip service to the concept of existing minority groups.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has spoken of so many matters and with such verbosity that it is really very difficult to isolate the points that are really at issue in this debate. The hon. the Minister quoted what Mr. Vorster had said, for example, and this must be the twentieth time since 1982 that quotation has been made. I could refer him to Hansard, which contains the answer to it, and during the discussion of clause 19 I shall go all over the matter with him once again. Mr. Vorster has fully explained that quotation. The hon. the Minister attaches a certain significance to those words. Mr. Vorster has publicly explained what their significance is, but the hon. the Minister refuses to accept it because he says that it was not said in this House. That is his logic.

Then the hon. the Minister attacks me on the aspect of the electoral college which I described as White domination. The hon. the Minister of Health and Welfare has spelt it out. It is White domination. The hon. the Minister himself has said that in the interests of White South Africa, and also in the interests of the Coloureds and the Indians in South Africa, there should be White control. In other words, the hon. the Minister agrees that clause 7 brings about White domination. When we examine the rest of the Bill, as the hon. the Minister has invited me to do, we see that it results in White domination.

That is not the argument I used.

But I have not completed my argument yet.

Mr. Chairman, we know that the hon. the Minister has a very good intellect and he knows what I want to say, but I am sure that the other hon. members do not yet know what I want to say. The hon. the Minister says that the one moment I call it White domination, and the next moment it is capitulation. I say that clause 7 contains an example of White domination. It is an example of the hon. the Minister’s bluff with regard to the Coloureds and the Indians. At the same time, however, I say that by accepting joint decision-making, by accepting power-sharing and a joint say, the hon. the Minister has got himself into trouble.

Of course.

Because the hon. the Minister is trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, he is in trouble, and he is going to be in trouble in future, too, because he is heading for integration. That is the position. As they say, you cannot be all things to all men. That is exactly what the hon. the Minister is trying to do, and he is certainly not going to succeed. [Interjections.]

The hon. member for Innesdal referred to our so-called racism, our paternalistic racism, etc. In what I am going to tell him now, I shall at the same time be replying to the hon. the Minister himself. The hon. member for Innesdal also wants to know from us how we want the State President to be elected. We believe that the White Parliament should elect the State President. That would be the ideal situation, in our opinion. We also believe that the Parliament of the Coloureds should elect their own head of State. This is our standpoint with regard to this new constitutional dispensation. We believe that the Coloureds and the Indians should each have their own State President as well. In the light of this, is it illogical to say … [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, it is very curious indeed that when Ciskei or Transkei, for example, have their own Presidents, this is not regarded as racism. When we invite the Zulus of Mr. Buthelezi to take independence and to elect their own President, this is not paternalistic; it is not racialistic either. However, the moment we say that we should like the same procedure to be followed in the case of the Coloureds and the Indians, all of a sudden it becomes paternalistic racism. [Interjections.]

What do the Coloureds say about your homeland?

Now the hon. member asks me what the Coloureds and the Indians say about it.

What does Buthelezi say, Albert? [Interjections.]

Now I want to know from the hon. member for Innesdal—as the hon. member for Barberton has rightly remarked—what Mr. Buthelezi himself says about this. Then I want to put a second question to the hon. member for Innesdal. If Dr. Verwoerd had told the Blacks in 1958 that the Government would give them a Chamber in this Parliament, would there have been four independent national States in South Africa today? Would those people still have wanted to give expression to their own nationality?

Order! I have allowed the hon. member for Brakpan to cover a very wide field. However, I now request him to confine himself to the election of the State President.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to have the attention of the hon. the Minister. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister that he fiercely attacked the hon. member Mr. Theunissen because he…

I did not attack him at all. [Interjections.]

Very well, Mr. Chairman, let us say then that the hon. the Minister criticized him. I hope the hon. the Minister will be better satisfied if I put it like that.

I simply replied to him.

Very well then, the hon. the Minister simply replied to him. [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. the Minister invited him to move an amendment. But we have moved an amendment which was not accepted. However, we say that in the light of the context of clause 7, it is unfair …

But put it right, then.

But we cannot put it right throughout this entire system. Within the system in which this whole new dispensation has to be accommodated, it cannot be put right. In any event, the whole new system which the hon. the Minister has submitted to us is rotten. [Interjections.] When we say that we are opposed to the principle of this, the hon. the Minister says we must forget the principle. When we are opposed to the principle, the hon. the Minister asks us why we …

[Inaudible.]

Mr. Chairman, that is exactly what the hon. the Minister said. He can go and look it up in his own Hansard. He did say it. [Interjections.] Furthermore, the hon. the Minister wants to know from us why, if we are so opposed to the principle, we are advancing arguments during the Committee Stage at all. Surely this is not a sensible question to ask. Even though we are opposed to the principle, why can we not move amendments to the clause concerned in spite of that? Why can we not state our standpoints and arguments with regard to this clause?

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

Mr. Chairman, I do not think I have time to reply to a question at this stage.

The hon. member Mr. Theunissen was arguing within the framework of the context of this clause, and not within the framework of the policy of the CP. [Interjections.]

Order!

Now the hon. the Minister alleges that we are advancing kindergarten arguments in this House. I just want to emphasize very strongly …

I did not say that. I was just reacting to …

Sir, he now invites us to move an amendment in respect of a system which we reject. We simply pointed this out, and his response was to criticize my hon. friend as well in this connection and to say that we were making a terrible mistake in saying that it was our task to point out the defects as well. He himself conceded that the hon. member had made this statement in reply to an interjection. Nor was it the end of my colleague’s speech. Therefore it is one of our functions to point out the defects in this legislation.

Order! I am sorry, but we cannot discuss the function of the Opposition under this clause.

It arises from clause 7 …

The hon. member has stated his standpoint. I think we should leave it at that. The hon. member may proceed.

Our standpoint in connection with clause 7 is that the composition of the electoral college is unfair and unreasonable within the context of this legislation. [Interjections.]

Order! Does the hon. member for Krugersdorp wish to say something?

No, Sir.

The hon. member for Brakpan may proceed.

Sir, the composition is unreasonable in the context of this legislation. That is one of the reasons why the CP will vote against this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the more the hon. member for Brakpan tries to get out of trouble, the deeper in trouble he gets. I do just want to refer to the arguments of the CP in connection with the unfairness of the composition of the electoral college. Then I want to refer specifically to the arguments of the hon. member for Pietersburg. It has been argued that the composition is unfair, and this is based on the supposition that in the near or distant future this composition will have to change owing to the fact that the population composition of the three population groups is going to change radically.

This also applies now.

In his speech he said that somewhere between 1990 and 2000 the combined total of Coloureds and Indians would exceed the number of Whites. He said that this Government was placing an unnecessary, in fact impossible, burden on the consciences of those who have to be sitting here when the Whites are in the minority in the country. He went on to say that if we wanted to be fair and honest, we could not, for all time, lay down to the majority vote in the electoral college. He said that this would be unfair, unjust and un-Christian.

Order! I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member. Perhaps he is developing his argument, but I just want to point out to him that the argument on population figures that may change in the future and the unfairness and injustice or otherwise thereof has already been debated in full. The hon. member must therefore put forward a new argument.

I do, in fact, want to raise an argument which has not yet been raised in this connection. I maintain that thus far the explanation has been one-sided. A report entitled “Bevolkingsherverspreiding in die RSA—moontlike langtermyn-implikasies van huidige tendense” was published by the HSRC. To the best of my knowledge, this is a new argument I am raising here. This is a scientific document. This is, in fact, the point I want to make. Arguments are constantly being based on an assumption, but I just want to point out that there is also another possibility, and in this connection I want to quote from the scientific report. On page 19 possible population figures for the RSA are dealt with. There one finds that in 67 years’ time, viz. in the year 2050, so it is estimated, the number of Asians will be 1,508 million, the number of Whites 7.131 million and the number of Coloureds 5,201 million. This still gives the Whites an absolute majority in 67 years’ time. However, this is not the point.—

In other words, there will be White domination for 67 years. [Interjections.]

Order!

That is not the point. The point I want to make is that one should not base one’s political conclusions on fleeting assumptions. I am not suggesting that a constitution should be valid ad infinitum. Certainly not. I merely wanted to clarify this matter. I hope I have now also made the point that there is also another view of things.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has, to a great extent, already replied to the debate, but it is interesting that thus far he has not yet taken the opportunity to react to arguments of hon. members on his side of the House. One can deduce one of two things from this. Either he agrees with them, or he prefers to remain silent when he disagrees with them. I do not want to draw that conclusion, but I will go so far as to say that he may consider their arguments to be inferior.

In particular I want to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the speech the hon. member for Randburg made here late on Tuesday afternoon. Die Burger specifically referred to the speech of the hon. member the next morning in bold type, I assume with his permission. In reply to a question by the hon. member for Rissik, the hon. member for Randburg said that it was his standpoint that if the Coloureds were in the majority today, he would not accept an electoral college, as proposed now, for the election of the State President. He said it would not be viable. What must one conclude from the standpoint of that liberal hon. member? One can only draw one conclusion, namely that the hon. member would not be prepared to accept an electoral college if there was the possibility that a Coloured could be elected President. If this is not the case, the hon. member for Randburg or the hon. the Minister must now take this opportunity to explain to us why it would not be viable in those circumstances. They must explain to us why a liberal hon. member of this House is of the opinion that such an electoral college would not be viable. The last thing under the sun I would want to accuse that hon. member of would be that he is a racist. After all, we have repeatedly heard such statements from the hon. member for Randburg, and the hon. member for Innesdal, in particular—he seems to have made it his life’s work to point out how racist we supposedly are. I should like replies from them.

This afternoon we heard the extraordinary argument that when a party is opposed to a Bill in principle—I deduced this from the hon. the Minister’s arguments—it has no further task in a Select Committee.

That is not what I said. You are surely more intelligent than that.

If I understood the hon. the Minister incorrectly, he must set me right.

You cannot misunderstand me if you draw a conclusion.

Our standpoint as regards this clause is unshakeable. We want a State President for the Whites to govern the Whites in their own geographical area. According to our standpoint the Coloureds must eventually also have their own State President to govern them in their own area. The same also applies to the Indians. [Interjections.] That is our basic standpoint.

Mr. Chairman, can the hon. member tell us whether the standpoint he has just adopted is or was also the standpoint of the previous hon. Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, at the moment.

In the first place I do not want to implicate Mr. Vorster, a former State President, in this debate. [Interjections.] Quite simply, I am not a hypocrite. Secondly I want to tell the hon. the Minister that I think he should be considerate enough to ask Mr. Vorster personally what he thinks about the Constitution bill. [Interjections.]

Order! I should be glad if the hon. member for Waterberg, the hon. member for Rissik and the hon. the Minister of Health and Welfare would now stop their verbal parrying so that the hon. member for Barberton may proceed. If hon. members continue in this way, I shall be requesting any hon. members who ignore the Chair’s authority again to continue their discussion outside this House. The hon. member for Barberton may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I assume that the hon. members you have mentioned have now finished their discussion.

It would seem so.

Where is your homeland?

An hon. member has asked me where my homeland is. [Interjections.] I do not think it would be appropriate to discuss a homeland or lack of a homeland under this clause … [Interjections] … unless you kindly give me the opportunity to discuss it.

Order! No, I am afraid that I cannot allow the hon. member to discuss that now.

I know. I merely mentioned it by way of argument. The hon. member Dr. Odendaal asked me a question. He asked me what about the other people living in this country. I assume he means the Black people. [Interjections.] Does that hon. member want to suggest, by that question…

Order! I am sorry, but I have to point out to the hon. member that the position of the Black people may not be discussed under this clause at all.

Sir, I know. I think you are jumping to the wrong conclusion.

Order! The hon. member may not discuss the position of the Black people at all.

Mr. Chairman, all Black people outside the national States are also citizens of South Africa. The State President who is going to be elected will be the head of South Africa. The hon. member Dr. Odendaal asked me what about the other people. Is he suggesting that it is his standpoint that those so-called other people should also have a joint say in the election of a State President.

Order! I want to point out to the hon. member that the principle involved here was accepted at Second Reading and I am therefore not going to allow the hon. member to discuss the matter further.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Barberton referred to my previous speech on this clause. Let me just repeat to the hon. member what I said. He is not listening at the moment. When the hon. member for Rissik has finished speaking to him, perhaps he would be prepared to listen. [Interjections.] I formulated the standpoint very clearly, and it was repeated by the hon. the Minister in his next speech, namely that we are engaged in a reform process here, a process in which one always has to take into account what is politically viable. Those hon. members are kicking up a terrible fuss because they are supposedly going to be sold down the river in terms of this Bill. However, at the same time they are extremely worried about the White domination which is supposedly contained in clause 7 in the composition of the electoral college. I want to question the rationale of their approach.

Secondly the hon. members are complaining terribly about the composition of the electoral college. They say they cannot move an amendment on this because the principle contained in this Bill was approved at Second Reading and they are opposed to the principle. They consider it their duty, however, to point out defects.

We did move an amendment.

If one looks at their amendment, which is printed on the Order Paper but which was ruled out of order, one sees that it is even worse. Against the background of the principle the hon. member for Rissik has said—and I am not going to refer to the amendment—by implication that he is prepared, against the background of this principle, to improve the Bill by stating that only Whites may elect the State President. Then this would more adequately meet the requirements laid down the hon. member Mr. Theunissen that everyone should feel that he has an equal opportunity of getting his candidate elected President. Surely that hon. member is wrong in that argument of his. The point I want to make—if hon. members accept this as a fact, although they are opposed to it—is that the principle was confirmed at Second Reading, and if it is their point of departure that they still want to cooperate constructively in this debate, with a view to improving the detail, against the background of the principle … [Interjections.]

Order! I cannot allow the hon. member to discuss the role of the Opposition now.

Mr. Chairman, I shall very quickly get to the point I want to make. Those hon. members are arguing that they would like to co-operate to improve this legislation. The invitation I want to extend to them is that they should, in fact, move an amendment, against the background of the principle, which would give everyone an equal chance. That would enable them to vote in favour of the amendment, but would also give them the opportunity to reject the clause on principle.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister …

Order! I am very sorry but I cannot allow the hon. member Mr. Theunissen to speak again because he has already had three turns to speak.

Sir, I have only had two.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: According to my calculations, the hon. member has only spoken once.

No, I have spoken twice. [Interjections.]

Order! No, I am sorry, the hon. member’s calculations are incorrect. On the evening of the 22nd he made a speech at 18h04. On the same evening at 18h26 he made a second speech which was interrupted by the suspension of business for supper. He began speaking again at 20h00. That was his second speech. His third speech was at 15h18 this afternoon. This is according to the Chairman’s record.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I just want to know whether you have now ruled that I may not speak a third time. After all is said and done, I am the man who was speaking, and I know that I only spoke twice. My first speech was interrupted for dinner and I continued it after dinner, but it was still the same speech.

The hon. member made a very short speech at 18h04 on the evening of 22 August, and the next member to speak, the hon. member for Constantia, began speaking at 18h07. [Interjections.] Order! I am very sorry, but the rules do not make provision for the hon. member to speak a fourth time.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I just want to say that it is not correct according to our calculations, but we shall accept your ruling in this connection.

I have no option.

Mr. Chairman, I want to come back to the questions the hon. the Minister put to me in respect of this particular clause. The hon. the Minister asked me why I accepted the contents of this clause in 1977, and not today. I just want to point out briefly that the proposals of 1977 differ fundamentally from the proposals before us today. The second point I want to make, is that I raised certain issues, I was concerned about, during the discussion of the 1977 proposals and Mr. Vorster replied to me on them. The hon. the Minister asked me what that reply was. [Interjections.] I do not want to dwell on this for too long, since we can discuss this on another occasion. Firstly, I want to ask the hon. the Minister himself to recall what the reply was in the caucus in 1977. Secondly, I want to ask the Minister to go and read what his colleague, the hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs, wrote in that year. That is a point we can discuss at a later stage.

However, I want to come to the hon. member for Randfontein and the hon. member for Randburg, as well as the discussion the hon. the Minister had with me. According to the documents of the governing party, it is quite clear that the composition of this electoral college is based more or less on population numbers.

I have already advanced the argument.

I am saying this because the hon. the Minister said that was not quite correct.

No, I did not say that.

At this stage I do not want the hon. the Minister and I to misunderstand one another on this point. Let me just tell the hon. the Minister again that according to the principles of this Bill, in terms of clause 7, the electoral college is composed on the basis of the numbers of the three different population groups.

You have said that over and over again.

Order!

The point I am making, is that we are not saying that it is unchristian, wrong or unfair for it to be composed in this way. To tell the truth, I think it is quite correct to base the composition of the electoral college on population numbers. I have no problem with that, but the relevant issue in the two problems I have with this matter, is that the strongest party in the White House will retain the power as long as the Whites are in the majority in this country. I think the hon. the Minister agrees with this, unless … [Interjections.]

Order!

Sir, I am the last speaker on this side, and as soon as the hon. the Minister has replied, we can vote on this. [Interjections.]

Order!

Now it is my contention that this is where White domination comes into the picture viz. that the White House has the largest number of members in the electoral college because the Whites have the largest number of members in the population. Surely that is correct. Now the hon. member for Randfontein claims—this is what the Whites in this country are being told—that the Whites will be in the majority in South Africa for the next 67 years. He said this with reference to the HSRC report. For the next 67 years the Coloureds and the Indians will not be able to elect a State President because they will not number more than the Whites. That is the point I want to make. The Coloureds and the Indians who are going to participate into this dispensation know in advance that for the next 67 years they will not be able to elect a State President.

The hon. the Minister asked me what the NP had said in respect of this matter in 1961. The hon. the Minister said that he could not see so far into the future. The hon. the Minister should not become quite so philosophical about it; after all, we are not all prophets or a Madam Rose. I could say just this: I am quite sure that with the establishment of the Republic of South Africa, in 1961 the NP did not foresee a mixed Government for South Africa. Dr. Verwoerd’s words demonstrate this very clearly. I can testify to this by recalling a speech Dr. Verwoerd made on Kerkplein in Pretoria. The hon. member for Springs will recall this, too.

Entrenched White domination will continue to exist as long as there are more Whites than Coloureds and Indians. [Interjections.]

Order!

The second leg is also correct. If the HSRC is wrong—they cannot look into the future either and can also make a mistake—and there are more Coloureds and Indians in 60 years time, either the Coloureds, or the Indians, or both, will seize control of the electoral college and they will elect a Coloured or Indian State President. [Interjections.]

Order!

That is why we are saying that it is a sell-out of, or capitulation by the Whites when one appoints a powerful State President in terms of the constitution, and by way of the electoral college, whilst there is the possibility that there will be more Coloureds in 20, 30 or 70 years’ time and, in terms of the NP’s proposals, they will take over the government of this country. That is what the CP is opposing in principle. The people who established this party 60 or 70 years ago, viz. Gen. Hertzog and the people who preceded him, did not try to draw up a constitution in which the position of the Whites would be assailed.

If the Coloureds were in the majority, is it not true that they would also be able to elect a White?

Theoretically, that is possible. I am asking the governing party whether they would permit their caucus to designate a Coloured or an Indian as a candidate for the Presidency if that man is better than a White in all respects?

The reason the CP is so vehemently opposed to this specific clause, is because it holds out the prospect of White domination of two other groups of colour for a particular period of time, and that at a certain time in the future the Whites will lose their say over themselves for ever. Basically, those are the two reasons for our being opposed to this clause.

With reference to a previous ruling by the Chair, I just want to point out that having looked at the record, it appears that the hon. member Mr. Theunissen still has a turn to speak. I now call upon the hon. member to address the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity. Earlier, the hon. the Minister took it amiss of me for advancing certain arguments to point out the shortcomings in this clause. What motivated me to do so, however? The hon. the Minister wants me to effect improvements to his defective clause so that, according to his argument, justice can be done to the Coloureds. It is the hon. the Minister who does not have the courage to do that. My argument is that the intentions of the NP with regard to the Coloureds are false and not genuine. In one of its motions of instruction, the PFP asked for automatic adjustments to the ratio as the population groups grow in number. The NP must tell us whether they are in favour of a Coloured or an Indian becoming President. My argument was aimed at pointing out precisely how false the intentions of the Government are. The day before yesterday, the hon. the Minister unashamedly told us why the NP wanted a White in that position. I quote what he said in The Citizen …

Read Hansard. Do not quote The Citizen in an argument against me.

Order! I regret that the hon. member will not be permitted to read out that quotation.

I accept that, Mr. Chairman. The hon. the Minister told us that Africa was sick and in the process of dying. According to his argument, the Whites must consequently remain in power. They are important, and must therefore remain in power. But for how long? That is the falseness of their argument. After all, we know that the ratios are going to change. The NP must therefore be prepared to rectify this and to recognize the full consequences of their policy. They are not prepared to do so. That is why we have moved an amendment to put forward the CP’s standpoint.

Order! The hon. member is not permitted to discuss the circumstances surrounding the amendment again. The hon. member must come back to the provisions of this clause.

Sir, that is the reason I have pursued another line of argument with regard to this matter.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Barberton and other hon. members are adopting a sanctimonious attitude in respect of the morality of the ratio of 50:25:13 in the electoral college. The hon. member for Rissik expanded on this and his argument centred around the old story of population numbers. For the purposes of my argument, I shall assume that the composition of the electoral college is based purely on population numbers. The hon. member for Rissik took it amiss of the hon. member for Randfontein for mentioning the results of a scientific investigation that there is going to be no marked difference in this ratio over the next 67 years. The hon. member for Rissik claimed that this constitution held out the prospect of blatant domination for South Africa. I just want to present two arguments to the hon. member. This ratio is entrenched for the sake of good order, but let us just consider two arguments. Firstly, there is nothing debarring a person from being a candidate for the presidency on the basis of his identity—the Bill, as well as the clause, tell us this. There is no prohibition whatsoever in that respect. When one speaks about Mr. Vorster, hon. members do not want to enter the discussion, and consequently, I do not want to take that argument any further. Mr. Vorster did not stipulate the identity of the President in terms of the 1977 proposals either. Therefore, there is no prohibition on the identity of the President. Secondly, the proposed new Parliament, which will consist of three Houses, is not prohibited from altering this ratio. There is no prohibition whatsoever on that. It is simply an entrenched clause. This means that if a motion is put forward that this be altered, all three the Houses have to approve it.

Then why is it entrenched?

It is entrenched for the sake of order in South Africa. The hon. member for Rissik must listen to what I have to say to him. I told the hon. member for Rissik that for the purposes of my argument, I would assume that his argument is correct, viz. that the ratio is based on population numbers.

What do you say?

It is my contention that if the population numbers should alter drastically in the future, it would rest with the highest authority in South Africa, viz. Parliament, the three Houses, to alter that ratio. Surely there are certain conventions that have to be taken into account for the purposes of amending the constitution of any country. I want to present as an example to hon. members the election of the Prime Minister. At present the Prime Minister is elected by way of a majority decision of the majority party in the House of Assembly, as it is composed at present. Different political parties have different constitutions, and I want to present the constitutions of the PFP and the NRP as an example to hon. members. I do not know what the constitution of the CP is.

It is a very good one.

Those two parties argue that their congresses elect their leaders. It would therefore be for them to decide whether they want to nominate their chief leader as a candidate for the State Presidency. However, I want to point out to them that the NP is in power in South Africa at present. After all, we can only confine ourselves to the realities. If the NP is in power when the new dispensation comes into operation, how is it going to work? The NP is a federal party, consisting of four provincial parties, which elects its chief leader in its parliamentary caucus. Surely it would be ridiculous for any political party to come to the electoral college and nominate someone other than the person who is that party’s leader. Consequently, it is a futile argument to say that because the NP would not nominate a Coloured or Asian as its candidate for the electoral college, this amounts to flagrant domination.

Would he remain a member of your caucus?

Of course he would remain a member of the caucus. Not only is he the Head of the State; he is also the political head. The hon. member for Barberton knows that. [Interjections.]

Order!

Let us have another look at the argument of those hon. members. The electoral college will be composed of Whites, Coloureds and Asians in the new dispensation. In terms of the 1977 proposals, the electoral college would also be composed of Whites, Coloureds and Asians. There was a difference, however, The difference was that in terms of the 1977 proposals there would be three Parliaments. In terms of the present Constitution Bill, there will be three Houses in one Parliament. However, there is one condition, viz. that we act in one geographic area.

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member?

No, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member still has a few turns to speak. He must abide by the rules of this House; he can put his questions to the hon. the Minister when he has another turn to speak. [Interjections.]

This principle has remained the same, however. Whether it is three Parliaments, or three Houses in one Parliament, we have always spoken of one geographic area. Even in terms of the 1977 proposals, there was never any question of three Presidents being elected and three electoral colleges being established. There would still only be a single electoral college, which would elect a single Head of State for one geographic area only. All I am therefore trying to tell hon. members, Mr. Chairman, is that they can forget about their argument, their sanctimonious attitude, and their attempts to try and tell us what is domination and what is not. All this carries no weight with us.

Daan carries quite a lot of weight. [Interjections.]

We believe that this electoral college is being composed in a fair and just way in order to accommodate two groups of people who in the past have not had the privilege of participating in the election of a Head of State in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address myself at once to the hon. member for Barberton. It seems to me that he and the hon. member for Rissik do not belong to the same political party, because they are arguing from totally opposite points of view. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Barberton is sitting next to the hon. member for Pietersburg. If I remember correctly, however, the hon. member for Pietersburg was not present in the Chamber when the hon. member for Barberton was speaking.

Yes, I was.

The hon. member was in fact present in the Chamber? Well, that makes matters much worse. [Interjections.] What was the accusation made against me by the hon. member for Rissik and the hon. member for Pietersburg, Mr. Chairman? They alleged that I was enlarging the State community.

But you said so yourself.

No, wait a minute. Take it easy. I said that we were extending participation in the democratic process. That is something totally different. The hon. member really should pay attention for a change. They accused me of enlarging the State community. The implication of that is quite clear. It is that I am now enlarging the State community to include Coloureds and Asians, and that I am making them South African citizens, which they have not been up to now. These are the facts.

Oh, no.

Yes, of course. Hon. members cannot deny this, Mr. Chairman. These are the facts.

However, what does the hon. member for Barberton say? Reacting to an interjection by the hon. member Dr. Odendaal, the hon. member for Barberton wanted to know what would become of Black South African citizens living outside the independent national States. That is exactly what the hon. member for Barberton asked. I think he and the hon. member for Pietersburg, as well as the hon. member for Rissik, of course, really need to sit down and talk things over. [Interjections.] I think they should have a talk about the concept of which persons are South African citizens and who belongs to the South African nation. This is something they must decide among themselves, so that, at least, they may not appear in such a ridiculous light when they argue in this House. However, I shall leave the matter at that. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Barberton must listen now. What did the hon. member do then? He said he did not consider it correct to refer in this House to a former State President. He said he did not believe he should be brought into this debate. Let us just examine the merits of the hon. member’s standpoint in this connection. In the first place, I did not bring the State President into the debate.

The Minister of Health and Welfare did.

No, he did not. He brought the former Prime Minister into this debate, and former Prime Ministers cannot get away from their statements in this House. However, let us assume that the hon. member for Barberton is right. See what the hon. member for Rissik is doing. Look at the disservice he is doing Mr. Vorster. Now I am not even referring to secret letters. He said that he had put certain questions to Mr. Vorster, that Mr. Vorster had answered them, but that this is not the occasion to say what Mr. Vorster said. The implication is that Mr. Vorster told him something which was different from what it says in Hansard.

No.

Then they say that we must not bring Mr. Vorster into the debate. They go further. Mr. Vorster’s name is being used in CP pamphlets.

We use your name in our pamphlets too.

Order!

But the hon. member for Barberton argued that it was wrong to do so. He sanctimoniously declared that we should not do such things and that he did not want to debate in this way. All I can tell the hon. member for Rissik is that he should please take to heart the advice of the hon. member for Barberton. That advice, if he means it, could be put to good use by the hon. member for Rissik.

I want to go further. The arguments advanced by the hon. member for Rissik are at variance with those of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen. Listen to what he says. He must tell me if I am being unfair to him, because that is not my intention.

Are you dealing with me now?

Yes.

I am listening.

He says that in the light of the present numbers of the various population groups, it is fair that the Whites should be in a majority in the electoral college.

If one takes the majority concept as a basis.

Yes, but the hon. member is arguing on that basis, after all.

That is correct.

Very well then, that is his basis.

But why are you getting worked up, then?

Sir, I am not getting worked up. I just want to avoid any misunderstanding between us. The hon. member says that I have quoted him correctly if we are talking on the basis of the majority concept. He said that this was the concept which they used as their premise. Is the hon. member still with me?

Yes.

Very well, Sir. Then I want to say that while the hon. member for Barberton should give the hon. member for Rissik a briefing, he as a senior member should do me the favour of briefing the hon. member Mr. Theunissen, because the hon. member Mr. Theunissen is arguing exactly the opposite of what the hon. member for Rissik is arguing. [Interjections.] It is a fact. The whole argument of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen is exactly the opposite of what the hon. member for Rissik is arguing. The hon. member for Rissik does not have a problem with the present position; his problem is related to the future. The problem of the hon. member Mr. Theunissen, however, is a problem which is related to the present position.

Let us take it a little further. The hon. member for Rissik has done the House a great favour, because he has given a number of replies to questions in the minds of members of his own party. He said he had been here in 1961.

Not here; just in the land of the living.

Yes, that is very interesting, because he said that Dr. Verwoerd never thought or anticipated in 1961 that there would be a mixed Government in this country one day. He nods in agreement. He says that he said so. This just shows that what I said was correct. I said that it was not possible to see 20 or 30 years into the future. [Interjections.] Just look at what has happened in spite of the fact that Dr. Verwoerd did not anticipate mixed government. The hon. member himself advocated mixed government. In terms of his definition, the hon. member advocated mixed government. Hon. members need not take my word for this. Let us examine … [Interjections.] Sir, have you not given a ruling on private conversations while the debate is being conducted? The hon. member himself and other hon. members of the CP advocated mixed government.

That is untrue.

It is not untrue. It is a fact.

I did not advocate it.

If the hon. member did not advocate it, he was disloyal from the start. [Interjections.] I think this is most probably the truth. What the hon. member for Kuruman has just said is the admission which should have been made long ago, and that is that he did not advocate this, but that he did come to this House under the banner of the NP.

It is because I did not advocate it that I am now sitting on this side.

That was the reason why it was necessary to investigate what was going on in his constituency. [Interjections.]

The hon. member for Rissik … [Interjections.] Sir, that was a slip of the tongue, not a personal remark. Let us be frank with one another. I do not blame the hon. member for having changed his mind. If we want to be honest with one another, there is not a single one of us in this House who is not prepared to adopt new policies when circumstances have changed. Whether this is right or wrong is not the point. We are all trying to find solutions, are we not? After all, the hon. member for Rissik rejected the idea of a homeland up to 1982. Surely it is not necessary to say in private conversations that this is not true. The hon. member did reject the idea of a homeland. However, he no longer rejects it.

He now advocates it.

Yes, he now advocates it. And he is fully entitled to do so. However, he cannot deny that this was not foreseen by Dr. Verwoerd in 1961. Surely the hon. member for Rissik knows that it was rejected.

As being impractical.

Yes, as being impractical.

It was not rejected in principle. [Interjections.] Mixed government was rejected in principle.

I cannot put it any more clearly than the hon. member did in the remark he just made. The fact is that the hon. member for Rissik rejected it. I very clearly recall that on 3 November 1981, if I remember correctly, the hon. member for Waterberg said that it was not practical and that for this reason it was not the policy. He rejected it.

It is not attainable.

He says it is not attainable. It does not matter what word he uses. [Interjections.] What did he say exactly nine months later—an entirely natural period—on 3 August 1982? Then it had suddenly become attainable. I should like to point out to the hon. member for Rissik that he admitted in his own argument that we do not have the gift of prophecy. When he said that we were not all prophets, it occurred to me that there was no one in this House who was a prophet, but that is not an argument. The hon. member will understand, therefore, that one finds it difficult to follow the arguments, and in the final analysis the hon. member knows that in terms of this measure, as in terms of the 1977 proposals, the electoral college will be entrenched. The hon. member will also concede that he never argued about its entrenchment.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No, I am dealing with the hon. member for Rissik.

It is a much better practical principle.

I know that, so let us stop asking one another …

What the truth is.

How will the hon. member understand what the truth is? Let us stop quibbling about what is going to happen in the year 2020, because our task is to do what circumstances require of us in the year of Our Lord 1983, and that is what we are doing here.

Amendment 5 negatived (Conservative Party dissenting).

Amendment 7 negatived and amendment 8 dropped (Conservative Party dissenting).

Amendment 9 agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 8, in line 13, to omit “secret ballot” and to substitute:
   way of a division in open session

The election of a State President in the new dispensation is a very delicate matter. Since the State President is being granted extraordinary powers, dictatorial powers, within the framework of the Constitution Bill, it is important to South Africa, and to the Whites in South Africa in particular, who the State President will be, who can be elected as State President, to occupy this exceptionally powerful position.

Clause 8 provides that the State President must be qualified to be a member of any one of the Houses of Parliament. The State President could therefore be a White, Coloured or Indian. Clause 8 provides that the electoral college, which has to elect the State President, will consist of 50 White members, 25 Coloured members and 13 Indian members. This gives the White Chamber a majority of 12.

The governing party is telling the public that the Whites have a majority in the electoral college and that the State President will be a White. The public is being told that as long as the NP is in power, the State President will be a White and a Nationalist. With a White State President and a White House, the Whites will retain …

Order! I must point out to the hon. member that this clause only provides for the method of election. The hon. member must therefore be extremely careful.

I should like to abide by your ruling, but I also want to point out to you how important the election of this person is.

But that has got nothing to do with the method of election.

In my opinion, the method of election will also determine the importance of the person. The Government says that with a White House and a White State President, the Whites will retain control, their future will be secure and its wishes will be carried out in this country. Although the CP rejects the Constitution Bill …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: It is my contention that the hon. member is out of order, since what is described in this clause, is the nomination of candidates and the election of the State President. It has got nothing to do with his powers and authority.

I have already pointed out to the hon. member for Kuruman that the method of election, and only the method of election, i.e. the nomination procedure and the voting procedure, who shall preside, and so on, is at issue, and not any peripheral implications.

Sir, I should very much like to show you why I am moving the amendment that it should not be a secret ballot.

Then the hon. member must speak about that.

That is the point I was getting to.

Order! This is a very specific clause which does not allow much room for digressions.

Although the CP rejects the Constitution Bill, we should like the assurance to be incorporated into the election procedure that the State President will, in fact, be a White. The Whites have a majority of 12 in the electoral college, and if seven members of the White House agree to the candidate of the Coloured House …

Order! The composition of the electoral college is irrelevant here. I want to point out once again to the hon. member that this clause is very specific. It only provides for the method of nomination and election.

I should very much like to show you why we have moved the amendment that this should not be a secret ballot and that it should take place by way of a division. To be able to do so, I want to give an example. One cannot simply say that a secret ballot or a division is satisfactory. I should like to try to motivate why we are moving an amendment that a division should take place, instead of having a secret ballot.

In this case, where there is a secret ballot, seven or more members can vote against the candidate for whom they are supposed to vote.

That is CP gossip.

The hon. member who says that this is CP gossip, must stand up and tell us whether I am wrong.

Order! The hon. member need not react to interjections that are irrelevant.

If seven members of the electoral college vote for someone other than the person for whom they are supposed to vote, a person of colour could become the State President of South Africa. I want to give an example. If the CP grows, as it is doing at present, the NP and the PFP could form a coalition. Seven or more Prog members of the coalition could possibly be included in the electoral college, whilst members of the PFP do not object to a Coloured or an Indian becoming State President. Those seven members could then see to it, by way of a secret ballot, that South Africa has a Coloured or an Indian State President. I have therefore moved this amendment in order to prevent this. It will ensure that the Whites vote for the candidate nominated by the White House.

Mr. Chairman, as you have said, clause 8 makes provision for the procedure with regard to the nomination of, and voting for, a State President.

I am surprised that the hon. member for Kuruman is objecting to one of the important components of clause 8, viz. that of a secret ballot. I listened attentively to the hon. member’s arguments. Apparently, his main argument is that the NP and the PFP could possibly form a coalition in the distant future. This unholy alliance, which has existed between the PFP and the CP for weeks, very clearly demonstrates that the kind of coalition he is speaking about is not possible. I shall leave the matter at that, since it is not relevant now.

I am also surprised that a representative of the public in 1983, i.e. 111 years after the last such representative objected to a secret ballot, is objecting to it again. I want to explain my statement. This system of voting was adopted in the British House of Commons in 1872. This method of voting was adopted as an important voting procedure. [Interjections.]

Order!

This took place as a result of the method that had been adopted in Australia in 1856, which was known as the Australian Ballot. In due course. This system was adopted by the Free World as time went by, until it had been adopted by all the States of America by 1950. After 111 years, the hon. member for Kuruman is objecting to this important method of voting. He reminds me of a certain J. S. Mill, who also objected to this 111 years ago, and claimed that one was dealing with a function that should take place in public. What is important, is that the British House of Commons rejected that argument. They did so for two important reasons. The first is that although the governing party in Britain is also called the Conservative Party, it has always realize that this name does not entitle one to lose one’s head and to do foolish things. The second important reason is that the essence of this important component, viz. the secret ballot, tells us that the voter must be able to cast his vote freely, fearlessly, without prejudice, without the fear of intimidation and without embarrassing himself or anyone else. That is the essence of this system, and what has the result of this been? The result has been that this component has been incorporated into every possible constitution or measure dealing with elections throughout the Free World, in South Africa as well. Our present Constitution of the Republic also contains this important component in terms of section 9(5), viz. the secret ballot. Consequently, it would be imprudent, unreasonable and extremely foolish to amend subsection (5) of clause 88, as the hon. member has moved in his amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the little joke to which the hon. member for Newton Park treated us actually cuts both ways, for a few days ago I saw the PFP vote with the NP on three consecutive occasions. So that is an argument which we need not take any further. I expect that hon. member to come up with something better than such nonsense. The hon. member said that there were two reasons why the British House of Commons had voted against it. The first reason was that they did not want to do such a foolish thing, and the second one was that people should be able to vote freely and without fear of intimidation. However, we are now moving away from the Westminster system. The examples which the hon. member mentioned here were Australia, Great Britain and the USA. I concede that it has also been said that it will not be possible to move away from all aspects of the Westminster system. Now we have the situation, however, that we are entering a new dispensation under which we shall have three different components. Now I want to ask that hon. member whether in his opinion, if a motion of no confidence were to be moved in the Government or in the State President, this should also be done in secret? Why should his election take place in secret? When a motion of no confidence is moved in him, however, should this be done publicly by way of an open division? Members of the three Chambers will go to the electoral college with a mandate, or is the hon. member suggesting that each of them will be able to go to that electoral college with a free and open choice? They will go there with a mandate, and they are going to carry out that mandate which they have received from their caucus, from their party or from the governing party. Is that not true? What would be wrong with it if those people who have received a mandate, an open mandate, which is known to everyone in the country, were to carry out that open mandate in public? What is wrong with that? Why would there be intimidation? Why would there be fear? After all, everyone would be acting in terms of a mandate and on the instructions he had received from his caucus. To speak of fear and intimidation is no argument, therefore. Just as justice should be seen to be done, I think the same should apply to an important matter such as the election of a State President. Under these circumstances there is absolutely nothing wrong with that vote being taken in public. It happens every day in this House, and the position should be the same in this case.

Mr. Chairman, I must say it honestly surprises me that the hon. member for Brakpan should try to make out a case here with regard to the suspension or discharge of the State President under the proposed new dispensation, and that he should advance the method according to which this will be done as a reason why it is desirable that members of the electoral college should vote for more than one candidate when the Head of State has to be elected. I believe that the hon. member for Brakpan will concede to me that such an argument simply does not hold water. When it comes to the suspension of the State President, after all, it concerns only one person. Surely it is made quite clear that when only one candidate has been nominated for election as State President, no election is held at all. In that case the candidate is simply declared elected. However, when more than one candidate has been nominated for election, a vote will in fact be taken by secret ballot.

However, there are certain things which I should now like to ask the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Kuruman. I shall begin with the hon. member for Brakpan. He says that we should not have said that people should feel free and unafraid, and that they should also be free of intimidation, when a vote is taken. The argument which the hon. member for Brakpan advances in order to substantiate this statement is the fact that we are now moving away from the Westminster system. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member cannot advance the fact that we are moving away from the Westminster system as a reason why, all of a sudden, people should no longer be enabled to vote without fear and without intimidation. Surely that is what the hon. member’s whole argument boils down to. Mr. Chairman. This kind of argument does not become the hon. member at all.

Who in the NP has intimidated you?

Mr. Chairman, I shall reply to the hon. member for Barberton under more appropriate circumstances.

However, I now want to come to the hon. member for Kuruman. When we had to elect a new Prime Minister, did the hon. member for Kuruman not vote by secret ballot in our own caucus, of which he was a member, after all? [Interjections.] No, I am not putting this question to other hon. members. Did the hon. member for Kuruman not vote by secret ballot? I am putting the question only to the hon. member for Kuruman. After all, the hon. member knows that this is the method which we have been following through the years. We are all used to it. I believe that the hon. member for Kuruman is deeply grateful for the fact that he could vote in secret, because he voted against the present hon. Prime Minister. [Interjections.]

How do you know?

No, I am only addressing the hon. member for Kuruman at the moment, Mr. Chairman. [Interjections.] I am not addressing the hon. member for Brakpan. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I am not very anxious to talk to the hon. backbencher member Mr. Theunissen. He represents no one in this House. [Interjections.] That hon. member should understand that we prefer to talk to someone who does represent people in this House. [Interjections.]

Order! I have now allowed the hon. member for Roodeplaat to make his statement on this aspect. However, this clause has nothing to do with the election of a Prime Minister.

Very well, Mr. Chairman. The clause deals with the election of the new Head of State. It also deals with voting by secret ballot. At the moment, the Prime Minister is elected by secret ballot from the ranks of the majority party.

However, I want to come back to the hon. member for Kuruman. This hon. member…

But you voted for Pik, Koos.

No, I voted for P. W. Botha. [Interjections.] I worked for P. W. Botha, too, and you know that. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Kuruman raised the hypothetical question of what would happen if seven people were to swing, as he put it. According to him, it is possible that the wrong man could then be elected. I want to make this promise to the hon. members of the CP. There are no more “swingers” in the NP. [Interjections.] That is point number one. [Interjections.] Point number two, Mr. Chairman, is that now for the first time I am happy with votes taken by secret ballot, for at least we can count all the heads now and we can get the numbers to tally every time. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, we support this clause as printed.

Mr. Chairman, in the first place I want to say that the existing constitution contains exactly the same provision as this clause for the election of the State President as far as voting by secret ballot is concerned. This is my first reply to that. Therefore it is established practice.

Finally, I want to support the hon. member for Roodeplaat by saying that if the hon. members of the CP had still been on this side, I would have accepted the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has said that the present constitution provides for voting by secret ballot. That is where our problem lies. When a secret vote is taken under the present constitution, a White State President is being elected, while under the new constitution, a White Coloured or Indian State President can be elected. [Interjections.]

Order! That point has already been made. The hon. member has made that point himself.

Sir, I also want to ask—we have not yet received a reply to this—why, while the voting will be public when a motion of no confidence is moved in the State President, there should be voting by secret ballot when he is being elected.

Mr. Chairman, the solution is not as difficult as the hon. member for Kuruman is trying to suggest, in the sense that we are dealing here with two different bodies. The one body is an electoral college, and it is traditional in South Africa and elsewhere that when a vote is taken in an electoral college, it is done by secret ballot. At least, this is what our present constitution provides. A motion of no confidence, on the other hand, is moved in the Houses of Parliament, and there voting traditionally takes place by division. For that reason alone, the two cases are different. In the light of the fact that it is customary at the moment for the vote to be taken by secret ballot, I want to say that if we were to change this, it would amount to a motion of no confidence in the members of the electoral college. We on this side of the House have no wish whatsoever to move a motion of no confidence in the members who are elected to serve in the electoral college. We have no problem with that. [Interjections.] I know that the hon. members of the CP do not trust the hon. members on this side of the House, but that is really not relevant at this stage. What is important is that we choose them and that we trust them. That is enough for us.

Mr. Chairman, we have just had a very interesting division. The hon. member for Newton Park accuses us of voting with the PFP, but immediately after having said so, he himself votes with them. For a Springbok hooker, that was a political “foot-up”. What is clause 9 about? It is about the tenure of office of Parliament and about the removal from office of the State President. I now move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 10, after line 10, to insert:
   1. (c) if the House in respect of which he was qualified to be nominated or elected and take his seat as a member passes a motion of no confidence in him.

This amendment provides a further check on the State President. It is directly related to his term of office. In other words, it specifies when his term of office has to end.

It is well known that the State President has very wide powers. Moreover, this is undoubtedly one of the strongest points of criticism levelled at the legislation as a whole, viz. the so-called dictatorial powers of the State President. This arises from the fact that the post of the symbolic Westminster State President is now being combined with that of the political Head of State, namely the Prime Minister. This entails many implications and for that reason it is necessary that this extra control be incorporated in order to keep a check on the tenure of office of the State President. In the past the State President performed the function of control, and also controlled the political head, the Prime Minister, by way of the reserve powers at his disposal, the conventions and the other powers. In this legislation the intervention of the Appeal Court is excluded in certain instances. The State President has very wide powers, for example, the power to specify what are own and what are general affairs. When we come to clause 14 we shall prove that there are no own affairs; that in fact, the concept of own affairs is a farce. The State President appoints Ministers—any number of them—and he also specifies their tenure of office. He also appoints 25 members of the President’s Council. He therefore occupies a very powerful position. He controls the Cabinet and the President’s Council and he determines what are own and general affairs. Those are tremendously wide powers. [Interjections.]

One of the points of criticism is that there is insufficient control over the State President. The amendment printed in my name merely provides for additional controls. After all, there are so few; now we are adding one extra.

In this regard I should like to refer to the comments submitted to the Select Committee by one of the departments of the University of South Africa. I quote—

I therefore find myself in the good company of the members of the University of South Africa as far as my amendment is concerned.

In effect, what the amendment amounts to is that the people who elect the State President must also have the right to discharge him. The question now is: Who, in effect, elects the State President? He is elected by an electoral college in which the majority, at this stage, are the Whites. Therefore he is in effect elected by the Whites, by the House of Assembly. That is a fact. My argument is that it ought therefore also to be possible, as an extra power of control, for him to be removed from office by those people. Therefore this is an extra control.

Sir, you will permit me one more minute. It has been said that this is a form of power-sharing, and I now refer to the electoral college. We in the CP do not regard the formula of 50:25:13 as power-sharing. As far as we are concerned it represents a majority decision. All it represents is the enforcing of power, and not power-sharing. Accordingly, in conclusion it is our point of view that body which in effect elects the State President, should also have the power to remove him from office, and that is why I moved the amendment.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the hon. member’s amendment, as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time, viz. that the removal from office of the State President is effected by way of a majority of all the members of the electoral college.

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the philosophy of the matter, and without dealing with the amendment, I wish to expound the philosophy of the Government and of this side of the Committee. The point was also made in the debate on a previous clause dealing with the composition of the electoral college, that it is the intention that the members of all three Houses should have a say in the election. Therefore the members of all three Houses must also have a say in the removal from office of the State President.

But surely they have that.

They would not have had it in terms of the philosophy put forward by the hon. member, because the philosophy of the hon. member as regards the removal from office, is that the House of which he can be a member must have the power to remove him from office. In that case it would mean that the members of the other Houses would not have a say in that decision on the removal from office.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You have already ruled that the amendment is not acceptable, but now the hon. member is discussing the amendment.

Order! The hon. member may not continue to debate the method of removal from office, unless he discusses the joint sitting.

Sir, the point I am trying to make is just that the method of removal from office is such that it is necessary to make a joint decision in that regard, or else it would mean in practice that one House would have control of the State President. He would have to dance to the tune of that House, or else they could do with him what they liked. The provision as it appears in the clause, merely constitutes confirmation of the philosophy that has already been evident in clause 7.

Mr Chairman, in so far as this clause goes, we have no objection to it. However, I use the expression “in so far as it goes” advisedly. I am referring to the extent to which it deals with the normal term of office of the State President. We have no objection in that regard. In so far as it deals with the termination of his office should he become disqualified or should he be removed from office by an electoral college because of misconduct or inability to perform his duties of office, we have no objection to it either. However, Sir, there is another condition in terms of which the State President should have his office terminated and that is in regard to the question of resignation, which is provided for, or else on termination of his office should he no longer have the confidence of Parliament. Clause 39(2) deals with this in the sense that it gives him an option either to resign from office or to call an election. We believe that under this clause there should be a specific and very formal statement that should he cease to have the confidence of Parliament, he will cease to be State President. I had in mind to move the same amendment on the Select Committee but I was persuaded to let it stand over and be moved as a further amendment to clause 39. However, we have re-examined the position and we believe that this is the appropriate place in which that provision should be included.

In this regard, we could have a very long and interesting discussion because the provisions regarding when and how the State President should resign or cease to hold office in relation to loss of confidence, form one of the most critical and fascinating parts of any constitution. I say this because it deals with the loss and transfer of power by democratic means. It is a confluence of the law which states certain things. It has also been regulated in the past by conventions which declared certain things, and it was also fixed by prerogatives because of the Royal prerogatives which he inherited from the British system. When we pass a new law, we can be guided to an extent by conventions and we can also be guided to an extent by prerogatives. However, we cannot have those conventions and prerogatives necessarily apply in a new constitutional system. Therefore, at best, we can consider the impact of previous conventions and prerogatives but we cannot assume that they are being transferred to this particular provision. At this stage, there ore, I wish to move the following amendments to this clause printed in my name on the Order Paper in order to initiate a discussion on this point, as follows—

1. 2. On page 10, in line 11, after “office”, to insert:
   1. (i) on each House during the same session of Parliament or the three Houses at a joint sitting—
      1. (aa) passing a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet; or
      2. (bb) rejecting any bill which appropriates revenue or money for the ordinary annual requirements or services of the: departments of State controlled by members of the Cabinet,
   2. (ii)
2. 3. On page 10, in line 20, after “(a)”, to insert “(ii)”.
3. 4. On page 10, in line 22, after “(a)”, to insert “(ii)”.

In moving this amendment I want to make it quite clear that there has come into this area a very distinct change in what have been most critically important conventions that have hitherto applied in South Africa. I am referring to the question of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister or the President, and their relationship to Parliament. I want in this regard to quote from a document that was produced by the department for the benefit of the Select Committee. It states, inter alia, as follows—

Therefore, the old convention which looked at the majoritarian system as far as members of the executive were concerned, falls away, and the President is now free …

But those clauses have been amended accordingly.

No, Sir. The hon. the Minister is quite wrong. The clause in respect of the Ministers’ Council has been amended.

That is what we are talking about.

No, we are not. I am talking about the Ministers for General Affairs. As far as the Cabinet of South Africa is concerned we have moved away from the convention that the Cabinet shall enjoy the support of the majority of the legislature. That is what I have just quoted. In terms of this convention, that falls away. In view of the fact that it does fall away, we now have to replace that convention by law. Because we cannot rely on convention we now have to rely on law in order to ensure that old consideration will still apply. Let us first of all understand that previously there were two people who came into play when there was a vote of no-confidence. There was the Prime Minister himself who could go along to the State President and advise him in a certain way, and there was the State President who had the right, by prerogative, to dissolve Parliament or not to dissolve Parliament. There was a certain convention that applied, namely that if the Prime Minister was a Prime Minister in whom Parliament had confidence, the State President acted on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, if the Prime Minister was somebody who had lost the confidence of Parliament, convention did not require him to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. In other words, if the Prime Minister no longer had the confidence of Parliament, convention did not force the State President to act on his advice. We had the classic example in September 1939 when the Prime Minister lost the confidence of the House. He went to the Governor-General and recommended that an election be held, but the Governor-General exercised his prerogative and decided against that.

We now have the situation, I must assume, where there has been a loss of confidence by Parliament in the new President, in the President as head of the executive. It cannot therefore be said that the President, as the head of the State, must now exercise a prerogative in this instance. Does a defrocked clergyman have a prerogative? How can a man who has lost the confidence of the House and of the people be the man to decide whether in fact to exercise a prerogative in favour of an election or not?

How will you have effective Government?

Quite clearly, in the old situation there were two people who came into play. There was the Prime Minister and, when the people lost confidence in him, there was the President who took over and made decisions. But now we have the situation where if there has been a deliberate vote of no-confidence in the State President, he has to resign, but how can he also then be the man who is going to make a decision about an election? He is a man in whom nobody has confidence. They have already expressed their lack of confidence in him. Quite clearly in those circumstances he should automatically cease to hold office. How can we have a situation where a man has been voted out by Parliament but still carries on in office and decides that he is going to dissolve Parliament? In those circumstances he must quite clearly resign and there must be a caretaker Government. It must be that caretaker Government, which has the confidence of the House, which either continues in office or advises the new State President that there should be an election.

It is an intolerable situation that the person whom Parliament as the elected voice of the people has voted out of office should still be able to have a presidential prerogative to decide whether he is going to get rid of that particular Parliament. When we talk of parliamentary control and of the President having to enjoy the confidence of Parliament, there is therefore only one thing that can be done. If he loses the confidence of Parliament, he should have no option but to resign and then let Parliament itself decide what should happen in due course.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sea Point as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time, viz. that in terms of clause 67(5) no resolution shall be adopted at a joint sitting.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether you are ruling that the principle was adopted at Second Reading that no decision be taken at a joint sitting?

To the best of my knowledge, the principle as accepted and applicable to a joint sitting was that no resolution be taken at such joint sitting.

Mr. Chairman, if that is your ruling then I must say it is a different ruling from the ruling we were given on the Select Committee, where in fact there was a motion to amend clause 67 to enable decisions to be taken at a joint sitting. It was certainly not ruled out of order at that stage. I think this matter should be clarified. If we are going to have rulings on minor details of this kind which thwart the whole concept of parliamentary control, it is going to be very difficult to do justice to this debate.

Mr. Chairman, may I also address you on your ruling? If one has to determine the principle I submit that, one has to decide whether the principle is the question of having joint sittings or what is to transpire at a joint sitting. I would like to suggest that the principle is actually a joint sitting, not what transpires at the joint sitting. A lot of other things may also transpire at the same time, and therefore I would suggest that at Second Reading the principle was not accepted as suggested by you and that it is quite proper to move an amendment of this nature.

I am of the opinion that the principle at Second Reading was that the joint sittings can be held for discussion. It was quite clearly stated that no resolution shall be adopted at such a meeting. In fact, subsection (5) states that no resolution shall be adopted at such joint sittings.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, if one moves to delete that, which is perfectly proper, then that is a proper amendment to move, and therefore that should not have been allowed either. I say, with great respect, here we have an utter contradiction because when one is allowed to move an amendment to delete something which would then in fact create a different situation, you are now saying that one is competent to do that. That cannot be right, and I would ask you with respect to either consult the Chairman of Committees or Mr. Speaker because it is a matter of some consequence.

There appears to be some difference of opinion on this. I am therefore prepared to allow this and to allow the Committee to decide on this. I now put the amendments moved by the hon. member for Sea Point.

Mr. Chairman in fact the idea and what the hon. member for Sea Point is putting forward is to allow the existing conventions that exercise parliamentary control over the Head of Government to remain under the new circumstances, or to adapt them so that they fit in with the new dispensation. When one considers the various situations that could arise in the present dispensation and project them onto the new dispensation, the implication of the clause as it reads at present, read together with the other clause, is not so far off the mark. The existing position is that when a Prime Minister loses the confidence of this House, he must submit his resignation. But he can also advise the State President that an election ought to take place. Theoretically the State President then has the prerogative of deciding against that. However, when one looks at history, one sees that prerogative is usually exercised only in the event of the most extreme crisis. What is more, the cases when that prerogative was in fact used have in each case been extremely contentious. Therefore, one would be able to make out a case that prerogative ought not really to exist. In the present circumstances the Head of the Government has the choice simply to resign, or to resign and at the same time request the State President to call an election. In terms of the provisions in the Constitution Bill, as the hon. member for Sea Point wants them changed he would not have a choice. He would simply have to resign. He would not be able to request an election. Now the entire control over the system is dissipated as a result to that point, because now the Houses, or a different body, will have to find a new President to designate. That President will then have to decide whether he wants to call an election or not. My argument is that the normal procedure is that when the Houses loses confidence in the Government, an election takes place. That is the normal procedure that ought to be followed. In terms of the existing provision as it appears in the Constitution Bill, this is what would logically happen. Therefore there would be an election unless the State President considered that he stood no chance of ever winning an election again because the swing that took place in the Houses was so hopelessly against him that he could achieve nothing by calling an election. All he could do then, would be to resign, withdraw and leave it at that.

However, one should also see the matter from a somewhat different point of view. At a given stage, when that specific State President is elected, an election is held in the three Houses. In the existing climate, that President would therefore be designated by those three Houses—by the electoral college of those three Houses. However, what will happen when the climate changes? Of course, it is not always clear why the change of climate has come about. It could have happened at one of three places. The cause could lie with the President himself, with the members of the various Houses or even with the population. If the changes occurred simultaneously in the population and among the members of the three Houses, then it is clear that the President is out of touch with affairs and that he ought to resign. After all, he will not, then, be able to win an election. In the original climate both the Houses and the State President were in accord with the population. At a later stage, however, the Houses have declared that they are no longer in accord with the State President. If the State President were still to be of the opinion that he had another opportunity to come to power, and if the Houses were in fact out of touch with the population, then the State President should be able to exercise that option. That is something that can in fact happen. It can indeed happen that the representatives get out of touch with the population. This can happen within a specific period. Therefore I believe that the head of Government ought indeed to have that option. He ought to be able to exercise the option of deciding when he wants to call an election or when he wants to resign.

Another result of the provision proposed by the hon. member for Sea Point is that the moment those three Houses pass a motion of no confidence in him, the President is simply removed from office. Then there is a discontinuity; and this will occur in a moment of crisis. It could only be a moment of crisis if these three Houses decided to remove the President from office and adopted a motion of no confidence in him. Therefore, I would say that what the effect of the existing provision amounts to, is that while the election is being called, the President, together with his Cabinet, carry on with their task as an interim Government. In fact, they would be acting as a caretaker government until after the election, when the new President would be elected.

We are dealing here with two possible situations. Either the President can say that he is not making himself available for re-election and that he is therefore retiring, and will only conduct affairs until that date, or he can decide to make himself available for re-election, in which eventuality he will continue to govern in such a way that he can be re-elected, Therefore, although he has already been removed from office by Parliament, he is still subject to the judgment of the population and of the next electoral college. Therefore he is not entirely free of the existing control. For that reason I believe it is better to allow that State President, who will at that stage be running the Government, to carry on as caretaker governor until the next election is past, viz. until a newly-elected President, elected by newly elected Houses, can take over in his place. I believe that is better than causing the double disruption caused by an election for the Houses together with a Presidency that has to be filled anew. Therefore I propose that we retain the existing provision in terms of which the President will have the choice either to resign or to call an election. After all, that is not far removed from the existing convention. Nor does it enable the President to carry out any kind of coup de’état. Therefore there is no danger. There is control over the period for which he is able to carry on as caretaker government. He is subject to control in the sense that if he does not behave himself during that period, he will not be re-elected. There is all that control over him. Indeed, he is subject to that control for a very short term. Therefore it is very intensive. For that reason I do not believe it necessary to impose additional control. I suggest that the motion of the hon. member for Sea Point could in certain circumstances cause serious disruption to the political system. For that reason I do not wish to support it.

You will see, Sir, that thus far I have said nothing whatsoever about one passage of the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point, viz. that the motion of no confidence could be passed in a joint sitting of the three Houses. In fact, his condition has two legs. The first is “on its being passed in all three houses” and the other is “at a joint sitting”. As far as the joint sitting is concerned, I want to say that I am quite unable to accept that part either, for different reasons. I therefore propose that we do not accept the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point, for the reasons I have mentioned.

Mr. Chairman, the problem that has come to light in this particular clause arises because of the combination of Head of State, a symbolic neutral figure, with Head of Government. What the hon. member for Helderkruin has said does not meet the problem that the Head of Government, a highly politicized individual, can continue to govern after having lost Parliament’s confidence. With respect to the hon. member, this is a very serious problem which one cannot allow to be glossed over as that hon. member has tried to do. The practical effect if the President as Head of Government, having lost the confidence of Parliament, then dissolves Parliament is that he is left in a position where he, as a defrocked Head of Government, as a Head of Government who has lost the confidence of Parliament, can continue to rule the country for a period of up to a year. That is an absolutely untenable situation. It is quite acceptable for a neutral Head of State to continue in office while the country goes through the process of electing a new Government.

How can he do that effectively?

Obviously he can, because he is a neutral individual and it is possible for him to take certain discretionary steps to ensure that Government continues, Government which enjoys confidence. However, under this provision as it stands the very man who has lost the confidence can exercise the option to dissolve Parliamant and continue to govern. That is a recipe for serious conflict. If one works out the timing in conjunction with other clauses, it is quite clear that a period of almost an entire year could elapse. Even if the three separate Houses adopt a motion of no confidence in February, at the beginning of the year, Parliamant has to be dissolved, notice has to be served of the election, a new House has to be called together and thus it could happen that only in November or December the new electoral college would come together. What ever the specific period may be, it is a long period and a period in which the man will rule without enjoying confidence.

I submit that this is another example of breaking the golden thread of Western democratic government. When one refers to clause 7, one sees that this is the other side of the same coin. In clause 7 the House broke the golden thread that the Head of Government must be the man who enjoys the majority support of the Parliamant of the day. The other side of that coin is that the man who continues to govern must be the man who must hold the support of the parliament of the day. To that extent this breaks that golden thread.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h00.

Evening Sitting

Mr. Chairman, before business was suspended for supper I was saying that the golden thread of Western democratic government is that the head of government must be the person who can retain the confidence of Parliament and that once he loses it he must make way for someone else who does enjoy that confidence. It is one of the absolutely cardinal principles of the democratic parliamentary form of government as practised in the Western World. The tenure of office of the head of government is wholly and completely dependent upon his retention of the confidence of the majority in the Parliament in question.

By that test clause 9, as presently framed, of the proposed new constitution is in fact one of the worst steps in the wrong direction. It makes no provision for the automatic termination of the term of office of the head of government on a motion of no-confidence. We believe it should be imperative for the man to resign upon a vote of no confidence. In that sense it is a step in the wrong direction because it is a key departure from parliamentary practice as it has taken root around the world and also in South Africa. The people of South Africa through their representatives in this Parliament, as presently constituted, have a very important measure of control over their Government. At any stage the head of the present Government can be changed by means of a vote of no confidence, by a defeat of a budget, or by a change of allegiances in the Parliament of the day. However, in terms of the proposed scheme the members will be forced into a once-off transfer of power.

When the vote is taken to elect the head of government, he is the head of government for the life of that Parliament. From that moment onwards he is almost unassailable in his grip on the office and in the power that he may exercise. Even if in the proposed new Parliament of three Chambers he were to lose the confidence of the majority of the 308 members sitting in that Parliament, or if he were to lose the confidence of two of the three houses, he cannot be removed. While it is true that the United States’ President and the French President cannot be removed by a vote of no confidence, the difference is that they have the legitimacy of a popular vote. I challenge the hon. the Minister to say where else in the Western democratic world the body that assigns the power, the body that makes the appointment, does not have the right to take it back. He must say where else such a system operates. As far as I am aware there is no place in the Western democratic world where a head of government appointed by Parliament cannot be removed by that same Parliament. In fact, it is a key mechanism of control over a parliamentary government. It confers important powers on minority groups. It confers the power to confront the Government, to combine voting strength to vote a Government out, to rebuke a Government and to form and reform alliances. The case of 1939 is indeed the classic case in our political history. This clause, in combination with certain other clauses in the Bill, changes that.

Ironically, this once-off transfer of power is more in common with the practice in the Soviet Union. [Interjections.] Hon. members must listen now. In terms of the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union the Supreme Soviet, their equivalent of Parliament, made up of delegates from the various regions, comes together to elect the Presidium, which is the executive authority of the Soviet Union. The chairman of the Presidium is also the party boss and he becomes the main man. That is what is also going to happen under this scheme. [Interjections.]

You know all about it.

That hon. member must read his Bill more closely. He is selling out his voters.

You know all about the Soviet Union.

The disturbing parallel is that the assembled MPs make a transfer of power to the executive without retaining the right to terminate the executive’s mandate at any time. This leads me to say that the NP has recently developed a very irritating habit of invoking the agreement that we should move away from the Westminster model and saying that it therefore follows that this proposal should be accepted. When the PFP talks about moving away from the Westminster model we mean something totally different from what the hon. the Minister and the governing party mean. We mean that we will borrow some good ideas from other parts of the Western democratic world. We would move away from Westminster towards Washington, for example, to borrow their concepts of a rigid constitution, a Bill of Rights and a separation of powers.

Order! The hon. member must come back to the clause.

There is a key difference, Mr. Chairman, between moving away from Westminster to some of the cardinal principles operating in some other Western capitals and what the Government clearly means when it says it wants to move away from Westminster.

Order! I have asked the hon. member to come back to the contents of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, this clause deals with terminating the office of the President on a basis of a vote of no-confidence.

Order! The hon. member is now discussing the question of moving away from Westminster to Washington. He must please come back to the clause.

Mr. Chairman, there is an important philosophical distinction.

Order! We are not discussing the philosophical aspects of the clause. We are discussing the contents of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that in so far as this clause makes no provision for the removal of a President who has lost the confidence of Parliament, bearing in mind that this new President is an executive head of government and not only the head of State, this clause moves us away from Westminster in the direction of places like—if you will permit me to say—Moscow and some of the banana republics of the world. It moves us in the direction of the non-democratic world, the despotic and less fortunate parts of the world. It is moving in that direction, away from the tried and tested principles of Western democratic practice. It is moving away from the practice that has operated in this country, in this House … [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I am merely rising to confirm that the hon. member who has just resumed his seat is an expert on the country he has just discussed.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to put on record the attitude of this party to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point and that is that we are opposed to the amendment. The reason is that we believe that the existing convention which was introduced in clause 39—when the present clause 39 was clause 41—is a better option than the one now proposed. We agree with the principle of a joint sitting. This is something that we support but the import of this amendment is that there will be only one option if a vote of no-confidence is passed. The sole option will be the resignation of the President because in terms of this amendment his term of office would terminate on a vote of no-confidence. We believe that a vote of no-confidence should lead to two options—either the removal of the President or the dissolution of Parliament. I do not want to delay the Committee and I do not want to join the filibuster brigade with long arguments but there are circumstances where obviously and logically in the case of a vote of no-confidence the President would resign because he would see no point in calling a general election which he knew he could not win. However, there are other circumstances, for instance, the crossing of the floor by a group from the governing party without the support of their electorate who then form an Opposition which passes a vote of no-confidence. In such case the probability would be—and this is the practice—there there would be a general election. We bear in mind the fact that the term of office of the President is linked directly to the term of office of Parliament. If Parliament is dissolved then, when the new Parliament meets, a new President will be elected. Therefore, the effect of exercising that option will be to terminate his own term of office and to face a new election. We believe this to be a better choice from the political point of view and the practical point of view—the choice between either accepting that he has been rejected and resigning or calling an election in which the electorate can make a determination. In terms of the amendment that has been moved, that option would be removed. The President would have to resign even though his resignation did not enjoy the support of the electorate. One could have an electorate that was opposed to the resignation of the President. However, because of the crossing of the floor by members without the backing of their constituencies, one could find that this had forced a vote of no confidence in the President. We therefore prefer the dual option which is the present convention, the present system and which we believe to be more satisfactory, and we shall oppose the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Durban Point referred to specific aspects of the proposed amendment. However, I wish to confine myself to what the hon. member for Constantia said at the beginning of his speech. I can only imagine that it is the undemocratic way in which the PFP designate their candidates that has given rise to these unfounded fears of his of a dictatorship. Exactly where they learned this way of going about matters, is a subject best passed over. When one listens to the hon. member for Constantia one can only assume that “what the heart thinks the tongue speaks”.

This clause forms an important part of the cross-checking mechanism that imposes restrictions on the State President and, indeed, makes nonsense of the stories about dictatorship that are sometimes heard. I contend that this clause, and the procedures specified therein, give greater expression to the democratic principle of responsibility to the voters than, indeed, the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point. This is an aspect which I think the hon. member for Durban Point also referred to and I shall come back to it later.

I want to confine myself to the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point, but before doing so, I just wish to refer to the background of the provisions of the clause relating to restriction or protection. In the first place, the State President is hereby subjected to all the limitations of an ordinary member of Parliament. Moreover, his term in office is linked to the term of Parliament and accordingly he is directly accountable to the voters on a regular basis. It is interesting to note that the CP, who are now joining in so lustily in the chorus of accusations of a dictatorship, proposed in the Select Committee that a fixed term of seven years be specified. Apparently, therefore, they want to do away with this principle of responsibility.

Another point which the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point dealt with is the removal from office of the State President due to misconduct or inability. Apart from that, the hon. member for Sea Point states that it must be possible to remove the President from office by way of a motion of no confidence in the Houses, whether separately or in a joint sitting. As far as a joint sitting is concerned, although the amendment was accepted for discussion, I contend that it conflicts with the principle of the constitution as embodied in clause 67(5), viz. that no decisions are taken at a joint sitting. I shall therefore leave that aspect at that.

As far as separate sittings are concerned, various problems were clearly outlined by the hon. member for Helderkruin. I just wish to mention the following points briefly. In the first place, it is interesting that the arguments advanced by the hon. member for Constantia, viz. that it is customary that the organ that elects a person must in fact remove him as well, do not support his premise. The mechanism in the legislation makes provision for just that and, indeed, by this means the power of control and supervision vested in the electoral college and in Parliament as a whole, is given teeth.

Secondly, the clause as it stands makes provision for effective continuity, in that immediately after he vacates his office, another State President who is able to take over the Government is designated.

The third aspect touched on by the hon. member for Durban Point—I think the hon. members for Sea Point and Constantia are overlooking this—is that when the Houses come forward with such a motion of no confidence individually, it may indeed be the case in that situation that it is Parliament that has lost the confidence of the voters, rather than the State President.

This amendment now provides that in the event of Parliament telling the State President that he is no longer trusted and that he must therefore resign, he may quickly and effectively test the opinion of the voters by way of an election to determine where their confidence does in fact lie. In that way one can avoid the situation as sketched by the hon. member for Durban Point. This would indeed give effect to the expression of the democratic principles that the State President is subject to the will of the voters.

Accordingly I should very much like to support the clause on behalf of this side of the House and reject the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. members for Helderkruin and Durban Point and the hon. member who has just resumed his seat have all tried to suggest that the clauses of the Bill as they stand all come close to the existing convention as far as the resignation of the head of government is concerned. The clause as it stands without the amendment which I moved is a fundamental departure from the existing convention, not only in South Africa, but in any Western democratic country.

Neither in South Africa nor in any other Western democratic country can the head of government in whom a motion of no confidence has already been passed himself call for the dissolution of Parliament. He is not in a position to do so.

That can happen now.

If the hon. members say this is going to be a new convention, let us argue on that basis, but what we must not say is that we are actually transferring the old convention into the new system. I think the hon. the Minister can help us. Can he tell us of any country with a parliamentary or an executive presidential system where the man in whom a vote of no confidence has already been passed can in fact determine not to resign but to dissolve Parliament? I do not know of one.

Probably Albania.

In South Africa we had an illustration of what happens when members walk across the floor of the House. In 1939 the Prime Minister of the day in whom confidence had been lost was not able to dissolve Parliament. We had a recent case in Western Germany when the same thing happened. When Genscher of the FDP left the SDP and joined the DCU they were not able to dissolve the House. It was not Helmut Schmidt who could decide to call a general election; it was only the new Government in whom the House had confidence that could in fact go to the President to ask him to dissolve the House. In this connection I want to use this phrase: One cannot have a corpse arranging his own funeral [Interjections.]

Order!

When a motion of no confidence has been passed, one has a person who is no longer in effect the Prime Minister or the State President; he is a man in whom the public has lost confidence. It is not he who can decide whether there will be an election or not. What he has to do is to get out of office. He has to get out of office in order to allow somebody else to decide whether there is going to be an election or not.

I want to say there is a fundamental departure not only from the South African practice but also from any normal and reasonable practice in any democratic country. Here Parliament is being denied the right to get rid of its Government. The Bill now provides that the President must decide. There is a fundamental departure. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister, and I hope he is going to respond just now, that in the statement issued by his department it is said that we have departed from the existing convention to allow Ministers to be appointed on merit and not by virtue of their enjoying majority support in the legislature. This is a new convention. In the past, in South Africa and elsewhere, Ministers have had to enjoy majority support in the legislature. Now it is said by the hon. the Minister’s department that we are departing from this convention. We are now entering an era when the executive, the Cabinet of the day, does not have to enjoy the support of the legislature. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he accepts this second fundamental departure from the principles of democracy as we have always known them in South Africa.

We believe it is fundamental that if the public through Parliament has lost confidence in the Government, that Government must go out of office and somebody else must decide what procedure must be followed thereafter, but not the person who no longer has the confidence of the Parliament who voted for him originally.

I come now to the other aspect of my amendment which has not been debated so far, namely whether the President should also be able to be removed by a joint sitting of the three Houses. The procedure in this respect is that he can be removed by resigning or dissolving parliament if there is a separate motion of no confidence by each of the Houses. Can you imagine what sort of a situation this creates? It means that any two Houses can repeatedly vote for a motion of no confidence in a Minister or in the Cabinet, but that if one House retains confidence in that Cabinet, it will continue to rule. What kind of a banana republic is this when two Houses and perhaps just less than a majority of the members of the third House vote for motions of no confidence, but the State President and his Cabinet are able to continue to rule? I did some arithmetic on this. Let us say that the Coloured and Indian Houses vote against and let us assume that 88 members of the other House also vote against, the fact remains that as long as 90 members of the White House, namely fewer than 30% of the members of Parliament, vote for a motion of confidence in him, he can continue to govern. We therefore have the situation in terms of this clause that one can have a minority presidency. Even if two Houses and 80 out of the 178 members of the other House vote against a Minister or a Cabinet, the President can ignore it, because the only circumstances in which he can be compelled either to resign or to call an election, are when all three Houses vote against him. It means that any one House can block the resignation of the President or the dissolution of Parliament. The President can continue to govern as long as one of the Houses supports him. What kind of democratic procedure is this? Surely we want a system in South Africa where the President governs with the goodwill and the support of the people whom he governs. Yet we are building into an entrenched clause in our constitution a provision that he can govern in spite of the fact that two Houses vote against him and a significant number of people in the third House as well. I want to put it to the hon. the Minister that we are changing conventions. We are moving away from prerogative. We are changing the law. However, for heaven’s sake, let us have some semblance of democracy in the system. Let us at least ensure that if somebody loses the confidence of Parliament he is out. Let us at least ensure that a President cannot continue to govern if he only has the support of the one House. The only way of resolving this, is to see to it that there is machinery for having a joint sitting in order to decide whether there should be a majority or not.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is it in order for the hon. member to plead a joint sitting which may accept a motion of no-confidence? That is the amendment he proposed initially and which the Chair ruled out of order.

The hon. member may proceed.

I trust that the hon. member will be suitably embarrassed when his friends tell him that my amendment was in fact ruled to be in order on this very point.

It might be said that surely it should be appropriate that the body that elects the President should also be the body that dismisses him. There can in fact be an argument with regard to this constitution because in fact it is not even so that the body which elects the President is the body that can dismiss him.

But your amendment does not even suggest that.

I do not want it. The hon. the Minister knows my view on this. If one is looking for consensus government in South Africa one cannot have a simple majoritarian line drawing a line through all the decision-making processes. In fact what one needs in South Africa and what we want under this clause is to see that there are cross-cutting majorities. In order to govern one must have broader consensus than just a simple majority in a single electoral college which is dominated by Whites. I would believe that if this Government is sincere in saying that it is looking for consensus government and if it wants to govern with the goodwill of the Coloureds, Indians and Whites, then it should be prepared to subject its continuation in office to the decision of Coloureds, Indians and Whites and not leave it to one House only. I put it again. I believe that the clause as it stands at the moment is a fundamental departure from the principle that has been tried and tested in South Africa and throughout democratic countries and that is that Parliament itself should have the right to get rid of the Government of the country. As long as this Government persists with this we shall know that it is not concerned about parliamentary control. What this Government is concerned about is grabbing control by means of the electoral college and then hanging on to that control irrespective of the wishes of the majority of members of Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, I am particularly interested in the vehemence of the hon. member’s plea and his claim that this is a fundamental issue that is basic to the whole Bill. I want to refer to page 68 of the Minutes of the Select Committee. On page 68 we find an amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point which reads—

That is exactly the amendment which is before this House. It is word for word the same and I have quoted it exactly as it appears here.

It says he shall hand in his resignation … [Interjections.]

No. The amendment which the hon. member for Sea Point has moved on clause 9 is exactly the same as the one I have just quoted. Then, when one turns to page 70 which deals with the record of the voting one finds that amendment No. 1 was in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time. That was an amendment moved by the CP. Amendments 2 and 3, i.e. the amendments of the hon. member for Sea Point which we have been told are fundamental to this Bill, were withdrawn with leave. This amendment which is now so fundamental and so important was withdrawn by the hon. member for Sea Point with the leave of the Select Committee. There was no vote taken on it and he therefore did not continue with it. We find on page 180 of the Minutes that when I moved an amendment to insert the option of resignation the hon. member for Sea Point accepted that amendment.

How did I word it? [Interjections.]

I am quoting the facts. The hon. member for Sea Point withdrew this amendment which is now before the Committee. There was no other one.

You are not being honest now.

I challenge the hon. member to show us any alternative amendment that he moved.

Read my alternative amendment on clause 39.

I am talking of the amendment to clause 9, which was then clause 10. [Interjections.]

Order!

When clause 39 was discussed I moved an amendment providing for the option of resignation. The hon. member for Sea Point voted in favour of that option. He then went on, however, to move his own amendment, and voted in favour of it. However, I voted against his amendment.

On what page is that?

That is on page 178 of the second report of the Select Committee on the Constitution. On page 180 hon. members will see that my amendment was agreed to without a division, while the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point was rejected with only hon. members of the PFP voting in favour of it. The point is, however, that the hon. member is moving that same amendment now in respect of clause 9. He is not moving it in respect of clause 39. He has now transferred in from clause 39, in respect of which he moved it before, and is now moving it in respect of clause 9.

So what? [Interjections.]

In the Select Committee he withdrew that same amendment after moving it in respect of clause 39.

So what?

So what? Mr. Chairman, it is typical of the inconsistency of that party. [Interjections.] It is typical of their inconsistency and their varying attitude when they are arguing in the calm and constructive atmosphere of the Select Committee in the one instance, and when they are trying to score political points here in the House, in the other instance, when they resort to using emotive phrases such as “Russian system” and all sorts of other emotional terminology. They simply do that here because they know that it will bring them the publicity they seek. [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. member for Sea Point, when dealing with these matters in the Select Committee, did not pursue this point in respect of clause 9. He argued this point in respect of another clause. He supported and voted for the option … [Interjections.]

Order! I now appeal to hon. members to afford the hon. member for Durban Point an opportunity to state his case.

He voted for the option of resignation on the one hand, or dissolving Parliament, on the other hand. In other words, Mr. Chairman, that hon. member voted in favour of the very option for which I am pleading now, and subsequently voted in favour of an amendment which would have the effect that it would negative that option by making resignation compulsory, without the option of dissolving Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, I find that sort of logic very difficult indeed to follow. [Interjections.] The hon. member votes in favour of an improvement which offers an option, and afterwards votes in favour of another amendment which destroys the option. I want to place on record that this party is still following the same line of reasoning which it did in the Select Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Sea Point advanced the argument that the State President “cannot arrange his own funeral”. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to venture to say that is exactly what the PFP are going to do in the coming referendum. They are going to be arranging their own funeral. [Interjections.]

I believe that the hon. member for Sea Point is splitting hairs. In fact, he is arguing against the philosophy of this legislation. The entire philosophy behind this legislation, as also embodied in clause 9, is, after all, that of the politics of consensus instead of the politics of conflict. However, the hon. member for Sea Point did his utmost to emphasize that conflict would occur from time to time. I contend that if his amendment were accepted, we should certainly be building conflict into the whole system.

The hon. member for Sea Point added that if a motion of no confidence in the State President were to be passed, the Government would have to resign. Indeed, that is the convention today. This is, of course, the case. I want to know from the hon. member how the State President and his government will remain in power when a motion of no confidence in them is passed. The hon. member for Sea Point refers, for example, to the budget and to other financial measures. Surely, particularly if the budget is not agreed to, the Government cannot remain in power. Surely it then has to resign and call an election.

The hon. member for Sea Point also did his very best to argue along the lines of the joint sitting. He knows full well that this measure provides very clearly that joint sittings of the three Houses will have no executive authority. Why, then, does the hon. member want to elaborate on that? I concede at once the point of the hon. member for Sea Point that all conventions at present existing will not be transferred to the new dispensation, because the new dispensation creates a new approach to government in South Africa. However, I am sure that one convention that will be taken over is the present convention that if a motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister is adopted, he will resign and call an election. That is true. I contend that convention will apply equally in the new dispensation as far as this clause is concerned.

The hon. member for Sea Point also conjured up a number of spectres about another matter. He said that if two of the Houses passed a motion of no confidence in the Government, the other House would govern in a bureaucratic way. Again I want to contend that this is in total conflict with the philosophy behind the new dispensation, viz. that consensus will be sought by whomever will be the head of state in South Africa. A head of state who lacks consensus cannot govern under this dispensation. He has to seek consensus. However, we must also ensure that we do not move away from effective government in South Africa. After all, one must have the mechanism that the body that elects the President will also be the body that can unseat the President.

Have you ever heard of democracy?

I believe that in his arguments the hon. member for Sea Point has moved away from the Bill entirely.

What does all this mean in practice? In practice we have a new situation. The posts of State President and Prime Minister are being combined. I also contend—and I think that this will probably be the case in practice—that the leader of the party representing the majority party in the electoral college will be the State President. If the people who have chosen him—the majority party in the electoral college—participate in a motion of no confidence in the State President, then surely they will be acting against him within his own party structure long before it comes to Parliament.

You have not been a member of the NP for very long.

I am a good Nationalist, but that hon. member was not. [Interjections.]

The hon. member for Constantia said that the post of State President was a highly politicized one. I contend that this is not the case. Indeed, I contend that this post is a post that is being created for the purposes of consensus government. Nor can the man elected as State President remain in active politics as a member of the House of which he was a member. Therefore he is partially removed from active politics, specifically because he also becomes the head of State of South Africa.

I believe that I have now dealt with virtually all the arguments raised. I am unable to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I simply cannot understand how the hon. member for Turffontein can say, on the one hand, that the State President will not participate in active politics, whereas just before that he said that if the State President were to act in such a way as to lose the confidence of his party, his party could kick him out. Therefore the whole intention is that the State President remains part of his own political party. I honestly cannot understand that argument advanced by the hon. member. The fundamental mistake that the hon. member for Turffontein makes is to think that consensus Government will necessarily always occur within the proposed constitution. The hon. member for Sea Point indicated what happened in West Germany. Therefore we cannot build a constitution on the assumption that consensus is always possible in these circumstances.

Allow me to come back for a moment to the hon. member for Durban Point. Before we adjourned for supper, the hon. member for Sea Point explained how it had happened that he had initially moved this amendment to clause 39, but was now moving it to clause 9. I do not know whether the hon. member for Durban Point was present earlier this evening, but the hon. member for Sea Point provided that explanation. Initially I gained the impression that the hon. member for Durban Point wanted to intimate that the hon. member for Sea Point had moved an amendment to clause 9 and then run away from it. It is the same amendment as the one on clause 39. I refer to the amendment as it appears on page 178 of the report of the Select Committee. There was a vote on that amendment and all the members of the PFP supported it, whereas the other members, including the hon. member for Durban Point, voted against it.

No, that is not correct.

The details of the vote appear on page 180 of the report. I refer to the amendments of the hon. member for Sea Point. [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must not take up the time of the Committee by constantly conversing with one another. The hon. member may proceed.

In the vote on the amendments of the hon. member for Sea Point, the three hon. members of the PFP voted in favour of the motion and all the other members voted against it. That is what I said.

I cannot quite understand the reasoning of the hon. member for Helderkruin and the hon. member for East London City. They, together with the hon. member for Durban Point, are the people who say that the impression being created that we are here creating a President with dictatorial powers, is incorrect. If the hon. the Minister wants to eliminate any possible impression that the State President may indeed be a dictator, then this is one of the fundamental aspects. The issue here is the fact that a person can stay on as State President in spite of all three Houses passing a motion of no confidence in his Government. If that is not a form of dictatorship, then I do not know what is.

I want to say to the hon. the Minister and to the hon. member for East London City that their remarks concerning the hon. member for Constantia are unworthy of them. The hon. member for Constantia was specifically discussing the principle of dictatorship. I do not wish to defend my hon. colleague, but to apply to him the Afrikaans expression “waar die hart van vol is, loop die mond van oor” is unworthy of them.

I did not make such a remark.

That is what the hon. the Minister’s remark amounted to. I think it is a remark that was unworthy of the hon. the Minister.

I did not say any such thing.

That is what I understood the hon. the Minister to say. If the hon. the Minister did not mean it that way, then I accept that.

That was the implication of his remark.

Yes, that was the implication. I repeat: If we want to eliminate the impression that the State President may be a dictator in specific circumstances, then we must accept the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. The basic argument of the hon. member for Sea Point, viz. that the prerogative to which the hon. member for Helderkruin and the hon. member for East London City referred, is not valid under these circumstances, has not been refuted. Nor can it be refuted, because we have here a totally different situation in that the positions of State President and Prime Minister are being united in one person. With the best will in the world that kind of prerogative, that kind of convention that is to apply, cannot be implemented summarily. Neither the hon. member for Helderkruin nor the hon. member for East London City effectively refuted that argument advanced by the hon. member for Sea Point. What is at issue here? It is not only a matter of the President. The issue here is that we cannot plan a constitution that we assume can only function in the optimum circumstances that we foresee. Therefore, if we want to create a sound constitution, it must make provision for the worst possible eventualities. All the hon. members on the NP side who spoke argued only on the basis that the optimum circumstances for consensus would exist. I suggest that this is the wrong point of departure. In the present situation, if a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet were to be passed, it would mean that motion would be passed with regard to members sitting in this House. After all, the Prime Minister comes from this House, and so do the Ministers. In terms of the new dispensation, however, the State President has the right to nominate anyone as a Minister, including members from outside the ranks of this House. Moreover, there is no limitation on the number of Ministers he may appoint in this way. Theoretically, he could appoint the entire Cabinet from among people from outside this House. [Interjections.] He has the right to do that.

Order! I can see where the hon. member is heading, but he must not digress too far.

No, Mr. Speaker. This is a point of vital importance. What I wish to intimate is that part of the reason why he has to resign in the present dispensation if this House passes a motion of no confidence in him, is that there are members of his Cabinet who are from this House. In a new situation, however, those members would not necessarily be from this House. Here we again have the image of a dictatorship. There is not even a limitation on the number of members he may nominate from outside this House.

Could you raise that point of order when we deal with that clause?

The hon. the Minister must not become impatient. I want to go further. Those people are not even subject to a limitation as far as their tenure of office is concerned. [Interjections.]

To continue at this point to speak about the conventions that will continue to apply, is something I cannot understand. Since the State President will now be a tremendously powerful person who can nominate his own Cabinet—as many as he likes—without them having to be members of this House, I simply cannot understand how one can say under these circumstances that the conventions still apply, because it is not true.

I wish to go further. The hon. member for Sea Point said that the State President could govern with one or two Houses. The argument has been raised that he would not be able to carry on without the support of the Ministers and a budget. However, there are two important elements that are being overlooked. The one is that the State President can govern with one House. If a specific House, e.g. this House, were to say to him that it had so little confidence in him that it would not convene, then he could continue to govern with one other House.

Where is that stated in the Bill?

Clause 37.

Order! I cannot permit the hon. member to discuss clause 37 now.

I realize that, Sir. the hon. the Minister asked me a question, Mr. Chairman. He asked where it appeared. I merely said that it appeared in clause 37. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member cannot, therefore, discuss that matter here. The hon. member must discuss that when we come to clause 37.

The point I want to bring home is the image of a possible dictator. What I am saying is that image is strengthened …

Order! The only relevant issue here is the tenure of office of the State President.

Yes, the issue is the period in office of the State President, but I am discussing the amendment moved by the hon. member for Sea Point. That amendment provides that if a motion of no confidence in him is moved by the three Houses, or if his budget is rejected, he has to resign. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member Prof. Olivier has referred here to conventions which would supposedly no longer be valid under the new circumstances. That is quite true, but the closest one can get to the convention, with the amalgamation of the posts of Prime Minister and State President, is clause 39(2)(b). This covers the essence of the argument of the hon. member for Sea Point, except that in his amendment he does not want to give the State President the option to resign. The hon. member had a great deal to say about the convention. Let us just consider what this convention says. I have here the Staatsreg van Verloren van Themaat by Wiechers. On page 180 of this book the convention says—

Wiechers goes on to say that the convention goes so far that if there is a motion of no confidence in the Government, it has no choice but to resign. It has to resign. However, he also says this—

He then goes on to quote certain British authors. He refers here to Wade and Phillips and others. He says—

He then goes on to say—

He then goes on to argue that in terms of the convention the King is also obliged—

He goes on to say that he could only find two exceptions to this during this century. The one was in Canada—hon. members will recall that it was the MacKenzie King affair, which also eventually led to problems because the person asked to form a Cabinet did not have the support of the majority either—and the second case was that of Gen. Hertzog and Gen. Smuts in 1939, when war was declared, where Sir Patrick Duncan, the Governor-General, asked Smuts to elect a Cabinet against the advice of the Government. He then goes on to discuss the dispute which arose as to whether this action was correct or incorrect. Wade and Phillips, the British writers, argue that it was in fact the right decision, because in the circumstances, if there had been another election this could have caused greater problems. However, there are also other writers who say that it was not the right action because there was insufficient voter support for it. The point I am trying to make is that the effect of the convention, except for these two exceptions this century, always led to Parliament being dissolved. The aim of the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point is, in fact, provided for in that way in clause 39(2)(b) because the State President is now compelled to dissolve Parliament unless he resigns his office. Under the circumstances I also want to point out that the argument of the hon. member for Sea Point is unacceptable if we have any intention of upholding the customs which those hon. members have also advocated, but from a different point of view.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point would quite possibly have been acceptable to the CP if he had not referred to a joint sitting. The amendment we moved simply implied that the State President had to resign when the House for which he qualifies passed a motion of no confidence in him. However, the hon. member for Randburg has now quoted authorities such as Wiechers and Wade and Phillips and all these people who are actually dealing with a situation where the King and the Prime Minister are two different people. Here we have one person, only one person and he need not resign. The old clause 7(5) provided that the conventions are retained and this is repeated in the region of clause 98. This provided that if it is not in conflict with the provisions of this legislation, they are retained. If he does not resign then he dissolves Parliament. This is in pursuance of what the hon. member for Randburg said. However, he is both King and Prime Minister. There has been a motion of no confidence against him in all three Houses. He knows he has the television behind him, all the NP newspapers behind him and the entire Press behind him. He says he is not going to resign … [Interjections.]

Order! Which clause is the hon. member discussing now?

Sir, I am talking about the clause under discussion. That State President may decide that he is not going to resign; he is going back to the people. [Interjections.]

Order!

The argument of the hon. member for Randburg fails because he is dealing with a King and a Prime Minister who are two different people. For that reason we cannot associate ourselves with that argument.

It is just a pity that the hon. member for Sea Point referred to a joint sitting. We cannot go along with this entire approach. We cannot vote either for the amendment or for the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. members of the CP and the PFP overlook in their arguments the political reality within which the State President is going to function under the new dispensation. Let us consider this practical point: If the hon. the Prime Minister had had a motion of no confidence in him passed in the NP caucus last year on 24 February there was no convention obliging him to resign as Prime Minister of South Africa, but he would have done so in any case.

Not as I know him. [Interjections.]

Order!

Sir, I think that hon. member should be the last person to make remarks about the hon. the Prime Minister. [Interjections.] I think he should be the last hon. member to make a remark about integrity.

Order! Hon. member must stop making these personal remarks about one another. This applies to everyone. The hon. member for Johannesburg West may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member for Johannesburg West said the hon. member for Rissik was the last person who should make a remark about integrity.

Order! What did the hon. member mean by that?

Sir, the hon. member for Rissik said that as he knew the hon. the Prime Minister, he would not have resigned.

The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You asked the hon. member for Johannesburg West for an explanation of what he meant by the remark he made to the hon. member for Rissik.

Order! I have ruled that the hon. member for Johannesburg West may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The insinuation which the hon. member for Johannesburg West made was that the hon. member for Rissik was the last person who should talk about integrity. That was also what he said. The insinuation he was making, therefore, was that the hon. member for Rissik had no integrity. The hon. member was therefore making an unparliamentary reflection, and I ask you to order him to withdraw it.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: The hon. member for Johannesburg West argued that in terms of practical politics a Prime Minister should have resigned as head of the Government last year if his caucus had passed a motion of no confidence in him. I maintain that it implied that the Minister would have behaved with integrity if he had resigned. The hon. member for Rissik reacted to that and said: “Not as I know him”. The hon. member for Johannesburg West then reacted that, in turn, by saying: “That hon. member should be the last person to talk about integrity”. I say that he was entitled to say that.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address you on this point. I think the hon. the Minister is a little confused. An hon. member on this side of the House asked whether the hon. member for Johannesburg West was allowed to say that the hon. member for Rissik should be the last person to talk about integrity. Now the hon. the Minister is advancing a different argument. [Interjections.]

Order! I want to ask hon. members to give the hon. member an opportunity to state his point of order.

I am not stating a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I am arguing …

No, the hon. member may only state a point of order now.

Then I wish to state a point of order, Mr. Chairman. It is that you allowed the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to address you on a point of order …

The hon. the Minister was stating a further point of order. The hon. member must resume his seat. Upon reconsideration I rule that the hon. member for Johannesburg West must withdraw his remark.

I withdraw it, Mr. Chairman.

I rule that the hon. member for Rissik, too, must withdraw his remark.

I withdraw it, Mr. Chairman.

The hon. member for Johannesburg West may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member said twice that he agreed with the hon. member for Johannesburg West. I ask you now to request him to withdraw that too.

Order! The hon. the Minister said that he agreed that if the hon. member for Rissik could say that, the hon. member for Johannesburg West could also say it. As I understood it, and the hon. the Minister says that is the case, that is what he meant. The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, there is very little of my time left. I just want to say that our side of the argument is that the State President is being allowed to exercise his discretion. One can foresee the situation that, for specific reasons it is necessary for the sake of stability in the country that Parliament should continue to function and that the State President should remain on for a specified time. The country may, for some reason or other, be experiencing a crisis. Let us consider the situation in the USA. There one also has an executive political head and a head of State, comprising one and the same person. What happened there in 1974 with President Nixon, when he had to relinquish the presidency? A succession occurred without there being any say in the matter. We can use a specific example which exists in respect of a combined head of State and executive head to say that in our own situation we have an amendment of a system which does not necessarily mean that the existing convention should be included in the new system exactly as it stands. One must take the practical circumstances in one’s own country into consideration. Hon. members opposite are saying that we should not use the American example. I am therefore talking from the point of view of South Africa’s interest by saying that I think in South African circumstances it is important to allow the President to have a choice, because it may happen that there is a crisis at that moment and the President must then have a choice in respect of what he should do under those circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, Mr. Chairman.

This is not a circus.

You are the clown in this place.

Order! The hon. member for Jeppe must withdraw the word “clown”.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member for Innesdal permitted to refer to the hon. member for Jeppe as the “circus” of this place?

Order! What words did the hon. member for Innesdal use?

Mr. Chairman, I apologize. What I said was that the hon. member for Jeppe was turning Parliament into a circus.

The hon. member for Johannesburg West may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I now return to my argument. I must say that because of all the interruptions I find it very difficult to keep to my argument. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I wish the hon. member for Johannesburg West, the hon. member for Randburg and the hon. member for Helderkruin would coordinate their arguments. The hon. member for Randburg based his entire argument on conventions which supposedly existed—that if a motion of no confidence was passed in the State President, he had to resign. Surely that is correct. The hon. member for Johannesburg West, on the other had, if I understood him correctly, said that in the new dispensation we need not take over the existing conventions. This is a new dispensation. The hon. member said that in a new dispensation we need not take over the conventions existing under the old dispensation. All I want to say is that the two arguments are contradictory. The hon. member for Randburg kept on discussing a situation which existed when the positions of President and Prime Minister, or King and Prime Minister, were separated. That kind of argument in that kind of situation does not apply in this situation, as the hon. member for Sea Point very clearly indicated. Consequently the hon. member for Randburg cannot quote the examples or conventions which exist in that situation—in the case of McKenzie King and in our own case in 1939—to support his standpoint. He cannot do so because we have a totally new dispensation.

What are we concerned with here? In his amendment the hon. member for Sea Point requests that if all three Houses, separately or jointly, pass a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet, or reject the budget, the head of State is obliged to resign. Let us imagine a situation in which the course of events is not as hon. members foresaw it. Let us imagine a situation where, as happened in West Germany, the composition of this House changes owing to fluctuations in party loyalties. Because we did not experience it in the past, except in 1939, most of the hon. members of the NP think that it cannot happen. However, we must take into account the possibility that the majority party may appoint a President on the basis of its majority in the electoral college, but that a change occurs in terms of which that majority party through splits, changes or whatever, has to act in coalition with other party groupings and that, although they still constitute the majority, they no longer have confidence in the President they elected. Then their hands are tied because they cannot get rid of that President unless he himself resigns. Now the hon. member for Durban Point and others are saying that the President cannot govern because the budget still has to be agreed to. In terms of the proposals, however, the situation now is such that if the budget is not agreed to by all three Houses, that budget, in terms of the Appropriation Bill, may be referred to the President’s Council. The President’s Council consists of a majority of people whose original appointment was in fact the interpretation of the wishes of the majority of the House concerned as it was constituted at that juncture.

Not for the sake of the PFP, but for the sake of sound and proper government, I wish to advocate that we should get away from the assumption that the President will inevitably, in the first place, enjoy the confidence of the majority of the House and, in the second place, that he cannot govern without the goodwill of the old party that established him in his position of power.

But, with all due respect, no one advanced that argument.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, that is the obvious implication of what the situation would be if we do not accept the proposed amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point, namely that the President should resign when a motion of no confidence is passed in him by all three Houses. If we do not accept this amendment, that will be precisely what happens. It is also on this basis that I advance the argument that…

Mr. Chairman, will the hon. member tell us how he himself, as a political realist, imagines a President could continue to govern after all three Houses have passed a motion of no confidence in him?

Mr. Chairman, in the first place the hon. the Minister wants to know how the President can continue to govern under such circumstances. He can continue to govern until the next Parliament has been constituted.

Now exactly how could he do that? [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister has put a question to me, and I am now trying to reply to him. There is no obligation resting on the President to resign in that case. He can therefore continue to govern until Parliament has been reconstituted. As soon as Parliament has been reconstituted, a new electoral college must be convened for the election of a new State President. In the meantime, however, the President can continue to govern, unless I do not understand the Bill at all. By virtue of my knowledge of the Bill I know …

I do not think the hon. member understands the conventions which are under discussion here.

Mr. Chairman, then we are back with the conventions again. Once again I wish to point out the very clear statement which the hon. member for Sea Point made, namely that the conventions which exist when we are dealing with two separate individuals—the President and the Prime Minister, or the King and the Prime Minister—do not apply at all, nor can they be transposed so as to fit into this situation, in which the two offices are combined in a single person.

Yes, that is precisely what I said.

Consequently I really cannot understand how the hon. the Minister can deny this. That convention and this is also my argument with the hon. member for Randburg—does not apply, in fact it cannot be valid under these circumstances. It simply makes no sense. Besides—and this is my honest opinion—if such a convention did in fact exist, that very convention would be nullified by the specific provisions of this Bill. After all, this Bill provides explicitly that the President will dissolve the House unless he himself resigns. On that basis alone, I believe, this provision itself nullifies the convention.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to reply, in part, to the arguments thus far raised here by hon. members. I should like to begin with the hon. member for Brakpan.

The hon. member for Brakpan made a very interesting statement indeed, Mr. Chairman. He contended that he and his party would have been prepared to support the hon. member for Sea Point’s amendment if it had not contained any reference to a joint sitting. He is therefore prepared to support the rest of the relevant amendment. If he is correct in his view, it will consequently be possible for the hon. member’s party to move a further amendment in which they could request that the reference to a joint sitting be deleted. Then the rest of the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point would remain. Then he would find himself in a position to vote for it. [Interjections.]

Now you are setting up straw dolls.

It is not a question of straw dolls. That was the hon. member’s argument. [Interjections.] Let me say that I am really not holding up a mirror for the hon. member for Rissik or the hon. member for Jeppe.

Those are simply straw dolls.

No, Sir, the hon. member for Brakpan’s statement was that he would have supported the hon. member for Sea Point had it not been for the fact that he referred to a joint sitting. [Interjections.] Is that not, after all, the truth of it? Sir, each time the stupidities of the hon. members’ arguments are pointed out to them, they adopt this attitude.

But you are setting up your own straw dolls.

I am still busy with this straw doll in front of me. The hon. member for Brakpan, being a man of integrity, can decide for himself whether he said it or not.

Are you doubting his integrity?

No, what I am saying is that he can, being a man of integrity, decide for himself. He said that if it had not been for the reference to a joint sitting, his party would have been able to support the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. [Interjections.]

Order! I am asking hon. members for their co-operation. The hon. the Minister sat listening to arguments for more than an hour, and I am asking hon. members to give the hon. the Minister an opportunity to reply to those arguments.

In this connection I want to make two statements. The first is that the hon. members of the CP have it in their power, by way of an amendment, to put right whatever they regard to be a defect in the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point. The hon. member, however, cannot do so. Do you know why, Sir? The hon. member for Jeppe moved an amendment to clause 6 to the effect that the State President must be able to convene joint sittings. [Interjections.] Those hon. members find themselves in the dilemma of having one specific standpoint in regard to one clause and another standpoint in regard to another clause. In the one clause the hon. members advocate joint sittings, and in regard to the next clause they say they cannot support the amendment because it refers to joint sittings. With all due respect, that is the kind of argument that is raised here with a view to conducting a meaningful discussion about the country’s constitution. Let me say, without beating about the bush, that we spent a whole sitting day arguing about the hon. members’ right to discuss the merits of the Constitution Bill. If that, however, is the way in which we want to discuss the merits of the Constitution Bill, it is an exercise in futility.

Then bring back your guillotine.

The hon. member can discuss that tomorrow.

I want to go further. The hon. member for Constantia made a very interesting statement. I accept the fact that as far as he is concerned, that is a fundamental point of departure. He said: “The body that assigns the power must be entitled to take that power away.” He proposed that as a purely democratic principle, if I understood him correctly. Let us now argue on the basis of his statement and not mine. Surely the hon. member for Sea Point’s amendment does not meet the requirement of the hon. member for Constantia in this specific connection because, after all, the hon. member for Sea Point’s motion does not propose that the body that has designated the President should have the right to take his powers from him. This afternoon we argued about the body that is to designate the President.

We disagreed with your amendment.

It does not matter whether we agreed or not. It has been accepted by the Committee. That is not, however, the point.

†The point is not whether the hon. member agreed or disagreed with me. The point is that he took a fundamental stand on an issue which he thinks is a fundamental principle. He said that the institution or body which elects the President and assigns the power to him must be entitled to take that power away. Then I would suggest that the appropriate amendment in this regard would have been that the electoral college be reconstituted, and then to take that power away.

*That is not, however, what we are discussing now.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No, the hon. member must sit down now.

Would you accept that amendment?

That is not the point at the moment. I am now arguing about the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point and about the hon. member for Constantia’s support of that amendment. My problem is that when hon. members stand up to support one another, they make use of arguments that conflict with the amendments they are proposing. With all due respect, surely one cannot conduct a debate along these lines.

Let me go further. The hon. member for Sea Point made a very important statement. He did not place at issue the convention that would apply. Hon. members must take note of the words he used. He said that what he wanted in the legislation was a “formal statement that he will resign”. That is what he said.

I should just like to debate this with the hon. member for Sea Point for a moment. According to the minutes of the Select Committee—this is relevant—the hon. member moved an amendment to the effect that there should be a change in the electoral college that must elect the President. Let me refer to page 61 of the Select Committee Report. The hon. member’s amendment was, in effect, that the electoral college be constituted from the ranks of all members of all three Houses.

That was then the hon. member’s amendment in this House.

Yes, I know that.

Then why are you discussing it now?

Surely I did not prescribe to the hon. member how he should conduct a debate. In the Select Committee the hon. member introduced an amendment in regard to how the electoral college should be constituted. I am now debating the hon. member’s Select Committee amendment and the one which he introduced here and which has been declared out of order, and I am debating this in the light of the hon. member for Constantia’s standpoint. There is a tremendously interesting correlation between the two. Sir, you have ruled that the hon. member’s amendment in regard to the constitution of the electoral college is out of order because the principle has already been accepted, but with this clause relating to the President being removed from office the hon. member for Sea Point is now trying to prescribe the procedure he initially wanted to have applied for the election of the President. That is the logical conclusion based on what he said. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Constantia very definitely said that.

That is removal.

But that is what I am talking about.

This has not been ruled out of order.

Would the hon. member not prefer to use the procedure, which he is now proposing in regard to having the President removed from office, for the purposes of having him elected?

But that has been ruled out of order.

I am asking whether the hon. member would prefer it.

Of course. [Interjections.]

Owing to a ruling, the hon. member now wants to achieve, by way of removal from office, what he could not achieve by way of election to that office. [Interjections.] It is only the hon. member for Constantia who could ask a question like that. What he does not realize is that this amendment clashes with his own viewpoint that the body to be appointed and the body to be elected must be one and the same body. That is a fact. That is the kind of thing on which we have to work together.

This brings me directly to the hon. member for Sea Point. He wants a formal statement in the Bill itself that under certain circumstances the State President must resign. Firstly, his amendment embodies two elements, the first being that if each House moves a motion of no confidence in the President, he must resign. The second is that if the Houses do not do so individually, but can muster a majority at any joint sitting, he must also resign. This side’s standpoint is set out in clause 67, and that is that no decisions may be taken during a joint sitting.

Why not?

I shall argue that point with the hon. member in just a moment. Just give me a chance. If the hon. member had been listening during the previous debate, he would have realized that the official Opposition is trying to use the majority in one group to neutralize a standpoint of another group, and the newspapers supporting them are doing the very same thing. They are merely a little more blatant about it than the hon. member for Sea Point, because they are saying that this system is intended to protect the Afrikaner majority against a decision of the Brown people and the Asians and what they describe as an English-speaking majority. The hon. member for Sea Point is directly engaged in giving credibility to that standpoint, and he is doing so under the cloak of arguing about conventions. He starts off by saying that in regard to the appointment of the Cabinet there is a deviation from the convention that members of the Cabinet must have the support of the majority party.

I am quoting from a document issued by your department.

I do not care what source the hon. member is quoting from. I am not saying that he has quoted incorrectly. He says that in regard to the appointment of Ministers there has been a deviation from the convention, and in support of that he quotes from a document about the existence of conventions, a document prepared at the request of hon. members. I am not wandering off the subject of the document prepared by my department. I shall be coming to that in just a moment. He says that there is a deviation from the convention as far as the appointment of Ministers is concerned, because Ministers no longer have to be members of the majority party and no longer need to have a seat.

No. They no longer have to have the support of the majority party.

That is what I said. That is all I am trying to say. Must we then also, in the Act, include a deviation from the other convention, that involving the resignation of the President? That is the drift of his argument. The hon. member is correct in stating that in regard to the appointment of Ministers, an established custom, an existing convention, is being deviated from. He is correct in saying that. In fact, we have all conceded as much, even in the Select Committee when we were discussing the question, and I thought the hon. members of the official Opposition were giving their support to that aspect within the context of this legislation. I want to add right away, however, that the hon. member is making a fundamental mistake by arguing that only one convention can apply in regard to the action taken by the State President in the particular circumstances referred to in the amendment. There is not only one convention that applies, but rather two, and here I think the hon. member will agree with me. That is why I am saying that the hon. member’s argument that the convention concerning the resignation of the State President should be changed, in order to bring it in line with what applies in the case of Ministers, is wrong. I do not think it is convincing, and I shall tell the hon. member why I think that this is indeed the case.

Firstly we must look at the present convention. What is it? I am now speaking about the President, no longer about the Ministers. My contention is that there are two conventions that are applicable. Here I am now referring to the convention that is applicable at present. After a motion of no confidence in the Government, the Government can resign or request the State President to dissolve the House of Assembly or Parliament, as it exists at present. The convention therefore allows for two options, and the hon. member will concede as much. The State President now also has a choice, and in this connection the hon. member for Sea Point also agrees with me. The State President can either comply with the request or, in exceptional circumstances, ask someone with majority support in the House to form a Government. I am sure the hon. member will also confirm that. I want to emphasize the fact that I am speaking of exceptional circumstances, because it is indeed only in exceptional circumstances that he would not comply with the request. The practicalities relating to this convention, as applied in England, Australia, Canada and South Africa, are that it is only in highly exceptional circumstances that a request for dissolution is not complied with. In Canada this happened in the ’twenties, and in South Africa it happened in 1939. It also happened a few years ago in Australia.

In three countries?

Yes, in three countries.

On what basis?

That does not matter. I am now dealing with the convention and saying that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Head of State would not comply with that request—in other words, where there is a deviation from the regular order of things in this connection.

With the amendment he has moved, the hon. member for Sea Point wants to make exceptional cases the rule for a convention. The hon. member may jump around as much as he likes, but that is a fact. [Interjections.] Yes Sir. I am aware of that.

But then you lose the argument.

No, I do not lose the argument. It is interesting to note, however, that is a point the hon. member for Brakpan did not argue.

I did argue that point with the hon. member for Randburg.

The hon. member did argue the point with the hon. member for Randburg, but he did not deal with the substance of my argument. I would be glad, however, if the hon. member for Brakpan would give me an opportunity to complete my argument, because I am dealing with the hon. member for Sea Point now. He does not have to worry. I shall be getting round to him.

The hon. member for Sea Point advances the argument that in the present system—and that is the next ground for his argument—there is a third person, i.e. the Head of State, who must decide on this matter. That is also the basis of his argument, and he would surely concede as much because he is specifically arguing—and this is also my answer to the interjection made by the hon. member for Brakpan—that because there would now be a combination of conventions if the new dispensation were to come into effect, in the present dispensation there is a third person who must decide. I am busy dealing with that argument. Why would there be sufficient reason for not doing away completely with one leg of the convention, i.e. the holding of an election? On what basis? In this regard the hon. member will agree with me that if the State President were to lose the support of Parliament, he could not govern. Let us be practical for a moment. That was also the hon. member for Johannesburg West’s argument.

I want to allege that if the hon. members of the CP are right in their assumption—I am now proceeding on that assumption—and if the hon. members of the official Opposition are right in their view that the State President is elected de facto by the White majority, it is not even necessary for the three Houses to pass a motion of no confidence individually, because he would not be able to govern if the House that elected him passes a motion of no confidence. That motion need not even be passed in Parliament; it could be adopted within his own party because, to start off with, he is at the very least dependent on the House that elected him. He must therefore maintain his position there. I am now arguing on the basis of the hon. member’s statement that one House is de facto responsible for his election. He could then not govern.

Fanie, oh how we need that guillotine of yours now! [Interjections.]

Let me say at once that by way of interjections the hon. member for Bryanston has, cumulatively speaking, made more speeches than any other hon. member this session. I can understand why he wants the guillotine applied to him.

In the Select Committee we accepted the amendment to clause 39. I want to concede to the hon. member for Sea Point that I myself, as Chairman, indicated that the only appropriate step would be to move an amendment to clause 39. I acknowledge the fact. So much for this specific aspect. In the Select Committee we accepted an amendment to clause 39 which boiled down to the fact that in a case such as that which I have just outlined, the State President would either have to resign or dissolve Parliament with a view to holding a general election. He cannot do nothing. In terms of the amendment to clause 39, under such circumstances the State President cannot do nothing. The hon. member will agree with that.

I want to refer to that, because in terms of what the hon. member himself said, it has a bearing on this. What is the amendment we have introduced? He must dissolve Parliament—let me just focus on that aspect—unless he resigns from office. The implication of the amendment to clause 39, which ties in with the amendment which the hon. member for Sea Point has just moved, is therefore that the State President does, in any case, have only one of two choices, and that is either to tender his resignation or to dissolve Parliament. In my opinion that is fully in accordance with custom or convention. Even if the State President were to decide on a general election, after the general election there would have to be another presidential election in terms of the provisions of the Bill under discussion. I maintain that this procedure—the hon. member for Sea Point was responsible for a part of the amendment we accepted—is so close to a convention that this can be applicable in the new dispensation. What is the hon. member’s amendment actually aimed at? It is aimed at joint decision-making in joint sittings of the three Houses.

The hon. member for Sea Point made a further statement.

†He said that the appointment of members of the Cabinet by the State President at his own discretion was a departure from democratic principles, because he was not obliged to appoint Ministers with majority support. I am not suggesting that the hon. member argued the merits of that, but that is the statement of fact he made. In other words, the fact that the State President will be empowered in terms of the relevant clause to appoint Ministers without majority support, is a deviation from democratic principles. I should like to ask the hon. member whether the appointment of Ministers by the President of the United States of America is undemocratic. Perhaps the hon. member will tell us whether that is his conviction.

Why do you compare us with the American system?

When it suits the hon. member, the American system is a system par excellence that we should follow in this country. But when it does not suit him, he takes up a different attitude and asks why we refer to America.

*Now I come to the hon. member Prof. Olivier. In my student days the hon. member was a senior lecturer and, in my final year, a class-mate. He did very well.

A pity I did not produce a better student.

The hon. member was not my lecturer. Even in those days I was choosy about who gave me classes! I say this in a friendly spirit. What did the hon. member say? He said that the State President could stay on, in spite of all three Houses having no confidence in him. Where does the hon. member get that from? It is quite simply untrue, because clause 39 provides that he must resign or dissolve Parliament. We included that provision, and the hon. member was present when we accepted that amendment. He must dissolve Parliament, with a view to a general election, after which a new President…

But he dos not have to resign.

That is not the point. The point is that he must either resign or call an election. After that election a new President must then be designated.

That is what I said.

That is not what the hon. member said.

†I now come to the hon. member for Constantia. He said the Bill makes no provision for the determination of the term of office of the State President. He made that categoric statement. But that is utter nonsense. If the hon. member had taken the trouble to read the proceedings of the Select Committee and if he had taken the trouble to read the Bill before the House, which we are now discussing, he would have found that is utter nonsense. Clause 39(2)(b), as it stands, reads as follows—

1. (i) passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet within any period of 14 days; or
2. (ii) rejects any Bill which appropriates revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual requirements or services of the departments of State controlled by members of the Cabinet.

On what basis can the hon. member for Constantia argue that the Bill makes no provision for the termination of the office of the President?

*The fact remains that the hon. member for Sea Point is firstly arguing from an incorrect premise; secondly he is arguing as if there were only one convention under the circumstances, and what I am saying is that there are two; thirdly I contend that in any case a President, whomever he may be, is at least not able to stay on as President if his own party—hon. members must remember that he remains leader of his party in terms of the dispensation—expresses a lack of confidence in him. He does not even have to be here, let alone the question of whether the House from whence he came has expressed a lack of confidence in him.

Mr. Chairman, I want first of all to thank the hon. the Minister for endeavouring to meet some of the arguments that were raised from this side of the House. The hon. the Minister will understand that we are not convinced by his counter arguments. However, we shall continue. Unfortunately, I have only one more 10-minute opportunity for doing so.

I want to concede, and I think I raised this point, that there are actually two conventions. There is the convention as to what the Prime Minister or the head of Government does when there is a vote of no confidence in him and there is the decision of what the head of State is going to do in the event of a vote of no confidence in the Government. I think the hon. the Minister said that it was not a convention that the Prime Minister would resign but I want to argue that if it did happen to Mr. Botha, he would resign.

You want a formal statement in the Bill itself.

The convention is that the Prime Minister shall resign. However, the one convention is that the head of Government who has lost the confidence of Parliament cannot determine whether there is going to be an election or not. Will the hon. the Minister concede that? Will the hon. the Minister concede that the Prime Minister or the head of Government who has lost the confidence of Parliament cannot decide whether there is going to be an election? It falls outside his powers to decide that. This new clause states that the defeated head of Government is going to have the option to decide as to whether there is going to be an election or not. They are trying to roll two conventions into one and keep the one that they want. Let us say that there is a dispute between the two of us on the first convention as to whether he should resign or not. Let us leave that unresolved. But there is no dispute on the fact that the defeated head of Government is not the man who can decide whether there should be an election. That is for somebody else to decide, but this clause as it stands at present states that the defeated head of Government is the man who can decide whether to call an election.

Not strictly speaking.

It is a fundamental departure. The hon. the Minister concedes that there are two conventions and I am conceding the first, but what he cannot decide is that one cannot have a man in whom Parliament has got no confidence deciding on what is going to happen to Parliament. How can one possibly have that? He has already lost his moral right to decide for Parliament.

There are two capacities.

The hon. member for Mossel Bay talks of two capacities. We are now talking of one capacity. Under this system there is going to be a head of Government, there is going to be a head of State and there is going to be a head of party. It will be Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov, all rolled into one. I know of no other situation in the West in which this sort of system operates—head of party, head of government and head of State, all rolled into one.

Only in Soviet Russia.

Yes, only in Soviet countries and in some African countries. It does not, however, happen anywhere in the Western World.

Mr. Chairman, all we want to put forward is the following. If the head of the Government receives a motion of no-confidence from his Parliament, we do not believe he should have the right to decide whether to call an election or not; he should resign forthwith. He should resign because Parliament has lost confidence in him. It should therefore be Parliament that must decide. Therefore somebody else must be appointed as the caretaker Government, and he must recommend to the State President. What we cannot allow, however, is that the man who has actually lost the confidence should still decide on the future of Parliament. This is the crisp point. Trying to support the argument of the hon. the Minister were the hon. the Minister for Randburg, the hon. the … [Interjections.] Sorry, Mr. Chairman, I must be looking into a crystal ball. The hon. member for Randburg is either going to become a Cabinet Minister or he is going to lose his seat. [Interjections.] I think he is probably going to lose his seat. [Interjections.]

Be it as it may, I want to proceed with my argument. They say one must judge conventions. In this instance the convention is that there is a resignation upon which the head of State calls an election. That is the principle one can quote from various books. Both the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Randburg, however, said there were certain exceptions. They said the exception occurred in the case of Mackenzie King, in Canada. That was, however, the only time in the whole history of Canada that a motion of no-confidence in the head of State was moved.

[Inaudible.]

Mr. Chairman, it seems that the only time this happens is the exception. I should say that if that is the only time it has happened it is the rule. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Randburg says the only time it has ever happened in the history of South Africa was in 1939—and that was the exception. I contend that although that was the only time a motion of no-confidence in the Government was carried it still proves the rule. The hon. member also referred to a third case; the case of Australia. It has happened only once there too. There has only on one occasion been a motion of no-confidence in the Government of Australia. He chooses the very examples of what happened, stating they were the exceptions.

Mr. Chairman, the point is that this hon. Minister does not want to admit that we have changed a fundamental convention. That is that Ministers are appointed because they have the support of the majority of Parliament. We are now moving away from that convention. The hon. the Minister is moving away from the concept of representative government, which has been the cornerstone of our system of government through all the years. He is changing that for a system in which the President will not have to take into account the question of whether Ministers have the support of the majority of Parliament or not. It is a departure from a fundamental convention, and I cannot understand why the hon. the Minister does not proudly proclaim this. He must actually say that in future …

[Inaudible.]

Well, if the hon. the Minister indeed says this is so, why then did he move an amendment to the effect that if a motion of no-confidence in the Cabinet was carried by all three Houses they either had to resign or a general election had to be called? Why did he do that? If he now agrees that it is not necessary to appoint Ministers who have the confidence of Parliament, why does he retain clause 39 of this Bill?

Because of the fact that we deleted clause 7(5) with the argument that…

No, Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister is running away now from the implications of his own legislation. What has happened since the time when the Select Committee met? In the Select Committee we examined this legislation. We also examined the implications of these clauses.

Mr. Chairman, I want to put the following question to the hon. member. Is it not true that all hon. members argued that clause 7(5) had to be deleted, and that we should write the conventions into appropriate clauses, and then also have a general clause? Is that not true?

Mr. Chairman, clause 7(5), which is now, I think, clause 88—or something like that—states that conventions will apply in so far as they are consistent with this legislation. The legislation has, however been changed. What has happened here? This is typical of what has happened even through the limited discussion that has taken place. That is that the more this Bill is being examined the more it is found to be defective. The more this Bill is being examined the less the guarantee of Parliamentary control it offers. The more this Bill is being examined the more power the President is discovered to have, and the less power remains in the hands of the people of South Africa. This is the trend that is found to be present throughout this legislation.

Now we are going to have a situation in which, should this House or the three Houses, through a very difficult procedure, pass a motion of no-confidence in the State President he is not required to resign. It is left to him to exercise his own option. Let me state something else. It is not a question of having an election or a caretaker Government. If the State President says “I am not resigning; let us call an election”, he carries on during the period of the election not only as the Head of Government with all the power that goes with that, but actually as Head of State. The 21-gun salute will boom out for him. Foreign ambassadors will come and pay him their respects. He will be having medal parades. So, during that whole process this man, in whom the public has lost confidence, is going to carry on using the trappings of State as well as the trappings of government in order to try to win the election.

The hon. the Minister referred to America. I think he is treading on dangerous ground if he tries to compare the two systems. They are very different. One thing is completely different, and that is that the American President owes his legitimacy to a popular election. Even in those circumstances the American people, after President Roosevelt won the election four times, passed a constitutional amendment to prevent anyone standing for a third term of office. Why was that? I know that the American people realize that, once one combines the roles of Head of Government and Head of State and possibly the head of a party into one, which Roosevelt tended to personify, such a man becomes the ultimate despot even in a democratic society. So, it is not just the formal letter of the law that is in question, but it is the consequences.

I want to say that I will feel ill at ease, if not ill, if one day I as a South African am going to have to pay my respects to a Head of State who is also head of Government and is an active member of the NP advocating apartheid. I think that is a disgusting situation. I think it is disgusting that we should be locked into a situation where the head of State and the head of Government are one and the Parliament of South Africa is unable to unseat that man. If I as an MP want to unseat him, I am told: “No, I am not going to resign; I, as the head of the NP, have the choice of dissolving Parliament while I carry on as Head of State until the next election”.

Mr. Chairman, that is an interesting aspect the hon. the Minister touched upon shortly before he resumed his seat. Earlier in his argument he also referred to it. I think it is now time for us to know precisely where the State President fits into this new dispensation. The President’s Council proposed that it be a supra-ethnic person and that there be a supra-ethnic Cabinet; in other words he is above party politics; he is at the head of a Cabinet which is elected from all sections of the population and he cannot therefore identify himself with any one of the population groups.

Where do you see that in the clause?

It is contained in the proposals of the President’s Council.

Perhaps you should indicate where there is any malice in that deduction.

The hon. the Minister cannot say that is our deduction. He must just read the report of the President’s Council again. Where is it set out, and where would there ever be room for the State President of the Republic of South Africa to remain a member of a party, and exercise control over that party from which he is elected, when there are three Houses that are involved? In each House there is a different political party with different standpoints. How can the State President then still remain a member of a caucus of one of the parties in the White House? That must be spelled out. We want to know where we stand as far as the new State President is concerned.

What does that have to do with the clause?

No, what I am saying arises out of what the hon. the Minister said. He said that it went without saying that the State President would have to resign if the White House were to pass a motion of no confidence in him. He said that he would then have no other choice. The majority of the electoral college members come from the White House.

He said “according to your argument”.

No, but the hon. the Minister also said that the State President would have no other choice but to resign if the party from which he came passed a motion of no confidence in him. He said that. [Interjections.] I think the Government party owes it to the Committee to say exactly how they visualize the State President’s position. Where does he stand if the caucus or the White Parliament institutes a motion of no confidence in him? In terms of clause 39, as it reads at present, he can …

[Inaudible.]

I do not think that hon. Minister knows exactly what this is all about. [Interjections.] Clause 9 must be read in conjunction with clause 39.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: In the previous debate—that was the only time I spoke about this matter—I was reacting to speeches that hon. members had made. We are now dealing with the removal of the State President from office and not the election of the State President. My contention is that the hon. member for Brakpan is out of order. [Interjections.]

I am specifically speaking about the removal of the State President from office, and that is why clause 39 must be read in conjunction with clause 9. The hon. member for Sea Point moved an amendment to clause 9, and clause 39 also deals with this aspect. If one looks at clause 39, one sees …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Clause 39 is not under consideration now, but the hon. member goes on talking about it.

Order! We are discussing clause 9, it is true, but if in passing, in support of an argument, reference is made to another clause, this is permissible. The argument, however, must basically centre on the content of this clause.

Thank you very much. Sir, I think your ruling is quite correct, because both the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Durban Point also referred to clause 39. That clause provides, amongst other things, for the President to be able to dissolve a House by proclamation in the Gazette if such House were to pass a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet. In other words, if the White House were to pass a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet, of which the President is the head, he has a choice. The position is that he is both Chairman and a member of the caucus. The hon. the Minister must now spell out for us whether he is going to be a member of the caucus, whether he is going to be the chief figure in the caucus, as is the case at present, the chief figure of one of the political parties in one of the Houses. The hon. the Minister must spell this out for us.

I want to go further and illustrate how the hon. the Minister sets up straw dolls and then shoots them down.

[Inaudible.]

No, I did so on the basis of what the hon. member for Jeppe proposed.

Is he the straw doll?

I do not expect that from that hon. Minister. There are other hon. members on that side of the House who can make that kind of remark, but he is not one of them. He certainly is not. I do not expect that from him. I have said that we cannot agree with the hon. member for Sea Point’s amendment because in it mention is made of a joint sitting. We also went further and said that we would feel better if the amendment that we were moving were not ruled out of order. Our approach to the matter is that what is at issue here is the House whence the President comes, but that was not permissible.

But surely that is not what I said.

The hon. the Minister said that I had done so because I was in the bad books of the hon. member for Jeppe.

I did not say that.

My goodness! It seems to me as if the hon. Minister’s memory is also leaving him in the lurch. He said that under clause 6 the hon. member for Jeppe had proposed that the State President should be in a position to convene a joint sitting. He had asked for that to be inserted. Can the hon. the Minister remember his having asked for that?

I shall reply to that in a moment.

In the case of clause 6 the argument was that it would not tie in to have the other powers of the State President included there, the reason being that they were mentioned elsewhere. For the sake of the proper formulation of legislation, the hon. member for Jeppe said that in view of the fact that in terms of clause 69 the State President was empowered to convene a joint sitting, we felt that power should also be mentioned in clause 6. That is all the hon. member for Jeppe said.

Order! The hon. member must try to bring this more into line with the content of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you wholeheartedly, but the hon. the Minister wrenched an argument, which we had used, completely out of context by saying that because we now objected to a joint sitting, I was now in the bad books of the hon. member for Jeppe. The hon. member for Jeppe said that power should be included in clause 6.

Order! That really has nothing to do with this clause. The hon. member is now replying to an argument that was advanced in reply to an argument that was not of any relevance.

Mr. Chairman, this makes things so very difficult for one. You must realize …

Order! The hon. member has, in any event, made his point. I do not think it is necessary to go on with that. [Interjections.] [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the amendment we are now discussing is that of the hon. member for Sea Point, and the amendment has two components, i.e. that the State President must resign if each of the Houses individually, or by way of a joint sitting, passes a motion of no confidence in him. Sir, you must now give me an opportunity to discuss the amendment and the hon. member for Brakpan’s reaction to it. His standpoint was that his party would have been able to support the hon. member for Sea Point’s amendment if provision had not been made, in the amendment, for joint sittings. Those were his exact words. I do not mind his arguing with me, but with all due respect he must not twist my words. Those were the hon. member’s exact words. My reaction to the hon. member’s argument was, firstly, that if that were his standpoint, he would be able to move an amendment to the hon. member for Sea Point’s amendment to delete the reference to joint sittings. I said, however, that the hon. member could not do so, because the hon. member for Jeppe had proposed that the State President should have the right to convene joint sittings. [Interjections.]

No, he did not. That was in terms of clause 6. [Interjections.]

In terms of clause 6 … [Interjections.]

Order!

I then said that the hon. member for Brakpan could not make that statement because it clashed with that of the hon. member for Jeppe. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Jeppe moved three amendments to the clause. On two of them there were divisions. When he saw what a mistake he had made on the question of joint sittings, however, he did not request a division on that issue. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Brakpan is now arguing that in clause 67 provision is being made for joint sittings. Is the hon. member going to vote in favour of that clause or not?

No, I am not going to vote in favour of it.

The hon. member says he is not going to vote in favour of it. Just look at what we are dealing with here. The hon. member says provision is made for that in the clause—that is the argument he has just advanced—but then he says he is not going to vote for it. Oh no, we certainly cannot go on like this.

Mr. Chairman, I really do not think that argument of the hon. the Minister should be left hanging in the air. After having said that we did not feel happy about joint sittings, I added that we would have liked the State President to resign if the House from whence he came were to pass a motion of no confidence in him. That is our standpoint, because we know that he will come from the White House. That is the amendment we would have liked to move. To tell me, therefore, that we should move an amendment other than the one moved by the hon. member for Sea Point, is ridiculous. The hon. the Minister wants to know from me whether I am going to vote in favour of clause 67. We were speaking apropos of clause 6, indicating what all the powers of the State President would be. We said we were not going to set out the State President’s powers in clause 6 if they were stated elsewhere in the Bill. In the Bill referred to the Select Committee, there were four powers of the State President which were set out elsewhere and were consequently removed.

I really do not know why the hon. the Minister is laughing now, because surely it is true …

I am laughing because you say you are opposed to it.

I say I am opposed to it. I say the reason why it is being presented in this way is because we want well-drafted legislation, and that is all. If one does not set out, in clause 6, some of the powers the State President will have …

Order! That argument has been advanced quite a few times. I understand that argument is now being used again for debating purposes, but it has been stated clearly and, besides, has no direct bearing on the clause.

Sir, I agree with you wholeheartedly. [Interjections.] Sir, are you the one who gives the rulings or do hon. members over there?

Order! The hon. member may proceed.

I agree with you wholeheartedly, but the hon. the Minister keeps distorting my argument. He is trying to intimate that we are going to vote against clause 67 …

Order! The hon. member has made that point, not once, but repeatedly. The point has now been made, and the hon. member must consequently come back to the clause.

I just want to put one question to the hon. the Minister: Does he now understand my argument? If he says he understands my argument, I shall resume my seat. He must just indicate whether he understands my argument.

Mr. Chairman, we are arguing that this clause should contain the golden thread in terms of which the State President must enjoy the confidence of the Parliament of the day. We argued, as I said on clause 7, that the head of government should be elected in terms of the majority will. This is now the other side of the same coin. The hon. the Minister, in replying to this point, had some sports with the principle which we enunciated that the body which assigns the power should be the body that withdraws the power.

Order! That point has already been made.

Yes, Sir, but I am replying to an argument advanced by the hon. the Minister …

Order! We are now dealing with clause 9.

Sir, I want to ask the hon. the Minister a question. He did not say he agreed with that principle. If he agrees with that principle—it is an important one—he will also agree, even in his terms, that the electoral college which installs the State President should be the body which can withdraw that position from him. However, he has not proposed that mechanism. In terms of clause 39, we have the position that the President has an option. It has been my argument that even in his terms he should accept the principle that the body that assigns power can withdraw it, and he should effect a change along those lines. It would not, of course, meet our basic objection which is that the golden thread of Western democratic principles should be upheld but at least it would be being consistent.

The next point I want to raise with the hon. the Minister is that he advanced the argument that what lies behind the amendment that has been moved by the hon. member for Sea Point is the idea of a minority in this House aligning itself with the majority in another House in order to frustrate the majority in this House. [Interjections.] I want to put it to the hon. the Minister that the mechanism that is proposed by him in this and other clauses is exactly that. He wants to make provision for a majority in one place to govern and he builds into this the potential to frustrate majorities in other Houses. In terms of clause 9 which makes no provision for removal by a vote of no confidence, that is precisely the position. There may be a vote of no confidence in two of the three Houses. There may also be a vote of no confidence on the part of the aggregate majority of the members in all three Houses and still one would not be able to get rid of the President. In this respect, therefore, the hon. the Minister is hoist with his own petard because he is guilty of the very thing of which he has attempted to accuse us.

Another point that must be addressed because it is a very important one is that the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Johannesburg West tried to argue that despite the absence of the necessary provision in the law, it would nevertheless be so that the President could not govern without the majority. The hon. the Minister went so far as to argue that he would be subject to a majority in the caucus of the ruling party. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, it was quite clear to me that both the hon. the Minister and the hon. member for Johannesburg West and, to an extent, the hon. member for Randburg, were saying that the President would not be able to govern de facto in practical terms without the confidence of the caucus of the ruling party. However, it is quite clear to me that because other clauses assign to the President the power to appoint a Cabinet completely outside this House, he would in fact be in a position to govern. If the President is able to appoint Cabinet Ministers from whichever source he chooses, irrespective of this House or of the other two Houses, he has an independent government authority. Although all three Houses could rail against him, in terms of this legislation and even in practical terms he could continue to govern.

May I ask a question? How would he get the legislation passed by the caucus in the House which has adopted a motion of no confidence in him?

This leads us to the question of … [Interjections.] I will answer that because if Parliament has been dissolved, if the three Houses …

But he cannot make laws.

But he will have a body of laws to administer without making new ones. If the President decides to call an election, the hon. the Minister must tell us how long he will be able to govern before…

There is a provision in the Bill.

Yes, and it says 13 months. Is that not correct in terms of clause 38? The hon. the Minister must not just shake his head.

I am telling you to read the Bill.

As I read the Bill, clause 38 provides for how long the President can stay in power after having lost a motion of confidence. The hon. the Minister must explain to this House and to South Africa what the length of time would be that he could govern without Parliament sitting. When one reads the Bill, it would seem that 13 months could elapse between the session of the Parliament which approved a motion of no-confidence and that of the new Parliament which would have to elect a successor. Whether that would take from January to December of the same year or even to March of the following year, is a question we must put to the hon. the Minister. It seems to me that there is no definite period within which the election must be held. You could therefore have the situation, if I read the Bill correctly, that for most of the year after a motion of no confidence has been passed by Parliament in him, he could continue to govern with all the trappings the hon. member for Sea Point has spelt out. Those trappings are considerable. The privileges, the patronage, the access to the media which the man would enjoy are considerable. If a President, having called an election as a defrocked President, decided to campaign against the existing parties, he would be in a very powerful position to do just that. I think that would be an intolerable situation.

The hon. the Minister must clear this up. If anything is contributing to the idea of a dictatorial President it is this clause, and this is one of the major accusations we make against the Government. This clause, read together with clauses 7, 38 and 39, is unacceptable to us. A further point the hon. the Minister must clarify, is whether the appointing body will be able to remove the President.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Constantia said many things here which deserve attention. I do not know whether I shall be able to get to all of them. Let me react immediately to a few of the last points he made.

If the hon. member reads the Bill carefully, and also takes note of the provisions of the Electoral Act, he will find that after Parliament is dissolved, if I remember correctly, a general election has to take place within two months. After the general election has taken place, it is provided in this Bill that the State President has to convene Parliament within 30 days with a view to the composition of an electoral college for the election of a State President. If the State President were to resign, this would mean that the electoral college would have to meet within one month to elect a new President. If there is a general election, a maximum of three months can elapse before a new State President is elected. We can return to this point later. It is not of immediate relevance to this clause and we can therefore suspend discussion of it until later, when the relevant clause is discussed.

I want to agree with the hon. member for Constantia on one point, namely that the body which grants the power must also be able to take it away. This is a valid point of departure. I also want to agree with the hon. member for Sea Point on one point. He said that because the two persons, the Head of State and the Head of Government, are now becoming one and the same person, the conventions which have existed up to now, cannot continue to exist in exactly the same form. He said that because those functions will now be performed by the same person and he will have to decide on all these things, the conventions do not work properly. He said that we should have to make a different arrangement. However, the existing convention allows for two possibilities in this situation. After a motion of no confidence has been agreed to, the Head of Government can either resign or call a general election. In terms of the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point, only one of these two possibilities will be possible. This will impoverish the situation and narrow down the alternatives. In a specific situation this would force one into a corner. For that reason I would say, since we are faced with this situation in which we cannot continue with the existing convention in its entirety, that the amendment of the hon. member for Sea Point does in fact obviate a specific problem, but it creates another problem. For that reason we must take a more fundamental look at what we really want to achieve by this, and it is here that the point of departure of the hon. member for Constantia crops up. What, in fact, is the structure of authority? The final authority lies with the electorate. The hon. member will agree with me on this. The electorate elects the legislator and transfers power to him. The legislator, in turn, appoints the executive and transfers powers to it. Now the hon. member for Constantia says that because the legislator transfers powers to the executive, he must also be able to take those powers back. However, the same argument applies to the legislator as well, because the voters have transferred powers to the legislator, and for that reason should be able to take those powers back. If, then, we consider what happens when a motion of no confidence is agreed to in all three Houses, this means that the synchronization among voters, legislator and executive has been disturbed somewhere. Someone has moved. It may be the legislator; it may be the executive, or it may be the voters. Something, somewhere, has moved. It is also possible that the legislator has moved, as the hon. member for Durban Point illustrated here this afternoon. This is quite possible. As a matter of fact, this has already happened. For that reason, what must happen now is that the balance must be restored. If it is the executive that has moved away, the logical step is that it has to resign so that another can take its place. This is possible in terms of the provisions of the Constitution Bill. If it is the legislator who has moved, it must be possible to discharge the legislator and appoint someone else in his place, someone who is in synchronization with the voters. If it is the voters who have moved away from the legislator, that is the prerogative of the voters and the legislator must be discharged so as to be brought back into synchronization with the voters, We therefore need both these options urgently, viz. we must be able to discharge the executive and we must be able to discharge the legislator. I maintain that this is built into this Bill. There are control measures built into the situation outside the legislation to ensure that the right thing eventually happens. It works like this: If the President miscalculates—for example, if he thinks he is still the man who expresses the will of the voters and he is proved wrong in an election, then he is discharged. On the other hand, if he realizes, that the voters and the legislator have moved away from him, he has the option to resign. However, the important point is that under all circumstances this Bill is worded in such a way that the position will correct itself within three months at most. The lack of synchronization cannot therefore carry on for longer than three months. A central mechanism has therefore been built in. For that reason it cannot be said that the President is a dictator either. If he were to exceed his powers to such an extent that he loses support, he would be brought to account within three months at most.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.