Mr. Chairman, today is the fourth time this official flag, the national flag of South Africa, is being confirmed as being the flag of this country and its people. The first time this happened was in 1927, when the late Dr. D. F. Malan introduced his now famous Flag Act here in this House, an Act in terms of which the present national flag became one of the two official flags of the then Union of South Africa.

Thirty years later, in 1957, it was proposed here in Parliament that this same flag should in future be the sole national flag of the Union of South Africa. Then, in 1961, this flag became the official national flag of the Republic of South Africa. Today, we believe, this will happen for the second time.

I believe that specific outstanding characteristics are necessary for a self-sufficient and respected nation including a nation with self-respect. I would say the first of these characteristics is its language; the language with which the nation identifies itself, the language in which the people communicate, the language which precedes the people’s laughter and happiness, and the language in which it expresses its heartbreak and suffering. In this regard the people of South Africa are unique; unique because this nation is fortunate enough to have two official languages. One of these is the Afrikaans language, a language which is spoken by about 60% of the White citizens of the Republic. The Afrikaans language has grown from the fruitful breeding ground of our own Republic of South Africa.

Order! I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member. In the clause under discussion the subject is the flag and not the language. We are now discussing clause 3.

Mr. Chairman, I ask you to allow me to sketch the background to the symbolic significance of our language in regard to our flag. The other 40% of the White citizens of this country speak English. The English language is also in the fortunate position that it is a world language. For that reason the English language makes the rest of the world more easily accessible to the population of the Republic of South Africa. Another thing symbolized by the flag, which our flag indicates to us, is that it is the banner of a nation which has its own country, its own territory. The Republic of South Africa also has this—a title deed to its own territory. The White nation of South Africa has this.

Another characteristic is its idealism and its faith; faith which gives its spiritual strength, and idealism which gives it the courage to build for the future. These things—the language, the country, the faith, the idealism—have to be symbolized for us by something. They have to be symbolized by something we hear. Our national anthem meets these requirements. They are also symbolized by our own national flag.

For that reason the fourth requirement for a nation is its own national flag; the flag which on occasion causes the hearts of a nation to swell and throb with pride, when the flag as a symbol binds its people together, particularly when the flag is flying amongst those of other nations in the world. When the flag of the Republic of South Africa is flying proudly and gracefully among the flags of the other nations of the world, it is telling the nations of the world that it, the South African flag, is the symbol of a White nation here at the southernmost tip of Africa; the symbol of a White nation that was not simply blown here by the wind, but the symbol of a White nation that was planted here with an injunction and a calling—an injunction to proclaim the Christian faith, to bear the message of civilization. This is what the White nation of the Republic of South Africa must convey here. When it flies among the flags of the other nations in the world, the flag of the Republic of South Africa tells those nations about its country and about its nation and what is symbolizes for them. Then that message of Christianity and civilization will and can and must be conveyed here in Africa; conveyed here at the southernmost tip of Africa. Our people, the people of the Republic of South Africa, will convey that message faithfully. With this flag in our hands, and its meaning deep in our hearts and minds, we shall convey our message, the message of White nationhood, here at the southernmost tip of Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I do not disagree with what the hon. member for Meyerton has just said. As a matter of fact, we are glad that he described to us the sentiments which our flag arouses in us. It is my privilege to speak after the hon. member, and I cannot express what I have to say better than in the words of Langenhoven. I am referring to the following words from the “vlaglied” (flag song)—

The national flag has a symbolism for us of which we must all take cognizance. It also pleases us to know that the nations of the world take cognizance of the meaning of the flag of the Republic of South Africa. It is a symbol of our identity, our national nature and our national character.

It is a step we take to build relations both inside and outside the country. It unites us because we are citizens of a specific State and territory. The flag is therefore the symbol of the entire State. Both inside and outside the country it characterizes the national awareness of the people. It is also the distinguishing symbol of the State in its relations with other States. It is a symbol accepted by all the modern States.

We have just heard about the history of the flag. It is interesting to note how it developed from various flags. There was the Dutch Tricolour, the flag of the Netherlands, the British flag, the Voortrekker flag, the flag of the Natalia Republic, the flag of the Orange Free State, the flag of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek and the flag of the Colony of Natal.

It is also interesting that the new flag of the Union flew in Havana on 30 March 1928, two months before our own flag was eventually raised here on 31 May 1928, at an international conference on immigration and emigration. Mr. Eric Louw, our then Trade Commissioner in New York, had such a flag manufactured in New York. That was the first time our national flag flew abroad.

Union Day, 31 May 1928, is very important to us because that is when we became aware of our highest ideals and aspirations and the full realization of nationhood and national unity revealed itself. On that occasion the two flags at present in the possession of this Parliament were raised on the Parliamentary Building. They flew together. Then we also experienced what Dr. D. F. Malan said—

In 1957 an English-speaking member, Arthur Barlow, suggested in this House that there should eventually be only one national flag. Then the Union Jack was also removed.

That is why I just want to ask, in conclusion, that this flag be treated with respect and that it be displayed correctly under all circumstances. It should not sometimes be used as a table cloth. The blue stripe should never be on top. We should have the same pride in it as the schoolchildren in America have in their flag. Those schoolchildren gather every morning before school starts to salute their flag and sing the national anthem. In this way it becomes a part of that nation’s way of life. We are pleading for it to be the highest symbol of our nationhood and that the desire of Dr. D. F. Malan be reflected in his followers and that everyone can eventually confirm—

We want to congratulate the hon. the Minister and the Select Committee and agree heart and soul as a people that we have now established our own flag for coming generations.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot find fault with what the hon. member for Rosettenville had to say. I just want to put a question to him. Can the hon. member state in all honesty that the other two components of the new State community that we are moving towards in terms of the new Constitution, will treat that wonderful poem with which he concluded his speech with the same emotional value and piety as far as the national flag is concerned? [Interjections.]

You are an absolute disgrace.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May the hon. member for Turffontein say that the hon. member for Pietersburg is an absolute disgrace …

You are also one.

… and may the hon. member for Springs confirm it? [Interjections.]

Order! Will the hon. member repeat his second point of order?

My second point of order is that the hon. member for Springs with his big mouth …

Order! The hon. member must withdraw those words immediately.

I withdraw them unconditionally.

The hon. member may now raise his point of order again.

The point of order I want to raise is that the hon. member for Springs said I was a disgrace.

The hon. member for Turffontein must withdraw his remark.

I withdraw it.

The hon. member for Springs must also withdraw his remark.

I withdraw it, Sir.

The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

The national flag …

Is today the flag of the Coloureds and the Indians as well.

Will that hon. member please give me a chance to complete my sentence? [Interjections.]

You are not a Deputy Minister yet. [Interjections.]

After all, I cannot raise an argument in half a sentence. [Interjections.]

Order! I appeal to hon. members to stop making these constant interjections. The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

The national flag forms an important part of quite a number of national symbols. The hon. member for Meyerton rightly pointed out that it was a symbol like the national anthem, the coats of arms, the mace of Parliament, and decorations, honours and awards made to distinguished citizens of the country. It symbolizes the unity of sense and of endeavour which contributes towards bringing people in the same State community closer together and uniting them in a joint purpose and a joint existence of self-determination and own government alongside other peoples and nations. Its actual form usually bears the characteristics or marks of its history, of its historical experience. For example we read the following in the latest Year Book as regards the origin of the present national flag—

A committee of experts was then appointed which eventually put forward the proposal as prescribed in the next clause. It was 17 years after South Africa became a Union before we got around to creating our own flag. In the course of that struggle Dr. Malan, for example, made his very famous speech on a national flag for South Africa in 1926.

Order! I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member but I cannot allow him to discuss the principle of the clause. I allowed the first speaker of the CP to discuss the principle, namely that there must be a flag, but I shall not allow any further speakers to motivate that principle. Consequently the hon. member may only discuss the particulars of the clause.

May I just point out that it is a delicate matter to establish a flag for a constitution. That is what we are in fact doing in this process. [Interjections.]

Order! The principle that there is a national flag has already been debated in the Second Reading and there will be an opportunity for further debate during the Third Reading. The hon. member must therefore address me now on the particulars of this clause and on nothing else.

Suffice it to say that because we are establishing a national flag for three peoples in the same State community, this is going to unleash a tremendous struggle. If we do not handle this matter carefully a struggle can arise around this national symbol, the flag, the outcome of which we cannot foresee.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take up much of the Committee’s time. I just want to make two observations and then I shall resume my seat. It is not correct that up to now and in future the flag has been and will be the flag of one specific community. The flag is the flag of the State and consequently the flag of all the citizens of that State irrespective of what population group they belong to. This was, is and will remain the case.

The second point I want to make is in pursuance of what the hon. member for Pietersburg said. One does not design a flag for a constitution and that is why the clause provides that the Republic as a State has a National Flag.

Mr. Chairman, this flag with its three horizontal stripes which we are discussing today and with the colours which it has today, was already 80 years old when Jan van Riebeeck planted it here as a flag. It actually owes the orange to …

Order! I do not want to interrupt the hon. member unnecessarily, but the hon. member is now discussing the colours of the flag and they will be discussed under clause 4.

Very well, Sir. I just want to mention one incident in connection with this flag of ours. On 30 May 1978 the Speaker announced in the House of Assembly that on that day a flag lowering ceremony would take place followed by a flag raising ceremony. On 30 May members of the Fleet lowered the flag on the Senate building and the next day, 31 May, that flag was raised again to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the flag, which was recognized as our national flag in 1928. On that occasion, on 31 May, the hon. member for Rissik, Mr. H. D. K. van der Merwe, opened the ceremony with a reading from the Scriptures and a prayer. The Speaker delivered a short address. Many hon. members and their wives were present.

Order! I gave the hon. member an opportunity to develop her argument a little, but I just want to draw her attention to the fact that she may not discuss the principle as to whether there should be a flag. She may only discuss the particulars of clause 3. I do not find the argument she is now raising in clause 3.

Mr. Chairman, that was just a piece of history I wanted to recount to other hon. members.

Mr. Chairman, one of us has a problem, either you have or I have. I want to discuss a matter here which is vitally important. Clause 3 reads as follows—

There is a flag and everyone in this Committee knows there is a flag. I want to say that with the inclusion of this clause it is quite clear that this is going to be the flag of all the people who are now going to become members of the new Parliament.

Order! The hon. member may not discuss the principle again. He must address me on the details; if not, I am going to request him to resume his seat.

Sir, when I want to elaborate on this point you must just listen to me for a moment, because I just want to point out that none of the Coloured and Indian schools have ever wanted to hoist this flag at a flag raising ceremony.

Order! That has nothing to do with clause 3.

Very well, Sir, I shall raise this argument during the discussion of the next clause.

The hon. member can try.

Mr. Chairman, may I please repeat…

Please do not repeat anything. The Chairman does not like it.

The fact that if the legislation is implemented, it will mean that all population groups will participate in Parliament, does not alter the fact that the flag is the flag of the State. The inclusion or exclusion of people does not alter the fact that everyone in this State lives under the same flag. The final point I want to make is that if one visits the Cape Corps, one finds this flag flying at their headquarters.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to tell the hon. the Minister that things are not as simple as the explanation he has just given, in which he simply associated the flag with a specific State without also bearing in mind the specific historical background to the forming of that State.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 4:

Mr. Chairman, as far as the design of the flag is concerned, the struggle that took place in South Africa concerning the flag is certainly relevant, because the design of the flag had a great deal to do with various groups that were in conflict with one another. For example, on 25 May 1926, Dr. Malan had the following to say in his Second Reading speech—

Order! I must point out to the hon. member that clause 4 relates to the design of the flag. The hon. member must not at this point use the argument that I was unable to permit him to use under clause 3. The issue here is the design of the flag.

Sir, with respect, I was advancing this argument when you stopped me during the discussion of clause 3 and said that it was relevant there.

Order! While the hon. member is discussing clause 4, he must discuss the contents of clause 4. I ask for the hon. member’s co-operation.

Sir, I shall abide by your ruling. I just wish to point out to you that I was advancing this argument when you told me that it was not relevant to clause 3, and now you are ruling that what I am doing at the moment …

Order! On that occasion I certainly did not tell the hon. member that it was relevant to clause 4. There are 10 hours available for the Third Reading debate and the hon. member may touch on the points he is raising now in the course of that debate. If he wants to discuss the principle again, he will have the opportunity to do so then. The hon. member must now confine himself to the details of clause 4, which deals with the design of the flag.

Sir, I shall abide by your ruling, although I just wish to point out that I was advancing this very same argument under clause 3 when you said that it was not relevant there.

Order! We cannot carry on like this. The hon. member must discuss the details of clause 4.

Mr. Chairman, I abide by your ruling. We must be very honest with one another about the design of a flag for our State. We must take into account the fact that it was only 17 years after the Union of South Africa had come into being that we succeeded in designing an acceptable symbol. Therefore we must be careful how we are going to enter this new dispensation. Let us be honest. The existing Republican flag, or Union flag as it was formerly known, has not always aroused the same emotions among all our people as is the case at present. For the Afrikaner in particular, with his centuries-long struggle to achieve his own freedom and justice, the Vierkleur of Transvaal symbolized that freedom far better than our present flag. Indeed, even today, when one asks many people what symbol symbolizes the concept…

Order! I am sorry, but the point at issue is not the symbol, but the details of the clause, viz. the design of the flag.

But I am speaking about the design.

No. The hon. member is speaking about the symbol. The hon. member must please co-operate with the Chair.

But I am speaking about the design, Mr. Chairman, because the concept “freedom and justice”, for example, was far better expressed for the Afrikaner people in the Vierkleur of Transvaal. If one looks at the history of the design of the flag, one finds that in 1942, during those years of storm and stress, the NP proposed the following design for a flag …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You ruled that the hon. member must confine himself to the design of the flag. I put it to him, in all courtesy, that he must discuss the way in which the flag has been designed, and not the historical reasons for the design. For example, he may advance reasons as to why he is dissatisfied with the way in which the flag has been designed. He may, for example, say that instead of three horizontal stripes, the flag should consist of 10 vertical stripes. However, I do not think it is in order if the hon. member speaks about the historical reasons for the design of the present flag.

The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

I should like to quote from section 2 of the Constitution Bill of the Republic of South Africa as formulated by the NP in 1942. With regard to the design of the flag, the following is stated—

This has an historic background and significance. I want to say that after that time of storm and stress in the forties, particularly as a result of the founding of the Republic in 1961, Afrikaans-and English-speaking people, and other White groups, developed, in the course of time, a greater unity, a constitutional unity, and we have developed a greater degree of loyalty and respect for the present flag, as much as for the other national symbols.

Order! I am really finding it difficult to bring home to the hon. member what I am trying to convey to him. Perhaps I am not expressing myself clearly enough. The clause provides that the national flag of the Republic is a flag which consists of three horizontal stripes of equal width, etc. The hon. member may therefore only address the Committee on the details stipulated in the clause and not on the history of the matter or how the various population groups feel about it. These are principles which the hon. member may not discuss at present.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I should like to address you as to the reason why those three stripes should be there and what their significance is.

Does the hon. member perhaps wish to propose that the flag be changed?

No, Sir.

Then I cannot see the sense of the hon. member’s argument.

Mr. Chairman, I merely wish to indicate what problems we are going to encounter if under this flag, a flag with an historic significance, we have other people … [Interjections.]

Order! That is a matter of principle which belongs in the Second Reading which has already been disposed of or in the Third Reading. The hon. member must now address the Committee on the details of clause 4.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: May I just put it to you that since the hon. member is speaking in support of clause 4 which deals with the design of the flag, it is surely permissible to deal with the history of the design as well. That is part of the detail of the clause, and I wish to make a friendly appeal to you to permit the hon. member to proceed.

No, I am sorry, but I cannot concede to the hon. member for Brakpan that when we discuss the details of the clause we may also discuss the history of the matter. The hon. member must confine himself solely to the details of clause 4. The hon. member for Pietersburg may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not pursue the history of the matter further. I just want to say in conclusion that a national flag bears the mark of history because it has developed out of a history. It is part of a people’s cultural historical experience over the centuries. It bears the marks of periods of its history, and one has to accept that. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, when one looks at this clause, at how the stripes are describe, one finds that in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), reference is made to the following—

In other words, it is stated here that in the middle of the white stripe of the flag of the republic of “De Oranjevrijstaat” … [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, we are here discussing a new constitution for the Republic, and as far as that constitution is concerned, the CP is diametrically opposed to the governing party. Our flag is one of the essential symbols of the republic that came into being as a result of a specific striving of a specific people in this country. The Government is here engaged in changing our constitution and as such it also affects the flag.

Order! I have no argument with the hon. member for Rissik in that regard, but he must understand that we are now dealing with the Committee Stage. The rules of this House provide quite clearly that the principles of a Bill are not discussed in Committee, but only the details. I refer the hon. member to Standing Order No. 63. I agree with the hon. member that the flag is an important principle, but the Committee Stage is not the place to discuss it. The hon. member for Rissik may proceed.

The point at issue here is what our flag consists of, its design. The flag of the Oranje Free State appears in it, as do the Vierkleur and the Union Jack. After all, that forms part of the detail of this clause. The reason for the presence of these three flags is that they relate to a historical struggle between the two White population groups. In this regard I should like to put a question to the hon. the Minister, and it is a very significant question. The hon. the Minister and I discussed the matter last week. The standpoint of the CP is that the Government is hereby enlarging the nation that introduced this flag, by adding two components, viz. the Indians and the Brown people. The flag with these symbols was created by the Whites as a solution for a State that was established for the Whites …

Order! The hon. member is now discussing the principle. That has nothing to do with the details of the flag.

I should very much like to help you, Sir. My point is that the design of this flag accommodated two population groups. It symbolizes the struggle of two provinces. Now the Brown people and the Indians are being involved in this. All I want to know from the hon. the Minister is whether, now that the Brown people and the Indians are becoming part of the Government’s dispensation, the Government will be prepared to give the Brown people and the Indians an opportunity to add their symbols as well.

Mr. Chairman, may I please just rectify once again a faulty argument, an argument based on an incorrect assumption. When this flag was accepted originally, the Coloureds were on the voters’ roll. The point I want to make is that this flag is not merely the flag of the two White population groups. It is the flag of the Republic of South Africa, and all South African citizens live under that flag. It is not I who enlarged the nation. However, the fact is that the South African nation does not consist of White people alone. In terms of no political concept can it be said that the South African nation consists of the two White groups only. It is also the flag of the Black people who do not live in the independent States. It is not I who arranged matters in this way. The Creator brought us together here in this way. I think it is time that we put a stop to the racist arguments that are being advanced here.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister must not display this kind of intolerance in debating the matter with us. If he accuses the CP of racism, then we must reply to that. We are not racists. Nor are we ashamed to be White people. The Minister puts forward the argument that when this flag was originally accepted, Brown people were on the voters’ roll. Let me remind the hon. the Minister of the historical situation. Towards the end of the Wars of Independence at the beginning of this century … The Minister must not frown when I want to tell him about the historical situation.

Order! I can no longer permit these arguments on principle. I suggest that the hon. member puts aside this specific argument of his until the Third Reading and, during the Committee Stage, confines himself to the details of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I should very much like to do so. Nor should I have spoken again if the hon. the Minister had not made this remark. What is the hon. the Minister really saying? The hon. the Minister is saying that when this flag was designed, Brown people and Indians were on the voters’ roll. What I really want to say to the hon. the Minister is the following. In Transvaal and the Free State there were no Brown people or Indians on the common voters’ roll. The struggle that preceded that is the struggle that the CP is pursuing today. However, I shall leave it at that. We shall refer to that again in the Third Reading.

The hon. the Minister did not answer the real question. In describing the composition and design of the flag—which is a design that originated with two population groups; with the people of two republics that lost their independence—a specific question necessarily arises. Therefore all I now want to know from the hon. the Minister is whether he is going to afford the Brown people, who are becoming an important third component of this Parliament, and the Indians, who are becoming an additional important component of this Parliament, the opportunity to attach their symbols, too, to this flag. After all, the symbols on this flag are bound up with history and with the struggle of the two White population groups. That is all that I wish the hon. the Minister to react to.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, should just like to reject the statement of the hon. the Minister that we are racists. I want to reject it on the basis …

Order! I shall under no circumstances permit that argument during the Committee Stage.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely reacting to what the hon. the Minister said.

Order! I permitted the hon. member for Rissik to react to that. I am not going to permit the hon. member for Jeppe to repeat the same argument.

Mr. Chairman, in that case I just wish to put a question to the hon. the Minister. Since the design of the flag is as it is described in clause 4 of the Bill—three horizontal stripes with three small flags in the centre; and no one can deny how those three small flags found their way into our flag—I want to know from the hon. the Minister whether he has consulted with the Coloureds and the Indians, who are now going to become components of this Parliament, as to the design of the flag. Has he afforded them the opportunity to insert in that flag their distinctive symbols, or has he not done so?

That is the cardinal point, Mr. Chairman. As we see it, the proposed flag is basically the flag as specified in the 1961 constitution. Under the proposed new constitution two new components are being included in this Parliament. Therefore the question now is whether those two new components are also to be represented in the flag.

I also suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the hon. the Minister goes and drinks a pill to keep his nerves under control. [Interjections.]

Order! Personal remarks of the nature which the hon. member for Jeppe has just made cause very serious problems in this House. The hon. member for Jeppe must withdraw that remark.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it.

The hon. member for Jeppe will not be permitted to make any further interjections for the remainder of the day’s sitting.

Mr. Chairman, I just wish to know whether one of the hon. members opposite could quickly draw the South African flag for me in accordance with the design as expounded in clause 4 of the Bill. I am sure that not 10% of hon. members in this House could do that. They would do well to remain silent now and begin practising. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the design of our national flag—its three horizontal stripes with the three small flags in the middle—has a history. It began with Gen. Hertzog, who loved to sketch flags. His first design was a green flag with the red cross of St. John. After that there was another design very similar to that of our present flag. However, Gen. Hertzog added a small constellation of stars. According to him, the stars were the symbol of Natal. He also had a shield instead of the square constellation in the middle. At the time the English said: “If the wound heals, the scab with fall off.” The flag was not proceeded with.

Then there was a big fight about the Union Jack in this fine flag of ours. That part of the design was never submitted to this House. That part of the design consists of the cruciform flag of St. Andrew. St. Andrew said that he could not be crucified, like Christ, on a vertical-horizontal cross, but rather on a diagonal cross. Therefore a flag was designed with a blue background and a white cross. Then the flag of St. George, who was a major figure in the wars of the Crusaders, was also included in the Union Jack. This was the basis for the red cross in the middle of the flag. Then, too, the cross of Sir Fitzgerald was inserted. That is also one of the symbols of that flag. That cross of Sir Fitzgerald is better known as the cross of St. Patrick. When one superimposes those crosses, one gets the Union Jack, which in fact is in the middle of our flag. The Union Jack was in fact created to remind the Christian world that St. John, St. Patrick and St. Andrew sacrificed their lives for a flag, for a symbol or religion.

What about St. George? Was he not there?

The point I just want to make is that I do not believe that when this contentious subject was discussed, everyone knew that this sign appears in a completely different place in ordinary flags. Usually the Union Jack appears in a corner of another country’s flag, but here there was an insistence that it appear in the middle. As hon. members will recall, the older people complained that it should not form the heart of this flag.

I now come to the fine flag of the Free State. Heraldically it has no meaning.

You are talking nonsense, man. [Interjections.]

Order!

Sir Eric Walker said that the flag of the Free State could not be found anywhere in heraldry. However, because that symbol is of great importance to the people, it was included. It also forms part of other flags. Sir Eric Walker, professor at the University at Cape Town and the foremost expert in the field of heraldry, said that this flag could be transformed into a flag with a green stripe, a yellow stripe in the middle, a red stripe above and a sky blue stripe at the bottom. The yellow stripe represents experience, the red stripe, sacrifice, and the green stripe, life itself.

Then, too, one has the Vierkleur. It, too, is in the middle of the flag. As hon. members will know, the Vierkleur is the flag that developed out of the cruciform flag of the Voortrekkers. It was a red cross on a blue background. All this appears in this flag. I want us to consider this flag, the flag of Orange and the British flag. St. Andrew lost his arm when he was crucified. It was returned to Scotland. All these designs are incorporated in one flag. When one considers the design of the flag, one sees that all the people in the Republic who had a say in its design are represented. The flag of Sir Eric Walker had already been approved by the Cabinet and by everyone who served on the Committee. However, it was not agreed to finally because Tielman Roos and others said that there had to be a compromise with regard to the flag.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I wish to address a friendly request to you to reconsider your ruling in regard to the hon. member for Jeppe. I concede that his remark concerning the Minister is not the kind of remark one ought to utter in a Committee Stage, but I do want to put it to you that it is not unparliamentary to say it. Furthermore, I also wish to say that there is a constant stream of interjections from the Government side. Very often they are made by the same hon. members. Sir, I shall mention their names if you wish. I feel that for the sake of fairness and objectivity you ought to reconsider your ruling that the hon. member for Jeppe may not make interjections for the rest of the day and that he had to withdraw a certain remark.

I asked the hon. member for Jeppe to withdraw the remark and forbade him to make further interjections, not because it was an unparliamentary expression, but because it was a personal remark. There is a ruling by Mr. Speaker that there must be no more personal remarks. I grant the hon. member for Brakpan that personal remarks will not be tolerated in future. I should like us to co-operate and for that reason I am quite prepared to reconsider the ruling in regard to the hon. member for Jeppe and to permit him, within the confines of the rules, to make further interjections today.

Thank you very much, Sir.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 5:

Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to support this clause, as amended by the Select Committee. With this amended clause the English name and version of the national anthem are given constitutional recognition. I say it is my privilege because this is a further step in the direction of complete national unity and total acceptance of the two language groups by one another.

National anthems, as is any national symbol, are not easily recognized. It takes time to be totally accepted by the population. “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” is a good example in this respect. Although the words and music were accepted in 1936, it was only used for the opening of Parliament in 1938 and on a number of occasions as an unofficial national anthem. It was only on 2 May 1957 that the authorities were fully convinced of the general acceptance of “Die Stem” as national anthem. It was then declared the only official national anthem of South Africa. It therefore took between 19 and 21 years of official use of this anthem before it was declared the national anthem. With the constitutional recognition of the English name and version of our anthem I do not think it can be said that we are acting too hastily. As early as in 1952 Dr. Dönges asked for an English translation of our national anthem. A selection committee was appointed under the chairmanship of …

Order! I regret that I cannot allow the hon. member to recount the history of the national anthem at this stage.

Very well, Sir. Mr. Chairman, the English version of our anthem is know as the “Call of South Africa”. It is heard over television on alternate days at the end of the day’s transmission. It is used as such at official functions. It is referred to in the encyclopaedia as our national anthem and it is used and generally accepted by our population as such, and this has been the position over many years. The time has come therefore for the English name and version to be constitutionally recognized. I see no reason why in a billingual country such as ours the national anthem and its name should not be constitutionally recognized in both languages if it is accepted in both languages by the various population groups, as is in fact the case. Therefore I support the clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to repeat here the question which I asked the hon. the Minister under clause 4. In this case, too, the expression “volk” is used. I just want to say that the “volkslied” (national anthem) was written and accepted as the “volkslied” of the White man, as we have historically accepted it. Another two components will now be added by this Parliament whereby the nation will be extended quite considerably and will be very different from what it was in the past. I just want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he is going to request the other two components, as he visualises Parliament in future, to add additional verses to our existing national anthem.

Mr. Chairman, I rise merely to say once again that, as in the case of the national flag, the national anthem is not the national anthem of a particular sector of the community. The national anthem is the national anthem of the State. If various people have differing emotions about it and if various people sing the national anthem with less enthusiasm, or if they refuse to sing it, then it is their personal choice. However, that does not detract from the fact that the national anthem is the national anthem of South Africa and not of a particular group of people.

Mr. Chairman, I am merely rising to tell the hon. the Minister that I differ materially from the standpoint which he stated here. I believe that is consequently the reason why we differ on the constitutional future of South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to ask the hon. the Minister whether, in respect of the national anthem, he also consulted the Indian and the Coloured components, that are to enter this Parliament, in connection with their view of the national anthem. I want to ask whether they possibly made any suggestions in connection with the wording and whether they may have wanted to add more verses. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether, in fact, there was liaison with them or whether steps were simply taken without consulting them.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Jeppe, as a member of the House of Assembly, is entitled to read the minutes of the Select Committee and also to listen to the evidence of both the Indian and the Coloured leaders with regard to the constitutional proposals. The clause provides that the national anthem of the Republic shall be “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika—The Call of South Africa” and in this particular case “Republic” means the State which administers our Republic.

So they are all part of the people now?

Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one appeal to the hon. the Minister. I asked him a very simple question. I just want to know whether he did consult those population groups about the contents of the national anthem, yes or no?

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister said that the flag was the flag of the State, but surely we cannot get away from the fact that the national anthem has originated with a specific sector of the population. It symbolizes the pride and a certain loyalty of a certain sector of the population in particular. It is quite interesting to note that Langenhoven wrote the original three verses of the “volkslied” on 31 May 1918 and subsequently, on request, the fourth verse. It is the fourth verse in particular with which we are going to have problems in the new dispensation. Let us take a look at it—everyone knows the words—

That is what is going to cause a real problem in the new dispensation. For that reason—the hon. member for Innesdal raised it for consideration—I believe that in the new dispensation the Government will have to give serious consideration to a white flag, a clean flag symbolising the surrender of …

Order! The hon. member may not discuss the flag under this clause.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member for Pietersburg made this remark with a grin on his face which indicated that he did so deliberately in order to provoke the Chair.

Order! I have given my ruling and I think the hon. member for Pietersburg has noted the displeasure of the Chair at his conduct.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that nothing should be closer to the heart of every people than its flag and national anthem. Let us listen to the words of “Die Stem” as I read it out to you—

I want to emphasize this sentence—

[Interjections.]

Order!

It is pathetic to hear this kind of remark when I am reciting the national anthem of South Africa. One asks oneself what is meant by that. Is it a farce or a joke? No, I believe our national anthem deserves all due respect. I continue—

I believe that as Afrikaners we want to do so. We shall make sacrifices for our people and country. This is how C. J. Langenhoven continues—

If the Constitution Bill is passed, South Africa will come to preserve those things which it has. I read on—

Our Republic as we had it—

I just want to mention that as far as our flag is concerned, if anyone should commit an offence against that flag …

Order! I am sorry, but the clause on the flag has been dealt with.

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman [Interjections.]

Order! Then the hon. member may not discuss it again.

I am now dealing with the penal provision.

All that the Committee is discussing at present is clause 5, which reads: “The National Anthem of the Republic shall be ‘The Call of South Africa/Die Stem van Suid-Afrika’”. The hon. member may only discuss that. The penal provision in respect of the flag will come up for discussion later, and the hon. member may discuss it then.

Mr. Chairman, I shall discuss the penalty for dishonouring the national anthem on that occasion.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 6:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 4, after line 35, to insert:
   1. (a) to appoint the times for the holding of sessions of Parliament or of any House and to prorogue Parliament or any House;
   2. (b) to dissolve Parliament or any House;
   3. (c) to call a joint sitting of the Houses;
2. 2. On page 4, after line 53, to insert:
   1. (i) to issue and to withdraw passports;
   2. (j) to appoint and to discharge commissions.

The marginal note next to this clause reads: “The President and his powers”. We are therefore now discussing the powers of the State President in the new dispensation, and I would suggest that these powers are an extremely important aspect of the whole new constitution. There are various other clauses in the Constitution Bill which are directly related to the powers of the State President. These clauses are of fundamental importance in discussing clause 6, and it would be impossible to conduct a meaningful discussion on clause 6 without them. I propose that in passing, we look at clause 19, which should be read together with clause 6. Clause 19 deals with the executive authority of the State President, and is directly linked to clause 6. In clause 19 the powers of the State President are divided into two watertight compartments. If we did not take this into account, we would not be able to conduct a meaningful discussion on clause 6. Clause 19 determines that as regards own affairs, the State President is the executive authority, acting on the advice of the Ministers’ Council in question. Therefore, if there are own affairs involved in clause 6, it means that the State President is the executive authority acting “on the advice of” the Ministers’ Council. If there are aspects dealing with general affairs in clause 6, the executive authority is vested in the State President, acting “in consultation with” the Cabinet.

Order! The hon. member is raising a very important issue, but I suggest that the hon. member should rather discuss the State President’s powers in respect of own affairs and general affairs when we discuss clause 19, and confine himself here to the details of clause 6.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address you on this point. Let us look a for a moment at clause 6(3)(b), it empowers the State President to confer honours. If I have to address your on the powers of the State President as regards conferring honours, I would have to say that in terms of the provisions of clause 19, if the matter is a general affair, he need only consult, but if it is an own affair, he can only do so on the advice of the Ministers’ Council in question This means that he has to exercise one of two powers. He can either confer that honour completely at his own discretion if it is a general affair, or he has no discretion to confer an honour if it is an own affair. He then has to act on the advice of the Ministers’ Council. Now I am in your hands, Mr. Chairman. I do not know how to discuss this without qualifying the powers of the State President.

Order! I can understand the hon. member’s problem, but I just want to point out to him that we cannot discuss the question of own and general affairs under two clauses.

I concede that.

If the hon. member discusses it here, he cannot discuss it again under clause 19. I should like to leave the choice to the hon. member.

I wrestled with this problem the entire weekend, and I am in your hands, Mr. Chairman. The fact of the matter, however, is that the head of the Republic is the President. Now I just want to sketch my dilemma for you. If it is a general affair, the President, as head of the Republic, acts completely in his own right. He need only consult. He has unlimited powers, like a dictator. I am saying this with respect. However, if the head of the Republic is an own affair, in effect, he has no power to act, since he has to act on behalf of the Ministers’ Council. That is my dilemma. I foresaw that we could possibly have problems with this, and in all fairness I must put my problem to you, and I should be pleased if you could give me a formula on how to discuss this, Mr. Chairman, since I do not know how to go about doing so. If I could try to be practical by saying that the head of the Republic is the President, if there is no election, I could possibly be a member of the White Chamber when this comes into operation. Is that head of State my own affair? In other words, if we were to have a Ministers’ Council, that Ministers’ Council would be acting on behalf of the State President and telling him what to do. In other words, the Ministers’ Council would tell the State President, as head of the Republic, what to do, but if it is a general affair, he would do as he pleases.

Order! I suggest that the simplest formula we can pursue, is that we read the clause, look at the details of the clause and then discuss them only.

Mr. Chairman, I think that is a good idea. Clause 6(1)reads—

That would be the State President. The whole of clause 6 deals with the prerogatives of the head of the State. Hon. members will note from the evidence that served before the Select Committee that the University of South Africa also commented, and a few very interesting facts on prerogatives came to light. I refer briefly to Unisa’s comment. Firstly, most of the powers mentioned in clause 6 were prerogatives in terms of common law. Secondly, the powers mentioned in clause 6 are basically the same as the State President’s powers in our present Constitution Act, Act No. 32 of 1961. Another interesting aspect is that because clause 6(4) ensures that other prerogative powers are not inadvertently lost, it demonstrates continuity with our common law. That, then is the comment made by Unisa.

The question now arises: What is a prerogative? These are all prerogatives. There are a number of definitions. Perhaps the simplest definition is that prerogatives are those powers that were initially important powers vested in the king. In the development of constitutions, constitutional customs and conventions have evolved, which will be discussed in more detail at a later stage when we deal with other clauses. This will be dealt with under separate clauses, and is not really affected by clause 6 in its present form.

It is my contention, however that a drastic change has now come about. The wording of clause 6 therefore seems to be suitable for a constitutional dispensation in the Westminster style, which is what South Africa has had until now. In terms of that, it seems to be quite in order, and if that is the case, I have no problems. However, comprehensive constitutional changes are taking place now, and we must consequently look at the wording of the clause from various angles.

The first change is that in future the State President will be both the head of the State and the head of the Government. Nothing like this has ever existed in the Westminster system. Another change is that Parliament, which has consisted only of this House until now, will in future consist of three Chambers. It is important to bear this in mind when considering the prerogative of the State President. Another amendment is that whereas there has only been one legislative body in charge of the territory of the Republic in the past, there will be four, or possibly five, legislative systems under the new dispensation. The powers of the State President will be regulated in a manner different from that in the existing Constitution, for example, the role of the Supreme Court will be curtailed in terms of section 18(2). [Time expired.]

Sir, I think it is high time we came forward with a few constructive ideas in this debate. I am surprised that there are so many objections to the proposed powers of the State President under the new dispensation. For decades people in this country have sought to recapture, in glowing terms, an heroic past. They have reflected on the existence of the two early Boer Republics, the republic of “De Oranjevrijstaat” and “De Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek” and lauded the two strong Presidents, Presidents Steyn and Kruger, who were at the helms of those two republics.

May I put a question to you?

No, Sir. I do not have the time.

President Steyn and President Kruger were idealized, and people longed for the day when we would once again have a strong executive President…

Did the Coloureds and Indians have the franchise then, too?

Order! The hon. member for Rissik must please restrain himself.

However, now that it is possible for South Africa to have a powerful executive State President once again, everyone is making as if the world will come to an end if the new President is placed in a position to be a dynamic President, like President Steyn and President Kruger were. However, it is now being claimed that the State President will have too much power. It was never the intention of the draftsmen of this Constitution Bill that the State President would be a despot, or that he would be able to force unrestricted powers upon the people of this country in a tyrannical way. However, because a new pattern of Government is coming into being and it will not get off the ground very easily if it is not tackled with vigour and determination, it is important that the State President be invested with exceptional powers. If he were to be given too little power, this new attempt could suffer. It could even fail. Moreover, the head of the State could then be seen as a weakling, and the new dispensation as a failure. Although the Presidents of the former Transvaal and Free State republics did not have unlimited powers, and were compelled to consult their various “Volksrade” before taking final decisions, the constitutions of those two republics enabled them to govern with a strong hand, and they also commanded a great deal of respect abroad. In the Republic of the Orange Free State, which is still presented as a model republic today, most of the laws, and the most important ones, were conceived in the mind of the President, and the President, with his great de facto power, which was much greater than his limited de jure power, placed his stamp on virtually everything, and he did so very successfully. Despite all these powers, however, there were complaints from time to time that the President was in all things merely the servant of the people, and that he did not have sufficient powers to …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: What has the history of the powers of the State President 80 years ago got to do with this Bill?

Order! I am listening patiently to the hon. member for Bloemfontein North, and I am waiting for him to get to the point.

My point, Sir, is that the history pertaining to those two Presidents teaches us that a President cannot govern satisfactorily if he does not have sufficient power. There has been criticism, in this hon. House as well, of the so-called dictatorial powers of the new Head of State. However, that criticism is not supported by facts. Surely it is untrue that the President can be given excessive or unrestricted powers, although it is very important that the power be concentrated in his hands for the sake of effective government. Firstly, he will have no legislative powers. He will be dependent on the approval of the three Houses to carry out his legislative programme.

Order! I think the hon. member would concede that this argument belongs under another clause. I think the hon. member should rather confine himself to the details of this clause.

Then I shall conclude by making only one other remark, Sir. That is that I want to commend the hon. the leader of the NRP for his realism in a speech he made last weekend in Pietermaritzburg, in which he stated the following, according to today’s Die Burger—

This also supports my statement that the State President will not have unlimited despotic powers in the new dispensation.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that if the interpretation of this clause by the hon. member for Bloemfontein North is correct, then we on this side will be voting against it. As we see it this is not the clause in which the essential new powers of the President are contained. This clause has been taken over from the present constitution as it relates to the State President. The hon. member is making a lot of nonsensical propaganda on the wrong clause. We see this clause as a repetition of the traditional verbal statement of the powers of a Head of State, but all these provisions, even as they stand there, are subject to conventions, to Acts of Parliament and to other provisions of this Bill. When we come to clauses 14, 19 and 20 we will certainly expose what we believe to be the potential dictatorial powers of the President. It does not apply under this clause. This is a traditional clause. As a matter of fact I would suggest to the hon. the Minister that all we really need here is clause 6(1). I doubt whether anything after clause 6(1) is really essential, because all these powers are contained either in other provisions of the Act or in terms of other laws.

So the PFP will support this not because we are satisfied with the general powers given to the President but because this is not the appropriate clause under which to debate this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to agree with what the hon. member for Sea Point has just said. It is clear to me, too, that the hon. member for Bloemfontein North has not studied the present legislation very well. He began by saying that we needed a strong President or head of State. However, the hon. member need only go and read clause 19 to realize that in terms of clause 6, the State President can only act “on the advice of” his Cabinet. The hon. member for Sea Point said that the provisions in clause 6 were merely traditional provisions. That is true. Those are also the prerogatives, as I said. However, there have been comprehensive changes. Those comprehensive changes, which we are going to discuss when we debate later clauses in the Bill, concern own and general affairs. We are still to realize what the problems are in that regard.

I now want to deal briefly with clause 6(1). When my turn to speak expired on a previous occasion, I was in the process of indicating that a motion served before the Select Committee in terms of which “head of State” was to be substituted for “head” of the Republic. However, we are satisfied with the present wording in the Bill. Since an amendment moved by our party, whereby “State President” is being substituted for the word “President”, wherever it appears, has been accepted, clause 6(1) now reads as follows—

This eliminates all possible criticism on the part of the Select Committee, or from any other quarters, with regard to the title of the head of the State. The term “State President” now appears throughout in the legislation.

Another document that came before the Select Committee, refers to the “head of the Republic” in clause 6(1), as well as to the term “head of the State” in clause 6(4). However, I shall say more about this in due course, when I discuss clause 6(4).

I now come to the real crux of my problem. We have had a temporary respite from it, but it is unavoidable that we return to it now, and that is the power of the State President, in terms of clause 6. Is it a power in terms of which the State president acts “on the advice of” his Ministers’ Council, or is it a case in which he acts “in consultation with” his Cabinet? I would suggest that there is a fundamental difference between the two. If he acts only “on the advice of” his Ministers’ Council, he does not have a discretion, and he is therefore merely the symbolic head of State of the Republic of South Africa; i.e. precisely as is the case at present under the Westminster system. However, in clause 6(1) we are dealing with an own affair, and there is no difference between the State President, in terms of the present legislation, and the present State President. However, if it is a general affair—and that is my problem the dilemma I explained earlier—the State President acts “in consultation with” his Cabinet. Therefore, this means, in effect, that he follows his own head, and is therefore a true executive head of State. What is he in reality, then? That is the question I should like to address to the hon. the Minister.

Order! I thought we had agreed that the hon. member would not advance that argument here now.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, you said that we should refrain from discussing certain issues until each separate clause had been put forward for discussion. Now I am half way through …

Order! The hon. member would agree with me that he should rather refrain from advancing that argument until we get to the relevant clause.

Surely we are there now, Mr. Chairman.

Order! The hon. member agreed with the hon. member for Sea Point that the issue here is the traditional powers of the State President. The hon. member may raise all the other powers he is concerned about when clauses 14, 19 and 20 come up for discussion.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, I cannot do so.

It seems to me that the hon. member for Jeppe is a little too fast for us.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Unfortunately, we find ourselves in a situation in which we do, in fact, sometimes have to refer to future clauses in order to be able to discuss a previous clause. If we look at clause 19(2), it appears that the State President acts “in consultation with” in certain cases, and “on the advice of” his Ministers, in other cases. Except for when this is specifically excluded, he acts according to his own discretion. This is one of the cases in which he acts “on the advice of” his Cabinet, or “in consultation with” his Cabinet. I am now referring to clause 6. The powers he exercises in terms of this clause, are powers granted to him in terms of clause 19. With respect, Mr. Chairman, it is therefore essential that the hon. member for Jeppe refer to clause 19 in order to be able to discuss clause 6 and to illustrate his arguments in this respect properly.

Order! It seems to me that the hon. member for Brakpan is a good intercessor for the hon. member for Jeppe. I shall therefore permit the hon. member for Jeppe to proceed, on condition that he only refers to these aspects. However, he will not be permitted to discuss them.

Mr. Chairman, I shall do my best. Without this knowledge, to which you have now permitted me to refer, the powers of the State President, in terms of clause 6, would be completely incomprehensible. Of course, this is irreconcilable with the legislative process. We must know these things. This concerns the powers of the State President.

I just want to try to determine briefly what the position of the White Chamber in respect of its head of State is going to be.

The House of Assembly.

Yes, the House of Assembly. What is the relationship of the House of Assembly with the head of State going to be, and what is the relationship of Parliament with the head of State going to be? I do not see this item in schedule 1. Therefore, it cannot be an own affair. The head of the State is therefore the head of Parliament in this respect. However, looking at the other criteria laid down, I would say that the House of Assembly is entitled to its head of State, that the House of Assembly has a certain right to its head of State. You would concede that, Sir. The problem is that there is doubt about the concepts own affairs and general affairs.

Order! The hon. member cannot speak about the concepts of own affairs and general affairs now. The hon. member must come back to the powers granted to the State President in terms of clause 6.

Suffice it to say that I find it absolutely impossible to discuss clause 6, which is a comprehensive clause, without qualifying the two kinds of powers the State President has. In the one case, he can do as he pleases, but in the other case, the Ministers’ Council tells him what to do. If anyone could tell me that as far as the head of the Republic of South Africa is concerned, it is an own affair, my problem would be solved, since I would know that the power of the State President is a power “on the advice of”, i.e. that if it is an own affair, the Ministers’ Council, and no-one else, will tell him what to do. However, if someone were to suggest that as far as subsection (1) is concerned, it is a general affair, the State President has a completely different power.

I want to tell you in all earnestness what my dilemma is in this regard. I pondered over this problem the entire weekend.

You should rather have gone to watch the rugby.

Perhaps the hon. member went to watch the rugby. Perhaps he should rather have visited a cheese factory.

Order! I have already had to ask the hon. member for Jeppe to refrain from making personal remarks this afternoon. The hon. member is doing so again. The hon. member must withdraw that remark.

I withdraw it unconditionally, Sir.

I just want to emphasize very strongly the seriousness of this matter. In future, I shall not permit similar personal interjections and remarks to be made.

Sir, did you hear what the hon. member for Bezuidenhout said?

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member for Bezuidenhout made a remark while the hon. member for Jeppe was speaking. It was personal.

Order! The hon. member for Bezuidenhout said that the hon. member should rather have gone to watch the rugby.

The point is that while the hon. member for Jeppe was speaking and telling us that he had devoted a certain amount of time to this issue, another hon. member made a personal remark. [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must give the hon. member for Rissik the opportunity of stating his case. Has the hon. member finished?

Yes, my standpoint is that if one hon. member makes a personal remark when another hon. member is speaking, I cannot see why the hon. member is not permitted to react.

The hon. member for Rissik would agree with me that the remark made by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout that the hon. member should rather have gone to watch the rugby, does not fall into the same category as the remark the hon. member for Jeppe made that he should rather have visited a cheese factory. It is not the same thing. The hon. member for Jeppe may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my remark.

Thank you very much.

Sir, I was in the process of putting my dilemma to you. What the dilemma amounts to is that the House of Assembly … [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I rise to emphasize what was said by the hon. member for Sea Point in regard to the powers listed in this clause. Just for the record, these are not quite identical to the present powers. The Select Committee deleted four clauses, which are covered elsewhere in the Bill and were therefore superfluous. The reference to conventions has also been transferred to another part of the Bill. However, in effect these powers are the existing, conventional, traditional powers which have existed since the time of Union and which are exercised in terms of convention by the President acting in Council—i.e. the Cabinet.

Although this is the position—the hon. member for Sea Point also accepts that this is the position—I want to emphasize that in publication after publication one finds these powers are referred to as part of the draconian powers of the President, that he can declare war and make peace, that he can ban and lock people up without trial, and all sorts of other things which are not done in terms of this clause at all. In fact, it is not done in terms of this constitution, but in terms of other legislation. I think it is important to make this absolutely clear to the public that these powers are the traditional powers exercised by the Governor-General under the old system and exercised by the State President when we became a Republic, powers which are traditionally powers of the head of State in any country. Subsection (4) reads as follows—

I have seen a number of newspapers referring to some of these powers, for example the power to proclaim or terminate martial law or the power to declare war and make peace, as draconian powers which create a new form of President who can in fact rule South Africa on his own. That is part of the false propaganda which is being distributed. I have even read leading articles in newspapers which have referred to these vast powers. I am glad to have it on record that the official Opposition accepts that these powers are exactly the same as the existing powers, that there are no hidden powers and that they are totally accepted in a normal democratic State. That is why we will support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, obviously the hon. member for Durban Point would not like any misunderstanding on this issue, the schedule is the same schedule in the present constitution as it was pre-1961 constitution. The range of powers listed in subsection (3)(a) to (h) is the same. However, we are not saying that they are executed under the same circumstances. The powers of the Governor-General were exercised by him on the advice of the Executive Council. The powers of the President at present are exercised on the advice of the Executive Council. In due course, when we argue clause 19(1)(b), we will argue that there is to be a fundamental change because one is moving away from the concept of a President standing separate from the Executive Council to a President who is an integral part of the President’s Executive Cabinet. While the list of powers is the same the manner in which they are exercised is totally different. We will argue the manner in which they are exercised under a different clause and not under this clause. The hon. member must not say that because we accept that the list of powers is the same we are conceding that the manner in which they are exercised is going to be the same.

Mr. Chairman, I am not quite certain whether the hon. member for Jeppe has indeed moved his amendments.

Yes, at the very beginning.

Let us look at what the hon. member did. The amendments moved by the hon. member really have no bearing on the argument he advanced concerning the clause, no bearing whatsoever. What is very interesting is that as far as the prerogatives involving the President are concerned, the hon. member wants to include a very interesting one, that of calling a joint sitting of the Houses. I find it strange—having listened to the debate we have thus far been conducting—that the hon. member now wants to give the President the prerogative of calling joint sittings of the Houses. That is a complete contradiction of the philosophy hon. members have thus far been propagating. I just say that in passing, however.

What are the facts about the amendments? The Select Committee specifically took out the insertions the hon. member is now proposing, and it did so for specific reasons, those reasons being that there are equivalent powers in other clauses of the Bill. The hon. member, for example, wants to grant the President the prerogative of determining sessions of Parliament or of any House provided for in clause 38, the prerogative to dissolve Parliament or any House is contained in clause 39, and the power to call joint sittings is contained in clause 67. So the fact that the Select Committee removed those specific items did not mean that they no longer existed, but rather that it was more fitting to have them included with the powers of the President. That is the reason why they were taken out.

The hon. member argues further that there have been fundamental constitutional changes, and he listed them. I do not want to argue with him about that. The first involves the amalgamation of the head of State and the head of Government. He said it was a deviation from the Westminster system. That is so. He also said that we wanted to change Parliament into a Parliament of three Houses. He said that was also a deviation. I cannot understand, however, what the hon. member wants to achieve with that argument. What he actually wants to do with his amendments is to alter the clause in such a way as to include more power. I cannot tie up his argument with what he wants to achieve by way of his amendments.

What are we discussing here? Not how the President will exercise certain powers. That is not what we are dealing with. Under the relevant clauses we will have an opportunity of arguing about whether it is right or wrong for the President to exercise certain powers in certain ways. That is not, however, at issue at the moment.

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question? I would be glad if the hon. the Minister would give me an indication of where, in the discussion of the clauses of this Bill, I shall be given an opportunity of discussing, for example, the South African Defence Force and the President’s powers in that context, if these aspects do not fall under this clause?

Mr. Chairman, that is precisely what I have been trying to do—like the hon. member for Sea Point and the hon. member for Durban Point, I have also been trying to draw a distinction between what the traditional powers of the head of State are and what are described as his prerogatives. All we are doing in this clause is to reiterate this, because in essence this clause is a duplication of section 7 of the present constitution. It is a verbatim duplication. In discussing the powers of the President, let us therefore discuss those powers under the relevant clauses in which those powers are set out, and this applies equally to whatever action he may take and to the manner in which he will use his powers. If the hon. member were to look at the various items contained in clause 6(2), it would be very clear to him that the specific items relate to all the population groups. Merely a quick reference to the list would indicate as much. Let us look at the Defence Force. Surely there is not only one group involved here. Surely the Defence Force is not only one specific group’s Defence Force. In this connection. I want to refer to clause 6(2). There are also the provisions relating to the conferring of honours and the appointment of ambassadors. Surely that is not something that only affects one specific group in the country. Ambassadors are not sent merely to represent one specific group; they are sent to represent the country. So one could go through the whole list, and the list itself gives an indication of what is involved.

My contention is that when we deal with the clauses involving own affairs and general affairs and prescribing what action the State President shall take in those respective instances, there will be no problem in determining whom the State President will not consult when exercising his powers. Surely that is clear enough. There are specific clauses and schedules relating to that. When they come up for discussion, we can argue about that as much as we want to.

Another power the hon. member wishes to propose is that involving the issuing and withdrawing of passports. In this country passports are issued on the instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs in terms of a specific Act, in fact section 2 of the legislation dealing with the issuing of travel documents. This has never before been a prerogative that has been detailed in the constitution. There is also the question of the powers involved in appointing commissions. In that regard let me refer the hon. member to clause 6(4). There we have the comprehensive provisions in terms of which all the powers which the State President now has remain intact, including the power to appoint commissions.

In conclusion let me say that the amendments are not acceptable in view of the fact that the necessary provision is made in the clauses I have enumerated. In regard to the addition of prerogatives involving the issuing or withdrawing of passports or other travel documents, together with the power to appoint commissions, in my opinion this is adequately covered in terms of clause 6(4), and there is consequently no necessity to have this amended. It has never previously been included in our constitution and we have always been able to handle the situation.

The hon. the Minister commenced by making a remark about amendment 1(c)—to call a joint sitting of the Houses. He said that he found it odd. Once again we are dealing here with a problem the CP has throughout. I think it has been placed on record fairly clearly that we are opposed to the entire Bill. It is stated in clause 67 that the State President can call joint sittings. Other clauses also state what he can do. If, as the hon. the Minister says, he finds the provision “to call a joint sitting of the Houses” odd, I may as well say that specific provision could be included under clause 67, and not here.

But I expressly pointed out that is the position.

The position, however, is that the Constitution Bill, which was referred to the Select Committee, did, in fact, contain these provisions. The Select Committee decided, the CP dissenting, to remove it from this clause. These provisions were included in this clause in the original Constitution Bill, despite the fact that they are dealt with later in the Bill. We felt that all the powers of the State President should be set out under one clause, so that anyone wanting to determine what all the powers of the State President are, would find them in one specific clause when reading through the legislation. That is why the original clause 7(3)(a), (b), (d) and (e) was included in that clause. I therefore do not think that there is anything wrong with including this here, with these powers, even though it is repeated at a later stage in the Bill. That is our case as far as this aspect is concerned.

The second amendment deals with the power to issue passports and to appoint commissions. The hon. the Minister advanced two arguments in this regard. One of the arguments is that these power have never been included in the constitution before. I would suggest that is not an argument, since the State President has various powers which he has exercised over the years, one of which is to appoint commissions. If one looks at a passport, one sees that it is a request from the State President of the Republic of South Africa that we be permitted to enter another country. We are therefore dealing here with a particular power of the State President. It could do no harm to spell out these two powers in this clause. The hon. the Minister is quite right in saying that these powers are covered by subsection (4), but this also applies to a few of the other powers that are specifically spelt out. A few of the other powers could just as well have been left out, too. To confer honours and to ratify international conventions, etc., are some of the other powers he has by way of prerogative. Why are these two important functions he has been performing for many years—over the past few years in particular—being omitted and not being included as being among his powers?

As far as the question of own affairs and general affairs is concerned, I just want to say briefly that I would imagine that a certain population group could ask the State President to confer an honour on an own organization or an own movement, for example, the Voortrekker movement, or a similar Coloured movement. Although I agree with the hon. the Minister that generally speaking, these are general affairs, it is arguable that there could be own affairs in respect of which he must act on the advice of the Ministers’ Council in question.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to associate myself with the hon. member for Brakpan. The idea behind the amendments we moved was the better rounding off and refining of the Bill. I am aware of the provisions of clauses 38(1) and 39(2), but as the hon. member for Brakpan has pointed out, the amendments are an attempt to have all the powers concentrated in one clause. That is the basic motivation for it.

As far as I am concerned, the hon. the Minister said a very important thing. He said that these powers had a bearing on all the population groups, i.e. that all affairs are general affairs.

Except for applicable provisions …

The hon. the Minister is now placing me in a dilemma. The hon. the Minister indicated that the powers contained in the various clauses related to everyone in the country. So all affairs are therefore general affairs. As the hon. member for Brakpan has pointed out, there could be problems in this regard. If all these powers were related to general affairs, let us suppose that this House of Assembly is operating under the new dispensation and we ask our Ministers’ Council to have honours conferred on a certain member. Then the State President would have to do so in terms of this Constitution Bill, because he acts “on the advice of”; he cannot refuse. Then surely that is an own affair of the House of Assembly. What I now want to know is whether the hon. the Minister concedes that I am right. The hon. the Minister does not want to react to that. He has every right not to do so. There is, however, still going to be a great deal of discussion on this matter outside Parliament. The hon. the Minister now has an opportunity of solving problems; that is essential.

Sir, let me just mention the S.A. Defence Force. If the S.A. Defence Force, the question of defence, is a general affair, as the hon. the Minister has indicated, there is a very important question I should like to ask, one which has previously been put to the hon. the Minister of Defence, but which has not been answered. In the new dispensation is the hon. the Minister going to extend compulsory military service to Coloureds and Indians? It is, after all, a general affair. Or is the hon. the Minister, in the new dispensation, not going to make military service compulsory for Whites, because otherwise he would be discriminating against the Whites?

Order! The hon. member is now going too far. The hon. member has made his point, but is now going too far. The hon. member may not, at this juncture, advance arguments about the various things that can be done with the Defence Force. He must only speak about the content of the clause and his amendment.

Sir, the hon. the Minister indicated that according to him the S.A. Defence Force was a general affair.

Order! We are not discussing general or own affairs now.

Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, it all revolves around the question of whether this is a general or an own affair. If it is a general affair, the President does what he wants to, because he has certain powers. If it is an own affair, he does not have those powers, because he is acting “on advice”. The answer to that question about the Defence Force, a question we have asked many times before, is an important one. People put that question to us. They say that we are debating …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The question of military service is not at issue now. The question of military service is dealt with in a special Act of Parliament. All that is being stated here is that the President is the head of the Defence Force.

That is, of course, not what stands there. Clause 6(2) reads—

The important question as far as we—as the House of Assembly, the White portion—are concerned is: What authority does the State President have over us? Does he have powers to act without taking advice, doing what he wants to, or is it a case of his acting “on the advice of” the Ministers’ Council? I am putting the question to the hon. the Minister.

Order! That is an argument the hon. member is now repeating for the third time, and if he does not come up with a new argument, I am going to ask him to resume his seat.

But, Mr. Chairman, I am not getting an answer.

Order! The hon. member cannot ask me to give an answer.

I shall now deal with subsection (3). Subsection (3) reads—

1. (a) to address any House, or the Houses at a joint sitting;

Let me now again ask the hon. the Minister: The President is empowered to address a House, and we are the White House, the House of Assembly. Must he, or must he not, got the permission of the Ministers’ Council to address us? In other words, is he acting “on the advice of” the Ministers’ Council, or does he, as President, take the decision himself? I can analyse this whole matter further. All this amounts to is the fact that own affairs are a farce. There are no own affairs.

Order! The hon. member may not discuss that aspect here. He may not discuss whether own affairs are a farce or not. The hon. member must discuss the powers of the President.

The powers of the President are completely vague in regard to certain matters. That is the problem. The problem before this committee today is that in terms of his prerogatives the powers of the President are totally vague and confusing. They are wrapped in a coating of wooliness, and I have been struggling so to get the hon. the Minister to give some attention to this that my throat is hoarse. We are simply not getting the answer we want on this important clause. I am just trying to get the hon. the Minister to tell us in what cases the powers are unrestricted powers and in what cases they are restricted powers in the sense that he himself does not have those powers. These are questions that we insist on being given answers to. These are the questions that we are being asked by the general public. Now is the time for us to ask these questions. I therefore put it to the hon. the Minister that it is completely unclear to us what the powers of the State President are going to be in terms of clause 6. We are entering upon a new constitutional dispensation in which the powers of the State President are not only unclear, as we shall discover later in the Bill, but also dictatorial in nature.

Mr. Chairman, I just briefly want to react to one statement the hon. member for Brakpan made, and then also to another statement made by the hon. member for Jeppe. The first statement I want to make is the following: Even if we were to introduce the proposed amendments to the wording of clause 6, even if we were to include those powers, clause 6 would still not present us with a complete picture of the State President’s powers. Even bearing in mind the hon. member for Brakpan’s limited objective in proposing that the State president’s powers be brought together in one single clause, i.e. that of giving a succinct review of the State President’s powers, and even if we were to amend the clause, as proposed, it would still not meet those specific requirements. Neither in the clause, nor in the amendments of the hon. members of the CP, is it stated that the State President will be Chairman of the Cabinet; something which actually gives the State President a good deal of power.

with a view to elaborating on this, and in the process coming to the argument of the hon. member for Jeppe, I want to emphasize that it is impossible for the powers of the State President to be both stipulated and defined in one single clause. One of the reasons why some of the State President’s powers or prerogatives were removed from this clause was because they are merely stipulated here. They are, however, defined elsewhere. We therefore removed them, in instances where they were merely stipulated, so as to insert them elsewhere where they can be both stipulated and defined. That was done because clause 6 would otherwise give an erroneous impression of what the State President’s powers would actually be.

One could, however, take note of the remaining prerogatives and powers. If one were to do so, one would see clearly that when the State President is acting as head of the Defence Force, for example, he is doing so in a symbolic capacity. It is therefore in a symbolic capacity that he is head of the Defence Force. As head of the executive authority, of course, he can also determine what the Defence Force shall do. So those are, in actual fact, two separate powers. The powers in clause 6 are therefore powers that are basically symbolic in nature.

In his argument the hon. member for Jeppe states that the State President would, for example, have to act on the advice of the Ministers’ Council. That is not, however, a relevant argument in this context. It is an argument relevant to the State President acting as head of the executive authority in terms of clause 19 of the Bill. One must actually separate these things somewhat in order to obtain a great deal more clarity on the matter, judging by the hon. member for Jeppe’s head-shaking gestures, it seems to me as if it is impossible for him to separate these aspects from one another. If I cannot help him within the space of 10 minutes, Mr. Chairman, I could always offer to give him a private lecture on this matter at a later stage. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, please allow me just to react briefly to what the hon. member for Helderkruin has just said. In the first place, he points out that the powers in terms of clause 6 are not the only powers the State President has. If that is indeed the case, surely this is a very good opportunity for the hon. member to move amendments. Over the years the legislator has seen fit to include quite a few of these powers here, in fact as specific powers. It would therefore also be a good thing to include, in this clause, the fact that the State President should also be Chairman of the Cabinet. That would be a good amendment, which we would also support if the hon. member were to move it. It is, however, our contention that all the powers that the State President would normally exercise should be included in this clause. We believe that would be a very good step to take.

The hon. member, however, contends that clause 6 only makes mention of the symbolic powers of the State President. I therefore merely want to know from him whether subsection (3)(a) also refers to a symbolic power of the State President. Does he address symbolic Houses or symbolic Houses in a joint session? Is that a symbolic action on his part?

The hon. member for Helderkruin would like to give us private lectures on this matter outside this House. In the meantime, however, he talks such a lot of nonsense, as he has just done here a moment ago. I definitely cannot fall in with that.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to state very clearly that if one wants to stipulate and define all the powers in one clause, one would have to make the one clause an Act in itself. If, on the other hand, one merely mentions them there and does not define them, this creates a false impression of the President’s powers.

Mr. Chairman, the speed with which we are moving through the clauses today leaves us virtually breathless when we think of Thursday and Friday. I should like to ask you to bear in mind that I have used the time of the Committee and your patience sparingly, so I should like to elaborate somewhat on this clause.

†This clause deals with the election of the State President and with the electoral college that has to perform this function. The electoral college will comprise Coloureds, Indians and Whites who will take part in the process of electing the State President, and this is obviously a constitutional innovation in the South African context. It is this principle which is being introduced that has caused a great deal of concern for some and a great deal of optimism on the part of others.

To understand the philosophy behind this clause and similar clauses, I have made a careful study of statements by the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning and other spokesmen on the Government side. It is quite clear to me that the philosophy which is being promoted here is one along the following lines: We need an executive president, he should have important powers, he should play a negotiating, bargaining role and he should try to assist in solving one of the problems endemic to the constitutional situation in South Africa, and that is of one group dominating others. The election of the State President and the powers which he shall have must be seen as one of the most important mechanisms assisting us in moving away from the problem of domination. It is in other words an attempt to promote the idea of consensus politics rather than domination politics. This is the underlying philosophy as I understand it.

The first point I want to make is that this clause in particular does not make provision for an executive president really. It is not an executive president in the proper sense of the word. In fact, from this clause it is quite apparent that the State President will be a creature of the legislature and he will, in fact, be a creature, as it were, of the dominant party in the White House of the new Parliament.

It is not the first time that there have been attempts at consensus government in divided societies. There are many other societies at which one can look and from whose mistakes we can learn very important lessons. I am not going to dwell at length on any of them; I just wish to mention that the formula of introducing other communities, population groups and/or ethnic components into a process of government in the search for consensus has been typical of societies like Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Malaysia, Sudan and Nigeria. In fact, if we look at the Lebanese example, we see that they had a Chamber of Deputies elected every four years by universal franchise. This chamber consists of 99 members, with a ratio of 6:5 Christians to Moslems. That gives you a composition of 30 Christian Maronites, 20 Sunni Moslems, 19 Shi’ites, 11 Greek Orthodox, 6 Druses, 6 Greek Catholics, 4 Armenian Orthodox and 3 for other minorities. By convention the President has to be a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister has to be a Sunni Moslem and the Speaker has to be a Shi’ite. Also by convention you find that the proportionality has to be reflected in the Civil Service as well as in appointments to the Cabinet. Let us remember that in this particular case, since 1943 until 1975, Lebanon had a stable democracy. It was only when it got sucked into the Middle East conflict that you found that this democracy could not hold, primarily because of the intervention of the PLO, Israel, Syria and other surrounding countries. If you look at Cyprus you see that there was a time when the same was attempted. You have a composition there of 77% Greeks and 18% Turks. In 1960 they had a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President, 7 Greek Ministers in the Cabinet and 3 Turkish Ministers in the Cabinet, and so on. The same kind of pattern reveals itself in the other societies. Some of them failed because people could not cope with it. It led to demands for partition, for example in Sri Lanka where the Tamil minority is even today demanding partition and India has agreed to accept 600 000 of them because of the domination of the Sinhalese majority.

The point I want to make is that these societies are as diverse culturally, racially and religiously as anything we hope to find in South Africa. There are differences in education, differences in industrialization and differences in the degree of urbanization in those societies. All the key characteristics you can find in South Africa you can find there. One of the most important characteristics is the attempts at ethnic outbidding on the part of one community vis-à-vis another. Here in South Africa we of course have ethnic outbidding where the Afrikaner Nationalist movement managed to use the Westminster system to entrench itself in a position of power and outbid any of its opponents in White politics.

However, there are two golden threads that run through the attempts at consensus democracy in those societies. The one is the idea of partition as a solution. The other is the idea of consensus as a solution to cope with the problem of domination. We have them here too. The CP consistently argues partition politics as a solution. The NP wants a combination of consensus and partition. We stand for consensus politics unqualifiedly.

What are the lessons one can learn from these societies? In all of them those communities have the right to free association. Nobody has to tell a Christian Maronite that he is a Christian Maronite, a Shiite that he is a Shiite or a Sunni Moslem that he is one. Nobody has to tell a Greek Cypriot that he is one or a Turkish Cypriot that he is a Turk. That is the fundamental difference between this society of ours and those societies. Secondly, you have genuine ethnic leadership. We do not have it here. There is no way, by any stretch of the imagination, that the Coloured population and the Indian population can be seen as an ethnic minority. They do not share the characteristics of a voluntary ethnic minority. The hon. the Minister himself said last week that the Indians in South Africa consist of 100 000 Christians, 150 000 Moslems and 400 000 Hindus. Nobody has to tell us how sharp the differences between Hindus and Moslems are. The whole history of Pakistan and India is an example of that. To lump them together for the purpose of trying to promote consensus politics in South Africa is actually a contradiction of what consensus politics are all about.

The third lesson we learn is that any attempt by subterfuge or otherwise to entrench the domination of one group in a constitution over the other groups simply generates more conflict.

If we look at clause 7, what do we see? It can be seen that the participation of Coloureds and Indians in the election of a President is actually a formality. It lacks any substance. What I mean by this, and I am not questioning the bona fides of the hon. the Minister in this respect, is that it seems most unlikely that the Coloureds and the Indians in the electoral college will be able to affect the outcome of the election of the President. They perform a decorative function in that electoral college in the sense that if they do present their particular candidate for serious consideration, it is very unlikely that this person will be elected, unless the hon. the Minister wants to argue, which some of his colleagues did not do, that as a result of some extraordinary insight on the part of that side of the House they will vote for a Coloured President or an Indian President. In that sense what we have here is in fact an electoral college set-up that does not in a sense broaden the basis of democracy. That also is more appearance than substance. What we have here is the structuring of the platform for constitutional conflict. This for me is of very, very serious concern. It is something that I think has the potential for generating more conflict in our situation than reducing it. One of the reasons is a simple one. The Labour Party leaders, for example, are not ethnic leaders. They will be the first to disclaim this. They will be the first persons to say to you: “I am not the leader of the Coloureds; I am the leader of the Labour Party.” This is something different from saying that Gemayel in Lebanon is the leader of the Christian Maronites and he speaks on behalf of the Christian Maronites. Here in South Africa not even the NP is speaking on behalf of the Afrikaner Nationalist. There are other parties speaking for them as well.

Order! The hon. the Leader of the Opposition’s time has expired.

Mr. Chairman, I merely rise to give the hon. the Leader of the Opposition the opportunity to conclude his speech.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to express my thanks to the hon. Whip of the NP for the courtesy which he has extended to me.

In this sense one does not have an attempt at bargaining between different ethnic communities. Secondly, there is also the situation where these political leaders of political parties are being forced into a situation where they have one of two choices. They either become unwilling victims of a gravy train where they simply have to participate in the perks of power, or they have perpetually to seek credibility amongst their own constituents by making radical demands. We have already seen examples of this were they have made it quite clear that they come in order to confront and make demands rather than to engage in consensus. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination can one talk about a grand coalition of élites. What we have in clause 7 is a conglomeration of representatives from artificially created political units. And why are they artificially created? It is because they are the consequence of the Population Registration Act. They are not the consequence of voluntary political mobilization on the part of any particular community. This is what we have here.

Therefore the process of electing the President, as we see it here, makes one think quite clear, and that is that the principle of White majority rule from a dominant minority position is non-negotiable for the NP. They are a dominant minority in a divided society and they use the logic of majority rule to entrench their position in the electoral college. It is as simple as that. That is why this legislation is a recipe for conflict. I say this because right at the outset, in the election of the President domination politics rather than consensus politics is going to play a role. If one is going to find some form of consensual agreement, as there was for example in Lebanon and for a short time in Cyprus and also for a short time in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, one has to leave the conditions of consensus flexible. One cannot entrench it into a constitution in terms of which one party is constitutionally favoured over all other parties. That is why while constitutionally we may have a powerful President in terms of his powers and rights, politically he is going to be a weak President. Politically he is going to be weak because of the narrow base in terms of which he is going to be elected and to which he owes his allegiance. Therefore he is going to continually be confronted with contradictory demands. Why? Because it is expected of him to play a conciliatory role from a confrontationist position. This is the dilemma in which he is going to find himself. It has got nothing to do with our goodwill or our bad will in opposing or taking sides in this matter. It also has nothing to do with the 19 academics who are in favour or the other people who think it is a step in the right direction; it has got to do with the structure of the constitution that has to operate in our divided society. Even if 80% of the White people support the President, if there is no basis for actual bargaining and negotiating politics right at the outset in electing this gentleman and deciding on the conventions that will operate, we shall have conflict.

That is why I want to make the point that our opposition to clause 7 and to other clauses is not based on personal animosity or on distrust of the bona fides of anybody. It is based on an analysis of similar situations in societies with similar problems elsewhere in the world. We honestly believe that this is not going to contribute to a solution.

During the last few days I have been listening attentively to the debate that has been going on in this House. Allow me to say on a personal note, Mr. Chairman, that it has made me feel a bit sad. When I say this, I do not say it in a spirit of arrogance. All I want to say is that we sound like a pathetic bunch of politicians wasting precious time, particularly if we consider the problems that we will have to solve in our society by actually promoting real negotiating politics.

The second impression I have gained is that I have been reminded of George Santayana’s phrase, who said—

Mr. Chairman, I have that extraordinary feeling—almost a sense of déjá vu—the feeling that we are repeating the mistakes of history by continuing to try to bring about consensus politics. Even if we are very sincere—and I do believe the hon. the Minister is sincere—the instruments we have created to promote consensus politics are going to be contradictory to our purpose because what we are doing at the moment, I am afraid, is wasting time while time has already all but run out for us.

Mr. Chairman, we in the NRP are also opposed to clause 7 of this Bill and I merely want to place our attitude on record. Nobody has any illusions about this clause. As it is drafted now it provides for the majority party in the House of Assembly to elect the State President. The representation by the other two Houses in this process can simply be seen as window-dressing. In practical effect the caucus of the governing party will be electing the State President. That is exactly the situation today. I accept that. Although we elect the State President by way of a vote in this House, it is still the majority party that elects the State President. In practice, therefore, the situation does not change. In principle, however, this Parliament should be the body which will elect the State President, either by way of an electoral college, which will be proportional, or, as has been proposed by the PFP, by all members in a joint sitting of all three Houses. Parliament should, however, elect the State President.

Under our present system it is in fact the caucus of the governing party which elects the Prime Minister. That has always been the case. With the two positions now to be combined, I accept the fact that nothing may change in practice in this House. In principle, however, we believe that all parties represented in Parliament—in all three Houses of Parliament—should participate in electing the head of State even though the minority parties know that they will not be able to outvote the majority. In some elections in the past we have proposed Opposition Party candidates who have been outvoted. We knew they would be outvoted but we exercised our democratic right to propose a candidate. Clause 7 as drafted does not even allow that opportunity of nominating a candidate because Opposition Parties will not even be represented in the electoral college. Therefore they cannot, even as a token demonstration, propose a candidate. They cannot even nominate their candidate, let alone vote for him.

We believe this is wrong, Mr. Chairman, and I should like to warn the Government that we believe that they are introducing a very dangerous principle here. It is all very well for the Government to think that they will be in power for ever, with an overwhelming majority in this House. It is, however, possible that we might get another party in government. We might get a leftist party in power, a party which is in favour of a one man, one vote system, such as the PFP. On the other hand one might get a CP Government, which will be, what I believe, only a bad political nightmare for South Africa, as dangerous as a “one man, one vote” majority rule party. Either would be fatal. If either became the majority in this Chamber, the House of Assembly, by one vote, the combination of other parties would be entirely unable to do anything about stopping them choosing the State President. I think that this is a dangerous thing to allow. If such a party were to win an election by one, two or three votes, the combined Opposition in this House would far outnumber the party that won and yet, together with the members of the other Houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates, could not prevent a tragic mental aberration of the voters or the result of split votes which do occur, putting into power a party which represented a minority of the electorate and whose policies were fatal for South Africa’s welfare. By an accident of history one would then get a Government which would control the executive. Through the President it would control the Cabinet and it would exercise the powers of the President. This is a dangerous principle.

I accept—we shall deal with this later and I also referred to it in the discussion on clause 6—that the President’s powers are subject to parliamentary control. He has responsibility to Parliament and Parliament could pass a vote of no confidence in him, it could refuse to pass the budget and it could impeach the President. So, there is a parliamentary safeguard. He cannot make laws and he cannot levy taxes or spend money. Despite those controls, he has other important powers, and the formula adopted here puts South Africa in a position of danger if a chance majority by, as I say, a split vote should put into power a party representing a minority, even a large minority. It could be a lot less than half the electorate. It could be just over a third of the electorate, a party that had only 35% to 40% of the electorate on their side while the 65% to 60% were split equally between two other parties. That minority party would then govern South Africa or would at least have executive control of the Government in South Africa.

That is the whole idea, Vause.

Therefore we think that this is a dangerous system. It will prevent the co-operation of moderates in the event of an extreme party coming into power and at the present time it ensures that the status quo will continue.

I do not agree with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that this entrenches the NP in power.

I did not say that. I said the dominant party in the White Chamber.

But the hon. the Leader of the Opposition’s party is saying this. It appears in its propaganda and the party has been using this on all its platforms. It says that this constitution entrenches the NP in control. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition used the term “majority party” in his speech, but that does not accord with the propaganda that is being made … [Interjections.] I will bring the quotations if he wants to know where this was said. It is being said and he knows that his party is saying that this constitution entrenches the NP. I do not believe it does. As long as there are free elections, I do not believe one can say that the constitution does that.

For these reasons, firstly, the principle that we believe that the Opposition should participate in all the functions of Parliament and, secondly, that there is the danger of having a chance minority Government which because of this formula holds power, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 1. On page 6, in lines 9 to 14, to omit subparagraphs (i) to (iii) and to substitute:
   1. (i) 50 members of the House of Assembly elected by the members thereof according to the principle of proportional representation, each member having one transferable vote;
   2. (ii) 25 members of the House of Representatives elected by the members thereof according to the principle of proportional representation, each member having one transferable vote;
   3. (iii) 13 members of the House of Delegates elected by the members thereof according to the principle of proportional representation, each member having one transferable vote,

The proportions are the same, but my amendment provides that those members should be elected by proportional representation.

I regret that I am unable to accept the amendment as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has made interesting references to more or less similar situations in other countries of the world. The situations in those countries are similar in the sense that they also have a diversity of ethnic groups living in those countries. He also referred to the events which had taken place in this connection. I do not think that this is the most opportune time to examine the standpoint of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition in this connection, and the alternative policy of the PFP.

However, I want to make only one remark. I agree with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that successive generations in the life of a people naturally tend to make the same mistakes and that they refuse to learn from the lessons of the past. Another interesting fact is that there are also certain realities present in a particular community which are perpetuated by successive generations. There are certain issues which simply remain unresolved. For that reason, our generation will also be faced with the same problems today and the solutions to those problems will also be solutions which were valid 10, 20 or 100 years ago. The difference between us and the PFP is that the PFP’s solutions to the problems are solutions which thinkers and others saw a hundred or two hundred years ago. On the other hand, there are also people who sought our solutions a hundred or two hundred years ago. Personally I cannot imagine any period, as long as the White community remains in this country, when these two solutions will be regarded as philosophies and solutions by the respective groups. Before I proceed to deal with another matter, I just want to say that I would really be interested to see how consensus politics based on the policy of the PFP can be applied in South Africa.

The hon. member for Durban Point referred to the policy of the CP as a mad nightmare. The hon. the Leader of the NRP, which is a continuation of the UP, should just show me, on the one hand, where in Africa the Blacks have accepted the solutions of the NRP, and on the other hand, where there has been any growth whatsoever in White numbers over the past 30 years after the introduction of a policy similar to that of the NRP. I think that if there is one man in this House—except the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning—who is feeling happy about the progress that has been made, then it is the hon. the Leader of the NRP. I think the NP is to a large extent moving in the direction of the NRP’s policy [Interjections.]

The substance of this particular clause was discussed in NP circles before 1977. I should like to refer to it briefly. When this aspect, the fact that a President would be elected by an electoral college consisting of the three population groups, came up for discussion, I stated, even before 1977, the fundamental problems which I had with this solution, in terms of which geographic separation was not to be carried to its logical conclusion, but in terms of which three different population groups were to be brought into the same Parliament.

Were you considering the possibility of a homeland even then?

I was considering the possibility of a homeland as far back as the 1950s. The hon. member has only to go and read it again. The problem which was experienced with this electoral college at the time, therefore, was how all three groups could be accommodated and how, on the one hand, they could be given the right to elect the head of State, while, on the other hand, preserving the control of the Whites. This is the dilemma which the NP faces today as well. In terms of this measure, the NP wishes to give the Coloured people and the Indians an opportunity to have a say, together with the Whites, in the election of the head of State with the special powers which he will have, but on the other hand, they want to keep control and power in the hands of the Whites. What is more, they want to keep control and power in the hands of the NP. That is the point of departure. That is what the governing party would like to achieve by this. For the record, however, I wish to point out the following: During discussions which took place in the NP before the 1977 caucus meeting in the Synod Hall in Cape Town, I voiced my concern to the leaders of the party at that time. In the second place, I was one of the persons who rose during the 1977 caucus meeting and raised certain objections to this proposal. The reply which Mr. Vorster gave me at the time satisfied me, but I want to repeat that this particular clause is an argument which the governing party has used against the CP, suggesting that we have already subscribed to this principle. I also recall very clearly that the leader of the CP, the hon. member for Waterberg, rose in the caucus at the time and said that this particular way of electing the head of State with these particular powers would become a focal point of conflict—a “stormsentrum”. I believe this is the term that was used at the time. I should like to point out that clause 7(1)(b) provides that this electoral college shall consist of—

1. (i) 50 members of the House of Assembly …

In other words, 50 Whites—

1. (ii) 25 members of the House of Representatives …

This refers to the Coloureds—

1. (iii) 13 members of the House of Delegates …

This in turn refers to the Indians. I want to add that the impression which this legislation creates—and perhaps the hon. the Minister could clarify the matter again today—is that the Government decided on the figures of 50, 25 and 13 members on the basis of the respective sizes of these three groups. This means that there is a ratio of 2 to 1 between the number of Whites and the number of Coloureds and that the number of 13 was arrived at because the Indian population is about half the size of the Coloured population. This leads to representation according to the ratio of approximately 4:2:1. I can understand that when the Government was faced with a specific ratio, the respective numbers of the three population groups had to be accepted. However, there is a second point in connection with this clause, and that is that it is entrenched. This means that this clause cannot be changed except in the way which is prescribed in the legislation for the amendment of entrenched clauses. The problem which I had in the past and which I still have today is this: On the one hand power is reserved for the Whites—and more specifically for the governing party of the Whites—solely because the numerical strength of the Whites is greater than that of the Coloureds and the Indians combined. In this way, one is establishing a power base for the Whites. In the light of this, the voters outside, and the CP voters in particular, are told: Do not worry. The Whites will retain their power. However, it is the NP that will retain the power. [Interjections.] The hon. members who are making those interjections have no understanding of what gave rise to this particular clause, because most of them, especially the hon. member for Heilbron, were not yet members of the House of Assembly at that time. [Interjections.] [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, just before he resumed his seat, the hon. member for Rissik said that the hon. member for Heilbron had not been here when these matters were being deliberated upon. I joined the NP after 1977 and I found that hon. member in the NP. I am surprised that the hon. member for Rissik should now be arguing against something in which he participated. Let us be quite clear about this. One of the formulae which have not been tampered with in terms of the 1977 proposals and in terms of the proposed new constitution …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member for Umfolozi allowed to say that the hon. member for Rissik is “’n tweegat” (two-faced)?

Did the hon. member for Umfolozi say that?

Yes, Sir.

The hon. member must withdraw that.

I withdraw it, Sir.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: After the hon. member for Umfolozi had made that remark, the hon. the Minister of Community Development asked: But isn’t he? [Interjections.]

Order! Would the hon. the Minister withdraw the insinuation in his question as well?

I withdraw it, Sir.

Throughout the debate which he has conducted here this afternoon, the hon. member for Rissik has self-righteously denied all responsibility for this formula which is now being implemented. The formula of 50:25:13 formed part of the 1977 proposals when I joined the NP and when all those hon. members were already members of the NP. At that time, they seemed to have very little objection to it. Now the hon. member for Rissik says that he said before 1977 that he was not happy with it. But why did he not leave if he was not satisfied? [Interjections.] Why did he go on sitting in this House of Assembly while the Government was dealing with those proposals? [Interjections.] The standpoints and the attitudes of all four of the political parties in their debating on this clause …

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. member for Kroonstad allowed to say that the hon. member for Langlaagte cannot pay his debt? He said that he could not pay his debt and that he was a financial burden.

Order! Did the hon. member for Kroonstad make that remark?

Mr. Chairman, I did not use those words. I asked whether the hon. member had paid his debt.

The hon. member for Kroonstad must withdraw that remark.

I withdraw it, Sir. [Interjections.]

Order! I appeal to hon. members to conduct this debate with the necessary seriousness. Hon. members must now stop making personal insinuations. The hon. member for Turffontein may proceed.

The standpoints and the attitudes of all four political parties are very clearly contained in the statements which they have made and the amendments to this clause which they have placed on the Order Paper. There are four attitudes which can be summed up here. In the first place, there is that of the Government, which wishes to propose reform on an effective basis, in a way which will not jeopardize effective and orderly government. In the second place, the PFP has suggested a joint sitting for the election of the State President. This is typical of their own attitude and philosophy of a one man, one vote system of government in South Africa. The hon. leader advocated this in his speech this afternoon. In the third place, there is the CP, which, as is evident from the words of the hon. member for Rissik, simply refuses to recognize the fact that there are people other than Whites in this country. They want to propose that the State President be elected by the White House of Assembly. The sooner they accept that there are not only White people in this country, but Coloured people and Asians as well, and that they have to be accommodated in some way, the better it will be for them.

And the urban Blacks?

The hon. member knows just as well as I do that the urban Blacks are not being involved in this dispensation. Therefore the hon. member must not try to lead me astray.

They are not in the country; they are “other people”.

In the fourth place, there is the standpoint of the NRP that there should be proportional representation in the electoral college of all political parties represented in Parliament. This may be a commendable idea, but in the end someone has to govern South Africa and we have to have effective government in South Africa. Then democracy must triumph and the majority party must be given the right to elect its leaders and to elect the head of Government.

Clause 7 deals with the election of the State President. You have already ruled the amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point out of order, Sir, and therefore one will naturally not be able to argue the matter any further.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition made the statement this afternoon that the PFP was the only party which was a consensus party in its approach to the way in which a State President should be elected. Then he made the accusation that conflict had been built into the election of the State President by the governing party. He made the statement that the election of the State President was a mere formality and he said that a White majority government was being entrenched in South Africa. I do not wish to quarrel with the hon. member about this. The hon. member is entitled to his standpoint, and we know that if his party were to govern South Africa, we would soon have Black majority rule in South Africa.

In formulating this standpoint, the NP has been guided by the proposals of the President’s Council and it has established two very important principles: In the first place, the protection of the conventional norms in South Africa and the protection of existing Christian values in South Africa, and in the second place, a fair and equitable accommodation of the aspirations of people of colour in South Africa.

The hon. member for Rissik argued that we had based the 50:25:13 formula on the population structure. That may be so; we shall not argue about the matter. The hon. member asks what would happen in future if those numbers were to change. Parliament, which will then be a tricameral Parliament, will have to decide on that in future. After all, we have no way of knowing at this stage what the population figures are going to be in the year 2000 or in the year 2020, and we cannot write a provision into the Constitution Bill at this stage to the effect that if, by a certain year, the population figures were to be such, the formula would then change. Parliament will decide on this in future. This is an entrenched clause …

What is your personal standpoint?

My personal standpoint is that I support the clause together with the NP. What more does the hon. member want me to say?

What is your standpoint about the situation if it were to change?

I think this is a very good basis, a very good point of departure. After all, we have to start somewhere.

Where do you want to travel to?

If the population figures were to change to such an extent in future, it would be the task of Parliament to decide on this.

What do you say?

But I am telling the hon. member what I say; what more must I tell him? I shall tell him this: I joined the NP when this policy had been formulated in this way.

You still argue like a UP supporter.

I may argue like a UP supporter, but I am telling the hon. member that I fought an election in 1981 in which this dispensation was anticipated, and I stand by that, while the hon. members of the CP no longer do.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Turffontein, when responding to the statement made by the Leader of the Opposition that this clause represents in-built White supremacy, said he was prepared to concede that sort of criticism and that he did not want to argue it. He then went on to say that as far as the Government was concerned, when they looked at the composition of the electoral college, they were going to be bound by what he termed the “need for the protection of conventional norms”, by which I presume the hon. member means the conventional norm in South Africa of White domination or White supremacy. This is in fact what is contained in this clause.

It is correct that the clause reflects a strict application of the 4:2:1 formula which can be found throughout this entire constitutional Bill. This is the formula which ensures that the views of the majority White party in the White House will always prevail. The more one looks at this clause the clearer it becomes that the presence of Coloureds and Indians on the electoral college is a purely cosmetic mechanism. It is sheer tokenism.

Last week the hon. the Minister talked glibly about an expansion of democracy and claimed that this was the main thrust of the new constitution. If one looks at this clause and if words have any meaning, what sort of expanded democracy does it represent when it ensures a built-in permanent majority for the majority party representing one racial group in the vital matter of electing a head of State? There have been months and years of talk of healthy or effective power-sharing. I want to ask again how effective the Coloured and Indian representatives on the electoral college will be. They will be as effective as eunuchs in a harem. They will have no power, no strength, no authority and will be totally impotent when it comes to giving effect to their own desires. They will be condemned to permanent minority status. They will be participating in the voting for a head of State knowing that they are merely rubber stamps. They will know that there is not the remotest possibility of any candidate of their choice being successful, if nominated, unless their choice happens to coincide with the choice of the White majority party. It is, therefore, pure tokenism in its present form, because it will all have been predetermined by the White majority party. There will be no chance of a combination of Whites, Indians and Coloureds being able to put up a candidate in opposition to the choice of the White majority party, a candidate who might have a much broader appeal, because no White party other than the White majority party will be represented on the electoral college. And this is not to elect a Prime Minister of a single Chamber of Parliament. This is a mechanism to elect a leader of State for all South Africa, who will be the effective master and ruler of all, combining the symbolism of that office with direct and effective executive authority.

In the circumstances of this clause and this Bill the State President can assume office on the basis of 51% of the members of the White Chamber, representing possibly 10% of the total population of South Africa.

Even leaving aside the patent and glaring defect in these proposals, namely the exclusion of Blacks from the new dispensation, you can still have a situation in terms of this Bill where a candidate may have 100% support in the Coloured and Indian Houses, plus 49% support in the White House, but that he will have no chance of election whatsoever, because in terms of this provision 51% of the White House has sent the majority of members to the electoral college. It is a built-in and assured majority. One wonders again where the expansion of democracy, about which the hon. the Minister speaks, is now. It is a farcical situation which has no regard for the will of the people whom this three-chamber Parliament will purport to represent. This represents permanent White minority rule and is totally incompatible with talk of real power-sharing and true consensus politics. The CP can relax. This is not power-sharing. This is mere window-dressing. There is no question of power being passed or of the Coloureds and Indians being allowed to have any real power at all. It is pure window-dressing. I now want to ask the hon. the Minister in all sincerity: How long does he think that the Coloureds and the Indians will be satisfied with this degree of impotence on the vital question of electing a Head of State? It is, as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has said, a sure récipe for conflict in the future. I believe and we in these benches submit that the only way of ensuring a better process of democracy is to recognize the principle of proportionality and for that to be introduced into the election of the Head of State. We believe that the best way of bring about proportionality is for all representatives in the White House, the Coloured House and the Indian House to be part of the electoral college so that on that basis one will really get a reflection of the will which those members of Parliament in the three Houses are purported to represent.

For that reason I wish to move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 2. On page 6, to omit lines 9 to 17 and to substitute:
   1. (i) the members of the House of Assembly;
   2. (ii) the members of the House of Representatives;
   3. (iii) the members of the House of Delegates.

I regret that I am unable to accept the amendment as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Berea has advanced more or less the same arguments as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, namely that the Coloureds and the other groups will always have the status of a minority, that they will never be able to put up a candidate and that this actually amounts to cosmetic change only. This is the kind of expression which the hon. member used.

There is nothing in clause 7 to prevent any political party from gaining a majority in this House of Assembly, in the House of Representatives, or in the House of Delegates. What the hon. members do not want is stable government. They see no merit in the principle that effect must be given to the view of a majority in one of these Houses or in all three when it comes to the composition of an electoral college. The hon. members’ argument—and this is also a proposal made by the hon. member for Berea—is that Parliament as a whole should meet when it is necessary to decide who the new State President is going to be, and that the decision should be taken by majority vote. Now I just want to ask the hon. member a simple question. A political party fights an election; it has a specific programme of principles and a specific policy which it submits to the voters. In the light of this, is it wrong that decision should be in the hands of such a majority party, the party which has a majority in this House, in the Coloured House and in the Indian House? We say that the people who win the election are the people who decide who the State President is going to be. Surely it is not true to say, as the hon. member did, that the Coloureds and the Asians will have no say. The majority party in the Coloured House and the majority party in the House in which the Asians are represented will in fact be able to nominate a candidate if they wish.

Will they be able to have a candidate elected?

No. If they are in the minority, they will no more be able to have someone elected than the hon. member for Bryanston. But there is nothing to prevent his party from becoming the majority party in this House. There is nothing to prevent the Coloureds and the Asians from canvassing for support, but what is wrong is to say that those people are not going to have any say in the election of the State President. They have never had it in the past. Here it is being given to them, and as such it is a step in the right direction. It is an extension of the democratic principle. However, it is also a reaffirmation of the principle that those who obtain a majority are entitled to elect the Head of State. If we are to have an executive Head of State, it can only lead to instability if people who have no respect for that man or who do not support his policy are also able to exercise an influence in deciding who should be State President. In this way, one would only be creating instability, not a single policy could be implemented in South Africa, and it would not be possible to obtain consensus in this country.

However, some hon. members have said before that consensus is not possible in South Africa. In fact, some members of the official Opposition have repeated that statement today. They do not believe that consensus is possible on this basis. However, what are the facts of the matter? Even this Constitution Bill offers a framework within which the majority of the Coloureds and Asians are prepared to co-operate, even though some of them do not agree with all the principles contained in it. Therefore they will participate in it. By means of the electoral college and by virtue of the majority principle in each House, they will certainly have a say in the election of the State President as well. This is in fact an extension of democracy. These are also steps in the right direction, which will satisfy those people, too, to a much greater extent than has been the case under the present system.

Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note that the hon. member for De Kuilen and the hon. member for Turffontein were the first two speakers on the Government side with regard to this aspect. [Interjections.] The hon. member for De Kuilen says it is a step in the right direction. I want to put to him the question which the hon. member for Lichtenburg put to the hon. the Prime Minister, namely what the end of the road will be. When the hon. member for De Kuilen alleges that this is a step in the right direction, I should like to know from him what the final destination will be in the direction which he wishes to take. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, the electoral college will be subdivided into components of 50, 25 and 13 members. From this I infer that the quota is based on the respective sizes of the White, Coloured and Indian components of the population. Now I want to put the following question to the hon. the Minister. Let us suppose—and I believe that this is a valid supposition—that the numbers of Whites, Coloured and Indians are going to change in future. This is going to happen, in five, ten, 20 or 30 years’ time, perhaps. Although this is an entrenched clause, what would be the hon. the Minister’s standpoint—from a moral point of view—as a member of the NP caucus, if the numbers of the Whites were to decline over a period of 10 or 20 or 30 years, with a corresponding increase in the numbers of the Coloureds and the Indians? What would the moral standpoint of the NP be then? Would he then change the present composition of the electoral college?

How did you answer that question in the past, Daan?

Mr. Chairman, I refuse to talk to that hon. Deputy Minister before he apologizes to me. He knows about what. [Interjections.]

How pathetic. You refuse to answer my question because you do not know how to answer it. [Interjections.]

I want to know from the hon. the Minister what his standpoint is. What does he say to the voters of the Republic?

He cannot answer you, Daan.

What is the NP’s standpoint today about what should be done when there is a change in the ratio of the respective population groups to one another? [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, at a meeting which I also attended, the hon. member for Parys said that it was only by the year 2020 that the Coloured people would certainly outnumber us. He added that our children and our grandchildren would then simply have to adapt to the circumstances of that time. [Interjections.]

As far back at 1977, Mr. Chairman, I adopted the standpoint that when we drafted a constitution, we were not doing so for ourselves and for the present generation alone. After all, we have children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. If the late Dr. D. F. Malan had offered South Africa a solution of this nature in 1948, and if he had said that our children would have reassess the situation in 30 or 40 years’ time, what would have been our situation today, 40 years after the NP came into power? [Interjections.]

There is a second aspect. At the meeting which I attended, the hon. member for Parys said that the Immorality Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act would remain in force. I want to know how the question of numbers is going to be interpreted as far as the Whites, the Coloureds and the Indians are concerned. It basically affects the composition of 50, 25 and 13. The hon. member said that the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act did apply between White and Coloured, but…

Order! The hon. member is tending to digress a little in his argument, but he may proceed.

The hon. member for Parys said that the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act would, however, be implemented between Brown and Black in such a way that when a Coloured man married a Black woman, she would be classified as, a Coloured, but when a Coloured woman married a Black man, she would be classified as a Black.

You have a real HNP mentality.

That hon. member can go on repeating that these are HNP sentiments if he likes.

There is a further question which I want to ask the hon. the Minister. What is the standpoint of the NP caucus? Is the NP caucus going to be instructed, for as long as it governs and exists, to vote only for a White?

What does Mr. Vorster say?

Mr. Vorster gave me a satisfactory answer. But his standpoint is not relevant today. As far as I know, Mr. Vorster is not in favour of the Government’s proposals. However, my question is: Is the NP caucus going to be instructed for all eternity to vote only for a White?

Then I want to ask a further question. This is why I say that the solution will be short-lived. If the position in the year 2020 will be, as the hon. member for Parys said, that the Whites will be outnumbered by the Coloured people alone, then the Coloured people will rightly take control of this electoral college and elect a Coloured State President. They will have every right to do so.

Where does it say so in the Bill?

It so happens that the hon. the Minister has just entered the House. He has not been listening to what has been said.

I have been listening all along.

Can the hon. the Minister tell me, then, whether the numbers of 50, 25 and 13 were based on the present sizes of the population groups in South Africa?

Where in the Bill is your statement confirmed?

The hon. the Minister must not try to evade my question.

Then you must not talk nonsense.

It is not nonsense. What is the ratio of 50:25:13 based on?

Mr. Chairman, my ten minutes have virtually expired. I therefore move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 4. On page 6, in lines 1 to 27, to omit subsection (1) and to substitute:
   1. (1) The State President shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of the House of Assembly, at a meeting to be called in accordance with the provisions of this section and presided over by the Chief Justice of South Africa or a judge of appeal designated by him.
2. 5. On page 6, in lines 28 to 31, to omit subsection (2) and to substitute:
   1. (2) The election of a State President shall be held at a time and place to be fixed by the Speaker or, in his absence, the Secretary to Parliament and made known by notice in the Gazette not less than 14 days before the date of such election.
3. 6. On page 6, in fines 56 to 58, to omit subsection (5) and to substitute:
   1. (5) No person may be elected or serve as State President unless he is qualified to be nominated or elected and to take his seat as a member of the House of Assembly.

Now I want to make the categorical statement that the numbers of 50, 25 and 13 were arrived at on the basis of the present numbers of the various population groups.

Proportional.

Yes, proportional. The indications we have is that the numbers of the Whites, Coloureds and Indians may change. Now I am asking the hon. the Minister of Law and Order, who is an honest Minister—he has been aware of the facts since 1977 …

Order! Could the hon. member just indicate to me where in this clause it says that the numbers may change?

Sir, this is an entrenched clause. [Interjections.] My question is …

We are now discussing clause 7.

Yes, Sir, we are discussing clause 7 and the electoral college to be composed on the basis of 50, 25 and 13. The inference I draw … [Interjections.] Sir, if the governing party does not wish to debate these things in this House, we shall go and discuss them outside when they have put a stop to the debate. We shall discuss them with the electorate. [Interjections.] Then I shall repeat this debate which we are conducting her today. I want to ask the hon. the Minister: On the basis of what is it to be 50, 25 and 13? Is it on the basis of the population structure? In that case, if the population structure changes, will the NP adapt themselves to those changes? Furthermore, I ask: When the Coloured people outnumber the Whites, will the NP be prepared to allow the Coloured people to take control of the electoral college?

Do not talk nonsense.

It is not nonsense. It is a fundamental question. Then I wan to ask the hon. the Minister: Since the Nationalists say they are not racists, and since they cast themselves in the role of the saints with regard to this matter, is the hon. the Minister prepared to tell us today that when there is a Coloured or an Indian man who is competent and civilized and who conforms to Christian norms and so on, the hon. the Minister will go to the NP caucus and will recommend that the NP caucus should choose that Coloured man or Indian as President? This is a reasonable question, and I believe that the hon. the Minister, who is a reasonable Minister, will answer this question. [Interjections.]

Order!

18 months have passed since the CP was founded, and the NP can no longer besmirch us by attributing a kind of HNP mentality to us. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Ermelo should be the last one to speak of this. If the NP is not prepared to say this here today, then the Coloureds and Indians will remain a minority in this Parliament into which they have been brought by the NP. They will remain a minority that will be subject to White supremacy—we do not want White supremacy—for that is the policy of the NP. If the NP wishes to do what is morally right, they must tell the Whites today that in 40 years’ time they will be outnumbered by the Coloureds and that the Coloureds will then take control of the country. Then the electorate and the Whites outside must know that the NP has produced a constitution which can only last as long as the Whites are in the majority. Black American political leaders are all saying today: “The name of the game is not power, but the name of the game is numbers.” In this case, too, the name of the game is numbers. That is why I want to say that the CP is not prepared to accept a constitution in terms of which the Whites cannot survive. Secondly, we are not prepared to manoeuvre the Coloureds or Indians out of a situation in which they can have full citizenship in their own fatherland and Parliament. [Interjections.]

I regret that I am unable to accept amendments 4 and 6, as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I should like to address you in this connection. I am referring to the fourth amendment, namely that the State President shall be elected by the electoral college. I ask with all due respect: Is the principle not that there will be an electoral college and is the way in which that electoral college is to be constituted not a matter of detail? I consequently wish to ask you to reconsider your ruling.

No, it was a main principle. It was also stated at Second Reading that the electoral college proposed in clause 7, formerly clause 8, was regarded as a main principle. It is the principle which was approved at Second Reading. It is on the basis of that accepted principle—this was also stated on the Select Committee; the hon. member for Brakpan is aware of that—that I have ruled the amendment out of order.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: I just want to point out that a ruling was given on the Select Committee. In that case, however, the principle was not debated. I consequently request you to reconsider your ruling. We are dealing here with a principle. The principle contained in clause 7 is that there will be an electoral college. The way in which that electoral college is to be constituted is a matter of detail. [Interjections.] I do not know whether those hon. members who are making the interjections will give a ruling on the matter. Sir, you must please tell me whether I should address them.

Order!

When a point of order has been raised, I am accustomed to it being heard in silence.

The hon. member may proceed.

My submission in connection with this matter is that the size and composition of the electoral college are matters of detail. They are not matters of principle.

It is quite clear that this amendment has been ruled out of order on the basis of the same principle as in the case of previous amendments by the hon. member for Durban Point and the hon. member for Berea. This amendment is in conflict with the principle as accepted at Second Reading.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: Is it your ruling that there must be no proposal whatsoever in the discussion from now on that the ratio of 50:25:13 be altered? Furthermore, is it your ruling that the composition of the electoral college on that basis is a principle which has already been accepted?

It is a principle which was very pertinently stated at Second Reading, and it is on the basis of this that I gave my previous rulings which were accepted by the hon. member for Brakpan and the hon. member for Barberton. I just want to make it clear again that this is a principle which was approved at the Second Reading of this Bill, and I stand by that.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: Is it the principle that the ratio is going to be 50:25:13? Are we allowed to alter this ratio?

[Inaudible.]

Order!

The hon. the Minister is so uneasy, Mr. Chairman, and I can understand why. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member must proceed with the point of order.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to know whether the ratio of 50:25:13 is a principle and may consequently not be changed.

The principle which has been accepted is that an electoral college can be constituted to which all three constituent bodies of Parliament, namely the House of Assembly, the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates, will appoint a certain number of members by majority vote. That principle was approved at Second Reading and it is in terms of that principle that I have now ruled the hon. member’s amendment out of order.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: Would an amendment to the effect that the ratio should be 20:20:20, for example, be in conflict with the principle or would it not?

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: The fact is that the principle is of a twofold nature. In the first place, all three Houses will participate in the election of a President. Secondly, the Houses will participate through the representatives of the majority parties. That has been accepted. I submit, with all due respect, that the hon. member for Rissik is not allowed to put hypothetical questions to you. I suggest that you should give a ruling on the matter if and when an amendment to this effect is put to you.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in an attempt to answer one question which has been put by hon. members on that side to hon. members on this side, namely what our standpoint would be if the ratio of Whites to Coloureds and Asians was to change in future. [Interjections.] I feel that members of the CP have been disregarding one important fact, namely that we are dealing here with group representation. It is written into the Constitution Bill that the electoral college will consist of representatives of the three separate groups. However, the hon. members of the CP are arguing as through one had a situation of one man, one vote in the Constitution Bill, which is not the case. As far as the electoral college is concerned, we are dealing here with group representation and specific groups will be represented. Then I just want to point out that when one has group representation in a democracy—this is the answer to the questions and arguments of those hon. members—it is recognized practice throughout the world that one is not dealing here with one man, one vote representation of the kind which occurs when the voters are all on the same voters’ roll and all vote at the same time. I should like to mention one example in this connection. We all know that America is known as the great democracy of the world. In that country they have a House of Representatives in which there is an equal representation of the voters as well as a Senate with 100 Senators. Each of those Senators represents two States on a group basis, the State as such being the group. In practice this leads to an extremely unequal representation. The State of Ohio, for example, had 10 700 000 inhabitants according to the 1980 census, and they have two Senators in the Senate. According to the same census, the State of California had 23 600 000 people, and as a group they only elect two Senators to the Senate. The State of Alaska has only 400 000 people and they also elect two Senators to the Senate. We know that the American Senate is indeed the most important legislative body in America and the representation there is on an unequal basis because we are dealing there with a representation of the groups, in this case the participant States.

How do the Americans elect their President?

In the present case we are dealing with three groups. We are faced with a unique situation. We are dealing with three groups that are going to be represented as groups in this Parliament.

Can you tell us how the Americans elect their President?

The hon. member knows, Sir, that the Americans elect their President through an electoral college which operates on a different basis. However, I am now discussing the fact that we are dealing with group representation in this connection.

I want to make this final point in this regard: When one is dealing with group representation in a democracy, one is not dealing with a one man, one vote situation. Therefore the argument about what the situation will be in another 20 or 30 or 40 years, when the numbers have changed, is, I believe, inappropriate at this stage.

I also want to make one point in connection with the argument concerning morality. The hon. member for Rissik made great play of the moral aspect of the matter, while he has no moral basis for his policy concerning Coloureds and Indians, because he knows that if the situation of White supremacy is to come to an end, what he is proposing is impossible. He must answer this question in this Committee. When the same principle was written into the 1977 proposals, how did he view the situation then?

Was the hon. member a member of the NP caucus at that time?

I was a member of the caucus at that time. I want to make the point that the argument which the hon. member is advancing here is being advanced for purely political reasons. He does not really mean it.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. 7. On page 6, in line 2, to omit “present”.

1. 8. On page 6, after line 52, to insert:
   1. (d) in the event of all the members of the electoral college not being present within 30 minutes after the time fixed in terms of subsection (2), at the place so fixed, be postponed by the Chairman to a date not more than seven days thereafter, on which date the State President shall be elected by the members of the electoral college then present.

Although we reject this Constitution Bill, we participate in parliamentary procedure, and that is as it should be. We should like to bring about improvements where we believe this is still at all possible. As a matter of course we shall try to prevent what could possibly happen. It could happen that at the hour designated for the election of the State President there are many people who are perhaps not present, and that could upset the whole result of the election. We would therefore appreciate it if the word “present” could be deleted. As far as clause 7(1)(b) is concerned, I want to confine myself to the number of members of the House of Assembly, i.e. 50; the number of members of the House of Representatives, i.e. 25; and the number of members of the House of Delegates, i.e. 13. They constitute the electoral college which the State President must elect.

I recommend, on page 6, after line 52, to insert—

The second portion of the amendment is nothing new either, because in many companies’ acts of incorporation this is included, and no companies’ acts of incorporation can even compare in importance to the occasion on which a State President for the Republic of South Africa is elected.

We are living in bad times; there is no doubt about that. It is clear that just prior to an election, members of an electoral college could wilfully be prevented, by malicious people, from attending a meeting of such an electoral college. Members of an electoral college could—let us hope and pray this never happens in South Africa—even be caused bodily harm prior to such an election taking place.

That is a boycott action.

That is not a boycott action; these are things that could happen. In fact, this could happen anywhere in the world.

Many people could even be absent owing to illness. If the hon. the Minister were even to propose to possibility of there being alternatives for those members, this would be greatly appreciated, because then one would know that the numbers mentioned would indeed be present on the day of the election. I am therefore asking the hon. the Minister very courteously to accept this amendment which I think is a very reasonable one.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Nigel has discussed technicalities, but I should like to come back to the main issue of how the State President is elected. This is surely one of the most important issues that any constitution of any country deals with: Who will exercise power and how? To that extent clause 7 is the crunch clause of the proposed constitution, and therefore if the hon. the Minister concerned and the hon. members of the governing party want to persuade the House and the country that the proposed constitution is an expansion of democracy, then whey must persuade the country that clause 7, the crunch clause, is an expansion of democracy. That, however, is by no means so. In fact, the contrary is done. I want to challenge the hon. the Minister to say where else in the Western democratic world is a head of government elected in any way similar to this. We know how the executive president is elected in the USA and France. In all the other parliamentary democracies the golden thread which runs through the election of all those parliaments …

(Inaudible.)

The hon. member for De Kuilen should know this.

In all those democracies the golden thread is that the man who commands the majority of Parliament is the man who becomes the head of government. That is the crisp issue: The man who can command the majority of Parliament, not the biggest party in a segment of Parliament…

Do you suggest that the Coloureds and the Indians will have no say?

The man who can command that majority is the man who should be the head of government. This Bill is a frustration of the possibility of electing a man who represents the majority of the whole of Parliament taken together. It is quite clear that in the foreseeable future this proposal as set in clause 7 does not provide an equal opportunity for all South Africans who must live under this proposed constitution or for all those who are enfranchised under this proposed constitution to become the State President of their country. It is quite clear that this clause provides a loaded mechanism which is grossly geared in favour of one party, the biggest party in the White House. It is a time-honoured test of any good constitution to ask whether it offers the citizens who must live under it an equal opportunity to become the President or Prime Minister of their country. It is so that very few people wish to become the head of government of their country, but it is the crisp test that every citizen, no matter whether he is of the lowest or the highest rank, can say to himself that there is no legal obstacle to him becoming the President. In terms of the proposed constitution, no Coloured person, no Indian person and most certainly and obviously no Black person—one could even argue that even minority sectors of the White community could not do so—could not answer “yes” to that question. It is clear that in terms of this clause the Government wishes to have its cake as well as eat it. They want to introduce Coloureds and Indians into the framework in order to give the appearance of reform; they want a semblance of respectability to be assigned to their rule; but they do so on the basis that they retain all powers in their own hands. In spite of the broadened basis of an enlarged Parliament and after 35 years of discriminatory government, the NP cannot face up to the test of seeking a majority in the enlarged Parliament. It wishes to depend only upon its established base. A party which had confidence in its track record, a party which felt it could command a majority of the enlarged Parliament, would not introduce a clause like this. It would in fact be prepared to seek a majority of the new Parliament as reconstructed. But this mechanism for electing a President by a minority demonstrates as clearly as anything could that the NP fears the consequences of enlarging Parliament. The net result is that they are proposing a permanent autocracy of the biggest White party. In the short term only a believer in fairy stories would believe that it is anything other than the preservation of all power in the hands of the NP as such, in spite of the decorative presence of Coloureds and Indians and Opposition groups. For that reason this party sees this clause as one of the clearest examples of a step in the wrong direction. It is a step away from democratic practice, as exercised throughout the democratic world. Even worse, this mechanism takes us backwards from the position we have at the moment in this house. At the moment the head of Government of South Africa is the man who can command a majority in this House, meaning 51% of this House. To be the head of Government, he must command that majority from day to day. But the proposed constitution will change that. The man who becomes the President under this scheme will become the President for a fixed period, he need not control the majority of this House and it represents a step backwards from the status quo in this House. Quite apart from controlling as a result of the expanded Parliament, the two innocent words “by resolution” conceal the fact that in the new arrangement the NP need no longer necessarily have the control of this House in order to elect the President and exercise total authority. In the present circumstances, and I am sure the hon. the Minister knows this very well, the NP could fall below the magic figure of 84 elected members of this Parliament, and in the circumstances where the PFP is to the left and the CP is to the right, could elect the 50 electors and thereby control the entire political system with less than the majority of this House. In fact, the size of the NP could reduce to a theoretical minimum of only 60 seats, provided the PFP had 59 and the CP 59 each, in other words a third plus one, and further on the assumption that the two Opposition parties would not combine, and that would mean that they could govern South Africa with only 22% of the total number of members of the new Parliament. I concede that the theoretical minimum is not likely to arise, but between the theoretical minimum of 60 and 84, there is a lot of leeway.

If you take the existing situation of 126 seats that the NP presently holds, even this would mean that they would be proposing to govern Parliament with only 41% of the members of that Parliament. It is quite likely that the NP could fall below 84 seats. They could get somewhere between 60 and 84 and from that position, if they can win the most votes for their resolution, they would control the presidency. I want to submit that it is only in the non-democratic countries of the world, in countries of the Eastern Bloc and in some of the more unfortunate parts of the Third World, that we see the practice that heads of government are elected by mechanisms that favour a particular ruling clique. I think it is ironic that the NP, which has so much to say against communism, is now proposing to go in the anti-democratic direction. This proposal here for single party domination from a minority position is more subtle than one finds in some of the other parts of the world. But it is not much more democratic than the practices operating in the Eastern Bloc. If this clause was to be a transition clause, if it was to be a mechanism for electing the first president under the new system, then reasonable people might have accepted that the NP, in return for expanding the base of Parliament, might ask for the opportunity to be allowed to elect the first President to redress the injustices of the past. But that is not what the NP is asking. It is asking for a permanent mechanism whereby a minority will run the country, whereby the President will not necessarily command the majority of Parliament. In that sense it is a move away from democracy. It is certainly not a move to a greater democratization of South African politics. Sir, as this clause stands, it is a profound step away from Western democratic practice and therefore we in the PFP utterly oppose it.

Mr. Chairman, the speech by the hon. member for Constantia boosted my confidence considerably. If this is the sort of argument with which they want to shoot down these proposals, they really do not have very valid arguments. For that reason it was a pleasure for me to listen to him. Now, I just want to single out a few things the hon. member said. On the one hand, the hon. member made out that this system would enable the NP to continue governing with only one-third of the votes plus one. However, if this is the case, should it not give the PFP a glimmer of hope? Then they need only have 33% plus one of the votes, because what applies to the NP also applies to any other party. However, let us consider the validity of that argument for a moment. The hon. member argued on the basis that a party with 33% plus one in this House would eventually be able to dominate the system. Under the present dispensation, if there is such an unequal division between the parties, the parties would have the choice of entering into alliances with each other in order to gain an absolute majority, and if were unable to succeed in doing so, a minority government would have to be elected. This is something that happens in democratic systems. This situation, that which applies now, is simply being transferred to the new system as far as this House is concerned.

No, that is not true.

As regards control over the 50 members which this House elects, that is exactly what the situation is. In other words, whether that party has an absolute majority, or whether the other two parties allow it to elect a minority government, this House gives it the authority to exercise the function of government as far as this House is concerned, and then it will get the 50 members in the electoral college. It is no worse than that. That argument about one-third plus one is therefore basically nothing more than an extension of the system as it at present exists.

However, let us just refer briefly to another point. What I find very interesting is that the hon. member for Constantia based much of his attack on these proposals on the viewpoint that not all the enfranchised voters can claim that he can become the State President of the country. However, earlier this afternoon even the hon. the Leader of the Opposition mentioned other countries where it is the custom for a member of a specific population group to be the Head of State. There are various examples of this. Consider, for example, Lebanon and Malaysia. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition mentioned a number of them. Therefore I do not know why the hon. member for Constantia was so fiercely opposed to that principle. After all, that is a problem one encounters in plural systems, where phenomena of this kind crop up. However, in South Africa there is no provision to the effect that only a member of a specific population group may become the State President of the country. Unfortunately one cannot conduct an exhaustive debate on all aspects of this and all its consequences.

There is one further statement I should like to make, namely that our system, in which the President is elected by an electoral college, is not so unusual. It is used, inter alia, in the USA. [Interjections.] Just give me a chance, please. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, hon. members must please just give me a chance to complete my argument.

In the USA the members of the relevant electoral college are in fact elected directly by the people. In some of the States it is the custom for the party gaining the majority in that State, to elect all the members of that electoral college as well. There is therefore no proportionality. In some States they are allocated proportionally, but in others not. The result is that a person can become the President of the USA with a minority of the popular vote. This can happen, and has in fact happened, and not so long ago either. A person can become the President of the USA with a minority of the popular vote. Thus the reason why the electoral college was established in the USA in the first place was that at the time the USA became a republic it was, for specific reasons, not practicable to hold a general election to élect the president, the problem of communication being, basically, the most important of these. For that reason the interim step of an electoral college was introduced.

In our case at this stage it is not practical for other reasons, to elect a State President by popular vote. For that reason we are making use of exactly the same mechanism, namely an electoral college. Thus this is not all that unusual.

Last but not least, I just want to point out that the hon. member for Constantia explained the matter very well. He said that the State President had to have the support of the majority in Parliament. That is why this electoral college is to be constituted in this way, in the sense that no State President will be able to govern if he has to rely on an incidental combination of parties in the three houses which will not necessarily form a majority.

But that is exactly where consensus begins.

In that way it could also happen that a State President might be unable to gain a majority in any of the Houses. It would indeed be possible, therefore, for us to have a President who was unable to gain a majority vote in any of the Houses, if we were to make use of a proportional composition. What we are, however, doing here is to ensure that the President represents an absolute majority in at least one of the Houses, and that the majority parties from the other two Houses are represented in that President’s electoral college, because it is with those majority parties that the State President will have to reach an understanding.

For that reason those persons with whom he has to reach an agreement, viz. the three majority parties in the three Houses, will be represented in the electoral college. Therefore this electoral college is not something which was sucked out of anyone’s thumbs or dreamt up in dark little rooms somewhere. This is a mechanism based on many considerations and on many precedents in history.

There is a final point I want to make. It concerns the CP. It boosts my confidence that the hon. members of the CP are so worried about what is going to happen when the number of Coloureds becomes equivalent to the number of Whites. According to their calculations, this could be the case in 20 to 40 years’ time. This really boosts my confidence, because it shows me that the CP is worried about how this system will function in 30 years’ time. This means that they admit that it will probably function well from now until 30 years hence.

Mr. Chairman, you have already ruled amendments moved by my colleague, the hon. member for Rissik, out of order. The amendments of the hon. member were already an indication that the CP is not in favour of clause 7, as it reads at present, being agreed to. We shall therefore vote against clause 7.

I should like to motivate why the CP is going to vote against clause 7. After all, in a democratic State like the Republic of South Africa, the eventual legality or legitimacy of a Government is determined by the extent to which the citizens of the State are or can be represented in it. I think that this is a very important and fundamental principle of democracy. According to this basic principle of democracy, the citizens of the State should also be able to participate in the establishment of a government by way of the franchise and also by way of access to public offices such as the office of State President. However, if a dispensation works in such a way that in the long term a steadily increasing section of the population is denied the civil right to have a correspondingly increasing say in establishing the government and, inter alia, the State President, and if they merely retain the status of subordinates, then you will agree with me, Sir, that this will lead to instability and will eventually promote extra-constitutional actions by the said.

The fact that clause 7(1)(b) entrenches the numerical ration, makes it the most unacceptable part of the clause.

It is a principle of the legislation.

although we oppose the clause, inter alia, because of the fact that Coloureds and Indians will be involved in the same political dispensation as the Whites, we say that if this were in fact to happen, the new dispensation in regard to which clause 7 establishes the machinery for the election of a President, would be unfair to people of colour, namely the Coloureds and the Indians. We are making this statement and motivating it by saying: Although the numerical ratio of Whites, coloureds and Indians will change in the future, to the detriment of the Whites, it will be impossible to give recognition to this fact in the new dispensation.

Business suspended at 18h30 and resumed at 20h00.

Evening Sitting

Mr. Chairman, before we adjourned for dinner, I said that although the numerical ratio of Whites, Coloureds and Indians would change in the future, to the detriment of the Whites, it would be impossible to give recognition to this in the new dispensation. It would be impossible to do so owing to the entrenchment built into this legislation. If my statement is incorrect, I would be glad if the hon. the Minister would point this out to us.

We say that the Coloureds and the Indians must take cognizance, in advance, of the fact that their candidate—whether he be a Coloured, an Indian or an ultra left-wing White liberal—will never be elected. [Interjections.] The Coloureds and the Indians know this because the mechanisms of the new constitutional dispensation are such that there is no machinery in terms of which this clause, clause 7(1)(b), can ever be amended. If this statement of mine is incorrect, I would be glad if the hon. the Minister would point this out to us. I know that earlier this evening there were attempts by the hon. member for Turffontein, the hon. member for Helderkruin and the hon. member for De Kuilen to reply to this, but if one does not have a good case one does not have an answer. The fact that this clause does not provide an answer to this question is very important as far as we are concerned. It is of no use for those hon. members to come up with evasive or clever replies. After all is said and done, with the entrenchment embodied in the clause, no one can be fooled. This is the real dilemma of the NP. The NP does not want to give a clear reply to this question, because this is a dilemma to which it does not have any answer. No one can be fooled, not the Whites, nor the Coloureds, and least of all the Indians. Is an amendment to this numerical ration, namely 50:25:13, at all possible? The question is: Is the NP prepared to bring about any changes to it? We would be glad if the hon. the Minister would answer this question for us. Not only the Coloureds and the Indians, but also the Whites of South Africa, would like a reply to this. I would like the hon. the Minister to give us a clear reply to this.

At this stage I also want to put another very important question to hon. members of the NP. Is the NP prepared to state, here and now, whether it will ever agree to a Coloured or an Indian being elected President? This is the question I want to put to hon. members of the NP, the question they have to answer. Is the NP prepared, at this stage, to announce that it is willing to have a Coloured or an Indian elected President? We should like an answer to this. In other words: Can the NP tell the Coloureds and the Indians today that it would have no objection to a Coloured or Indian President? I would prefer not to have the hon. the Minister reply to this, but rather one of his hon. colleagues. I know the hon. the Minister has a good answer. At any rate, he thinks he has. [Interjections.]

He is honest.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is it permissible for the hon. member for Rissik, by saying that the hon. the Minister is honest, to imply that other hon. members are not?

The hon. member Mr. Theunissen may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I should very much like to hear hon. members of the NP reply to this question. The hon. member for Pretoria Central and the hon. member for Virginia—he is not here at the moment—and the hon. the Minister of Internal Affairs, hon. members who are known as the so-called conservatives in the NP ranks, must give us a reply to this question. After all, the hon. members to whom I have put this question do believe in an opinion poll. They and their newspapers are constantly holding selective opinion polls. Tonight they have an opportunity of expressly telling us whether that NP over there will go to its voters and tell them that it is prepared to have a Coloured or an Indian become President of this Republic. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I feel I owe the hon. the Leader of the Opposition a reply to his denial and repudiation of a statement I made that the PFP is selling to the public the fact that the powers which basically stem from this clause are an entrenchment of the NP. He repudiated it and said “of the majority party”. Am I interpreting the challenge correctly? Other hon. members of that party questioned me and therefore I feel I owe it to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition to reply to him. They questioned the correctness of my claim.

I have here a report from The Cape Times of 27 July 1983, a newspaper which I do not think is exactly hostile to the PFP. This report covers a meeting the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens addressed in Amanzimtoti, and I quote—

The report continues a bit further on—

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself is quoted on the front page of The Cape Times of 9 August as listing the PFP’s objections—and I quote—

He did not say “majority party” but “inbuilt White Nationalism domination”. An hon. member of the party said in the Second Reading debate—and I quote (Hansard, 16 May 1983, col. 7070)—

[Inaudible.]

The hon. Leader of the Opposition must then not challenge me and question my honesty when I make a statement. He disputed what I said and I am simply putting the record straight. I quote—

Now who would say that, Vause?

A member of that party. It happened to be the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself speaking on 16 May. I raise it because I dislike being challenged with the implication that I am not telling the truth.

Those are the facts, and therefore we oppose this clause because we believe in principle that the Opposition should participate. We are not opposing it, as is the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, because it is an entrenchment of the NP. We believe that while we have elections, any party worth its salt can contest those elections and, if the electorate so wishes, they can change the Government by putting another party into power. As I say, our objection is to the exclusion of the Opposition from this procedure.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to reply to what the hon. Leader of the NRP has just said. His speech reminded me very much of the general attitude adopted by the United Party subsequent to 1948 and that is now being adopted by the NRP as well, namely to treat the result of 1948 as some kind of collective White electoral mistake that would somehow rectify itself in subsequent elections. What they did not realize, was that 1948 was the culmination of a period of ethnic mobilization, of Afrikaner Nationalist mobilization. What the Afrikaner Nationalist did, quite fairly, not illegitimately, was to use the existing rules of the game, which was the Westminster political system, to compete for political power. They came into power and, since then, they have maintained that power. [Interjections.] What happened then was that they did not necessarily appeal to party political programmes or anything of that nature. As they say in this kind of politics, they called to blood. Subsequent to that stage, the United Party thought that somehow they could compete in terms of the same system and eventually come back into power. The hon. member for Durban Point has used the same logic. He has said: Obviously, this is not NP domination. If any party competes fairly in this whole situation, it can find itself in a position of power and then it can dominate the situation. The one thing that I have granted the NP in the person of the hon. the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning is that he saw immediately the dilemma in which we find ourselves. We find ourselves in the dilemma of ethnic or racial or group domination. How does one get away from that? How does one get away from a situation in which one particular group mobilizes support quite independently of the merits of the argument or of the political programme by simply appealing to blood? How does one get away from that and still have consensus government? The irony of the whole thing is that hon. Minister is arguing with the CP against that selfsame argument at the present time because the CP is going back to the same call of 1948 to try to mobilize on that basis. What I am trying to suggest to the hon. the Minister is that this formula for the election of a President is actually reinforcing the dilemma of 1948.

Let us now consider for a moment the merits of the argument of the hon. member for Durban Point.

All I want to do …

I know what the hon. member wanted to do. I just want to discuss the merits of his argument. As a matter of simple fact, given the present political preferences among the White electorate, it is a matter of fact that if this formula is followed the governing party will elect the President. Therefore, as a matter of fact, as long as that happens to be the case, they will determine the outcome of any election for a President. It is as simple as that. [Interjections.] The hon. member for Umhlanga must restrain himself for just a moment. This is the Committee Stage and the hon. member can get up and make a speech if he so pleases. I have never denied the fact that the dominant party in the White House of Parliament will determine the election of the President. All I am saying is that the historical evidence would seem to indicate that for the past 35 years that party happens to have been the NP. Therefore I can see this situation continuing for the foreseeable future. [Interjections.] All I am saying is that if the argument is as the hon. the Minister says and as the hon. member of the NRP claim as well, that this is an attempt to move away from domination, then this formula contradicts such an attempt because we are not moving away from domination; we are in fact enshrining the principle of domination in the legislation. I went further than that and I said that we are not even where we were in 1948 because we are no longer in the position that party can claim to be the leaders of a particular ethnic movement; that movement has disintegrated and has become fragmented. That is exactly what the hon. members of the CP are trying to say. Those people can no longer speak on behalf of Afrikaner Nationalism. So it is not only a question of not being able to do that; they are not even capable of speaking on behalf of the White electorate. They are speaking on behalf of a particular political party, and I am saying by enshrining that party’s position in the new constitution, if it is our concern to move away from domination and to move towards consensus, this formula is not going to help them.

Mr. Chairman, with all due respect to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition, I do not think that is the point the hon. member for Durban Point wishes to make. The argument of the hon. leader is entirely farfetched now, and I shall react to it in a moment, if I may. [Interjections.]

Order!

Fundamentally it is concerned with one point only, and I am not going to spend much time on it. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition denied that either he or members of his party made the allegation that these proposals confirmed and entrenched NP domination.

For the time being.

No, not for the time being. If they entrench White domination, they do not entrench it for the time being.

NP domination; not White domination.

Yes, I mean NP domination. That is what the hon. the Leader denied. All that happened was that the hon. member for Durban Point proved to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that the hon. the leader had said it himself. I do not think we should now try to get out of what we said.

No, I do not wish to.

Let us leave it at that.

If there is one thing which emerged clearly from the discussion of clause 7—this is important and I should like to point it out—it was the futility of the method which the official Opposition wishes to use to obtain consensus. Nothing could illustrate this better than the debate we have been conducting on this clause this afternoon. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition must concede one thing to me, and that is that he will have to invite the political parties represented here to his national convention.

That is correct.

He agrees.

Let us suppose that what happened among us here repeats itself at the national convention. I ask him in all fairness what viable possibility exists of our attaining a consensus there.

Then we have a few braais. [Interjections.]

Sir, with all due respect, I am replying to the contribution made by the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. If the hon. member for Bryanston feels like doing again what he did during the supper break, I would suggest that he leaves. [Interjections.] I assumed that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition meant it seriously when he introduced the debate on this clause. Indeed, I accepted it as a fact. Apparently the hon. member for Bryanston does not think so. [Interjections.]

I ask the hon. the Leader of the Opposition what viable possibilities exist for attaining consensus at a national convention among more divergent standpoints and factions than are represented in this House.

What about your Standing Committees? That is precisely the same situation.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Berea postulated, and the hon. member for Constantia confirmed, that what was being confirmed here was NP domination. That was the same point the hon. member for Durban Point was arguing a moment ago. If it is true that these proposals in the clause and in the legislation are in general nothing but NP domination, surely it proves the unattainability of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition’s own policy. Let us be realistic. He said that the NP was going to govern this country ad infinitum.

No.

But the hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that we were entrenching NP domination.

In the short term.

It was not a question of in the short term. He said we were entrenching NP domination. If he has said that, and I am now arguing on the basis of the standpoint of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition and his party, surely there is no possibility whatsoever that we can accomplish any reforms on the basis which he advocated. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition must concede one thing to me, namely that the constitution of the country can only be changed with the consent of the White voters.

Yes.

He agrees.

Peacefully, yes.

Yes, of course. Surely we are not talking about a revolution now. I agree with the hon. the Leader of the Opposition. What do his statements mean now? In the first place he is saying that the Whites must agree to any evolutionary amendments of the constitution. In the second place he is saying that the White voters are going to keep the NP in power permanently. [Interjections.]

I did not say that and that is not what I meant. You may as well use another argument now. That one is nonsense.

If the hon. the Leader of the Opposition says that we are entrenching NP combination, surely that has meaning. If the hon. member says that was not what he meant, I shall stop arguing about it immediately. The hon. member for Constantia said it a moment ago. He said this clause “entrenches all power in the NP Government”. [Interjections.]

Order!

On the one hand, and this is very important, the Opposition draw two divergent conclusions from the same proposals. The one is that the proposals stand for White domination, while it is also being argued that they stand for White abdication. I want to predict that hon. members on the opposite side are going to vote together on the clause. On the other hand it indicates the futility of the argument we are conducting with one another.

I should like to go further. I said at the outset, and I should like to repeat, that what can be achieved in this country is not determined by the utopian expectations which we cherish. It is determined by a true perception of the reality, of the circumstances. It is determined by the mechanism which we wish to use to move from one point to the next.

What is the next point?

If one wishes to display courtesy to a party’s leader by replying to his questions to the best of one’s ability, and one gets nonsensical interjections such as those of the hon. member for Greytown, then it becomes extremely difficult to conduct a debate. My reply to the hon. member for Constantia is that it is not possible to solve the constitutional problems of the country on the basis of Western democratic examples. It is also fundamentally wrong to test alternatives for the country against those examples.

I did not say that.

I did not say that it was the hon. the Leader of the Opposition who said that. I am talking to the hon. member for Constantia now. His entire argument was based on that premise, and I am replying to it. I say it is not possible and in our society it is not an attainable objective.

I now come to certain general statements. The hon. member for Berea and the hon. the Leader of the Opposition argued, and they had every right to do so, that my statement was erroneous when I said that we were trying in this Bill to extend participation in the democratic system. That was what the hon. member for Berea said.

I am embarrassed when you say it.

Well, I am embarrassed when I look at you.

*I now wish to put a question in all fairness. Are we assessing this statement of mine on the basis of the provisions of one clause, or are we assessing it on the basis of the entire Bill?

It is a principle.

Could I just complete my argument first. Then the hon. member can put as many questions as he likes to me.

It is a principle.

Of course it is a principle, and we accept the principle.

By what means?

By means of this House.

The point I want to make is that we discussed the general implications of the Bill before we began to discuss the clauses. The hon. member for Sea Point then put forward his seven reservations. I reacted to them and asked whether the proposals were sufficient according to the perception of one party or whether they went too far according to the perception of another party. The fact of the matter is that peoples’ participation in decision-making processes is being expanded. I challenge any hon. member to dispute this. These facts remain: Participation in the decision-making process of Parliament is being expanded to population groups that never had it before. I am not arguing now whether it is a great deal or very little. I am arguing the postulate. I want to go further. Another fact is that Coloured leaders are prepared to participate in the system, for whatever purpose that may be. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition, however, alleged that they had a declared intention. Surely the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has precisely the same intention, but he wishes to reserve to himself the right to sit here with the same intention as the Coloured people and prevent them from doing so too.

Not at all. I never said that.

Yes, you do. It is a fact. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition and his party held a series of meetings. To achieve what end? To make propaganda for the rejection of the proposals. A rejection of the proposals simply means that the Coloureds and the Indians will not be able to participate in the decision making processes in this Parliament. [Interjections.]

What is the alternative? [Interjections.]

Order!

If that is not the case, what does it mean then?

The status quo continues to exist.

Yes, then the status quo continues to exist.

The status quo can never remain.

Then surely it continues to exist, Mr. Chairman. All I am trying to say is that when we begin to argue with one another, we should please adhere to the facts. [Interjections.]

Order!

Scores of speeches have been made on this specific clause. Apparently the standpoint of hon. members of the official Opposition is, however, that the only people who have the right to speak are they themselves. That is the impression they create. [Interjections.] Hon. members of the PFP profess to be the great apologists for freedom here. However, it seems to me that only their own freedom is involved, while this has nothing to do with the freedom of other people. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, whether we want to or not—and the hon. member for Pretoria Central referred to this—we cannot get away from the fact that there is only one possibility—as we on this side of the House see it—in terms of which this aspect can be dealt with, and that is that if we wish to maintain civil rights in this country, we must keep them within the group context. If we do not do that, we shall be destroying the civil rights of everyone in the country.

General affairs!

The fundamental premise of the Hon. the Leader of the Opposition is wrong. This premise is—and I want to emphasize it—that he should, on the one hand, recognize the circumstances and the realities of the population structure of this country. He cannot deny it. He must recognize it. For that reason he already has to pay lip service to the concept of pluralism, to the existence of separate peoples, and also to the existence of minorities.

You people are destroying pluralism in South Africa.

No, Mr. Chairman, what we are doing is to try to reflect it in our constitutional proposals. We are trying to use it to make building blocks with which we …

You would do well to take cognizance of what happened in Mitchell’s Plain on Saturday evening; then you will know whether you are succeeding or not.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition must please not talk about Mitchell’s Plain. [Interjections.] The hon. the Leader of the Opposition must not talk about it at all. [Interjections.]

Order!

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition must be careful when he talks about these things. Perhaps he should tell us at some time or other what part the “liberal establishment” plays in meetings of the kind held on Saturday in Mitchell’s Plain. [Interjections.] Yes, perhaps he should tell us something about that, Mr. Chairman. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I am saying these things in dead earnest. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition need not look far to find those people among his own rank and file.

They are breathing down his neck, as it were. [Interjections.]

Yes, they are breathing right down his neck.

Di Bishop and her pals. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, … [Interjections.]

Order! I ask hon. members please to give the hon. the Minister an opportunity to react to this two-hour debate, which he has been sitting here listening to. I ask hon. members please to listen to him in silence now. The hon. the Minister may proceed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The fact of the matter is that the proposals which we are now considering are not proposals which we only decided on this year or last year. They are the culmination of inquiries extending over a period of 10 years.

And with which very little progress was made during the entire period.

By whom?

Do you see, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member now wants to know from me by whom. Inter alia by the Erika Theron Commission, which was multiracial in its composition, and which, in spite of the fact that it sat for three years, made no proposals as to what the constitutional model should look like.

That was not their task.

The hon. member for Green Point says it was not their task. Nevertheless they made a recommendation in that respect. The hon. member must therefore go and argue with the members of the Erika Theron Commission.

Subsequently the recommendations of the Erika Theron Commission were accepted—and once again hon. members cannot agree with them—whereupon a Cabinet Committee was appointed to inquire into that question. Those proposals were referred to a Select Committee of this House.

After another recommendation had been rejected, not so?

What recommendation?

That there should be direct representation on all levels of the State. That recommendation was rejected.

No, that is not correct.

Recommendation 178.

I know about recommendation 178. It stated that they should receive representation on every level.

Direct representation.

Yes, on every level, but it did not state “in the same institutions”. [Interjections.] The hon. members can go and read the report. After that the matter was referred to a Select Committee and, if I remember correctly, we ourselves sat for 18 months. After that it went to the President’s Council and when it came back it again went to a Select Committee of this House. What I am trying to say is that what we are considering today is the result of successive attempts under the leadership of various Prime Ministers to see whether we could escape from this impasse.

Which you yourselves created.

The Government adopted certain premises which I think I should state to this House. The first was that constitutional amendments could not be allowed to have a destabilizing effect on society and that they therefore had to occur in an evolutionary way. If they had to occur in an evolutionary way, they had to be accessible and acceptable to the people who put us where we are. Otherwise they would not be evolutionary and would destabilize society. Secondly, they must be practicable on the basis of various criteria, including the financial means of the country. Thirdly, they must as far as possible be acceptable to the various population groups. What is also important—and I make no apology for this—is that for the sake of the general interests of all the population groups, the security and permanence of the Whites must be guaranteed, and the prospect of the attainment of their reasonable expectations must be held out to the other population groups.

Let me say this bluntly today: If we consider countries of this continent, we find that their economic prosperity and stability, their political stability and the degree of freedom of their citizens depend on the position of the Whites in those states. It remains a fact that the withdrawal of the White presence and the undermining of White security in African countries has not only affected the position of the Whites, but has also had the result that Africa—and these are not my own words—is dying. That is why I say that it is in the interests of Whites, Blacks, Asiatics and Coloureds that the position of the Whites in this country should not be questioned. I make no apology for saying this, because it is of primary importance that there should be no doubt about this question. I want to emphasize that I believe—and I have stated this repeatedly—that the position of the Whites in this country and their survival is not only something in which the Whites are involved, but is also of importance to Coloureds, Asiatics and Blacks. I have stated repeatedly and I should like to say it again tonight, that the survival of the Whites in this country can only be guaranteed and ensured as long as they are the bearers of the Christian values which we advocate, and that it is also in the interests of the other people that the position of the Whites should be maintained.

I have never pretended that these proposals, or any other we are able to make, are the perfection of constitutional models as we have come to know them in Western democracies. That is not the case and that is not possible. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition must agree with me on this point. If we should succeed in destroying support for these proposals, we are not playing into the hands of people who desire a developing democracy, but into the hands of those who wish to destroy it. [Interjections.] That is why I want to say that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is making a mistake—that is my summing up of the situation—because he does not realize the urgency of allowing Coloureds and Asiatics to share in the decision-making process. I do not think he realizes that no party that has been in power in this country so far has ever succeeded in persuading the electorate that Coloureds and Asiatics should be represented in Parliament. That has never happened before.

We can argue about whether these proposals are sufficient, whether it should be one Chamber, three Chambers, or three Houses, but that is not the point I want to make. According to the definition of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition himself, in regard to which he agrees with me, this is the first time that White voters have granted consent to Coloureds and Asiatics serving in the Parliament of this country. [Interjections.]

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member for Sea Point can argue whichever way he likes. He was after all a member of the old UP. Did they give the Coloured people direct representation, according to a common voters’ roll in Parliament? Did they ever make such a proposal?

That is why we left the UP.

In other words, if one does not achieve anything, one simply walks out.

You achieve nothing and you stay put.

I want to tell the hon. the Leader of the Opposition—we can differ about this and we need not to it in enmity—that it is a fact that progress with constitutional reform can only be made if every step we take is practicable. Practicability is not determined by means of hair-splitting debates. It is determined in the country at large where the people decide who should govern here. I say that this Constitutional Bill, in spite of all the defects which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition thinks it contains and in spite of all the consequences which the CP wishes to avoid, is on the whole an improvement on the status quo. Whether we wish to concede this or not, it amounts to an extension of democracy in a sense that more people from other population groups are going to participate I want to say in all honesty that no proposal which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition has made so far, has been politically practical. He knows that as well as I do. With such an impractical approach in respect of the test or criteria which I mentioned to him, we shall not make any progress. We shall most certainly not make any progress from the point of view of the Coloured people and the Indians.

I want to ask the hon. the Leader of the Opposition: Is there increasing support for his party’s standpoint in this country? I am asking in all fairness: Is there more support for his standpoint in this country on this subject than there was last year?

Yes.

Surely the hon. the Leader of the Opposition knows that is not true, and what is more …

Is there more support for the NP among the people throughout the entire country?

Throughout the entire country?

Yes.

No, support from the people who have to change the constitution. It was a fair question. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition agreed with me that he needed that support. In other words, that is where we must begin with our constitutional change. I say to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition: He has less support for his standpoint on this Constitution Bill than his party normally has for other standpoints.

Does your party have more support now.

Oh yes, I think we have, but I am prepared to put it to the test outside. But what is the hon. the Leader of the Opposition doing? The hon. the Leader of the Opposition is seeking joint rejection of the proposals with the CP.

We differ from one another in principle.

They differ in principle, but the result is precisely the same. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition can argue whichever way he likes. [Interjections.] Furthermore, the hon. the Leader of the Opposition condemns the composition of the electoral college because a White majority is being entrenched in that way—it was also argued that it was an NP majority—which, according to him, will intensify the conflict.

[Inaudible.]

I do not want to quarrel with the hon. the hon. the Leader of the Opposition about this, I should like to debate the matter with him. In all fairness, what do the proposals of the Opposition comprise? The hon. the Leader of the Opposition tells me that the electoral college which consists of Coloureds, Asiatics and Whites—with White majorities—is going to intensify conflict. But what are the proposals of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition? In the first place the hon. the Leader of the Opposition not only wishes to bring together Whites, Coloureds and Asiatics in the same institution, but he also wishes to bring together all the political groups of importance—so he says—among all the population groups and peoples in the same institution. I want to ask this question: Is that intensification or regulation of conflict? The House of Assembly consists of 178 members, the House of Representatives of 85 members and the house of Deputies consists of 45 members. The Opposition’s proposal is that they should sit together. Surely there is a built-in White majority if they sit together. What is the hon. the Leader of the Opposition opposed to then? He is not opposed to the entrenchment of White majority. That is not the issue, because his own proposals, which were not accepted, make provision for a White majority. The issue is not White majority, but something else. The issue is the NP majority. That is what the hon. the Leader of the Opposition objects to in the proposals. In this regard the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is in fact correct, and I agree with him. We are not entrenching NP members, but the inability of the Opposition is bringing this about. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that he did not consider the Coloureds and Indians to be ethnic minority groups. That is what the hon. the Leader had to say about minorities. He spoke about Coloured leaders, the leading political parties. I want to tell him that during the past few years I have negotiated with Coloured, Asiatic and White leaders.

The fact of the matter is that each one of them says: I am pleading for my people. That is not my terminology. It is theirs. Those for whom they are pleading represent a specific group of people, the existence of which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition wishes to deny. He says it is not the case.

They must all undergo the hair test.

The hon. member for Green Point must not provoke me for I might have something to say about hair tests in a moment. [Interjections.]

Order!

The Constitution Bill which we are discussing affords these population groups an opportunity to participate in the central government bodies. This does not appear to be the case under the PFP, and this stems from their denial of the group context of people. The hon. member for Constantia maintains that it is undemocratic because the opinion of the majority party in the electoral college will prove decisive. Then the election of the State President in terms of our present Constitution Act is also undemocratic. Why? Because he is elected by a majority decision of the House of Assembly and the opinion of the majority party therefore proves decisive. Surely that, too, is undemocratic. [Interjections.] The same applies to the designation of the hon. the Prime Minister by the majority party today, under our present dispensation.

I want to come now to the hon. member for Rissik. I do not wish to spend much time doing so. I do want the hon. member to help me though. He said that he questioned the 1977 proposals, yet in terms of those proposals the President was to have been elected in precisely the same way as the way in which provision is being made for in this clause. Is that not true? [Interjections.] The hon. member for Rissik could help me. Is it not true that in terms of the 1977 proposals the electoral college was to have been appointed in precisely the same way? [Interjections.] Yes, we are still coming to that. At the moment we are discussing the provisions of clause 7. It was to have happened in precisely the same way. [Interjections.] The hon. member need not quarrel with me. I was not the Government spokesman in 1978 when we debated those proposals in the House of Assembly. Surely the hon. member will remember that. Nor was it, with all due respect, the present hon. Prime Minister who debated them. The hon. member will remember that too. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition put certain questions to the then hon. Prime Minister. The hon. member will remember that as well. He asked questions about the election of the President, and the hon. member will also remember that. The answer which he received was that the legislation which was to have been introduced would not contain a provision that the president had to be a White or a Coloured or an Asian person. Surely the hon. member knows that is true. Since 1978 the hon. member for Rissik has been living with a statement of the previous Prime Minister that the president could be White, Coloured or Asian. He was able to live with it.

He has nothing to say!

Mr. Chairman, I am behaving myself, and now the hon. members say that I have nothing to say. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. members must not tempt the hon. member for Rissik too far; he is displaying remarkable self-control.

All that I want to say is that one can behave oneself, but one need not always do so in silence.

The hon. member for Rissik was able to live with it. That was not why he left the party, because he will recall that his hon. leader—I am speaking under correction when I mention the date—held a Press conference on 24 February 1982 in which he stated that he stood by the 1977 proposals. The 1977 proposals contained precisely the same provision which we are now discussing with one another. I do not take it amiss of the hon. member for having subsequently adopted a different standpoint; the point I want to make is that either he agreed with the exposition of the former Prime Minister here in this House in 1977 or he kept his objections to himself. The hon. member himself will have to decide what is what; I do not wish to quarrel with him. Did he or did he not accept them? [Interjections.]

Order!

If he accepted them, the hon. member must not reproach me for adhering to something which he accepted. If he did not accept them, the following question is logical: What was he doing in the NP between that date and 1982? In all fairness, consider what the hon. member did to the former Prime Minister. He said that he put questions in this regard to the then Prime Minister and the Prime Minister furnished the hon. member with a satisfactory reply. However, the hon. member did not state what the reply from the former Prime Minister was which proved so satisfactory to him, and by omitting to disclose that reply, he is doing the former Prime Minister a disservice.

Are you not ashamed of yourself, Daan? Surely that is dishonest. [Interjections.]

Order!

That implies, if my view is correct, that the former Prime Minister did not stand by those proposals either. I want to tell the hon. member for Rissik that he owes it to the former Prime Minister to tell us what the reply was which was given to him which satisfied him to such an extent than between 1978 and 1982 he was able to live with the concept of a President who was to have been elected in precisely the same way.

I want to go further and the hon. member must help me. I am also asking other hon. members to help me. The hon. member for Rissik put questions to me. He asked me what was going to happen in 30 or 40 years’ time. I want to reply to him. I do not know. I do not think the hon. member knows either. Just as the hon. member was not able in 1978 to say where he would be tonight, I cannot say where South Africa is going to be. I do not know.

It is therefore a step in the dark.

No, it is not a step in the dark. I want to ask the hon. member whether becoming a Republic was a step in the dark. [Interjections.] I do not know what will happen in 30 or 40 years’ time. What I do know is this: If what is going to happen in 30 or 40 years’ time is going to be constitutional, the people who are participating in the system under this constitution will themselves decide what it is going to be. That means, for the information of that hon. member, that all three population groups have to agree on those amendments. Consequently what is happening in regard to these proposals?

All the doors have been bricked up.

The hon. member for Brakpan says that all the doors have been bricked up …

No one can get out.

I want to ask him whether we are not, by making these entrenchments an intrinsic part of the constitution, ensuring security for the rights of people. Will this not ensure security in respect of White rights in the sense that they cannot be changed unless the Whites agree? Will this not ensure security for Coloured rights? Will this not ensure security for Indian rights?

Suppose the NP as it is sitting there decides in two years’ time that it is not working. How is it going to get out of this thing?

The NP need not get out of these things …

Suppose it wanted to. Answer the question. [Interjections.]

Order! If the hon. member has put a question to the hon. Minister, he must give him a chance to reply to it.

There is no danger that the system will not work, except if people do not wish to participate in it. Surely the hon. member for Brakpan knows that there are provisions in the constitution on what the situation will be if people do not wish to participate in the system. It is not necessary for him to put that question, because he knows what the situation will then be. Surely the hon. member has studied the Constitution Bill. Of all the members of his party he has made the best study of it. The fact that all three population groups must participate in the amendment protects rights and ensures security for the rights or people.

There is nothing in this proposal which halts constitutional development. There is nothing in this proposal which prevents the groups which the hon. the Leader of the Opposition wants from becoming a reality. The dilemma of the hon. the leader of the Opposition is that he knows as well as I do what the restrictions on constitutional reform in this country are. He knows just as well as I do that apart from the economic and financial restrictions, emotional restrictions are the greatest restrictions. He knows that this is true for societies which are less complex than ours. The hon. the hon. the Leader of the Opposition—I derive no satisfaction from this—is not, however, being put in a position to lead his party.

Oh come now.

He can do what he likes, but the fact remains: There are profound differences in the ranks of his party. His problem is to reconcile the factions. There is only one way of doing that, and that is to show no progress whatsoever.

I want to ask once again that, although we can have objections to the proposals, we must be part of the fact that we are extending the situation.

Mr. Chairman, I shall try my best to draw the attention of the House back to the clause we are supposed to be discussing now. It deals with the election of the State President and not the 1977 dispensation. The hon. the Minister said that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition found himself in a dilemma, but the hon. the Minister’s speech showed us very clearly where the real dilemma lay. The dilemma, in fact, lies with that side of the House. We have actually listened to two hon. Ministers here tonight, viz. an hon. Minister who inclines to the right and an hon. Minister who inclines to the left, a Minister who speaks for the conservatives and a Minister who speaks for the reform-minded. Nothing was more breathtaking than the following statement by the hon. the Minister, and I hope I wrote it down correctly. The hon. the Minister said: If one wants to uphold civil rights, they must remain within a group context. I thought this Bill was about own affairs and general affairs. Now the hon. the Minister tells us that civil rights are protected only within the scope of own affairs. When one comes to general affairs, however, where one goes beyond the group context, they are at risk. [Interjections.] What does that mean? I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he does not believe that civil rights are as well protected within the scope of general affairs as within the scope of group affairs. Does he not believe that civil rights are protected by both co-responsibility and self-determination? The right wing is now being told: We are protecting your civil rights within the scope of group affairs, in the full knowledge that the other part of this Bill deals with general affairs. For this part of the debate he pushes it aside and discusses only apartheid issues and not general issues. I therefore want to ask the hon. the Minister: What shift does he envisage for the future? If this is supposed to be a step in one direction, is it in the direction of more co-responsibility, or is it in the direction of more apartheid? He says that this is merely the point of departure. If this is a point of departure, we must be heading somewhere. What course is he steering for South Africa by means of this Bill? He cannot be all things to all men. He must either butter up the conservatives and speak of more apartheid and self-determination or he must butter up the left-wing. He cannot try to please both.

The debate dealt with two aspects. Do we here have an entrenchment of NP domination as such, or is it the entrenchment of White group domination? I want to confine myself for the moment to whether it involves an entrenchment of White group domination. I am sorry that the hon. member for Helderkruin tried to gloss over the whole matter by explaining that we are adopting the same course as the Americans. He said that our system did not differ from that of the Americans, because there they have 50 electoral colleges, and when they come together, each of those 50 has a majority vote. That is merely saying that we have minority government in South Africa, because we have 166 constituencies, in each of which the result is determined by a majority vote. That is stupid logic and the hon. member knows it. The hon. member also knows that in America there is no entrenchment on a racial basis, nor a numerical basis. There is a numerical shift as the number of voters within each State in that country increases. It is therefore a nonsensical glossing over of the truth. We came the closest to the truth when the hon. member for Pretoria West accidentally made a certain statement. Unfortunately he fell over his own feet and told the truth. He said that this system was not so much a matter of majorities or minorities, but rather one of groups. He said that there were three groups and that the group vote was being cast out. What he meant was to tell the conservatives that through its built-in majority vote’s as entrenched in this clause the White group would dominate and exercise “baasskop” over the others. If he says that the idea is to have three groups, the votes of one group being a majority vote within that group is saying that White domination has been written into this legislation, not only in terms of an ordinary clause, but actually in terms of an entrenched clause. That is not how the hon. member put it, of course, nor what he meant, because in his own way he is a liberal sort of Nationalist. Even in those ranks, however, the truth does come to light, viz. that the essence of this clause lies in the fact that by means of this franchise arrangement or procedure the Whites are allowed to retain their domination and, what is more, have it entrenched.

†Mr. Chairman, I should want to touch on three aspects with which the hon. the Minister has also dealt, in order to test the validity of this particular clause. The hon. the Minister tells us not to think only of this clause but to think of the whole system. I want to talk about this clause which provides for the election of the State President. I believe it is true to say that the State President is the “sluitsteen”, the keystone of the whole edifice. He is the man around whom this whole new constitutional mechanism will operate. I do not believe that the hon. the Minister will say he is insignificant. The State President is the key man in the executive. He is the head of State. He is the key man in the legislature, in the determination of own affairs, in the resolution of disputes. In all these things he is the numero uno; the number one. This clause deals with how we are going to elect the most powerful political institution and personality in South Africa.

What does it say? It says that we will have an electoral college in which there will be 50 Whites, elected by the majority party in the White Assembly, and that we will have 38 other people. That is basically what it says. By resolution of the majority there will be an entrenched majority of Whites from one single party in this electoral college.

Mr. Chairman, let us look at three statements made by the hon. the Minister. I do not have his exact words, and I also do not want to mislead the House. What did the hon. the Minister say, however? He says this system is to try to lead us towards the concept of consensus in resolving the key issues in South Africa. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether this particular clause leads to consensus or whether it leads to White domination. How can one possibly have consensus when one says to the others they should come into the system but for all time, in terms of this entrenched provision, they are going to be in a minority position? What scope does it offer them? Why should they look for consensus? Why look for consensus when the NP has a built-in majority? In the first instance therefore this clause makes nonsense of the hon. the Minister’s claim that this constitution is aimed at looking for consensus.

The hon. the Minister says, in particular, that the object of the constitution is to broaden the base of democracy. Well, Mr. Chairman, democracy does not involve calling elections which mean nothing. Democracy does not involve giving the vote to people without enabling them to become part of the decision-making process. It does not involve giving a sham say to people. It involves allowing individuals to become part of the majority. Yet, Mr. Chairman, this particular clause specifically and permanently denies to Coloured and Indian people the right to become a majority in the election of the most critical person in this constitution.

I submit it makes a mockery of the hon. the Minister’s second claim that this is an extension of democracy.

I want to say something further to the hon. the Minister. This is very dangerous. He is playing with fire. Rather not give the people a vote than raise their expectations. [Interjections.] Why give them the expectation that they are going to have some meaningful say and then, when they actually reach the position, let them find that they are trapped in a permanent minority situation? It is better not to have a vote at all than to be offered a vote which has no meaning. [Interjections.]

Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister says that we want to move away from the Westminster system. In the course of his Second Reading speech he said the key note of the Westminster system, the keystone principle of the Westminster system, was the principle of the winner takes all. He said, and I quote (Hansard, col. 7057)—

The hon. the Minister says the object of this Bill is to move away from the Westminster system, which is the keystone of the winner takes all concept. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether this clause causes us to move away from the principle of the winner takes all. Does this clause cause us to move away at all from the concept of the winner takes all? No, Mr. Chairman, the effect of this clause it to entrench the worst feature of the Westminster system in the new constitution of our country. [Interjections.] The effect of this clause is to take this very concept of the winner takes all and convert it into the concept of the winner takes everything. [Interjections.] This clause, as it stands, makes a farce of the Government’s claim that it wants to move away from the principle of the winner takes all. It makes nonsense of the Governments claim that it wants to move towards consensus Government. It makes a mockery of the hon. the Minister’s claim that this is in any way broadening the base of democracy in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, the debate surrounding this clause has taken a surprising turn in the past hour, because for three-quarters of that hour the debate was being conducted between the party which is in the middle, or slightly left, of the political spectrum in South Africa and the party which is far to the left in the political spectrum. The hon. the Minister was actually wrong in alleging that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition had said that in his view the NP would continue to govern in the future. He rightly said, or actually wrongly, that for the foreseeable future the NP would maintain its present position. I want to say that I doubt it. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition also said that the NP was no longer the mouthpiece for Afrikaner nationalism. That is then the very reason why that party is rapidly losing support. I want to ask the hon. the Leader of the Opposition why he does not ask this side of the House whether our support is on the increase? We can justifiably say that on 10 May there was a radical increase in support for this side of the House.

Just ask Fanie.

Sir, I want to come to this clause.

Order! I would be glad if hon. members, in any further discussion on this clause, would actually confine themselves to the detail of the clause. I think we have thrashed out the principle sufficiently by now. Hon. members must now come back to the actual provisions of the clause.

I want to come back to clause 7. I want to tell the hon. the Minister that he has not yet fully answered two pertinent questions from this side of the House. The one he has only answered in part, and the other not at all. The question he answered in part related to whether the composition of the electoral college would change when the ethnic composition of these three groups changed. The hon. the Minister’s answer was that he did not know what would be happening in 25 years’ time. Other hon. members on that side of the House were not prepared to tell us either. We now ask very pertinently: If, within the lifetime of this White House, the ethnic ratios were to change, what would the hon. the Minister’s standpoint then be?

Secondly, I want to ask him whether the composition of this electoral college would be in accordance with the numerical composition of the population. There has not been any specific reply to that as yet.

But we said it would, did we not?

The hon. member for Rissik said that he deduced that would be the case. Let me refer to the Government’s little blue booklet on constitutional guidelines, and more specifically to page 14. I understand this booklet was intended more for the consumption of the Coloured and Indian population. In the booklet they can read the following in regard to the electoral college—

The answer to that is—

Mention is made of “an equitable basis”. Is what I have just quoted the correct answer?

Mr. Chairman, in the hon. member’s opinion, what is wrong with the answer he has just quoted to us?

Hon. members opposite should also have told the people in the rural areas what the situation would be. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member accuses us of not having informed the people in the rural areas, out how many thousands of copies of those blue pamphlets were not purchased by his party and distributed in the rural areas? [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. the Minister put a question to the hon. member for Pietersburg, and think the hon. member is quite capable of answering it without any assistance. Other hon. members need not try to answer it. The hon. member may proceed.

I think the hon. the Minister should have been grateful, because surely it was the department’s intention to have the brochures distributed throughout the country. This side of the House was merely lending the department some assistance. The problem, however, is that hon. members on that side of the House are telling people in the rural areas that the NP will always be able to designate the State President, that the NP will always be in the majority and will therefore be able to maintain White domination. [Interjections.] We, however, know that the population figures are going to change.

The hon. the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications is, I am sure, very familiar with the figures Prof. Sadie of Stellenbosch has furnished in this connection. According to him, by the year 2000 there will be a total of 5,7 million Whites and 6,1 million Coloureds and Indians.

That is merely conjecture.

Somewhere between 1990 and the year 2000 the overall total of Coloureds and Indians will be more than that of the Whites. If the hon. the Minister now wants to be fair, just and Christian, he must tell us this evening that when that position is reached, the NP will be sufficiently willing and magnanimous to change this ratio embodied in an entrenched clause such as this. This Government is placing an unnecessary and impossible burden on the consciences of those who have to take their seats here at a later stage when the situation is such that the Whites in this country are in the minority. We all know that the White growth rate is levelling off and moving into a negative phase, in spite of the fact that many people argue that a point will never be reached when the Coloureds and Indians will outnumber the Whites.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to put a question to the hon. member. As a medical practitioner, familiar with the realities of the world around him, and also as erstwhile member of the NP study group on health and welfare, would the hon. member not concede that these projections, made by Prof. Sadie and other demographers, could possibly change from year to year and that they are mere conjecture and not based on facts? [Interjections.]

I think the hon. the Minister must rather take that matter up with Prof. Sadie.

If one looks, for example, at the number of children who have to be cared for by the State—we asked the Government this question recently—one sees that there are three times more children needing care amongst the Coloureds than there are amongst the Whites, although the Coloured population is only half that of the Whites. It therefore goes without saying that the Coloured growth rate is much higher than that of the Whites. The fact remains: Some time or other in the future the population ratios are going to change. They cannot do otherwise, because already the Whites are experiencing a negative population growth rate. Clause 7 embodies the end of the freedom of the White population in South Africa. If we are to be honest and fair we cannot, for all time, lay claim to a majority vote in the electoral college. That would be unfair, unjust and un-Christian. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pietersburg said that this clause carried within it the seed of the downfall of the Whites. However, I contend that this clause carries the seed of the growth of the Whites and the growth of the future of our children. It also carries within it the seed of the growth of co-existence for our children, the Brown people and the Asians. The hon. member for Pietersburg argues as if the voter of South Africa is totally stupid and unable to read. He is arguing as if the voters of South Africa are unable either to understand or to hear. I say this because every voter in South Africa who is able to see and hear for himself is seeing, on the basis of reports on television and in the newspapers, exactly what this clause provides with regard to the electoral college that elects the State President of South Africa. When one looks at the arguments advanced by the CP, one finds in them an ironic contradiction. On the one hand, they are telling the Coloureds and the Indians that the composition of the electoral college means that the Brown people and the Indians are being cheated. On the other hand, they also say to the White voters that the composition of this electoral college means something different. The hon. members of the CP must settle amongst themselves whether this constitution—and this provision, among others—ultimately signifies the downfall of the Whites, or whether, as other hon. members have argued, it means that the Coloureds and the Indians are being cheated all the way. As far as this clause is concerned, we on this side of the House are not afraid to tell our people that we see the State President as a person who will be elected by this electoral college of Coloureds, Indians and Whites. As the hon. the Minister said, as far as this clause is concerned we must not only ook at the election of the State President but must also look at the State President in the overall context of the constitution. If we consider the totality of this constitution, the powers of the State President, the role of conciliation and obtaining consensus that the State President must perform, we see that there is no alternative to electing the State President by way of just such an electoral college, to enable him to do the work in terms of this constitution with the co-operation of all our people. When we discuss this clause there is probably no informed person in South Africa—in any event, there is none in my constituency—who honestly believes that it is in our interests, as the White community, that we alone should always, ad infinitum, elect the State President of South Africa. There is not a single voter who believes that. The hon. member for Pietersburg referred to the people from my part of the world, our part of the world, as the conservative Afrikaans-speaking voters. He spoke about the appropriation of those people, and that is one of the amazing aspects in this regard, because the arguments advanced by the members of the CP concerning this point in fact reflect a parasitic conservatism. It is a conservatism that is anti-oriented, a conservatism that preys upon people’s fears. When we discuss this clause, we should rather speak about a positive conservatism, a conservatism that seeks to preserve. That is exactly why we elect the State President in this way, because by so doing we shall be preserving those values that are of importance to all of us: The participation of all people in the democratic process as embodied in this clause. It is our aim to take people with us by way of a State President who is elected in terms of this clause so that he can also help take those people with us on the road of the acceptance of other principles that are of importance to us. When I say this, I am referring to a free economic system and other values that are of importance to all of us.

In conclusion, I should like to refer to the master-servant politics conjured up around this provision by the CP. The hon. members of the CP have just been speaking about the numerical reality. If we in South Africa want to conjure up fears for the future with regard to numbers, then surely it is logical, when we discuss this clause and make an estimate of the numbers involved and fill our public with fear of the numerical realities, that we must also fill the people with the fear of numerical realities on the basis of the CP’s own policy which is a substitute for this policy. Then we must also tell the people that the foolishness of a homeland policy is refuted by that very numerical reality of people who will never be settled there. Then, when we consider this clause, I want to ask this: Why do we use that argument concerning numbers, if not in an effort to exploit the fears and anxieties of people? I believe that the President who will be elected by this electoral college will play a conciliatory role. I believe that President will achieve in South Africa exactly what we want to achieve by way of this electoral college in making all people participants in the election of that President. We as the NP are not afraid to tell the voters at large that we have here a State President who will be elected by Brown people, Asians and Whites because that President is not solely the executive head. He also represents to us the symbol of what we regard as co-existence and progress in the interests of our children in this country.

Mr. Chairman, like the hon. the Minister, the hon. member for Innesdal has again suggested that this clause is an example of including other races in the democratic process in South Africa. I want to put certain basic questions to the hon. the Minister and to certain other hon. members on the other side once again. They talk about including others in the democratic process. This is a very nice sounding phrase but we must analyse it in terms of what this particular clause provides.

The hon. the Minister once again spoke at great length this evening. He said that we should look at the whole Bill and not simply at this one clause when we talk about expanded democracy. However, I want to bring the hon. the Minister back to this particular clause. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether he seriously suggests that this clause is an example of expanded democracy. The hon. member for De Kuilen spoke along the same lines this afternoon as did the hon. the Minister. He put a question to the hon. member for Constantia. He asked him whether he was suggesting that the Coloureds and the Indians would not have any say at all. When he replied to my speech, that was the theme of his response as well. When one considers this clause which provides for an electoral college composed of 50 White members dominated by the majority White party, 25 members of the Coloured House and 13 from the Asian House, I want to ask what sort of say those Coloureds and Asians have in the electoral college. Is that an example of expanded democracy? I want to put this question to the hon. member for De Kuilen. Let us assume, as will obviously happen, that the 50 White members—of whom that hon. member may well be one; he may well be one of the members of his party elected to the electoral college—have a nominee in mind. If he goes to that electoral college with a nominee and the Coloureds and the Indians have another nominee, have they any chance at all of having their nominee elected as State President of South Africa? Is there the remotest chance of that happening?

Does your party have any chance now?

That is not the point. We are talking about what the hon. the Minister claims to be an example of expanded democracy. This is the great gift that he is giving to other racial groups. If those racial groups did not agree with the nominee of the White House, I want to know whether they would have any hope at all of having their alternate choice elected. Quite clearly, the answer is that they would have absolutely no chance. They would not have any chance at all of having their nominee elected. However, the hon. the Minister gives this as an example of expanded democracy. As we have said before, we are dealing here with a vital clause. We are not dealing here with the election of a Prime Minister for a unicameral Parliament. We are dealing here with the election of the head of State representing three Houses and purporting to represent three different racial groups. The answer is that the will of the White majority in that electoral college, the White majority elected by the majority party in the White House, will always prevail. This is totally incompatible; it is totally irreconcilable with any concept of expanding democracy because it simply is not expanded democracy; it is White domination prevailing. It is the domination of the dominant party in this House.

That brings me to the next point. The hon. the Minister suggested in his remarks that the hon. the Leader of the Opposition had been unable to convince the House that by way of a national convention one could achieve consensus. I believe that in a real national convention one would be talking to the people who matter and one would have a far better hope of achieving real and meaningful consensus. I want to ask the hon. the Minister if really he was debating this Bill and in this House there were Coloureds and Asians, whether he really thinks that they would go for this sort of clause. Does he think that he would get their support for a clause which condemns them to a situation of permanent minority? The answer clearly is that he would not get their support because no people in their sane minds would vote themselves into a position where they would be in a position of permanent minority in an electoral college of this kind.

Therefore, if the hon. the Minister talks of consensus, that is a totally phoney type of consensus. If one is looking for real consensus, consensus which will contribute towards resolving the real problems of South Africa, the only way in which one is going to achieve that—we shall find that out willy-nilly in future; inevitably it is going to happen—is by sitting down as equals to debate a new dispensation in South Africa. That is where this type of clause and this type of electoral college provided for in this key clause in the Bill is not going to endure. The hon. the Minister must realize this.

Hansard and history will reflect in the years that lie ahead that there has been no way for the hon. the Minister to satisfy the Coloureds and Indians in an electoral college situation where he condemns them into a situation of permanent minority. It may work once, but as time goes along he is going to have conflict and those people are not going to accept the situation. I put it to the hon. the Minister: Would he accept it if he were a Coloured or an Indian sitting in the electoral college where he knew that it was simply there as a part of a window-dressing situation and where he had no authority, no power, no strength whatsoever to make his will prevail? The hon. the Minister as, I hope, a reasonably intelligent person, a sensitive person, should realize that nobody will accept that situation.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether he has taken part in any electoral college in a window-dressing situation?

Sir, I am in a position where I can aspire to let my group become the majority group. I am in that position as an equal member of this House, but that is not the position of a Coloured or an Indian in terms of the new dispensation because those groups’ rights are being entrenched—they will be the permanent minority. That is not the question as far as I am concerned. Through the process of democracy I can try to influence sufficient people to allow my party to win sufficient seats in order to become the majority, but that will not be the position of the Coloureds and the Indians in the new dispensation. That is the basic difference. That is what makes this clause a cardinal clause and it will be a cardinal cause of conflict in the years which lie ahead. For that reason there is no way in which we can support this.

The hon. the Minister wants to know whether we are suggesting that this clause entrenches the NP. Other hon. members have referred to this too. Certainly this clause does make certain that the dominant party in the White House will always be the dominant party in the electoral college. From the point of view of practical politics, that of course is the NP. When one looks at the entire constitutional proposals—the hon. the Minister and the hon. members opposite must realize this—one finds that what we are doing in the constitution is to write into the constitution the apartheid policy of the NP. That is what we are doing. Where in the past it has been a political policy, we are now—this clause gives an example of it—writing into the constitution of South Africa the apartheid ideology of the NP. It is going to be done on the basis of the groups, its going to be done on the basis of separation, it is going to be done on the basis of the domination of the White group, and we believe it cannot possibly work in the South Africa of today or of the future.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister spoke for at least 50 minutes. I listened attentively to him. I gained the impression that the hon. the Minister was very cleverly trying to avoid certain questions, whilst he also made certain statements I found very interesting. He said, inter alia, that this constitutional proposal of his is better than the status quo. I cannot understand that kind of logic. There has been the greatest degree of disagreement among Whites, Coloured and Indians since the first time the issue of the new constitution was raised.

Another point the hon. the Minister made, was that he was extending democracy, since more people are going to be participating in it now. My question is whether this has now become the principle. Or is self-determination the principle? If the principle is to extend democracy, I want to ask just one pertinent question. Why are the Blacks being excluded?

Order! I am not going to permit the hon. member to speak about Blacks in the debate on this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, I accept your ruling. The hon. the Minister said something I found particularly interesting, and which indicated to me that he realizes that this new constitutional dispensation is collapsing like a house of cards, viz. when, emotionally and almost desperately, he said this evening that if the NP plan does not succeed, those who are opposed to it would be playing into the hands of people who want to destroy democracy. What was the hon. the Minister doing? In an attempt to make a political point, he once again involved the total onslaught. I take that amiss of the hon. the Minister. The total onslaught is brought up from platform to platform to score cheap political debating points. [Interjections.]

Order! I should be pleased if the hon. member would come closer to the clause under discussion. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. the Minister permitted to say that the hon. member for Jeppe is mad?

The hon. the Minister must withdraw that.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it.

Mr. Chairman, on a further point of order: The hon. the Minister of Law and Order also said that.

The hon. the Minister of Law and Order must also withdraw that.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw it.

The hon. member for Jeppe may proceed.

The entrenchment of the 50, 25 and 13 members of the Electoral College, respectively, is directly linked to this clause. Two points of criticism were raised this evening as a result of this entrenchment. The first criticism was that it is an entrenchment of White domination. The second criticism arising from this was that he was relinquishing White sovereignty. Surely it can only be one of the two. What is happening here, is that it is indeed White entrenchment, since the number of members from the various Houses will remain constant, regardless of what changes may occur in the population. I found it interesting that the hon. the Minister was attacked from two sides. On the one hand, it was said that he was relinquishing White sovereignty, and on the other, that he was entrenching White domination. The hon. the Minister then jumped up and spoke for 50 minutes, but I gained the impression that “the lady protesteth too much”. What is going to happen? Chaos is going to result from this dispensation of the hon. the Minister, and I am saying this in deadly earnest. Once a party has become a middle-of-the-road party, so that it can move to either side…

Order! The hon. member is circumventing my ruling. A middle-of-the-road party has got nothing to do with the clause we are discussing. I am making a final appeal to the hon. member to confine himself to the contents of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, this clause deals with the entrenchment of the 50:25:13 ratio.

Order! The hon. member has already said that twice. The hon. member is not permitted to repeat himself.

Mr. Chairman, I am not repeating anything. You are reprimanding me, and I want to tell you why I am saying what I am saying. That is where I began. I began by saying that there is this entrenchment. The hon. members of the PFP regard it as White domination. The hon. member for Pretoria Central, however, said that the issue was not proportionality, but group rights. What I find interesting, is what the principle is. Is the principle proportionality, how they arrived at that ratio, or does the hon. member for Pretoria Central think it is group rights? It can be nothing but proportionality, and I shall tell you why I say so. The blue booklet says so, and if one makes a calculation, one arrives at 50, 25, 13. That, therefore, is the principle involved here—not group rights, but proportionality. Now I find it pleasing to look at the NP’s principle, since it entails democracy, justice, Christianity and all the other fine concepts we have been hearing about recently. However, if one asks them how strong their principle of proportionality is going to be in the future, they run away. Then the hon. the Minister does not answer. Then he says that he does not know what is going to happen in the future. He says that he cannot foretell the future. I can only make one inference, and that is that this is a blatant entrenchment of White domination. The reason the hon. the Minister is not prepared to answer, is because it is White entrenchment. [Interjections.]

Order!

There is only one way to solve this problem, and that is to give the Whites their own head of State, as the hon. member for Rissik suggested, and one should give the Coloureds and the Indians their own head of State as well. Then one would not have domination; one would have self-determination. That is the only answer.

Mr. Chairman, I want to put the following question to the hon. member: Supposing they have put all the Coloureds in a homeland and their numbers grow tremendously, is the homeland going to be enlarge accordingly, as their numbers increase, and where is it all going to end when there are so many Coloureds, that they will be able to take over the whole of South Africa?

Mr. Chairman, I expected a much better question from the hon. member. If you will permit me to discuss the homeland, I shall reply to him.

Order! I shall only permit the hon. member to discuss what is contained in clause 7.

That question is not contained in it, Sir. The question is about a homeland for Coloureds.

Order! The hon. member must not argue with the Chair. I am only going to permit him to discuss the details of this clause.

I shall do so, Mr. Chairman, and you must please stop me if I wander too far. There are 2,5 million Coloureds and the hon. member is concerned about them. Is he not concerned about 20 million Blacks, who are not included in the dispensation? [Interjections.] [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I just want to try to bring the debate back to the essence of what the hon. the Minister said in his reply. The purpose of this clause is, in the first place, to lay down the principle of participation by all three Houses in the election of the President. This principle is contained and entrenched in this clause. That is the first point.

The second point is that in order to change this clause in any way, it is not possible, for example, to follow the procedure of approaching the President’s Council in this connection; on the contrary, it requires the consensus of the majority parties in all three Houses. Only in this way can this clause be amended. However, the point of departure in this respect is obviously the fact that the ration of 4:2:1—the relevant numbers are 50, 25, 13—is more or less based on the principle of proportionality. Now the objection is being raised—especially by the official Opposition and the CP—that this amounts to White domination.

It is indeed a fact that the majority party in the House of Assembly will have the final say—as far as the implementation of this provision is concerned—on who should be State President. However, this does not mean that this in itself will lead to domination. After all, there are many other provisions in the legislation which must be taken into consideration in the process of governing as well as the process of legislating.

The hon. member for Berea also said, however, that this clause contained a provision which would not stand the test of time. Mr. Chairman, this provision is obviously not meant to stand the test of time; it is being entrenched purely in order to ensure that it can only be amended with the consent of the majority parties in all three Houses. If in due course greater wisdom were to suggest a way of changing this in order to bring about a workable solution, and the consent of the majority parties in all three Houses could be obtained for this in order to arrive at the new formula, a new formula which would also be acceptable by virtue of its feasibility in terms of practical politics, such a proposal would naturally be made. This could happen at any time in future. However, it would still require the consent of the majority party in each of the three Houses.

Just as in the case of a national convention! [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, this brings me to one last thought which I should like to express. Hon. members of the CP have made great play here of the possibility of an adjustment at some future time, when the situation will allegedly arise where the Coloured representatives—i.e. the members of the House of Representatives—could have a majority vote, and the hon. members of the CP suggest that if we want to be morally just and consistent, they will have to have the deciding vote.

But is that not correct?

That is what those hon. members say, after all. Now the hon. member for Rissik is once again asking whether this is not correct. I must honestly say that I do not believe it is correct.

Why not?

I do not believe it is correct because we would then find ourselves back in the position in which we are now, with the same shortcomings as those we are faced with at the moment. [Interjections.] I have really tried to explain it very clearly, Mr. Chairman. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to put the following question to the hon. member for Randburg. Suppose the Coloureds had outnumbered Whites at this stage, would the hon. member still have adhered to the composition of the electoral college which is being proposed here? [Interjections.]

No, we would not. It is very likely that we would not have done so. After all, I have also told the hon. member that everything that is being done is in fact being done with a view to the feasibility of the proposed situation in terms of practical politics. What is very important in this connection, after all, is the movement, the process of adjustment and reform and of accommodating everyone.

The statement I was making when the hon. member for Rissik interrupted me was that this provision is indeed imperfect in terms of what the ideal situation would be. If we had to design our models to conform to our ideals, the provision would probably be very different. We are making progress however, and in this respect I am honestly unable to understand the standpoint of hon. members of the official Opposition, at any rate. They are obviously looking for an ideal system, although they have repeatedly conceded that such an ideal system is simply not feasible, precisely because there are limits to what we can possibly achieve in practice at this stage. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, in the first instance the hon. member for Randburg made the statement that the principle of participation by all three Houses was confirmed by this clause. This refers, of course, to participation on the basis that people are only allowed to see how the game is played. The ratio, as we already know, will be 50:25:13. As the hon. member for Musgrave has indicated, there is no possibility whatsoever that the Coloureds and the Indians can even participate in the game, because the Whites will be in the majority and therefore their candidate will become the State President. [Interjections.]

However, the hon. member for Randburg takes the matter further and contends that this as such does not amount to domination. He says that this is not domination per se.

I say that one must also take into account the other aspects of the legislation

Very well then, let us consider the other aspects of the legislation. In order to debate this Bill in terms of this particular clause, it is necessary also to consider the other aspects of the legislation. We are dealing here with a State President who, off his own bat, appoints members of the Cabinet. For five years he is in charge. He selects the members of his Cabinet to serve for five years. What is more, they do not even have to come from the House of Assembly. Therefore they are not accountable to the House of Assembly or to either of the other two Houses. Some of them can be away from the two Houses entirely. As the President’s Council says, they will be responsible only to the President, because it is the President who appoints them.

Who appoints the members of the House of Assembly?

Yes, it is the President and the Prime Minister, but they do not necessarily come from the House of Assembly. Their appointment is not dealt with here.

Order! I wish to point out to the hon. member that we are not dealing with the election of the Cabinet now but with the election of the President.

Yes, but the hon. member for Randburg says that it is not domination per se if the President is elected in this way, because one should consider the rest of the Bill. Now I just wish to argue on that basis.

Yes, but the hon. member will understand that if I were to permit him to argue at this point on the basis of the argument advanced by the hon. member for Randburg, then he would have to exceed the provisions of the clause. Then I should again have a problem in that regard. Accordingly, I should be obliged if the hon. member would now come back to the clause.

Sir, I understand that you have a problem in that regard. I just wish to say to the hon. member for Randburg that this is not domination per se, but that if one considers the rest of the Bill, as he says we must do, one will see that it is most definitely domination. That is the point I want to make.

The hon. member goes on to say …

You say we are giving everything away, but now all of a sudden it is domination.

That is the point. The hon. the Minister is right. That is the problem.

You say we are giving everything away.

Yes, that is the problem. You see, Sir, as soon as one begins to give in with regard to matters of this nature … [Interjections.]

It cannot be both. [Interjections.]

If the hon. the Minister wants to put a question to me, he is most welcome to do so. I just wish to say to him that once one begins to give in on that principle, one is on the road to surrender, to capitulation. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member must really come back now to the issue of the election of the State President. He cannot pursue any further the issue of the principle that is conceded.

Sir, I am merely reacting to an interjection. I just wish to refer to the case made out here by the hon. the Minister. The electoral college is appointed on the basis of a certain ratio. Now, the NP caucus may decide that proportion is no longer a good one—there is no election, but that proportion is no longer a good one. I ask the hon. the Minister what one would do then. The Bill provides that the other two Houses would carry on. The hon. the Minister said that I should read the Bill. He said that I surely knew what the Bill provided. The other two Houses would then carry on with legislation.

Order! The matter at issue is not legislation that can be passed by the other two Houses. We are dealing with the election of the State President.

That is correct, Sir, but I am now stating that if one of the Houses is dissatisfied with the proportion of 50:25:13 and reaches that decision in the caucus, or if a different party comes to power after an election and they say that they and their congresses want to effect a change in the situation, then one cannot change that situation without the permission of the two other Houses. What better way to promote frustration? [Interjections.] This entrenched provision cannot be amended or altered without the permission of both of the other Houses. [Interjections.]

Order!

Sir, when the noise emanating from the other side increases in volume, then I perceive very clearly that I am right.

I also just wish to refer once again to what the hon. member for Sea Point had to say about the Westminster system. The hon. the Minister said that we were moving away from the Westminster system, but not in all respects. He said that it was not being rejected entirely but that we were still keeping to it to some extent. However, he added that the aspect of that system that was falling away was the aspect of “winner takes all”. The provisions of clause 7 provide for an extreme case of “winner takes all”. Now he is not only going to appoint a State President who acts on the advice of a Cabinet, but he is going to appoint a State President who will be a dictator for five years. That is not a case of “winner takes all”; it is a case of “winner takes everything”. There is nothing that he does not take.

Order! The hon. member cannot again discuss the issue of what the State President can do. The issue here is the election of the State President. I now call upon the hon. member, for the last time, not to attempt to circumvent my ruling.

With all due respect, this is an aspect that must be seen in context. In heaven’s name, one must surely consider the election of the State President in the context of all his other tasks and powers. Sir, if you are not going to permit me to discuss that, I shall resume my seat. [Interjections.]

Order!

I just wish to make the point that the most objectionable aspect of the Westminster system is being embodied in this clause.

Mr. Chairman, if I understood the hon. member for Randburg correctly, he said that the principle at stake here was the principle of inclusion of Coloureds and Indians in the election of the President. What he says is pie in the sky. The Chairman has ruled our amendments and the amendments of other parties out of order on the basis that the essential principle is that the majority party in the White Chamber elects the President. That is a question of domination. The hon. member for Randburg tries to sweeten the matter and he tries to create expectations, but the clause as it stands is clearly a domination clause. [Interjections.]

The hon. the Minister talked for about three-quarters of an hour and he opened up far more questions than he was able to close off. I want to take up one particularly important issue with him. For the record, I should just like to deal with the accusation that this party said that this was a clause to entrench the NP. I think the hon. the Minister almost specifically accused me of having said that. I said, and other members of this party have said, that the clause introduces a mechanism which provides for the permanent autocracy of the majority White party. In the short term however, the clause provides for a NP autocracy in spite of the decorative presence of Coloureds and Indians and Opposition groups. [Interjections.]

Order! I wish to point out that I will not allow the hon. member to repeat the same argument again and again. This argument has been dealt with before.

In the short term, especially if one looks at the content of clause 102(4), while this Chamber operates as the Chamber that will elect the 50 White members it is quite clearly an entrenchment of the NP. With 126 seats out of 308 seats it entrenches the NP’s minority control of the presidency. Unless further amendments are effected to other parts of the Bill, that presidency will last for the full life of the Parliament which could be to 1989. After a subsequent general election, which may be held between now and when the next President is elected, the NP could even lose the majority in this House, as was shown earlier, and it could still elect the President. I say again that in the short term it is an entrenchment of the NP autocracy.

Of course it is.

I come now to the point I particularly wish to take up with the hon. the Minister. This is a terribly important point which must be clearly understood by the public. The hon. the Minister, as I understood him, said in response to our challenge to him to show that this clause was an expansion of democracy that it was not possible to solve this country’s constitutional problems in terms of the principles of Western democracy. Is that correct?

I said the Western democracy models.

The point is that the hon. Minister claims one cannot solve our problems in terms of the broad principles and philosophy of Western democracy, the central thread of which is that the leader of the majority party in the Parliament of the day is the head of Government. The person who can command the majority of the whole Parliament in a Western democracy is the had of Government. If the hon. the Minister is saying that it is not possible to solve this country’s problems in terms of those principles, in terms of that golden thread, then what is he saying? He is putting the corollary and that is that non-democratic principles must be used. He is saying that this NP wishes to lead South Africa from a minority position which it intends to entrench in terms of this clause and that it does not wish to seek allies and share the task of governing this country. With the 126 seats the NP has right now all it needs is another 30 allies out of a 308 seat Parliament to have a new overall majority.

Order! We are discussing the election of the President.

I shall come back to the point, Sir. The mechanism that is provided for here is a non-democratic mechanism. It is a move away from democracy.

Did you vote at Mitchell’s Plain?

If one looks at the philosophy behind this particular clause, it reflects what to my mind can be described as the Atatürk option. The hon. member for Rissik once referred to a speech by a certain Prof. Huntington and the ideas he has been promoting, such as the idea of a dictatorial presidency which might be able to introduce reform. He refers favourably to the example of Kemal Atatürk. I believe the hon. the Minister has taken that to heart. What he is providing for in this clause is a dictatorial system with a minority base which makes no requirement for seeking allies outside of the NP.

The Ata-Botha option.

It seeks to create the impression of widening the scope of democracy without really widening it one iota.

The hon. the Minister of Community Development and a few other hon. members there made references to Mitchell’s Plain. The hon. the Minister himself made a scornful reference to the UDF meeting on Saturday night.

I am sorry but I did not find anything in this clause referring to Mitchell’s Plain and the UDF. I should like the hon. member to come back to the contents of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, it specifically relates to this clause, because in his argumentation the hon. the Minister referred to negotiations with Coloured leaders who are going to participate in what is envisaged in this clause. I just want to say to the hon. the Minister that I was a witness to the events in that community the other night. The SABC did not enlighten the public as to what was happening and so I took it upon myself to go down there for about two hours as an observer just to see what was happening.

Order! I think the hon. member is getting us into deep water now. I think he must come back to the clause.

Mr. Chairman …

Order! I will not allow the hon. member to discuss it. He may proceed now, but he must come back to the contents of the clause.

Mr. Chairman, if this clause is going to work, as the hon. the Minister has suggested to this Committee it will work, it has to have the support of the other participants in this proposed constitution, the Coloured and the Indian communities. The hon. the Minister has said in his speech just a short while ago that he had been negotiating for a long time with the leaders of the Coloured and Indian communities. I am going to ask the hon. the Minister something. The Labour Party has not been able to hold a successful meeting in the Western Cape, whereas that meeting on Saturday, which I witnessed with my own two eyes as an observer, was a meeting of thousands of people. It was unchallenged and there were no disturbances. Their attitude to this clause and to the whole constitution was unmistakeable. The hon. the Minister knows exactly what I am talking about.

Order! The hon. member must come back to this clause.

All I would like to say, Sir, is that when the hon. the Minister says that those who reject this clause and this constitution are playing into the hands of those who will destroy South Africa—or words to that effect—he should bear in mind that if anyone is to blame for fanning the flames of revolutionary pressure around us, it is the perpetrators of these proposals in this Constitution Bill.

Mr. Chairman, if I allow myself to be led astray in order to repeat a good argument, then I hope you will not interrupt me. It is always good to say something good twice.

I want to dwell for a moment on what the hon. member for Innesdal said this evening. It is not the first time he has said it. He referred to the CP as a party based on parasitic conservatism and said, that we sought to exploit the fears and anxieties of Whites. Let us test this clause against this specific statement that the hon. member made. I want this clause to be read in conjunction with the entrenchment of the clause. If that hon. member is accusing the CP of pandering to the anxieties and fears of the Whites, then I want to say this evening that what ever the Government party may say, there is only one reason for the entrenchment of this clause and that is to pander to the fears and anxieties of the Whites. Why? Because throughout South Africa—and after all, we have experienced that—the White voters are being told from platform to platform: You need not be concerned: as long as the NP is in power a White man will be State President. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: The hon. member can argue about the entrenchment or non-entrenchment when we deal with the clause. With all due respect, we cannot discuss every clause on the basis of this clause. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member may proced.

I want to repeat it. It is the only reason for the entrenchment of this clause, because entrenchment would not have been necessary in an effort to allay the fears of the Whites if it had merely been said that change could not be effected unless the Whites agreed. What I also find amazing was the reply which the hon. member for Rand-burg gave us here this evening. He is a man I have always regarded as preeminently a fair an just man. This was his reply to the question put to him by the hon. member for Rissik. The hon. member for Rissik asked the hon. member for Randburg whether, if the Coloureds had been in the majority as far as these three groups are concerned, the NP would have been prepared this evening to accept the same formula for the election of a State President, which in that Case would have meant that the Coloured group could have designated a State President. The unambiguous reply given by the hon. member for Randburg was: No, that would not be politically feasible. What, then, is the hon. member for Randburg saying? he is saying that the NP would not have accepted that, because it would have meant that in that case a Coloured could become State President. We are now getting a little weary of this piety of the NP’s, their contention that they are the fair and just people and that we, with our approach, are the so-called racists, whereas in their own arguments they are indicating exactly what is in the back of their minds, which is that they have the same intentions, viz. to try to keep the real political power in the hands of the Whites.

We have often in the course of this debate had the argument concerning this clause that two arguments cannot be true, the argument of White domination put forward by the PFP, and our standpoint that these are the first steps on the road to forfeiting control by Whites of their own affairs in this country. The NP can try to bluff itself that it will retain the political power in the long term in this country by way of the so-called entrenchment clause in a mixed Government, in spite of what their numerical proportion may be in the future. The history of the rest of the world, and particularly that of Africa, has shown us that little entrenchment clause is not worth the paper it will be written on, because once one accepts mixed Government, one has irrevocably set foot on the road to eventual majority Government, which is what the NP accuses the PFP of. The same argument applies if the NP has placed itself on the road of mixed Government with whomever, because then those in the numerical majority will eventually govern and one will not be able to prevent that by way of entrenchments alone.

Mr. Chairman, I am rising, in the first place, to say that amendment 5 as moved by the hon. member for Rissik is not acceptable. Nor are amendments 7 and 8 as moved by the hon. member for Nigel acceptable, and I shall have more to say about that in due course.

Basically, amendment 5 envisages the substitution of “Chief Justice” by “Speaker”. It is our point of view that the Chief Justice ought at all times to play the key role in filling the highest post in the country. Therefore I am unable to accept the amendment.

As far as amendment 7 is concerned, the hon. member for Nigel proposes that the word “present” be deleted. The word “present” is necessary because its deletion would entail that an electoral college could not come to a decision if one of its members was sick. No quorum is stipulated for the electoral college. Amendment 7 is related to amendment 8 in terms of which he proposes that if all the members are not present, a second meeting must be convened. Amendment 8 is not necessary either. In normal circumstances problems will not be created if anyone is absent. Absence due to illness or other circumstances will only affect individuals. With great respect, the concern of the hon. member that half of the electoral college may be ill, is really far-fetched.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question?

No, I first wish to finish answering.

Acceptance of the hon. member’s amendment would also entail an amendment of subsection (3)(a) and (b) that provides that the State President must be elected within seven days after the commencement of the session.

I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

As formulated at the moment, the clause is not entirely clear. In the first place it is susceptible to the interpretation that the various Houses must, for the purposes of the composition of the electoral college, comprise all the directly elected members. That is not our intention. In the second place it is not clear that the nominated and indirectly elected members may riot participate in the composition of the electoral college and may not be designated as members of the electoral college. The amendment I have proposed seeks to eliminate those two problems.

The hon. member for Sea Point argued on the basis of a totally incorrect assumption concerning something I never said. What, in fact, did I say? I said that it was the standpoint of the Government that individual rights and civil rights must be upheld in the group context in the country. That is what I said and I have always said that, and said it repeatedly. With great respect, the hon. member is far more intelligent than that, but from that statement he infers that I am speaking to the left and to the right. Surely that is not true. My name is not Hartzenberg. He says that I am only referring to own affairs when I argue in that way. But surely that is not a correct inference from what I said. The fact remains that general affairs are also dealt with in the various Houses. The hon. member knows that, and therefore such an inference is malicious, to say the least. The basic problem of the official Opposition is reflected in their morning mouthpiece in Cape Town. They think that they can use their minority to achieve a specific result together with other population groups. That is the basic issue, and not all these fine and elevated things that the hon. member is speaking about. Hon. members know that they will never come to power on the basis of White support. It is just that the hon. member is not prepared to say that. That is why The Cape Times says it for him.

The hon. member goes further by saying that then we should rather not give them a vote. The hon. member was present when the various political parties submitted evidence. He knows as well as I do that the Labour Party did not submit evidence on the composition of the electoral college.

That was a principle about which they were unable to submit evidence.

That is not correct. [Interjections.] The hon. member must give me a chance to reply. [Interjections.] He is just like a fish. The hon. member must go and look at the evidence. The Freedom Party submitted evidence about that. The Indian delegation did so too. How, then, can the hon. member say that they were unable to submit evidence about that. Surely he knows that is not true.

I do not mind, but you cannot say that.

The hon. member tells me that they could not submit evidence.

The hon. the Minister cannot say that I know that is not true.

Order! The hon. member is replying now.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: Is the hon. the Minister allowed to say that another hon. member has said something which he knows to be untrue?

Did the hon. the Minister say that?

I withdraw it, but after all, the hon. member knows that it is not correct. [Interjections.] The hon. member’s facts are not correct. The facts are that the Indian delegation submitted evidence on that point and the representative of the Freedom Party also submitted evidence on that. Now the hon. member is saying that the Labour Party were not permitted to submit evidence about that. Surely that is not correct.

May I ask you a question?

No. The hon. member then said: “Rather not give them a vote.” Why does the hon. member not let the Brown leaders speak for themselves? Why does he not let the Indian leaders speak for themselves? He should take the advice of a Brown leader from Port Elizabeth who publicly adopted a standpoint and told the hon. member for Port Elizabeth Central that he must stop speaking to the Brown people there because they did not elect him. To argue here on the basis adopted by the hon. member for Sea Point, is not fair.

I now come to the hon. member for Pietersburg. He asked what was Christian about the numerical proportions. I now wish to put a question to him. Since when has his quality of Christianity changed?

Never.

Sir, that is a fair answer. However, the hon. member was a Christian in 1977 and in 1981 before he fought an election. Then it was Christian. This evening, however, the hon. member states that it is un-Christian by implication, that this proportion is un-Christian. I want to ask the hon. member why it is that he endorsed an un-Christian creed by his own admission. The hon. member championed this from 1977 to 1981, and if the hon. member wants to be honest he must admit that he advocated an electoral college composed as envisaged in this clause. Is that not true?

Wait a moment.

No, but it is a fact. Surely the hon. member was present here on 12 April 1978 when the former hon. Prime Minister explained the position.

We shall reply to you on that score.

The hon. member for Jeppe need not shout so. I am speaking to the hon. member for Pietersburg. [Interjections.]

Order!

I asked the hon. member for Pietersburg: If it was Christian up to and including February 1982, whereas now it is un-Christian, then what has changed?

I shall reply.

According to your ruling, Mr. Chairman, only the appointment of the electoral college that has to appoint the President is at issue now. It was on that basis that the hon. member made the remarks he has in fact made. All I am asking the hon. member now is; What has happened to him in that case? What has happened? [Interjections.] The hon. member and his hon. colleagues in that party championed, within the NP, all those things that they are voting against now.

That is untrue.

Either the hon. member for Pietersburg went to sell this electoral college, as composed here, to the people in 1977 and 1981, or he did not. If he did not do so, he was disloyal to the former leader of the party. However, that is not what worries me. I wonder whether the hon. members realize what they have done to the voters who believed them when these things were announced. They must tell us what has become of the confidence of the people outside who believed these hon. members. Today we are saddled with people who were elected on the basis of things they told the voters while believing something else.

Like you, yes.

I now come to the hon. member for Berea. The hon. member wants to know whether I suggest that it is an expansion of democracy when people are given the right to participate although they be in minority numbers.

Always in the minority.

I say it is an expansion because the hon. member should not read one clause in isolation, and I submit that he is doing that deliberately. I have argued, and I should like to repeat the argument, that this Bill before us in its full context extends participation to other groups, and nobody can deny that.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.