Mr. Speaker, I give notice that I shall move on Monday—

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the notice of an instruction which the hon. member for Wynberg has read to the House as it seeks to empower the Committee of the whole House to effect amendments which are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

as Chairman, presented the First Report of the Select Committee on Rent Control.

Report and proceedings to be printed and considered.

Mr. Chairman, I move—

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the new clause as it is in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Clause 5:

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. the Minister a question I have already put to him during the Second Reading debate in connection with this clause. I admit that it was a very weighty and a very long debate and that the hon. the Minister could therefore not reply specifically to this question. The question deals with the substitution of section 32. It concerns the composition of the commandos and the fact that if one reads this together with clause 6—which deals with the repeal of section 45—this clause seeks to make the status of the commandos equivalent to that of the other two sections of the Defence Force. The question I asked in this regard was whether it was the policy of the Defence Force to establish permanent headquarters for commandos. At present we find that many of the commandos are being housed in temporary headquarters, such as hostels, leased from the province on a temporary basis. We in this party feel that the Defence Force must spell out clearly that it is its policy eventually to establish permanent headquarters so that the various branches of the Defence Force will be able to enjoy equal status in this regard as well.

I also pointed out that many local authorities and commandos are at present engaged in collecting funds for this purpose and that there are local authorities that have already done something about it in that they have donated land, and so on, to the commandos. I should just like to know from the hon. the Minister in what way the Defence Force is going to play its part, for example, in supplementing financial contributions from local communities, to assist the commandos in eventually establishing their own full-fledged headquarters accommodation.

In the second place, since the composition of the commandos is at issue here, I just want to ask the hon. the Minister whether this legislation will also be S.A. Defence Force legislation under the proposed new constitutional dispensation. According to the published document of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, the Department of Defence is classified as a common department. For that reason I must therefore take it that military service will also become compulsory in respect of the other sections of the population involved. This clause specifically concerns the composition of the commandos with regard to of ficers, etc., and I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether it will have to be possible for the three population groups to be accommodated together in the same commandos.

Mr. Chairman, as far as the proposed amendments to give the commandos and the Citizen Force equal status are concerned, the hon. member for Pietersburg said that he would like to know what the position was with regard to the provision of permanent headquarters for commandos. In the first place, I want to say that the provision of permanent headquarters for Citizen Force units and commandos takes place on exactly the same basis. Both enjoy equal status and are treated equally. The availability of Government buildings as headquarters—I am referring here to Government buildings controlled and administered by the S.A. Defence Force—actually depends on the availability of funds. What it amounts to, therefore, is that priorities are laid down to determine which Citizen Force headquarters and which commando headquarters, depending on the availability of money, can be accommodated in permanent structures, which are part of the buildings under the administration of the S.A. Defence Force. The hon. member made a very valid point in this connection. The hon. the Prime Minister addressed representations years ago already to other organizations within the areas of commandos—I am referring now in particular to the commandos—to see whether they could not assist in establishing permanent headquarters for the commandos. Certain local authorities made land available, money was collected and headquarters were built accordingly. I want to support those actions very strongly. I feel local authorities also have a certain responsibility with regard to the security of people in their area. I would be very glad if this matter could be publicized and brought to people’s attention, namely that we must encourage our local authorities to assist in making permanent accommodation available.

The second aspect concerns the constitution. Because many of the actions, activities and responsibilities of the South African Defence Force will very probably be classified as matters of common interest, the question was whether the other population groups in volved, namely the Coloureds and Asians, would also be administered in accordance with this legislation and whether the same situation would apply in respect of them. We shall have to wait until the new constitution comes into force. Only when it has been approved by Parliament can we determine what actions must result from it.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 7:

Mr. Chairman, on page 8, line 5, the words “Active Citizen Force Reserve” appear. I want to ask the hon. the Minister whether this term is not already out of date. In the past we referred to the “Active Citizen Force” and to the “Rifle Commando”. Nowadays, however, we refer to the “commandos” and to the “Citizen Force Reserve”. I am merely asking—it is not very important—whether the word “Active” should not be deleted.

Mr. Chairman, in the statutory amendments accepted by Parliament last year with regard to the new system of military service, it was provided that after a member of the Citizen Force had done his 14 years of service, he would be placed in an Active Citizen Force Reserve for five years. The old term for this was “reserve list”, a separate list or something of that sort. What this therefore implies is that for five years he will have no obligations, but he will have to be actively available to be called up as a reserve or to play a supplementary role if the manpower in the Defence Force is inadequate. At the moment, therefore, “Active Citizen Force Reserve” is still the correct term.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 8:

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of decisions of the exemption boards, the registering officer allots persons to various sections of the South African Defence Force to serve in certain categories. To date the registering officer allotted persons who belong and adhere to a recognized religious denomination in terms of the tenets of which its members may not participate in war, to a unit in which he would render service in a non-combatant capacity. In terms of the amending Bill before us, the officer shall now, after a decision by a board to be appointed in terms of the proposed section 72A, allot persons strictly according to the board’s classification. The Bill provides for three categories.

In the Second Reading we made out a case for classification to be made on grounds more extensive than those provided for in this Bill. We gave examples of civilized societies, such as ours, which, while they had and still may have, conscript systems for military service, provided or still do provide for a basis of objection to participation in any war, systems which over the years have been adapted or modified so as to provide for religious, moral and ethical beliefs in those societies. It is particularly worthy of note how, in modern times, the State and the courts of the United States have adapted their approach since the introduction of conscription during the American Civil War. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 in America laid down certain criteria for the State draft boards to grant non-combative status or alternative service on the grounds of conscientious objection. Special provision was made for that. In fact, section 6(j) basically stated that persons who, by reason of religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to participation in any war, shall not be required to participate in combative training and service. So one sees that there was a very definite limitation to religious training and belief which did not include essentially political, sociological, philosophical views or merely a personal moral code.

As we pointed out earlier in this debate, the Supreme Court in the United States then shifted the emphasis from the basis of the beliefs to the strength with which those beliefs were held. There were essentially three court cases which are today accepted as the watershed cases and which have set the bench-marks which most countries, which have the conscript system, adopt. We use the court cases in our deliberations to explain our philosophy regarding what we believe to be a clear, unambiguous basis for determining legitimate conscientious objection. Members on the other side of the House, time and time again, have said that if the limitation were not only that of religious grounds, it would be impossible to decide who was genuine or sincere and who was simply trying to evade his responsibilities. In terms of the findings of the American courts, we say that that is not a valid argument. It is, in fact, nonsense. It is a fact that a court—and a Supreme Court—in the United States found that what that side of the House claims is not the case. We therefore believe that the sincerity or the depth of a person’s moral, ethical or religious beliefs are testable in the United States. As I have said, the courts accepted the responsibility of doing so.

That is why we maintain that we are right and that the Government is wrong. During the Second Reading debate we put a case—and lodged a plea—for acceptance of the fact that there are people who, owing to deeply held moral, ethical or religious beliefs, find it irreconcilable with their conscience to serve in a combatant capacity in any armed forces or to perform any tasks in or in connection with any armed forces. Our plea was that such people should be entitled to perform non-combatant military service or a non-military form of national service. I therefore move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 8, in line 16, to omit “religious”;
2. (2) on page 8, in line 24, to omit “religious”;
3. (3) on page 8, in line 28, to omit “religious”;

In these amendments I put forward a case for accepting that objectors should be those who object on religious, moral and ethical grounds. With that in mind I have moved the deletion of certain words.

Order! I regret that I am unable to accept the amendments moved by the hon. member as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

Mr. Chairman, in his Second Reading speech and also in his reply to the second reading debate the hon. the Minister stated the standpoint of the Government very clearly. This is also laid down as a principle in this legislation. We know what it is. In this legislation we are only making provision for the person with a religious objection.

I now have a problem with the official Opposition, in the person of the chief spokesman of the official Opposition. To date they have yet to spell out to us exactly what their reason is for the arrangement they have suggested. It seems to me as if there is something they are not revealing. We set out our case very clearly and I expressly asked the hon. member for Wynberg to spell out to us what criteria or norms he would lay down to test the other objections. As far as religious objections are concerned, there is a body that can investigate that kind of objection. However, what criteria can we lay down to test other objections, of whatever nature? I remain convinced that these people are keeping us in the dark about something; are hiding something. It would seem to me that it is a question of people with subjective motives, people who want to get around the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: You have ruled the amendments of the hon. member for Wynberg out of order. Is the hon. member for Standerton then allowed to make a speech with reference to them?

I am listening carefully to what the hon. member for Standerton is saying. I will stop him when I think he is going outside the provisions contained in the clause. The hon. member for Standerton may proceed.

I myself am counting my words. The hon. member for Wynberg again pleaded this case, but we cannot accommodate it because we do not want to cause a deficiency in our Defence Force by means of legislation. We cannot hamstring the Defence Force and then say it must be a dynamic Defence Force. We simply cannot allow the Defence Force to falter. Here we have an arrangement by means of which we can accommodate bona fide religious objectors, and this side of the House supports this principle in the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Standerton raised the question how one could possibly deal with the concept of moral and ethical objectors. That is a valid question. He puts it on the basis that these are concepts which one cannot possibly define or identify in the beliefs of an individual. We have illustrated in the Second Reading debate that this is not a unique definition which here in South Africa we in the PFP are suddenly putting forward. Moral and ethical objections to military service are concepts which are applied in virtually every Western country. They are concepts which the Supreme Court in America dealt with in its judgement in the case of Welsh vs. the United States. The hon. member will know of that judgment.

That is only if you accept the concept of an unjust war.

The hon. member for Durban North now illustrates his complete ignorance of the decision in the American Supreme Court and I suggest that he should have a look at it.

In the event of a just war, on what can an ethical objection be based?

I suggest that the hon. member go back to the American case law. The position in America, for example, is that one of the ways in which the boards there test whether or not …

Order! I cannot allow another broad discussion on the principles of the Bill. The question before the Committee at the moment is clause 8, in terms of which the registering officer has certain duties to fulfil. Therefore a broad discussion on objection on religious grounds is not permissible now.

With respect, Mr. Chairman, I am attempting to answer the questions posed by the hon. member for Standerton. He suggested that we have not up to this stage attempted to indicate how we are going to define this concept.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, subsection (a) of clause 8 deals with boards to deal with religious objectors. The hon. member for Durban Central is dealing with religious objection and is, moreover replying to the hon. member for Standerton.

Yes, but this provision provides for a registering officer to allot to a unit people with religious objections. I do not think we should start discussing the whole principle of conscientious objectors again under this clause. The hon. member for Durban Central may proceed.

I then wish to conclude by indicating that one of the criteria that one uses in establishing whether the beliefs of an individual are intensely or deeply held is, for example, by establishing whether those views, be they religious, moral or ethical, are held with the same fervour as traditional religious convictions. This is one of the tests that one can apply in establishing whether they are genuine moral or ethical views. There are many other tests. Therefore I reject the suggestion that it is impossible to deal with moral and ethical concepts when dealing with conscientious objectors.

Mr. Chairman, I think we should get clarity on this. This clause provides for the registering officer to allocate people falling within the different categories of objectors. One of those categories is service in the normal course in a non-combatant capacity. Another category is serving, not in uniform, but still in a military unit. Still another is alternative service, i.e. community service. What I should like to get clarity on is the following. In applying for classification as an objector, does the official Opposition include under ethical and moral grounds the concept of a just or unjust war?

We have already answered that.

We have not had an answer. I want a clear answer. Does the official Opposition reject the concept of an unjust war as ground for “ethic or moral” objection? I want a clear answer to that. Does the official Opposition reject political grounds for moral and ethical objection? We must get clarity on what we are talking about. Does the official Opposition reject political grounds and does it accept the concept of unjust war? This is fundamental to the argument on other clauses of the Bill. All we get from them is that the court will determine the sincerity.

It has been ruled out of order; so we cannot discuss it.

It is not for the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North to control this debate. In determining the category would the official Opposition expect the nature of the objection to be taken into account in category 1, 2 or 3, and if so, will the official Opposition give us a clear answer to this question so that we can have it once and for all? Otherwise, does the official Opposition—and I should be delighted if one of them would answer this question—accept the concept of an unjust war as an ethical or moral objection?

We cannot debate that now. Do you not realize it?

Just give us a simple answer.

We cannot talk about it now. It would be out of order. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, they must just give us a simple answer, but they will not even do that. [Interjections.] They simply will not give us an answer. This is my real problem. [Interjections.] They will not give an answer. They will use nice terms, but we will not get an answer from them. We believe that only a person who tests his conscience by religious standards can really justify it. That is why we are opposed to the view of the official Opposition. We want to know what their alternative includes. This is the simple issue I am trying to establish. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, we are not very interested in the replies of other parties, for example the PFP. We are more interested in what is stated in the clause. In this clause provision is made for the establishment of a board for religious objectors. As we understand it, this refers exclusively to religious objectors, and it specifically excludes people with ethical and conscientious objections. This is the basis on which we support this clause.

Order! I just want to point out to hon. members that we are now discussing clause 8. No provision is made in clause 8 for the establishment of a board to deal with religious objectors. Clause 8 only concerns the registering officer who, after a board has classified the person concerned, shall allot him with due regard to the requirements of the Defence Force.

I am most certainly not going to allow any further discussion of the principle itself.

Mr. Chairman, so many questions are being asked over and over again. During the Second Reading debate, and again earlier today, when I moved my amendments, I referred to the basis of our objection, and also to the strength with which those beliefs must be held. We repeatedly referred to certain benchmarks which had been set in the USA, in which there was indeed a situation similar to this one, a situation in which boards were set up to perform a duty similar to that of the board which we are talking about in terms of this clause. Those boards had similar functions to this one.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you should grant me only this one opportunity of finally reading to the House the judgment of the court because it also sets out our point of view absolutely clearly.

Order! I shall allow the hon. member to quote that court judgment when we discuss clause 9. It has nothing to do with the provisions of clause 8.

Mr. Chairman, I shall do that then when we discuss clause 9.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper as follows—

The object of the amendments is to provide for a greater degree of fairness than at present. The greater fairness means that a national serviceman who belongs to a religious denomination not represented on the board, can have a theologian from his religious denomination co-opted to the board to assist the board in solving the problems surrounding the standpoint he puts to the board.

It is a fact that there must be stability in the composition of the board, and for that reason it is emphasized that the board shall be appointed for two years in order to promote such stability. It is a fact that certain compromises can be made if different boards have to pass judgment from time to time, and if there is a greater degree of stability in the board, such anomalies can be eliminated so that there will be uniformity.

We believe that the amendment will lead to greater effectiveness, greater satisfaction and greater fairness.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 10, in line 40, after “comply” to insert “in any material respect”;
2. (2) on page 16, in line 44, to omit “twice” and to substitute “one-and-a-half times”.

I am told that what my first amendment seeks to bring about, is not legally necessary and that a person who has had an application turned down because of an insignificant mistake could go to court and have the ruling upset. I feel, however, that it does no harm to put into the procedure for applications a provision that an immaterial omission, a weakness or something missing which does not affect the case at all should not have the effect that the application would not be considered. It should be considered so that the applicant would not be disqualified should be considered so that the applicant could be given the opportunity at the inquiry to correct whatever omission or minor error there might be.

The purpose of the first amendment is solely to avoid an unnecessary waste of time and administration in the sense that if an application comes before the board from which something insignificant is omitted, it need not be referred back to the applicant who would then have to apply ab initio. Although, as I say, the law might provide that an immaterial ommission should not disqualify an application and the applicant could go to court, we should bear in mind that here we do not deal with a legal procedure. This is not a trial; it is a hearing by a board to determine the sincerity of a person. He is not been tried and he will not be convicted. There is no penalty being imposed. The purpose is to inquire into the applicant’s personal views. I feel it should be made as simple as possible. Every opportunity should be given without unnecessary delay. It should not be necessary for the applicant to think in terms of having his application reviewed or his going to court. I therefore move that an immaterial error or omission should not disqualify an application.

My second amendment concerns category 3 objectors. This measure defines category 1 objectors as those who serve in uniform but without any weapons in a non-combatant capacity; category 2 objectors as those who serve in units but not in uniform, and category 3 objectors as those who do community service in lieu of military service. The Bill proposes that category 1 objectors, the non-combatants in uniform, serve the normal required time; that category 2 objectors should serve one-and-a-half times the required time and category 3 objectors twice the required period.

There is a significant difference between the service required in respect of category 2 and that required in respect of category 3. Category 2 people will be called up and will do one-and-a-half times the basic two-year period, i.e. three years. The balance of their service will be non-continuous and will consist of periodic camps spread over 12 years. They will therefore only be required to do one-and-a-half times the normal call-up period spread over the period for which the Citizen Force members are called up, which is another 12 years of camps. Category 3 objectors do their alternative community service in one continuous period. There is a tremendous difference between the burden placed on a person who has to serve a continuous period of eight years, as proposed in the Bill, and the burden placed on the person who has to serve an initial period of three years and then half as much more by way of camps spread over 12 years. My proposal is that those in category 3 who are required to serve a continuous period should not have to do twice as much, but the same, viz. one-and-a-half times the required service. I submit this to be a much heavier commitment than the one-and-a-half times served by those in category 2. Although ultimately the period they serve would be the same, the practical result of their commitment would be that six years’ continuous community service would be a greater imposition on them and a greater sacrifice than in the case of a person doing three years’ continuous service and then three years’ service over 12 years. I therefore do not equate the final period, just the total, but the actual burden which is placed on a person. I believe that a continuous period of six years is sufficient and constitutes a much greater deterrent than a period of one-and-a-half times the required time in respect of those in units but not in uniform. I also believe that it is sufficient alternative community service to compensate for the benefits of not being in the Army and of avoiding the danger of military service, the periods on the border, the discipline, the normal camp procedure, the physical burden of service, the training, the physical fitness requirements and all the other things which make life hard for a soldier and which he has to undergo. I think a period of six years is a fair compensation for the benefit one has gained through being able to live a normal civilian life sleeping between sheets and working regular hours. It is still a sufficient deterrent to them not to use this just as a “try on”. Although it may be considered illogical that the two categories have the same period, in practice it does not work out that way. The way it works out is that one is making a greater commitment by doing it in one period.

I have had representations, and we have considered them very seriously, that the community service should also be permitted to be done in an initial period followed by non-continuous periods over the years afterwards. We have looked at it very seriously, but we feel that one cannot have any large number of people placed in community service for short periods of time on an annual basis. One can put a person into a particular community service to serve, and then he will be slotted in and a position created for him in the institutional body in which he serves. But to serve for three years and then for 45 or 135 days a year after that, is going to disrupt the procedures of a civilian organization. I want to deal with this because of the approach which has been made to me. I looked at it very seriously, but I think it will be extremely difficult to administer the allocation of men on any scale to institutions or bodies for community service for short periods. It might be done for very short periods, but not for a period of, say, 45 days, which would be one-and-a-half times a 30-day camp or one-and-a-half times a 90-day camp. It would be too disruptive. We therefore do not support the concept of non-continuous periods in the category of community service. We think it must be done in one shot.

I will also move consequential amendments to other clauses to alter the penalties, etc. However, at this stage I will rest with the two amendments, which I have already moved.

Mr. Chairman, in certain respects we agree with the hon. member for Durban Point, in the sense that we have an amendment on the Order Paper under the name of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens, in terms of which we move that “one and a half” be substituted by “one and a quarter” and “two” substituted by “one and a half”. The difference is that we do not want continuous service. We want the person to serve his basic period of service according to a factor of one and a half after which he has to attend camps for 12 years. We feel this will have a less disruptive effect on his career. We therefore agree with the hon. member for Durban Point to a certain extent, although not totally.

The object of the sentence of extra time for an objector is to ascertain whether, and to give the objector an opportunity to prove that, he has integrity as far as his faith is concerned. That is the intention. We feel that if a person has already, if I may put it that way, been penalized by way of being sentenced for a period of time for his integrity and the seriousness of his convictions, one must accept this.

But it is not a sentence. It is compensatory service.

We believe that if an ordinary young man performs his national service in the Defence Force for four years—that is what that period of 14 years involves—and he is also prepared to do six years—this is already proof of his serious and convincing objections to military national service on the basis of his beliefs. I think one and a half and one and a quarter will be quite sufficient. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, at this stage I should like to move the amendments printed on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens, as follows—

1. (1) On page 16, in line 25, to omit “one-and-a-half” and to substitute “one-and-a-quarter”;
2. (2) on page 16, in line 44, to omit “twice” and to substitute “one-and-a-half times”;

Mr. Chairman, may I put a question to the hon. member?

No, I am not finished yet. [Interjections.] We are now dealing with the Committee Stage. That talkative hon. member who made so many interjections during the Second Reading will get a chance to blow his own trumpet in a moment. [Interjections.] There is still plenty of time in the Committee Stage for him to put his case. He need therefore not be so insistent with his questions now. He can make his own speech. [Interjections.] We support the basic proposal, while taking into account, however, the amendments of the hon. member fur Durban-Point.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 8, in line 54, to omit “who” and to substitute:
   two assessors who shall be legally qualified persons and all of whom
2. (2) on page 8, in lines 57 to 62, and on page 10, in lines 1 to 3, to omit paragraphs (b) and (c);
3. (3) on page 10, in line 5, after “alternate” to insert:
   who shall be a legally qualified person
4. (4) on page 10, in line 10, to omit all the words after the first “of” up to and including “vote” in line 13 and to substitute:
   three members or their alternates

These amendments are again different to the amendments already referred to. This amendment relates to the composition of the board. As provided for in the Bill at present, the board will consist of a judge or acting judge with three theologians plus two members of the Defence Force, one of whom will be a chaplain. It is clear, from these provisions, that the board will be dominated by theologians or individuals with a religious training. At the same time one knows that the very concept of religious objection or conscientious objection is a very controversial one, even amongst the churches themselves, in that different views are held by the Christian churches about the validity of those concepts.

Let me just refer to some of the attitudes of the churches in order to indicate how different their approaches are. I shall be doing that in order to suggest, later on, that one cannot possibly have a board which would, in an impartial way, assess the views and feelings of any person appearing before that board if it is dominated by theologians. Why do I say that? I say that because each theologian has been brought up in the tradition of his particular church and obviously believes in the particular tenets of his church. One must obviously also assume that he will remain true to those tenets of his church. One knows that the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk has expressed its views in the booklet Geloofsbesware teen Diensplig which came out in 1980. In that publication it indicates that it does not really see the Christian religion as accommodating pacifists. It was suggested, by reports in the Press, that its acceptance of the concept of religious objectors was, in reality merely a gesture towards the other churches, a concession. One knows that the Anglican Church, for example, adopts a completely different attitude towards conscientious objection, as referred to during the Second Reading debate. It wants objector status also to be given to ethical and moral objectors. The hon. member for Randfontein, for example, said in the Second Reading debate that in his view there is no justification for objectors, for pacifists, in his religion. The different members of the board will move within the teachings of their particular church. They will not be objective.

What we are suggesting with this amendment is that the board should consist of a judge and two assessors. Why do we suggest that? We do so because they, far more than theologians, in my view, are trained to deal with, and have experience in, the question of assessing the bona fides and the views of an individual who appears before them. [Interjections.] This is not necessarily the view only of people outside the churches. The churches themselves suggest that. What I mean by that is that they suggest that a board consisting of theologians cannot possibly deal with it objectively. It is not an odd suggestion of mine that …

Where are you preaching this Sunday? I want to come and listen to you.

The Presbyterian Church of South Africa and the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa have, for example, suggested that a board like that cannot possibly objectively deal with an individual who appears before it because the minds of those theologians will be dominated subjectively by their particular religious beliefs. Those two churches suggest and indicate, for example, that theologians would be useful in determining the actual belief of the objector and its relationship to Scripture where he is a religious person, but they say that they are not experts in assessing a person’s sincerity. That is why we suggest that legally trained people are better qualified to assess a person’s sincerity. The theologians will be able to assess whether or not the objector’s views correspond with particular religious tenets or views. The laughter on the other side of the House at this suggestion is therefore not justified at all, seeing that some churches themselves put forward that suggestion in regard to the composition of the board.

Do you believe that a Supreme Court Judge cannot exercise objectivity?

Order!

A Supreme Court Judge has years of training behind him without being bound to a particular religion as regards his views and without being tied up with the Defence Force for example. He is therefore obviously in a better position to make an assessment in this regard. [Interjections.]

On the board will also be two members representing the Defence Force, one being a chaplain. I suggest that the presence of Defence Force personnel on the board will basically have the effect of those people standing in judgment for their own cause, really. One cannot possibly expect, and it would be unfair to expect, of the personnel of the Defence Force that they should not have a bias towards their cause, towards the Defence Force as such.

That is an insult.

I am not suggesting a malafide one, not at all; but inherently, if one is employed by and works for the Defence Force, one will obviously be biased towards the views of the Defence Force. Therefore, again, I do not think it will be proper, or will assist in a proper hearing, if Defence Force personnel are to serve on the board. The composition of the board is crucial. We have faith in our judiciary and I submit that the public will have more faith in a board which consists of a judge and assessors than in this board which can be seen as one being loaded against an applicant if he comes from a particular religion which is in favour of conscientious objection.

Mr. Chairman, I should like briefly to follow on what the hon. member for Durban Central has said relating to the composition of these boards and I should like to support his plea that these boards should be comprised of a judge and two assessors, rather than of theologians. I note that the amendment of the hon. member for Parys is aimed at broadening the issue a little by suggesting that the denomination of a particular applicant in particular circumstances should be represented. If the clause goes through in its present form or even in the amended form as proposed by the hon. member for Parys, what is the hon. the Minister’s attitude going to be to those churches who have made the strongest representations in opposition to this Bill? Is he going to be prejudiced in any way? I am talking here about the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church and the Presbyterian Church, churches which, I am told, have indicated to the hon. the Minister in the clearest possible terms that if the Bill goes through in its present form it will mean a continuation of the dispute between the State and the Church in South Africa. These are representations made to the hon. the Minister objecting strongly to the total inadequacy of the narrow confines of the legislation now before the House. Those churches have strong views and they have indicated that they are going to continue to express those views as time goes along. As the punitive aspects of this Bill are enforced, there is going to be a continuation of the dispute between the S.A. Defence Force, in other words the State, and the churches concerned. These churches have the largest membership certainly amongst the English-speaking community of South Africa. I want the hon. the Minister to deal specifically with that. During the course of the debate the hon. the Minister has told us something of the representations which he has received from these churches and the objections which they have lodged.

Having said that, I want to come now to the amendments which stand in my name on the Order Paper. The first amendment relates to the provision in the clause that the application of a minor will have to be supported also by his parent or guardian. To them I move as an amendment—

I notice that an identical amendment is to be moved by the hon. member for Sasolburg. I have moved this because I believe that there may well be situations where there might be a conflict between the 17 year old, or whatever his age is, i.e. the minor, and his parents. I think in a matter of this kind, which affects the individual who is going to be directly involved in this, the application should be made by that person alone. I do not believe in these circumstances that he should be obliged to have the support of his parent or guardian. That is my reason for moving amendment number one which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

Then the paragraph relating to the hearing and the type of application that has to be made states that the application “shall state the books of revelation and the articles of faith upon which the religious conviction of the applicant are based.” I believe in these circumstances the simpler the issue is made for the young man who is making the application, the better it will be. I do not believe there is need in this sort of application to complicate the issue by suggesting that a young man who is making this sort of application should have to state books of revelation and the articles of faith on which his application is based. In any event, in terms of the previous paragraph (c) he is already quite obviously obliged to state the grounds upon which his application is made. I think to include paragraph (d) in addition to that complicates the issue as far as the applicant is concerned. So I accordingly move—

Then, further oh in paragraph (e) reference is made that the application should be accompanied by affidavits from those whom he intends to call as witnesses. Again, in the interests of simplification, I believe that this should simply not be a sworn affidavit because those people are going to give evidence in any case as witnesses and will give evidence presumably under oath. I believe it would be far simpler if we made provision for “statements”, if that is what is required, a statement by the person who is going to give evidence in support of the application. For that reason I move as an amendment—

A consequential amendment to this is my amendment number four, which I now move as follows—

I do not think that the witness should be prejudiced by making him sign an affidavit or by making him give a statement before he gives verbal evidence before the board.

My next amendment relates to applications that do not comply in every respect with the previous paragraph of the clause. I believe here it should be in the discretion of the board to decide whether an application has got to be totally rejected or whether it can still be considered even although it does not strictly comply with the provisions of the previous paragraph. I think that should be in the discretion of the board and I accordingly move as an amendment—

Equally, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the following amendment is consequential upon amendment No. 5 moved by me, which again allows for a discretion in cases of this kind. I therefore now move the sixth amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

I also move the seventh amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This amendment relates to the period of time within which an application should be made. At present the clause stipulates that the application should be made within 14 days of the individual being notified of the need to render service or of his being called up. I believe that restricts it too much. I believe it would be fairer to extend that period, and therefore I propose a period of 30 days. I submit that 14 days is too short a period, and I believe the individual should have a longer period within which to submit his application.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I move the eighth amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

This amendment relates to the situation of a serviceman who is already doing active service, and who wants to make an application in terms of this provision. It is provided here that it should be made to his commanding officer. Again, I believe, there might well be a situation in which that individual might be afraid or might be put off in some other manner. His commanding officer might not be all that sympathetic to an application of this kind. Attempts might be made to dissuade the applicant from pursuing the application. Therefore I believe an alternative should be allowed so that that individual could submit his application to another senior officer in the services. In my amendment I suggest an officer of the rank of brigadier or of a higher rank in the services. This again, I believe, would be to the advantage of the applicant. He would now be quite sure that even if there were opposition from his own commanding officer he would have access to another senior officer in the Defence Force.

I therefore ask the hon. the Minister to give consideration to these amendments moved by me.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I move the four amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 10, in lines 26 and 27, to omit “and, if he is a minor, also by his parent or guardian”;
2. (2) on page 10, in line 68, and on page 12, in line 1, to omit, “but such applicant shall continue to render service or undergo training”;
3. (3) on page 12, in lines 3 to 6, to omit paragraph (c) and to substitute:
   1. (c) The board shall consider and decide upon the application as soon as possible after receipt thereof.
4. (4) on page 12, in line 9, after “on” to insert “facts and”.

As far as my first amendment is concerned, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me as if there is actually something on which the hon. members of the official Opposition and I are agreed as far as this clause is concerned. I should also just like to motivate my amendment briefly. As far as I am concerned there is both a practical and a philosophical motivation for this.

For example when such a young man receives his call-up papers, he may be alone at home. His parents may even be overseas. It may therefore be difficult or even impossible for him to apply to the board within the prescribed period. For that reason I feel it is necessary for us to delete this specific provision in the clause.

However, as I have already mentioned, there is also a philosophical motivation for this. A man who is old enough to lay down his life in war or while doing border duty for his country, is surely also old enough to decide for himself whether he wants to apply to be categorized in terms of this specific legislation. For that reason we feel it is necessary for this clause to be amended and for the decision whether he wants to be categorized or not, to be left solely to an 18 year old.

As far as my second amendment is concerned I want to point out that what is actually at issue here is a duplication of exactly the same idea as matters stand now. We came to the conclusion that the average person undergoing military service, as well as the official Opposition, are intelligent enough to know that if one’s military service is not suspended by one’s application this will mean that one must continue with military service. As I mentioned, this is actually a duplication of exactly the same idea, which makes the clause unnecessarily long and clumsy. That is why I am moving my amendment, because this will definitely make it more administratively meaningful.

I should also like to refer briefly to the hon. member for Durban Central, Mr. Chairman. He stated here that only legally qualified persons and not theologians should serve on this specific board. But what is at issue here is the actual spiritual concepts or convictions of a person. I really do not believe it is logical to say that legally qualified persons would have a better understanding of a person’s spiritual needs, his views and his convictions than the trained theologian could have. I do not believe this argument holds water, Mr. Chairman.

If the hon. member had argued that there were many theologians who had such a distorted view of the S.A. Defence Force and its activities that they could never judge objectively, I would have agreed with him. After all, one cannot expect theologians who compare the S.A. Defence Force to a brothel, as certain members of the S.A. Council of Churches have in fact done, form an objective judgment of a man’s objections to performing military service ever to be able to.

While I am on my feet, I should like to comment on amendment 2 of the hon. member for Berea that on page 10, in lines 33 to 35, paragraph (d) be omitted. I find that entirely symptomatic of the entire approach of those hon. members. They want us also to accept conscientious objections, too, whereas they know that there are no criteria in terms of which these people can be judged and checked. They want the criteria against which religious objections can be measured, because that is the case, to be removed from the legislation, probably to lend further support to the arguments they will advance in the future to the effect that conscientious objectors must also be accepted. I do not think this can be at all acceptable to this side of the House, but the hon. the Minister will probably reply to this.

There is also a further amendment moved by the hon. member I should also like to comment on briefly, namely the concept that affidavits of witnesses that must be included in these applications, need not be sworn. This is a serious matter we are dealing with. We are prepared to give people who have religious objections a better deal in future, but we also know that there can be many abuses or attempts at abuses in this connection. This side of the House does not want people to submit affidavits and then later, when they have to give evidence before the commission in respect of such affidavits, do an about-turn and in that way use the activities of this board to achieve their own political objectives.

For that reason we also want these affidavits to be sworn affidavits so that a person can be charged with statutory perjury if it later appears that he made a false affidavit in this particular regard. I do not think we must treat this matter lightly. This side of the House is very serious about this entire matter in so far as we are indeed prepared to meet religious objectors halfway. However, we are certainly not prepared to leave loopholes that would be misused by mischievous or wilful persons. I am convinced that this proposal is totally unacceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly agree with the statement by the hon. member for Sasolburg that this matter of religious objectors is a very serious one and that we must all take it seriously.

As far as the boards for religious objection are concerned, I wish to cross swords a little with my friend, the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North. We do not see these boards as courts. We see these boards as an informal fraternal discussion among a judge, four theologians and a soldier, a meeting which, in pleasant conditions, holds a fraternal discussion with a religious objector. As far as this is concerned, we are also in favour of there not being assessors in the ordinary judicial sense of the word. I could perhaps put this question: What in fact is an assessor? An assessor is a person who assists a judge, but in that case the four theologians as well as the soldier could in a certain sense be seen as assessors. We do not want legal experts there; we want theologians there, because this is a purely theological matter.

Assessors are normally legally trained.

That is correct, Sir, but the point is that in this case we are not concerned with a judicial matter but with a religious matter. That is why we are satisfied that theologians may act as assessors in such a case.

We have problems with the concern of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North that the soldier is going to be prejudiced. We think that if the Chaplain-General of the Defence Force appoints a person to serve on this board, the integrity of such a person will be beyond all doubt. As far as we are concerned we believe that he will not be prejudiced.

In my Second Reading speech I raised the matter of the judge. I asked the hon. the Minister whether this would include an acting judge, but apparently an acting judge has the same status as a judge, and he may therefore ignore that point.

We still have the practical problem in connection with the theologians. We wonder how they are going to be selected. We should like to know which theologians they will be, what their religious denominations will be …

Why is that of importance?

I shall tell the hon. member why it is of importance. If, for example, an objector belongs to the Apostolic Church, will it be a consideration that one of the chaplains should be an Apostolic, or if the religious objector is a Methodist, that one of the theologians should also be a Methodist?

The hon. member therefore admits that they can be subjective?

I wonder whether one can ever get away from subjectivity completely in any situation.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether he agrees that although one can never get away from subjectivity completely in this life, one must try to get away from it as far as is humanly possible?

I agree.

And that is why one would want to use legal experts.

The hon. member has a good point and I agree with it. One must try to move as far away as possible from subjectivity in such cases. I also believe that the judge, owing to his legal background and inherent independence, will try to maintain the greatest degree of objectivity.

I now come to the matter of cases that have been partially heard. I mentioned an example in this connection. Let us suppose the board sits with five members and after progress has been made with the case, one of the members dies. Will the alternate member merely be present while the rest of the case is heard, or will the entire case have to heard again?

There is also the question of legal assistance. Here I am referring to the proposed section 72B(2)(a) that provides that the application must be in writing and that the applicant must write it himself. By this we do not understand that if he must do so himself in writing, this includes only his own handwriting and excludes that of his legal adviser. We believe that at this stage he can make use of legal assistance.

With regard to the question of secrecy we asked why the hon. the Minister was of the opinion that the procedure should be kept secret. Is it because it concerns an extremely personal matter? Why must it be kept secret.

Why can it not be made public?

As far as the proposed section 72D is concerned, we have a problem as regards the word “vexatiously”. What we have in our gunsights is the “chancer” who pretends to be a religious objector. Because of him a great deal of trouble must be taken and money and time are wasted as a result. The board eventually comes to the conclusion that the applicant is a chancer. We feel that such a chancer should pay the costs.

In connection with the same proposed section there is also the matter of the enemy. The question is how the board will set about solving this problem of ascertaining who the “enemy” is.

As far as the proposed section 72E is concerned, I am particularly concerned about the man in category 1. His period of service is not loaded. We prefer to use the word “loading”. Although his period of service is not loaded, he enjoys the benefit of escaping the operational risk. We just wondered if he should not do one and a quarter. On the other hand we feel a little sorry for him because he is at least there; he does wear a uniform. He is a bonafide soldier except that he does not wish to fight. Perhaps I am sticking my neck out by wondering whether he should be totally deprived of any rank. If he spends a period in uniform peeling potatoes, could he not become the corporal of the potato peelers?

As far as the proposed section 72E(5) is concerned, I move the following amendments—

1. (1) On page 18, in line 10, after “rendered” to insert:
   as ordered by the Minister of Manpower or an officer authorized thereto by him
2. (2) on page 18, in lines 16 and 17, to omit “the Minister of Manpower or an officer authorized thereto by him” and to substitute:
   that Minister or officer: Provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained the rendering of community service in any such post may be ordered

The problem we foresee here is that basically there are two elements. There is a religious objector who must now perform community service, and on the other hand there is a post available for him somewhere in community service, but the problem we foresee is that there may be a link missing. This link is the express authorization for the Minister of Manpower to in fact recommend a religious objector to any such post. The motivation for this is that it gives rise to a risk that this system may be manipulated by religious objectors. It may, for example, happen that a religious objector happens to be performing community services already. A religious objector may occupy a senior post in the Public Service and the Minister may not have the express authorization to transfer him to another post. This person therefore retains his senior post in the Public Service and he merely continues doing his own work. In fact, therefore, he will not be undergoing service in terms of the intentions of this clause. We therefore move the amendment, because it prevents the system being manipulated and it leads to absolute certainty as to the precise intention of the legislature.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 12, in lines 32 and 33, to omit “, subject to the provisions of section 72D(l)(c)”;
2. (2) on page 12, in lines 36 to 38, to omit subsection (3) and to substitute:
   1. (3) The procedure to be followed in respect of proceedings before the board shall be as prescribed.
3. (3) on page 12, in lines 41 and 42, to omit subsection (5);
4. (4) on page 12, in lines 43 to 51, to omit subsection (6);
5. (5) on page 14, in line 7, to omit all the words after “application” up to and including “application” in line 23;
6. (6) on page 14, in lines 50 to 72, and on page 16, in lines 1 to 4, to omit subsection (4);
7. (7) on page 18, in line 43, after “and” to insert:
   the first two years of

I shall deal briefly with each of these amendments seriatim. The first amendment relates to the fifth amendment I am moving, which I shall come to in due course. The second amendment relates to amendments to clause 11 that I am moving and which I shall also deal with later on. The third amendment will result in the council’s proceedings being open, and I believe that everybody in this House will agree with it. The fourth amendment is consequential to the third amendment. I think the House will agree that the fifth amendment will count in favour of the applicant and that the cost aspect would then be deleted from the Act. The reason for the sixth amendment is that, because it is not a legal body or a trial court, the board will not necessarily be competent to determine on legal grounds when a person is an enemy of the State. I believe that this amendment is consequential and therefore necessary. At present the Act states that any service rendered as community service shall not be taken into account for the purposes of seniority, promotion or remuneration. The idea behind the seventh amendment is that only the first two years should not count as such and that the rest would then in fact count as such.

I want to turn to the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North and point out to him in a friendly spirit that the legislation deals with religious objectors and not objectors on the basis of belief. The hon. member speaks of objectors on the basis of belief in the same context as religious objectors. That is not correct. If the hon. member speaks of objectors on the basis of belief, he must give us a definition of a “objector on the basis of belief”. I still do not believe that a single hon. member on that side of the House can define it. We must not have this kind of woolly talk. When we speak, we must speak in terms of concrete concepts. That is the first point.

Secondly, I should like to point out to the hon. member in a friendly spirit that no one is being penalized here. The hon. member said that people were being penalized by way of extra service.

They are being burdened.

We could rather call it compensatory or substitutive service. That is what it really is. It is not a penalty or a burden but substitutive service which the religious objector in fact chooses himself when he places himself in one of those categories.

†I should now like to turn to the hon. member for Durban Central. I see the hon. member is not here at the moment. He referred to theologians as if they had a warped concept of justice and impartiality.

He never said that.

Of course, by necessary implication he said that. He also said that they would be judges in their own cause, which I think is an uncalled for slur on the theologians’ integrity. I will go further. I am also legally trained and I happen to be a confessing Christian, but that does not mean that I cannot be objective when matters of law come before me, or even matters of theology. Simply because a man is a lawyer or a judge does not make him a complete stranger to theology. He also has his own convictions.

The board will consist of theologians. It is not a case that there will be only one minister of religion. As a matter of fact, there will be four theologians. There could even be five, in terms of the amendments on the Order Paper. We have a think tank here that can certainly come to a conclusion as to what is a religious objector. I would go further and say that they are better equipped, by definition, than legal people are to define what is religion.

*We are concerned with religion here. During the Second Reading of this Bill I spelt out very clearly the criteria for determining religion. Religion is a definable concept. However, morality and ethics are not definable. At a later stage, however, I should like to speak about the judgments of the court in America. If the hon. member for Wynberg raises the matter again, I should like to speak about it. Since at this stage he has not yet raised it, I shall not go into it now.

†I should like to turn to the hon. member for Berea. The hon. member said that the articles of faith should not be stipulated in a document. The proposed section 72B(2)(d) reads as follows—

Surely that is a practical aspect, because obviously, during the board sessions, he would be asked about these things. He would be asked, for example, what his books of revelation are and where they are to be found, and also what his articles of faith are. I think this is a practical way of informing the board beforehand so that the board members can investigate, read up and study the relevant articles of faith, and this from a purely practical point of view. So I think it is very necessary, from such a purely practical point of view, that this should be incorporated, as it is incorporated here.

However, the hon. member also referred to clause 72B(2)(e), stating that an application should include affidavits. The argument put forward was that since the witnesses would, in any event, be giving evidence under oath, there would be no reason for affidavits at that stage. The hon. member, as a practising lawyer, well knows that in motion proceedings in court—although this is not a court—affidavits are required, after which matters can then be referred in this regard to evidence. It is a normal procedure which happens every day. So there is no earthly reason why there should be any objection to this aspect here.

Do you really expect a boy of 17 to know all the rules of legal procedure? [Interjections.]

If a man is old enough, if he is mature enough to have strong religious convictions, certainly he must base them on something, and surely he would then know where to find the source on which he bases those convictions. Surely he would then be prepared to submit an affidavit. The point I am trying to make here is that this is nothing strange in relation to existing procedure today. In fact, it is in conformity with existing procedure. I therefore really cannot agree to the hon. member’s proposition or his arguments.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of debate on a number of issues, and I should like to comment on only some of them very briefly because I think that some of them have already been replied to.

Firstly let me deal with the reference to theologians as against assessors serving on the board. I did not hear my colleague disparage theologians in any way, or cast a slur on any of them.

Then you were not listening to him.

As one who has been a theologian for more years than I care to remember, I think I can say with some authority that if one really wants to get a good row going, one only has to get a bunch of theologians together. I think the hon. member who has just sat down will concede that. [Interjections.] This does not only apply to the contemporary scene. It has been true throughout the centuries. It is a fact of life. The very fact that we have so many denominations suggests that there are very strong differences of opinion. What we are seeking to do is not to disparage theologians, but to find out who the people are who are best equipped to make a decision which is a very important decision. The assessors themselves may well be religious people, but they would have been trained to set aside that subjectivity, whereas the theologians are there on the basis of their subjective commitment. [Interjections.] There is a very big difference.

So you should not be taking part in this debate.

No … [Interjections.]

You are not objective.

I am also trained, both legally and philosophically, so I can deal with that hon. member who knows nothing about the subject and reveals it every time he opens his mouth. I have no problems there. [Interjections.] One of the reasons why we wanted this Bill referred to a Select Committee is that then one could talk seriously without trying to score cheap points. The hon. member who has just sat down, as a lawyer, as someone who is trained himself, must surely concede …

He is also a surveyor.

… as the hon. member from the CP immediately conceded, that a man who is trained in law is trained to set aside, as far as is humanly possible, his subjectivity. He stresses the objectivity. I want to place on record that there are theologians—and many of them, who have often been criticized by hon. members on that side of the House—who have very strong views on this very subject. Therefore their approach is going to be a loaded one. That is not casting a slur on them. I am saying that by virtue of their very strong convictions they are going to find it very difficult indeed.

The hon. member for Randfontein, I think it was, made the point that in the Dutch Reformed Church, for example—these are more or less his own words—there is not a very strong tradition of conscientious objection. In certain other churches, on the other hand, there is a very strong conviction in this field. Of course one is going to have two different people approaching this from very different points of view. So, without belabouring the point, I want to say that on merit…

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

Mr. Chairman, let me make our attitude towards that hon. member quite clear: He has not had the courage to participate in this debate.

Have you?

Yes, I am participating, you mug! What do you think I am doing now?

Order! The hon. member must withdraw the word “mug”.

I withdraw the “mug”, Sir. [Interjections.]

That word is unchurchly.

Yes, it is based on a very good interpretation of the Dead Sea Scrolls, where they discovered lots of mugs and other things. However, I withdraw it unconditionally.

I want to refer to the major question which has been put by many members of the NRP and the PFP. It concerns our attitude as to why we want to broaden this whole issue. I think they have every right to put that question, because that concerns the major point we have been trying to make. Since 1963, in this country at least, major churches—I name them: Anglican, Methodist …

Their synods, but not their members.

All right, their synods, but that is how they must make decisions. The hon. member might want to have a referendum amongst Whites only—I do not know. Anyway, this is the situation.

This Bill is concerned with military service for Whites only.

The same theologians who are now thought to be so important and so objective, the theologians of the Anglican Church, the Methodist Church, the United Congregational Church, the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic Church, based on their own traditions, their own articles of faith, have asked since 1963, at least in this country, that conscientious objection should not only be seen in terms of religious grounds. This is therefore not a question of the PFP hiding behind something.

Of course it is.

As far as the just and the unjust war is concerned …

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether in the same document in which originally, in 1963, that was the approach, it also specifies that the churches accept the concept of the just war and that that is associated with the question of conscientious objection?

Yes, the hon. member is quite right. All major churches, including the Dutch Reformed Church, have a tradition of the just-war doctrine. That is there.

Do you support that?

No, I do not. That is a point which we have made time and time again. [Interjections.]

You never did.

Yes, we have. We have stated that our grounds are religious, moral and ethical and we have never stood up and defended the just-or-unjust-war concept. The reason is that the doctrine as enunciated by St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, would not today be accepted by many of the people of his own denomination. Times have changed. The just-and-the-unjust-war theory, which has been debated since Augustine right until today, has in the course of time been approached in many different ways.

What do you believe it to be?

I believe that all wars are unjust. [Interjections.] That is right, Sir. How can one describe the mass killing of people as something that is just?

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, sit down. That is why the churches have differed so strongly on their understanding of a just and an unjust war. There are those who say at a particular time in history that this war is just and that one is not. That is why we have deliberately avoided even discussing this point. [Interjections.] The churches themselves are unable to agree on this very important principle, a principle which has existed since long before this House came into being and long after us there will still be this debate. What we are arguing for is that allowance ought to be made on religious, moral and ethical grounds.

Does “moral ground” exclude defence?

Of course! One can debate this, Mr. Chairman, and if you would give me the time I could teach these people so that we could then really have a decent debate. But they are totally untrained in this area. It would take me at least 12 hours. Let us look at the confusion that exists in this debate. If I were to ask the members of the NRP, for example, what their definition of “pacificism” is, I wonder what it would be. [Interjections.] Let me say what it does not mean. It does not mean killing people.

Does it not?

No, it does not mean that. To be a pacifist means that you are a resister.

In due course I shall give you my definition of a pacifist.

That hon. member has already given it. I shall quote from his speech where he said he is a true pacifist as far as war is concerned.

Defence, not attack.

How can one distinguish in any war between defence and attack? For heaven’s sake, speak to the hon. member for Durban Point … [Interjections.]

Order!

A true pacifist means, according to the definition in my dictionary and according to any understanding of religious ethic and doctrine, one who is not prepared to participate in a military war, defence or attack. That is a pacifist. And that hon. member says he is a pacifist. [Time expired.]

That is your definition.

Mr. Chairman, my bench-mate often says that there is no one more intolerant than I in that I gave up smoking 15 years ago and am intolerant of anybody that smokes, but I think the most intolerant person of all is the person who stands up and starts to pontificate and claim that he is the true theologian, the only person who really knows what he is talking about.

I know a lot more than you do.

I intend moving the amendments standing in my name with the exception of No. (3) which I wish to amend slightly. Firstly, however, I should like to refer to line 42 on page 12. We are dealing here with what I believe to be a very emotional issue in that it is suggested that the proceedings of this board “shall take place behind closed doors”. Everybody is having a lot to say about this particular angle. I regret to say that the message is being put out that this is a secret tribunal. Sir, this is not a trial. Therefore I would make a very sincere appeal to the media in South Africa to please put this right so that the people can be given the true facts. This is not a trial; it is an examination. The man is not standing there on trial. I say this because one only has to refer to last night’s Argus to find a long tirade from a Mr. Anton Richman, the president of the SRC at the University of Cape Town, who in addressing a meeting at the Congregational Hall at Rondebosch talked about the “invasion” of Angola in 1975, many “bloody incursions” into neighbouring States, widespread allegations of “torture and atrocities”, and he goes on to give facts of police and Army roadblocks, i.e. 633 of them during the years 1979 to 1981.

He then goes on to criticize the provision of the Bill in terms of which objectors would be tried by secret tribunal. This, I submit, is not the case. He goes on to say that this attacks the fundamental democratic principle that a fair trial needs a public hearing, and also says it is an attempt to ensure that the S.A. Defence Force is above criticism by silencing opposing views.

Mr. Chairman, I make my appeal now to the hon. the Minister. Let us now put this ghost to rest for ever and a day. Let us not allow anybody to attack the S.A. Defence Force even by suggesting that the S.A. Defence Force wants to silence criticism or silence opposing views. Therefore I move the first amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

Religion is a very private thing. I hope that I can talk now with the hon. member for Pinelands. Religion may be public, but to many an individual it is a private thing. Because of that, I believe that this hearing should be conducted behind closed doors. However, in order to establish the bona fides—if one can put it in that way—the applicant should have the right, if he so desires, to have it all exposed. Have it open, and then nobody can criticize the S.A. Defence Force, and nobody can have another word to say about secret trails or secret tribunals. One might find that the chairman of that board may feel that he wants this hearing open, and I believe that if he wants it to be open he has the right to open it only as long as the applicant agrees that it should be open. Let us allow this right.

I know there are other amendments too. The hon. member for Pretoria West has an amendment on the Order Paper. I am sorry we cannot agree with him. I think the hon. member for Bezuidenhout will be moving an amendment in which he will state that the chairman may close a meeting if he believes that evidence or arguments are going to be considered that may jeopardize the security of the State. That is a very noble thought. However, if a man is stating his religious beliefs I want to ask whether it is possible for him to say anything that will jeopardize the security of the State. Surely if this man is there for the sole purpose of proving what his religious beliefs are, and what he thinks he should do with his life because of his religious beliefs, and if he then deviates from that, it is surely the right of the chairman to say, as you would, Mr. Chairman, that he should come back to the matter under discussion; that he should come back to the issue.

I do not want to spend more time on that.

I want to move the other amendments printed in my name. The second amendment, however, leads into my third amendment. I have altered this one slightly, and I accordingly move as an amendment—

I move this amendment in order that it should be consequential upon the amendment moved earlier by the hon. member for Durban Point. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we have to debate this at any great length. Something which I detected during Second Reading, and which I feel strongly about, is that this money clause—if I might call it that—which contains the idea that one can buy one’s way out of doing penance, is abhorrent to all. This is something of which no hon. member, I believe, on any side of the House is really enamoured. I believe we will be doing better by bringing in the amendment I have just moved. That will merely bring it in line with the amendment moved earlier by the hon. member for Durban Point.

I would suggest that my other amendments from (4) to (14) are all consequential and I do not think that anything can be achieved by my speaking at any length in respect of any of them because they all flow from amendment number (3) that I have moved. However, I do sincerely believe that we can only improve this Bill if my amendments numbers (2) to (14) are accepted. I sincerely hope therefore that the hon. the Minister will see his way clear to accepting them.

To revert to my first amendment, we obviously have a situation here in this House where there are three points of view. The hon. member for Pretoria West has moved an amendment to the effect that this should not be a secret trial but I believe that it will obviously now come under the Commissions Act. This will mean that the chairman can close the door. The hon. member for Bezuidenhout who has not yet moved his amendment but will no doubt in due course do so, has a very good amendment. He says that the hearing can be open at the request of the applicant and he then goes on to suggest that the chairman could close the door if he felt that the security of the State was in jeopardy. I must say again, however, that I do not think that a man representing a religious argument can ever divulge any information that could endanger the security of our State. I sincerely do not believe that. I wish to appeal once more to the hon. the Minister to give very, very sincere consideration to laying to rest all these bogeys once and for all so that we can go away from here and tell the outside world that the inquiry will be a closed one but that the right to open it, the right to have the whole world there to hear the applicant’s point of view lies with the applicant. Even if the chairman says that he would like the inquiry to be open, the applicant has to concur so that the whole matter can be made public. I sincerely think that every single person who is sincere will go into such an inquiry and say that he would prefer that the inquiry be a closed one because it is personal to him. He will say: I elect to be heard by you with, if possible—and we shall move an amendment in this regard later on—my religious adviser, my own padre with me to assist me. I would choose that course.

Mr. Chairman, I now move the following amendments—

1. (3) On page 16, in lines 50 to 64, to omit paragraph (b) and to substitute:
   (b) rendering service in terms of any other provision of this Act, render community service which shall be completed during a single continuous period of service twice as long as the particular period of service which he otherwise has to render in terms of that provision or 24 days, whichever is the longest:

Provided that the Minister may determine that such community service may be completed during a shorter period.

1. (4) on page 18, in lines 1 to 8, to omit subsection (4);
2. (5) on page 18, in line 10, to omit “(a)”;
3. (6) on page 18, in line 19, to omit “(5)” and to substitute “(4)”;
4. (7) on page 26, in line 8, to omit “(a)”;
5. (8) on page 26, in lines 22 to 31, to omit subsection (3);
6. (9) on page 26, in line 38, after “render” to insert “the particular”;
7. (10) on page 26, in line 39, to omit “(a)”;
8. (11) on page 26, in line 39, to omit all the words after “be” up to and including (b) in line 44;
9. (12) on page 26, in lines 55 to 60, to omit subsection (5);
10. (13) on page 28, in line 18, to omit (2) or (3)" and to substitute “or (2)”;
11. (14) on page 28, in lines 44 to 55, to omit paragraph (c).

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Umhlanga has motivated his amendments very reasonably and I think there ought to be some way in which one can find consensus of opinion in this regard. We believe that on balance it will be far better for the proceedings to be open for the simple reason that the person concerned has nothing to hide. Very often a person who has strong religious convictions—and this has happened throughout history—has wanted to nail his colours to the mast. He has not wanted to keep them private. I take the hon. member’s point about its being private and sensitive. I accept that without hesitation but my experience has been that if a person has a strong religious commitment in any direction he will want sooner or later to tell the world that that is where he stands. It may well be that that is the way in which we all see it but it is certainly the way in which I see it. I think too that this is the way my colleagues see it but the hon. member for Bezuidenhout will motivate his own amendment in due course.

I want to say at this juncture that we on these benches will support the amendments moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West. We also think that those amendments make very good sense and we trust that the hon. the Minister will accept them.

I want to come back now, if I may, to where I left off earlier.

The unjust war?

No. I am referring to the way in which a board or a commission will try to discover whether or not the person concerned, either on religious grounds as is set out in this Bill or even in terms of our wider interpretation, is a bonafide religious or conscientious objector.

Business suspended at 12h45 and resumed at 14hl5.

Afternoon Sitting

Mr. Chairman, before the suspension of business I addressed the hon. the Minister and I made the point that in his reply it seems that the major objections he has to our wish to extend the grounds for objection are twofold. On the one hand it would appear that in the debates there was the suspicion that the PFP and its spokesman were trying to bring something in under the guise of moral or ethical considerations. That was the one thought that came through all the time.

We have tried to argue that we are not alone in this and that major Churches—whether or not we are in agreement with them—in this country and throughout the world have actually said that it would be intolerant of Churches to take unto themselves the only grounds for objection. That was the first reply.

The second point which I think the hon. the Minister has made and many of his hon. colleagues and the other parties in the House is that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to test the moral or the ethical whereas it is relatively easy to test the religious. Let me refer to the remarks made by the hon. member for Umbilo. I assume that he speaks for his party. I assume further, because the hon. the Minister was so loud in his praise of the NRP, that the Government accepts the arguments as well; they certainly did not differ with them. The hon. member for Umbilo says—

He then gives a couple of examples.

I think these of course are misinterpretations. As far as I am concerned there is no justification in the Scriptures for religious objection. Would that hon. member his party or the Government tell me then what is the objective test for a religious objector if one takes away the whole of the Scriptures and secondly …

Is that a formal question on which you want a reply right now?

No, we are now in Committee; the hon. member can reply later.

The second argument is that he has read many, many religious books and in none of these books does he find any grounds for religious objection to war. That means that the Bible has been ruled out, the Old and the New Testaments, when the board sits in judgment on a young man who says; “I am a religious objector”. He therefore cannot appeal to that. Secondly he cannot appeal to many, many religious books, because the hon. member says he has read a great number of them and he finds in them no real grounds for that. What will such a young man have to do? Will he have to produce some revelation out of the blue or some book of which that hon. member does not know or some new Scripture? This is the farcical situation.

The hon. the Minister must answer this too, because he praised the NRP and he never ever called into question any of their arguments. I put it to the hon. the Minister that we are sitting in a board where we have all the theologians present who differ fundamentally but who have to look at this. We also have the judge. The young man—let us assume he is a Christian—comes in and says: “Well, I have read the Scriptures of the New Testament very carefully and I believe they tell me that I dare not kill and I cannot be associated”. They then say that they have read the same Scriptures and there is no justification whatsoever there for religious objection.

That is to say if we follow the hon. member and his party. I assume there is a fundamental difference between the Government on the one hand and that party’s interpretation on the other hand. One certainly cannot have it both ways. Where is the objectivity of the test? If one follows that hon. member and one accepts his interpretation, then at least one should go a little further to say that it is very difficult to interpret religious objection and it is just as difficult to interpret moral and ethical objections, but because all are difficult, one will test every case on its merits. That seems to me logical. That I feel this House ought to be accepting. But no, the argument was thrown in our face that we cannot argue on moral and ethical grounds. That hon. member says that one cannot argue on scriptural or any religious books. I think he is quite wrong in his understanding of the Scriptures. I think he is also quite wrong in his understanding of all the many books that he has read on this subject. I would refer the hon. member to books on the first 300 years of the history of the Christian Church. He will then know that it was part of the articles of faith that they would not serve in the army. That was the situation for 300 years, immediately prior to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That is a book the hon. member must read as well. I also asked that hon. member and his party, who have been very strong with their mudthrow image, their red blood in the veins and all that, to read the central message of the New Testament, which is non-violence, as depicted by a symbol which is precious to us all, a cross.

Pacifism.

That is right, genuine pacifism which says that one cannot do harm to a man who bears the image of God, which that hon. member serves. I submit that their arguments fall down completely. If you have no objective test and if you say the Scriptures do not give ground for religious objection, then what on earth are you going to be about it? I happen to believe that the Scriptures do give reason for those. I do not happen to be a pacifist myself, but I know of many people in history and in contemporary times who have had just as much courage as that hon. member, whose blood is as red in their veins as that hon. member’s blood and who have actually risked their lives and their property because of the stand they have taken, and I respect that. I do not agree with it but I actually respect it. What I find distasteful in the extreme is the kind of contempt that has come from those benches towards young men who have taken the risk of saying that they cannot kill. What is so bad about that? But they are namby-pamby. The hon. member for Umhlanga says they are a bunch of pansies.

I said you were a bunch of pansies.

Oh no, that was the implication. [Interjections.] [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few comments on what the hon. member for Pinelands has said. Firstly, it has already been decided in principle that this Bill is confined to religious objectors and therefore it is pointless to continue bringing forward arguments about ethical and moral objectors. It is simply pointless to do so at this late stage. Secondly, I want to say to the hon. member for Pinelands that the understanding of the scriptures, Christian or otherwise, by individual members of this House is not relevant to the Bill before the House. Therefore his little contretemps with the hon. member for Umbilo is really not relevant.

What is the objective test?

We have argued the test in Second Reading, and I think successfully. There were several, but I will just list some of the main ones. The objective test is whether the participation of a person who claims to be a religious objector in a military capacity or in association with a military organization in any form whatsoever, universally, is in conflict with the will of the deity, God, godhead or Supreme Being that he obeys. [Interjections.] One tests that because he appears before the board and he places before it, if he belongs to an organized religion, the tenets of that religion. That is of course where I personally differ from the hon. member for Umbilo. I just feel that little contretemps is irrelevant to the Bill. He brings before them the tenets of his religion, as I have said, his own articles of faith. He can write them down. Then there is his behaviour.

That is subjective. Articles of faith refer to a particular religion. [Interjections.]

Of course. Admittedly. The test should be as objective as possible, and there are naturally grey areas. If there were not any grey areas, we would not need a board. The matter would be cut and dried, the commanding officer could make a judgment and we would not need a board. There are, of course, grey areas, and one does try to limit the grey areas as far as possible. A person says, for example, that he is in conflict with his God. His God says: Thou shalt not kill. He believes that his God will punish him or whatever if he disobeys his God. That is then, we think, an acceptable test for religious objection.

They would have to accept his word.

Yes, one would have to accept his word to a certain extent, and the board is also there to judge the sincerity with which he propounds his faith or declares his faith. Ethical or moral objections, however, are matters of conscience.

So is the other.

In a matter of conscience, one is not in conflict with a supreme being. One is in conflict with oneself if one disobeys.

Oh no. Quite the opposite.

I think that that is an arguable point. [Interjections.]

Order!

Mr. Chairman, we are now in the Committee Stage, and anybody can get up at any time and make a speech. I therefore suggest that the hon. member for Bezuidenhout should avail himself of the very next opportunity to do so, instead of cackling at me all the time. [Interjections.]

This brings me to my second argument. We believe naturally that a person’s God—from our point of view the “drie-enige God” or Trinity—takes precedence over the State, but we also believe that the interests of the State take precedence over the interests of the individual. When a person therefore has sincere religious objections which bring him into conflict with the State, but which he holds in obedience to his God, naturally those objections must then take precedence, because his God must take precedence over the interests of the State. Where the person is objecting purely for secular reasons, however, we believe that the secular interests are subservient to the interests of the State.

Even if he has the same reverence for life?

Yes, I would think so. I also made the point, in the Second Reading debate, that we all have a reverence for life. All of us find war abhorrent. All of us, by training, by virtue of our religion—and all the great religions have this in common—respect and revere life and do not wish to kill, which is contrary to our ethics, religion and everything. If one’s country is being attacked, however, is the subject of aggression, it has to be defended. Then these purely secular reasons, ethical objections, have to be overcome. Otherwise one simply could not defend one’s country.

So those are the two arguments I would offer to indicate why we think religious objection should be the category and why we do not think it should be broadened.

For an hon. gentleman who says in this House that he has been a theologian for longer than he cares to remember, like the hon. member for Pinelands did, and for another hon. member, like the hon. member for Durban Central, whose father has been a theologian for longer than he would care to remember, I must say that I found that they advanced rather peculiar arguments about the abilities—objective or otherwise—of a theologian to be appointed to the board. [Interjections.]

How long have you been a theologian?

That is not the point. I am just saying that I think it is rather peculiar. Surely I am entitled to my opinion. I do not pretend to be a theologian.

I know theologians better than you do.

I have no doubt about that. [Interjections.] However, in suggesting that theologians are quite incapable of making objective judgments, that they are untrained to judge the sincerity of people, that they have no legal training and will be biased, etc., those hon. members seem to have quite forgotten that the person presiding over this board is of course a judge or a retired judge who of course does have the legal training and is by virtue of his long training and experience—it is after all not any legal representative we are taking, but a judge or a retired judge—very well able to make objective judgments and also to judge the sincerity of a person’s exposition to the board. If the theologians were then to become biased and unfair in their perceptions of what the applicant was saying, this learned judge would be very capable of putting them on a more even course. I am therefore suggesting that, since one has a judge there, one does have the legal component with legal experience there.

Then one could say that, instead of having two further legal assessors, one should have a judge to provide that component plus four, and under certain circumstances five, religious assessors to assist him. It was also said that, because of the likely composition of this board, certain theologians with certain viewpoints would most likely predominate, their views would not be the same as those of the applicant and consequently the applicant would be disadvantaged. However, if one takes into account the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Parys in terms of which, if the applicant’s minister of religion is not already on the panel, the applicant can request that he be brought on, then I think that, with the judge and the applicant’s own minister of religion present, that would serve to create a balance and counter the argument of bias. [Time expired],

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

The words to be inserted follow on the words—

We believe that there may well be circumstances where people coming before the board are insufficiently articulate to be able to put a reasonable case on their own behalf. I am aware that there is an amendment proposed by one of the other hon. members to the effect that a minister of the religion of the applicant concerned be on the board as an ad hoc member. I would of course be quite happy with that. However, I still believe that it may well be better, if the applicant does require somebody to put his case for him, if he could bring his own local minister who knows his whole background and his whole life-story. I therefore ask that this amendment be very seriously considered for inclusion.

The hon. member for Pinelands chose to criticize, attack, or call it what you will, certain aspects of my address to the House the other day and implied that there was a lack of logic, if I am correct…

Yes.

Yes, he implied that there was a lack of logic in what I had to say, viz. that I believed that the Holy Scripture did not make it clear that a person should be a pacifist or a conscientious objector. There was nothing there to indicate that that was the will of God.

Except that they could not be used in that regard.

That is correct. They could not be used to substantiate this question. I think if the hon. member were being fair he would appreciate that I made it clear that I believed that there was not sufficient there, and I am not so arrogant or egotistical as to believe that I am omniscient, that I really do know all the answers, not as the hon. member for Pinelands seems to feel he is in respect of ecclesiastical matters. Because I do not have this arrogance to the extent that I believe that I cannot be wrong—and the members of my party do not have this type of arrogance—we accept that on religious grounds, if the person concerned himself believes, if he has interpreted it differently from ourselves, that it would be a mortal sin, we are at the very least prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt and to allow him to go before this board on religious grounds, because he could well believe this to be a mortal sin. Such being the case, who are we to try to force a person to commit what he believes to be a mortal sin? The hon. theologian concerned will know perfectly well that a mortal sin cannot really be applied to a person who is either an atheist or someone who does not believe in God in any way, shape or form. A mortal sin cannot be so applied. Such being the case, although the hon. member may have felt that he made a very good point, I believe that I have reasonably refuted him because, as I say, we are prepared to give the maximum benefit of doubt on religious grounds and on religious interpretation.

Incidentally, I do wish that the hon. member for Greytown would be a little quieter on his great love and respect for Swapo, because he keeps on mentioning that they also have a great respect for life.

He never said that.

Oh yes, he did! He knows perfectly well he did. He will not deny it. Whatever that hon. member may be, I can assure hon. members the hon. gentleman is not a liar.

On the question of defence, I said that I am a pacifist, and I reiterate that I am a pacifist in that I will not personally strike the other man, nor do I advocate our country, going into and attacking, without cause or for territorial purposes, another country. However, I believe a true pacifist has not only the right, but the duty to defend himself. Would the hon. member who believes that he is a true conscientious objector, allow somebody to come into his house and destroy his wife and children? Of course he would not! He would defend them. And that is his duty. Similarly I believe that the country is the extension of the home. Such being the case, if people are going to attack our country, it is not only a normal thing, but it is our duty, to defend it. As I say, however, if the reverse were the case, and we were gratuitously attacking somebody else, that could be another story. I can assure hon. members that I believe that it is totally reconcilable to be a pacifist at heart, but a practical pacifist to the extent that you will defend yourself in the event of somebody attacking you. May I just make one further point? [Interjections.] Will that little boy please grow up? [Interjections.] During the entire period that I have been in this House, and it is not very long I agree, I have never, and hon. members can check up on every speech I have made, attacked any person unless I have been attacked first. I have never had the desire to have to go at any individual. Even in this debate I have avoided it. I do not believe in gratuitously attacking and insulting people, as seems to be the case with certain hon. members. But I want to put to rest this nonsense of my party supporting the concept of religious objection and not any other. We are prepared to accept that we have our interpretation while the other side may have theirs. Finally I should like the hon. the Minister to keep in mind what I have started this address with, i.e. the amendment on the Order Paper asking that a person appearing before this board will have the opportunity of having his local minister of religion to assist him to present his case.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member who has just sat down has changed his position quite drastically, and I am glad about it because obviously what I have said has got through to him.

He has not changed his standpoint.

I assume that when he said “we” he was speaking for his entire party when he said that his party did not accept that there are grounds, in their judgment, for religious objection in the Scriptures.

No, we did not say that.

Well, he said “we”. He said “we” would not be so arrogant and “we” think this while somebody else may think differently. But in his original speech the hon. member did not say that. There he stated quite clearly that those who believe that the Scriptures have this are not necessarily sincere and have a different point of view. If they truly believe that they believed it as a consequence of their misinterpretation.

I believe it and I have stated that I believe it.

Sir, that hon. member set himself up as a judge by saying that all who come before that board are misinterpreting the Scriptures. [Interjections.] Well, if words mean anything that is what the hon. member has said. I accept that the hon. member may not have chosen his words carefully during his Second Reading speech and is trying to rectify it now. [Interjections.] So, the hon. member stands by his speech during the Second Reading which says that those who claim that the Scriptures are justification for objection are misinterpreting the Scriptures?

I believe that to be the case.

Does your party believe that too?

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, Sir. I am asking that hon. member a question.

At this stage, Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 26, in line 12, to omit “detention” and to substitute “imprisonment”;
2. (2) on page 26, in lines 22 to 31, to omit subsection (3);
3. (3) on page 26, in line 33, to omit “or detention”;
4. (4) on page 26, in line 39, to omit all the words after “be” up to and including “(b)” in line 44;
5. (5) on page 26, in line 46, to omit “detention” and to substitute “imprisonment”;
6. (6) on page 26, in lines 63 to 65, to omit paragraph (a);
7. (7) on page 28, in lines 44 to 55, to omit paragraph (c).

I am not going to spend much time in motivating these amendments. They speak for themselves. For instance, on page 26 of the Bill we ask for the word “detention” to be omitted and to substitute the word “imprisonment”. As regards amendment No. (2), we are fundamentally opposed to anyone buying himself out of any service, and I hope the hon. the Minister will not need much persuasion to delete this. We believe it is unfair and unjust. It is not a good encouragement ever to introduce the question of financial buying-out of one’s national service. The third amendment is consequential upon the first; so too is the fifth. The fourth, the sixth and the seventh amendments also have to do with the question of payment, excepting the sixth amendment, in which we asked that a court martial should be deleted and that the case should rather be left to a magistrates’ court. We believe that would be far better in order to achieve a fair judgment.

The other point I should like to make is the following. I stated earlier that the argument used against us in respect of our attempt to widen the definition was that we were using something which could not be quantified, something which could not be measured or even defined. I think I am right in saying that there are those hon. members on the other side of the House who would probably accept in principle the concept that it is possible to have ethical and moral convictions relating to many subjects. There are people, for example, who have no religious persuasion but who have very strong views about alcohol; on alcohol because of what it does to the human body. That is but one area; it is an area of conscience. They also see what alcohol does to other people. [Interjections.]

Order!

You see, Mr. Chairman, one cannot ascribe to someone a religious conviction if he says he does not have it. He may subconsciously have that.

What is your yardstick?

The answer is purely and simply that to desecrate one’s body…

But that is religion again.

No, it is not a religious consideration at all. We cannot claim that only people who are religious have moral and ethical values. Let us take, for example, an agnostic, someone who cannot bring himself to believing seriously; he may think it is an insult to his intellect. It is someone who finds it difficult to believe that there is a higher being than himself. He genuinely, honestly, has this conviction. Surely, nobody can tell me that such a man has no ethics. He may live a far better life than I do or than any other hon. member of this House. He probably does. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, in talking about this, one example that immediately comes to mind is one of the giants of history, namely Socrates. He was not a Jew. He was not a Christian; and most of us in this House are either one or the other.

But do not forget that ethics is an incomplete science.

Of course. So is religion an incomplete science. That is absolutely so. One cannot prove that; it is a faith. We talk about the Book of Revelations and the Jewish believers say they do not accept this business of a Book of Revelations because they believe that one cannot look upon God without committing sin; that God is sacred and so holy that man must not gaze upon Him; that God rehides Himself in history; He does not reveal Himself.

The ramifications of this are so deep, so profound, that none of us … [Interjections.]

Order!

Let us take an atheist by way of example. Atheists can have very strong ethical views, Mr. Chairman.

Order! The hon. member for Pinelands must address himself to the clause now, please.

Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to help this hon. House. [Interjections.] All right, Sir, I shall come closer to the Bill now. Allow me to use one final example, however.

In the Second World War there were people in Germany who refused to fight for Hitler. Some of them were Christians. Some of them were chaplains. Some of the greatest of them have influenced our thinking considerably. Some of them were totally irreligious in that sense but … Yes, Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Rissik should not look so surprised. I have read and studied that subject. I did my doctorate on it. I know what happened. I was there and I looked at all the documents. Time and time again the churches and these other people came together even though they had strong disagreements. They came together because of their opposition to Hitler and to what he stood for. That is why I say that we cannot say that man is without ethics.

I should like to add, Mr. Chairman, that we should come a little closer home. In the Second World War, in this country, even in this House perhaps, there were those who had strong moral and ethical reasons for saying no, they would not volunteer and they would not take part in that war.

Such as who?

I am not going to say who they are. Anybody should know who they are. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. During The Second Reading we accepted the principle that this legislation was limited to religious objectors. Therefore the principle that ethical and moral and other objectors are excluded from the principle, has been accepted. I just want to ask whether the hon. member for Pinelands is in order when he persists in arguing about matters that have been excluded from this legislation.

Order! I have already requested the hon. member for Pinelands to confine himself to the legislation. The hon. member for Benoni may rest assured that I shall keep a close watch on the hon. member for Pinelands to ensure that he confines himself to discussing the legislation. The hon. member may proceed.

Thank you very much, Sir. I can understand why that hon. member is a trifle sensitive at this time and, of course, his timing is quite predictable.

I want to conclude by saying that we have tried to stress again and again that we believe that people with strong religious views should be allowed to make their objections known. This is common cause. We have tried to extend that. However, we also feel that there appears to be a strange reluctance on the part of certain hon. members in this House to accept the fact that people of religious persuasion should be given this opportunity albeit very, very reluctantly as though they were not quite kosher, as though they did not have red blood in their veins. I wish to make the point again that we on this side of the House support unreservedly the improvement to this particular clause which gives people of religious commitment an opportunity to object even though we may not share that objection. We believe that there should be room for them in a tolerant and civilized society. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, today I want to make war a little, especially with hon. members of the PFP. However, I hope that it will be a just war.

†Mr. Chairman, before I make an unjustified attack upon the hon. member for Pinelands, I should just like to put one question to him on a point of information because I could not quite hear what he was saying at one particular point. Did he say that he was a pacifist or did he say that he was not one?

I said I was not.

The hon. member said that he was not one. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

*Before I start firing the heavy artillery, I want to argue on a somewhat more sober note. [Interjections.] The argument today has been concerned, inter alia, with how the board is to be made up—whether its members should be theologians or lawyers. I am not a theologian or a lawyer, and perhaps therefore I can approach this matter from an objective point of view. Unfortunately I have had to deal with quite a number of them on both sides. I think the one point we must keep in mind here is that there are actually two points on which this board must decide. Firstly, they must decide whether or not that man’s objection is based on religious considerations, and secondly, they must decide whether that man is really serious. As regards theologians, they are not just trained in their own religion and in their own doctrines. They are also trained in the nature of other religions. It was clear from the argument of the hon. member for Pinelands that he has an understanding of the substance of other religions. That is why I think that theologians are not such a bad group of people to judge whether that person is actually arguing on a religious basis. Surely the religions of all of us include the principle of religious freedom, which then frees those theologians from any inherent obligation to judge only according to their own convictions. I therefore think that the theologians, as experts in that field, will be the best people to judge and also because knowledge about the subject brings one closer to a point at which one can judge objectively. On the other hand, there is the second consideration: It must be decided whether the man is serious. It is argued that jurists are the proper people to judge objectively, but there is a subtle difference. Jurists are trained to judge whether somebody is speaking the truth. What is at issue here is not whether somebody is telling the truth, but whether he is serious about it. [Interjections.] There is, therefore, a subtle difference.

Somebody can tell an untruth seriously.

There is a subtle difference between whether somebody is talking the truth or whether he is serious, but it is a very important difference. [Interjections.]

Order!

I contend that the professional orientation of a theologian is actually geared to ascertaining whether somebody is serious about a point of view rather than to determine whether he bases his point of view on real facts. That is why I think the theologians are a perfectly good choice.

I now want to do battle a little. Earlier today the hon. member for Pinelands said that all wars were unjust. This creates a problem for me, on the one hand because the hon. member says that he is not a pacifist. I cannot quite understand how he can be a pacifist. After all, he is going to take part in a war, but according to him, all wars are unjust.

Have you not heard of a choice between the lesser of the two evils? [Interjections.]

However, I have yet another problem if the hon. member for Pinelands says that all wars are unjust.

That is so.

He says this today in this Committee while our soldiers are busy fighting a war. By implication, therefore, he is saying that the war which is being waged by our people is unjust. Are we not then back with people like Yeats and others who say that they cannot take part in the war because the war is unjust?

I did not say that.

But this is the implication. Furthermore: If he says that all wars are unjust, I infer from that that this war is also unjust. However, the hon. member for Yeoville said—

What, then, is the matter with that party? On the one hand we have this plain, clear statement of the hon. member for Yeoville, and on the other hand we have the insinuation of the hon. member for Pinelands who says that all wars—and therefore this war, too—are unjust. The hon. member for Berea supports those who say that the war which is waged here, is unjust. Then there is also the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North who, while the hon. member for Wynberg as well as a few other hon. members, for example the hon. member for Edenvale, made the point in the House that they will not allow selective objectors, is busy that same day supporting a man who is engaged in selective political objection to the war which is being fought. He says there in an open court that the man should be accommodated by the authorities. I do not quite understand how that party can simultaneously adopt these two points of view.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Helderkruin referred to what the hon. member for Pinelands said about a just war. The hon. member for Pinelands said that in his view no such thing as a just war exists. The hon. member for Helderkruin wants to take it further and say that the hon. member for Pinelands therefore suggests that the war that is, at the moment being waged in South West Africa for example, is an unjust war. He then arrives at patriotism. [Interjections.]

I prefer to look at what the D.R. Church of South Africa says about it. What does the D.R. Church say about the question of just or unjust war? Can the hon. member for Helderkruin tell me whether the D.R. Church regards wars as just, or do they say that there is no such thing as a just war? Can any hon. member on the other side of the House tell me? [Interjections.] If one looks at the findings of the Breë Moderatuur of the D.R. Church, as contained in their publication which was published in 1980, one will see that on page 11 there is a discussion under the heading “Regverdige of Onregverdige Oorlog”. I quote paragraph 1—

The view—as well as the opinion of the hon. member for Pinelands—that a war cannot be regarded as being just or that there is no just war, is not something foreign to the D.R. Church. It is not something which is foreign to any church. [Interjections.]

If one looks at the terminology that is being used on the Government side, it is clear that there is a misunderstanding about precisely what they mean. The hon. member for Pretoria West criticizes the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North and says that the hon. member should not confuse objections based on belief with objections based on religion. He says we are confused when we use the word “geloofsbeswaar” because it should be “godsdiensbeswaar”.

†He says it is typical of our woolly-headed approach and that we do not know what we talk about. He also says that we must get clarity.

*What does the DR Church say about this specific aspect? The title of the booklet is Geloofsbesware teen Diensplig. [Interjections.] Objections based on religion do not appear in this book. Everything deals with objections based on belief.

[Inaudible.]

It is the text of the Breë Moderatuur. It has also been said that there is a distinct difference between somebody who objects on the grounds of his beliefs and someone who is opposed to the idea of war on ethical grounds. Even in this booklet of the DR Church there are various references to religious-ethical grounds. In other words, in many respects the DR Church sees the concepts “religious” and “ethical” as basically the same concept. [Interjections.] In this regard I should like to read one sentence, paragraph 14, on page 3—

Reference is made to religious-ethical views.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

No, I suggest that hon. members on the other side of the House should not try to create the impression that they know something about these specific terms. They do not know themselves what they are talking about when they just talk about religion or just about ethics or morality. The hon. member for Pretoria West is a good example.

Mr. Chairman, I see the hon. member for Pinelands is just leaving. [Interjections.] I am sure his colleagues will tell him what I have said. Let me start off by saying that we in this party have total confidence in our defence spokesman’s ability to handle this debate, and so it is really not necessary for all of us to enter into the debate, unlike the official Opposition. [Interjections.] As the hon. member for Pinelands directed specific comments to me, I feel that I am justified in getting up to reply to them. I must say one thing for the hon. member for Pinelands, however, and that is that he was prepared to engage us in debate on the logic of the PFP’s case, something very few of the other hon. members are prepared to do. They threw out platitudes and clichés, without substantiating or motivating their case for the broadening of the provision of this Bill to include moral and ethical objectors.

They even chucked out the bath-water.

I should like to state very clearly why we believe that religious objection is valid and not the other category. In the first instance the hon. member for Pinelands asked the hon. member for Umbilo how it was possible that he could state that he personally saw no religious or philosophical basis for objection on religious grounds, yet was prepared to tolerate that within the framework of this Bill. The answer to that is, of course, very clear indeed. We believe in freedom of religion, and although my hon. colleague may be a Catholic and I may be a Protestant, that does not mean that because we differ in our basic tenets and interpretation of the Scriptures, we will not tolerate other people’s interpretation.

I am not a Catholic.

No, I was using that as an example. I am not sure what my hon. colleague is … [Interjections.] … but we believe in freedom of religion. The very basis for our support of religious objection is founded on the concept or construct of freedom of religion which I believe that all hon. members in this House believe in. [Interjections.] We have the Mohammedan ethic, which is the ethic of the sword and fire. We are prepared to allow those people to practise the religion of their choice. [Interjections.]

Order!

The difficulty we have with the extension, in terms of the concept of PFP has, i.e. that of conscientious objection based on ethics or morality, is that it provides a cover for those people who believe in the political concept of the unjust war. It is the very lack of definitions and criteria that makes it impossible to distinguish between the genuine pacifists and those who want to propagate the idea of political reasons. It is that dilemma which prevents us from accepting the broadening of the concept to include ethics and moral objections. [Interjections.]

Is the board not capable of making the decision?

We believe that there will be many cases of people using this for political reasons which have nothing to do with ethics or morality or religion. They will abuse the provisions of this legislation.

And the board members are a bunch of clots!

Not at all, but in the concept of religious objection one does have pacifists, humanists, etc. One has all those categories enveloped within the ethos and dogma of a church, and that we find quite acceptable. [Interjections.] There is no problem with that at all. The hon. member for Durban Central promised me an answer to the question about whether he believes we were fighting a just or unjust war, and I hope he will give us that answer.

I will.

He will appreciate that ethics is the science of morals and that morality itself deals with an individual’s concept of what is right or wrong. That very concept must have tangible expression so that one can see whether it is a rational concept or whether it is an irrational concept.

So does religion.

Even hon. members of the PFP, I am sure, would not support an irrational concept or thought process. One of the finest tangible bits of evidence of rationality in a philosophy is to be found in the extent to which it is able to mobilize group support. If an individual has a concept, but cannot convince sufficient people to form a group with him, in order to propound that theory, I am sure even the PFP would not want to give support to such an individual’s ethics or morality. It is the absence of the group connotation, of the observable support for the process, that makes it irrational, makes it illogical and makes it impossible to discriminate between one individual’s opinions and those of another, as compared with a moral or ethical dogma which is to be found in the definitions and tangible evidence of a church group. I do not think the hon. members will disagree with that. I am sure the hon. members will not disagree with it. I am also sure they will agree that it is very possible that within the prescripts they propose for ethical and moral objection many or most of the people who would object would do so for political reasons.

I am very sorry that the hon. member for Pinelands is not here, because he was one of the few, together with the hon. member for Yeoville, who was at least prepared to get up in the House and state his case clearly as to whether he believes that the SADF is fighting a just or an unjust war. Let me say that in the absence of a positive response from those hon. members we must assume that they support the concept that South Africa is fighting an unjust war. [Interjections.] No hon. member who has the conviction that we are fighting a just war will allow his answer to go by default. Every single member in these benches, and I am sure in NP and CP benches as well, is prepared to stand up and go on record as saying that South Africa is fighting a just war and not an unjust war. I ask the hon. member for Durban Central and the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North: Are they prepared to go public stating that South Africa is not fighting an unjust war? [Interjections.]

That is just cheap politics.

Order!

That, Sir, is really what this argument is about. It was said by the hon. member for Pinelands and others that we suspect that there is something being hidden by the PFP, and I want to say that that is indeed our fear. Let them give us tangible evidence that that fear should be dispelled and that it is unfounded. I ask the hon. member for Berea: Does he believe South Africa is fighting a just or an unjust war? This is the Committee Stage and he can still get up on his feet and give a lead to the people of Natal and of South Africa …

My colleagues have answered that and …

Harry gave one answer and Boraine another. We have had two answers.

Order!

We can argue about the whole science of ethics. We can argue about the Protestant ethics and we can argue about the religions of the East, which were referred to by the hon. member for Yeoville. We are prepared to examine any rational dogma which has tangible evidence of group support and we will judge it on merit. What we cannot tolerate and what this party and this country will never condone is for certain people to try to undermine the efforts of the SADF and the political and social initiatives taken in this country in order to further the aims of Marxism or some other alien dogma by shielding behind a provision in this Bill which says they may escape their military obligations for ethical and moral reasons. That would open the bag completely without a genuine criterion or prescription by which any rational, loyal and patriotic person can judge the merits of the case for abstention.

My final challenge is this: Unless hon. members of the PFP are prepared to get up and state clearly their position on the unjust war, it must be assumed that they are prepared to tolerate and support that concept.

Order! Before I call upon the next hon. member to speak, I just want to draw the attention of hon. members once again to Standing Order No. 63, which reads as follows—

I have the feeling that we have already discussed many principles this morning. I also know that as far as clause 9 is concerned, it is very difficult not to involve the principles. However, I expect hon. members, when we continue, to address the Committee on the details as contained in clause 9 and not on the principles.

Mr. Chairman, I want to agree with the sentiments of the hon. members for Durban North and Helderkruin. It is of no use to quote from documents of the NG Church as the hon. member for Durban Central did if one does not also take semantics and Afrikaans rules of grammar into consideration. In that book there are no religious and ethical grounds, but religio-ethical grounds. When one spells religio-ethical, religieus-etiese, with a hyphen in Afrikaans the emphasis falls on the religious, because the opposite of this would of course be the non-religious choice.

Order! Where does the hon. member see that in this clause?

I am returning to the clause now. The hon. member for Umbilo also asked here that the clergyman of the person appearing before the board should also appear with him to give evidence on his behalf. A person applying to be classified as a religious objector is not necessarily a member of a church. What is at issue here is his affidavit of personal revelation and the like, and I think his own sincerity must be assessed here. For that reason I do not think that anyone can give evidence on the sincerity of another person, whether he be an expert on religion, as the hon. member for Umbilo wants, or an expert on law, as the official Opposition wants. When one discusses the matter of legal experts serving as members of this board instead of religious experts, I want to tell the hon. member for Pinelands that it is unfair of him to accuse this side of the House of considering religious objectors to be rather namby-pamby, non-Kosher and so on. If he had not been absent so frequently during the Second Reading he would have realized that this clause and the statutory amendment we are discussing are in fact there because we are giving recognition to the religious freedom of these people and because we are in fact recognizing that they have sound religious reasons for objecting to military service, and this has nothing to do with being non-Kosher. What we do in fact consider to be non-Kosher is the constant argument that the category of religious objectors should be extended to include other forms of objection. The danger in this is that it opens the door to political objections. That is what we on this side of the House find to say the least.

The hon. member for Umhlanga moved another amendment, namely that the board be partially open at the request of the applicant.

†The hon. member said that the hearing should be open. If one takes into account the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West, that is precisely the effect that is going to happen and one assumes that the normal provisions of the Commissions Act will come into force.

*However, there is another aspect I should like to say a few words about. We on this side of the House are rather suspicious of hon. members on that side of the House as regards their intentions in connection with this legislation, due in part to the language they used. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North stood up here—I do not want to have a serious fight with him—and he said that the longer period that the last two categories of religious objectors have to serve, was introduced to test the sincerity of their religious objections, and that view is quite wrong. The sincerity of their religious objections has already been tested by the board. This is merely to compensate for the fact that they are not exposing themselves to dangerous situations, that they are not exposing themselves to the risk of death and that they do not have to endure all the other inconveniences people who are rendering active military service in a fighting capacity have to endure. For that reason of course it is also a completely distorted conclusion to see this as a sentence, as that hon. member said. It is not a sentence at all, but a compensation. The whole idea is to give these people who have such religious objections an opportunity to make a contribution to the stability and orderliness of this country, which the other people are defending, by being productive in the community. The reason why we therefore fail to understand the motives of those hon. members or even doubt their motives, is that they use such extravagant words as though this were a sentence, as though this were slave-labour. Because they want legal experts and legal representation for these people, religious objections can no longer be at issue. Political objections are then at issue.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to move amendments Nos. (12), (15) and (16) printed in my name on the Order Paper, renumbered as follows—

1. (1) On page 14, in line 7, to omit all the words after “application” up to the end of the paragraph;
2. (2) on page 16, in line 7, after “(l)(a)” to insert “(ii) or (iii)”;
3. (3) on page 16, in lines 14 and 15, to omit subsection (6) and to substitute:
   1. (6) An appeal against the decision of the board shall lie to the Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa in the area of jurisdiction in which the hearing of the board took place.

As far as amendment No. (1) is concerned, it is similar to that moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West and consequently I shall not spend any time on trying to explain it. However, I should like to motivate amendment No. (2).

The board provided for in the Bill can classify non-combatants into three groups and the Bill distinguishes between these groups in so far as it provides, in respect of categories two and three, for the automatic removal of any rank these persons may have if their application to the board is successful. My amendment is intended to restrict the loss of rank and privileges that go with it to the second and third categories and not apply to the first category as these people are still part of the SADF despite any limitation which the board may place upon them. They will still be doing a full day’s job and may be in charge of people and may not be able to operate efficiently without their rank. If they are medical people, for instance, there would in fact be severe problems. Hence I move this amendment. I notice the hon. the Minister is nodding his head; so I take it that he is prepared to accept this.

Coming to my amendment No. (3), the Bill does not provide for any appeal against the findings of the board. Now, I know it has been said that this is not a court. Nevertheless it is true that a decision which this board may make can have a profound affect on the life of a person who perhaps feels aggrieved in that his case has not been heard and “judged” in the proper way. Therefore we in this party think there should be the right of appeal. Hence my amendment.

These are the three amendments I have moved up to this stage. There are still a great number of amendments standing in my name and earlier in the debate you, Mr. Chairman, gave me an indication that you would allow me once again to speak to the points I make here. The problem that we are dealing with, and which we have dealt with practically all day, is the question of whether it is possible to establish the sincerity and the validity of the depositions by those who lodge an appeal on the basis of a moral or ethical nature. Those who disagree with us, Mr. Chairman, have said that they basically disagree with us because it is impossible to establish the sincerity of those strongly-held beliefs. The view that we have put across is that it is indeed possible; that it has always been possible. In certain recent court findings it has been established that this possibility really exists. The courts, as I have said, are quite prepared to concede that this is indeed so. That is the case certainly in the USA, and I should imagine that if courts were to be established to do that same work in this country they would also be prepared to take that very responsibility upon them.

On several occasions earlier we used as the basis of our arguments court cases that had been heard in the USA. One almost gets the impression that the House does not accept the validity of the findings of those courts of law. I should once again like to use this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, of making our point very clear. We referred earlier to three separate court cases. An abridged version of the findings in the case of Welsh has often been quoted. However, I should like to quote further from two subsequent cases heard in 1971. In both these cases the same vexed problems had to be settled by the courts. I quote from one of the documents relating to one of those two court cases, as follows—

In two similar cases heard simultaneously by the American Supreme Court, the case of Gilette vs. USA and the case of Negré vs. Larsen, both heard in 1971, the Supreme Court held by a majority decision that it was impossible to grant objector status to someone objecting to a particular war. I quote again from this same document—

I should like to point out to the House that our argument has been based to a large extent on the findings of these courts. It says here—

Do you support that point of view?

Now, Mr. Chairman, I believe …

Do you support that point of view?

Can you not ask me a question and then give me an opportunity of answering it, damn it?

Order!

I withdraw it, Mr. Chairman. However, I was replying to the hon. member, but he persists in repeating his question. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, I am sorry for what I said.

The hon. member may proceed.

Mr. Chairman, I was the first speaker of the PFP to take part in this debate, and if I remember correctly I referred indeed to these particular two court cases. I also quoted from these particular court cases. I even read out extracts from the Welsh case. I also mentioned where I had got my information from. Therefore I would have thought that hon. members opposite would have the intelligence to read a record of that court case and to see what it said. Obviously when I quote from the findings in a court case I do not do so in order to fool hon. members of this House. I do not leave out words in order to mislead the House. I could even waste the time of the House by quoting in full the finding of the court. However, that is not what I should like to do. What I have said here is what I and my party stand for, and it is on that basis that we have argued this party’s case. [Interjections.] On that basis we have argued for the expansion of the concept on which objection would be made valid. That is why we have argued again and again that the definition should be widened to include objectors on moral and ethical grounds as well as religious objectors. One cannot make it more clear than that. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I have been listening for some time now to the arguments raised in connection with this clause. I found it significant that in the reasoning of the official Opposition there was something missing which I could not quite pinpoint. I do not know why they arrived at the conclusion they did arrive at. I have a great deal of respect for the hon. member for Wynberg. I feel that the hon. member for Wynberg’s reasoning makes it worth my while to try to ascertain in which direction he wants to move. What is the actual situation we are experiencing today? We are involved in a war. This is a truth we cannot escape. A second truth we must accept is that in this legislation before us the Government wants to create the opportunity for people with religious objections to submit those objections and in that way be let off active service. However, we also know that in this entire process we are up against forces that want to practise subversion here in South Africa. Surely that is a fact. Those forces that want to practise subversion in South Africa, are forces that we have to combat in all kinds of ways to prevent even this legislation from being undermined. We now ask ourselves the question: If this clause establishes a specific board to meet a bona fide religious objector halfway, how should it be constituted and what practical and equitable effect would it have? Today I listened very attentively to the arguments raised here and it seemed to me the hon. members of the Opposition were trying to reason like theologians, as if this were a case which was being tried to ascertain whether or not a person should be exempted. That is what they suggested throughout. In my opinion, they reasoned like theologians, and this applies in particular to the hon. member for Durban Central. He asked our side of the House what the D.R. Church had to say about this. He wanted to know what their religious approach was with regard to this specific matter, as if that was a valid argument with regard to the way in which this matter should be approached. That was the whole of his approach and reasoning. However, in the amendments he moved here, he stated that a clergyman should not serve on the board because he would not be able to reason objectively. It is ridiculous for a person to argue a matter on religious grounds, and then try to bar theologians from the process of assessment, to ascertain whether a case is just or not.

When one reviews this entire matter there is another factor which comes to the fore and the hon. member for Durban North argued this matter very well. The question was asked: “Is it a just war or is it an unjust war?” What is the approach of the official Opposition? I want to ask what the approach will be of the person who is going to object on the basis of whether this is a “just” or an “unjust war”. What is the position in respect of the court cases to which mention was made? Is it a matter of a just war or an unjust war? [Interjections.] If this House wants to protect South Africa from the onslaughts that are being launched on us, then it must protect South Africa in this legislation in such a way that there will be no loopholes for the persons who want to practise subversion in South Africa.

The hon. member has very little confidence in the population.

We know what forces want to practise subversion among our population. We also know that these forces are distributed throughout the population. They are to be found everywhere in the population. Their influence is also to be felt throughout the country. That is, after all, the case. That is why this Committee must adopt a very circumspect approach to this matter in order to get the merits of this case straight. That is why I say that the principles are as they have been stated here by the hon. the Minister of Defence. We accept that there are people who may, in principle, have sincere religious objections. Provision is being made for them so that they can lodge these objections. This side of the House is, however, not prepared to be used to afford people the opportunity to make misuse of an Act to forsake the defence of this country on grounds other than religious grounds.

Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult to explain a complex matter like moral and ethical principles to an hon. member who wonders from Wednesday till Saturday whether he should support a motion of confidence in his Prime Minister. [Interjections.]

†I should like something which is pretty non-contentious in this debate and mention something which has not been discussed before. The proposed section 72E(5) provides that national service can only be done in a post in a branch of the Public Service or a local authority. I wish to comment on the type of alternative service and I start by moving amendment No. (5) printed in the name of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens on the Order Paper, as follows—

The spirit of national service in the Defence Force is that of the defence of the country and the community against some form of violent attack or threat from either alien or internal sources. The need for such a military service is directly proportional to the threat. If Utopia were to be possible and no violent or military threat would exist, it would of course be considered completely senseless to continue with such military service because that manpower could then be better utilized on normal civilian activities of the society. This very fact illustrates the second aspect with regard to the spirit of national service and that is that it is something which is outside the normal civilian activities of society.

When alternative national service is rendered, I believe that it should be in the same spirit as that of military national service in that firstly it should be directed towards the defence of the country against some form of attack or threat and secondly it should be rendered outside the normal civilian activities.

Considering the spirit of national service I can point out several other threats to South Africa but of a non-military nature although by no means of lesser potential destructiveness. There are threats which in terms of invasion or loss of land and in terms of human life and spirit are more insidious than a terrorist movement. I can refer for instance to the relentless invasion by Rooikrans or Port Jackson that has irretrievably damaged large tracts of indigenous fynbos and duineveld or rendered useless previously productive grazing along the Cape Coast. [Interjections.] I refer for instance to invasion of bugweed in the valleys and wilderness areas of Natal. I refer also to the march of the Karoo, deforestation etc. As much as an individual farmer cannot defend himself against a terrorist force, so much is he defenceless against these creeping threats. I think those aspects constitute as much a threat to the community as a whole. The defence against these threats can hardly be considered a normal civilian activity. It cannot be undertaken as a normal economic activity because the benefit would not manifest itself in the normal short-term budgetary period. I suggest that these are the areas in which alternative national service should be rendered. To draft someone into normal civilian activities can indeed be considered to be slave labour and is not in the spirit of national service.

I can also refer to other things such as the threat to the bodies and minds of people because of shortages of educational and health services, etc., for Blacks in the rural areas. Here again, I think, there is an opportunity for service in the true spirit of national service.

One of the most important aspects, too, of national service, in fact of our whole defence against possible violent revolution, is to win the hearts and minds of the people. It can therefore be said that anybody who is engaged, even voluntarily, in winning the hearts and minds of people, is indeed rendering service to the community which is in complete harmony with the spirit of national service. I think that if there is one single aspect that perhaps contributed more than anything else to the suppression of violence or the potential for violence in this country, it is the religious revival that is taking place all over South Africa. I think the acceptance, by deprived people, of the fact that there is perhaps a better life hereafter, certainly reduces the urge to change their current conditions by violent means. There are many religious organizations all over the country that are engaged in this work of building bridges.

Agreement has been reached by all parties in this House that religious conscientious objection provides grounds for alternative service. I therefore trust that no one will not agree that such alternative service could be rendered in any religious organization engaged in such spiritual and other services to the community. It is on this basis that I have moved the amendment to also include other institutions or bodies. Similarly there are other welfare organizations, not necessarily religiously motivated, that also do tremendous work in the improvement of health, education, the community, or simply in the improvement of race relations. I think these could also qualify to employ people who are doing alternative national service. One can think, for instance, of organizations such as the Valley Trust in Botha’s Hill, the S.A. Institute of Race Relations the SPCA, Cripple Care and many other organizations that do perform a community service.

I trust that in the course of time we shall win the military struggle and also the battle for the hearts and minds of the people, and that more attention could then be given to these other threats that imperil South Africa. I also trust that at that time this House will show no mercy to people who object to such peace-time national service on the grounds that it is not of a military nature.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address the House on the amendments standing in my name on the Order Paper, which I do not intend to move. The amendments read as follows—

1. (1) On page 12, in lines 60 to 65, to omit subparagraph (ii);
2. (2) on page 14, in line 1, after “service” to insert “in a military uniform”;
3. (3) on page 16, in lines 20 to 37, to omit subsection (2);
4. (4) on page 16, in line 39, to omit “(iii)” and to substitute “(ii)”;
5. (5) on page 20, in line 36, to omit “(iii)” and to substitute “(ii)”.

The reason for not moving the amendments is that I understand that the consequential changes to the legislation would be of such an involved and intricate nature that it would take an enormous amount of reshaping, and also that the administration required to put this into effect would not be practicable.

However, I should like to take the opportunity of just stating our opinion on this matter because it is a little difficult to visualize the second category of religious objector who will serve, under military discipline clothed in some form of distinctive clothing, other than a uniform, and doing maintenance tasks. It worries me—it concerns all of us in these benches—that here we have a situation in which people will draw attention to themselves or will be the focal point for unnecessary derision. On the other side of the coin, of course, this could also adversely affect the morale of the particular unit in which they are serving. If we went back to the situation prevailing at the inception of this legislation, I think that we would find that the situation in the S.A. Defence Force was one in which non-combatant soldiers, wearing uniform, did serve, whilst all others were serving periods of detention of up to three years. This piece of legislation will now bring about a totally new process of accommodating people with religious objection status. The amendments proposed in connection with the board, the fact that the applicant has the right to have the hearing held in public or behind closed doors, at his behest, as put forward by this party, the question of a padre from his own community being present and factors such as that, give this legislation a far more benign and understanding approach. The discussions have indicated over and over again, in fact, that a person is not to be sentenced or fined, because in actual fact he would be doing compensatory service.

Let me now focus again on the individual who is serving in some specific form of clothing, for example overalls, for the sake of argument. I do not think he would be seen as someone doing compensatory service in the eyes of other people. I think it is going to be very difficult to control the handling of such a person. It worries me—both from his point of view and from the Defence Force’s point of view—that circumstances might arise in which there was, or could be, abuse or mistreatment of the individual concerned, that he might in fact have to bear the brunt of an attitude towards conscientious objection, by people perhaps not sensitive to it, that the community service objector does not, in fact have to bear at all because he is right out of it, is away in civilian life doing a job for six years under the auspices of the Department of Manpower. His circumstances would therefore not give rise to the sort of thing I have described, which would be both to the disadvantage of the individual concerned and certainly also to the disadvantage of the SADF itself, because it would be quite impossible to keep complete tabs on every single situation that occurred in a military unit. I would not like to see the good aspects of this Bill, after the possible amendments to the Bill have been introduced, jeopardized by a loophole involving how such people will be regarded or treated and the possibility of consequent abuse.

I just want to touch on one point again in connection with the question of religious objection vis-à-vis ethical or moral objection. Quite obviously the yardstick for ethical or moral objection does not allow for a very distinct line to be drawn in the constitution or decision-making of any specific board.

What really concerns hon. members in these benches about the official Opposition’s attitude, however, is not their approach on behalf of those people. The hon. member for Pinelands did us a slight disservice when he was a little unpleasant about out attitude towards the political objector, because I did state in my Second Reading speech when referring to the support given in a recent court case, in connection with which the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North suggested that the Defence Force should accommodate a Mr. Hathorn who had a political objection-basis to his arguments that whilst it was a brave decision on his part, the circumstances are such that members of that party have in fact supported political objection.

Would you not have done the same thing for a young man?

No.

Right. Now we know.

He said he did not agree with them but …

No, but he indicated that we should accommodate them. That is the whole point. That is where the division comes in. One moment we are talking about moral and ethical objections, which is a field which is entirely open to a great deal of debate …

You are just debating on semantics.

Our approach to the situation has been that there are elements in the PFP who feel that political objections should be accommodated.

Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

The hon. member may put his question in a moment if I have the time. One cannot get away from the facts that members have supported political objections.

Who has?

The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North has, and the hon. member for Berea yesterday indicated in this House that they should be accommodated.

Have you read the evidence?

Whether I have read the evidence or not… [Interjections.]

Then you do not know what he said.

The fact of the matter is they have indicated their support for political objections.

How can you say that when you have not read the evidence?

It is public knowledge. The court was open to the public…

And?

It was reported in the newspapers.

Yes, it was reported and he indicated quite clearly, as I said in my Second Reading speech, that the individual concerned, i.e. the young man, who I described as being brave, did not hide behind religious objections.

He did his duty.

He was objecting to the basis that South Africa was fighting in a civil war and that the SADF was fighting South African citizens. That is what he said. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North indicated that he should be accommodated. Let us not run away from it.

That is just not so.

That is in fact the case. Perhaps the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North would like to confirm this.

If you find you are wrong, will you apologize?

Indeed I will apologize.

Are your political convictions not based on moral or ethical grounds in any way whatsoever?

No, I have indicated to the House that we have the situation where there are hon. members in that party who do believe that political objections should be accommodated.

Because there are some morals in politics.

Then that hon. member must stand up and say so.

Did you read our amendment to the Second Reading?

The situation is very clear and that is what the argument is about. The question of deciding about moral and ethical grounds is an extremely difficult one, but there are in fact people who agree that objectors should be accommodated on political grounds and that is the area that has not been cleared up.

[Inaudible.]

No, but there are hon. members in that hon. member’s party who have said it publicly.

Where?

The hon. member for Groote Schuur asks: “Where?”

Well, give us a reference.

Members of the hon. member for Groote Schuur’s party who support the Black Sash have indicated quite clearly that we are fighting an illegal war in Namibia. [Interjections.]

Where?

It is not a question of a reference. It was reported in the newspapers. [Interjections.]

Give us the quotation.

If we bring you the evidence, will you apologize? [Interjections.]

Those are the questions we want answered. Arguing on moral and ethical grounds is one thing, but the other argument is something that must be explained by the hon. members who support that attitude.

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to tell the hon. the Minister that from a personal point of view I appreciate the classification of religious objectors contained in subsection (l)(a)(i), because, while I do not know whether other hon. members of the House are religious objectors, I am one. I am therefore pleased that a non-combatant religious objector who is prepared to serve in the SADF is now accommodated as of right and that it is no longer dependent on the goodwill of his commanding officer. I believe that that is a sensible decision, and I certainly hope that it will not be abused by people who may think that they can get a soft option throught that.

I am particularly concerned and interested—and that is in a real sense—in the question that has been debated in this House for most of this afternoon, namely that of the sincerity of the religious objector. I think a function of testing a man’s sincerity is, of course, how these boards are actually going to meet and how they are going to conduct their activities. Inevitably all of us tend to see them as legal bodies, as courts, and I know that Government members are very concerned about this and want to indicate that the boards are not courts. However, the hon. member for Pretoria West immediately raised the question of affidavits and himself falls into thinking of the boards as courts. I think the hon. the Minister, who has been deafeningly silent for a Minister thus far in the Committee Stage, should tell us how he sees these boards meeting. Is it going to be, as the hon. member for Jeppe suggested, a “broederlike gesprek”? In other words, is the board going to be seated in a lounge with comfortable chairs and are the members going to be in civilian clothes? Will they have a chat with the young man and say to him in a friendly way: Now tell us about your religious convictions. Why do you have them, etc? Or is it going to be the atmosphere of a court martial where there will be saluting and standing to attention, etc? I think this is an important factor. I believe the hon. the Minister must tell us how he conceives of these boards meeting, because that would, of course, be a vital factor.

As hon. members have been reminding us regularly over the last week, I was giving evidence at a court martial on Tuesday. The young man I was giving evidence for was a political objector. But, of course, he was a man who went into that court martial knowing what the results of his action were going to be. I do not believe that a young man who is a religious objector, because this is what we are dealing with, is going to be any different from the man on Tuesday, for example, who was a political objector in terms of this commitment and his preparedness to take the consequences of his action. And what essentially are the consequences of his action? It is not the board that worries him; it is the fact that he is going to have to spend not necessarily two years or four years—if one thinks of the 14 years of service that he will have to do—doing military service, but the fact that he is possibly going to have to do eight years or six years. For a young man of 18 or 19 years of age, that is a very, very long time. Even to keep a girlfriend in suspense for that period of time is very difficult.

It is impossible.

In fact impossible, as my hon. Chief Whip seems to say from experience. What concerns me, in a real sense, is that it is the question of sincerity that we have to test. I do not believe that these boards are going to test the sincerity of an objector. The thing that is actually going to test the sincerity of an objector is the fact of paying the cost of having to be an objector. In other words, he will say, if he is religious and a Christian: I have to take up my cross. He will see that extra service as a cross that he has to bear. Therefore that becomes the most difficult thing. I think that to test people’s sincerity on a religious level is an extraordinary difficult thing. I say this because even in this House people are offended if hon. members from different parties query or question the religious convictions or sincerity of other hon. members. Certainly I myself would never do that, because I believe that if somebody has deeply-held religious views—even if we disagree with them—we must respect his sincerity on the basis of his own admission, on the basis, of as the Lord himself said: Judge not, lest ye be judged. For that reason I believe that the de facto test of a man’s sincerity is whether he is prepared to do time and a half or whatever the Bill proposes. That is the test of sincerity. There is a certain sense in which one can almost do away with all the boards. All we need do is say to someone that if he is a religious objector that is his own decision, but that he must then serve extra time. By doing that we will immediately have taken the S.A. Defence Force right out of the whole high profile issue, out of all the problems, all the debates, all the political agitation, all those things which necessarily accompany this whole business. Then it would be up to the person in question himself. I think that is actually what is going to tip the scales for anyone who professes to be a religious objector. Personally I think that is a vital factor. A young lad who is determined to be a religious objector is determined despite, and also in a sense because of, the extra time he will have to serve. He is not going to be intimidated by a board, no matter how intimidating that board may be from the point of view of that young lad.

I believe that if this Bill goes through, and if the clause with which we are dealing now is passed, we are going to have to amend it very soon. I say that because the attitude of people is that a man’s religious convictions, or his moral and ethical convictions—as they are increasingly becoming in our secular society—are indeed important. I think it is important for us in this House to take note of the fact that the European Parliament, in February this year, passed a very interesting resolution about conscientious objection; something with which we do not agree but which, I believe, is going to have an influence because the European Parliament has taken note of it. It states in that resolution, which was passed with 111 votes for, 15 against and 35 abstentions, that there must be alternative services provided for anybody. They go so far as to say that alternative service—we do not agree with this, but it shows how far they are prepared to go—should be a right, and that it should be no longer than military service. That is what they are suggesting.

As I see it, this is the kind of resolution that is going to place more and more pressure on our society.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I now move the third and fourth amendments printed on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens, as follows—

1. (3) on page 16, in lines 50 to 64, to omit paragraph (b);
2. (4) on page 18, in lines 1 to 8, to omit subsection (4);

These amendments relate to the fines to be imposed on people who refuse to do commando service. We are opposed to that our attitude is quite clear. We fail to see why people who may be rich, and who can afford it, should be allowed to get out of military activities whereas people who are poor have to suffer the penalty of imprisonment or whatever other penalty it may be. That, I believe, is a bad principle. It is an unfortunate principle. I know that in Switzerland they have a form of this sort of penalty. I do not think, however, that this is one that we should allow in South Africa. It simply discriminates in favour of the rich, and that is something to which we are opposed.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to register our protest against the hon. the Minister of Defence, who is in charge of this Bill. I wish to do so on two grounds.

In the first instance clause 9 of the Bill now under discussion has nine subsections, each one of which should have been a separate clause and should have been dealt with separately in order to give this House an adequate opportunity for debate. I sincerely trust that in future this hon. Minister, and also other hon. Ministers, will not saddle this House in Committee in such a way that we cannot deal effectively with legislation, particularly when it comes to amendments to clauses. In this particular instance clause 9 should have been divided into nine different clauses.

My second protest, Mr. Chairman, is the following. We have now been discussing clause 9 for well over three hours.

Nearly four hours.

We have already heard more than 22 speeches, and there are seven pages of amendments. The hon. the Minister is not dealing now with a Second Reading; he is dealing with a Committee Stage. Hon. members can only speak three times each; after that they cannot speak again. Some hon. members are already about to deliver their third speeches. The hon. the Minister has so far failed to respond to a single one of the more than 22 speeches already delivered. [Interjections.] I should like to ask the hon. the Minister how he thinks it is possible for us to engage in meaningful debate, to put forward our arguments and to listen to his counter-arguments, and also to deal with his counter-arguments in turn. How does he expect us to conduct a meaningful debate on such an important issue in circumstances such as these? I challenge the hon. the Minister to get up and to deal with our arguments right now.

Yes, he should get up and begin to talk. [Interjections.] He should talk if he has the guts to talk! [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: is the hon. Chief Whip of the official Opposition entitled to say that the hon. the Minister does not have the guts to get up?

I did not say that.

You did.

I said the hon. the Minister must now have the guts to get up and talk.

Mr. Chairman, for the sake of clarity I wish to deal with a few matters that have already been raised. [Interjections.] Mr. Chairman, when the side-show is over, I shall continue. I should like to begin by expressing sincerely meant sympathy to a man whose patriotism and whose approach to defence matters I appreciate. He is a man who is in this building but who has not participated in this discussion in this House. I am referring to the hon. member for Yeoville. [Interjections.] I feel sorry for him and I want to state publicity that I respect the view that he has adopted, the view he has always held, and I am sorry that he has been forced to apply for exemption because of conscientious objection from participating in this debate. [Interjections.]

Hon. members on these benches have been attacked because we have been trying to obtain clarity—which at long last we now have—in regard to whether the PFP rejects an unjust war for political reasons as a basis for the ethics upon which a person can be an objector.

Where in the world does the hon. member get that nonsense from?

Has the PFP not accepted that?

Just define that again. [Interjections.]

I have been trying to get this matter settled, Mr. Chairman. The hon. member for Pinelands said that there was no such thing as a just war. He does not himself agree but he said that the PFP does not accept the concept of an unjust war.

The hon. member will not get any votes that way.

I am not looking for votes. The reason why I am doing this is because I am shocked that that party which springs form a history of parties that fought for this country should be adopting the attitude that they are adopting in respect of this Bill. [Interjections.] Unless the PFP repudiates the hon. member for Pinelands I will have established that the party itself and, I assume, the hon member for Wynberg, do not accept the concept of an unjust war as a reason for conscientious objection. Am I correct? [Interjections.] But the hon. member for Bryanston challenged me when I said that the party does not accept the concept of an unjust war as a reason for conscientious objection. [Interjections.] That is correct. I have established that fact. I have now established that that party does not accept political grounds for conscientious objection.

Correct, you have got the message.

Am I also correct in saying that it does not support exemption from military service on political grounds?

Correct.

When my colleague the hon. member for King William’s Town made that statement just now it was denied by the hon. Chief Whip and it was denied by other hon. members. [Interjections.] I have here extracts from the record of the representations made by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North this week in relation to a court martial. There are details here which affect this matter directly. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North had this to say—

Then he quotes the rebellion, strike and all the rest.

Is that correct?

I am not disputing it; I say he said it.

Do you agree with his views? [Interjections.]

Of course there are people who had political objections; I am not arguing that. If their objections were political objections, I disagreed with them.

The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North said—

He went on to say that Peter Hathorn’s views were sincerely held. He pointed out that those were sincere convictions. In reply to a question by the court he then stated—

Then he continued to state that he should be accommodated by being allowed to continue to serve …

You are quoting selectively.

I am quoting extracts, but these are the relevant ones. If I can have another two speaking turns, I shall read the whole thing. There are three essential elements. The one is that this is a politically motivated case. The second is that the hon. member has sympathy for his views. The third is that he should be accommodated. Those are the three essential elements.

The hon. member for Berea spoke very strongly in favour of one Yeats whose views, when he appeared before a court martial, were that the South African forces in Namibia were a criminal element. The question was—

The answer to that question was “Yes”. That hon. member in that party pleaded for him and supported him.

Mr. Chairman, on a point of order: I ask you for a ruling on the relevance of the hon. member’s speech.

Order! The hon. member for Durban Point must come back to the clause.

Sir, I have completed what I want to say, but the relevance of it is that the denials by that party are meaningless as long as its public representatives hold the views of the hon. members for Pietermaritzburg North and Berea and Mrs. Di Bishop and others like her. That party is trying to bluff the people of South Africa behind the cliché “moral and ethic grounds”.

The hon. member for Durban Central promised a clear answer and now we have it: They reject selective objection and they reject the unjust war objection. While the hon. member for Durban North was talking—I want to get this very clear—the hon. member for Durban Central interjected. The hon. member for Durban North said that he was talking about a group which held an ethical belief and then the hon. member for Durban Central interjected “Like Marxism”.

I did not say that; I deny it.

Well, one of the hon. members there said it. [Interjections.] I believe it was the hon. member for Greytown who said “Like Marxism”. [Interjections.]

Order! Hon. members must give the hon. member for Durban Point a chance to proceed with his speech.

I want to know whether that party accepts the tenets of Marxism as an “ethic”.

The answer is no.

Well, another hon. member of that party is now repudiated. [Interjections.]

Order! The hon. member for Green Point must contain himself.

The hon. member for Wynberg quoted at length in criticism of something I had said. He talked about the American court case. If he had read a little earlier in that article he would have seen that in the build-up to that case it led to demonstrations. I quote from the article—

That was the build-up to that court case. I quote further—

When did I read from that document?

The hon. member read from the findings of the court and he said that I had quoted from the same document. This is what I quoted from. What I am pointing out is that we do not want that sort of demonstration, protest and situation in this country. This article states that it was not the Government, but the courts which altered the meaning of the law by interpretation rather than by amendment.

The last point which I want to make is that that party denies that it accepts or will tolerate political objection, and yet its congress, according to a report in The Citizen of 23 November “refused to accept a motion excluding political objection” … [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I should like to refer briefly to something which the hon. member for Durban Central said. He referred to the D.R. Church’s “Geloofsbeswaar teen Diensplig”, published by the Broad Moderamen of the D.R. Church. I do not think the hon. member for Durban Central is a member of the D.R. Church. However, he is the only one in this House who quoted the opinion of the Broad Moderamen of the church to which I belong. Moreover, he quoted extremely selectively. We cannot allow this to happen. It is unfair to everyone who is a member of the D.R. Church. Therefore I wish to quote briefly what the hon. member should have quoted. Firstly, I wish to quote from page 1—

Therefore, this does not refer to a general atheistic concept of faith, but to the conscientious objection of a Christian. This makes an enormous difference. We do not take it amiss of the hon. member if he does not understand the language used by the D.R. Church. However, we do take it amiss of him when he says things without verifying them. However, the most important thing he should have quoted, is on page 20. If he wishes to quote the D.R. Church, he should please quote what it says on page 20 in full. I quote—

It is those ethical arguments which the PFP emphasizes so strongly. I quote further—

That is the standpoint of the D.R. Church. This is diametrically opposed to the standpoint which that party advocates.

We said so earlier.

No, that party did not say that. They said people should also be granted exemption on ethical grounds. Having said that, I hope this matter has been rectified.

The hon. member for Wynberg moved an amendment in respect of a mandatory right to appeal. The hon. member should accept that it is not possible on technical legal grounds to appeal to anything other than a court of record. They must accept that on technical legal grounds we have here a board…

In terms of our amendment.

In terms of the amendment?

Yes.

Very well. I understand from the amendment that an appeal to the Supreme Court concerning the decisions of the board is being requested.

[Inaudible.]

I beg your pardon?

Order! I cannot permit a debate across the floor of this House. The hon. member for Pretoria West is addressing this House.

Thank you. I merely wish to indicate how I understand the hon. member; and it is no use saying that I am not paying attention to his amendment, since I am repeating his amendment word for word. He says that this is in terms of his amendment, and I am aware of what his amendment says. In this case, only a review can take place. Legal action is not precluded, and this is an extremely important point. Although this is a board which consists of a judge and assessors who may also be theologians, the legal process is not precluded. It is still possible in this case. A person has a common law right to take his case to the Supreme Court for review. However, appeal is not technically possible in this case, since all kinds of prerequisites are needed before there can be an appeal. For example, it should be possible to have cross-examination and legal argument. However, this does not take place under these circumstances. Therefore this is the reply on that score. Consequently I do not think I can support this amendment.

The hon. member had a great deal to say about the legal position in the USA. The hon. member had a great deal to say about what the situation is in the USA. He referred to court verdicts in the USA. Let us understand one another now, since the rights of people in the USA are determined by their constitution which was drawn up in 1787, of course, with amendments which have been added afterwards. Surely the legal system, the legal environment, in the USA and the legal environment in South Africa are different. However, this does not mean that the one has a better society, or even a better legal society than the other. Court cases in the USA are interesting, but we should study them in their full context. If we do so, we see that things work differently there. Inter alia, the court case to which the hon. member referred was decided on 8 March 1971. There the court found that the conscientious objections of Guy Gilette and Louis Negré to a particular war—even if they were based on the Roman Catholic theory of the unjust war, which Negré invoked—were not permissible. This issue was concerned with what a just war was. However, it was said that this could not be argued, since they did not think the question of an unjust war was involved here. [Interjections.] That is the first point. The second point is that the court found that there may not be selective conscientious objections. The arguments of the hon. member for Pinelands concerned ethical and moral conscientious objections. He by no means requested that selectivity be eliminated. Therefore their argument is not comparable with the said verdict in America.

Let me put it this way. In South Africa we have a certain legal system, and our legal system requires the House of Assembly to make a value judgment on how important the House of Assembly thinks the military service is which a person should perform and whether we in this House think that anything other than religious objection should be permitted.

I wish to conclude now. The arguments we raised should, after all, be applicable to the South African situation. The arguments of the hon. member for Wynberg concerning the American legal system are in no way applicable to the South African situation.

Mr. Chairman, politicians have a bad reputation, in many cases, as far as the public is concerned, because of their ability …[Interjections.]

Order! On what proposed section contained in clause 9 is the hon. member now speaking?

Sir. I am dealing with the hon. member for Durban Point whom you allowed to speak at length on issues concerning me. The hon. member for Durban Point unfortunately does not help that reputation. I have the statement here and he started quoting from it as follows—

Then I made the following careful point in court—

Why did he not quote that?

The hon. member for Durban Point is trying to smear this party, but we are used to those tactics.

He should be ashamed of himself.

I believe that this debate in which the hon. member for Durban Point has come with his smear tactics and the expressed desire to put people against the wall and shoot them is going to ruin that party.

Did you say he should be accommodated?

Order!

I said that this young man was a sincere person and that he had strongly held views. I said he had real integrity and that I felt he could not make a contribution in the national interests in a civilian gaol. If you want to call it that, I spoke in mitigation—I do not know whether the hon. member has ever heard of that.

You said he should be accommodated.

Order!

If one happens to have known someone for ten years and one has a relationship with him, one does not just drop him because the hon. member for Durban Point happens to object.

What I find amazing about this debate is how hon. members can think that this party would be interested in the issue of a just or unjust war. This party, sitting in this Parliament, has a commitment to constitutional change. We have a commitment to a strong, proud Defence Force. The reason why we are concerned about this Bill is that we want the name of the Defence Force to be held high in this country. We do not enjoy this sort of high-profile trial, which brings no credit to the S.A. Defence Force. One of the reasons why we are concerned about this Bill is that we believe that this kind of legislation is going to exacerbate that situation and is going to continue to embarrass the Defence Force and bring it into direct conflict with the churches. I believe that if the hon. the Minister were to accept our amendments, the Defence Force would be relieved of all that embarrassment, all those problems, all those difficulties. It would make it quite clear to people that they must do their national service. Those who do not wish to do military national service will be punished, but the problems in this connection would immediately be withdrawn. We believe that this clause is going to produce problems. I do not want to deal with the implications of the Bill at this stage, but our concern as members of this party with relatives and ancestors who have served in the SADF is to try to prevent the Defence Force from getting involved in all these problems and issues. That is why we welcome certain of these provisions. However, we find hon. members in the House trying to smear us where we are concerned to have a Defence Force which is respected and honoured and which is not subjected to the awful embarrassment which this kind of issue causes. I want to make it quite clear that this party’s motivation for moving these amendments is the endeavour to keep the Defence Force clear of this kind of controversy. We believe that the legislation now before us is not going to make that sort of contribution, but is going to deal with young men, who may have sincerely held convictions, in ways which is going to make it very, very difficult for the Defence Force.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendments printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

1. (1) On page 12, in line 25, after “prove” to insert:
   on a balance of probabilities
2. (2) on page 12, in line 28, to omit “at his own expense”;
3. (3) on page 12, in line 30, to omit “investigation” and to substitute “questioning”;
4. (4) on page 12, in line 38, after “board” to insert:
   :Provided rules of procedure shall be reduced to writing and approved by the Minister
5. (5) on page 12, in line 39, to omit “not”;
6. (6) on page 12, in line 42, after “doors” to insert:
   either with the consent of the applicant, or for such evidence or for such argument as may be considered by the chairman to safeguard the security of the Republic
7. (7) on page 12, in line 50, after “proceedings” to insert:
   ; or

1. (c) where proceedings have been open to the public; or
2. (d) where the Minister has given his approval

These amendments refer to the procedures followed by boards for religious objection. The proposed insertion of “on a balance of probabilities” is a normal practice in legal procedure and I think no harm would be done by introducing it here because the chairman will in any case be a judge. The onus of proof will then be on the basis of probability and I think that that is the best way to deal with that.

As regards my second amendment, the situation is that the board is likely to sit in Pretoria. To expect a young fellow of 17, who might live in Springbok, in Cape Town or anywhere in South Africa, to have to meet all his own expenses in order to go to Pretoria is, I think, a bit unfair. I believe that it would be as well for the S.A. Defence Force to remove that particular problem that young people might have to go there. If he wants to have legal representatives or if he wants people to come up and support him, that is his problem and he will have to pay for that. However, I do not believe that where he goes alone it should be at his own expense.

My next amendment relates to the omission of the word “investigation” on page 12, line 30. We are dealing here with a board that is sitting on the man’s statements. I do not think that he has to be “investigated”. What we are really trying to do is to “question” him and find out what his real beliefs are. I think the word “investigation” should be substituted by the word “questioning”.

I now want to deal with amendment (4) namely, on page 12, line 38, after the word “board” to insert “provided rules of procedure shall be reduced to writing and approved by the Minister”. Subsection (3) will then read—

The same applies in the Military Discipline Code as to exactly how court martials should proceed and as to how courts of inquiry should proceed, and there is no reason why the procedure of this particular board should not also be reduced to writing. Then at least the Minister will know what is going on at all times.

The next amendment is on page 12, in line 39, where I want to omit the word “not” so that subsection (4) will read—

The next amendment is on page 12, in line 42. The hon. member for Umhlanga raised this point during the debate this morning. I want to add at the end of subsection (5) the words “either with the consent of the applicant, or for such evidence or for such argument as may be considered by the chairman to safeguard the security of the Republic”. One could, for example, have a objector saying that he does not want to serve in the Defence Force because they are making nuclear weapons, that he has been to such-and-such a place and that he has seen them. Or he can say that he has been here and there and that he has seen this, that and the other. I think that he might then be disclosing something in open court that can affect the security of South Africa. It is that that I want to stop. I want to make absolutely certain that if anything is done in open court it will not affect the security of South Africa. That is the only reason for that amendment and I see no reason why it cannot be accepted.

My final amendment relates to page 12, line 50. If this amendment is accepted subsection (6) will read—

1. (a) to the extent to which it may be necessary for the proper application of this section; or
2. (b) for the purposes of legal proceedings; or
3. (c) where proceedings have been open to the public; or
4. (d) where the Minister has given his approval, shall be guilty of an offence.

If it has been held in open court, as I have asked, then there is no reason why he should be guilty of an offence, or if it has been held in a closed court, it should be left to the Minister to give his approval for the publication of that particular matter. If the Minister gives his approval for publication he cannot be held guilty of an offence.

Mr. Chairman I do not think we can allow the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North to get away with what he has just said. I wish to give him a gentle reprimand. [Interjections.] I cannot simply allow him to get away with it. One thing he cannot get away from, is that he said in the evidence he gave in court—

Of course, it is true that this man does not need go to prison. It is very clear that the issue here is political objections. However, we simply cannot allow him to get away with that. The fact is that he made a plea for a political objector to be recognized. [Interjections.] I can attach no other meaning to those words of his. [Interjections.]

Order!

I can attach no other meaning to those words of his. The hon. member said that he should be recognized so that he would not have to go to prison.

Why did he appear in court then?

However, there is another facet I wish to reprimand the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North about. He made an emotional speech here in which he said that that party did, in fact, want this category of people to be recognized so that the Defence Force could be dispensed with.

Time will prove us right.

Let us accept that the hon. member’s intentions were honourable; that this was, in fact, his intention. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that this will not, in fact, be the case; that this will not be the result, in the sense that if we recognize other people besides religious objectors, each time those people appear before the board and they are justified, each time someone is justified on ethical, moral or political grounds, the effort in which the Defence Force is engaged will be made out to be unjustified. This is, in fact, what the result will be. Each time the objections of a person from among their number is recognized as being lawful, we are consequently recognizing that our Defence Force is engaged in unlawful acts—engaged in unethical and immoral acts. Therefore each time one affords these people recognition, one is, in fact, undermining the morale of one’s own people.

I should like to quote from an article written by a certain Gendin. It is an article written about this very question of conscientious objection. The article appeared under the heading “Governmental tolerance of civil disobedience”. In it the writer builds a case for civil disobedience and, inter alia, he writes the following—

Of course, this lies at the heart of the matter. Each time those people appear before a board and that board acknowledges that they are right, the board is acknowledging that it is wrong, and it is therefore undermining its own Government.

A further statement I wish to make, is that after making inquiries I ascertained that the only kind of objectors we have had during the past few years in this country were serious religious objectors—religious objectors—on the one hand, and political objectors on the other. As far as I know there has not been a single case of someone truly objecting on ethical grounds without those ethical grounds being based fundamentally on religion. There are simply no such cases. However, what does in fact happen, is that people initially object from a political point of view, and afterwards they try and base their objection on an ethical or moral standpoint. This is something we are all well acquainted with. Those people always use that platform to propagate their standpoint.

There is a third point I wish to make in view of what the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North had to say. He said that the fact that a person was prepared to do a longer period of service was already proof of his sincerity, as he put it. It is my contention that this is not the case. There are many people who are prepared to make sacrifices for the cause they believe in, but that cause is not necessarily one which is favourable to us or a cause which is associated only with that person. There are people who are our enemies who are prepared to make sacrifices for their cause and those sacrifices would be so much easier and so much more pleasant for them if they could firstly use them as a platform and then do two years additional service in a comfortable post somewhere. If one were to accept all the amendments of the Opposition, it would ultimately be an extremely small sacrifice they would have to make. However, it does further the cause he believes in, the cause of the downfall of South Africa. Therefore the mere fact that a person is prepared to do longer service, particularly in the improved circumstances which the Opposition is advocating for him, does not impress me. It by no means convinces me that that person does, in fact, really have a serious objection.

The person we really wish to protect, is the person we place in great difficulty if we call him up for military service. If, to his way of thinking, a person’s objection is based on a command he receives from a Supreme Being, we are placing that person in an extremely serious situation. We now expect him to disobey the commands of a being who is above him and over whose commands he has no control, a being greater than he. We expect such a person to rebel against someone greater and stronger than he is and who will wreak vengeance on him. We expect him to rebel against his Redeemer and this is what we wish to prevent. We wish to avoid plunging that person into that tremendous struggle in which he has to disobey his Redeemer.

As far as the person with the ethical, moral objections is concerned, those ethical, moral objections ultimately reside within himself. In his Second Reading speech the other day, the hon. member for Bezuidenhout argued that conscience was within a person. We are simply bringing that person into conflict with himself, and each one of us is in conflict with ourselves daily. It is nothing unusual. I have no sympathy for that person, but we wish to make provision for the person whom we want to cause to rebel against his Maker. That is why I think this legislation is one of the best pieces of legislation which could be accepted by any Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to begin by thanking the hon. member for Helderkruin sincerely for his very fine elucidation and for the motivated contribution he made.

I want to refer very briefly to the various amendments moved by hon. members in this House, and I shall do so in the sequence in which they were moved. Consequently I begin with the hon. member for Parys. To my mind his amendments were very well motivated. I think that they are a substantial improvement on the legislation, and therefore I accept them. I agree with him that they will be conducive to greater fairness and a more sympathetic approach.

I come now to the hon. member for Durban Point. I accept his first amendment. I also consider it to be a fair proposal which ensures that minor and non-material deficiencies in an application will not cause it to fail. I prefer the amendments moved by the hon. member for Durban Point to the fifth amendment of the hon. member for Berea. I think the one moved by the hon. member for Durban Point will make better provision, and for that reason I accept it.

I also accept the second amendment of the hon. member for Durban Point. The dissimilar nature of the non-recurring community service is a factor which, correctly, renders such service inherently more arduous for category 3 religious objectors. In my opinion the one-and-a-half formula is adequate compensation in regard to community service. I am therefore prepared to depart from the twice and accept one-and-a-half times. [Interjections.] In certain cases this will amount to a period of approximately six years. In terms of the amendment the community service will be just less than six years. In my opinion this is one of the very important factors as to why I am prepared to accept the one-and-a-half. Moreover it simplifies the legislation in that we will now have the formula of one-and-a-half times throughout. Consequently there will be no doubt in respect of the circumstances. This factor of one-and-a-half times will not be affected by the category or the circumstances as such.

If it should subsequently appear—this point is very important—that the reduction of the period from twice to one-and-a-half is going to cause us to have a tremendous influx in the sense that there will not really be a category 2 while there is a heavy influx to category 3, I shall have to reconsider this principle. I shall then have to consider whether the one-and-a-half times should not be amended.

In my opinion it is important that the principle of one-and-a-half times should be applied throughout in respect of section 22, section 44 and the proposed section 126A. This means that a category 2 objector will do one-and-a-half times as much service per occasion. This means that the initial period of two years will be three years in his case. His follow-up service may be a maximum of 120 days per two years, and it would be unfair if I were to apply the formula of 120 days and the two years exclusively to that follow-up service. I think one should be reasonable in this connection. I visualize that one’s approach will be to see what the average citizen force serviceman does during that period. If that average period is less than 90 days—that is the maximum in one year—and amounts to 60 days for example, it has to be applied in the case of category 2 so that we do not make the service of any person who falls into that category does too onerous. Category 3 then remains one-and-a-half and this amounts to approximately six years, as I have just elucidated it.

The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North moved the first amendment of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens. He requested that one-and-a-quarter times be substituted for the one-and-a-half times. This is not acceptable since I have already accepted the second amendment moved by the hon. member for Durban Point. I think my acceptance of the hon. member for Durban Point’s amendment is to a certain extent, too, an accommodation as far as the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens is concerned.

I come next to the hon. member for Berea. I accept his first amendment. At a later stage the hon. member for Sasolburg moved the same amendment, but since the hon. member for Berea moved his first, I am accepting his amendment.

I come now to the second amendment of the hon. member for Berea. Since religious convictions have already been accepted as the decisive factor for the classification of religious objectors—this is in my opinion the argument we have had here throughout, because we talk about religious objectors and not of objectors on moral and ethical grounds, since we disposed of that matter during the Second Reading—it is important to me that the religious objector’s articles of faith and books of revelation should be submitted in support of his application. I think that is basic, that is his premise. The hon. member for Sasolburg and the hon. member for Pretoria West motivated this very well and therefore I cannot accept the hon. member’s second amendment.

As far as the third amendment of that hon. member is concerned, I feel that affidavits carry more weight than mere statements. Consequently, I prefer this as the hon. member for Sasolburg moved it. Therefore I cannot accept the third amendment of the hon. member.

The fourth amendment of the hon. member seeks to restrict the making of statements to persons who are willing to do so. This restricts the applicant and the board in that they cannot therefore exclude any person with information which could have a material affect on the finding of the board, from offering such information because he does not perhaps wish to become involved. For that reason I do not accept this amendment either.

I accept the fifth amendment of the hon. member. It was in fact the hon. member for Durban Point who moved the amendment. I think he phrased it better, but this will also accommodate the hon. member’s amendment. I think the hon. member is perfectly satisfied with that.

I accept the hon. member’s sixth amendment, in terms of which “but shall” is omitted and “but may” substituted. I think this is an improvement. The hon. member originally moved “or may”, but I think that that does not read quite correctly. I therefore wish to suggest that the hon. member moves that this be changed to “but may” instead of “or may”. That would be better.

Mr. Chairman, with leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment No. (6).

Amendment, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, I now move the following amendment—

Mr. Chairman, I also accept the seventh amendment of the hon. member, i.e. that the period of grace of 14 days be extended to 30 days. I think this is a very good suggestion.

Unfortunately I cannot accept the hon. member’s eighth amendment because we are in fact entering in the channel of command of the person concerned and his commanding officer. It could be that the commanding officer is a lieutenant, or it could be that his commanding officer has a higher rank. However, there is a certain channel of command in accordance with which action must be taken. From a disciplinary point of view it would be far better and correct that he use that channel. As far as the practice is concerned, I therefore prefer the present wording of the clause and I therefore do not accept the hon. member’s amendment.

I come now to the hon. member for Sasolburg. His first amendment falls away because it has already been moved by the hon. member for Berea. I have already accepted it. In my opinion the hon. member’s second amendment, in respect of continued service of training of the applicant is a very good one and I therefore accept it. It will lead to good administration. The third amendment of the hon. member, which deals with the removal of the restriction placed on the board in regard to the hearing of applications, is a substantial improvement. It now eliminates the repetition of the process which would have had to be followed if the board had not been able to hear an application within 30 days. I agree with that. Thank you very much for the amendment. The fourth amendment of the hon. member broadens the test and I accept it.

I come now to the hon. member for Durban Central. Unfortunately I cannot accept his four amendments. The aspect involved here—I think we discussed this at length—is that this board is not a court. It does not try anyone. It is concerned with religious grounds of objection and not with merit. Consequently it is not concerned with whether a standpoint is right of wrong. In my opinion theologians, owing to their training and experience, are better equipped than legal people to determine through discussion the grounds of an objection with reference to an objector’s articles of faith and books of revelation. I think this is a point which was argued by many hon. members here in this House today. I am personally of the opinion that a clergyman or theologian is better equipped to determine the sincerity and credibility as individual of the religious objector. He has the expertise. He has the background. I am personally of the opinion that he has a better chance of forming an opinion, and he also has a sympathetic approach, as member of the board, as compared with that of the legal representative.

I think the hon. member for Helderberg also made a very well motivated contribution in this connection, and so did the hon. member for Ventersdorp. An upright theologian must—mention was made of this today—in my opinion, just like a judge, be absolutely impartial in his assessment of persons. Of course this also applies to the theologians of the various church denominations, and there were hon. members who put questions to me about churches that object to this legislation, but the same applies to those of them who are so vehemently opposed to the legislation, who may possibly be represented on the Board, as permanent members or as co-opted members. There is no reason why they cannot serve on the board. I visualize that some of their members will in fact be able to serve on the board.

This brings me to the hon. member for Jeppe. He moved two amendments, and I accept both amendments. [Interjections.] The effect of these amendments is to ensure that no manipulation of the system occurs in that it is insisted that the religious objector in category 3 who was employed in a government body prior to classification, in other words who is possibly already working for the State, performs his community service in the posts which already exist for community service and in which he was previously employed, while it may perhaps not be convenient to have it that way. For example the person may not be suitable for the position, depending on the circumstances and the environment in which he has to work. The motion also ensures that it is stated beyond all doubt that the hon. the Minister of Manpower, or an office-bearer authorized thereto by him, apart from the identification of positions, may also recommend where the religious objectors should go and perform their community service.

The hon. member put certain questions yesterday during the Second Reading debate, and he put questions again today. I just wish to reply to these very briefly. He asked how theologians were to be selected. The churches will be asked for nominations, and then the hon. the Minister of Manpower, in consultation with the Minister of Defence, shall decide who to appoint to the board. He also referred to alternates and asked whether they would be full members of the board. They are of course by implication full members of the board. Should a member of the board therefore be absent, there is an alternate who can automatically continue with the work. He also asked a question about the applicant. He asked whether the applicant would be able to receive any legal assistance with the completion of his application. He may. The most important requirement is simply that he has to sign it himself.

A question was then asked about open or closed courts. The third amendment of the hon. member for Pretoria West is acceptable to me. It is acceptable to me that the board should, according to that concept, be an open board. Some of the other Opposition parties also felt very strongly that we should not have a closed board, but an open one. The question of “vexatiously” which the hon. member was concerned about, is being deleted as a result of the fifth amendment of the hon. member for Pretoria West. I therefore accept the first and second amendments of the hon. member for Jeppe.

I come now to the hon. member for Pretoria West. I accept his first amendment which is in fact consequential upon his fifth amendment. As far as his second amendment is concerned, the procedure of the board is prescribed to ensure uniformity where more than one board is appointed, and also to cause the applicant to be notified in advance of the procedure of the board. There will be regulations in this connection. I therefore accept the amendment as moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West.

The third amendment is concerned with open proceedings of the board. Here we have a shift in emphasis. I prefer this amendment to the amendment as moved by the hon. member for Umhlanga. As I have said, it is merely a shift of emphasis. The hon. member for Pretoria West sees it as an open board which may be closed by the chairman, depending upon the circumstances. The hon. member for Umhlanga, on the other hand, sees it as a closed board which may be opened, whether by the applicant or by the chairman. The concept of an open board is to my way of thinking better than the premise of a closed board. I therefore accept the third amendment of the hon. member for Pretoria West. The fourth amendment is consequential upon the third, and this is also accepted.

The fifth amendment seeks to delete the recovery costs in the case of vexatiousness. The hon. member motivated his case very well. If the provision is deleted, it will give the applicant the confidence to present his case with nothing to be concerned about. Consequently I accept that amendment.

The sixth amendment excludes an applicant who supports the enemy from being declared to be a religious objector. Personally I think the board is not equipped to decide on the matter. I therefore accept the sixth amendment of the hon. member for Pretoria West.

I come next to the seventh amendment. Only the first two years of community service are excluded from recognition for promotion, remuneration, etc. in the case of officials. This eliminates elements of punishment over and above the element of compensation. Representations have been received from various parties to the effect that we should not leave this unchanged for the period of six or eight years because it may possibly be too onerous a penalty. The seventh amendment provides that this will apply only for two years. I accept the amendment as moved.

The first amendment of the hon. member for Umhlanga is not acceptable because, as I have explained, it deprives the chairman of the initiative. His second and third amendments are acceptable to me provided “one-and-a-half times" is substituted for “twice” and “18 days” is substituted for “24 days”.

Mr. Chairman, with leave of the Committee, I withdraw my amendment No. (3).

Amendment, with leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Chairman, I now move the following amendment—

The hon. member’s amendments Nos. (4) to (8) and (10) to (14) are of a consequential nature and are therefore also acceptable. I also accept amendment No. (9) as moved by the hon. member for Umhlanga.

I come next to the hon. member for Umbilo.

†He moved only one amendment. Despite the merits of his argument, I cannot accept that amendment. By and large such a provision seems unnecessary because of other amendments such as the opening of proceedings and provision being made for a minister of his religion to serve on the board. His own minister can assist him at any rate by giving him advice when drawing up his initial application and by testifying at the hearing. The hon. member for Benoni elaborated on this matter and I agree with his views on this aspect.

*As far as the hon. member for Pinelands is concerned, his first amendment is concerned with the substitution of the word “imprisonment” for the word “detention” for category 3. Unfortunately this amendment cannot be accepted because the laws and regulations of the prison service do not make provision for parole. This means that if imprisonment were to be imposed, we could not release them immediately and give them the opportunity to perform this community service while, if it is detention, we are in fact able to do this. I wish to put it this way: This is an aspect which accommodates the religious objectors, and most of them will benefit from it. They are perfectly satisfied. We consulted the main group which is involved in this matter.

As far as amendment No. (2) is concerned, namely the deletion of the commutation sum, this was also moved by the hon. member for Umhlanga and has already been accepted by me.

Amendment No. (3) is consequential upon amendment No. 1 which has been rejected, and therefore this amendment must also be rejected.

Amendment No. (4) has already been moved by the hon. member for Umhlanga and accepted.

Amendment No. (5) is consequential upon amendment No. 1 which has already been rejected and must also therefore be rejected.

Amendment No. (6) requests that an ordinary court martial shall not be able to impose up to three years imprisonment in regard to category 2 refusal to render service. However, this is unfortunately necessary owing to jurisdiction extension, and for that reason this amendment must also be rejected.

Amendment No. (7) has already been moved by the hon. member for Umhlanga and accepted.

I come next to the hon. member for Wynberg. Amendment No. (12), as was also moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West, has been accepted.

Amendment No. (15) has also been accepted. This means that a category 1 person who has a rank, will retain it. I know this could create a problem in the case of an officer, but I hope that it will seldom happen in practice. However, I accept the amendment as moved by the hon. member for Wynberg.

In passing I could just say that the hon. member for Hillbrow became very loquacious as a result of this legislation. I just want to tell that hon. member that it is not I who draft the laws, but the law advisers, and I take his point. I do not issue instructions to law advisers in respect of their expertise.

With reference to amendment No. (16), an applicant who thinks that justice was not done at the hearing of his application, may in any event take the case to the Supreme Court on review. Consequently it is not necessary to make provision for that here as well. The applicant’s rights are accommodated by means of the existing legislation in regard to review protection, and therefore I cannot accept amendment No. (16).

I come next to the hon. member for Greytown who moved amendment No. (5) on behalf of the hon. member for Cape Town Gardens. In spite of the merits of his motion and without wishing to comment on the suitability of the institutions to which the hon. member referred, I think that the time is not yet ripe at this stage for this proposed dispensation. With these statutory amendments we are in fact dealing with a new system which has not yet come into operation. Before we consider approaching non-government institutions and adding them to a list of government institutions, I first think we should see whether we cannot get the present system to function and afterwards one can consider the idea as the hon. member proposed it. At this stage, however, I do not think it is wise, and consequently I do not accept that amendment.

That brings me now to the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. He was the last hon. member who moved amendments. His first amendment dealt with the extension of the onus of proof of being declared religious objectors, by way of the insertion of a provision that it should rest on a balance of probabilities. This is already implicit in the provision in the Bill. Consequently it is unnecessary to state it again. Therefore I do not accept the first amendment of the hon. member either. In his second amendment the hon. member for Bezuidenhout asks that the words “at his own expense” in regard to a conscientious objector be omitted. I cannot accept that. The reason for that is that the appearance of such a person before the board is to his own benefit. That is why it is deemed fit and proper that he should bear the costs involved himself. The same applies in the case of national servicemen, for example, who wish to appear before a medical board while they are not rendering service. Such a national serviceman must also pay his own travelling expenses. The same would apply in the case of a national serviceman who asked to appear before an exemption board.

With reference to the example which the hon. member for Bezuidenhout quoted of a person who has to travel from Cape Town to Pretoria to appear before a board, I just wish to point out that, as hon. members ought to have observed throughout, reference is made throughout the Bill to various boards. I do not visualize that the board will sit only in Pretoria. I foresee a geographic distribution of boards, depending on …

It is not stated in that way in the Bill.

No, but the legislation makes provision for various boards. The hon. member will note that the measure does not make provision for only one board, but for various boards.

In his third amendment the hon. member for Bezuidenhout requests that the word “investigation” be omitted and the word “questioning” substituted. I want to point out again that this board is not a court of law. The board will have to question the applicant and his witnesses in any event, if it wishes to assess the statements of the applicant or his witnesses. As far as I am concerned, the concept of investigation already includes the element of questioning. That is why I cannot accept this amendment of the hon. member.

The fourth amendment of the hon. member for Bezuidenhout relates to the procedure of the board. The amendment moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West, in which he requested that this be prescribed, is more acceptable to me. It will be prescribed by way of regulation. This is important to me, because a suggestion was made which amounted to the Minister having to promulgate certain provisions. I myself do not think that the Minister finds himself on such a level that we should see this absolute necessity for that in this. It will therefore be done by way of regulation by the State President, who is an even higher authority than the Minister. Consequently I do not accept that amendment either.

As regards the fifth amendment of the hon. member—it is in connection with legal representation before the board—I repeat that I do not think this is a court of law, and that legal representation would therefore be considered unnecessary in this case as well. The applicant may in fact make use of lawyers who assist him in drafting his application. Before the board, however, his clergyman will be of far greater value to him than a legal representative. One of the hon. members referred in this report to a fraternal disacussion. In accordance with these regulations it will be determined what procedure will be adopted, and I visualize that form of discussion, far more than anything else. There is no cross-examination on the board. There is no question of there being a desire on the part of the board to, as it were, crucify anyone. It is not a trial which is taking place.

In regard to the sixth amendment moved by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout, I just wish to point out that I prefer the amendment moved by the hon. member for Pretoria West, which has already been accepted. Owing to the acceptance of the amendment by the hon. member for Pretoria West that the proceedings should be open, the seventh amendment of the hon. member for Bezuidenhout also falls away.

Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment printed in my name on the Order Paper, as follows—

In reaction to the hon. the Minister, I wish to say the following by way of commencement. Although he has not been able to satisfy us in many respects, I do want to say that some of the amendments he has accepted and which were, in fact, placed on the Order Paper by us, are sound amendments and we should like to express our appreciation to the hon. the Minister for his attitude in this regard. I am thinking in particular of his decision that the proceedings of the board shall be open. I think this is an important improvement. The omission of that particular vexation is important. There is also the omission with regard to recovery costs and everything connected with such costs. That is also important. I think we are also particularly grateful for the omission of those provisions in the Bill which refer to support of the enemies of South Africa, since this was a problem we were very concerned about. I think it is an important amendment which was accepted by the hon. the Minister in this regard. There is also the question of his co-operation concerning promotion in respect of people who are already serving in the Defence Force. This is an important concession which is certainly accepted with appreciation by this side of the House. The commutation sum payable has also been omitted. This is also important and we are grateful for this. I am sorry that at this stage he has rejected the amendment of the hon. member for Greytown in respect of community service in other possible institutions. I think the hon. the Minister could well reconsider whether he cannot accept it.

Time does not permit me to comment on the other amendments accepted by the hon. the Minister, as well as those he did not see fit to accept. I hope we can come back to this later in the debate.

My proposed amendment to this clause deals with all the measures which could be taken in respect of the third category of religious objectors which could be prescribed by way of regulation, as well as the penalties and other provisions they could be subject to. What are we dealing with here? Firstly, a group of religious objectors, that group falls into category 3. These are people who do not refuse to do service for arbitrary or superficial reasons. That third group of people are these whom we may generally regard as being non-militarists and people who, because of serious objections, do not see their way clear to become involved in any form of military service. That group, then, consists of people who refuse to do that kind of service because of their serious religious objections. However, it is also a category of people whose objections have been accepted by the board. By placing them in category 3, the board has therefore accepted that the religious objections of those people are genuine, and consequently they ought to be respected. By accepting those objections, it is clear that the board has accepted that those people are not refusing to do military service for arbitrary or superficial reasons. If this is the case, then it seems to me to be foolish to penalize those people further with what really amounts to penalties of an extremely serious nature. They are already being penalized by having to perform community service for six years. I wish to say at the outset in this regard that we welcome the reduction of that period from eight years to six years. However, they are already being penalized, since they have to perform one-and-a-half times continuous service for a period of six years. From a purely human point of view, one could consider the fact that if a young man of 19 or 20 years who, on the basis of serious religious objections to participating in military action, is being penalized for six years, if the Minister does not reduce that period, will have to perform community service, he will only have completed it when he is 25 or 26 years old. This is a tremendous chunk to cut out of the life of any young man. It could ultimately determine the whole course of his life and his future, since these are the formative years of every young man, as we are all aware. Since such a person is already being penalized, as it were, by having to give up six years of his life during that important period in his life, we should not have additional measures which, in fact, take on the character of punitive measures.

I think there is a simple question each hon. member of this House should ask himself: What would the position be if perhaps I had a son who, in view of his own religious convictions, felt that he could not participate in military actions? May I be so bold as to say that this is a possibility which exists for many hon. members in this House. As far as we are concerned, we have no doubt about the desirability or otherwise of participating in a war or in military activities, but with the best will in the world it is impossible for us to say beforehand how our own children are going to feel about this matter. That is why I am saying that when we assess this clause in the Bill, we must ask ourselves how we would feel if one of our own sons were to be placed in category 3.

You are being highly subjective now.

Of course it is subjective, but it is subjective in respect of an objective question I wish to put to the hon. member for Durban Point as well.

We are making laws for everybody; not just for ourselves.

Of course, I concede that, but this concerns the impact of these measures. In the light of this, I can only say that these are not subjective views I am advancing, since in our judgment of this clause it is desirable that we should ask whether this clause can affect anyone of us who is a member of this House. If, as far as we are concerned, we accept that this is sound legislation, we can expect that it will also be generally accepted. However, if we say that as it affects us and our children, it is not sound legislation, then it means that we should take care not simply to accept it.

The issue here is not the Defence Force. What I mean by this is that the objections I am raising are not a reflection on the Defence Force, since the regulations which are being made in terms of these provisions are made by the State President. Therefore, in the final instance, it is the politicians who make the regulations. The objections I am raising in respect of these provisions are therefore not objections to the Defence Force as such.

What can be done in terms of the powers being granted to the State President by this Bill? Firstly, the kind of employer which the religious objector can work for may be stipulated, viz. in one of those two categories. The hon. the Minister is of the opinion that he cannot accept the amendment of my hon. colleague, and therefore, in terms of the regulations, the employer of the religious objector can be determined for him. [Time expired.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to start by saying that we on this side of the House are most appreciative, and in a way we consider it a victory for sanity, to find that the hon. the Minister has agreed to suggestions, also coming from some of his own people, that the period of community service should be reduce from twice to one-and-a-half times as long.

Say thank you to Vause.

This was one of the main concerns which we expressed in addition to the limitation on the basis for objection. However, it was the period which we were most concerned about. Thirdly, we were also concerned about the restrictions or the provisions which apply to these people doing community service, which my hon. colleague Prof. Olivier has just dealt with. Those of us who were here during the Second Reading debate may well be aware of the fact that one becomes a slave to one’s own words, but I want to say that the reduction of the period plus our anticipated reappraisal in terms of my hon. colleague Prof. Olivier’s proposal with regard to the provisions and limitations placed on these young people doing community service, may well go a long way towards proving that the words which I used last week in that context were correct but in terms of the new provisions may certainly no longer be appropriate. [Interjections.] We consider it a victory and a sensible attitude in that regard. If we could get the rest of the amendments proposed accepted, then certainly we would be fairly happy.

There are certain other amendments which still stand in my name on the Order Paper which I want to move. I move the amendments on clause 9, numbered Nos. (1) to (11), (13) and (14) and (17) up to and including (36) on the Order Paper, and now renumbered as follows—

1. (4) On page 8, in line 41, to omit “religious”;
2. (5) on page 10, in line 22, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
3. (6) on page 10, in line 28, to omit “religious”;
4. (7) on page 12, in line 25, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
5. (8) on page 12, in line 26, to omit “religious”;
6. (9) on page 12, in line 57, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
7. (10) on page 12, in line 58, after “convictions” to insert:
   • or moral or ethical convictions
8. (11) on page 12, in line 60, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
9. (12) on page 12, in line 61, after “convictions” to insert:
   • or moral or ethical convictions
10. (13) on page 12, in line 66, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
11. (14) on page 12, in line 67, after “convictions” to insert:
    • or moral or ethical convictions
12. (15) on page 14, in line 35, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
13. (16) on page 16, in line 6, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
14. (17) on page 16, in line 16, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
15. (18) on page 16, in line 21, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
16. (19) on page 16, in line 38, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
17. (20) on page 18, in lines 49 and 50, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
18. (21) on page 18, in line 52, to omit “religious”;
19. (22) on page 18, in line 55, to omit “religious”;
20. (23) on page 18, in line 56, to omit “religious”;
21. (24) on page 18, in line 60, to omit “religious”;
22. (25) on page 18, in line 64, to omit “religious”;
23. (26) on page 18, in line 65, to omit “religious”;
24. (27) on page 18, in lines 67 and 68, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
25. (28) on page 18, in line 68, to omit “religious”;
26. (29) on page 18, in line 70, and on page 20, in line 1, to omit “religious”;
27. (30) on page 20, in line 19, to omit “religious”;
28. (31) on page 20, in line 37, to omit “religious”;
29. (32) on page 22, in line 63, to omit “religious”;
30. (33) on page 22, in line 66, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
31. (34) on page 24, in line 55, to omit “a religious” and to substitute “an”;
32. (35) on page 28, in line 20, to omit “religious”;
33. (36) on page 28, in line 22, to omit “religious”.

Order! I am unable to accept the further amendments moved by the hon. member as they are in conflict with a principle of the Bill as read a Second Time.

The answers which we had from the hon. the Minister on the amendments which he had accepted are certainly most pleasing. However, there is one area which I find a bit surprising and that is that the hon. the Minister has agreed, I understand, to make the service of the category 2 objector, who now will be doing six years service, i.e. time-and-a-half, continuous. Am I wrong in that respect?

I have not accepted that.

Business interrupted in accordance with Standing Order No. 22.

House Resumed:

Progress reported and leave granted to sit again.