Mr. Speaker, I move—

Mr. Speaker, our attitude to this Bill is very well-known. We regard this Bill as a measure which is clearly designed to deprive nurses in self-governing States of their right to belong to the S.A. Nursing Association and to compel them to form their own ethnic and separate nursing associations. We believe that what this Bill seeks to achieve is totally contrary to the spirit which should obtain in a noble and humanitarian profession, which should be kept free of this sort of racial consideration.

We have, in previous debates on this Bill and on other similar legislation, pointed out the harm which this sort of measure can cause to the nursing profession. We have also stressed the feeling of alienation from the rest of the profession which Black nurses will now harbour. The hon. the Minister is well aware of the situation which already obtains in this regard. I believe that by introducing this measure he is aiding and abetting tampering with a very healthy attitude which has existed amongst our nurses, both Black and White, in South Africa, who have been proud of being associated in a single professional body.

The hon. the Minister brings this Bill solely to place beyond all reasonable doubt the legality of forcing the separation of a large section of our Black nurses in South Africa from the rest of the profession in the Republic. This is the object behind this Bill. We believe it is a thoroughly bad object. We believe it is a harmful object. We look at this Bill as a shabby little measure which we are compelled to reject with the utmost contempt. We will therefore vote against the Third Reading of this Bill. [Interjections.]

Mr. Speaker, I listened attentively to what the hon. member for Berea said. I want to stress what was said in the Second Reading and the Committee Stage, and which was also very clearly evident from the views also advanced by the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North.

I want to begin by differing outright with what the hon. member for Berea has just said. The nurses of South Africa are not being deprived of a single right by this measure; on the contrary, doors and opportunities, which they did not have before, are being opened to them. We have to consider the Bill as it reads at present, and examine every clause, as well as what is envisaged by those clauses. Because we are faced with pressure from outside, foreign political boycott campaigns, an effort is now for the first time being made, to merge the various nurses’ associations by way of an umbrella body. It is being done by means of a body which was established by the nursing profession itself. It is a body which the nursing profession asked for. In fact, the retiring president, Prof. Charlotte Searle, was in favour of it.

Just as provision has been made by means of legislation for medical doctors and pharmacists to establish their own separate bodies, similar provision is being made for the nursing profession in the measure under discussion. In this way the separate health service professions are, as it were, being brought into line with each other, not just with regard to local authorities, but also as regards the opportunity to, in the first place, take part in international congresses, for example, and secondly, to enable every nurse who has the necessary qualifications and who is prepared to do so, to take part in conferences of this nature. This measure concerns the use of each others’ expertise with regard to the standards of the services provided by the separate institutions. Secondly, it concerns the training of these people. This means that every nurse in Southern Africa, after having obtained her qualifications, will not have to take a back seat to her colleagues in South Africa or in any national State as far as her standard is concerned. This is what it is all about. It does not concern the type of KwaZulu politics which the Opposition tried to make of this matter.

Again today I want to express my absolute disgust at the conduct of the hon. chief spokesman of the PFP during the Committee Stage of this Bill. I am tempted to say that it was outrageous of him to have abused this measure to get at the hon. the Minister. To us it was a completely transparent effort. We could clearly see what kind of a game the PFP was playing. Firstly, they engaged in with a kind of KwaZulu politics. Secondly, they launched an attack on the hon. the Minister. They are not at all concerned about the nurses as such. They do not allow themselves to be guided by the wishes of the Nurses’ Association. This afternoon, and on previous occasions as well, they in fact in suited the retiring president of the S.A. Nursing Council, Prof. Charlotte Searle. If there is one person to which we can listen in this regard, it is she. She endorses this measure. As far as we are concerned, we confine ourselves to the essence of the matter. What is of importance to us, is the interests, the welfare, the quality and the mobility of the nursing profession. We want to honour them for the contribution they make to the total framework of health services in South Africa. Whether they are in KwaZulu, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Soweto or anywhere else in South Africa, we honour and respect them and wish them well. They can only benefit from this new body which they have created, a body which will represent the interests of everybody in Lenasa.

The other evening the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North indicated that he did not even know what Lenasa stood for. Surely, if he wants to debate this matter he is supposed to know what it stands for. I believe it is an absolute scandal. The hon. Leader of the Opposition will have to call those hon. members in and tell them that if they want to take part in debates in this House, they should ensure that they know what they are talking about, and that they should confine themselves to the measures being discussed without launching personal political attacks on the hon. the Minister on the pretext of promoting the interests of a health service.

I support the hon. the Minister and I thank him for introducing this measure in the House.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot but associate myself with what the hon. member for Brits said. He expressed his disapproval of the behaviour of the official Opposition because they have blatantly and calculatingly abused the professional association of nurses in order to physically demonstrate their dissatisfaction at this legislation. Their actions did not concern the promotion of the nursing profession, but the propagation of a political philosophy. Once again it is very clear that the PFP simply cannot accept this type of legislation because it is in conflict with their philosophy of liberalism, of equality, fraternity and the obliteration of all boundaries between nations and countries. It is in conflict with their concept of a unitary state in South Africa, with common citizenship. Their concept just does not make provision for separate Governments and separate professional associations for example for the nursing profession, that we are dealing with here, to be established. The official Opposition advocate one nursing association for the whole of South Africa. Do they also advocate one teachers’ association for all teachers in South Africa?

Yes, we plead for it daily.

Very well. Now the public knows what it would be letting itself in for if it were to support that party. [Interjections.] This violent opposition by the Opposition does not really stem from a genuine interest in the nursing profession. This unusual interest stems from their desire to derive party-political gain from it. When we discussed this same legislation last year, the hon. member for Berea even denied that KwaZulu was a self-governing Black State. Surely he will still remember that. This self-appointed spokesman for the Black people in South Africa now wants to tell these people what should and should not be acceptable to them.

The Departments of Health in these areas now have full control over health matters in their various States. Do the hon. members on that side of the House now want the South African Nursing Association to prescribe to these Governments what salaries they should pay their nurses, what working hours they should have, what type of uniforms they should wear and what conditions of service should be instituted across the broad spectrum of the nursing profession? They begrudge these people the right to decide on their own professional associations.

The nursing profession in particular is so much part of the daily circumstances and the customs of a community that certain arrangements which the S.A. Nursing Association wishes to make, will not necessarily be feasible, workable or even desirable in other areas such as Gazankulu and Qwaqwa, which have already decided to form their own associations. I want to mention an example. At the moment there is something of a shortage of White nurses in the Republic. This can be ascribed to a large number of factors which are not relevant at this point. The S.A. Nursing Association must now endeavour to establish how the conditions of service of nurses can be improved in such a way that the large number of qualified nurses that are being drained to other professions, or who are now housewives, can be drawn back into the nursing profession. Perhaps it could be done by, for example, elevating the professional status of the nurse by adapting conditions of service to enable a housewife with a family to let her children stay at places of care during working hours for example, and to adapt the working hours in such a way so that it is possible for a mother to nurse again. These matters are peculiar to a community and do not, for example, apply to areas such as Qwaqwa and Gazankulu. Completely different circumstances apply there and these can best be handled by their own nursing associations. This amending Bill rectifies a matter about which a degree of uncertainty existed, a principle which has already been accepted in principle by the House. It is merely stated clearly and correctly in the Bill, as it should be. This legislation is in accordance with the view of the CP of the freedom of destiny and freedom of self-determination of every people in Southern Africa, including its freedom of self-determination in respect of its professional association if they should so desire. On behalf of the CP I therefore take pleasure in lending my wholehearted support to the Third Reading of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to express my thanks to the hon. member for Pietersburg because he made a very good job of spelling out the NP’s approach to race relations in South Africa. In doing so, the hon. member proved that he did not want to make political capital out of the situation we are dealing with in this Bill.

It is clear from the Bill that the hon. the Minister is seeking to regulate the interests of nurses and that he wants to afford each nurse the opportunity to develop her say to the full. In fact, the hon. member for Pietersburg also referred to that. We have been tinkering with this Bill for a very long time. The principle envisaged by the hon. the Minister, has already been approved. When we study the various debates on the nursing legislation last year and the amending Bill this year, we see that after the hon. the Minister had delivered his Second Reading speech last year, the hon. member for Berea saw a chance to make politics out of the legislation. If we study the speeches made by the hon. member last year as well as this year—they were relatively short, and we are only too glad about that—we see that he is not at all concerned about the welfare of nurses. He was only looking for a political gap, and that is why the first thing he asked the Minister when he stood up last year was precisely what the hon. the Minister’s view of the boundaries of the Republic was. We are glad that this was raised, because it gave the hon. the Minister the opportunity to see the flaw in the Bill. However, now that the hon. the Minister wants to rectify it and to define it more clearly—not to determine the Republic’s borders, but to define clearly where associations function and to give every population group the opportunity to get their association to function within their own national context—those hon. members blatantly make politics of the matter. In this regard I wish to associate myself with the hon. member for Brits and say that it was specifically aimed at getting at the hon. the Minister personally. Words fail us to express our absolute disgust for the way in which the PFP, and especially the hon. member for Berea, dragged politics into matters where it does not belong. Sir, I should like to confirm that we appreciate the sincere intentions of the hon. the Minister as regards the regulation of the interests of the Nursing Associations of the various population groups, and accordingly we are delighted to support the Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I apologize to the hon. the Minister for not having been present during the Committee Stage yesterday evening, because there were one or two points which could in fact have been resolved at that stage. However, I feel I can omit the points which I was going to raise specifically in the Committee Stage and concentrate rather on points which are permissible in the Third Reading. I regret that when the hon. the Minister replied previously he ignored totally our primary reason for objecting to this Bill, and that was that we cannot accept the deeming of a part of South Africa not to be part of South Africa for such a purpose.

That is politics.

Everything is politics. Now, that was our primary point. We cannot accept that we deem a part of South Africa to be not a part of South Africa for this purpose. At no time during the course of the debate that preceded this Stage of the Bill has it been suggested that there are objections in respect of the totally independent homeland States. Nobody is arguing in respect of the totally independent homeland States. We are concerned here purely and simply with the self-governing States. I think the hon. the Minister—inadvertently I am quite sure—misrepresented the situation to some extent when he said that the nurses of KwaZulu would not as a consequence of this Bill lose certain rights. I submit that they will, because in terms of certain agreements with KwaZulu in 1977 and 1978 and the previous Bill that was passed, they would lose those rights. The reason for this Bill being introduced is that the Government has not been legally able to remove those rights, and this is the purpose of this Bill. Therefore, up to this very stage they still have those rights. Therefore I cannot accept that the rights have already been taken away. I am aware of the difficulties, as I indicated previously, in negotiating with Ministers of self-governing States, but I cannot help but feel that it should not be beyond the ingenuity of the governing bodies of the nursing profession to be able to resolve those problems themselves.

It is very obvious that the Minister of Health of KwaZulu does noet want this Bill. He has stated so on a number of occasions and certainly it has been well published in the Press. I am aware that in one of the original documents which was signed in connection with granting of self-government to KwaZulu they accepted certain responsibilities, but, as is always the case with such documents, certain renegotiations can always take place in respect of certain facets. I believe this is one that could well have been done. Further, it is very clear that the nurses of KwaZulu do not want this Bill. I can assure the hon. the Minister that the Natal Provincial Administration, in so far as KwaZulu is concerned, also do not want this Bill. They realize that there will be a lack of mobility between the nurses of KwaZulu and the nurses of Natal. I believe that if as a consequence of the application of the provisions of this Bill the nursing services of Natal and KwaZulu generally deteriorate, then, I am sorry to say the hon. the Minister will have to accept full responsibility for this. I am afraid he will have to accept full responsibility, because in Natal we have fewer problems with the nursing profession than seem to prevail in the other provinces.

That is what you think.

That is what we know.

This is what we know. I am aware that this Bill was originally initiated, not by the hon. the Minister of Health, but by the predominantly White S.A. Nursing Association. I do not believe that when they initiated this they took sufficient notice of the wishes of the nurses in the non-independent homelands, the self-governing homelands. I really do not believe that they took cognizance of the wishes of these nurses at all. I also believe that in time to come the South African Nursing Association is going to bitterly regret having taken this action because I think that their sister associations overseas are going to crucify them for having virtually cast aside—as they will see it and as it will be published, let there be no mistake made about this—their Black sisters of mercy. Moreover, I do not believe that it will assist in maintaining or upholding the standards and status of the nursing profession overseas because the general attitude is likely to be one of complete condemnation and if, as a consequence of not being part of the South African Nursing Association, standards are lowered in any way in any of these other self-governing States, the attitude adopted overseas will simply be, if a nursing sister or a nurse comes from South Africa, to assess her standards in terms of the lowest denominator.

Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that I have been so adamant in our objections to this legislation but I do sincerely believe that it is detrimental to the nursing profession as a whole and particularly detrimental to the Black nurses who are going to be affected.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to conclude the debate. I do not want to get involved at this stage in arguments which were advanced repeatedly in the Second Reading debate and to my surprise, in the Committee Stage as well, and which have moreover just been repeated by the hon. member for Umbilo in the Third Reading debate.

To sum up, I want to say that the hon. member for Umbilo, at this late stage, still does not know exactly what this is all about. There is only one reason for that.

† The hon. member for Umbilo told us that the South African Nursing Council will bitterly regret having taken this step. I have taken up some hours of the time of this hon. House in trying to explain to the hon. member that the first claue of this Bill has absolutely nothing to do with the South African Nursing Council. The hon. member does not know the difference between the S.A. Nursing Association and the S.A. Nursing Council.

Of course I do.

Until he knows what that difference is, I cannot argue with him at this Third Reading stage because if one starts from the wrong premise then one’s whole argument will be at fault.

I was talking about the S.A. Nursing Association.

As I say, if the hon. member starts from the incorrect premise then he will wind up with an incorrect argument. It is not my job as Minister to reply to an argument that is based on a wrong premise.

The hon. member also spoke about the rights of the nurses. I do not know where he gets this idea of the rights of the nurses from. The nurses have no rights in this regard. They are forced by legislation to join an association. That is the right a nurse has. She has no right to refuse to join an association. She has to join an association. What sort of right is it if one is taken by the neck through the medium of legislation and compelled to join an association? This was asked for by the Nursing Association. [Interjections.] When one argues about rights, one must take the picture as a whole. One must then have grown up with the whole question of the Nursing Association, the Nursing Council and the various areas that have at some stage or other become self-governing. The crux of this matter is that whether an area is self-governing or whether it is an independent State, the self-governing States all have their own health departments and they have a Minister running those health departments with a Chief Minister running the government. Therefore if the nursing services in any one of these States deteriorate, the blame for it cannot be laid at the door of the Minister holding the portfolio which I hold at the moment but must be laid at the door of the Minister of Health in that self-governing State, and the sooner this is realized, the better. I do not carry any responsibility in this regard at all and I cannot be blamed if something goes wrong. I and my department are available at all times on an advisory basis but those authorities will have to bear full responsibility for the health services in their own particular area. They are allocated a budget for this work, they have the staff to do it and they must get on with their job. That is my advice to the hon. member and also to anybody else on whose behalf he has spoken.

*I should like to thank the hon. members for Brits, Pietersburg and Middelburg for their participation and for their contributions. I do not want to repeat what they said, because I only wish to place a few points on record.

What one deals with in the Third Reading, is the effect of the legislation in question. In all the legislative bodies on which I have served, I have found that that is what the Third Reading debate is about. The Third Reading debate is not a repetition of what was said in the Second Reading debate. Nor is the Third Reading debate the occasion to throw live fuses around. This debate, then, deals with the effect of the legislation.

What is the effect of the Bill? In dealing with this, I shall start by pointing out that the legislation was requested by the S.A. Nursing Association. Their request is in writing in my office and it is on our files. The legislation was requested by the body which is representative of all the nurses who are members of the association.

On this occasion I do not want to reply directly to the speeches of hon. members who have taken part in the debate. Hon. members who took part must simply hang their hats where they see fit.

The Nursing Association requested me to take this step with the aim, as they state in their letters, of getting their profession in order and getting it properly organized. They have drawn up a new constitution which has nothing to do with apartheid. Reference was made in the course of the debate to apartheid, but that constitution has nothing to do with apartheid. In terms of the constitution of the association, Whites, Coloureds and Blacks can belong to the association. Any member of the association can make progress, first in the regional movements and eventually in the central movement. They can advance to the highest post. Where, then, does apartheid come into it? What kind of apartheid is it which allows anybody, whatever his colour, to advance to the highest post?

As hon. members have mentioned, the legal position must be rectified. The legislation originated in 1978—before I became Minister. In the legislation as it was accepted in 1978, there is one part which is aimed at assisting the Nursing Association to regulate matters. When the Bill is placed on the Statute Book—this is its effect—the total control of the profession will be in the hands of the association, except for one aspect, because in legislation which I piloted through the House last year there is a provision that if they want to amend their constitution they have to obtain ministerial approval. After all, one cannot allow an association to amend its constitution year after year as the mood takes it. If their requests for amendments are in any way reasonable, I shall not be interested in interfering. However, this is something which they have discussed with me and they felt that with a view to continuity it would be better if this was the procedure. After the adoption of the Bill they will as it were be in complete control of their affairs.

The legislation was placed on the Statute Book in 1978, and in 1981 a few amendments were introduced. There was the question of the putting into operation of a certain section, which would be the final rounding-off. Provision is made in the legislation for me to be able to put the section into operation by means of a proclamation. This was done. After the adoption of the Bill the Nursing Association will regulate its own affairs. The area from which its members will come, was defined at the request of the association; not at my request.

† As the responsible Minister dealing with this aspect, I obviously have to listen to their wishes rather than to the wishes of a number of soap-box politicians who are at this stage trying to drive in a wedge between the nurses on the one hand and the Minister and the department on the other hand. [Interjections.]

*I have said very clearly that I do not want to become involved in arguments with hon. members; I am not busy replying to arguments, and I did not interject while hon. members made their speeches.

I am not rude, but I am afraid you are.

I now come to the second clause of the legislation which contains an indication that we have done the same in other fields. All the independent States can, for example, make use of the Medical Council, without having to establish their own council. In this case all those independent States can use the Nursing Council to help them set standards, approve curricula and draw up syllabi. They can do this by means of negotiation. It can then be approved. This is an enabling clause which is really to the advantage of all the Black States. These States make use of the services of the Nursing Council and therefore they need not have such a council themselves. This is the effect of the first and second clauses of this particular piece of legislation.

This piece of legislation, which is now passing through its last stage in this House, was called for by the nurses themselves. There are all the advantages for nurses which I announced. From 1 October they will, for example, be getting a completely different salary structure. I therefore think that a period of prosperity is in the offing for nurses, in spite of the bad publicity which this profession has received over the past 18 months. I think that the opportunity now exists for nurses to arrange their own affairs. They will now have the opportunity to earn a good salary and they will also have good conditions of service. I therefore think that it is high time that we leave the nursing profession in peace so that the nurses can get on with the job for which they were trained, and that is to care for the sick in this country, while at the same time enjoying a good life and making a contribution to the South African society.

Question put,

Upon which the House divided:

Mr. Chairman, during the Second Reading debate I outlined the views of this party about the particular measure now under discussion. It is actually a three-clause Bill, and what I said during Second Reading can obviously be repeated quite appropriately again at this stage.

The clause we are discussing now deals with the definitions and it introduces what, to our mind, is the absurd definition of “demonstration”. It means “any demonstration by one or more persons”. We believe that to be absurdly wide.

A “gathering” is defined as “any assembly, concourse or procession of any number of persons, relating to or arising out of any demonstration”. We believe that this is quite absurd. It is a normal custom for people to gather at courts where their friends or relatives are being tried. It is also very possible that a demonstration will arise quite spontaneously. If only one person is to be seen demonstrating outside a court, that in itself constitutes an offence in terms of this measure, and clause 3 prescribes very heavy penalties.

We intend to oppose each one of the three clauses.

Mr. Chairman, after further consideration and after the hon. member Mr. Theunissen and I had had the opportunity to discuss and investigate this matter further, and having also had the privilege of speaking to certain of the hon. the Minister’s officials, we have reached the conclusion that we are satisfied with the present wording of this clause, for the following reasons.

In the first place, this wording was accepted by this House when the Gatherings and Demonstrations Act, Act No. 52 of 1973, was promulgated. In a court case arising from this legislation that may come before the courts, public opinion will be further interpreted by the judge or magistrate hearing the case. It is very clear that there are also various authorities who could confirm this standpoint. In this regard, for example, I refer to the case of the State versus A and another (SA Law Reports, 1971/2, p. 299). I quote—

Therefore it is not in conflict with public opinion or with the “boni mores” when a friend, a member of the family, an interested party or a law student attend the court proceedings, either alone or in one another’s company. The intention of doing something illegal is still to be proved. In the circumstances the CP is satisfied that this is a fair definition of “demonstration”. We therefore support this clause.

Mr. Chairman, I want to support the hon. member for Houghton in the point of view she has stated here. I am afraid that we have grave difficulties, both with the definition contained in this clause and with the arguments raised by the hon. member for Brakpan. The hon. member referred more to the attendance of court hearings than to the actual definition of “demonstration”.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to put our objections into perspective. We surely still live in a democratic society. [Interjections.] In a democratic society one has certain fundamental freedoms. One of those is the freedom of speech. Surely, people should also have the freedom of gathering, and even the freedom of demonstration, provided that the freedom to gather and the freedom to demonstrate are exercised within the limits of the law. If people gather or demonstrate lawfully and innocently, this measure will surely be an interference with the basic freedoms of a democratic society as it is known throughout the Western World. It is just as much a part of a democratic society as is the Rule of Law, for example. This measure is a violation of that freedom. [Interjections.] In terms of the clause we are dealing with now a demonstration can mean any kind of demonstration by one or more persons in favour of or against any other person. In the same way a gathering is defined in this clause as a demonstration. That means that a demonstration is a gathering, and a gathering is a demonstration. That means that there is no clear distinction drawn between the two. It is also not made clear under what circumstances either a demonstration or a gathering would be unlawful. That is why I was hoping that the amendment suggested by the hon. member Mr. Theunissen, when he spoke during Second Reading, would indeed be introduced into this clause because it would have brought “intention” into both definitions contained in this clause. It would have made it clear then that a demonstration or a gathering with unlawful intent would constitute a criminal offence. That would have been far more acceptable to us than the way in which the clause is worded at the moment. For instance, according to the way it is worded now, a demonstration need not be a demonstration of protest. Let us assume that the court is in session, that it has completed the first case that had been going on for a long time, and then continues with the next case. At the end of the first case, the accused leaves the court and the people cheer him because they are happy that he has been freed. This would be a demonstration of joy, and according to this legislation it is a demonstration for which there is a very severe penalty of R1 000. [Interjections.] This demonstartion does not however have the mens rea which is essential in a criminal offence to show evil intent or intent to do harm. As the hon. the Minister, who is an experienced lawyer, will know, courts adjourn for tea and they adjourn for lunch, and everybody sitting in the court then go outside. Particularly in a trial concerning a non-White, where do the public go to? If they congregate on the steps outside the court, they are in fact having a gathering. Where can they go to? There is nowhere else to go. [Interjections.] In those circumstances we were making an ass of the law by bringing this sort of legislation before the House. That is why we have to accept at least that the demonstration has the intention of interrupting the court’s proceedings. We also accept that the court proceedings should not be interrupted, but that it should be able to give a fair judgement, and that, with that in view, the proceedings of the court should be conducted free of any interference. There is, however, ever so many laws in existence to ensure that court proceedings are not interrupted. If there is an unlawful demonstration or a gathering taking place outside a court, it can be stopped by applying those laws. If the people taking part in a demonstration is disturbing the peace to such an extent that a court’s proceedings are interrupted, they can be stopped because there is a law against disturbing the peace. It is as simple as all that.

The argument was also raised that the demonstrators might interfere with witnesses. But, Sir, it is one of the most serious offences for anyone to interfere with a State or defence witness in any criminal proceedings, and there very serious consequences can flow from that for anyone doing this. So to intrduce a clause such as this to try and stop interference with a witness is really laughable.

I think that we have shown that the intention here has not been made clear. Here we are interfering with a basic freedom. In any event, as the hon. member for Houghton has said, we have existed all these years without this type of legislation, so why do we suddenly need it at this stage?

I have looked very carefully at the hon. the Minister’s speech, and he has not given us any really valid motivation as to why we have to take such drastic steps—and these are really drastic steps—in order to stop demonstartions of this nature.

The last leg of the argument, namely that a demonstration can be a one-man demonstration and that that constitutes a gathering because it is a demonstration, is really laughing us out of court, with the greatest respect. I cannot see how one person can interfere with a court’s proceedings, and on that basis I think we are going much too far in order to deal with a situation which, quite frankly, can be dealt with in many other ways.

For that reason we will oppose the passing of this clause.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Hillbrow makes out that any demonstration is excluded by the legislation. However, the definition prescribes that a demonstration must be “for or against any person, cause, action or failure … ”. It is therefore very clear that it must be a demonstration aimed at influencing the course of affairs, and for that reason it is our opinion that such a demonstration should not take place at our courts, because influencing of either the court procedure or the witnesses is undesirable.

Mr. Chairman the real objection being advanced by the Opposition, as I understand it, is that no clear intention is evident from the definition of “demonstration”.

That is only one of the objections; there are many more.

Before we proceed with this Committee Stage and the other security legislation on the Order Paper I think the PFP must tell us—they can do so during this Committee Stage—where we stand with them with regard to the series of bills relating to security that are before us at present. Arguments are now being advanced on the most ridiculous grounds merely in an effort to keep the debate going, and accordingly I cannot accept that those hon. members are in earnest. I cannot accept that the argument advanced this afternoon by the hon. member for Hillbrow concerning the issue of demonstations, is a serious one. Does the hon. member for Hillbrow expect me to accept that he wants all this noice, clamour and disruption at courts?

That is not what he said.

I am speaking to the hon. member for Hillbrow now. Does the hon. member for Hillbrow want this House to accept that all those things should first take place, that the court case and the whole vicinity should first be disrupted before steps are taken to put a stop to it? Must action only be taken at that stage, and must the demonstration be stopped only then? Must such a gathering first be declared illegal? At what stage must it be declared illegal? The hon. member wants disruption and violence to take place first, he wants the police to remove a crowd of people from the court rooms and vicinity with all the consequences that entails, so that the proceedings of the court are disrupted for an hour or two? The hon. member wants all those things. By means of this legislation we are telling the people in good time that there may be no demonstrations around a court in South Africa, whether criminal or civil cases are involved. What would the hon. member prefer? Does he prefer peace and order, the proper administration of justice, quiet circumstances in which the administration of justice can take place, or what? The hon. member must tell this House what he prefers. Does he prefer peace and order, in which the administration of justice can take place, or does he first want chaos and disorder, and does he link this to so-called human rights and the right to demonstrate? The hon. member must tell this House, so that we know where we stand with one another. The hon. member might as well give me an indication. Does he first want to take the path of chaos with a deficient set of laws, deficient in the sense that one cannot take timeous action—we have already had experience of this—or does the hon. member really want to help us to establish order around our courts? This applies to the entire official Opposition. They could well give us an indication.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question? We are actually talking about clause 2 now, but never mind.

No, I am speaking on clause 1.

We should be talking on clause 1, but the hon. the Minister raised a point under clause 2.

The hon. member must speak to clause 1 now.

The hon. the Minister has been talking about demonstrations that take place outside courts, and that is dealt with in clause 2. Anyway, since he has raised that, I want to ask him a question regarding clause 2(2).

The hon. member can ask me a question on that when we get to clause 2.

But then you must not raise arguments pertaining to clause 2 when we are discussing clause 1.

I believe we know where we stand with the official Opposition if they cannot answer this question of ours.

† The fact of the matter is that I indicated to the hon. member for Houghton last night that under clause 1 the definition of “demonstration” should be read together with the definition of “gatherings”.

*The fundamental concept of a “demonstration” is, after all, a demonstration by one or more persons for or against any person, cause, action or failure to take action, and which is connected with or coincides with particular court proceedings. The definition of “gathering” is, “any assembly, concourse or procession of any number of persons, relating to or arising out of a demonstration”. One should see these things in context.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. the Minister a question with regard to that? In terms of the definition one person standing there with a placard is a demonstration. The placard could state “Down with law and order” or “Up with the Government”. Whatever one calls it is still a demonstration, outside or inside the court. I should therefore like to ask the hon. the Minister whether he would accept an amendment to the effect that a “demonstration” should consist of a group of not fewer than 30 people.

No.

No? Would the hon. the Minister then …

If you sit down I can answer you.

Then I shall resume my seat.

Mr. Chairman, I told the hon. member last night that the number of people was not important. It is what they do that is at issue. We all know people in this House who individually can kick up as much of a fuss as the 30 people that the hon. member for Houghton wants as a minimum figure. Therefore there is no sense in trying to limit the numbers involved in a demonstration. Therefore, as far as that argument is concerned, I do not think it is necessary for me to argue further with the hon. member. As far as the hon. member for Hillbrow is concerned, I want to point out to him that there is no such provision in any form of human rights which gives any individual the right to abuse his position as a citizen of the State at any court proceedings of that State. The hon. member cannot give me any authority whatsoever to support that. Therefore I do not know where the hon. member gets that idea. There is no authority that states that it is part of one’s so-called human rights to perpetrate any form of disorder. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Bill that prohibits normal attendance at any court proceedings. Why, then, does the hon. member want to intercede for people who desire disorder. I think it is time the hon. Opposition and ourselves try to understand one another with regard to the legislation we are dealing with. I accuse the official Opposition of interceding at this stage for dis-orderliness in South Africa and therefore I am not prepared to consider any amendment of theirs in this regard. [Interjections.]

It does not matter to us what you say.

I think the hon. member for Brakpan also provided an adequate answer in this regard, as did other hon. members who have taken part in the Committee Stage thus far.

Mr. Chairman, we heard from the hon. the Minister that the purpose of the legislation was to prohibit demonstrations at courthouses, demonstrations disrupting court proceedings. This is the aim of the legislation.

† However, the Bill goes much, much further than that. That is our main objection to the Bill. I refer, for example, to the words “or coincide with” in clause l(i). Clause l(i) states—

Let us pause for a moment and see what sort of demonstration or gathering could be covered by this definition. A situation could arise where a court is busy with a case where someone is being tried for failing to put this third-party disc on his windscreen, and 400 metres away from that court there is a demonstration, which happens to coincide with the court case by the Housewives’ League who are protesting against the increase in price of maize.

What has that got to do with the court proceedings?

It coincides with the court proceedings.

Read the Bill.

I ask the hon. the Minister to look at the definition. There it states “coincides with any court proceedings”. The definition does not even require that the demonstration must have anything specifically to do with the court case. It merely needs to coincide with it. Therefore, in such a case, the Housewives’ League would be liable to be convicted under this particular legislation if this Bill is passed. We have to take into account the fact that a distance of 500 metres is a considerable distance where we are dealing with cities because the court buildings are very often situated in the centre of a city. Court proceedings normally take place between the hours of nine o’clock in the morning and four o’clock in the afternoon. The aim of this Bill is in effect to prohibit any gathering or any demonstration of whatever nature in an area which is within 500 metres of any court. As I said just now, if an innocent organization such as even the SPCA demonstrates at 10 o’clock in the morning 400 metres away from a court building where a court case is to take place at that time, it can be prosecuted. That is the objection that we have. The hon. the Minister seems to have the tendency to introduce security legislation only about one tenth of the wording of which actually deals with the problem which he is seeking to solve; the rest of it is couched in such wide terms that it must be objectionable to any ordinary individual who reads it.

Order! The hon. member is now actually discussing clause 2.

Mr. Chairman, with respect, I am still dealing with the wide definition contained in clause 1. If the hon. the Minister wishes us to have a serious debate about security legislation, he makes it very difficult to do so when he comes to light with such widely couched and unrealistic definitions because before one can get to the crux of the matter one has to deal with these wide and empowering definitions. That is the objection we have and that is why we cannot support this.

Mr. Chairman, the official Opposition are failing to grasp the heart of this matter. The whole intention and purpose of these provisions is to weigh up certain interests against one another—the interests of the State or the community against the interests of the individual. To me this is the heart of the matter. The hon. member who has just resumed his seat, created the impression that he was looking for a hole in a sieve with a magnifying glass, and that he was ridiculing it since he extended the example he gave to a situation which, in fact, is not envisaged by this legislation.

Give us another definition.

If that hon. member’s party wanted another definition, they should have proposed it themselves. I say, Sir, that the criterion is the question of interests, where the interests of the State and the community are weighed up against the interests of the individual. If we do this, I say that the wording, as it appears here, is correct. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. the Minister I want to say at once that it is quite unfair and quite unjust for him to say that we are in favour of demonstrations and that we do not want law and order to prevail. Really, I did not expect the hon. the Minister to advance such an argument at this stage. [Interjections.] Obviously, it is hardly necessary for me to state that we want to see court proceedings conducted in a properly dignified way where evidence is led in the proper way and where eventually judgment is also given. For the information of the hon. the Minister I want to say that many of us here happen to be officers of the court.

That is why I am so surprised at your attitude.

With great respect, that is the reason why I am so surprised at the attitude of the hon. the Minister because the hon. the Minister has accused us. He puts up skittles and he knocks them down himself. [Interjections.]

I want to ask the hon. the Minister what he is seeking to achieve by means of this definition. Is he going to achieve what he is trying to achieve, namely, that he does not want court proceedings interrupted? Is that what he wants? Or is he trying to find a definition which will prevent demonstrations either violent or peaceful, in which either one or any number of people take part and which may take the form of carrying placards opposing certain matters in respect of what is happening in court? With which one of the two situations is the hon. the Minister trying to deal? We believe that in terms of this legislation we shall be able to protect a court so that proceedings will not be interrupted, but we now find, in terms of definition, that a person who stands near a court with a placard can be found guilty of an offence. People who are opposed to certain things and who are there quietly, can likewise, in terms of the definition, be found guilty. If they are found guilty, they can be sentenced very severely, although they may not have interrupted the court’s proceedings in any way. This is the difference between how we see this situation and how the hon. the Minister sees it. The hon. the Minister should tell us what he is trying to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate myself with what the hon. member Mr. Theunissen said. I think the definition is very clear. In my opinion, we should make a distinction when it comes to the question of onus probandi. If the State is expected to prove in each case that a demonstration which is taking place is directly connected with a specific court case, an extremely heavy onus is being placed on the State. I think hon. members of the Opposition are displaying an unnecessary and wilful attitude in this case.

I respectfully wish to state that the State’s actions will not be such that a single person standing with an innocent placard which has nothing to do with the court’s proceedings, will be arrested and brought before a court where serious penalties will be imposed on him. I believe that this attitude of the Opposition is out of all proportion.

I agree with the hon. member Mr. Theunissen that the most important consideration in this case is the maintenance of law, order and tranquility in the vicinity of a court building. I believe that it will be possible for this measure to be handled with complete safety by responsible officials of the department. Sufficient measures and safeguards exist so that the Opposition and/or their supporters may protest, whether inside a building or outside, on a public holiday or other days. There is sufficient scope for exercising the right of lawful protest. In terms of this legislation it is in fact permitted, and therefore I cannot see what the Opposition’s problem is.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member who has just sat down has said that we can rest assured that the authorities will handle instances of this kind with great care and with great delicacy, but that is not what we are doing. We are here passing a Bill and we are dealing with a definition. The difference between this side of the House and that side lies in the fact that once again the Government is coming forward with a measure which amounts to an overkill. The Government believes in passing laws for every possible thing which may arise, and after years during which our courts have survived without legislation of this kind, the Government comes with something which is a total overkill.

As the hon. member for Hillbrow has pointed out, we do not want court proceedings interrupted. We do not want the courts disturbed in the exercise of their functions. Can the hon. the Minister however, when he replies to these comments, address himself to the issue of the narrowness of the definition, both in regard to “demonstration” and the word “gathering”. Can the hon. the Minister really asset that it is reasonable to say that when one person is standing outside a court it can amount to a demonstration to which the sort of penalties can be attached for which provision is made in a subsequent clause of the Bill? I think it is totally unreasonable, but that is what the definition says—“‘demonstration’ means any demonstration by one or more persons”. I think that in any language that is a ridiculous situation. The same applies to the question of a gathering which is defined as—

I think that is totally unreasonable. One might for example—we have had it before— have citizens carrying placards in the street to indicate a particular point of view. They just might stand outside a court of law with one placard, holding a perfectly peaceful demonstration, but indicating their feelings about a particular matter. Is it therefore right, in any normal society, for a person to be guilty in terms of a measure of this kind? Is it right for one person, for example, to be considered a gathering? I want the hon. the Minister, in all seriousness, to consider whether that definition at any rate, cannot be changed. The hon. member for Houghton has suggested a figure of 30 people. It could even be 20 people, but I think it is totally ridiculous to say that a demonstration or a gathering can be construed to be taking place when one single person is standing outside a courthouse.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to tell the hon. members of the official Opposition that that is, in fact the intention, even with regard to one person, and there are a number of reasons for this. I have repeatedly stated that one person can, in fact, actively demonstrate—this argument has already been raised—and be a nuisance or an embarrassment, or may cause the disruption of certain activities. In the second instance, reasons may be advanced as to why such a person’s form of demonstration—as suggested by the hon. member for Berea—could lead to a further gathering of people. This could lead to the further disruption of the situation.

[Inaudible.]

The hon. member for Houghton should really try to keep quiet for just a short while.

Just get on with it.

Why do you not just shut up and give me a chance?

*One person who demonstrates at court proceedings, may also give rise to a further gathering of people, and this could lead to tumult and disruption. This is why I say to the hon. member that even a demonstration by one person—the hon. member for Green Point, for example—may lead to further disruption at a court. That is why I am not prepared to consider that the number of persons in the definition be changed. If hon. members would take the trouble to read the relevant paragraphs of the report—particularly pages 210 and 219 in which the Commission’s reasons for this finding are set out— they would see very clearly that the Commission, as a result of previous experiences in South Africa, is concerned that the disturbance of proceedings within or around our courts has reached a stage where serious attention has to be given to it. I should therefore like to tell the hon. member for Hillbrow and other hon. members that in the definition a demonstration it is very clearly referred to as one—

Coincides.

Yes, “coincides with any court proceedings …”

That could be coincidental.

It need not be coincidental. That is the intention of the Act, and this is based on the Commission’s standpoint that there should be tranquillity when justice is being administered, regardless of whether it is a civil or a criminal case. Nor does it matter whether it is the Housewives’ League standing at the other end of the street banging on a drum, or whether it is some other person. The intention is that nothing should be done in the vicinity—the radius is mentioned in the legislation—which will disturb the normal course of justice—in the sense applicable in this regard. We stand by that. If hon. members could put forward real improvement, one would of course consider it. However, not a single member has put forward a sound argument to indicate how else one could maintain order around a court building. The object of this legislation is of course to maintain order around a court building. A specific radius has been specified and I concede that that figure is arbitrary. It happens to be 500 metres, but another person may say 400 metres or even 300 metres. However, this is the recommendation of both the Commission and the Government, and I was prepared to accept that recommendation as such. However, this is not what is at issue now. The question is whether it is necessary to prohibit people from being within that radius—in the case of any form of gathering which could be demonstration. The reply to this is “yes”, since this is not the point at issue. What is at issue is the tranquillity around a place where justice is being administered. That is why I stand by the definitions of “demonstration” and “gathering” contained in this Bill.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, this clause lays down the absolute prohibition of a demonstration or gathering of any number of persons—one or more—within a fixed distance from certain buildings. That distance is “within a radius of five hundred metres from such building”. The building that is indicated is, of course, a court-house or any place where an inquest is taking place. It is true that such gatherings are not prohibited on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. It is also true that a magistrate of the district in which a demonstration or gathering takes place can give permission for it to take place.

How is any magistrate going to anticipate whether people attending a court for the purpose of hearing a verdict which is going to be pronounced on friends or relatives whom they may not have seen for many months—people, for instance, who have been locked up in solitary confinement in terms of section 6—are possibly going to demonstrate, and more so, is that magistrate ever likely to give such permission? It is not as though there is any leeway, any discretion, in this clause. No discretion has really and truly been written into this clause. It contains merely an absolute prohibition.

I want to point out to the hon. the Minister that we do already have the Riotous Assemblies Act, which has prohibited, and still prohibits, outdoor meetings of any kind. Outdoor meetings are already prohibited. That is meant to be a temporary measure, good only as long as the particular proclamation issued by the magistrate in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act exists. This new prohibition, of course, is a permanent one. It is a new feature introduced into our legislation. From now on nobody will be able to gauge what is going to happen in a courtroom. Anyone who goes there and finds himself—willy-nilly, one might say—in the midst of a demonstration can be hauled in, charged and convicted, and can have severe penalties inflicted on him. We can, for example, take a case in which onlookers go to a court—this is something which is happening all the time now in South Africa—out of interest or curiosity because that particular case has aroused a certain amount of public interest. Such a curious onlooker might find himself in a courtroom together with 50 or 60 other people, who are there, not ostensibly to create a demonstration, but because they have a personal interest in the particular court case. They may, for instance, be the relatives of someone who is being arraigned. It could happen that when the verdict is given a spontaneous demonstration follows, either of joy, if the accused is being acquitted—cheers and shouts of “amandla” and so on, as happens all the time …

Why “amandla”? Why do you not choose something else? Why do you always have to emphasize only these negative things? [Interjections.]

Why does the hon. the Minister introduce this Bill?

I cannot help it if you are one-track-minded!

All right, but would the hon. the Minister prefer me to say “Hurray!”?

Not really.

All right, then.

Or should she sing “Die lied van jong Suid-Afrika”? [Interjections.]

Three cheers! Hurray! The accused has been found not guilty! That is how people could react. It could be a spontaneous demonstration of joy where people throw their arms around each other, and so on. That is a demonstration, of course. Other people who are there as interested spectators are involved, whether they like it or not. Equally, if the accused happens to be found guilty, one is likely to have a very different scene in that court. It is a natural, emotional reaction in a courtroom, particularly in our country in these times. I have seen it happening not only in cases concerning Black people. These days it is very likely that things of this nature are going to happen where White people are concerned. Jaap Marais is a case in point.

He has a case on at the moment.

Yes, and anything can happen. I am sure large numbers of his followers will be going along to the court and will be demonstrating in one way or the other. Demonstrating is a natural, emotive reaction.

They may shout: “Gesonde magsdeling!”

Well, I do not know what they will be shouting. Anyway, this legislation is absolutely absurd. I do not believe that the hon. the Minister’s explanation is logical at all. It takes no cognizance whatsoever of natural emotions which may very well evidence themselves during the proceedings in a court of law, which very often is conducted under stressful conditions. As for the surrounding precincts of a court, we already have the Riotous Assemblies Act, that, to the best of my knowledge, is invoked countrywide and nobody can have an outdoor meeting. In fact, we do not realize anymore that the ordinary right of assembly has disappeared in South Africa. [Interjections.] And there is a normal right of assembly. It is a normal, democratic, human right accepted by the United Nations by the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as in America under the Bill of Rights. In America assemblies cannot be forbidden. It is one of the accepted rights in terms of the Bill of Rights in the USA. Here, in South Africa, however, these things disappear, and the people’s threshold of tolerance, as I have said before, rises all the time. They do not realize what is happening until it is too late, and finally we will become a silenced society in South Africa with no right of protest at all.

In the circumstances we are certainly going to oppose clause 2 of this Bill.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member says that the ordinary right of assembly has disappeared in South Africa. On what authority does she say that? [Interjections.] On what authority does the hon. member say that the right of assembly has disappeared in South Africa? [Interjections.] The hon. member knows very well what the position is today.

No outdoor meetings.

The hon. member knows very well that permission can be obtained for outdoor meetings.

How many times has that happened?

Permission can be obtained for any normal meeting. In what way, then, is the right to assemble affected in South Africa? Why does the hon. member always use this kind of expression? Why always refer to people arrested in terms of section 6 as if those are the only people being charged under the law in South Africa? Why only refer to those people who express their joy by shouting “Amandla!”? Is that the only way one can express one’s joy in South Africa?

Well, it is one way.

But why always do it in that way? Is the hon. member trying to gain more popularity with a view to her visit to Moscow, or what? Is that the reason for it?

[Interjections.] Is she trying to gain more popularity with a view to her visit to Moscow?

No.

Why always concentrate on these particular provisions and expressions? [Interjections.] Why does the hon. member always do that purposely? The hon. member knows very well that the right of assembly has not been and is not being curtailed in South Africa. I am not talking to the hon. member for Pinetown.

I said nothing.

I beg your pardon, I thought you did. [Interjections.]

Why not pick on me?

I was on the point of telling the hon. member for Pinetown something; so that hon. member need not worry. After last night, the hon. member for Pinetown and I have something to tell to each other, and the hon. member for Parktown must just stay out of this. [Interjections.]

I want to emphasize that clause 2 provides specifically for what we have in mind with this particular Bill. It does not contain deterrent of the right of people to assemble. People who want to demonstrate or gather innocently—an hon. member on the opposite side mentioned the Housewives’ League—can ask permission from the magistrate, and permission can be granted. There is no reason why the Housewives’ League cannot get permission from the magistrate to sell soap 300 yards down the street whilst the court is in session. They can get that permission.

Why should they even have to get permission?

The clause provides very clearly that it must be a demonstration “by one or more persons for or against any person, cause, action or failure to take action, and which is connected with or coincides with any court proceedings”.

*We are not concerned with absurdities here. Surely it was never the intention that provision be made for absurdities in a Bill. If members of the public are engaged in innocent activities and wish to meet on a street corner with the best of intentions, then there is no reason why they cannot approach the magistrate for permission to do so nor why they should be granted permission. After all, it is really wilful of the hon. member for Houghton to want to use as an example a member of the public who, quite innocently, goes to court simply because he takes an interest in the court proceedings. That is analogous to the interest the hon. member took in the events at the Cathedral near here on one occasion. The hon. member went there out of interest. I accept that just for the moment for the purposes of the argument, and I do not really believe that. Thereafter many of those people began to walk in the direction of Parliament, in conflict with certain legal provisions. However, the hon. member remained in the background. At that stage she was not in the forefront.

[Inaudible.]

I shall prove the hon. member’s innocence. She need not be concerned. I am merely acting as her attorney, and she need not therefore be concerned.

She was afraid of the dogs.

Yes, and had it not been for the dogs, the hon. member would have been in the forefront. In any event, the fact of the matter is that if anyone went to a court innocently and with good intentions, as in the example I mentioned, in order to attend proceedings, and if such a person were to happen to become involved with a group of people engaged in these things we are discussing today, then surely there is not the least chance that such a person could be charged in court or arrested unnecessarily. Surely that is not what we are making provision for here. However, it could indeed happen that such a person could be trapped in such a situation, but then it is surely the easiest thing in the world to explain to the police there what his or her involvement there is. Surely that is the easiest thing in the world. After all, we cannot make provision in an Act for the movement of every single person on the street. That is ridiculous. All I am trying to say is that the Bill under consideration certainly does not have that kind of absurdity in mind. Therefore I say that the privilege that a member of the public or a citizen of the State has to assemble …

Is it a privilege?

Mr. Chairman, I asked the hon. member for Johannesburg North last night please to keep his articled clerk out of this debate. I want to confirm that in terms of this Bill no restriction is being imposed on the privilege of the public to carry on with their activities in the normal course. This Bill must be regarded as applying to meetings as described in the definition of “demonstration”. The Bill must be seen in that light.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think one can let this opportunity go by without indicating that the hon. the Minister’s arguments have been most revealing and underline the basic differences when it comes to questions of human rights between this side of the House and that side of the House. The hon. the Minister took the hon. member for Houghton to task for dealing with the concept of the right of assembly. He said the right of assembly was not under attack, that as far as open-air meetings were concerned, there was not an attack on the right of assembly and that individuals would be able to go the magistrate and ask for permission to assemble in the open air. He said the same about demonstrations or assemblies outside a court. He said that if people wanted to do that, he is not interfering with that right and that they could get a permit and permission from the magistrate. But that is quite contrary to the whole concept of the right of assembly. The very fact that one has to get a permit and permission from somebody means that the right of assembly has already been taken away from you. This I think underlines the difference in approach between this side of the House and that side of the House. We take it that in any normal democratic society the right of assembly is an inherent right. One does not have to go to any authority for permission. But here we have an authoritarian Government who believe that they can dole these things out to citizens by way of permits from time to time and by doing that, they say, they are doing credit to the right to assembly.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question?

The hon. the Minister can take part in the debate. I am finished with what I wanted to say.

Mr. Chairman, does the hon. member want to tell this House that the so-called right of the individual to assembly is an absolute right?

I did not say it was an absolute right.

Mr. Chairman, here we see the naivity and innocence of a man who has been brought up with a totalitarian mentality. I say this because, obviously, the hon. the Minister does not appreciate the basic principles of democracy, and I believe that he has become innoculated against a sensitivity to the realities of what democracy and freedom really are. Since when is the right to have a cake sale a privilege? That is what the hon. the Minister said. He said that if people wanted to hold a cake sale on the street, they should go and get permission. They have the “voorreg”, the privilege, to go and do that. I believe that every hon. member in this House should be ashamed of that fact. Let me give hon. members an example. When I was member of Parliament for Pinetown, I held a report-back meeting in the open air in a Black township and I was speaking to 500 or 600 people. It was an orderly and pleasant meeting. It was a hot day and it was an ideal situation in which to meet. A year later, because of the fears of this Government, we had to hold a similar meeting in a cramped church hall and we packed about 900 people into that hall on that occasion. It was not very pleasant because of the crowd. I believe the hon. the Minister does not really appreciate the principle of the right to assembly. He gaily comes along and says that anybody can have permission at any time to meet. That is precisely the aim of this legislation. And, of course, it is one’s absolute right to hold a meeting. We already have the Riotous Assemblies Act to control any demonstration anyway, even outside a court building if necessary. If a gathering outside a court should become disorderly which it should not as in many cases the policemen about outnumber the spectators, and not only that, they are usually armed with submachine guns. And what judge cannot clear a court if he needs to? If a judge is concerned about the number of people outside, he can ask the Minister to invoke the Riotous Assemblies Act if necessary. But to throw the baby out with the bath water—because that is what is happening here—is ridiculous. We accept the fact that there may be disruptions as a result of meetings, but to throw out the principle of the right to assembly for the sake of certain political trials that create problems for a court, is to me absolute nonsense and a great tragedy. As the hon. member for Berea has pointed out, this is a classic example of the radical difference between this side of the House and that side of the House. We believe that the issues involved here are non-negotiable. The right to assembly is the cornerstone of a civilized society, and we are not prepared to make a god and a heathen idol out of the security of the State under all circumstances. We believe that the security of the State is secured in the right to free assembly, much more than in this type of totalitarian legislation.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North is trying to be very clever here today by saying that we should use the Riotous Assemblies Act to deal with this matter.

If it is necessary.

Yes, if it is necessary. But the Rabie Commission, which investigated this matter and which made the recommendation, considered this matter very carefully. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North has not read this report and I am prepared to make a bet with him on that. In paragraph 13.4.5 of the Report, the Commission states, inter alia, the following on page 210—

This is what the Rabie Commission says. As the hon. the Minister stated last evening, if we were to choose between the judgment of the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North and that of the three judges, one of whom is the Chief Justice designate, in respect of what has to be done in the interests of the security of the people of South Africa, then I want to say that I would rather trust the judgment of the Chief Justice designate of South Africa than depend on that of the hon. member.

For the record, I should like to quote once again from the Rabie Commission report. [Interjections.] That hon. member must realize that the hon. the Minister did not simply wake up one morning and suddenly decide to make a law in this regard. It is based on evidence and I wish to prove this to the hon. member. In paragraph 13.4.5 of the report, the Commission also stated—

The Commission went further and gave us an example. They said—

Does that hon. member want us first to allow 800 people to gather, who then refuse to disperse, and then the police have to disperse them with tear gas? Is this what he wants? This, then, is more acceptable to the hon. member than to prohibit it beforehand so that it cannot take place.

They may have gone there to hear the case.

How could it be possible that 800 people who were making a noise outside could have come to listen to the case? Do not be foolish. [Interjections.] I wish to cite another quotation in respect of a murder trial which took place here in Cape Town. I wish to quote this, for I want the hon. member to take cognizance of it. The quotation reads—

This is according to a report in the Rand Daily Mail and the Sowetan of 6 and 12 March 1981 respectively. Furthermore, it reads as follows—

Apparently this is what the hon. member wants to happen, after which we must act in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. I think the hon. the Minister’s approach is reasonable. He wishes to prohibit it beforehand. He wants to take precautions so that peace and order and calmness and tranquillity may reign at a court case where the law has to be administered and where judgments must be given on a case which has to be judged on merit—this has nothing to do with politics. If we have to disagree on this point with those hon. members, then it must be so. We on this side of the House support the fact that there should be law and order in the country and that there should also therefore be law and order around our court buildings.

And justice, too.

The hon. member says “and justice, too”. However, this is precisely what we are dealing with. In a court case where an accused is being charged, we want his case and the facts of his case to be heard in a peaceful atmosphere. If the Opposition continues to accuse us of acting in an authoritarian way, then I want to tell those hon. members that they support riotous demonstrations outside our court buildings. [Interjections.]

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Houghton stated just now that as far as arrests in such a case is concerned, “it might even happen to White people”. I cannot understand the argument of the hon. member for Houghton and the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North at all. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North is a White man, and now he is complaining about the fact that he had to obtain permission for an outside meeting when he had to report back. This merely proves that it applies to White people as well. Those hon. members are always trying to give these matters a racial connotation. To pretend that this legislation is being introduced merely in order to suppress Black people, is nonsense. The hon. members of the Opposition are fond of moralizing and trying to place things on the basis of a whited sepulchre. I wonder on what basis they wish to govern in this country. I respectfully suggest that if they are going to govern in such a moralizing way, they will not even have the little backbone which is required to govern the country. I fully support what the hon. member for Verwoerdburg said, and we must just accept that we on this side of the House differ with the hon. members opposite.

Mr. Chairman, I should appreciate it if the hon. member for Houghton or the hon. member for Berea would tell me whether they differ with paragraph 13.4.4 of the Rabie Report—

Do the hon. members wish to tell me that they differ with this?

It is quite right.

Yes, but it is so unrealistic.

The hon. member for Johannesburg North says it is quite right.

† Why do hon. members then oppose the Bill?

Because we cannot anticipate what is going to happen. That is why.

The hon. member for Verwoerdburg pointed out that it cannot be foreseen how circumstances will develop, and I also wish to quote the following extract from paragraph 13.4.6—

I quote this extract in answer to the further argument advanced by the hon. member for Verwoerdburg.

Surely no responsible hon. member could seriously object to this standpoint of the commission. So where does the hon. member for Pinetown come from with his “right of assembly”?

† When he deals with this, he gets so emotionally excited.

Why pick on me? [Interjections.]

I apologize. The hon. member whom I have in mind is the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North.

There was a time when I represented Pinetown.

I cannot understand why the hon. member gets so emotionally excited about the so-called right of assembly. The right of assembly is not an absolute right. Let me rather put it as follows: If there is such a right, it is not an absolute right.

Very few rights are absolute.

Then the hon. member agrees that it is not an absolute right. Why does he then complain when we, in these specific circumstances, curtail the right or the privilege of the individual to demonstrate at or near court buildings? After all, he accepts that it is not an absolute right.

Well, if it is “oproerig” …

I wish to point out to the hon. member that this side of the House will give no consideration to his representations that people should have an absolute and free right of action in all circumstances. He thinks that if things go wrong we should utilize various measures in order to combat or prevent this. We have ample experience of this and that is why we are now coming to this House and saying: Due to the experience we have gained we want to place an Act in the Statute Book which can assist us in preventing that kind of thing timeously. That is the intention in this regard and I shall let that suffice.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. the Minister is, of course, now ranging far and wide, because nobody has ever suggested that such rights are absolute. I believe in freedom of speech, but that does not mean that I believe that someone can be allowed to shout “Fire!” in a crowded cinema. Obviously one knows that one cannot have absolute rights that might, in any way, infringe upon the freedom or convenience of others. We do certainly know that. If demonstrations or gatherings become uproarious, or in any way interfere with the proceedings in a court, it is perfectly possible for the magistrate or judge, under existing conditions, to order the courtroom cleared. It is likewise perfectly possible for a magistrate or judge to send for the police to clear a crowd in the vicinity of a courtroom if they are in any way interfering with the proceedings. The Bill does not, however, say that.

But we have heard all this already.

Yes, but we have not yet had a reply. That is the point. We have had no reply. The hon. the Minister goes off at a tangent and talks about my visit to Moscow and the hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North’s reference to free assembly. There is one thing I will say for the hon. the Minister, and that is that he is absolutely consistent.

Yes, I know that.

Yes, so am I. That is why I know this. I say that because, in May 1973—that is nine years ago—when the gatherings and demonstrations outside Parliament were under discussion, he took exactly the same line. At one stage I was arguing that the magistrates would never give permission, because the wording of this Bill is almost exactly the same in this respect. Neither do I believe that a magistrate has ever, since then, given permission for a demonstration or procession to take place within a one-mile radius of Parliament. I therefore think that this is a completely redundant provision.

Because they have learnt their lesson.

No, it is not a question of learning their lesson, because nobody can anticipate what happens when a crowd gathers. When a rugby match is held, no one knows whether events are going to proceed peacefully or whether people are going to start throwing bottles and naartjies at the hon. the Minister. [Interjections.] So one just does not happen to know. No magistrate would, of course, ever take a chance. So there is no possibility of that whatsoever, and I said as much at the time. Let me, in fact, quote exactly what I said (Hansard, Vol. 44, col. 6328)—

To this Mr. Le Grange, who was then not a Minister, replied—

In other words, why should the police not forbid it. I then went on to say—

So he had precisely the same attitude towards freedom of assembly, then. We have had the hon. member for Verwoerdburg quoting Judge Rabie, and I now see that the Rabie Commission’s report is going to become the new bible of the NP. It seems we are going to have it quoted at us all the time.

It is a better bible in any event than the one which you read.

I also want to quote a judge.

Which bible do you read?

That is none of your business. My religion is my own private concern. [Interjections.] There are, however, other judges that say other things. When Judge Van Zyl was the Acting Judge President of the Cape Provincial Division he heard a case against students charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act and had the following to say about free assembly (column 6329)—

I only wish it did! That was stated by Judge Van Zyl before the advent of the legislation on gatherings and processions and the legislation prohibiting outdoor meetings. It was merely stated as a general rule for South Africa. None of those robust meetings outside the Johannesburg City Hall any more, meetings we all used to enjoy. None of the old meetings on the Parade in Cape Town any more. They are all gone, and nobody really understands that this means the complete erosion of one of the democratic rights of citizens, i.e. to demonstrate peacefully. Nobody is saying that people must be allowed to demonstrate violently. There are plenty of laws under which violent demonstrations can be stopped. Judge Van Zyl said (column 6329)—

He goes on to say that this is a most important right, and ends up by saying something that I commend to the hon. member for Verwoerdburg who is very worried about my religious proclivities.

Yes, I am.

Well, let the hon. member listen to what Judge Van Zyl had to say (column 6330)—

Those are very wise words indeed. [Interjections.] They applied in those days and I believe they are as applicable today when we are discussing the disappearance in South Africa of yet another right, the right of assembly, other than by permit. This country is becoming a country riddled with permits.

It is becoming “permissive”.

The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North says it is becoming a “permissive” society. I am afraid it is not. It is becoming a permit-ridden country.

No, you cannot say that.

Soon there will be nothing we can do without running to some official, some magistrate, some policeman or some Minister to get a permit. That is what is happening in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, if one considers the words of Mr. Justice van Zyl which the hon. member for Houghton has just quoted, it is noticeable that she is at least quite consistent. If one reads the debate on Act No. 52 of 1973, one sees that the arguments which she has raised now, are precisely the same as those she raised then. After that she has had nothing new to say in this House.

Secondly, the then member for Durban North, I think said to her on that occasion that she was nothing but an advocate of street democracy. I wonder to what extent this was not correct at the time.

Who said that?

Mike Mitchell.

Furthermore, the hon. member for Houghton said that a magistrate would always refuse when a request was made to hold a demonstration or to arrange an open-air meeting. Surely this is an absolute reflection on our judiciary. I wonder what she thinks of our magistrates. I think our magistrates would consider an application on a reasonable basis when there is bona fide, correct action. The hon. member for Pietermaritzburg North put forward the argument that as far as such action is concerned, there are usually many more policemen than spectators. He said, “The police outnumber them” and that they usually have a number of machine-guns and machine-pistols with them.

And dogs.

That hon. member’s approach is absolutely naïve, and I do not think we can leave it at that. I wonder when the hon. members on that side of the House are going to act with a measure of understanding of what it means to rule. Their approach is really so naive, that it indicates that they realize that they will never govern. They will never be able to act as a Government with backbone should.

Suddenly you are going to govern because you now have a law.

Mr. Chairman, I should just like to reply briefly to a certain allegation that was made. I merely wish to confirm that in this clause of the Bill, the interests of the individual, as well as of the State are at stake. The Government’s standpoint is that in this case, and under the circumstances we are debating here, preference will be given to the interests of the State. It is in the interests of the State, and therefore also in the interests of the citizen, that a court should be allowed to carry out its work peacefully. This is how it will be done in future. As I have already said, there is no question of any intention to restrict the normal movements of people or to restrict the normal rights which people have to express their feelings. That message therefore cannot justifiably be conveyed from this House. This is the attitude in which this Bill was drawn up and it is also the attitude with which this Bill is being approached by this side of the House.

Clause put and the Committee divided:

Mr. Chairman, this clause is almost identical to a provision in the Gatherings and Demonstrations Act of 1973, and we think it is going too far in relation to the demonstrations and gatherings that we have discussed in the two previous clauses. I see no point in reiterating the arguments raised previously. We shall simply object to this clause. I would, however, like to move the following amendment—

• three hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately this side cannot accept the amendment of the hon. member for Houghton. After all, it is very clearly stated in this clause that the fine imposed is an amount of not more than R1 000 and that the period of imprisonment is not more than one year. It is therefore for the court to impose a lighter sentence. The clause determines the maximum sentence and therefore I see no sense in reducing the maximum fine. In the circumstances we cannot accept any amendment as far as this clause is concerned.

Mr. Chairman, I am not prepared to accept the amendment.

Amendment negatived (Official Opposition dissenting).

Clause agreed to (Official Opposition dissenting).

House Resumed:

Bill reported.

Mr. Speaker, we on this side are as opposed as anybody in the House to people intimidating others by means of some criminal act or by the threat of such act. Therefore, if physical violence against anyone or malicious injury to property is used as an intimidatory measure then it must attract a heavy penalty.

There are two principles with which we take issue in this Bill. The first principle is contained in the phrase “cause damage” which is used twice in the Bill. That phrase is a very wide concept. It is not a crime to cause damage and it is not even a delict per se. Therefore it is not known from that phrase what activity is made a criminal offence by this Bill. The public will not know and the courts will not know what is meant by “damage”, and therefore we cannot accept it. I want to give two examples. If, for example, a person writes to a company and says: “I will not buy your product unless you change your attitude to trade unions” that will cause damage to that company. Is that to be covered by this legislation? It will cause damage to that company but it is not a crime to stop buying goods from a person because one has no obligation to buy goods from a specific person.

The second example I want to give is where one advocates a boycott of a certain company in support of trade unions. That will obviously cause damage to that company but is that to be a crime? We accept that if someone is intimidated by means of a crime or by means of the threat of a crime such as assault, injury or a killing—as is set forth in the Bill—or even malicious injury to property, then the intimidator should be liable to a heavier penalty. But to induce a person to adopt a standpoint by means of the threat of a boycott or any other damage, is not a crime. We submit that the phrase “cause damage” is too wide and too vague a phrase.

The second principle I want to refer to is the phrase “without lawful reason”. That again is a very vague phrase and it is not helpful. Incidentally, the onus in regard to that is thrown upon the accused and we oppose that.

I want to draw the hon. the Minister’s attention to the fact that so far as I have been able to ascertain there has only been one case in South Africa—that case goes back a long time—in which intimidation was the subject of the case. It was a civil claim for damages in regard to a boycott. I refer you to the case of Murdoch vs Buller 1923 TPD. In that case a phrase similar to “without lawful reason” was in question. The phrase in question in this case was “just cause or excuse”. In that case there were two judges, Mr. Justice Mason and Mr. Justice Gregorowsky, and they had great difficulty with that phrase. Eventually the judges differed on the interpretation of the phrase, but what both of them said was that because the defendant had committed a criminal offence in that he had contravened the Master and Servants Ordinance, he had no just cause or excuse. So in that case it was held that where an offence was committed there was no just cause or excuse. However, in this Bill, it merely says to “cause damage” which is not in itself a criminal offence and the phrase “without lawful reason” does not help to throw any light on what is meant by “cause damage”.

The Bill should only make intimidation together with an unlawful act a crime. “Lawful reason” relates to the motive for the act and does not refer to the lawfulness of the act itself. As Mr. Justice Mason pointed out in Murdoch’s case, liability in cases of intimidation should only arise from an unlawful act, and in this case “cause damage” is not an unlawful act. For those reasons we do not support this Bill.

Has the hon. member read the report?

Of course I have read it.

It does not look like it.

I do not know whether the hon. the Minister has read the case or not. Whatever the report says, the position is that to cause damage is not a criminal offence. It is not even a delict per se. This Bill is introducing the principle that intimidation together with something that is not a criminal offence will be a criminal offence attracting a very heavy penalty. Mr. Speaker, we oppose it.

Mr. Speaker, when the hon. member for Pinetown spoke last night, he left us in some doubt as to whether he was just speaking to pass the time or whether he knew what this Bill was all about. The hon. member has spoken again this afternoon and by doing so he has removed all doubt because he spoke at length but in fact said very little. Although one can not accuse him of undue clarity, I deduced— and the hon. member must please tell me as I go along where I deduced wrongly—that he and his party accepted the need for intimidation to be made an offence but that they objected to the Bill in its present form as it did not define the offence properly and because the wording thereof would lead to legal uncertainty. Am I correct so far?

Yes.

The hon. member says: “Yes”. Their acceptance of the need for such protection to be afforded to the public, a need which the hon. the Minister showed very clearly in his speech, makes it unnecessary to debate that aspect further and all that remains is to examine the objections raised by the hon. member to the Bill in its present form.

The first issue that he raised was that the offence of intimidation should only be committed when a person committed another offence, such as assault or malicious damage to property, with the intent to intimidate the victim to a particular course of action. I think a simple example will serve to show up the fallacy of this argument. Where A threatens B that he will assault C, C being say a relative of B, or that he will destroy C’s house unless B acts in a certain manner, this does not constitute an assault on either B or C and neither does it constitute malicious damage to property. Now should one accept the hon. member for Pinetown’s definition it would in fact mean that A would in these circumstances, irrespective of what his threat may be, if it is directed at another person, not be committing an offence. Surely not even that hon. member can desire such a ridiculous result.

The Bill states “to that person or any other person”.

I think the hon. member must read the Bill again.

It states “that person”.

The hon. member’s objection in this respect is therefore completely without substance, as is his interjection.

The hon. member’s next objection was that the words “without lawful reason” which an accused could plead as justification for an otherwise prima facie unlawful coercion of another had no definable exact meaning and would lead to uncertainty, and that it could also create the possibility that innocent acts could be branded as intimidation in terms of this Bill. I suspected that the hon. member was going to plough with another’s oxen here and he in fact did so, because the objection that he raised and the examples that he used to sustain it are basically all set out in the March 1982 publication of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of Witwatersrand where the Rabie Commission Report is discussed. As is often the case when using other people’s ideas, especially if one uses them only selectively, it can be very dangerous as I shall point out. The fact is that the phrase “without lawful reason” is well known in our law as it is used in other Acts and Ordinances and as it has been the subject of interpretation by our courts when it has not caused the difficulties that the hon. member apparently fears will be caused. Our courts have ascribed to it the meaning of “unlawfully” or “without legitimate reason” which amounts to the fact that the accused would not be committing any offence should his actions have been within the legal limits of his rights. In interpreting legislation, where there is a doubt as to the meaning of a phrase, which I submit in this instance there is not, our courts, as the hon. member should be aware, will establish the intention of the legislature as expressed in the Act as a whole. This legislation before us is clearly aimed at preventing unlawful coercion by one person of another and this fact then will throw light upon the way in which this phrase is to be interpreted. Even in the original ideas, advanced here by the hon. member, this fact is acknowledged. In this regard I should like to quote from this report at page 88 where it is stated—

This little rider at the end in regard to the words “could be interpreted more restrictively” which has apparently blinded the hon. member, is no more than a typical example of people who are expected to criticize by their peers, and do so in fulfilling their briefs, probably, as with this hon. member, against their better judgment.

Society is not stagnant and therefore the law cannot be either. It would be impossible to define this ground of justification in any other way if it is to remain practical and relevant to changing circumstances. This objection is therefore also without merit.

The last aspect with which I want to deal is the presumption indirectly created in subsection (2) which I was surprised albeit pleased to note the hon. member did not criticize. This subsection simply determines that when an accused has not indicated during the course of the prosecution that he relies on a lawful reason as justification for his prima facie illegal act, then, and only then, the onus of proof shall be on the accused to prove such reason. Where he indicates this as being his defence or part thereof at any stage before the State closes its case, the onus to disprove this beyond reasonable doubt remains on the State. The intention and the effect of this is therefore not to place an additional burden on the accused but simply to prevent the prosecution being taken unawares unfairly, resulting in witnesses having to be recalled or fresh evidence having to be led with the costs and the delays that this will entail, or sometimes resulting in justice not being done. In any event, as the hon. the Minister stated, the Criminal Procedure Act places a duty upon an accused when pleading to a charge against him, to indicate which allegation contained in such charge he places in issue and it is furthermore normal for these issues then to be raised in the course of cross-examination which, in terms of the wording of the Act, will in fact be sufficient to allow the onus to remain on the State. This subsection is therefore not prejudicial to an accused but basically only conforms with the present situation in practice.

*It is clear that there is a need for this type of legislation in practice, and it is furthermore also clear that this particular legislation makes provision for this need. Consequently this side of the House supports it wholeheartedly.

Mr. Speaker, the establishment of an offence to be known as intimidation, which offence is specifically defined in the legislation before us, is the result of a recommendation by the Rabie Commission. The Bill we have just dealt with is also a result of that commission.

Although the Rabie Commission was directed to investigate and report and make recommendations on, inter alia, the necessity and the effectiveness of legislation on internal security, it must be clear to everyone who read the commission’s report that the Commission would have something to say about the role played by intimidation, the role it still plays and the role it will play in future when it comes to such matters as the internal security of the Republic of South Africa.

In chapter 9 of the report certain offences are considered, and the Rabie Commission also discusses the question of intimidation and a recommendation is made that a law be created to make intimidation a punishable offence. Naturally the Rabie Commission considered various forms of intimidation, and I think it would be meaningful for us also to consider some of the forms of intimidation and then to decide whether we agree with the commission’s recommendation that there is a need for a measure which will help to combat intimidation over a far wider area.

One of the forms of intimidation which is at present in the limelight occurs in cases where possible State witnesses are threatened. They are told that if they give information to the police when action is taken against terrorists, they or their families will be murdered. The hon. the Minister referred to this yesterday in his Second Reading speech.

Sufficient evidence was submitted to the Rabie Commission to convince it that this is a very serious form of intimidation. If one reads paragraphs 6.93 to 6.95 of the Rabie report in this connection, it becomes quite apparent.

It also becomes quite apparent that, particularly in the case of security legislation trials, fewer people will be prepared to give evidence in future, for fear of retaliation. Strict measures to prevent this form of intimidation are therefore clearly necessary.

There are also other forms of intimidation to which attention was drawn. I shall also refer to a few of them. There is intimidation in connection with demonstrations and boycotts. There is intimidation to force a person to join a specific organization or to resign from it. People are also intimidated not to work for a specific employer. Businessmen and undertakings can be intimidated into not selling certain goods.

Another form of intimidation is that people can be intimidated into changing their political views. In this connection, during the past few days, light-hearted reference was made to the fact that it is actually the CP that should be afraid of this happening. As I said, we accept that it was said in jest, because we do not believe it. I think the older members of this House will be able to testify to the fact that the last time people were intimidated as far as their political views were concerned was in the days when Gen. Smuts was in power. In those days people were not only intimidated but interned as well.

Although the Rabie Commission also considered the means at present available to fight intimidation, it came to the conclusion that a measure was needed to combat intimidation over a far wider area than was possible through common law or statute law measures. That is why they recommended the introduction of the piece of legislation now before us. The penalty prescribed is a maximum penalty. This will give the court the opportunity to impose lighter sentences depending on the seriousness of the offence.

It gives us pleasure to support this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to thank the hon. member Mr. Theunissen for his support in this connection. My friend next to me here has already replied to the technical aspects of the legislation. Consequently I am merely going to say a few things about intimidation in general.

Intimidation interferes with the individual’s right to make his own decisions, to form his own opinion and to act in accordance with that decision and opinion. It is a form of hijacking of the individual or the group against whom it is aimed. It is true that many other Acts would prohibit this behaviour in certain cases, but not always successfully. Where assault is resorted to, the charge brought will be one of assault, and where injury to property is resorted to, it will be a charge of injury to property. However, when persons react immediately to the intimidation, it is difficult to prove that the offence of intimidation was committed or that an attempt to commit the offence was completed. After all, it cannot be argued that the person intimidated should not have scared so easily. The fact remains that if the person reacts to the illegal intimidation, he is not expressing his own free will. One can consider this as a violation of a person’s basic rights, because the intimidator succeeded in forcing his own will on the victim in an improper way. There are various examples in the Rabie report of actual intimidation, inter alia, in the case of the Coloured schools boycott in 1980. In this connection the Rabie report states that the pupils were influenced because they were threatened with violence and there were even threats to burn down a church hall. The members of the commission came to the conclusion that the existing legislation and the common law does not afford the victim adequate protection and that a separate punishable offence should be created.

I also want to suggest that the legislation now before us, which was also printed by the Rabie Commission as an annexure to its report, is far more elegant and practical than the legislation repealed by this Bill, namely sections 10 to 15 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, Act. No. 17 of 1956. It is far better, and more elegant, to prohibit intimidation as such and not to try to interpret various intimidatory actions and then try to make provision for each of these actions. If one tries to do this, other actions are merely substituted.

It therefore gives me pleasure to support this legislation because it meets an essential need and because it is a tremendous improvement on existing legislation.

Mr. Speaker, intimidation is a dreadful evil which has crept into our modern society. I think that possibly it is something that has become more apparent in the latter half of this century than ever before. I know that it is very difficult clearly to define what is meant by intimidation, but I believe that intimidation is one of those things one cannot have degrees of. It is like murder; one cannot have a little bit of murder. Similarly, I do not think one can have a little bit of intimidation.

We are implacably opposed to intimidation of any sort whatsoever. We believe that this is an evil that must be rooted out of our society. There is no shadow of a doubt that it does take place in our country. Following on what the hon. member for Houghton said last night in respect of another Bill when we spoke of the right of people to gather, I believe that it is the basic right of the individual to have freedom in his life and not to be intimidated or live in fear in respect of that freedom. Intimidation is the one thing that infringes on the basic right of the individual to enjoy the amenities and the good things there are in life and to make up his own mind about anything.

I listened to the long-worded legal arguments which have been put forward by the hon. member for Pinetown. I must confess that I could not understand them. I do not know whether the legal people in this House could understand them.

Not even his clients understand his arguments.

I know, however, that none of those arguments can alter the facts of the case. I believe that arguments of that nature are arguments of the courts to deliberate and decide on.

I will say that the penalties at a first glance seem harsh. They seem almost excessively harsh, but in the light of the sort of example that was quoted to us by the hon. Minister in his Second Reading speech—I think he was referring to a certain incident involving someone known as “Traitor” Nkosi—I can only say that obviously the penalties need to be harsh.

I want to conclude by saying that I have confidence at all times that our courts, even with that sort of penalty as the ultimate penalty, will impose the sentence fitting to the circumstances of any particular case. With those few words I want to say that we in these benches will be supporting this measure, because there is absolutely no way in which we can do otherwise in view of the evil of intimidation in our society.

Mr. Speaker, under these particular circumstances it is a pleasure for me to follow up on the previous speaker. I agree with him in all respects that intimidation has become an evil in our society and that we must eradicate this evil. As far as his remark in connection with the penalties is concerned, I also agree with him that in the light of events the penalties should indeed be heavy. I also share his confidence in our courts.

The hon. member also stated that he did not quite understand what the hon. member for Pinetown was trying to tell us here yesterday evening. I agree with him in this respect as well, because I also found it difficult to ascertain what the hon. member for Pinetown was actually trying to tell us. He gave me the impression that he was getting a little bogged down with concepts like “assault” and that he wanted on that basis to explain the superfluousness of the Bill under the circumstances. In the course of my speech I want to refer in particular to the concepts of “assault” and “extortion”. These concepts are closely linked to this specific debate.

Intimidation also includes unlawful terrorization. In approximately 80 B.C. the praetor Octavius, in his Formula Octaviana, introduced a criminal indictment against persons who forced others to give up certain benefits or to do certain other things.

That really is a long time ago!

I agree with the hon. the Minister that that took place a long time ago. In that case one cannot help thinking that we really are lagging a long way behind.

In this way intimidation as an obligation creating fact has become part of Western common law, and today it is a cause of action in all Western legal systems. In modern society there are many refined methods of intimidating people. There is for example, the threat of physical assault, publication of secrets, criminal prosecution, strikes and boycotts, and the threat to cut off supplies of essential commodities, etc. The basic prerequisite for liability in private law, namely unlawfulness, also plays a definitive and regulating role in the legislation under discussion. Unlawful intimidation, which is part of intimidation, is also expressly prohibited in other countries, for example, the Netherlands, Germany and England. The requirement that the intimidation must be unlawful is set out in South African law and is also very explicitly included in the legislation under discussion.

After all, the Bill provides explicitly that it must take place without good reason and deliberately. Therefore to intimidate someone by persuading him or even compelling him to adopt a specific standpoint or to carry out a specific action, has been known in our civil law for many years. We even have court decisions in this connection dating from 1883 in which the specific judge found that when a person did not voluntarily enter into a contract, that specific contract was invalid. The other party cannot compel the intimidated person to perform if he did not enter into the specific agreement voluntarily. We therefore see that the concept is not unknown to us in civil law.

As far as the administration of justice is concerned, we cannot say that offences such as assault and extortion also include the offence of intimidation, which we want to cover in this Bill. Let us consider the definition of assault given by the learned authors De Wet and Swanepoel. I quote—

We therefore see that when we are dealing with assault there has to be a positive action on the part of one party towards the other, whereas, in the case of intimidation, it need only be a gesture. That is why it is necessary that we differentiate between the two of fences. That is why the legislation under discussion is necessary.

We must remember that a person can be intimidated in many other ways, without his necessarily being assaulted. For this reason it cannot be argued that this legislation is superfluous because assault as an offence would include the intimidation of a person. The same arguments could be raised as regards the concept of extortion. Extortion is a subdivision of the concept of intimidation, because extortion involves the surrender of a proprietary asset. The concept of intimidation goes much further than that, and therefore includes the concept of extortion. Because the State must protect its inhabitants, it is necessary that laws be drafted to achieve this aim. For this reason the legislation under discussion is necessary, and I take pleasure in supporting the Second Reading of this Bill.

Mr. Speaker, we are dealing here with a Bill which, as has been said, is a consequence of the recommendations of the Rabie Commission. It is a Bill the effect of which will be the creation of a new crime in South Africa. The objective of this Bill is to make intimidation a crime. It is not a crime at the present time, and we are therefore in fact introducing a new offence into our criminal code.

I believe that in these circumstances it is important, when we deal with a Bill of this nature, that there should be absolute certainty in respect of the offence or the offences which the Bill is proscribing. From the amendment that was moved last night by the hon. member for Pinetown, the hon. the Minister will know that it is this question of lack of certainty in law in regard to the parameters of this Bill that is causing us some problems.

There can be no doubt that all of us in this House are opposed to those who seek to intimidate people by causing or threatening to cause personal physical injuries to people, to assault them, or to cause malicious damage to their property in an attempt to make them change their points of view or standpoints on issue. I do not believe that there can be any difference of opinion in the House in regard to that sort of action on the part of people. There have been examples, as we all know, and the hon. the Minister last night referred to these. There have been examples of people involved in court hearings particularly, whether as witnesses or as accused and, of course, if there are threats or that sort of intimidation to people of that kind, one concedes immediately that it is an intolerable intereference with the freedom of the individual if he is to be subjected to undue influences of that kind to do anything or abstain from doing anything or to change his standpoint. We recognize that problem, and if that were the only problem there would be no great difficulty and no great differences between us on this side of the House and hon. members on the other side. We are certainly entitled to seek means of protection for people against such forms of intimidation. However, it is by no means clear from the wording of this Bill that the effect of its provisions stops at the sort of situation that I have described, and it is this uncertainty in law that causes problems when one looks at this Bill.

The Bill is couched in very wide terms and I believe that much will depend on how the courts will interpret those terms in determining the extent of its purview. The Bill refers to “any person who without lawful reason …”—and these are key words, Sir—“ … and with intent to compel a particular person”—and this could be a natural person or a legal person—“ to do or abstain from doing any act or to abandon a particular standpoint, (a) assaults, injures or causes damage to that person; or (b) in any manner threatens to kill, assault, injure or cause damage to that person …”. The Bill describes it as an offence and sets a very large maximum penalty for it.

We have problems with the interpretation of the words “without lawful reason” and the words “causes damage or threatens to cause damage”. The damage caused or threatened need not necessarily be physical. It need not be physical damage and it may be directed at anyone. In order to commit the offence, the accused has to act with intent and without lawful reason, and the onus will be on the accused to prove the existence of a lawful reason, while the Bill provides for a very heavy maximum penalty.

As one reads the Bill, all intimidation involving violence will be unlawful. Nobody argues with that. However, it is unclear and uncertain what threats of damage or loss of a non-physical nature will be considered to be intimidation. This is what is unclear and uncertain, namely what threats of damage or loss of a non-physical nature will be considered to be part of intimidation. What, for example, would be the position of a person or a group of persons who as a protest threatened to organize withdrawal of their support—and this has been mentioned by the hon. member for Pinetown and others— from a business house for political, racial or even religious reasons? Firstly, if that were to happen, would it be interpreted as a lawful reason or not, or would the second necessary element in terms of this Bill, namely causing damage to such person, be interpreted as being present? The damage threatened in the case of a trade boycott while not being physical will certainly be economic or financial damage through loss of business or loss of profits. As we read this Bill there is therefore uncertainty as to whether this is covered and whether it is as wide as this in terms of the definition.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member a question? Can the hon. member just explain to me what the unlawful element is in the example that he has given?

I shall give the hon. the Minister another example of the unlawful element. This is a question of interpretation by the courts. Let us take a commodity boycott as an example: “Do not buy their product”. Is it unlawful to do this? Will the courts interpret this as being unlawful? This is our precise difficulty. Let us take the example of a person who expresses anti-Semitic feelings. We have recently had unfortunate examples of this in South Africa. Let us take the example of a businessman operating a business who expresses anti-Semitic feelings. Assuming the members of the Jewish community say to him that unless he changes or abandons his standpoint on Jews they are going to damage his business by persuading people to withdraw their custom, will this be interpreted as being unlawful?

Then you have an unlawful element because they are going to damage the business.

Of course they are going to damage it, but is that going to be unlawful element? This is precisely our difficulty. The hon. the Minister by his last interjection substantiates the difficulties which we have in regard to this. He says that would be unlawful. This is precisely our problem. Is it unlawful or is it not unlawful? I believe in terms of the Bill as it is presently worded that might well be held to be intimidation and we believe that goes much too far. As long as there is this sort of lack of certainty in regard to matters of this kind we will have problems with the Bill. It would seem therefore that any consumer boycott would fall into this category because that might also be held to be unlawful in exactly the same way as the example which I have given. I think it was the hon. member for East London City who said that if there were problems the court would look at what the intention of the legislature was when it passed the Bill. I do not know whether the intention of the Bill is to go as far as I have indicated it may go. On the other hand, the wording is so wide that it may well be used in instances of this kind and people involved in that sort of activity would find themselves guilty of a new crime of intimidation with the enormous maximum penalties which are provided for in this Bill. It is this uncertainty in law which this Bill introduces which makes it impossible for us to support the Bill in its present form. That is why we have moved a reasoned amendment. If the hon. the Minister persists in putting this Bill through without any amendments or any attempt to narrow the definition, I should like to guarantee that he will be putting a piece of legislation on the Statute Book which is going to provide the legal profession with a large amount in fees in the years to come. Speaking as a lawyer, that may not be a bad thing, but I want to tell the hon. the Minister that I believe we are going to have court case after court case to try to determine precisely what this Parliament intended when it passed this legislation. I believe it is our function as an Opposition to ensure that before we pass legislation of this kind there should be the maximum possible certainty as to what is intended in the legislation. For that reason we have moved the amendment that was moved by the hon. member for Pinetown.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Berea did not advance a new argument. He quoted virtually verbatim from criticism expressed in a Wits report in March 1982. He therefore did not come up with anything new in this connection. In any event, we on this side of the House are glad about the measure of support we are getting from the PFP, even if it is qualified support. The PFP realizes that this legislation is necessary, particularly in the light of the examples mentioned by the hon. the Minister in his Second Reading speech. The ideal of everyone in this House is, as far as possible, to draft clear and unambiguous legislation. I think we must accept that we are not always able with words and semantics to achieve the degree of clarity we would like. We are facing a problem here, and this was also admitted by professors and other academics during the discussion at the University of the Witwatersrand. To a great extent the course they eventually chose was to state that the concept “without lawful reason” would have to be spelled out by the courts and that the courts would also have to give a reasonable interpretation of this concept. I do not think we would make any progress with the definition as they tried to amend it. I think it would be more likely to diminish the force of this legislation, and for this reason the amendment in question is unacceptable. I feel that as far as the penalty is concerned, although it is heavy, we must accept that we are dealing here with a very serious offence. The courts are not bound to that maximum punishment either and may at their discretion impose a lighter sentence. It will be within the discretion of the judge or the magistrate to act in this way. For this reason I do not foresee any problems in this connection, and I therefore support the Second Reading.

Mr. Speaker, the point on which this side of the House differs from that side of the House, is very clear and simple. The question in our minds is whether this Bill creates the necessary legal certainty. That is what is at issue. In spite of what the hon. member for East London City and other hon. members said, we contend that there is in fact doubt regarding the interpretation of the specific clauses in the Bill to which reference was made in the amendment of the hon. member for Pinetown. We on this side of the House have made it very clear that we have no problem as regards the actual combating of intimidation, as that term is normally understood. This is also as it is stated in the Rabie Report. If we consider what the Rabie Report said, I think that the hon. the Minister and hon. members on that side will agree with me that the crux of the Rabie Report’s recommendation for a Bill to counteract intimidation, actually involved what we normally understand by intimidation, namely a threat of violence against a person or his property, with the aim of forcing that person to do something or refrain from doing something. We have no problems with that. If one looks at the Rabie Report, one sees in paragraph 9.5.2.1 that this was stated quite clearly by the commission, as follows—

In paragraph 9.5.2.3 reference is again made to the intimidation of witnesses, and the necessity to protect those witnesses. The same appears from paragraph 9.5.2.5, where it is stated that—

This is further proof of the need to protect such witnesses. In essence the same point is made in paragraphs 9.5.2.6 and 9.5.3. It also appears from paragraph 9.5.5 that this is the kind of intimidation the Rabie Commission had in mind when they asked for legislation in this connection. Nowhere in the Rabie Commission’s motivation could I find anything that dealt substantially with other forms of intimidation. In other words, protection of this nature should exist basically for State witnesses and other people. In as far as the Bill makes provision for the offences, for penalties for an offence which is being created here, this side of the House has no problems with it. As the hon. members for Pinetown and Berea however, indicated, we feel that there is in fact legal uncertainty with regard to the concepts “causes damage” and “without lawful reason”. I think the hon. the Minister will admit that in the available judgments which exist on this matter there is in fact a degree of doubt. As the hon. member for Pinetown indicated, we have only one specific decision by a court on this land of case, in other words, where a boycott campaign is launched against a specific firm or person’s business activities. In that specific case—it was the Murdoch case in 1922—the court in fact said the following—

This is Mr. Justice Mason speaking—

Then follows this restrictive qualification—

I could not quite understand the implication of the interjection the hon. the Minister made when my hon. colleague was speaking. The question which had been quite clearly put by him and the hon. member for Pinetown was: Would it in terms of this legislation be a criminal offence for a person to say: We are not going to buy goods from a specific person or we are not going to have dealings with a specific person, for whatever reason? This is what is at issue here. That is why we are uncertain about the concepts “causes damage” and “without lawful reason”. In this connection I should like to point out that this phenomenon is not unknown in South Africa. After all, the hon. the Minister and hon. members opposite will remember that there were times when the Afrikaners, in terms of their own economic considerations also launched boycotts.

How many students did the hon. member intimidate in his day?

I did not intimidate anyone, that I can assure you, but I do know of forms of intimidation. I also want to say that many of us who at a specific stage dared to express the views now being expressed by the hon. member for Verwoerdburg, were indirectly intimidated in various ways. He knows this as well as I do. However, this is not the point because in that kind of intimidation no criminal offence is committed. All I want to tell the hon. the Minister—and I think he should be reasonable and rational—is that there is in fact a difference in respect of legal interpretations as far as this matter is concerned.

Nonsense.

The hon. member says that is nonsense. I just want to say that I am not relying in the first place on the legal opinion expressed in this little publication from which various hon. members quoted, the publication of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies. We also have other legal opinions in this connection. There are other legal opinions which maintain that there are grounds for doubt and uncertainty about the interpretation of this matter. It is that simple and we cannot get away from it. As my hon. colleagues asked: Is it necessary for us to create an offence at this stage in respect of which the application of this legislation creates a measure of uncertainty? All we are asking is that the uncertainty be removed and that uncertainty can be removed by defining these two terms clearly.

Mr. Speaker, can the hon. member give us the definition they want to use for the offence of intimidations?

I just want to say that we in fact…

It is rather difficult, is it not?

We did in fact make an attempt which has so far not proved acceptable to the hon. the Minister. During the Committee Stage we shall certainly …

Wait a moment. Do not run away. [Interjections.]

Order!

During the Committee Stage we shall certainly put forward an amendment.

The point I want to emphasize—this is what is at issue—is the legal uncertainty which exists. It is of no avail hon. members opposite telling us that in their opinion there is no legal uncertainty. In our opinion and in the opinion of experts whose advice we sought, there is uncertainty on the exact interpretation of these provisions in the Bill. On the basis of that uncertainty we cannot support the Bill in this form.

Mr. Speaker, for the information of the hon. member Prof. Olivier I point out that the hon. member for Pinetown submitted an amendment last night. It was with reference to that amendment that the hon. member for East London City asked whether the hon. member Prof. Olivier did not want to help us with his party’s definition. The amendment moved by the hon. member for Pinetown read—

As we all know, this amendment relates to the Second Reading and not the Committee Stage, and I must say that I should also welcome it if the hon. member or other hon. members of the PFP would be so friendly as to give us a more detailed definition. [Interjections.] There are a number of lawyers in the ranks of the PFP who could surely perform such a task.

Harry Schwarz in particular.

Why do they not do that, and why do they not assist the House with a better definition?

There are various possible ways.

I shall try to give a reply to that to the best of my ability but in this regard I must associate myself with the hon. member for East London City and say that we would welcome assistance from the other side if they feel so strongly about this.

The hon. member Prof. Olivier asked me whether one would be guilty of an offence if one encouraged, instigated or influenced any person not to trade with a certain body. There is nothing per se unlawful about that. If I tell my friend that he must not go and buy cigarettes at the corner café because the café is dirty, then surely that is not intimidation and is not, therefore, illegal. Accordingly that does not fall under these provisions. It must comply with what is provided in the legislation—

But what are you going to do with your friend if he does go and buy cigarettes there?

That is his affair. It is his right to differ.

I shall leave the hon. member at that, but I do want to say to the hon. member Prof. Olivier and other hon. members of the official Opposition that as far as I am concerned they are creating a certain impression.

† I am under the impression that hon. members are not really opposing the principle involved in the Bill as such. That is not what is being opposed. They do, however, seem to want more clarity about these two, let us say, “principles”, i.e. “lawful reason” and “damage”. According to the best advice I could get on this particular issue from my advisers, the term “lawful reason” is not defined in the Bill for the simple reason that it is incapable of definition within the context of the Bill. This is so because there can virtually be as many lawful reasons as there are people on earth. Whether or not a lawful reason for a particular apparently intimidating act exists, and the nature of such lawful reason, are purely matters of evidence and depend on the circumstances of each individual case. That is also why the accused is charged with the duty of advancing such lawful reason and explaining it, it being a matter peculiarly within his sphere of knowledge. If the legislator were to embark upon a definition of the term “lawful reason”, the result would inevitably be to the detriment of the accused person concerned inasmuch as he would, in presenting a defence based on “lawful reason”, be confined to the lawful reasons enumerated in such a definition, none of which might fit the circumstances of his case. The answer I am giving now, let me just say, also covers the argument advanced by the hon. member for Pinetown. It is therefore a matter of simple logic that because of the infinite variety of situations that may each in itself constitute a lawful reason in a particular case, any attempt to define the term in the context of the Bill before the House would be completely nugatory.

Similarly, and to some extent for the same reasons as those already mentioned, it would be inadvisable to attempt a definition of the term “damage”. According to the normal rules of construction the term should, in the absence of a specific definition in the statute itself, be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “damage” as—

The term “injury” is, in turn, defined as—

In my submission that is exactly the kind of intimidatory act contemplated in this Bill. It would, of course, be for the prosecution in each case to prove the existence and nature of the damage alleged in any prosecution in terms of this legislation. That is my answer, at this stage, to the hon. members of the official Opposition who advanced these particular arguments in regard to this Bill.

*I should like to thank other hon. members including the hon. members of the CP, for their support for this Bill and, of course, the hon. members on this side of the House too, for their well-prepared and neat contributions.

Question put: That all the words after “That” stand part of the Question,

Upon which the House divided:

Mr. Speaker, I move—

With a few adjustments, which were considered essential in the light of comment that had been received, and otherwise, this Bill embodies the proposals made by the Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation with regard to a new comprehensive Internal Security Act, as contained in appendix “A” of the commission’s report.

In its report, the commission expressed the opinion that bearing in mind the factual background outlined in chapter 6 of its report, as well as certain aspects subsequently mentioned in chapter 7 of its report, and especially the acts of terrorism and sabotage committed in the Republic in recent years, the likelihood that these activities will increase in the foreseeable future, the fact that these activities are planned and executed by the supporters of organizations which are seeking the violent overthrow of the existing dispensation in the Republic, the fact that these organizations are supported and aided by communist countries in their activities aimed at achieving this objective, and the fact that these activities can be continued from territories bordering on the Republic, there can be no doubt about the need for security legislation, and the commission indicated that it believed the measures it was recommending to be necessitated by the exigencies of the situation in which the Republic found itself.

The commission also indicated that generally speaking, existing measures were to a large extent sufficient to enable the authorities responsible for the maintenance of internal security to perform their task. Therefore these means and powers must be preserved. The commission mentioned that it did not mean to imply by this finding that all existing measures should be retained intact. The commission also found that certain other or additional measures were necessary at the same time for the effective performance of the task concerned.

Representations have been made to me by interested parties to the effect that legislation of this nature should not form a permanent part of our legal system. It has been suggested, among other things, that an inquiry should be instituted at regular intervals into the need for the continued existence of such measures. As the commission found, the intensity of the onslaught on the Republic cannot be expected to diminish within the foreseeable future.

Since it is the sincere wish of the Government to keep these measures on the Statute Book only for as long as they are absolutely essential—an approach which in fact forms part of the Government’s process of rationalization in respect of legislation—the need to retain the measures will be continually reviewed by the Government. Therefore it goes without saying that when the need for certain measures has fallen away, their continued existence will be reconsidered.

In fact, the commission mentions, in paragraph 8.2.5 of its report, inter alia, that relevant information about the working or implementation of security legislation can be obtained from the various attorneys-general, the South African Police, the inspectors of detainees, magistrates and medical practitioners who visit detainees, and that the Minister concerned can inform the Government, whereupon such decisions can be taken as may be deemed necessary.

Within the Security Legislation Directorate and the security administration system, too, the working and implementation of the legislation will be monitored continually, and when it appears that adjustments are necessary, or that the legislation is no longer necessary, steps will be taken accordingly.

Provisions which in the past gave rise to much of the criticism levelled at our existing security legislation, such as prescribed minimum sentences, the provision that juveniles convicted of certain offences shall not be treated as juveniles for purposes of sentencing, and provisions placing an onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt on an accused in certain cases, have not been included in the Bill, in accordance with the commission’s recommendation.

The Bill, which consists of 74 clauses, replaces existing legislation as contained in the Internal Security Act, 1950, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1953, the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956, the Unlawful Organizations Act, 1960, the sabotage provisions in the General Law Amendment Act, 1962, 14-days-detention provision in the General Law Amendment Act, 1966, the Terrorism Act, 1967, and quite a number of Acts amending the abovementioned Acts. In all, the total or partial repeal of 28 Acts is recommended.

Generally speaking, the Bill is a consolidation and a re-enactment, containing amendments and adjustments of the provisions embodied in the abovementioned legislation. Arising from the commission’s recommendations in connection with the administration of security legislation, provision is being made in the Bill for certain powers, especially those which are connected with preventive security action and which are exercised by the Minister of Justice in terms of the present legislation, to be conferred upon the Minister of Law and Order. Administratively, the review system proposed in the Bill will fall under the Minister of Justice.

The Minister of Law and Order will be assisted in the exercise of these powers by a Director of Security Legislation and other officials, for whose appointment provision is being made in clause 2 of the Bill. The director and his senior staff will be officials of the Department of Justice with legal qualifications who have been seconded to the Security Legislation Directorate for this purpose.

In chapter 2 of the Bill, provision is being made for the declaration or organizations to be unlawful organizations and for the prohibition of publications. These provisions are based mainly on existing provisions, with adjustments recommended by the commission.

Before exercising his powers of declaring an organization unlawful or prohibiting a publication, the Minister must first, in terms of the provisions of clause 7 of the Bill, consider a factual report and recommendations made to him regarding the organization or publication in question by an advisory committee appointed by the State President on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice to inquire into all matters relating to such organization or publication.

When the Minister has declared an organization to be an unlawful organization or has prohibited a publication by notice in the Government Gazette, he can be requested, in terms of clause 10(3)(a) and (b), to furnish reasons for his action, and he must furnish such reasons, and so much of the information which induced him to issue the notice concerned as can, in his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to the public interest. Provision is also being made in clause 11 for a review of the Minister’s action by the Chief Justice or such other judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice may designate.

It is also important to note that there is no interference with the right of an interested party to institute proceedings in a competent court for the invalidation of a notice in terms of which an organization is declared to be an unlawful organization or a publication is prohibited, provided that such proceedings, as laid down in clause 12, are instituted within a period of 14 days from the date of the notice concerned. When such proceedings are instituted, the review of the case referred to in clause 11 does not take place. Certain time limits in respect of the conclusion of the proceedings are laid down in clause 12, but the court may extend the period if the court is satisfied that the delay in concluding the proceedings is not due to the fault of the party who instituted the proceedings.

Interested parties therefore have the choice of either making use of the review procedure or instituting proceedings in court in order to have the Minister’s action invalidated.

† Mr. Speaker, the commission states in its report that it is satisfied that the threat to the security of the State and to the maintenance of law and order in the Republic is such that there must be certain preventive security measures to counter this threat, and it finds that legislation which, as at present, authorizes the preventive detention of persons and the imposition of certain restrictions on the movements of persons is still essential. The provisions contained in the Bill in regard to these matters are, in the main, a consolidation and re-enactment of existing provisions. In this regard it is important to note that the Government has in the past consistently taken the view that, since it is the duty of the executive authority to watch over the security of the State, the final decision as to what must be regarded as a threat to the security of the State and what steps should be taken to ensure the security of the State, should also rest with the executive authority. This view is supported by the commission in its report.

An important innovation is the review system which is proposed by the commission and which is incorporated in the Bill for the review of orders by the Minister imposing certain restrictions on persons or placing certain persons in preventive detention.

Provision is made in clause 35 for the appointment by the State President, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, of a board of review, or, if he deems it expedient, two or more boards of review, for the purpose of reviewing orders issued by the Minister of Law and Order in respect of persons in terms of clause 18(1), 19(1) or (2), 20 or 28(1) of the Bill.

A board of review shall, in terms of the provisions of clause 35(3) of the Bill, consist of three members. The chairman shall be a judge or a former judge or a former chief magistrate or a magistrate of a regional court, or any person who has acquired the necessary qualifications to be admitted to practise as an advocate and who, after obtaining such qualifications, has been concerned in the application of the law for a continuous period of not less than ten years. At least one of the other two members shall also hold legal qualifications. When an order has been issued, the Minister shall submit to the board of review all the information on the grounds of which he took his decision, as well as any other information relating to the matter which came to his knowledge after the issue of his order, together with any written representations made to him by the person concerned. The board of review shall, unless the chairman is of the opinion that it would not be in the public interest to do so, afford the person concerned the opportunity, if he so requests, of giving oral evidence. The board of review may also, in its discretion, hear oral evidence or representations from any other person.

The board of review shall submit a report on its findings to the Minister and, where it is of the opinion that grounds exist for the amendment or the withdrawal of the order issued by the Minister, make a recommendation in this regard to the Minister. The Minister is not obliged to give effect to such recommendation, but if his decision not to do so has the effect that stricter measures than those recommended by the board of review remain in force in respect of the person concerned, he shall in terms of the provisions of clause 41 submit all the documents relating to the case to the Chief Justice.

The Chief Justice, or any other judge of appeal designated by him, may set aside the steps taken by the Minister if he is satisfied that the Minister exceeded the powers conferred upon him, or acted in bad faith, or based his decision on considerations other than those contemplated in the statutory provisions in terms of which he acted.

In view of the possibility that circumstances different from those prevailing at the time of the issuing of an order may supervene during the duration thereof, provision is made in clause 43 of the Bill for the periodical review of cases of persons subject to certain restrictions, or in detention under the provisions of clause 28. Any person to whom an order applies may periodically— namely at intervals of six months in the case of a person in preventive detention, and 12 months in other cases—request that his case be reviewed by the board of review and specify in such request any change that has occurred in the circumstances of his case which, in his opinion, would justify the amendment or the withdrawal of the order. The process of review in such a case is the same as for the initial review of the order.

The review procedure does not deprive the person to whom an order applies of the right to challenge the order in court. As it would be undesirable to allow the review of an order if at the same time proceedings for the setting aside of the order have been instituted in a court, provision is made in clause 42(3) of the Bill that, if proceedings have been instituted for the setting aside of an order, there shall not be a review of the order as well, but that where a person does not succeed in proceedings instituted by him and the order therefore remains in force, he may request that the order be reviewed after a certain period has elapsed after the judgment of the court, namely six or twelve months, depending on the nature of the order and at similar intervals thereafter.

*Mr. Speaker, the commission gave careful attention to the question of detention for purposes of interrogation and found that this was still necessary. Provision is being made for this in clause 29 of the Bill. Measures embodied in the Bill for the protection of persons who are being detained for purposes of interrogation are visits by a magistrate and a district surgeon, which have to take place every fourteen days, and visits by inspectors of detainees, who have to visit the detainees as frequently as possible and report to the Minister on their findings during the visits. It is also being provided that a detainee cannot be detained for longer than 30 days unless the Minister of Law and Order issues a written order for his further detention. In addition, it is being provided that if a detainee has not been released after six months, the police have to adduce reasons before a board of review as to why the detainee concerned should not be released. The board of review can also hear the detainee and must submit a report on the proceedings and its findings to the Minister.

Provision is also being made in clauses 30 and 31 of the Bill, respectively, for the power of the Attorney-General to prohibit the release of an accused on bail or on warning in certain cases, and for the detention, in certain cases, of State witnesses. The commission found that these measures, which are based on existing legislation, are still necessary.

Chapter 5 of the Bill contains measures relating to gatherings. Certain powers are being conferred upon the Minister of Law and Order and magistrates to prohibit gatherings when, inter alia, there is reason to believe that the public peace would be endangered by the holding of a gathering or gatherings.

Powers are being conferred upon the police to close places to prevent prohibited gatherings and to disperse prohibited or riotous gatherings. These provisions are in the main a re-enactment of existing provisions relating to gatherings in the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956, and the Internal Security Act, 1950.

However, clause 46(1)(ii) of the Bill contains a provision which does not occur in any of the Acts I have just mentioned. In terms of existing legislation relating to gatherings, a magistrate has the power to prohibit a meeting, but not to allow it if certain conditions are met. The commission was of the opinion that such a power should in fact be provided for and that it could also help to ensure the orderly conduct of certain kinds of gatherings, such as funerals and memorial services, where emotions are aroused and which lead to disorder and violence, but which, because of their nature, can hardly be prohibited. The power is therefore being conferred upon a magistrate to impose conditions which must be complied with in respect of any gathering or procession, when circumstances require this. In its report, the commission points out that as far as funerals are concerned, similar measures are contained in legislation applicable in Northern Ireland.

In part E of chapter 11 of its report, the commission also refers to the riots which have occurred in several parts of the country during certain periods in the past, leading to considerable disruption, violence, damage to property and loss of life, and undermining the foundations of an orderly community, and comes to the conclusion that there is a need for a measure such as the one contained in clause 50 of the Bill. In the clause concerned, provision is being made for the detention of a person in a prison for a period not exceeding 14 days, if a police officer of or above the rank of warrant officer is of the opinion that such a person’s actions contribute towards the continuation of a state of public disturbance, disorder, riot, or public violence, and that his temporary detention will contribute towards the termination or combating of that state or towards the prevention of the resumption of such a state. In terms of the relevant provisions, such a person will be detained like a prisoner awaiting trial and can be released at any time. He must be released when 48 hours have expired since the time he was first detained, unless his continued detention is authorized by a magistrate at the request of the police, and he can subsequently be freed at any time before the expiry of the 14 days and must be released if his release is ordered by a magistrate.

Clauses 54(1), (2) and (3) contain the new offences recommended by the commission to replace the existing offences aimed at combating terrorism and sabotage, namely terrorism, subversion and sabotage.

In brief, the proposed offence of terrorism is committed when any person, with intent to overthrow or endanger the State authority, or to achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change in the Republic, commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts to do so, or performs any act which is aimed at causing such act or threat of violence. The penalty proposed by the commission is the one that may be imposed on conviction of treason.

Mr. Speaker, since I am explaining new offences in this legislation, and it may not be opportune to adjourn the House in the middle of this explanation in a few minutes’ time, I should like to move at this stage—

Agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, I move—

Agreed to.